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The part of the evidence that was not accepted was the part that said the pilots were told the track went over Erebus.
As regards the waypoint, being a separate and distinct issue (being a point lost on the idiot Royal Commissioner), none of the pilots said that thought the waypoint to be 20 miles west of McMurdo Station, out in the middle of nowhere. |
Originally Posted by ampan
(Post 9419460)
The part of the evidence that was not accepted was the part that said the pilots were told the track went over Erebus.
As regards the waypoint, being a separate and distinct issue (being a point lost on the idiot Royal Commissioner), none of the pilots said that thought the waypoint to be 20 miles west of McMurdo Station, out in the middle of nowhere. |
Photos developed from the passengers’ cameras found in the wreckage showed that the weather over Antarctica had been clear moments before the crash, launching Vette on a search to find out why none of the men on the flight deck saw or tried to avoid the mountain as the plane approached it descending through 2,500 feet.
Vette discovered that in certain conditions, the powerful effect of “whiteout” eliminated visual borders, and that pilots might not see obstacles as big as mountains directly in front of them. Vette’s alternative explanation was considered credible, and was incorporated into the commission’s final report, which was officially accepted by the government in 1999. |
The part of the evidence that was not accepted was the part that said the pilots were told the track went over Erebus. none of the pilots said that thought the waypoint to be 20 miles west of McMurdo Station, out in the middle of nowhere Where did the pilots think the waypoint was, if not out in the middle of nowhere and didn't pass over Erebus? Collins knew where the waypoint out in the middle of nowhere was, and called McMurdo. |
Photos developed from the passengers’ cameras found in the wreckage showed that the weather over Antarctica had been clear moments before the crash, launching Vette on a search to find out why none of the men on the flight deck saw or tried to avoid the mountain as the plane approached it descending through 2,500 feet. Vette discovered that in certain conditions, the powerful effect of “whiteout” eliminated visual borders, and that pilots might not see obstacles as big as mountains directly in front of them. Vette’s alternative explanation was considered credible, and was incorporated into the commission’s final report, which was officially accepted by the government in 1999. The Mahon report was "tabled in Parliament" - whatever that means - by an MP who thought he was doing a good thing. If you believe that that episode adds credibility to anything.... you probably don't belong here. |
none of the pilots said that thought the waypoint to be 20 miles west of McMurdo Station Two of the 3 pilots of the operating crew of flight TE 901 were subjected to the specially devised audio-visual, written and simulator route qualification briefing for the route to and from Antarctica (First Officer Lucas had not received the Antarctic route briefing). An examination of this briefing revealed certain significant items were not included: The way in which the Air New Zealand route varied from the normal military route, which followed the reporting points depicted on the Radio Navigation Chart (RNC), particularly on the leg from Cape Hallett south to McMurdo. Topographical maps for use on the flight. With the exception of a Photostat copy of a small insert enlargement of a map of Ross Island (1:1,000,000), these were not issued to the crew until the day of the flight, and were of a relatively small scale i.e. 1:5,000,000 and 1:3,000,000. Although topographical charts for the area were available on the day of the flight the only “charts” of the area below the flight planned track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo available at the initial briefing were: The passenger information map (an overprint on a 1:16,000.000 chart) The RNC chart and A slide depicting a schematic diagram taken from the rear of a passenger brochure All of which showed a track proceeding o the true west of Mt Erebus down the McMurdo Sound. While these “charts” were not intended to be used for navigation the track shown was not that to be followed by TE 901. Several members of earlier crews were of the opinion that the inbound track to McMurdo was intended to be on an alignment which was over the sea level ice to a point adjacent to McMurdo but to the west of that base. (The dialogue which accompanied the audio visual briefing referred to the RNC chart when discussing the appropriate flight levels for the flight.) The strip map of the route from Christchurch to McMurdo issued on the day of the flight also had two tracks printed on it both depicting a passage to the west of Ross Island. A track and distance diagram issued at the route qualification briefing correctly depicted the intended flight plan track from Cape Hallett to the McMurdo TACAN, but this showed no relationship to geographical location or terrain. The audio visual presentation of the route qualification briefing showed two slides purporting to be of the track between Cape Hallett and the McMurdo TACAN. The first which only showed Cape Adare, 73 miles northwest of the Cape Hallett waypoint, accompanies the statement “We are almost 77° south proceeding from Cape Hallett towards Ross Island at Flight Level 330. Mt Erebus, almost 13000 feet, ahead. McMurdo Station and Scott Base lie 20 miles beyond the mountain in the direction of grid north”. A second slide accompanies the statement “Now approaching Erebus at 16000 feet the minimum sector altitude. In VMC a descent to this minimum altitude up to 50 miles before McMurdo will be found advantageous for viewing”. This slide gave no indication of the relationship of the track to Mt Erebus, as it shows a view of Mt Erebus taken from behind the co-pilot’s seat with the aircraft heading north. The computer flight plan used at the briefing had been in error for 14 months in that it showed the destination point for McMurdo as two degrees ten minutes of longitude to the west of the intended turning point. This error was not corrected in the computer until the day before the flight. Although it was intended that it be drawn to the attention of the previous crew, immediately prior to their departure this was not done, nor was it mentioned during the preflight dispatch planning for the crew of the accident flight. The crew was shown a copy of the erroneous flight plan with the incorrect co-ordinates at the route qualification briefing but the flight plan issued on the day of the flight was correct. Mention was made in both the audio-visual presentation and the written brief of “A whiteout emergency landing area for ski-equipped aircraft” located grid northwest of and adjacent to Williams Field with a landing procedure and talk down being available from the PAR (Precision Approach Radar) Controller, Williams Field. The United States Navy advised “The emergency whiteout landing area does not have PAR available. This area along with the skiway, is for ski equipped aircraft only. Wheel equipped aircraft would use this area only if a crash landing/wheels up landing was required. |
For megan’s benefit, I’ll try to explain this waypoint issuein the simplest possible terms.
