E190 near collision Mildura May 16 - ASI bulletin 56
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The report that's right under my nose is based on TCAS data that the report itself says in "indicative only".
Crew observations and interviewed witnesses were among others used for the report.
What relevance does your TCAS TA in controlled airspace have to this discussion?
Was the pilot of XGA interviewed?
You're obviously very proud of your masterpiece, so you should have first hand-knowledge of whether the pilot of XGA was interviewed.
The closest point of the "near collision" is based on TCAS data.
The relevance to the rule in controlled airspace is relevant to the well-known limitations of TCAS and the well-known natural propensity to react in a particular way.
You're obviously very proud of your masterpiece, so you should have first hand-knowledge of whether the pilot of XGA was interviewed.
The closest point of the "near collision" is based on TCAS data.
The relevance to the rule in controlled airspace is relevant to the well-known limitations of TCAS and the well-known natural propensity to react in a particular way.
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You keep assuming that the only method of getting the facts is from TCAS data. You tell me if the pilot was interviewed?
Of course TCAS has limitations and is another reason not to rely on it for separation. The CAAPS recommend it and is why it needs reviewing. Im led to believe by your post that you agree. Crew observations in the report mention the two aircraft were on a collision course without prior warning.
Of course TCAS has limitations and is another reason not to rely on it for separation. The CAAPS recommend it and is why it needs reviewing. Im led to believe by your post that you agree. Crew observations in the report mention the two aircraft were on a collision course without prior warning.
Originally Posted by LB
The relevance to the rule in controlled airspace is relevant to the well-known limitations of TCAS and the well-known natural propensity to react in a particular way.
The TA would probably have been an RA but the EJet was too low.
Must be hard, LB, arguing about things you know nothing about, not being a pilot and all. Your brain's trust must be working overtime what with all their CTAF+jet experience...
You wrote the report, Utradar. Was the pilot of XGA interviewed or not?
"The TA would probably have been an RA but the EJet was too low." Although my brains trust tells me that the RA function was probably disabled as a consequence of the Jet's height, they also say that your assertion that "the TA would probably have been an RA" is mere speculation. Given your propensity to exaggerate risks, that is unsurprising.
"The TA would probably have been an RA but the EJet was too low." Although my brains trust tells me that the RA function was probably disabled as a consequence of the Jet's height, they also say that your assertion that "the TA would probably have been an RA" is mere speculation. Given your propensity to exaggerate risks, that is unsurprising.
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I didn't write the report. I'm stating from the report that the crew observed XGA on a collision course.
Don't you believe the ATSB? That would make you a conspiracy theorist.
Don't you believe the ATSB? That would make you a conspiracy theorist.
Last edited by Utradar; 6th Feb 2017 at 18:49.
I'll track down the primary regulatory references, but meanwhile my brains trust tells me that this stuff from AC 12-55C, although merely guidance, does provide some relevant insights:
I added the bolding to (d) and (e) because my brains trust considered them to be particularly relevant.
The natural reaction to a TA is to take avoidance action, particularly if you're someone with a propensity to overrate risks. For the reasons set out in the AC, the natural reaction may increase risks. Each time the Capn merely anticipates an RA he may be inadvertently increasing the risk of a collision.
k. TA Responses.
(1) Objective. To verify the pilot properly interprets and responds to TAs.
(2) Criteria. The pilot must demonstrate the following:
(a) The PF should continue to fly the airplane, and be prepared to respond to any RA that might follow. The PM should provide updates on the traffic location shown on the TCAS display, using this information to help visually acquire the intruder.
(b) Both pilots confirm that the aircraft they have visually acquired is that which has caused the TA to be issued. Use should be made of all information shown on the display, note being taken of the bearing and range of the intruder (amber circle), whether it is above or below (data tag), and its VS direction (trend arrow).
(c) Other available information is used to assist in visual acquisition. This includes ATC party-line information, traffic flow in use, etc.
(d) Because of the limitations that may exist with various display systems, the PF should not maneuver the aircraft based solely on the information shown on the TCAS display. No attempt should be made to adjust the current flightpath in anticipation of what an RA would advise.
