Engineers slam Virgin on safety
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Geek,
I have heard QF are adopting exactly the same approach re the LAME's and aircraft inspections, so why is all the comotion about DJ, and not QF as well? Correct me if Ive heard wrong.
Do QF have LAME's in Karratha, Kalgoolie or Broome? Or do they travel with the aircraft?
I have heard QF are adopting exactly the same approach re the LAME's and aircraft inspections, so why is all the comotion about DJ, and not QF as well? Correct me if Ive heard wrong.
Do QF have LAME's in Karratha, Kalgoolie or Broome? Or do they travel with the aircraft?
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The limited knowledge of some pilots is what frightens me the most (at times). The talk about gear pins is a perfect example. (And it was in support of the LAMEs). The gear pins referred to are to 'safety' the gear when hydraulics are off and the aircraft is parked, under tow or undergoing maintenance. The pin used as part of a typical pushback procedure is the nose wheel steering deactivation pin. The reason I mention it is to illustrate that a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing. (And I don't mean to single out the individual who posted)
And now for something completely different...a 'Preflight' done by a Virgin pilot with the aircraft assessed and 'signed for' as airworthy, immediately followed by one by a LAME as a personal duty of care.Lo and behold it's had a birdstrike - to the extent the aircraft is grounded and the engine requires replacement!
'Gibbo' says not to worry! And Snowballs says it's a beat up with no safety implications. (You're a bloody disgrace and if you're ex AN then I'm simply ashamed and flabbergasted.)
As for QF they are working VERY hard through CASAs Standards Consultative Committee to have this practice implemented...they're just cunning enough to keep their head down at the moment.
Watch this space!
And remember...
'You can teach a monkey to ride a bike...'
And now for something completely different...a 'Preflight' done by a Virgin pilot with the aircraft assessed and 'signed for' as airworthy, immediately followed by one by a LAME as a personal duty of care.Lo and behold it's had a birdstrike - to the extent the aircraft is grounded and the engine requires replacement!
'Gibbo' says not to worry! And Snowballs says it's a beat up with no safety implications. (You're a bloody disgrace and if you're ex AN then I'm simply ashamed and flabbergasted.)
As for QF they are working VERY hard through CASAs Standards Consultative Committee to have this practice implemented...they're just cunning enough to keep their head down at the moment.
Watch this space!
And remember...
'You can teach a monkey to ride a bike...'
on your FM dial
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Neither the B737-300/400 nor the B737-700/800 needs an inspection by a licenced engineer on every turn-around.
This safety line is a complete red-herring. Why don’t you engineers be HONEST and just come out and say that you are conducting a public scare campaign for the sole reason that you want to create more jobs for engineers? At least people could respect you then.
This safety line is a complete red-herring. Why don’t you engineers be HONEST and just come out and say that you are conducting a public scare campaign for the sole reason that you want to create more jobs for engineers? At least people could respect you then.
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Hmmm, I find the 'create more jobs for engineers' line a little difficult to believe.
A large 3rd party maintenance organisation based in the south of Victoria who has a contract with a prominant Australian airline got NO applicants for a recent recruitment.
Simply put, there are no engineers out there looking.....
What seems to be forgotten is that the walkarounds may not find anything for thousands of turnarounds, but you only have to find something ONCE to justify the other incidentals.
K
A large 3rd party maintenance organisation based in the south of Victoria who has a contract with a prominant Australian airline got NO applicants for a recent recruitment.
Simply put, there are no engineers out there looking.....
What seems to be forgotten is that the walkarounds may not find anything for thousands of turnarounds, but you only have to find something ONCE to justify the other incidentals.
K
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AN LAME
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The limited knowledge of some pilots is what frightens me the most (at times). The talk about gear pins is a perfect example. (And it was in support of the LAMEs). The gear pins referred to are to 'safety' the gear when hydraulics are off and the aircraft is parked, under tow or undergoing maintenance. The pin used as part of a typical pushback procedure is the nose wheel steering deactivation pin. The reason I mention it is to illustrate that a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing. (And I don't mean to single out the individual who posted)
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What is the problem ?
The incident I mentioned involved an engineer using his own modified, chopped down Stanley Screwdriver, complete with yellow handle, as a quick fit and release “Nose Gear Locking Pin” minus any attached flag, which he forgot to remove after a pushback.
It was nothing to do with the Nose Gear Disconnect Pin or whatever you want to call it.
I have not seen anyone even suggesting pilots remove the Nose Wheel Steering Disconnect pin. In fact quite the contrary, some airlines insist pilots confirm it is installed as part of their preflight checks for obvious reasons.
