PIC command authority
MickG0105 said:
Yes I have. You only need to look at the first few pages of the formal transcript to understand what Capt S was required to do and the context.
This was a public hearing of the NTSB’s “Office Of Administrative Law Judges”. Capt S was in front of a Board of Inquiry and was required to answer questions asked by an NSTB safety investigator, a bloke who I think was from the French equivalent of the NTSB, Ms Kolander from the Association of Flight Attendants (as you’ve noted), a representative of the FAA, a representative of the US Airline Pilots Association, and three members of the Board of Inquiry.
You and I might disagree as to the proper metaphor for the process, but it certainly did not comprise Capt S merely explaining, in a quiet chat with an NTSB investigator, what he deemed necessary to be done in the emergency, with no further comment, and the NTSB accepting that and moving on. Capt S was, in effect, cross-examined publicly about his actions – sometimes gently in his interests and sometimes more aggressively – by a number of people outside the NTSB as well as NTSB itself. (I'm confident that no PIC of an Australian RPT aircraft would expect to be formally and publicly questioned by a representative of the Flight Attendant's Association in the wake of an incident, as part of an ATSB investigation. But I'm happy to stand corrected.)
Sure: Capt S lives happily ever after. But that’s only after he was put under intense public, NTSB-mandated scrutiny involving non-NTSB people asking him questions.
My perhaps poorly made point is that there is no magic law to the effect that a PIC’s judgments in an emergency will never be the subject of any critical scrutiny and never result in negative consequences.
Have you ever looked at either? If so, perhaps you could point out the parts [of the NSTB hearings] where "Sully was put through the ringer".
The most aggressive questioning of Sully came from the Flight Attendants Union rep, Ms Kolander, when she pressed him on the lack of clarity that the cabin crew had about the ditching (most thought they were making a forced landing on Terra Firma), and on the capacity of the life rafts.
The most aggressive questioning of Sully came from the Flight Attendants Union rep, Ms Kolander, when she pressed him on the lack of clarity that the cabin crew had about the ditching (most thought they were making a forced landing on Terra Firma), and on the capacity of the life rafts.
This was a public hearing of the NTSB’s “Office Of Administrative Law Judges”. Capt S was in front of a Board of Inquiry and was required to answer questions asked by an NSTB safety investigator, a bloke who I think was from the French equivalent of the NTSB, Ms Kolander from the Association of Flight Attendants (as you’ve noted), a representative of the FAA, a representative of the US Airline Pilots Association, and three members of the Board of Inquiry.
You and I might disagree as to the proper metaphor for the process, but it certainly did not comprise Capt S merely explaining, in a quiet chat with an NTSB investigator, what he deemed necessary to be done in the emergency, with no further comment, and the NTSB accepting that and moving on. Capt S was, in effect, cross-examined publicly about his actions – sometimes gently in his interests and sometimes more aggressively – by a number of people outside the NTSB as well as NTSB itself. (I'm confident that no PIC of an Australian RPT aircraft would expect to be formally and publicly questioned by a representative of the Flight Attendant's Association in the wake of an incident, as part of an ATSB investigation. But I'm happy to stand corrected.)
Sure: Capt S lives happily ever after. But that’s only after he was put under intense public, NTSB-mandated scrutiny involving non-NTSB people asking him questions.
My perhaps poorly made point is that there is no magic law to the effect that a PIC’s judgments in an emergency will never be the subject of any critical scrutiny and never result in negative consequences.
I thought the comment was flippant rather than ironic. Instead of pontificating, you could have just posted the answers to the OP’s questions and saved two pages on this thread. I mean, you’ve known all along what he’s asking about, haven’t you?
It’s “wringer”. Quasimodo was a ringer.
Perhaps you should, and use a CRAYON font. But make sure Clinton and Lead use different colours please.
That's why he was put through the ringer.
(I think I'm going to have to start using coloured font, as they do on US fora...)
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Icarus: You overlooked the bit about the PIC bearing the evidential burden in relation to all 3 matters in order that 13.2(1) applies. One of the other matters is that committing the offence was "the only reasonable way to deal with the emergency".
