Another disaster averted
We filed an alternate on every single flight. Typically Batam for Singapore, occasionally KL. But whether your fuel policy requires you to carry an alternate (SQ, CX etc) or holding fuel in lieu (Aus carriers), the trick is knowing when to give it away and divert.
That 3rd set of eyes on the flight deck might have helped, but he/she may not have been technically allowed there due being burned out and therefore required to rest in the cabin. I know nothing about Singapore FTL’s, but have operated under such requirements numerous times.
Interesting report.
That 3rd set of eyes on the flight deck might have helped, but he/she may not have been technically allowed there due being burned out and therefore required to rest in the cabin. I know nothing about Singapore FTL’s, but have operated under such requirements numerous times.
Interesting report.
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I understand you´re living rent free in your circus? You do come across as happy clueless clown. The uber Clown.
Lookleft, I’m surprised you’re so sensitive to this thread. The initial post was highlighting that there was no coverage in the press of such a close call. The investigation report itself does not mention the final fuel figure (other than well below FFR). Do you agree that this has been hushed up a little? Why so defensive?
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Report: Singapore B773 at Batam on Oct 25th 2022, landed significantly below required final reserve fuel
Quote:
"I happened to be on this flight and at the time couldn’t understand why they had not diverted to KLIA or Batam significantly earlier given the localise weather conditions.
Shortly after successful landing a short taxi was completed arriving near a gate, but before the doors were opened or a connecting bridge/stair way arrived, the aircraft lost all power, without warning. A refuelling was completed with passengers on board before attempting to restart the AGPU which ultimately failed. Later a ground generator arrived and provided external power which also continued to drop out frequently. In the end all passengers disembarked and were held until an engineering crew could be flown in from SIN. 30 minutes after engineering crew arrival the passengers reboarded, power restored and was able to take off.
Eventual arrival was 12+ hours after original scheduled arrival time."
Quote:
"I happened to be on this flight and at the time couldn’t understand why they had not diverted to KLIA or Batam significantly earlier given the localise weather conditions.
Shortly after successful landing a short taxi was completed arriving near a gate, but before the doors were opened or a connecting bridge/stair way arrived, the aircraft lost all power, without warning. A refuelling was completed with passengers on board before attempting to restart the AGPU which ultimately failed. Later a ground generator arrived and provided external power which also continued to drop out frequently. In the end all passengers disembarked and were held until an engineering crew could be flown in from SIN. 30 minutes after engineering crew arrival the passengers reboarded, power restored and was able to take off.
Eventual arrival was 12+ hours after original scheduled arrival time."
A common misconception is that FRF is the minimum fuel required at the end of the landing roll. 30 minutes.
part 91extract of the MOS..
I could well be incorrect but have a think about this statement and what your company considers minimum fuel. There is something incorrect in the interpretation or application of the MOS part 91 here in Stralya by some airlines including the big one.
Waiting to be corrected but it doesn’t matter until it does.
part 91extract of the MOS..
I could well be incorrect but have a think about this statement and what your company considers minimum fuel. There is something incorrect in the interpretation or application of the MOS part 91 here in Stralya by some airlines including the big one.
Waiting to be corrected but it doesn’t matter until it does.
I can't think of any checklist/Flight manual procedure on anything I've flown that would not be covered by the addition of that word.
I actually feel a bit sorry for them . Once they decided to divert the tetris pieces came fast and faster .
Im sure nobody sims for what , 2 or 3, GAs when the fuel is getting super tight .
Did it say why there was " no auto land "displayed , was it a switch pigs ?
Im sure nobody sims for what , 2 or 3, GAs when the fuel is getting super tight .
Did it say why there was " no auto land "displayed , was it a switch pigs ?
You’d think that any SIN based pilot would know without looking at the port pages that their primary alternate didn’t have A/L capability
Johor Bahru is also available just up the road - I wasn’t there but I just can’t imagine that all three airports had crap weather.
Sounds like the crew threw away KL as a diversion option after the first go around
Any afternoon arrival in SE Asia can have “that” CB over the field - just take the gas
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What's the "misconception" of FRF in Australia? The prescribed FRF is a specified number of minutes of "flight time". An aircraft's "flight" ends "the moment at which it comes to rest after being airborne". That looks to me very much like the end of the landing roll. If it's intended to cover the period taxiing to the gate, that's not very clear.
The report also says the two planned destination alternates were Paya Lebar and Senai (Johor Bahru). The crew indicated that, while holding at PASPU, the aircraft's weather radar showed heavy precipitation over Changi and both the alternates, while the weather appeared fine over Batam.
Last edited by BuzzBox; 5th Oct 2023 at 03:08. Reason: Added info regarding weather at the alternates.