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The limited knowledge of some pilots is what frightens me the most (at times). The talk about gear pins is a perfect example. (And it was in support of the LAMEs). The gear pins referred to are to 'safety' the gear when hydraulics are off and the aircraft is parked, under tow or undergoing maintenance. The pin used as part of a typical pushback procedure is the nose wheel steering deactivation pin. The reason I mention it is to illustrate that a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing. (And I don't mean to single out the individual who posted)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
What is the problem ?
The incident I mentioned involved an engineer using his own modified, chopped down Stanley Screwdriver, complete with yellow handle, as a quick fit and release “Nose Gear Locking Pin” minus any attached flag, which he forgot to remove after a pushback.
It was nothing to do with the Nose Gear Disconnect Pin or whatever you want to call it.
I have not seen anyone even suggesting pilots remove the Nose Wheel Steering Disconnect pin. In fact quite the contrary, some airlines insist pilots confirm it is installed as part of their preflight checks for obvious reasons.
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Snowballs.
Who said that LAMEs are faultless. I certainly don't defend the actions of every LAME in the country. I presume you wouldn't vouch for every pilot.However there is absolutely no requirement whatsoever for the nose gear downlock to have a safety pin inserted for pushback - the individual would not have been following SOP (at AN at least). The Nose Gear dectivation pin is fitted prior to the towbar being connected to prevent shearing of the towbar if you blokes check the rudder at the gate or on pushback. As I said before, you sound like a perfect example of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing.
Kanga767 has hit the nail on the head:
Because there hasn't been a jet hull loss in this country, many of you believe that engineering preflight is dispensible.
And BIK, you are simply a w@nker. If you listen to Virgin's reasons, they state that Boeing do require a preflight for the classic. But we are not talking about a maintenance schedule. We are talking operational maintenance and serviceability of the aircraft which may be affected by anything from FOD to fatigue cracking; from tarmac vehicular accident to making all doors are closed correctly. On top of that ensuring nothing and noone is ingested during start/pushback.
And then you get on to providing knowledgeable advice to crews having technical problems during start and prior to headset disconnect. Do you understand that you are going to lose all these resources as well?
And remember
'You can teach a monkey to ride a bike..."
Who said that LAMEs are faultless. I certainly don't defend the actions of every LAME in the country. I presume you wouldn't vouch for every pilot.However there is absolutely no requirement whatsoever for the nose gear downlock to have a safety pin inserted for pushback - the individual would not have been following SOP (at AN at least). The Nose Gear dectivation pin is fitted prior to the towbar being connected to prevent shearing of the towbar if you blokes check the rudder at the gate or on pushback. As I said before, you sound like a perfect example of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing.
Kanga767 has hit the nail on the head:
What seems to be forgotten is that the walkarounds may not find anything for thousands of turnarounds, but you only have to find something ONCE to justify the other incidentals.
And BIK, you are simply a w@nker. If you listen to Virgin's reasons, they state that Boeing do require a preflight for the classic. But we are not talking about a maintenance schedule. We are talking operational maintenance and serviceability of the aircraft which may be affected by anything from FOD to fatigue cracking; from tarmac vehicular accident to making all doors are closed correctly. On top of that ensuring nothing and noone is ingested during start/pushback.
And then you get on to providing knowledgeable advice to crews having technical problems during start and prior to headset disconnect. Do you understand that you are going to lose all these resources as well?
And remember
'You can teach a monkey to ride a bike..."
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Still waiting on someone to explain why the B737NG does NOT need an Engineering Preflight, but a B737-300/400 does need one?
While we are patiently waiting, did you see this today.
(QUOTE)
THE Civil Aviation Safety Authority has urged pilots to watch a new safety video on pre-flight checks, prop swinging, refuelling and passenger safety. The 18-minute video, available from the authority's safety promotions section , was made in response to a spate of recent serious incidents involving aircraft on the ground.
(ENDQUOTE)
The Safety Authority that is going along with this ridiculous change to the Preflights, has had to put out a video for Pilots covering Preflights and other things....
While we are patiently waiting, did you see this today.
(QUOTE)
THE Civil Aviation Safety Authority has urged pilots to watch a new safety video on pre-flight checks, prop swinging, refuelling and passenger safety. The 18-minute video, available from the authority's safety promotions section , was made in response to a spate of recent serious incidents involving aircraft on the ground.
(ENDQUOTE)
The Safety Authority that is going along with this ridiculous change to the Preflights, has had to put out a video for Pilots covering Preflights and other things....
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have a look at this http://www.casa.gov.au/avreg/rules/rulings/ar0203.pdf
CASA are about to state their policy is that pilots require NO training. Looks like the lunatics have taken over the asylum...or Peter Gibson has been promoted to Director.
CASA are about to state their policy is that pilots require NO training. Looks like the lunatics have taken over the asylum...or Peter Gibson has been promoted to Director.
