New ‘Security’ Measures
I find it somewhat amusing that getting through screening in the US as crew is significantly easier, quicker and much less hassle than it is going through screening in Australia.
They at least, it seems, acknowlege that having been put through the wringer to get crew visas and security clearances for ID’s that they would have identified any issues much earlier than when you turned up at the airport ready to “take over an aeroplane”
In the US we get treated much like the punters enrolled in the TSA’s trusted traveller programs. https://www.dhs.gov/trusted-traveler-programs
It would never happen in Australia because of our seemingly unendless desire to bow to the tall poppie syndrome - we could never be seen to get preferential treatment just because we are crew, so the great egalatarian ethos keeps us firmly in our place.
To me there needs to be a risk based approach to this, we get a rectal probe every time we renew out Asic, we get trusted with the lives of those we fly around and we get trusted with a multi million dollar machine, so perhaps there is some element of trustworthiness that can be extended to the other palava.
Engineers, cabin crew same same. The engineers particularly are the other major group who are “careerists” in so much as we tend to get into the flying/fixing game and whilst we might move airlines/businesses throughout the course of our respective careers, we stay pretty much in the same job. So we have an investment in our careers both in terms of money, effort and future employment, so perhaps we can be trusted just a little
They at least, it seems, acknowlege that having been put through the wringer to get crew visas and security clearances for ID’s that they would have identified any issues much earlier than when you turned up at the airport ready to “take over an aeroplane”
In the US we get treated much like the punters enrolled in the TSA’s trusted traveller programs. https://www.dhs.gov/trusted-traveler-programs
It would never happen in Australia because of our seemingly unendless desire to bow to the tall poppie syndrome - we could never be seen to get preferential treatment just because we are crew, so the great egalatarian ethos keeps us firmly in our place.
To me there needs to be a risk based approach to this, we get a rectal probe every time we renew out Asic, we get trusted with the lives of those we fly around and we get trusted with a multi million dollar machine, so perhaps there is some element of trustworthiness that can be extended to the other palava.
Engineers, cabin crew same same. The engineers particularly are the other major group who are “careerists” in so much as we tend to get into the flying/fixing game and whilst we might move airlines/businesses throughout the course of our respective careers, we stay pretty much in the same job. So we have an investment in our careers both in terms of money, effort and future employment, so perhaps we can be trusted just a little
Yes, it says Platypus was stealing a story from Peter Ustinov!
Or Oscar Wilde, Evelyn Waugh, Michael Foot or Gilbert Harding - to all of whom that quip has been attributed at one time or another.
Or Oscar Wilde, Evelyn Waugh, Michael Foot or Gilbert Harding - to all of whom that quip has been attributed at one time or another.
I think we've been over all these issues a million times before, and people still haven't come to grips with the big picture. Yes, there's a million little anomalies that, when viewed in isolation, make the big picture appear nutty.
We have to remember a few things:
Security is a huge big organism and the aviation security measures we see in daily life is just one little annoying part of the big machine. I'm convinced it continues to fill a purpose.
We have to remember a few things:
- Aviation Security...like any Security, will NEVER be foolproof
- Does it really matter who the share holders of a Security Company are? Who owns Qantas? Who owns Virgin? No, it's who is on the ground, or in the seat, that really matters
- Aviation Security is a deterrent...nothing more
- Everyone going through screening gets checked...otherwise the punters would be asking (valid) questions. Even Security Officers get screened before they can screen
- Not every would be terrorist is an evil genius...good example, the latest Sydney attempt using an over weight meat mincer. Perhaps we might catch a few of these enthusiastic amateurs, but we would be pretty lucky to catch an evil genius. That's just a fact of life. At least have a go at catching or deterring those we have a chance of deterring...and let the Feds search out the others.
- It's obvious from reading here that screening is a pain for most....sounds like its working to me
- Don't under estimate the other objective of screening...intercepting nasty, pointed, sharp things...that people still attempt to conceal in their carry on luggage. Do your cabin crew really want to be confronted with one of these pointed at them during a flight, because they refused service of alcohol?
- Yes, a pilot can easily bring down an aircraft without any outside assistance or tools...but it would be a big decision. Their employers are responsible for keeping an eye out for those sort of tendencies. Screening's part in the process is to make it harder to use other options.