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What's the "misconception" of FRF in Australia? The prescribed FRF is a specified number of minutes of "flight time". An aircraft's "flight" ends "the moment at which it comes to rest after being airborne". That looks to me very much like the end of the landing roll. If it's intended to cover the period taxiing to the gate, that's not very clear.
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Whether you have fuel to taxi is a moot point, once you are cutting into final/fixed reserve prior to completing the landing you have busted the law and in emergency territory. If the engines stop due to fuel exhaustion just after vacating the runway it's obvious that you did not have 30 minutes airborne, or any sort of reserves remaining.
The most interesting part of the report is the final landing. They obviously knew they were just about on fumes with a teardrop procedure onto the landing runway. This would have been so outside the box for the crew, obviously hitting the oh **** point.
Culture certainly comes into play here, google and read the report on the 777 engine fire on the runway, hesitation and unwillingness to make a command decision.
I type this as I’m about to board an SQ flight so take that as you will.
Culture certainly comes into play here, google and read the report on the 777 engine fire on the runway, hesitation and unwillingness to make a command decision.
I type this as I’m about to board an SQ flight so take that as you will.
https://www.casa.gov.au/guidelines-a...r%20exposition.
read page 25.
737ng Low Fuel is at 1.8 FRF is approximately 1.2
787. Low Fuel is at 3.4 FRF is approximately 2.1
checklist says land asap.
To be honest, I think you're reading too much into the AC. The low fuel procedure (eg. open crossfeed valves, boost pumps on, etc) is intended to ensure the fuel remaining is usable by the engines. The fuel quantity that triggers the procedures is not a "minimum fuel quantity" below which you're not supposed to operate, even though you might need to land ASAP.
Of course, and yes.
To be honest, I think you're reading too much into the AC. The low fuel procedure (eg. open crossfeed valves, boost pumps on, etc) is intended to ensure the fuel remaining is usable by the engines. The fuel quantity that triggers the procedures is not a "minimum fuel quantity" below which you're not supposed to operate, even though you might need to land ASAP.
To be honest, I think you're reading too much into the AC. The low fuel procedure (eg. open crossfeed valves, boost pumps on, etc) is intended to ensure the fuel remaining is usable by the engines. The fuel quantity that triggers the procedures is not a "minimum fuel quantity" below which you're not supposed to operate, even though you might need to land ASAP.
from the QRH (Boeing 787)
a couple of pertinent notes to help your decision making process
Note: Avoid high nose up attitude. Make thrust changes slowly and smoothly. This reduces the possibility of uncovering fuel pumps
Note: Use flaps 20 and VREF 20 for landing. Increased airspeed at flaps 20 gives improved elevator control for landing flare in the event of a dual engine flameout. Check the Non-Normal Configuration Landing Distance tables in the Performance Inflight-QRH chapter or other approved source.
Are you sure about that?
from the QRH (Boeing 787)
a couple of pertinent notes to help your decision making process
Note: Avoid high nose up attitude. Make thrust changes slowly and smoothly. This reduces the possibility of uncovering fuel pumps
Note: Use flaps 20 and VREF 20 for landing. Increased airspeed at flaps 20 gives improved elevator control for landing flare in the event of a dual engine flameout. Check the Non-Normal Configuration Landing Distance tables in the Performance Inflight-QRH chapter or other approved source.
from the QRH (Boeing 787)
a couple of pertinent notes to help your decision making process
Note: Avoid high nose up attitude. Make thrust changes slowly and smoothly. This reduces the possibility of uncovering fuel pumps
Note: Use flaps 20 and VREF 20 for landing. Increased airspeed at flaps 20 gives improved elevator control for landing flare in the event of a dual engine flameout. Check the Non-Normal Configuration Landing Distance tables in the Performance Inflight-QRH chapter or other approved source.
If you think it's an issue, I suggest you take it up with your fleet technical people.
Sorry, but it doesn't disturb. The title says it all "Another disaster averted". Why anyone would think it disturbing is a reflection of their own thinking, rather than the event.
In this case the crew used all the fuel before making the decision they had to land. In the Mildura situation the first jet to land 'may' have had over an hour of fuel left on board, but still busted the minima, and the company made sure the actual fuel logs and state were not released to the ATSB, the ATSB only had access to the dispatch calculation and a statement 'the captain routinely uplifts more fuel'. Prior to diversion the first crew to land there stated in the report that they had enough fuel to cover a TEMPO on arrival at Mildura, however they basically went straight into the approach 'due fuel' and landed. The ATSB even calculated that if they had held at altitude they could have still returned to Adelaide at 0955 almost 10 minutes after they had landed in Mildura, and that was based on minimum fuel uplift from Sydney. I don't have to tell you which airline that was, it was not SQ, and I would consider the lack of compliance with the ATSB on the issue as substantial or the ATSB has chosen not to release such data due to the implications with regard to CAR 257. Now does that constitute an airline having its arse covered or not...