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AN LAME
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Who said that LAMEs are faultless. I certainly don't defend the actions of every LAME in the country. I presume you wouldn't vouch for every pilot.However there is absolutely no requirement whatsoever for the nose gear downlock to have a safety pin inserted for pushback - the individual would not have been following SOP (at AN at least). The Nose Gear dectivation pin is fitted prior to the towbar being connected to prevent shearing of the towbar if you blokes check the rudder at the gate or on pushback. As I said before, you sound like a perfect example of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing.
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I still think you are barking up the wrong tree ………….. again, nobody has suggested pilots remove the Nose Gear deactivation pin for obvious reasons, they were referring to the practice of pilots removing the undercarriage locking pins if the aircraft is cleared online and laying them on the ground beside the undercarriage.
I certainly never suggested pilots were likewise fire proof from error, I just have a strong belief that there is nothing wrong with some pilots doing some walkarounds at out ports and when some group tries to beat it up in the media by way of a scare campaign read “safety issue” it is only a half truth.
Some airlines I have worked for do insert the nose gear downlock pin (as well as the Nosewheel deactivation pin or what ever you want to call it, during a pushback) as it is included in “their” SOP’s. I guess also you have first hand knowledge as to why pilots would want to check the rudder during pushback as you are so familiar with aircrew SOP’s. A pilot would probably respond that that the deactivation pin is inserted so as the tow bar is not broken and the ground staff trashed when the hydraulics come online during the engine start which occupies most of the pushback time. Apart from an abnormal situation after maintenance, the only time I have ever checked the rudder was during pre taxi or during the taxi and again, as per SOP’s.
This whole thing is degenerating into a pilot vs engineer thing which will result in both sides beating each other to pulp. Perhaps its back to the original thing …… why shouldn’t some pilots do some walkarounds at out stations.
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Who said that LAMEs are faultless. I certainly don't defend the actions of every LAME in the country. I presume you wouldn't vouch for every pilot.However there is absolutely no requirement whatsoever for the nose gear downlock to have a safety pin inserted for pushback - the individual would not have been following SOP (at AN at least). The Nose Gear dectivation pin is fitted prior to the towbar being connected to prevent shearing of the towbar if you blokes check the rudder at the gate or on pushback. As I said before, you sound like a perfect example of a little knowledge being a dangerous thing.
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I still think you are barking up the wrong tree ………….. again, nobody has suggested pilots remove the Nose Gear deactivation pin for obvious reasons, they were referring to the practice of pilots removing the undercarriage locking pins if the aircraft is cleared online and laying them on the ground beside the undercarriage.
I certainly never suggested pilots were likewise fire proof from error, I just have a strong belief that there is nothing wrong with some pilots doing some walkarounds at out ports and when some group tries to beat it up in the media by way of a scare campaign read “safety issue” it is only a half truth.
Some airlines I have worked for do insert the nose gear downlock pin (as well as the Nosewheel deactivation pin or what ever you want to call it, during a pushback) as it is included in “their” SOP’s. I guess also you have first hand knowledge as to why pilots would want to check the rudder during pushback as you are so familiar with aircrew SOP’s. A pilot would probably respond that that the deactivation pin is inserted so as the tow bar is not broken and the ground staff trashed when the hydraulics come online during the engine start which occupies most of the pushback time. Apart from an abnormal situation after maintenance, the only time I have ever checked the rudder was during pre taxi or during the taxi and again, as per SOP’s.
This whole thing is degenerating into a pilot vs engineer thing which will result in both sides beating each other to pulp. Perhaps its back to the original thing …… why shouldn’t some pilots do some walkarounds at out stations.
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Snowballs
I wasn't attacking the pilot SOP of checking rudder operation at the gate. And I did qualify my comment about the downlock safety pin not being a SOP at AN.
However your comment 'I just have a strong belief that there is nothing wrong with some pilots doing some walkarounds at out ports and when some group tries to beat it up in the media by way of a scare campaign read “safety issue” it is only a half truth.' indicates to me that you are unaware that Virgin and QF are proposing that LAMEs are not required to carry out Transit Preflight Inspections at ANY ports (i.e. major ports) not just outports. That is, after the first flight of day inspection by a LAME, you are on your own. I think you will find that most LAMEs (and the ALAEA for that matter) accept that a pilot can trained to carry out a walkaround at an outport in, for example, a 'hub and spoke' operation.
Cheers
'You can train a monkey to ride a bike...'
I wasn't attacking the pilot SOP of checking rudder operation at the gate. And I did qualify my comment about the downlock safety pin not being a SOP at AN.
However your comment 'I just have a strong belief that there is nothing wrong with some pilots doing some walkarounds at out ports and when some group tries to beat it up in the media by way of a scare campaign read “safety issue” it is only a half truth.' indicates to me that you are unaware that Virgin and QF are proposing that LAMEs are not required to carry out Transit Preflight Inspections at ANY ports (i.e. major ports) not just outports. That is, after the first flight of day inspection by a LAME, you are on your own. I think you will find that most LAMEs (and the ALAEA for that matter) accept that a pilot can trained to carry out a walkaround at an outport in, for example, a 'hub and spoke' operation.
