Another disaster averted
Always sage advice.
I can't find any reference to the VA flight actually declaring a fuel emergency. They had previously advised ATC that they would likely need to do so at around 1003.
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At 0937 the crew of Qantas 735 contacted the crew of Velocity 1384 to discuss the arrival and the crew of Velocity 1384 stated that they were tracking to the initial waypoint to commence the RNAV GNSS approach to runway 27. At 0939 the crew of a Qantaslink Bombardier DHC-8 aircraft (Dash-8) broadcast to traffic at Mildura that they were conducting a go-around. The crew of Velocity 1384 asked for an appreciation of the weather and were told by the Dash-8 crew that at the minima, they ‘couldn’t see anything’.
At 0940 the crew of Qantas 735 contacted Velocity 1384 to advise that they were commencing the RNAV GNSS approach ‘due fuel’. The Velocity 1384 FO replied that they were ‘in the same boat’ but, after discussion between the captain and FO of Velocity 1384, they elected to hold and allow Qantas 735 to continue with the approach. This decision was passed to the crew of Qantas 735. The crew of Qantas 735 applied a revised minimum to the approach that was 200 ft lower than that published. This was based on the knowledge that the cloud base would preclude becoming visual via a normal approach. The crew reported that as they descended toward the revised minimum, the extent of the cloud reduced and they gained sufficient visual reference of the runway environment to continue the approach. At 0946 the crew of Qantas 735 broadcast that they had landed at Mildura. The aircraft landed on runway 27 with the required fuel reserves intact and the crew reported that the runway was visible once they descended below the cloud.
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At 0937 the crew of Qantas 735 contacted the crew of Velocity 1384 to discuss the arrival and the crew of Velocity 1384 stated that they were tracking to the initial waypoint to commence the RNAV GNSS approach to runway 27. At 0939 the crew of a Qantaslink Bombardier DHC-8 aircraft (Dash-8) broadcast to traffic at Mildura that they were conducting a go-around. The crew of Velocity 1384 asked for an appreciation of the weather and were told by the Dash-8 crew that at the minima, they ‘couldn’t see anything’.
At 0940 the crew of Qantas 735 contacted Velocity 1384 to advise that they were commencing the RNAV GNSS approach ‘due fuel’. The Velocity 1384 FO replied that they were ‘in the same boat’ but, after discussion between the captain and FO of Velocity 1384, they elected to hold and allow Qantas 735 to continue with the approach. This decision was passed to the crew of Qantas 735. The crew of Qantas 735 applied a revised minimum to the approach that was 200 ft lower than that published. This was based on the knowledge that the cloud base would preclude becoming visual via a normal approach. The crew reported that as they descended toward the revised minimum, the extent of the cloud reduced and they gained sufficient visual reference of the runway environment to continue the approach. At 0946 the crew of Qantas 735 broadcast that they had landed at Mildura. The aircraft landed on runway 27 with the required fuel reserves intact and the crew reported that the runway was visible once they descended below the cloud.
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At 0950, Velocity 1384 sought an update on the weather from Qantas 735, who stated that the fog had appeared to be getting thicker but was now clearing, although the cloud was still below minima.
At 0952, Velocity 1384 updated ATC that they were still holding due to the low cloud at Mildura. ATC asked them to nominate a latest divert time to proceed to a suitable airport. The FO replied that they did not have the fuel to proceed anywhere else. After obtaining further information from the crew, ATC initiated an alert phase and at 0958, after contacting the crew again, ATC activated the Mildura Airport emergency procedures.
At 0954, the controller made another ‘all stations’ broadcast with the latest TAF issued for Mildura, valid from 1000. This forecast predicted:
• visibility as 3 km in mist
• scattered cloud at 300 ft AGL
• an improvement in both visibility and cloud base in the hour from 1000
• a 30 per cent probability of the visibility reducing to 500 m in fog for the period between 1000 and 1200.
Given their available fuel, the crew of Velocity 1384 determined that they needed to commence an approach just after 1000 to allow for a second approach if needed. They discussed the conduct of a ‘sighting’ approach to ensure the aircraft was aligned with the runway from the RNAV GNSS approach. The captain was still the pilot flying; however, they briefed that if at any time during the approach the FO sighted the runway, then the FO was to take control and land. At 1002, Velocity 1384 transmitted that they were on a 4 NM (7 km) final for the RNAV GNSS approach.
At 1004, as they were not visual with the runway, the crew initiated a missed approach from 132 ft AGL. The FO reported that as they commenced the missed approach, it was possible to confirm that they were aligned with the runway by looking directly down.
