Stress caused by the handling by management of major changes within

[FYSTI]

If you as a pilot can not help but get involved in the company politics then it probably will cause you stress. A suggestion would be to mind your own business, fly your roster and go home at the end of your shift to the wife and kids. Smile and be happy.

The issue with this is that it was a deliberate campaign engineered to *maximise* publicity over an extended period of time to influence the employeess, public & politician. This was a textbook propaganda campaign designed to appeal to emotion & bypass reason to generate an ACTION. QF deliberately maximised the pain of "the sky is falling in", designed to generate a political outcome. This the key, to generate an ACTION. (Jaques Ellul Propaganda provides all the guidance needed)

It was virtually impossible to shut out this level of company generated hysteria. Short of telling wives, friends & family to also avoid reading the newspaper & watching TV, it was impossible to avoid. The campaign was deliberately designed to inflict & maximise emotional pain & distress. This was the desired outcome.

So to say, simply fly the roster & go home is naive. Sure plenty of other operators have had issues. However, I wonder how many other airlines ran a fully blown propaganda campaign to convince everyone (except selected insiders) that the company was about to fail unless an action was taken. it was always smoke & mirrors, and I said so at the time, however, the vast majority were convinced by narrative. It takes a lot of strength & knowledge about how "the game" is played to see beyond the newspaper & TV spin and avoid emotional engagement.

[Sunfish]

Australianguy:

Running around saying that safety is affected by change management within the company is a bit of a stretch. These activities go on all the time all over the world. Do you think this situation is unique to Qantas?

You obviously have no experience whatever on which to base your worthless opinion.

I have participated in many restructures over Forty years both as the consultant, restructurer and the restructuree.

Let me explain that Qantas is using the worst of all possible techniques to restructure its business and that it is causing stress because it is maximising Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt, causing misery among its employees, as far as I can tell purely for the emotional gratification of management.

There are Three ways to do a restructure.

1. The "quick and dirty" way when the business requires an immediate reduction in costs. This is planned in secret by a very small group and employees are told on Friday as their pink slips are handed out and told "don't come Monday". On Monday the survivors are given a pep talk and resume business. I've had to fire 30% of staff once that way. You provide support services etc. to try and minimise the pain. There is no "working out notice" and suchlike. One minute you are happy and productive, the next you are on the street.

2. The "slow and clean" way. You announce that there needs to be a cutback. You explain the reasons in detail. You explain the targets. You call for voluntary redundancy. You consult, you report back regularly, you keep people informed, you hold job fairs, give counselling, etc/ and you take at least six months to implement it

Qantas has chosen the worst way : "Slow and dirty". Maximum Fear Uncertainty and Doubt. One day somone tells you you have a job, next day maybe not. Strange looking consultants prowl the place talking in whispers. Rumours abound - fantastic rumours thrive in the absence of hard information. Some people purport to know whats happening but withold information to settle old scores - "if you are going to be kept, they will send you a letter next week" yadda yadda..

In this fertile hothouse evil flourishes. Where are Alan Joyces Five Thousand victims? Are you going to be one of them? Alans not telling. Stress multiplies unchecked.

[Captain Nomad]

A suggestion would be to mind your own business

I would suggest ensuring his aircraft is airworthy with sufficient fuel and oil for the job he is paid do is indeed a critical part of a pilot's business:

CAR 234 "Fuel requirements (1) The pilot in command of an aircraft must not commence a flight within Australian territory, or to or from Australian territory, if he or she has not taken reasonable steps to ensure that the aircraft carries sufficient fuel and oil to enable the proposed flight to be undertaken in safety." (italics added)

CAR 224 (2) (b) (b) "A pilot in command of an aircraft is responsible for:
the operation and safety of the aircraft during flight time;"

CAR 233 (1) (g) "The pilot in command of an aircraft must not commence a flight if he or she has not received evidence, and taken such action as is necessary to ensure, that: the aircraft is safe for flight in all respects;"

The just 'do your job and go home' approach reminds me of those I have come across over the years who have been fortunate that others do the right thing which so happens to save their 'couldn't care less' backsides...