Cheers
'You can train a monkey to ride a bike...'
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Still waiting.
While we are still waiting, one of the excuses given for this ridiculous idea, is that Boeing said this and that.
Now while I obviously do not know what Boeing has told any other individual on PPRuNe, or what they told the Airlines to get them to buy these Aircraft the following is directly from Boeing, and it refers to Maintenance Checks carried out by Maintenance Engineers/Mechanics, NOT by Pilots.
(QUOTE)
Aircraft maintenance inspections
U.S. airlines spend more than $10 billion a year to keep their fleets safe and in top operating condition. An airline's maintenance program specifies the intervals at which certain aircraft and engine parts will be inspected. The maintenance centers that perform inspections and repair work, either the airline's own shops or those of a subcontractor, must be certified by the FAA and open to inspection at all times. Records of maintenance work on an aircraft are carefully maintained and subject to FAA review.
Airlines have maintenance programs for each type of aircraft they operate. The programs are developed jointly with the manufacturers of the equipment, such as Boeing or Airbus, and approved by the FAA and other regulatory agencies in countries where the airline operates.
For every hour that a plane is in flight, maintenance crews spend roughly three-and-a-half hours working to maintain it. Each maintenance program involves a series of increasingly complex inspection and maintenance steps, depending on an aircraft's flying time, calendar time, or number of landings and takeoffs. With each step, maintenance personnel probe deeper and deeper into the aircraft, taking apart more and more components for closer inspection. A typical program involves various types of inspections:
A visual "walk-around" inspection of an aircraft's exterior several times each day to look for fuel leaks, worn tires, cracks, dents and other surface damage; important systems inside the airplane are also checked.
An inspection every three to five days of the aircraft's landing gear, control surfaces such as flaps and rudders, fluid levels, oxygen systems, lighting, and auxiliary power systems.
An inspection every eight months of all of the above, plus internal control systems, hydraulic systems, and cockpit and cabin emergency equipment.
A check every 12 to 17 months during which the aircraft is opened up extensively so inspectors can use sophisticated devices to look for wear, corrosion and cracks invisible to the human eye.
A major check every three-and-a-half to five years in which aircraft are essentially taken apart and put back together again, with landing gear and many other components replaced.
Between the scheduled maintenance checks, computers on board the airplane monitor the performance of its systems and record such things as abnormal temperatures and fuel and oil consumption. In newer aircraft, this data is transmitted to ground stations while the plane is in flight.
(ENDQUOTE)
So, Boeing says, A visual "walk-around" inspection of an aircraft's exterior several times each day to look for fuel leaks, worn tires, cracks, dents and other surface damage; important systems inside the airplane are also checked.
Cannot see where even Boeing say except on our New Generation Aircraft.
While we are still waiting, one of the excuses given for this ridiculous idea, is that Boeing said this and that.
Now while I obviously do not know what Boeing has told any other individual on PPRuNe, or what they told the Airlines to get them to buy these Aircraft
the following is directly from Boeing, and it refers to Maintenance Checks carried out by Maintenance Engineers/Mechanics, NOT by Pilots. (QUOTE)
Aircraft maintenance inspections
U.S. airlines spend more than $10 billion a year to keep their fleets safe and in top operating condition. An airline's maintenance program specifies the intervals at which certain aircraft and engine parts will be inspected. The maintenance centers that perform inspections and repair work, either the airline's own shops or those of a subcontractor, must be certified by the FAA and open to inspection at all times. Records of maintenance work on an aircraft are carefully maintained and subject to FAA review.
Airlines have maintenance programs for each type of aircraft they operate. The programs are developed jointly with the manufacturers of the equipment, such as Boeing or Airbus, and approved by the FAA and other regulatory agencies in countries where the airline operates.
For every hour that a plane is in flight, maintenance crews spend roughly three-and-a-half hours working to maintain it. Each maintenance program involves a series of increasingly complex inspection and maintenance steps, depending on an aircraft's flying time, calendar time, or number of landings and takeoffs. With each step, maintenance personnel probe deeper and deeper into the aircraft, taking apart more and more components for closer inspection. A typical program involves various types of inspections:
A visual "walk-around" inspection of an aircraft's exterior several times each day to look for fuel leaks, worn tires, cracks, dents and other surface damage; important systems inside the airplane are also checked.
An inspection every three to five days of the aircraft's landing gear, control surfaces such as flaps and rudders, fluid levels, oxygen systems, lighting, and auxiliary power systems.
An inspection every eight months of all of the above, plus internal control systems, hydraulic systems, and cockpit and cabin emergency equipment.