The PIC can, for example show that there was a sudden or extraordinary emergency - note that an 'ordinary' emergency isn't enough - and also show that the PIC's conduct was a "reasonable response" to that emergency, but if there was another "reasonable way" to deal with the emergency than engaging in the conduct that constitutes the offence, section 13.2(1) does not apply.
Maybe the other provision Bleve quoted at #53 (and was quoted by one of the Balloons all the way back at post #3) is more 'PIC friendly'?
This stuff is unavoidably complicated, folks. Understanding it means eating an elephant. Nibbling at the edges doesn't work.
The PIC can, for example show that there was a sudden or extraordinary emergency - note that an 'ordinary' emergency isn't enough - and also show that the PIC's conduct was a "reasonable response" to that emergency, but if there was another "reasonable way" to deal with the emergency than engaging in the conduct that constitutes the offence, section 13.2(1) does not apply.
Maybe the other provision Bleve quoted at #53 (and was quoted by one of the Balloons all the way back at post #3) is more 'PIC friendly'?
This stuff is unavoidably complicated, folks. Understanding it means eating an elephant. Nibbling at the edges doesn't work.
I thought the comment was flippant rather than ironic. Instead of pontificating, you could have just posted the answers to the OP’s questions and saved two pages on this thread. I mean, you’ve known all along what he’s asking about, haven’t you?It’s “wringer”. Quasimodo was a ringer.
Perhaps you should, and use a CRAYON font. But make sure Clinton and Lead use different colours please.
Perhaps you should, and use a CRAYON font. But make sure Clinton and Lead use different colours please.
As an act of purest optimism, I’m going to use a very simple, specific scenario in an attempt to show why the answer to the OP’s question is very complex and scenario-specific. And, in anticipation of the indignant fulmination about lawyers that will ensue, I note that my submission to the Senate GA inquiry (it’s a public document) said, among other things:
I didn’t make the mess. I’m a trenchant critic of it.
The following was done in a hurry and is just a ‘big hands small maps’ explanation. It will have errors and omissions. Sue me.
Compliance with air traffic control clearances and air traffic control instructions
When I learnt to fly in the mid-80s, CAR 100 was drummed into me. (All of my training was in, or from and back to, YSCB.) CAR 100 said:
Note well subreg (3). It is precisely the kind of provision which a pilot would reasonably paraphrase as giving the PIC authority to “vary regs/procedures/limitations if they deem it necessary in an emergency”. That’s what it says, in not so many words. “[T]the pilot may…”.
I won’t go into who carried what onuses and burdens of proof under CAR 100 if the **** hit the fan after a deviation, as that’s all now water under the bridge. (My apologies for the serial mixed metaphors.) Ditto the question as to resolution of what was “necessary”.
I do have to highlight one quirk in CAR 100, though, as the quirk is relevant to the explanation of the ‘CASR equivalent’: Among the things CAR 100 prohibited was – not surprisingly - entry into controlled airspace without a clearance. However, the exception in subreg (3) in its terms appeared to apply only to clearances or instructions already given. Entering controlled airspace without a clearance is not a deviation from a clearance or instruction. Rather, it’s not having one in first place.
Where did CAR 100 ‘go’?
The substance of CAR 100 went to three places. One of the more obvious of those places is CASR 91.257:
(1) The pilot in command of an aircraft for a flight contravenes this subregulation if, during the flight:
(a) air traffic control gives the pilot in command an air traffic control clearance or air traffic control instructions; and
(b) the pilot in command does not comply with the clearance or instructions.
(2) Subregulation (1) does not apply if:
(a) it is not practicable to seek authorisation for the non compliance before it occurs; and
(b) the non compliance is necessary for the safety of the aircraft or the persons on the aircraft; and
(c) the pilot in command informs air traffic control about the non compliance as soon as practicable after the pilot in command is unable to comply with the clearance or instructions.
(3) A person commits an offence of strict liability if the person contravenes subregulation (1).
Penalty: 50 penalty units.