At 1012, ATC initiated a distress phase. The aircraft was positioned for a second approach, during which the cabin crew were briefed and prepared for an emergency landing, briefing the passengers to brace accordingly.
At 1014, Velocity 1384 landed at Mildura in foggy conditions with fuel below the required reserves. As they taxied in, the captain told the cabin crew to stand down and normal arrival procedures resumed.
At 0950, Velocity 1384 sought an update on the weather from Qantas 735, who stated that the fog had appeared to be getting thicker but was now clearing, although the cloud was still below minima.
At 0952, Velocity 1384 updated ATC that they were still holding due to the low cloud at Mildura. ATC asked them to nominate a latest divert time to proceed to a suitable airport. The FO replied that they did not have the fuel to proceed anywhere else. After obtaining further information from the crew, ATC initiated an alert phase and at 0958, after contacting the crew again, ATC activated the Mildura Airport emergency procedures.
At 0954, the controller made another ‘all stations’ broadcast with the latest TAF issued for Mildura, valid from 1000. This forecast predicted:
• visibility as 3 km in mist
• scattered cloud at 300 ft AGL
• an improvement in both visibility and cloud base in the hour from 1000
• a 30 per cent probability of the visibility reducing to 500 m in fog for the period between 1000 and 1200.
Given their available fuel, the crew of Velocity 1384 determined that they needed to commence an approach just after 1000 to allow for a second approach if needed. They discussed the conduct of a ‘sighting’ approach to ensure the aircraft was aligned with the runway from the RNAV GNSS approach. The captain was still the pilot flying; however, they briefed that if at any time during the approach the FO sighted the runway, then the FO was to take control and land. At 1002, Velocity 1384 transmitted that they were on a 4 NM (7 km) final for the RNAV GNSS approach.
At 1004, as they were not visual with the runway, the crew initiated a missed approach from 132 ft AGL. The FO reported that as they commenced the missed approach, it was possible to confirm that they were aligned with the runway by looking directly down.
At 1012, ATC initiated a distress phase. The aircraft was positioned for a second approach, during which the cabin crew were briefed and prepared for an emergency landing, briefing the passengers to brace accordingly.
At 1014, Velocity 1384 landed at Mildura in foggy conditions with fuel below the required reserves. As they taxied in, the captain told the cabin crew to stand down and normal arrival procedures resumed.
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That is not supported by the facts in the ATSB report. Here are some excerpts:
So conditions deteriorated after QF landed, they did not improved. The first SPECI which didn’t have FG on it was issues over an hour after they landed. Holding would not have improved their ability to get in, as indeed was proven by the difficulty that VA experienced shortly afterward.
Again, there is no real equivalency to the SQ incident. After being confronted with unforcast fog in ADL both VA and QF were confronted with unforcast fog in MIA. The TEMPO was only for BKN 600’. So again the forecast was wrong and conditions much worse than advertised.
VA also made an approach below minima prior to declaring a mayday but you don’t criticise them, only Qantas. Rather than analyse this serious SQ incident you only seem interested in taking pot shots at QF over an unrelated historical incident.
So conditions deteriorated after QF landed, they did not improved. The first SPECI which didn’t have FG on it was issues over an hour after they landed. Holding would not have improved their ability to get in, as indeed was proven by the difficulty that VA experienced shortly afterward.
Again, there is no real equivalency to the SQ incident. After being confronted with unforcast fog in ADL both VA and QF were confronted with unforcast fog in MIA. The TEMPO was only for BKN 600’. So again the forecast was wrong and conditions much worse than advertised.
VA also made an approach below minima prior to declaring a mayday but you don’t criticise them, only Qantas. Rather than analyse this serious SQ incident you only seem interested in taking pot shots at QF over an unrelated historical incident.
So what happened is a QF crew busted a minima by significant margin, while they still had significant fuel to hold or conduct a missed approach and try a second attempt. I can not see how that is compliant with CAR 257. The VA aircraft waited for QF, and when their fuel was at minimum attempted an approach. QF then has done everything to cover up what the crew did here, including letting them depart when they were involved in a serious incident, ie knowingly busting a minima.
The crew reported that as they descended toward the revised minimum, the extent of the cloud reduced and they gained sufficient visual reference of the runway environment to continue the approach
the crew reported that the runway was visible once they descended below the cloud.
At 0948 the crew of the Dash-8 asked Qantas 735 for their assessment of the weather. The crew replied that the cloud base was at 150 ft AGL and that they had landed off the approach ‘due fuel’. At this time, a SPECI was issued for Mildura, showing visibility was now 900 m in fog and that the cloud was overcast at 100 ft AGL.