(e) When visual acquisition is attained, right-of-way rules are used to maintain or attain safe separation. Do not initiate unnecessary maneuvers. The limitations of making maneuvers based solely on visual acquisition, especially at high altitude or without a definite horizon, are understood.
(1) Objective. To verify the pilot properly interprets and responds to TAs.
(2) Criteria. The pilot must demonstrate the following:
(a) The PF should continue to fly the airplane, and be prepared to respond to any RA that might follow. The PM should provide updates on the traffic location shown on the TCAS display, using this information to help visually acquire the intruder.
(b) Both pilots confirm that the aircraft they have visually acquired is that which has caused the TA to be issued. Use should be made of all information shown on the display, note being taken of the bearing and range of the intruder (amber circle), whether it is above or below (data tag), and its VS direction (trend arrow).
(c) Other available information is used to assist in visual acquisition. This includes ATC party-line information, traffic flow in use, etc.
(d) Because of the limitations that may exist with various display systems, the PF should not maneuver the aircraft based solely on the information shown on the TCAS display. No attempt should be made to adjust the current flightpath in anticipation of what an RA would advise.
(e) When visual acquisition is attained, right-of-way rules are used to maintain or attain safe separation. Do not initiate unnecessary maneuvers. The limitations of making maneuvers based solely on visual acquisition, especially at high altitude or without a definite horizon, are understood.
The natural reaction to a TA is to take avoidance action, particularly if you're someone with a propensity to overrate risks. For the reasons set out in the AC, the natural reaction may increase risks. Each time the Capn merely anticipates an RA he may be inadvertently increasing the risk of a collision.
Don't you believe the ATSB? That would make you a conspiracy theorist.
You must have been hiding under a rock during the Senate's Aviation Accident Inquiry and when John Deakin wrote his article called "Lead In the Hogwash" about the ATSB's masterpiece report on the Whyalla tragedy.
I have complete faith and trust in the ATSB - to f*ck it up and fudge it when it's expedient to do so. And that's not a criticism of you, Utrader. It's a criticism of the people who've wrecked what used to be a credible organisation.
Yep, assertion of a probability is mere speculation. I think. But then again, I would have thought an assertion involved claiming something as a fact. I'm struggling with the assertion of a probability. Let me think about it some more.
Do you have any evidence to back up that assertion or is it mere speculation on your part?
I might start writing for the department!
There you go, you learn something every day, although this fact/assertion/non-speculation is written in the report. Maybe you missed it. The trouble with reading and discussing things about which you know nothing is that these small although important details slip through the cracks. Tut tut. 
Originally Posted by LB
Given your propensity to exaggerate risks,
I might start writing for the department!
Although my brains trust tells me that the RA function was probably disabled as a consequence of the Jet's height
LB, you and your brains trust are an embarrassment, although I am relieved that I will never meet you in the air given you're not a pilot.
That is precisely what I do; if I get a TA, I anticipate that an RA will shortly follow and I am ready for it. A concept you obviously don't have a clue about. Next?
Each time the Capn merely anticipates an RA he may be inadvertently increasing the risk of a collision.
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More comedy gold
I have complete faith and trust in the ATSB - to f*ck it up and fudge it when it's expedient to do so.
My apologies for the delay in responding. My brother said he had to use his computer. I couldn't practice more approaches on FlightSim until he'd finished.
What seems passing strange to me is that none of you (other than kaz, who is always a consummate professional) has actually proposed a solution to the problem you're having conniptions about.
I'm an idiot endangering others' lives, but only on FlightSim. Throw rocks at me as much as you like, but that won't change anything.
What do you say is the sensible and practical real-world solution to the problem of which you say the YMIA incident the subject of this thread is a symptom?
Mandatory radio calls? No straight-ins for non RPT aircraft? CAGRO? MBZ? AFIZ? D? C? B? Another avionics gadget?
What experiment do you actually want to run, or run again, to prove what's already been learnt over and over and over again?