A check every 12 to 17 months during which the aircraft is opened up extensively so inspectors can use sophisticated devices to look for wear, corrosion and cracks invisible to the human eye.
A major check every three-and-a-half to five years in which aircraft are essentially taken apart and put back together again, with landing gear and many other components replaced.
Between the scheduled maintenance checks, computers on board the airplane monitor the performance of its systems and record such things as abnormal temperatures and fuel and oil consumption. In newer aircraft, this data is transmitted to ground stations while the plane is in flight.
(ENDQUOTE)
So, Boeing says, A visual "walk-around" inspection of an aircraft's exterior several times each day to look for fuel leaks, worn tires, cracks, dents and other surface damage; important systems inside the airplane are also checked.
Cannot see where even Boeing say except on our New Generation Aircraft.
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AAP Friday February 28, 07:50 PM
Australia's aviation watchdog cracked down on Virgin Blue after surveillance revealed shortcomings in its maintenance checks. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) summoned Virgin representatives to a meeting in Brisbane and issued them with a formal notice over the breaches.
CASA said it was within its guidelines for pilots to conduct the maintenance checks but they were not being thoroughly carried out. "We have had a series of discussions with Virgin Blue today about the issue of turnaround checks," CASA spokesman Peter Gibson said.
"The issue for us is the pilots have got to do these checks properly and what we have found in the course of audits and some surveillance of Virgin Blue is that some of these checks are not being done as thoroughly as they should be by the pilots."
The audit was carried out earlier this month and the checks were placed under surveillance for several days this week.
There was no evidence passenger safety was at risk at any time, but the safety shortcomings were serious enough for a formal warning to be issued, CASA said. "We've got no evidence that anything went wrong with the aircraft because they were subject to shortcuts," Mr Gibson said.
Virgin Blue has undertaken to provide pilots with refresher training courses and issued an email bulletin reminding pilots of safety procedures and the need to carry out all tasks thoroughly.
It will also formally write to its pilots outlining the same points.
Mr Gibson said CASA was satisfied that if those measures were undertaken, Virgin could continue to use pilots to carry out the checks.
Virgin Blue commercial head David Huttner said CASA and the company had come to agreement on the issue. "We had a meeting with CASA to discuss their concerns, and we have agreed with CASA to some amendments to our system," he said.
"There will also be a review process in the coming months.
"But CASA has agreed with that, our pilot system will be continued."
The Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association said by using pilots to conduct pre-takeoff safety checks, airlines were watering down an aviation safety system currently among the best in the world. The union's federal executive this week endorsed a series of industry-wide stopwork meetings to consider the issue, starting in Brisbane on March 10.
Virgin maintains the airline has always adhered to safety regulations set by both the aircraft manufacturer and CASA.
But the airline is on notice that it will be watched. "What we are going to do is keep a higher level of surveillance of Virgin Blue in the coming days, weeks and perhaps months to make sure these checks are being done properly," Mr Gibson said.
Australia's aviation watchdog cracked down on Virgin Blue after surveillance revealed shortcomings in its maintenance checks. The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) summoned Virgin representatives to a meeting in Brisbane and issued them with a formal notice over the breaches.
CASA said it was within its guidelines for pilots to conduct the maintenance checks but they were not being thoroughly carried out. "We have had a series of discussions with Virgin Blue today about the issue of turnaround checks," CASA spokesman Peter Gibson said.
"The issue for us is the pilots have got to do these checks properly and what we have found in the course of audits and some surveillance of Virgin Blue is that some of these checks are not being done as thoroughly as they should be by the pilots."
The audit was carried out earlier this month and the checks were placed under surveillance for several days this week.
There was no evidence passenger safety was at risk at any time, but the safety shortcomings were serious enough for a formal warning to be issued, CASA said. "We've got no evidence that anything went wrong with the aircraft because they were subject to shortcuts," Mr Gibson said.
Virgin Blue has undertaken to provide pilots with refresher training courses and issued an email bulletin reminding pilots of safety procedures and the need to carry out all tasks thoroughly.
It will also formally write to its pilots outlining the same points.
Mr Gibson said CASA was satisfied that if those measures were undertaken, Virgin could continue to use pilots to carry out the checks.
Virgin Blue commercial head David Huttner said CASA and the company had come to agreement on the issue. "We had a meeting with CASA to discuss their concerns, and we have agreed with CASA to some amendments to our system," he said.
"There will also be a review process in the coming months.
"But CASA has agreed with that, our pilot system will be continued."
The Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association said by using pilots to conduct pre-takeoff safety checks, airlines were watering down an aviation safety system currently among the best in the world. The union's federal executive this week endorsed a series of industry-wide stopwork meetings to consider the issue, starting in Brisbane on March 10.