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matters in subregulation (2): see subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code.
The first and obvious thing about that regulation, compared to CAR 100, is that the exception in subreg (2) is not expressed or structured as a discretion conferred on the PIC. Recall that CAR 100 said: “If an emergency arises that, in the interests of safety, necessitates a deviation …, the pilot in command may make such deviation as is necessary..”. Subreg (2) is instead expressed and structured as a defence. The PIC has committed an offence unless the PIC – who bears the evidential burden – makes out the defence. (More on the joys of how the evidential burden works, later.)
The other point to note is that there is no mention of “entry” into controlled airspace in CASR 91.257(1). On the face of CASR 91.257 alone, and in contrast to CAR 100, there is no prohibition on entry into controlled airspace without a clearance.
So CASR 91.257(1) prohibits deviations from ATC clearances or instructions already given. The exception in CASR 91.257(2) – a defence for which the PIC bears the evidential burden – applies only to those deviations.
Where did the prohibition on entry into controlled airspace without a clearance go, and where is the exception if I decide I need to do it in an emergency?
The prohibition on entry into controlled airspace without a clearance is now split over two places, and there are two potential exceptions, each of which exceptions has its own, different, criteria and neither of which exceptions is in the same terms as the exception in CASR 91.257(2).
The Part 91 MOS says this at section 11.15:
There is another MOS provision which prohibits e.g. taking off or landing at a controlled aerodrome without a clearance.
(As an aside, I don’t see how a prohibition on doing something counts as a ‘standard’. Nor do I understand how the prohibition from deviating from a clearance remains in CASR but the prohibition on entry in controlled airspace without a clearance gets a guernsey in a MOS. It’s incoherent to me. But don’t get me started…)
There are no ‘consequence’ provisions in a MOS because a MOS is (or is supposed to be) just a bunch of ‘standards’. The primary ‘consequence’ provision for the Part 91 MOS is back up in CASR, at 91.255:
So, for example, entry into controlled airspace without a clearance or landing at a controlled aerodrome without a clearance is a bog standard strict liability offence under CASR 91.255(3), with no ‘built in’ exceptions for emergencies. Those exceptions are in section 30 the CAA Act and s 13 of the Criminal Code. Each of those has its own (and different) criteria and onuses/burdens.
Let’s take an example, from a common scenario (for me) that develops into an emergency (mercifully not a common scenario for me).
I’m orbiting a little bit west of Black Mountain tower, outside Class C airspace at 3,500’, having contacted Canberra tower and asked for an inbound clearance to YSCB. Canberra tower acknowledges my request, gives me squawk code and instructs me to remain outside Class C airspace. I acknowledge and comply with that instruction.
Smoke then starts billowing from behind and under my instrument panel. My passengers start panicking. I immediately turn my aircraft to point straight at the intersection of the YSCB runways. which I can see from my current location and are in gliding distance if my engine fails.
Three seconds later I’m in the YSCB Class C without a clearance.
Strict liability offence under CASR 91.255(3). Potential defences: section 30 of the CA Act and section 13 of the Criminal Code.
I then declare a mayday and YSCB TWR gives me a clearance to join right downwind for RWY 30. I acknowledge that clearance.
Things get worse. Turns out that the smoke is coming from my COMM RxTx. It fails. I decide to turn towards and land at the closest runway, which is 12.
Non-compliance with the acknowledged clearance: strict liability offence under CASR 91.257(1). Potential defence: CASR 91.257(2).
I then land on RWY 12 without a clearance. (Because of the displaced threshold and the tailwind, I end up at the intersection with 35 and a number of RPT aircraft are instructed to go around.)
Strict liability offence under CASR 91.255(3). Potential defences: section 30 of the CA Act and section 13 of the Criminal Code.
In Part 2 I will give a ‘big hands small maps’ explanation of how the onuses and burdens of proof work for the various defences. But at this point I hope some readers comprehend why the answer to the OP’s question is unavoidably complex.
I’m now going flying for fun.