And Utradar, I recognise that you're an earnest and honest investigator full of youthful exuberance, dedicated to making the world a safer place. More power to your arm. But you really do need to read the Senate's report arising from its aviation accident investigation inquiry (I didn't write it) and various other sources (not written by me) to understand why the ATSB's reputation has been trashed. I hope you help to restore it, but your contributions on this thread do not auger well.
What seems passing strange to me is that none of you (other than kaz, who is always a consummate professional) has actually proposed a solution to the problem you're having conniptions about.
I'm an idiot endangering others' lives, but only on FlightSim. Throw rocks at me as much as you like, but that won't change anything.
What do you say is the sensible and practical real-world solution to the problem of which you say the YMIA incident the subject of this thread is a symptom?
Mandatory radio calls? No straight-ins for non RPT aircraft? CAGRO? MBZ? AFIZ? D? C? B? Another avionics gadget?
What experiment do you actually want to run, or run again, to prove what's already been learnt over and over and over again?
And Utradar, I recognise that you're an earnest and honest investigator full of youthful exuberance, dedicated to making the world a safer place. More power to your arm. But you really do need to read the Senate's report arising from its aviation accident investigation inquiry (I didn't write it) and various other sources (not written by me) to understand why the ATSB's reputation has been trashed. I hope you help to restore it, but your contributions on this thread do not auger well.
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Ban straight in approaches cos 2 aircraft didn't see each other? FFS!
I've got a better idea, limit the circuit to one aircraft at a time, every aircraft can circle overhead at separated levels then let down one at a time, that'll fix it.
I've got a better idea, limit the circuit to one aircraft at a time, every aircraft can circle overhead at separated levels then let down one at a time, that'll fix it.
Last edited by The name is Porter; 6th Feb 2017 at 20:39.
What seems passing strange to me is that none of you (other than kaz, who is always a consummate professional) has actually proposed a solution to the problem you're having conniptions about.
"Lead Balloon's" a good handle...
Hmmm.
Your post at 73:
Your post #76
I may have missed your proposed solution that wasn't dripping with sarcasm, in which case that's my fault. My apologies.
Please just state your proposed solution, so that the people who aren't idiots like me can benefit from your experience and wisdom.
Your post at 73:
As Porter (I think it was) does: everybody clear off until RPT on the ground. That would solve LB's "suspected" problem that "May" or may not be a problem.
You are so blinkered that you can't even see the sarcasm in my suggestion that everybody rack off when I'm about.
Please just state your proposed solution, so that the people who aren't idiots like me can benefit from your experience and wisdom.
Originally Posted by LB
Please just state your proposed solution, so that the people who aren't idiots like me can benefit from your experience and wisdom.
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Welcome back LB 
You've had your fair share of rock throwing and sarcasm too but I like your interest in finding solutions and I think that's important.
I've re-read through this thread and realise you may know more than you're letting on.
What aircraft would have come closer to ZPJ than XGA?
Limitations of the current system:
- No requirement for mandatory calls
- It's a big sky out there but gets smaller at a circuit
- See and avoid for a jet/turbo is difficult in a circuit due to workload and positioning for landing, speed and window size.
- TCAS difficult to monitor and interpret in a circuit due to delays in updating in turns and other limitations (non transponder equipped GA aircraft and Txpdr not being turned on)
- 2, sometimes 3 aerodromes linked to same frequency (Wentworth and Mildura for example)
- Company procedures of having 2 frequencies being monitored at the same time.
- Wake turbulence issues for smaller aircraft
- Manoeuvrability of larger aircraft to avoid collision
- More chance of conflict with 'Cowboys' due to non controlled environment
Now try asking Mr and Mrs ticket holder if they'd find this acceptable?
Proposed solutions:
- Towered aerodrome (too costly)
- Class E to the ground
- AFIS
- Unicom
- Straight in approaches only for RPT (less workload, more time to observe traffic visually and using TCAS, no banking obscuring other unsighted traffic (no delay in TCAS updates), higher on horizon (easier to distinguish from ground or circuit, landing lights on being seen longer).