PS I'm not interested in perpetuating this topic, just responding to who is.
Last edited by 43Inches; 7th Oct 2023 at 01:22.
As for SQ is any more dangerous that any other airline in the region, I think something happened in Bangkok a few years back to a local airline, the Rome incident, Munich incident, Perth incident, Mildura etc etc etc.
True dat, but that was just in response to SQ being the only airline that covers up events, not in regard to the flight crews actions. I do agree entirely the SQ event sounds like an almighty circus, and they have done similar in the past. But that has been covered to death by many other posters. My point is that airlines closer to home also tend to sweep things under the carpet, and in the not too distant past.
What are you talking about? This report is published and freely available to you and I by clicking on the link to the government website. Straw, meet man. If you want to go to town on QF or VA, start another thread called - "I Really Hate How These Airlines Cover Everything Up, And Here Is Why".
I'm not criticizing VA because they did everything right by the book and did not try to cover it up,… they rightfully declared an emergency when faced with a below minima landing and requested services.
So what happened is a QF crew busted a minima by significant margin, while they still had significant fuel to hold or conduct a missed approach and try a second attempt. I can not see how that is compliant with CAR 257.
So what happened is a QF crew busted a minima by significant margin, while they still had significant fuel to hold or conduct a missed approach and try a second attempt. I can not see how that is compliant with CAR 257.
That makes no sense and shows your bias.
What are you talking about? This report is published and freely available to you and I by clicking on the link to the government website. Straw, meet man. If you want to go to town on QF or VA, start another thread called - "I Really Hate How These Airlines Cover Everything Up, And Here Is Why".
You contradict yourself. By your own assertion, VA made an approach below the minima prior to declaring a fuel emergency. The exact thing you are criticising QF for doing. They descended to the same height (150’) but did not get visual. If they had got visual at 150’ clearly they would have landed, just as QF did, but you criticise QF while saying VA ‘did everything right by the book’.
That makes no sense and shows your bias.
That makes no sense and shows your bias.
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I have no idea why you repeatedly refer to their ability to return to ADL. ADL still had fog, either destination would require busting a minima.
From the report:
So ADL still had fog 2 and a half hours after they landed in MIA. There was no port they could divert to or hold until it was have been above minima.
As to suggesting they breached CAR 257, again this is addressed in the report:
If you disagree with their interpretation of the law take it up with the ATSB, but don’t try to slander the crew and airline.
From the report:
Subsequent TTFs were issued for Adelaide, each extending the predicted time for the fog to clear. The first TTF with no fog present was issued at 1230.
As to suggesting they breached CAR 257, again this is addressed in the report:
The flight crews of Velocity 1384 and Qantas 735 had insufficient fuel to divert to another airport once they arrived at Mildura. Given the meteorological conditions were less than the landing minima for a Boeing 737, this constituted an emergency. As such, both crews were able to land under the provisions of CAR 257(5).
You are completely missing the point with blind faith in your masters. The crew had fuel to hold, there is no doubt, the fact they had fuel to return to ADL, with reserves intact, at a time after they had landed proves this, but they elected to land immediately by busting a minima. They had even discussed the possibility of an autoland from the ILS in ADL prior to descent. The ATSB went softly as they quoted CAR 257 as the out clause, so I can commit myself to an aerodrome and despite having significant fuel to hold I can just claim I busted minima and landed because I would run out of fuel some point later on. But I wont disclose how much fuel I had on board because it might mean I could have held until conditions improved.
And the point is not that they landed immediately, but they knowingly busted the minima in doing so. And then afterwards either did not report this, or were allowed to depart on the next sector. That in itself reflects badly on the operator. Maybe I should release some of the anecdotal evidence as well, that I was told on the day, but that might not go down well either.
BTW I have absolutely no problem in how the crew/operators acted in how they got to Mildura and became committed, the problem is what happened afterwards.
Yet half this thread is slandering another crew and airline. I'm just being the devils advocate and showing everyone does this, Australia has just been very lucky that the incidents did not convert into accidents. No one likes it when the focus is on their hen house.
PS I haven't even brought up the fact that they were given the fog update for ADL just after departing Sydney and calculated only scraping into ADL with the Fuel on board relying on Fog to lift on 'schedule'. Because we all know fog follows schedules and the forecasters have always got it right. So in this case like the SQ case the crew should have known better. Should we pick at the scab more or leave it there?
And the point is not that they landed immediately, but they knowingly busted the minima in doing so. And then afterwards either did not report this, or were allowed to depart on the next sector. That in itself reflects badly on the operator. Maybe I should release some of the anecdotal evidence as well, that I was told on the day, but that might not go down well either.