A waypoint is, obviously, a point, identified by co-ordinates. Knowing its location does not identify the track to that waypoint. That’s equally obvious. To know the track to that waypoint, you have to know the location of the previous waypoint, being Cape Hallett in this case.The waypoint and the track to it are separate and distinct issues. Look at the inset to NZMS135, which is all they had at the briefing. It does not include Cape Hallett. You will see that McMurdo Station sits on the end of a peninsula jutting out towards the middle of the Sound. It’s very easy to picture a track running down the middle of the sound to McMurdoStation. Some of the material used at the briefing suggested a track with Erebus to the left rather than dead ahead, but remember that the track and the waypoint are separate and distinct issues. Mahon did not appreciate that.Having heard evidence that the briefed track went to the west of Erebus, he concluded, wrongly, that the briefed waypoint was to the west of Erebus. To do that, he had to ignore the indisputable evidence from the audio track with his ridiculous nonsense about one part of the briefing “taking precedence” over another. A good indication of Mahon's forensic skills is that he never considered the obvious solution to this apparent conflict in the evidence, because he never considered the waypoint and the track as separate issues. Once you do that, it’s easy. They all though the waypoint was at McMurdo Station but thought that the track to it was down the sound to the west of Erebus. That was Captain Collins mindset when he left the briefing.It changed the night before, when he plotted the track on his atlas, which had a copy of the whole of NZMS135, which showed Cape Hallett. He would have noted that a track from there to McMurdo Station crossed Erebus, but he also would have noted that the final waypoint was 20 miles west and that a track to that point would take the aircraft well to the west of the high ground - hence his locking the aircraft back onto the nav track at 2000 feet when he couldn't see anything (when he supposed to be VMC). |
ampan, for your benefit I'll explain the waypoint issue to you.
The nav section obliged, thinking they were only moving the waypoint from the NDB to the TACAN. The airline’s navigation section believed it was making a minor adjustment to the flight’s longstanding destination point, but a typing error some 14 months earlier meant it had actually shifted this point some 27 nautical miles to the east. Instead of the IFR route taking Flight TE901 over flat sea ice, as Collins and Cassin had been briefed, it would take them directly over Mt Erebus, a 3794-metre-high active volcano. Does it seem strange to you ampan that ALL the preceding flights to the Antarctic returned to Auckland safely? Despite evidence pointing to flight below MSA, low flying for a great view etc,. on some of these flights. However, Jim Collin's flight did not. Why ? Mahon and Vette found out through persistent, thorough investigation and the statements of many witnesses. Excerpt from Mahon report: 393. In my opinion therefore, the single dominant and effective cause of the disaster was the mistake made by those airline officials who programmed the aircraft to fly directly at Mount Erebus and omitted to tell the aircrew. |
ampan, this is my only reply to your previous post. Absolute and utter nonsense. Read my last post and COMPREHEND what Chippendale had to say.
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I assume the significant part of what Chippendale said is the bit in bold:
"Several members of earlier crews were of the opinion that the inbound track to McMurdo was intended to be on alignment which was over the sea level ice to a point adjacent to McMurdo but to the west of that base." If you look at p176 of Macfarlane's book, all will become clear. It shows the four relevant waypoints. For the early flights, the waypoint was at the ice runway at Williams Field which, obviously, was "over the sea ice". The hangers, associated buildings and the TACAN (ie, "that base") was 11 minutes of longitude to the east. The pilots Chippendale spoke to were not referring to a point more than 20 miles west by the Dailey Islands, out in the middle of nowhere. They were referring to the ice runway at Williams Field. It seems a little strange to cherry-pick comments made by Chippendale but then, I assume, to condemn his findings as to the cause. I have every word of evidence presented to the Commission by the other pilots who gave evidence, cross-examination included. If you don't believe that the comments made to Chippendale were about the early Williams Field waypoint, I'll go through every pilot's evidence. |
.......the comments made to Chippendale were about the early Williams Field waypoint, I'll go through every pilot's evidence. to condemn his findings as to the cause. with history. Remember, the Chippendale report was the catalyst for the Mahon Inquiry. There is no point in trying to mix'n'match snippets of evidence from both in an effort to divert the primary cause of the accident. I'll say again: ",,,,,,,,,,,,the disaster was the mistake made by those airline officials who programmed the aircraft to fly directly at Mount Erebus and omitted to tell the aircrew." |
Will everybody try and get one thing correct,his name is spelt Chippindale.