Virgin maintains the airline has always adhered to safety regulations set by both the aircraft manufacturer and CASA.
But the airline is on notice that it will be watched. "What we are going to do is keep a higher level of surveillance of Virgin Blue in the coming days, weeks and perhaps months to make sure these checks are being done properly," Mr Gibson said.
AN LAME.
It might be my blonde hair but what are you exactly trying to say with your comment 'You can train a monkey to ride a bike...'
I heard your union man say the exact same thing on the news the other day.
Are you sure your not trying to make it you guys Vs us guys??? Because i'm sure that won't acheive the result that we are all looking for!!
It might be my blonde hair but what are you exactly trying to say with your comment 'You can train a monkey to ride a bike...'
I heard your union man say the exact same thing on the news the other day.
Are you sure your not trying to make it you guys Vs us guys??? Because i'm sure that won't acheive the result that we are all looking for!!
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HGW,
I don't get what you mean?
Boeing say quite clearly "maintenance crews", I don't think anyone would consider Pilots to be part of any "maintenance crew" even the pilots themselves.
airsupport.
I don't get what you mean?
Boeing say quite clearly "maintenance crews", I don't think anyone would consider Pilots to be part of any "maintenance crew"
even the pilots themselves. airsupport.
Thread Starter
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Sat "The Australian"
CASA spies on Virgin Blue safety
By Steve Creedy, Aviation
March 01, 2003
THE aviation watchdog cracked down yesterday on Virgin Blue after a surveillance operation found the airline had failed to ensure its pilots were properly undertaking pre-flight safety checks on newer aircraft.
Civil Aviation Safety Authority investigators spent two days secretly observing the checks at the same time as the airline was rejecting union claims it was cutting corners and compromising safety by allowing pilots to replace engineers on the inspections.
It is understood videotaped evidence from the operation was presented to Virgin officials at a meeting in Brisbane yesterday.
CASA spokesman Peter Gibson confirmed Virgin had been served with a formal safety alert after investigators found pilots were not following proper procedures.
This is the second time CASA has raised concerns with Virgin about the checks. It also uncovered deficiencies during a recent audit of the airline.
Mr Gibson said the latest surveillance found pilots on some flights had been rushing the checks and cutting corners, although there was no evidence this had resulted in any safety incidents or risks.
"There's . . . nothing to suggest that anything happened, or could have happened, because these corners were being cut," he said.
"But once we were aware through the audit and subsequent surveillance that procedures weren't being followed 100 per cent, we naturally wanted to make sure that situation was redressed."
Mr Gibson said Virgin had undertaken to write to pilots stressing the need to follow the procedures, which also would be reviewed.
It also had agreed to put the pilots through refresher training and to review its initial training.
CASA believed the response was satisfactory but had converted the safety alert to an order for corrective action.
"What we will do . . . is undertake some fairly intensive surveillance on not just this activity but Virgin Blue in general," he said.
Despite the problems, Mr Gibson said CASA retained its view the inspections were not a maintenance function and did not require engineers as Boeing allowed on some newer aircraft.
Virgin head of commercial David Huttner said the airline was addressing CASA's concerns.
But the Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association said the CASA findings supported its argument that replacing engineers with pilots on the checks downgraded safety.<
CASA spies on Virgin Blue safety
By Steve Creedy, Aviation
March 01, 2003
THE aviation watchdog cracked down yesterday on Virgin Blue after a surveillance operation found the airline had failed to ensure its pilots were properly undertaking pre-flight safety checks on newer aircraft.
Civil Aviation Safety Authority investigators spent two days secretly observing the checks at the same time as the airline was rejecting union claims it was cutting corners and compromising safety by allowing pilots to replace engineers on the inspections.
It is understood videotaped evidence from the operation was presented to Virgin officials at a meeting in Brisbane yesterday.
CASA spokesman Peter Gibson confirmed Virgin had been served with a formal safety alert after investigators found pilots were not following proper procedures.
This is the second time CASA has raised concerns with Virgin about the checks. It also uncovered deficiencies during a recent audit of the airline.
Mr Gibson said the latest surveillance found pilots on some flights had been rushing the checks and cutting corners, although there was no evidence this had resulted in any safety incidents or risks.
"There's . . . nothing to suggest that anything happened, or could have happened, because these corners were being cut," he said.
"But once we were aware through the audit and subsequent surveillance that procedures weren't being followed 100 per cent, we naturally wanted to make sure that situation was redressed."
Mr Gibson said Virgin had undertaken to write to pilots stressing the need to follow the procedures, which also would be reviewed.
It also had agreed to put the pilots through refresher training and to review its initial training.
CASA believed the response was satisfactory but had converted the safety alert to an order for corrective action.
"What we will do . . . is undertake some fairly intensive surveillance on not just this activity but Virgin Blue in general," he said.
