Lockhart River.........10 years on
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Lockhart River.........10 years on
7th May 2005 must be remembered
Now it is 10-years since the Lockhart River tragedy.
The tragedy that is Lockhart River still has serious doubts around the event, the sadness continues, with it being nearly 9 years before there was insurance payouts – look at the case with Karen Casey [6-years] and still “..not done…”.
The sadness continues and we must remember Shane Urqhart, his work in exposing the problems , his family and the other families involved.
RIP
Now it is 10-years since the Lockhart River tragedy.
The tragedy that is Lockhart River still has serious doubts around the event, the sadness continues, with it being nearly 9 years before there was insurance payouts – look at the case with Karen Casey [6-years] and still “..not done…”.
The sadness continues and we must remember Shane Urqhart, his work in exposing the problems , his family and the other families involved.
RIP
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The fact that nothing seems to have been learnt by the tragedy is highlighted by a lack of awareness or interest by the new generation of pilots who are absent in replying to this post. The industry just hasn't learnt. Those that fail to learn by history are doomed to repeat the same mistakes.
That is another tragedy to be talked about in the future I guess.
Rest in peace...
That is another tragedy to be talked about in the future I guess.
Rest in peace...
Not nice, but then flying metros around, you often got spurious GPWS terrain warnings due to many fields not in the database, usually below 500 feet on approach. The work around used to be the 'terrain inhibit' button going into many of these types of places. You knew you'd get spurious warnings. I think they call that normalised deviation.
A tragic day, but one doomed to repeat. With the emphasis now on regulation and tick box arse covering vs training and common sense, I don't see any end in sight.
I can't believe it's been ten years.
A tragic day, but one doomed to repeat. With the emphasis now on regulation and tick box arse covering vs training and common sense, I don't see any end in sight.
I can't believe it's been ten years.
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FFS not again. Attention all new generation pilots (neglectfully failing to reply) take heed! This is NOT the way to manage your multi crew aeroplane, or the way to fly an instrument approach.
Serious doubts about the event? Here's your problem;
From the ATSB report.
Contributing factors relating to the event and individual actions.
• The crew commenced the Lockhart River Runway 12 RNAV (GNSS) approach, even though the crew were aware that the copilot did not have the appropriate endorsement and had limited experience to conduct this type of instrument approach.
• The descent speeds, approach speeds and rate of descent were greater than those specified for the aircraft in the Transair Operations Manual. The speeds and rate of descent also exceeded those appropriate for establishing a stabilised approach.
• During the approach, the aircraft descended below the segment minimum safe altitude for the aircraft’s position on the approach.
• The aircraft’s high rate of descent, and the descent below the segment minimum safe altitude, were not detected and/or corrected by the crew before the aircraft collided with terrain.
• The accident was almost certainly the result of controlled flight into terrain.
3.2.2 Contributing factors relating to local conditions
• The crew probably experienced a very high workload during the approach.
• The crew probably lost situational awareness about the aircraft’s position
along the approach.
• The pilot in command had a previous history of conducting RNAV (GNSS) approaches with crew without appropriate endorsements, and operating the aircraft at speeds higher than those specified in the Transair Operations Manual.
Desperately sad for all involved. So why not just leave it rest.
Serious doubts about the event? Here's your problem;
From the ATSB report.
Contributing factors relating to the event and individual actions.
• The crew commenced the Lockhart River Runway 12 RNAV (GNSS) approach, even though the crew were aware that the copilot did not have the appropriate endorsement and had limited experience to conduct this type of instrument approach.
• The descent speeds, approach speeds and rate of descent were greater than those specified for the aircraft in the Transair Operations Manual. The speeds and rate of descent also exceeded those appropriate for establishing a stabilised approach.
• During the approach, the aircraft descended below the segment minimum safe altitude for the aircraft’s position on the approach.
• The aircraft’s high rate of descent, and the descent below the segment minimum safe altitude, were not detected and/or corrected by the crew before the aircraft collided with terrain.
• The accident was almost certainly the result of controlled flight into terrain.
3.2.2 Contributing factors relating to local conditions
• The crew probably experienced a very high workload during the approach.
• The crew probably lost situational awareness about the aircraft’s position
along the approach.
• The pilot in command had a previous history of conducting RNAV (GNSS) approaches with crew without appropriate endorsements, and operating the aircraft at speeds higher than those specified in the Transair Operations Manual.
Desperately sad for all involved. So why not just leave it rest.
Last edited by Iron Bar; 1st May 2015 at 23:14.
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The pilot in command had a previous history of conducting RNAV (GNSS) approaches with crew without appropriate endorsements, and operating the aircraft at speeds higher than those specified in the Transair Operations Manual.
A bloke who was a constant risk taker, a man in a constant hurry, and a "short-cut merchant" - the exact opposite of what is required for someone totally in charge of a complex piece of flying machinery and numerous peoples lives.
If there ever was a perfect example of a total lack of "duty of care" towards peoples lives in a PIC's care, this would be it.
The failure of aviation authorities and instructors to be able to accurately assess a persons character and suitability to be in command of an RPT aircraft, is where the flaw lies.
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The whole story please
Maybe a quote from the Coroners report is worthwhile, which doesn't seem to match your take*ronbar**:
.........associated with applications by air operators to vary their AOC to add new routes. Such applications required CASA field officers to apply the guidelines and provisions of a particular manual of air operator’s certification. In the case of Transair this involved considering the operator’s request, in 2001, to add Bamaga as its first mainland Australia regular public transport route (from Cairns), and subsequently in 2004 to seek the addition of Lockhart River.
In neither case did CASA require the operator to conduct a comprehensive or structured risk assessment of the proposed change. In particular, no such assessment was required in relation to Transair’s operating procedures, pilot experience or level of training, the rostering practices of Transair in relation to pilots who would be flying the routes involved and the pilot resources available to Transair.