Why should less manoeuvrable (bigger) aircraft have to give way to other traffic while on a straight in approach? Powered aircraft give way to gliders due to their limitations. Larger aircraft have more limitations.
Now please discuss without sarcasm or rock throwing.........
You've had your fair share of rock throwing and sarcasm too but I like your interest in finding solutions and I think that's important.
I've re-read through this thread and realise you may know more than you're letting on.
What aircraft would have come closer to ZPJ than XGA?
Limitations of the current system:
- No requirement for mandatory calls
- It's a big sky out there but gets smaller at a circuit
- See and avoid for a jet/turbo is difficult in a circuit due to workload and positioning for landing, speed and window size.
- TCAS difficult to monitor and interpret in a circuit due to delays in updating in turns and other limitations (non transponder equipped GA aircraft and Txpdr not being turned on)
- 2, sometimes 3 aerodromes linked to same frequency (Wentworth and Mildura for example)
- Company procedures of having 2 frequencies being monitored at the same time.
- Wake turbulence issues for smaller aircraft
- Manoeuvrability of larger aircraft to avoid collision
- More chance of conflict with 'Cowboys' due to non controlled environment
Now try asking Mr and Mrs ticket holder if they'd find this acceptable?
Proposed solutions:
- Towered aerodrome (too costly)
- Class E to the ground
- AFIS
- Unicom
- Straight in approaches only for RPT (less workload, more time to observe traffic visually and using TCAS, no banking obscuring other unsighted traffic (no delay in TCAS updates), higher on horizon (easier to distinguish from ground or circuit, landing lights on being seen longer).
Why should less manoeuvrable (bigger) aircraft have to give way to other traffic while on a straight in approach? Powered aircraft give way to gliders due to their limitations. Larger aircraft have more limitations.
Now please discuss without sarcasm or rock throwing.........
Last edited by Utradar; 6th Feb 2017 at 20:59.
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(e) When visual acquisition is attained, right-of-way rules are used to maintain or attain safe separation. Do not initiate unnecessary maneuvers. The limitations of making maneuvers based solely on visual acquisition, especially at high altitude or without a definite horizon, are understood.
This right of way rules stuff only works when both aircraft have TCAS warning systems, designed for higher altitudes. The two airvans didn't have TCAS and maybe a maneuvre was required to avoid a collision based on visual observation. I've repeatedly said the report shows the crew saw XGA on a collision course.
XGA didn't know ZPJ was on base and the TCAS alerted the crew to this. From the report, the closest the two aircraft got to each other was when ZPJ commenced the go-around.
So the closest point occurred just prior to or on commencement of the go-around.
Interesting.
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- Towered aerodrome (too costly)
- Class E to the ground
- AFIS
- Unicom
- Unicom
- Straight in approaches only for RPT (less workload, more time to observe traffic visually and using TCAS, no banking obscuring other unsighted traffic (no delay in TCAS updates), higher on horizon (easier to distinguish from ground or circuit, landing lights on being seen longer).
It also puts aircraft on the runway alignment earlier and so may actually result in more conflicts if other aircraft also perform a straight in approach. It may move the conflict to e.g. 10 miles from the airport where there is more uncertainty about what frequency an aircraft will be on. Class E and straight in approaches only allowed for IFR aircraft? Maybe.
Why should less manoeuvrable (bigger) aircraft have to give way to other traffic while on a straight in approach? Powered aircraft give way to gliders due to their limitations. Larger aircraft have more limitations.
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Good points Ar
RPT on a straight-in are still obliged to give way to circuit traffic by law. Straight- in arrivals may add 20nm to track but maybe it's small price to pay for perhaps more safety?
Class E and straight in approaches only for RPT could be answer or a combination of other suggestions.
RPT on a straight-in are still obliged to give way to circuit traffic by law. Straight- in arrivals may add 20nm to track but maybe it's small price to pay for perhaps more safety?
Class E and straight in approaches only for RPT could be answer or a combination of other suggestions.