Despite the problems, Mr Gibson said CASA retained its view the inspections were not a maintenance function and did not require engineers as Boeing allowed on some newer aircraft.
Virgin head of commercial David Huttner said the airline was addressing CASA's concerns.
But the Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association said the CASA findings supported its argument that replacing engineers with pilots on the checks downgraded safety.<
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Well that should convince any reasonable person, and end this debate.
The Pilots have already been found to be NOT doing these safety checks properly.
The Engineers were right, SADLY safety IS already being compromised.
The Pilots have already been found to be NOT doing these safety checks properly.
The Engineers were right, SADLY safety IS already being compromised.
on your FM dial
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airsupport
I don’t see anywhere in your rather lengthy Boeing quote any requirement that the “walk around” inspection must be carried out by a licenced engineer. Neither can I find any prohibition on the “walk around” inspection being carried out by, for example, an unlicenced mechanic, or even - god forbid - a pilot.
I disagree with the inference you have drawn from the Boeing term “maintenance crews”. Not all “maintenance crew” are licenced engineers. I think you might be inappropriately trying to infer a specific meaning from an expression where Boeing has deliberately and for good reason chosen to use rather generalised language.
The document you have quoted is obviously a PR type dossier written for consumption by the general public. Would you care to quote from an approved and legally binding Boeing Maintenance Manual? I have never found anywhere in any of the B737-300/400/700/800 maintenance manuals or flight crew manuals where Boeing specifies that the person who conducts and certifies the “walk around” inspection must be a licenced aircraft engineer. I would be delighted to be proved wrong. Boeing don’t generally get involved in personnel licencing issues because such issues are considered matters for National Regulatory Authorities - not manufacturers.
AN LAME
Of course B737-300/400/700/800s require a “pre flight inspection”. We agree on that much.
But I am not aware of any Boeing specification that requires that the pre-flight inspection be carried out by a licenced engineer. And that is, in fact, the issue at the very heart of the public scare campaign being conducted by the ALAEA.
To be clear – we are not talking about the “daily” or “24 hour” inspection. Those DO require an inspection by a licenced engineer.
We are talking about the “pre-flight”, “turn-around”, “walk around” or “transit” inspection. The type of inspection that is carried out before every flight, even if there are no reported defects.
I don’t have those “resources” now. And I don’t see why I need them either – unless I have a problem after push-back in which case I will call for them. In the last 12 months I have needed to call for a licenced engineer after pushback on only one occasion.
Let’s not allow ourselves to be distracted by the cheap-shots and the overly-dramatic Hollywood-style headlines from the ALAEA. I’m sure that you and the ALAEA could trot out any number of horror stories of “near death” oversights made by pilots. And I am equally sure that, should I be suitably inclined, I could trot out at least as many examples of significant oversights made by licenced engineer members of the ALAEA. But so what? What would it prove? Nothing very much, I suggest. We all know that we are all fallible.
At issue here is not whether these airplanes need to be inspected before each departure. We all know that they do.
The question is what is an acceptable level of qualification for the person conducting the inspection.
Naturally, the licenced engineers trade union says that we will all crash-burn-die if we don’t use a licenced engineer for every inspection. Such assertions are not unheard of from organisations with an obvious and significant vested self-interest.
But the evidence from overseas would suggest that the ALAEA is, shall we say, gilding the lily somewhat. Every day of the year there are many thousands of B737-300/400/700/800 flights made safely after having their turn-around inspections carried out by one of the pilots. And there aren’t licenced engineers on the headset during the push-backs either. But the pushback crewmember that is on the headset is required to carry out their own external aircraft inspection prior to donning the headset and commencing pushback. This inspection is conducted separate from and independent of the inspection conducted by one of the pilots. All the bleating about “two sets of eyes” is all just huff and puff because there ARE two sets of eyes. And yet there is still not a licenced engineer in sight.
This is approved and accepted practice in numerous mature western aviation markets overseas where the airline industries are many times the size of the airlines in Australia. So why is Australia so different?
It isn’t.
Except that in Australia there are some deeply entrenched working practices that hark back to the days of piston-powered airliners. So enshrined are some of these practices that it is not always easy to be precisely sure where the safety regulations end and the industrial relations issues start.
In any debate of this nature it is of the utmost importance to know which is which. You have to be able to sort the wheat from the chaff. And you have to be able to sort the genuine and verifiable safety concerns of technical experts from the self-interested industrial campaigning of an unscrupulous and aggressive trade union.
The deeply entrenched Australian work practices are out of step with much of the world on this one.
CASA don’t require a licenced engineer for turn-around inspections. Boeing don’t require a licenced engineer for turn-around inspections. The employers, it seems, don’t require a licenced engineer for turn-around inspections.
But the ALAEA says we should use them anyway because that’s the way it’s always been done – in Australia at least.
