Four Corners B737 Max
The following users liked this post:
The following 2 users liked this post by Ollie Onion:
Makes you wonder what problems the MAX 10 will present itself with. That’s if it can even get certified.
You think the -8 was pushing the old design too far, the -10 is going even further. I understand it comes with a new landing gear design. Perhaps the FAA need to say nope and just end the program with the -8 and -9.
Virgin just need to bite the bullet and order a small sub fleet A321XLR.
You think the -8 was pushing the old design too far, the -10 is going even further. I understand it comes with a new landing gear design. Perhaps the FAA need to say nope and just end the program with the -8 and -9.
Virgin just need to bite the bullet and order a small sub fleet A321XLR.
MAX 10 Problems? The -10 is longer so it should be more stable. Certification flights after the MCAS 1.0 fiasco were done using the short -7 for this very reason.
If a driver fell asleep at the wheel and had a head on collision: It wouldn’t influence me to avoid that vehicle.
If a car steered of it’s own volition into the oncoming traffic, with the driver trying to fight it: I wouldn’t get in that model.
If a car steered of it’s own volition into the oncoming traffic, with the driver trying to fight it: I wouldn’t get in that model.
MAX 10 Problems? The -10 is longer so it should be more stable. Certification flights after the MCAS 1.0 fiasco were done using the short -7 for this very reason.
The following users liked this post:
With nearly a 10T increase in the MTOW with the same wing as the -700. So you solve one problem and subsequently generate a few more. It was time for a new design 20 years ago.
What are these “few more” problems that the -10 has?
Big difference, Boeing knowingly put a defective aircraft design into production knowing the risk of hull loss should the MCAS fail. It cost 350 people their lives and Boeing got caught out cutting corners and putting profit ahead of safety. The limp dick regulator let them get away with it and since then we have seen other numerous warning signs that many Boeing programmes are also a bit dodgy. What Boeing has done is criminal and people should have gone to jail, they got the soft touch and the result of that is more quality issues including a fuselage plug failing on a 737 which very nearly resulted in another aircraft loss. O would take any modern Airbus over a Boeing any chance I get. The latest whistle blower has warned 787s may start to break apart in flight, Boeing says they won’t, after the last five years I am not so sure I trust what Boeing says.
The one thing pointing against that is the 787 has been in service now for 13 years, and many in service today would've been subject to D checks where any issues from either manufacturing or airframe fatigue would have been uncovered, and there doesn't seem to have been any long term issues uncovered that would suggest 787s are more prone to 'breaking up in flight'. On the contrary the MAX MCAS issue had presented itself multiple times within the type's first 18 months in service.
Rather, the gear redesign is to give some more ground clearance (mainly for T/O and landing rotation angles).
Boeing knowingly put a defective aircraft design into production knowing the risk of hull loss should the MCAS fail.
On the contrary the MAX MCAS issue had presented itself multiple times within the type's first 18 months in service.
The following users liked this post:
Here we go again...
That simply is not true. An MCAS failure alone would not cause a hull loss. You are misrepreenting the issue. The whole crux was LACK OF CREW TRAINING about MCAS as Boeing did not believe it was required. They were wrong. There was a trim runaway procedure which mitigated the risk but some crews did not apply this procedure. Simply turn the trim OFF.
Have a look at those MULTIPLE TIMES and you will see that most were well handled by the crew following a trim runaway procedure, as provided for by Boeing in the QRH.
Have a look at those MULTIPLE TIMES and you will see that most were well handled by the crew following a trim runaway procedure, as provided for by Boeing in the QRH.
“…The horrific culmination of a series of faulty technical assumptions by Boeing’s engineers, a lack of transparency on the part of Boeing’s management, and grossly insufficient oversight by the FAA.”
This lack of oversight and care by Boeing resulted in Boeing putting an aircraft into service knowing that the MCAS system and MCAS failures could result in a loss of control if not handled properly. Internal memos have that phrase about ‘loss of control in them’. So with this risk, what did Boeing do? Pushed the aircraft into service whilst effectively hiding the information about MCAS from the Crew who were flying them. So please tell me who is responsible for this?
MCAS 1.0 started over and over again whenever it felt like being triggered.