The aviation regulatory reform program is the single biggest and most expensive hoax ever committed on the Australian aviation sector. The complex, convoluted mess that is the package of aviation safety regulatory legislation in 2020 achieves few if any of the stated aims of the program …
The following was done in a hurry and is just a ‘big hands small maps’ explanation. It will have errors and omissions. Sue me.
Compliance with air traffic control clearances and air traffic control instructions
When I learnt to fly in the mid-80s, CAR 100 was drummed into me. (All of my training was in, or from and back to, YSCB.) CAR 100 said:
100. (1) An aircraft shall comply with air traffic control instructions.
(2) Subject to subregulation (3), and unless otherwise authorised by the appropriate Air Traffic Control Unit or by a notification in Aeronautical Information Publications or in NOTAMS, an aircraft shall not:
(a) enter, operate in, or leave a control area;
(b) operate outside a control area as a result of a diversion out of that control area in accordance with Air Traffic Control instructions; or
(c) enter, operate in, or leave a control zone or operate at a controlled aerodrome; except in accordance with an air traffic control clearance in respect of the aircraft.
(3) If an emergency arises that, in the interests of safety, necessitates a deviation from the requirements of an Air Traffic Control clearance or Air Traffic Control instructions, the pilot in command may make such deviation as is necessary but shall forthwith inform Air Traffic Control of the deviation.
(2) Subject to subregulation (3), and unless otherwise authorised by the appropriate Air Traffic Control Unit or by a notification in Aeronautical Information Publications or in NOTAMS, an aircraft shall not:
(a) enter, operate in, or leave a control area;
(b) operate outside a control area as a result of a diversion out of that control area in accordance with Air Traffic Control instructions; or
(c) enter, operate in, or leave a control zone or operate at a controlled aerodrome; except in accordance with an air traffic control clearance in respect of the aircraft.
(3) If an emergency arises that, in the interests of safety, necessitates a deviation from the requirements of an Air Traffic Control clearance or Air Traffic Control instructions, the pilot in command may make such deviation as is necessary but shall forthwith inform Air Traffic Control of the deviation.
I won’t go into who carried what onuses and burdens of proof under CAR 100 if the **** hit the fan after a deviation, as that’s all now water under the bridge. (My apologies for the serial mixed metaphors.) Ditto the question as to resolution of what was “necessary”.
I do have to highlight one quirk in CAR 100, though, as the quirk is relevant to the explanation of the ‘CASR equivalent’: Among the things CAR 100 prohibited was – not surprisingly - entry into controlled airspace without a clearance. However, the exception in subreg (3) in its terms appeared to apply only to clearances or instructions already given. Entering controlled airspace without a clearance is not a deviation from a clearance or instruction. Rather, it’s not having one in first place.
Where did CAR 100 ‘go’?
The substance of CAR 100 went to three places. One of the more obvious of those places is CASR 91.257:
91.257 Air traffic control clearances and instructions
(1) The pilot in command of an aircraft for a flight contravenes this subregulation if, during the flight:
(a) air traffic control gives the pilot in command an air traffic control clearance or air traffic control instructions; and
(b) the pilot in command does not comply with the clearance or instructions.
(2) Subregulation (1) does not apply if:
(a) it is not practicable to seek authorisation for the non compliance before it occurs; and
(b) the non compliance is necessary for the safety of the aircraft or the persons on the aircraft; and
(c) the pilot in command informs air traffic control about the non compliance as soon as practicable after the pilot in command is unable to comply with the clearance or instructions.
(3) A person commits an offence of strict liability if the person contravenes subregulation (1).
Penalty: 50 penalty units.
Note: A defendant bears an evidential burden in relation to the matters in subregulation (2): see subsection 13.3(3) of the Criminal Code.
The other point to note is that there is no mention of “entry” into controlled airspace in CASR 91.257(1). On the face of CASR 91.257 alone, and in contrast to CAR 100, there is no prohibition on entry into controlled airspace without a clearance.
So CASR 91.257(1) prohibits deviations from ATC clearances or instructions already given. The exception in CASR 91.257(2) – a defence for which the PIC bears the evidential burden – applies only to those deviations.