Security is a huge big organism and the aviation security measures we see in daily life is just one little annoying part of the big machine. I'm convinced it continues to fill a purpose.
“[L]ittle anomalies”? That’s an interesting euphemism for gaping holes.
There were “little anomalies” in the defences of Singapore back in WWII, even though the British touted it as impregnable.
The system does continue to fill a purpose: To provide the facade of security, at the expense of the law-abiding.
Fortunately the real terrorists and maniacs have yet to resolve to exploit the “little anomalies” in the system. Let’s pray they never do.
There were “little anomalies” in the defences of Singapore back in WWII, even though the British touted it as impregnable.
The system does continue to fill a purpose: To provide the facade of security, at the expense of the law-abiding.
Fortunately the real terrorists and maniacs have yet to resolve to exploit the “little anomalies” in the system. Let’s pray they never do.
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Some of those same anomalies were pointed out by Sir John Wheeler in the Wheeler report , Circa September 2005.
A number of those numberous security shortcomings highlighted by the report are still there and still ignored !
Obviously Airport security holds a high priority with Government !
http://www.allthings.com.au/Catalogu...cingReview.pdf
A number of those numberous security shortcomings highlighted by the report are still there and still ignored !
Obviously Airport security holds a high priority with Government !
http://www.allthings.com.au/Catalogu...cingReview.pdf
Last edited by blow.n.gasket; 25th Oct 2017 at 06:01.
Do you not think the Government is aware of every existing anomaly in the system? Do you not think that every Minister with any sort of responsibility to Aviation Security has not tin platted his or her arse with a water tight Risk Assessment review, prepared by his or her senior staff, showing that all the likelihoods and consequences line up appropriately...and that all the appropriate controls are in place? These people may be dumb, but they're not stupid !
My feeling is that the latest changes are purely to placate the squeaky wheels...not to address a particular need.
My feeling is that the latest changes are purely to placate the squeaky wheels...not to address a particular need.
Everyone going through screening gets checked.
It's obvious from reading here that screening is a pain for most....sounds like its working to me
Yes, a pilot can easily bring down an aircraft without any outside assistance or tools...but it would be a big decision. Their employers are responsible for keeping an eye out for those sort of tendencies. Screening's part in the process is to make it harder to use other options.
Sorry if it seems like I'm having a go at you - I agree with your other points, and appreciate you coming on here and politely defending what to many of us seems like nonsense at times.
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Yes, it says Platypus was stealing a story from Peter Ustinov!
Reckon you could be quite correct!
It’s not the cost: It’s whether what is spent gets the best security for the buck, and the answer to that question is no.
Making the ASIC ID process more inconvenient and expensive for pilots will do nothing to increase security. Why is it happening? Simple: Because it can, without any political consequences.
Requiring photo ID for all commercial passengers could be done with the stroke of a pen. No ID? About turn out of the terminal and have a nice day. Why isn’t it happening? Simple: Because there would be political consequences.
British General, Singapore before the fall: Bolster the defences for an attack from the sea!
Hapless Minion: Sir, maybe the Japanese will invade on pushbike, down the peninsular. Maybe the seaward defences are adequate and we’d be better off bolstering the defences on the peninsular side.
British General: Nonsense, Hapless Minion! An invasion on pushbike? The attack will be against our strongest defences! Bolster the sea defences!
If there is a terrorist or maniac attack on an aircraft in Australia (and touch wood there isn’t) I reckon it will be by the equivalent of a Japanese soldier on a pushbike. Straight through the back door.
Making the ASIC ID process more inconvenient and expensive for pilots will do nothing to increase security. Why is it happening? Simple: Because it can, without any political consequences.
Requiring photo ID for all commercial passengers could be done with the stroke of a pen. No ID? About turn out of the terminal and have a nice day. Why isn’t it happening? Simple: Because there would be political consequences.
British General, Singapore before the fall: Bolster the defences for an attack from the sea!
Hapless Minion: Sir, maybe the Japanese will invade on pushbike, down the peninsular. Maybe the seaward defences are adequate and we’d be better off bolstering the defences on the peninsular side.
British General: Nonsense, Hapless Minion! An invasion on pushbike? The attack will be against our strongest defences! Bolster the sea defences!
If there is a terrorist or maniac attack on an aircraft in Australia (and touch wood there isn’t) I reckon it will be by the equivalent of a Japanese soldier on a pushbike. Straight through the back door.