BTW I have absolutely no problem in how the crew/operators acted in how they got to Mildura and became committed, the problem is what happened afterwards.
If you disagree with their interpretation of the law take it up with the ATSB, but don’t try to slander the crew and airline.
PS I haven't even brought up the fact that they were given the fog update for ADL just after departing Sydney and calculated only scraping into ADL with the Fuel on board relying on Fog to lift on 'schedule'. Because we all know fog follows schedules and the forecasters have always got it right. So in this case like the SQ case the crew should have known better. Should we pick at the scab more or leave it there?
Last edited by 43Inches; 7th Oct 2023 at 03:37.
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Interrupting the QF/VA slanging match for just a moment:
The report also states, right at the start:
So Batam was not the planned alternate. Granted, Senai (Johor Bahru) is not much further away than Batam, but the Senai TAF the crew probably used before departure showed, at worst, TEMPO 5000 TSRA for the period Senai might have been needed. The earlier TAF didn't forecast any thunderstorms at Senai until much later.
Approaching SIN, the FMC estimated the aircraft would land with 7,000 kg, ie FRF plus about 4,000 kg (approx 40 minutes), so the crew did have the option to hold for a short time and then divert, or to throw away the alternate and hold for longer. In my view, and having operated in that region for close to 30 years, bunging on an extra 60 minutes would have been overkill, given that none of the forecasts indicated the weather would be as bad as eventuated. Putting on that much extra fuel is especially inefficient for an ULH flight, where you'd have to put on a whole bunch extra just to carry the extra 60 minutes to destination.
My opinion is the crew erred by trying to hold at SAMKO for too long, especially having already advised ATC they could only perform one hold. As stated in the report, if they'd diverted to Batam immediately after that first hold, they very likely would have landed while the weather was still ok.
Now, back to regular viewing...
In the incident at hand the report clearly states, right at the start:
So there were TEMPO thunder storms forecast for their arrival. It wasn’t a surprise. But they chose not to take 60 mins holding fuel. I don’t care what your fuel policy says is legal, that’s just stupid.
Before you argue they had diversion fuel, so don’t need an alternate, recall that Batam is 15Nm away from SIN. It is your base turn. You can’t be surprised that storms in SIN also lead to storms in Batam.
So there were TEMPO thunder storms forecast for their arrival. It wasn’t a surprise. But they chose not to take 60 mins holding fuel. I don’t care what your fuel policy says is legal, that’s just stupid.
Before you argue they had diversion fuel, so don’t need an alternate, recall that Batam is 15Nm away from SIN. It is your base turn. You can’t be surprised that storms in SIN also lead to storms in Batam.
The planned alternate destination airports were Paya Lebar Air Base in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur International Airport and Senai International Airport in the state of Johor in Malaysia.
Approaching SIN, the FMC estimated the aircraft would land with 7,000 kg, ie FRF plus about 4,000 kg (approx 40 minutes), so the crew did have the option to hold for a short time and then divert, or to throw away the alternate and hold for longer. In my view, and having operated in that region for close to 30 years, bunging on an extra 60 minutes would have been overkill, given that none of the forecasts indicated the weather would be as bad as eventuated. Putting on that much extra fuel is especially inefficient for an ULH flight, where you'd have to put on a whole bunch extra just to carry the extra 60 minutes to destination.
My opinion is the crew erred by trying to hold at SAMKO for too long, especially having already advised ATC they could only perform one hold. As stated in the report, if they'd diverted to Batam immediately after that first hold, they very likely would have landed while the weather was still ok.
Now, back to regular viewing...
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And gets back to my original argument, there are lots of factors that means this crew made one simple error and that was not to divert early enough. We all make mistakes. Like Mildura a series of events put this aircraft in a low fuel event, the result is the crew landed safely. They had the pre-flight fuel requirements. There's no government conspiracy or much evident cover up or hush hush by the media, it's just what it is. Every airline keeps things under lids until it's exposed, either by a regulatory investigation or by the media. If the media does not get wind of it early on it becomes less of a news story. If it's caught on the day it spreads like wildfire, sensational events, otherwise somebody monitoring the reports caught wind of this and published a 'this happened' report.
Approaching SIN, the FMC estimated the aircraft would land with 7,000 kg, ie FRF plus about 4,000 kg (approx 40 minutes), so the crew did have the option to hold for a short time and then divert, or to throw away the alternate and hold for longer. In my view, and having operated in that region for close to 30 years, bunging on an extra 60 minutes would have been overkill, given that none of the forecasts indicated the weather would be as bad as eventuated. Putting on that much extra fuel is especially inefficient for an ULH flight, where you'd have to put on a whole bunch extra just to carry the extra 60 minutes to destination.