Where did the prohibition on entry into controlled airspace without a clearance go, and where is the exception if I decide I need to do it in an emergency?
The prohibition on entry into controlled airspace without a clearance is now split over two places, and there are two potential exceptions, each of which exceptions has its own, different, criteria and neither of which exceptions is in the same terms as the exception in CASR 91.257(2).
The Part 91 MOS says this at section 11.15:
11.15 Control zones and control areas — entry into Class A, B, C, D or E airspace
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), a pilot in command of an aircraft must not enter a control zone or a control area that is Class A, B, C, D or E airspace without ATC clearance.
(2) Despite subsection (1), a VFR flight does not require clearance to enter Class E airspace.
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply when an ATC service is not in operation for the control zone or the control area.
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), a pilot in command of an aircraft must not enter a control zone or a control area that is Class A, B, C, D or E airspace without ATC clearance.
(2) Despite subsection (1), a VFR flight does not require clearance to enter Class E airspace.
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply when an ATC service is not in operation for the control zone or the control area.
(As an aside, I don’t see how a prohibition on doing something counts as a ‘standard’. Nor do I understand how the prohibition from deviating from a clearance remains in CASR but the prohibition on entry in controlled airspace without a clearance gets a guernsey in a MOS. It’s incoherent to me. But don’t get me started…)
There are no ‘consequence’ provisions in a MOS because a MOS is (or is supposed to be) just a bunch of ‘standards’. The primary ‘consequence’ provision for the Part 91 MOS is back up in CASR, at 91.255:
91.255 Air traffic services—prescribed requirements
(1) The Part 91 Manual of Standards may prescribe requirements in relation to the use by an aircraft of [blah blah blah…]
(2) The pilot in command of an aircraft for a flight contravenes this subregulation if a requirement mentioned in subregulation (1) is not met for the flight.
(3) A person commits an offence of strict liability if the person contravenes subregulation (2).
Penalty: 50 penalty units.
(1) The Part 91 Manual of Standards may prescribe requirements in relation to the use by an aircraft of [blah blah blah…]
(2) The pilot in command of an aircraft for a flight contravenes this subregulation if a requirement mentioned in subregulation (1) is not met for the flight.
(3) A person commits an offence of strict liability if the person contravenes subregulation (2).
Penalty: 50 penalty units.
Let’s take an example, from a common scenario (for me) that develops into an emergency (mercifully not a common scenario for me).
I’m orbiting a little bit west of Black Mountain tower, outside Class C airspace at 3,500’, having contacted Canberra tower and asked for an inbound clearance to YSCB. Canberra tower acknowledges my request, gives me squawk code and instructs me to remain outside Class C airspace. I acknowledge and comply with that instruction.
Smoke then starts billowing from behind and under my instrument panel. My passengers start panicking. I immediately turn my aircraft to point straight at the intersection of the YSCB runways. which I can see from my current location and are in gliding distance if my engine fails.
Three seconds later I’m in the YSCB Class C without a clearance.
Strict liability offence under CASR 91.255(3). Potential defences: section 30 of the CA Act and section 13 of the Criminal Code.
I then declare a mayday and YSCB TWR gives me a clearance to join right downwind for RWY 30. I acknowledge that clearance.
Things get worse. Turns out that the smoke is coming from my COMM RxTx. It fails. I decide to turn towards and land at the closest runway, which is 12.
Non-compliance with the acknowledged clearance: strict liability offence under CASR 91.257(1). Potential defence: CASR 91.257(2).
I then land on RWY 12 without a clearance. (Because of the displaced threshold and the tailwind, I end up at the intersection with 35 and a number of RPT aircraft are instructed to go around.)
Strict liability offence under CASR 91.255(3). Potential defences: section 30 of the CA Act and section 13 of the Criminal Code.
In Part 2 I will give a ‘big hands small maps’ explanation of how the onuses and burdens of proof work for the various defences. But at this point I hope some readers comprehend why the answer to the OP’s question is unavoidably complex.
I’m now going flying for fun.