In short, it was not part of CASA’s processes to require Transair to undertake a formal risk assessment or make out a safety case for the inclusion of Lockhart River as a new port although it did require Transair to revise performance charts.
I find that senior CASA management failed to provide sufficient guidance to its staff to enable them to fully and effectively evaluate risk management issues associated with Transair’s application to add Lockhart River to its air operator’s certificate as an interim port on the Cairns – Bamaga route. That guidance may have been as straight forward as requiring Transair to engage an independent specialist to conduct an assessment of, and provide a report on, all safety issues that were pertinent to the operation proposed.
It is also strange that two sources of relevant information were apparently not accessed by the regulator.
I refer to the newspaper articles indicating that an operator who did not have an appropriate AOC [Aerotropics(sic)] was about to commence an RPT passenger service into Bamaga and later, Lockhart River. I would have thought an agency as large and well funded as CASA would subscribe to a clipping service that would bring such information to its attention for routine checking.
Similarly, it is of concern if CASA did not access the inquest findings and transcript in relation to the death of the pilot Mr Short. [Died at TI in January 2002 (sic)]
Had it done so I would have expected that the evidence given in those proceedings by Mr Hotchin might have caused it to raise a query with Transair about aspects of his flying.
In neither case did CASA require the operator to conduct a comprehensive or structured risk assessment of the proposed change. In particular, no such assessment was required in relation to Transair’s operating procedures, pilot experience or level of training, the rostering practices of Transair in relation to pilots who would be flying the routes involved and the pilot resources available to Transair.
In short, it was not part of CASA’s processes to require Transair to undertake a formal risk assessment or make out a safety case for the inclusion of Lockhart River as a new port although it did require Transair to revise performance charts.
I find that senior CASA management failed to provide sufficient guidance to its staff to enable them to fully and effectively evaluate risk management issues associated with Transair’s application to add Lockhart River to its air operator’s certificate as an interim port on the Cairns – Bamaga route. That guidance may have been as straight forward as requiring Transair to engage an independent specialist to conduct an assessment of, and provide a report on, all safety issues that were pertinent to the operation proposed.
It is also strange that two sources of relevant information were apparently not accessed by the regulator.
I refer to the newspaper articles indicating that an operator who did not have an appropriate AOC [Aerotropics(sic)] was about to commence an RPT passenger service into Bamaga and later, Lockhart River. I would have thought an agency as large and well funded as CASA would subscribe to a clipping service that would bring such information to its attention for routine checking.
Similarly, it is of concern if CASA did not access the inquest findings and transcript in relation to the death of the pilot Mr Short. [Died at TI in January 2002 (sic)]
Had it done so I would have expected that the evidence given in those proceedings by Mr Hotchin might have caused it to raise a query with Transair about aspects of his flying.
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Maybe a quote from the Trans-Air Ops Manual, CAR, CAO or AIP would be more worthwhile.
My "take" does not include any comment about CASA. If you choose to operate an aeroplane in a reckless and negligent manner it will end badly. Regardless of any amount of CASA supervision.
Get over it numbskull, there is no good to be achieved here.
My "take" does not include any comment about CASA. If you choose to operate an aeroplane in a reckless and negligent manner it will end badly. Regardless of any amount of CASA supervision.
Get over it numbskull, there is no good to be achieved here.
Last edited by Iron Bar; 2nd May 2015 at 04:41.
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Why would anybody possibly want to quash further comment on this matter?
Why would this tragedy not be a worthwhile example for future pilots and operators to learn from the experiences of others and;
Why would anybody except someone with a vested interest take such a stance. Except of course unless he were a lawyer or a government stooge placed on a committee or board or a tribunal who had an interest in the matter just disappearing?
Why call someone a numbskull and tell him or her to get over it?
Why?
No good can be achieved here... phooey!
Why would this tragedy not be a worthwhile example for future pilots and operators to learn from the experiences of others and;
Why would anybody except someone with a vested interest take such a stance. Except of course unless he were a lawyer or a government stooge placed on a committee or board or a tribunal who had an interest in the matter just disappearing?
Why call someone a numbskull and tell him or her to get over it?
Why?
No good can be achieved here... phooey!
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Apart form embarrassing dickheads like you, the investigation of this matter has disappeared and no further comment is necessary.
Why don't you concentrate on chemtrails instead.
Please lock the thread.
Why don't you concentrate on chemtrails instead.
Please lock the thread.
Last edited by Iron Bar; 2nd May 2015 at 04:51.
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Oh! my goodness. Dickheads, numbskulls, chemtrails, and tin hats no doubt.
Did somebody hit a nerve? Perhaps the AAT should be asked to investigate and rule on the matter. Or maybe the Regionals can whip the hat around and give a donation to the "Laborials' to hush it all up?
I'm guessing business is crook in the shyster profession and you are off your medication. I'll make a point in sticking the pin in my AAT doll to help annoy you.
I'll ask again for sensible comment, (not you mate), Why would anybody possibly want to quash further comment on this matter? and now ask for the thread to be shut down.
Did somebody hit a nerve? Perhaps the AAT should be asked to investigate and rule on the matter. Or maybe the Regionals can whip the hat around and give a donation to the "Laborials' to hush it all up?
I'm guessing business is crook in the shyster profession and you are off your medication. I'll make a point in sticking the pin in my AAT doll to help annoy you.
I'll ask again for sensible comment, (not you mate), Why would anybody possibly want to quash further comment on this matter? and now ask for the thread to be shut down.
Last edited by Frank Arouet; 2nd May 2015 at 07:42. Reason: Shyster got mixed up with another word. Sorry.