No need to apologise. I'm a big boy.... I can take it. And, I don't have all the answers...only an opinion.
Unfortunately, I haven't seen the answers from anyone else here...only gripes... Interspersed with a smattering of ill informed generalisations.
The bottom line is.....it is impossible to satisfactorily sterilise everyone who goes airside.
So, do you give up and throw your hands in the air....or do you do what is achievable and economical?
That, together with other, not always visible, controls....should provide an acceptable residue risk.
If it doesn't , then additional measures need to be put in place, but....who is it that knows if we have an acceptable residue risk? The pollies, I guess.
So, we either accept that, or we promote the notion that we know better than they...who have all the information.
I'm the last one to say trust a pollie, but I guess there comes a time that we have to trust them to do the job we pay them to. If we don't like how they're doing their job...get rid of them at the next election.
Unfortunately, I haven't seen the answers from anyone else here...only gripes... Interspersed with a smattering of ill informed generalisations.
The bottom line is.....it is impossible to satisfactorily sterilise everyone who goes airside.
So, do you give up and throw your hands in the air....or do you do what is achievable and economical?
That, together with other, not always visible, controls....should provide an acceptable residue risk.
If it doesn't , then additional measures need to be put in place, but....who is it that knows if we have an acceptable residue risk? The pollies, I guess.
So, we either accept that, or we promote the notion that we know better than they...who have all the information.
I'm the last one to say trust a pollie, but I guess there comes a time that we have to trust them to do the job we pay them to. If we don't like how they're doing their job...get rid of them at the next election.
.....it is impossible to satisfactorily sterilise everyone who goes airside.
So, do you give up and throw your hands in the air....or do you do what is achievable and economical?
Your sentence should be: You do what has the greatest causal effect on aviation security, for the cost.
That, together with other, not always visible, controls....should provide an acceptable residue risk.
That’s merely an expression of earnest hope.
If it doesn't , then additional measures need to be put in place, but....who is it that knows if we have an acceptable residue risk? The pollies, I guess.
Whilst is it true that is impossible to satisfactorily sterilise everyone who goes airside, the ease with which the sterilisation measures can be circumvented suggests the assessment of acceptable residual risk is more about astrology than risk assessment.
So, we either accept that, or we promote the notion that we know better than they...who have all the information.
I'm the last one to say trust a pollie, but I guess there comes a time that we have to trust them to do the job we pay them to. If we don't like how they're doing their job...get rid of them at the next election.
The reason the people who know better don’t point out the patent inconsistencies in the system is the that almost inevitable outcome would be more inconvenience and costs to the law-abiding rather than a re-jigging of the system so as to deal with risks in a consistent way.
Lead Baloon, you've said it all in your second last paragraph....the probability is low.
So, why can't the Pollies also accept that probability and tailor their measures to it...like they have. That is how risk management works.
You appear to be supporting a case where there is an expectation that measures to counter a (non existing) higher probability are implemented.
So, why can't the Pollies also accept that probability and tailor their measures to it...like they have. That is how risk management works.
You appear to be supporting a case where there is an expectation that measures to counter a (non existing) higher probability are implemented.
[W]hy can't the Pollies also accept that probability and tailor their measures to it...like they have.
The measures have not been tailored to get the best security outcome for the cost, but rather to get what’s easiest and looks good. That’s why the usual methods for access to many regional aerodromes by-pass the ‘security’ infrastructure. Lots of ‘criminal’ activity, but terrorists and maniacs don’t care about the law. That’s why the ASIC ID requirements are becoming more complex and incoherent when measured against the risks and whether the requirements actually mitigate those risks. Just keep piling it on to pilots. Curious that the same requirements aren’t imposed on pilots in the USA.
This is the kind of thing that produced the circumstances that triggered this thread. We have a security system in which the least-trusted class of persons as to background and identity is pilots, who sit in the cockpit and watch a bunch of people of unknown identity or security risk or even known-dubious backgrounds wandering happy as a cloud airside, unscreened.
I stress - because this is my key point - that I’m not advocating for filing the gaping holes at the same time as piling more and more requirement on pilots, but rather for mitigation measures that are appropriate to the risk. If having terrorists or maniacs airside is a risk worth mitigating, it’s incoherent to mitigate that risk by implementing hairy-chested security measures for the people who come in through one door while leaving other doors or windows open.