Last edited by Clinton McKenzie; 11th Jan 2024 at 18:49.
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When I was preparing for command training, I subscribed to Avplan EFB to allow full access to every CASA publication with search function. If you’re trying to find info re. PIC etc, the search function is excellent. Searching for the terms you’ve mentioned will bring up the exact right answers. You can generally get 30 days access to Avplan or Aus runways for free. That’s long enough to do all the searches.
When I was preparing for command training, I subscribed to Avplan EFB to allow full access to every CASA publication with search function. If you’re trying to find info re. PIC etc, the search function is excellent. Searching for the terms you’ve mentioned will bring up the exact right answers. You can generally get 30 days access to Avplan or Aus runways for free. That’s long enough to do all the searches.
interpreting the CASRs as a non lawyer is another.
In the regulatory rewrite of our Ops Manuals, we had 100+ years of flying experience sitting around a table. It took most of the afternoon for us to distill out and break down (into digestible chunks for pilots to easily understand) one reg and MOS ref in Part 121.
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I used to use the online docs a fair bit, but when I was in training I wanted to have the lot available without exception. It was just easy and stress free. Once I returned to GA instructing during and post COVID, I kept up the subscription.
Ok, so, do we all just roll over and give up?
I have no hesitation in confidently exercising the full privileges of a PIC. Like most people, I did the study, wrote notes, talked it over with trainers and got a good grip on “strick liability”. I don’t try to second guess the regs, or treat them like a typical CASA gotcha exam question.
The OP asked a very simple question, it needs a very simple answer. The scare mongering on many of the posts in this thread is not helpful. When I was a very junior pilot, the oldies seemed to delight in making a question into 10 more questions. now that I’m one of the oldies, I choose to be different and just answer the question, along with how I got the answer.
I have no hesitation in confidently exercising the full privileges of a PIC. Like most people, I did the study, wrote notes, talked it over with trainers and got a good grip on “strick liability”. I don’t try to second guess the regs, or treat them like a typical CASA gotcha exam question.
The OP asked a very simple question, it needs a very simple answer. The scare mongering on many of the posts in this thread is not helpful. When I was a very junior pilot, the oldies seemed to delight in making a question into 10 more questions. now that I’m one of the oldies, I choose to be different and just answer the question, along with how I got the answer.
Thank you for your post CM. A bugger's muddle indeed. It's almost as if in writing the regulations the writers kept tripping over themselves and then had to rewrite sections only to find further contradictions necessitating further rewrites resulting in more contradictions.........
I think the simple answer to the OP's question is answered in the link provided by Bleve. Where did they go? But that then begs the question what effect does that have (I've grossly simplified the issue) and you've begun the task of untangling the mess.
This is FAR 91.3
The FAR 91.3 far simpler, clearer and operationally practical than our version CASR 91.215.
Why don't we have something that closely resembles 91.3 (b)?
I think the simple answer to the OP's question is answered in the link provided by Bleve. Where did they go? But that then begs the question what effect does that have (I've grossly simplified the issue) and you've begun the task of untangling the mess.
This is FAR 91.3
FAR 91.3 Responsibility and authority of the pilot in command.
(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.
(b) In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency.
(c) Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under paragraph (b) of this section shall, upon the request of the Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to the Administrator.
(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.
(b) In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet that emergency.
(c) Each pilot in command who deviates from a rule under paragraph (b) of this section shall, upon the request of the Administrator, send a written report of that deviation to the Administrator.
Why don't we have something that closely resembles 91.3 (b)?
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Again, from the 1988 CARs:
Anyone able to locate an equivalent provision in CASR?
Emergency authority
145. In conforming with the rules ..., the pilot in command of an aircraft shall pay due regard to all dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances which may render a departure from those rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger.
145. In conforming with the rules ..., the pilot in command of an aircraft shall pay due regard to all dangers of navigation and collision and to any special circumstances which may render a departure from those rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger.
I was perhaps a little too flippant. How about a poorly governed regulator that has scant regard for the people who actually use the regulations to guide their operations? As a result, we've ended up with a system of regulations and other material that were written by lawyers, for lawyers. The fish rots from the head, as they say.