My opinion is the crew erred by trying to hold at SAMKO for too long, especially having already advised ATC they could only perform one hold. As stated in the report, if they'd diverted to Batam immediately after that first hold, they very likely would have landed while the weather was still ok.
My opinion is the crew erred by trying to hold at SAMKO for too long, especially having already advised ATC they could only perform one hold. As stated in the report, if they'd diverted to Batam immediately after that first hold, they very likely would have landed while the weather was still ok.
LHR-SIN isn’t really ULH, that normally over 16 hours. LHR-SIN is more like 13 hours. Very easy range for a 773ER. I’d be very surprised if the weren’t able to put a few more tonnes of gas on to cover the TEMPO periods. Cost to carry is probably less than 500kg/tonne, so pretty cheap insurance.
The report reads as if they were in a major rush to land in Batam and that lead to errors on the approaches.
Would you be hand flying an ILS intercept in IMC at 1195’ if you had enough fuel for a leisurely 10mile final? The next approach had them again offset from the LOC and G/S leading to a GPWS and go-around 200’ off the deck. If they had more fuel, hence more time, I’m sure they could have completed the approach in a more stable manner.
1.5T of gas seems a small price to pay to avoid that scenario.
Fair enough if that’s your opinion BuzzBox, but I believe the situation would likely have been better handled if they had more fuel.
LHR-SIN isn’t really ULH, that normally over 16 hours. LHR-SIN is more like 13 hours. Very easy range for a 773ER. I’d be very surprised if the weren’t able to put a few more tonnes of gas on to cover the TEMPO periods. Cost to carry is probably less than 500kg/tonne, so pretty cheap insurance.
The report reads as if they were in a major rush to land in Batam and that lead to errors on the approaches.
Would you be hand flying an ILS intercept in IMC at 1195’ if you had enough fuel for a leisurely 10mile final? The next approach had them again offset from the LOC and G/S leading to a GPWS and go-around 200’ off the deck. If they had more fuel, hence more time, I’m sure they could have completed the approach in a more stable manner.
1.5T of gas seems a small price to pay to avoid that scenario.
LHR-SIN isn’t really ULH, that normally over 16 hours. LHR-SIN is more like 13 hours. Very easy range for a 773ER. I’d be very surprised if the weren’t able to put a few more tonnes of gas on to cover the TEMPO periods. Cost to carry is probably less than 500kg/tonne, so pretty cheap insurance.
The report reads as if they were in a major rush to land in Batam and that lead to errors on the approaches.
Would you be hand flying an ILS intercept in IMC at 1195’ if you had enough fuel for a leisurely 10mile final? The next approach had them again offset from the LOC and G/S leading to a GPWS and go-around 200’ off the deck. If they had more fuel, hence more time, I’m sure they could have completed the approach in a more stable manner.
1.5T of gas seems a small price to pay to avoid that scenario.
Would extra fuel have made any difference to the outcome? We’ll never know, but it seems the crew was intent on holding as long as possible in the hope they’d land in Singapore. Extra fuel might only have prolonged that exercise, with the same result.
The key was knowing when to bug out with the fuel they had available.
The key was knowing when to bug out with the fuel they had available.
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Beer Baron:
Have you spoken to anyone who flies for SQ about this? I've not flown for this airline, but from friends who have (admittedly we're talking about a decade ago), taking extra fuel was, how shall we put it, very firmly discouraged.
I’d be very surprised if the weren’t able to put a few more tonnes of gas on to cover the TEMPO periods.
One of the Finnair operated Qantas flights diverted into Batam in the last few days after some holding inbound to Singapore?
I've no idea what the weather was or if it was even weather related, however it was nearly always a sector to throw on additional fuel for holding to prevent diversions and the subsequent knock-on impacts if the two crew ran out of hours. Not sure if Finnair are doing this with 2 pilots or 3.
I've no idea what the weather was or if it was even weather related, however it was nearly always a sector to throw on additional fuel for holding to prevent diversions and the subsequent knock-on impacts if the two crew ran out of hours. Not sure if Finnair are doing this with 2 pilots or 3.
The F28 became dangerously low on fuel and after circling for some time Captain Harold Rowell considered ditching the aircraft in the ocean. However, he eventually landed the jet on a gravel runway in the isolated town of Fitzroy Crossing, landing with less than ten minutes of fuel remaining.