I don’t see anywhere in your rather lengthy Boeing quote any requirement that the “walk around” inspection must be carried out by a licenced engineer. Neither can I find any prohibition on the “walk around” inspection being carried out by, for example, an unlicenced mechanic, or even - god forbid - a pilot.
I disagree with the inference you have drawn from the Boeing term “maintenance crews”. Not all “maintenance crew” are licenced engineers. I think you might be inappropriately trying to infer a specific meaning from an expression where Boeing has deliberately and for good reason chosen to use rather generalised language.
The document you have quoted is obviously a PR type dossier written for consumption by the general public. Would you care to quote from an approved and legally binding Boeing Maintenance Manual? I have never found anywhere in any of the B737-300/400/700/800 maintenance manuals or flight crew manuals where Boeing specifies that the person who conducts and certifies the “walk around” inspection must be a licenced aircraft engineer. I would be delighted to be proved wrong. Boeing don’t generally get involved in personnel licencing issues because such issues are considered matters for National Regulatory Authorities - not manufacturers.
AN LAME
Of course B737-300/400/700/800s require a “pre flight inspection”. We agree on that much.
But I am not aware of any Boeing specification that requires that the pre-flight inspection be carried out by a licenced engineer. And that is, in fact, the issue at the very heart of the public scare campaign being conducted by the ALAEA.
To be clear – we are not talking about the “daily” or “24 hour” inspection. Those DO require an inspection by a licenced engineer.
We are talking about the “pre-flight”, “turn-around”, “walk around” or “transit” inspection. The type of inspection that is carried out before every flight, even if there are no reported defects.
“And then you get on to providing knowledgeable advice to crews having technical problems during start and prior to headset disconnect. Do you understand that you are going to lose all these resources as well?”
Let’s not allow ourselves to be distracted by the cheap-shots and the overly-dramatic Hollywood-style headlines from the ALAEA. I’m sure that you and the ALAEA could trot out any number of horror stories of “near death” oversights made by pilots. And I am equally sure that, should I be suitably inclined, I could trot out at least as many examples of significant oversights made by licenced engineer members of the ALAEA. But so what? What would it prove? Nothing very much, I suggest. We all know that we are all fallible.
At issue here is not whether these airplanes need to be inspected before each departure. We all know that they do.
The question is what is an acceptable level of qualification for the person conducting the inspection.
Naturally, the licenced engineers trade union says that we will all crash-burn-die if we don’t use a licenced engineer for every inspection. Such assertions are not unheard of from organisations with an obvious and significant vested self-interest.
But the evidence from overseas would suggest that the ALAEA is, shall we say, gilding the lily somewhat. Every day of the year there are many thousands of B737-300/400/700/800 flights made safely after having their turn-around inspections carried out by one of the pilots. And there aren’t licenced engineers on the headset during the push-backs either. But the pushback crewmember that is on the headset is required to carry out their own external aircraft inspection prior to donning the headset and commencing pushback. This inspection is conducted separate from and independent of the inspection conducted by one of the pilots. All the bleating about “two sets of eyes” is all just huff and puff because there ARE two sets of eyes. And yet there is still not a licenced engineer in sight.
This is approved and accepted practice in numerous mature western aviation markets overseas where the airline industries are many times the size of the airlines in Australia. So why is Australia so different?
It isn’t.
Except that in Australia there are some deeply entrenched working practices that hark back to the days of piston-powered airliners. So enshrined are some of these practices that it is not always easy to be precisely sure where the safety regulations end and the industrial relations issues start.
In any debate of this nature it is of the utmost importance to know which is which. You have to be able to sort the wheat from the chaff. And you have to be able to sort the genuine and verifiable safety concerns of technical experts from the self-interested industrial campaigning of an unscrupulous and aggressive trade union.
The deeply entrenched Australian work practices are out of step with much of the world on this one.
CASA don’t require a licenced engineer for turn-around inspections. Boeing don’t require a licenced engineer for turn-around inspections. The employers, it seems, don’t require a licenced engineer for turn-around inspections.
But the ALAEA says we should use them anyway because that’s the way it’s always been done – in Australia at least.
I wonder who’s been feeding the spin doctor this crap
There's . . . nothing to suggest that anything happened, or could have happened, because these corners were being cut.
Mr Gibson said CASA retained its view the inspections were not a maintenance function and did not require engineers as Boeing allowed on some newer aircraft.
One thing’s for sure: “maintenance” includes an inspection for the purposes of ascertaining whether an aircraft is in a fit state for flying, and an inspection of an aircraft component for the purposes of ascertaining whether it’s functioning correctly.
Let me see if I got CASA’s message straight. These “pre-flight safety checks” have got nothing to do with safety, and aren’t conducted for the purposes finding out if the aircraft and its bits are OK.
Yeah right.