[Australianguy]

Ok, granted that many are nervous. And while I certainly feel terrible for those pilots that may or may not be facing the axe, the issue here is if change management is affecting safety. Perhaps I could have been more delicate in my approach.

[The Banjo]

No, I am not a management stooge, however, this oil scenario has been topical for a number of weeks now.

Perhaps a better way to resolve the issue would be a professional internal email query to the fleet manager rather than plastering emotional crap on an electronic graffiti board for ALL to see....

[ALAEA Fed Sec]

Letters over the oil issue have formally gone to CASA. CASA must have acted because the Fleet Manager issued guidance for Pilots to use to ensure enough oil was in the tanks for safe flight. The guidance was wrong.


Change Management is something covered by the CASA Regs and it is an integral part of the now required Safety Management Systems. It must also include provision for consultation with users of the amended system. By not advising Pilots of their minimum oil requirements before the change and then getting it wrong after, breaches countless principle of the SMS.


Oil is just one of many changes though that have not been communicated, consulted or considered IAW mandatory Change Management rules. As this thread is about the interaction of CASA and the ATSB, it will be interesting to see how they react and what they do because of these alleged breaches.


From reading the REPCON outcomes, one could easily come to the conclusion that submitting a report is pointless because there is never any resulting fix to identified problems. I think someone needs to talk to the good Senator before he goes into the next estimates hearings.

[Paragraph377]

One could also include 'just culture' as an argument in this case. Just culture is also an element of the safety management system, and it has been heavily promulgated by ICAO and CASA. I would argue that in the case of QF management their just culture process is in breach of their safety management system because a just culture is not being fostered, promoted or complied with. Anybody at the company been issued a NCN for that yet? That's right, I didn't think so.

[Angle of Attack]

The minimum oil quantity was published last week for the 737 and with my own extra research it seems entirely correct. I don't watch TV and only read the odd paper so maybe it insulates me but I just go to work and after that go home to the wife and kids. There's no point worrying about stuff you can't change anyway.

[Hempy]

Tell me if this is a plausible scenario.

A/c has an engine burning abnormal levels of oil. A/c starts the day 'topped off'. A/c flies short sector. A/c oil levels now at 'normal'. New crew 'check oil' is at 'normal levels' and depart on long sector.....

[Angle of Attack]

As long as the oil is at the minimum required it would be more than enough for the maximum endurance of the aircraft, even if it was burning abnormally high levels. It would need to be burning extremely high levels to cause any issues. Regardless of that hypothetical would you refuse to go because the Oil quantity was at a minimum for a long sector? Unless you were going to a port with no engineers then possibly, otherwise I wouldn't think so. At the end of the day the 737 minimum is still 75% of capacity anyway, it's not that low.

[Australopithecus]

Angle of Attack...the minimum is 60%, not lower. We as a group have to rely on those pesky engine designers for a definitive oil quantity. Being ignorant of the geometry of the oil reservoir, the pick-up location, the minimum mass for thermal stability, the behaviour in turbulence, etc, I have to rely on published data.

As someone else mentioned, you could surely operate the engine safely with a bit less than minimum. But is something happened, even unrelated, they would be looking for a scapegoat. Guess who?

The published figures differ from those in the maintenance manual as mentioned in the other thread. You are apparently supposed to have 12 plus the anticipated consumption.

[ALAEA Fed Sec]

12 plus consumption is correct. The Fleet Manager put out information that the minimum oil was 12. period. no calculation for consumption.

[Angle of Attack]

In that case if the figure is 12 plus consumption that is concerning. The trouble is we can only go on what we are told. As usual we are left to take responsibility with no further guidance...oh yeah that is SOP I guess...

[HeSaidWhat]

Back to the topic - change and the stress it brings


In a way the 'safety card' has its place here. There is an old adage in Risk Management that says "Wherever their is change or growth, there is risk". This holds true because change can bring additional hazards in the operational space, or additional threats in the business sense.


So safety may well be in play here. That is, of course, if the risks associated with the change are not mitigated. Have QF put controls in place? Have those controls been implemented? Seems at the very least they haven't been communicated well, hence the REPCON.