MickG0105 said:Yes I have. You only need to look at the first few pages of the formal transcript to understand what Capt S was required to do and the context.
This was a public hearing of the NTSB’s “Office Of Administrative Law Judges”. Capt S was in front of a Board of Inquiry and was required to answer questions asked by an NSTB safety investigator, a bloke who I think was from the French equivalent of the NTSB, Ms Kolander from the Association of Flight Attendants (as you’ve noted), a representative of the FAA, a representative of the US Airline Pilots Association, and three members of the Board of Inquiry.
You and I might disagree as to the proper metaphor for the process, but it certainly did not comprise Capt S merely explaining, in a quiet chat with an NTSB investigator, what he deemed necessary to be done in the emergency, with no further comment, and the NTSB accepting that and moving on. Capt S was, in effect, cross-examined publicly about his actions – sometimes gently in his interests and sometimes more aggressively – by a number of people outside the NTSB as well as NTSB itself. (I'm confident that no PIC of an Australian RPT aircraft would expect to be formally and publicly questioned by a representative of the Flight Attendant's Association in the wake of an incident, as part of an ATSB investigation. But I'm happy to stand corrected.)
Sure: Capt S lives happily ever after. But that’s only after he was put under intense public, NTSB-mandated scrutiny involving non-NTSB people asking him questions.
My perhaps poorly made point is that there is no magic law to the effect that a PIC’s judgments in an emergency will never be the subject of any critical scrutiny and never result in negative consequences.
This was a public hearing of the NTSB’s “Office Of Administrative Law Judges”. Capt S was in front of a Board of Inquiry and was required to answer questions asked by an NSTB safety investigator, a bloke who I think was from the French equivalent of the NTSB, Ms Kolander from the Association of Flight Attendants (as you’ve noted), a representative of the FAA, a representative of the US Airline Pilots Association, and three members of the Board of Inquiry.
You and I might disagree as to the proper metaphor for the process, but it certainly did not comprise Capt S merely explaining, in a quiet chat with an NTSB investigator, what he deemed necessary to be done in the emergency, with no further comment, and the NTSB accepting that and moving on. Capt S was, in effect, cross-examined publicly about his actions – sometimes gently in his interests and sometimes more aggressively – by a number of people outside the NTSB as well as NTSB itself. (I'm confident that no PIC of an Australian RPT aircraft would expect to be formally and publicly questioned by a representative of the Flight Attendant's Association in the wake of an incident, as part of an ATSB investigation. But I'm happy to stand corrected.)
Sure: Capt S lives happily ever after. But that’s only after he was put under intense public, NTSB-mandated scrutiny involving non-NTSB people asking him questions.
My perhaps poorly made point is that there is no magic law to the effect that a PIC’s judgments in an emergency will never be the subject of any critical scrutiny and never result in negative consequences.
But they do stupendously more flying in the US don't they? And they have more lawyers.
Here you can not even sue a driver that damages your car if they are insured, even if the insurer is stalling payment. You have to wait significant time and go through the ombudsman before it can progress.
BTW none of this means you should think twice about performing your duty when faced with an emergency. The rules are written in a way that prevents you from intentionally or negligently doing something and then claiming it was an emergency to get away with it. Like knowingly pushing weather and then claiming it was due 'stress of weather', when you had several other options that were just inconvenient to you. However that does mean that after an actual emergency you will most likely have to submit a report, and then most likely face some form of investigation/interview or possibly even nothing and life goes on.
The Sully movie made it appear that the NTSB investigators took an adversarial approach and were extremely critical of Sully's actions, but how much of that is actually true? I recall that some investigators expressed their disappointment (to put it mildly) at the way they were portrayed in the movie. Perhaps you'd care to rise to Mick's challenge and provide some evidence to support your claim?
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I have. I described the process I went through and the tools I used and sent a reference via PM to wnafly to explain Strict liability. What I didn’t do was try to scaremonger that if they aren’t a lawyer, get ready to suffer.