I'll say again: ",,,,,,,,,,,,the disaster was the mistake made by those airline officials who programmed the aircraft to fly directly at Mount Erebus and omitted to tell the aircrew." You may well believe that, but many think it is a stupid statement. |
Apologies to Mr Chippindale.
As for Mr 3 Holer, clearly not irrelevant but admittedly argumentative. As for hearsay, that is a word that I know the meaning of and you don't - so I suggest that you stop using it. |
Apologies to Mr Chippindale. You may well believe that, but many think it is a stupid statement. "He had not been able to find out definitely what caused the plane to crash" "he had great difficulty in finding the 'ultimate cause' for the crash" "It has been hard to establish a definite cause" "Therefore, I have said in the report what I think is the probable cause - the last thing that made the accident inevitable, though there were other factors or causes leading up to the accident" What is stupid is folks clinging to positions that experts have said were not tenable, radar monitoring of the airlines cloud break procedure being one. |
Me too, apologies to Mr Chippindale.
Stupid is as stupid does prospector. Meteorological information confirmed that conditions at the time were conducive to the existence of surface whiteout in a VMC environment (clear of cloud with good visibility). However, what is evident from the report is Mr Chippindale’s lack of understanding of the impact of that phenomenon in the presence of the entire crew’s mindset regarding their position. |
From the officials perspective, the aircraft had always been programmed to fly directly over Mount Erebus, so there was nothing new to tell the aircrew.
At the briefing, the waypoint conveyed to the crew was at McMurdo Station. With that knowledge and the whole of NZMS135 (provided on the morning of the flight), it was clear that the route was over Mount Erebus. But Collins had a flight plan showing a different waypoint - so he had conflicting information. What was he then obliged to do as pilot in command? Resolve the conflict. Did he? Clearly not, and he realised his mistake just before he died, when he initiated a left turn, towards the area, according to Mahon, where he thought the high ground to be. There was nothing inherently strange about a nav track going over Mount Erebus. It was the most distinctive geographical feature. The NDB was behind it, and it was common practice to locate waypoints at beacons. The was no obligation to follow the nav track, and most didn't, because they had blue skies. If the volcano was erupting, a good idea might be to avoid it. If there was cloud cover, stay above MSA on the nav track until overhead the NDB and then use the briefed cloud-break procedure. The notion that the aircraft was doomed from take-off, which many people actually believe, is nuts. |
"officials who programmed the aircraft to fly directly at Mount Erebus and omitted to tell the aircrew" be a stupid statement? No, the "officials" never programmed anything below MSA, it was the decision to descend below MSA against the laid down descent procedure that caused the crash, and advice from on the ground re the weather conditions at McMurdo, that were well below that required for the authorised descent procedure, advice that Ross Island was completely covered in cloud, there was a recorded conversation between Collins and Met people on the ground that passed all this information to him, but the person that passed the info was never called to give evidence, why?: because it would stuff up Mahon and Vette trying to find a reason to absolve the crew from "making any error"perhaps? It is a fact that the AINS was not cleared as a Nav aid below MSA, and what were they doing relying on that when they had to go down to 1,500ft? if it was VMC at 2,000ft why did they have to go down to 1,500ft?. Why was not the Lat and Long, that was being updated continuously, on this magical navigational system not used to positively give a fix before the descent was commenced? It would appear that the radar, in mapping mode, that previous crew said showed up Ross Island very well was not used,WHY.? If it was VMC with a min vis of 20km, why did Mulgrew say 4 minutes before impact, he would advise people where they were when he knew himself? |
Some good questions prospector, but I'm afraid they will remain unanswered because the crew did not survive the accident. We, of course, can continue to presume, assume, guess, presuppose and feign the answers, through smoke & mirrors, but it will do no good.
Until someone discovers a new piece of evidence in the maze of testimony in the Mahon/Chippindale reports we will continue the merry-go-round. |
Some good questions prospector, but I'm afraid they will remain unanswered because the crew did not survive the accident. We, of course, can continue to presume, assume, guess, presuppose and feign the answers, through smoke & mirrors, but it will do no good. |
At the briefing, the waypoint conveyed to the crew was at McMurdo Station. With that knowledge and the whole of NZMS135 (provided on the morning of the flight), it was clear that the route was over Mount Erebus. There was nothing inherently strange about a nav track going over Mount Erebus. |
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