Skippers incident.
From the report-
At 0751:36, at 730 ft, the peak rate of descent derived from the recorded data was about 2,500 ft/min. At 0751:48, while passing 300 ft the derived rate of descent was still about 1,800 ft/min, the speed was 11 kt above the reference approach speed (Vref) and the aircraft was banked 23° to the left as the runway centreline was intercepted. At 0751:55, at 100 ft, the derived rate of descent was about 1,200 ft/min as the landing flare was commenced and a small amount of power reintroduced. The touchdown on the 1,800 m paved runway was normal at 0752:12.
A circling approach in IMC requires a normal RoD and normal manoeuvres for the type for a landing within the runway touchdown zone in order to descend below MDA along with the required viz and clear of cloud etc.
Everything stated is obviously grossly in excess of that requirement. According to the above report they went from 730' to touchdown including a power on flare in 36sec total!!
This extreme dive for the runway is beyond exceptional in any circumstance. A jet commencing a 3 degree descent from altitude at a 500KTAS / GS would be using a 2500fpm descent rate. This rate was achieved at some point above 1000 ft and was still maintained passing 730!
Everyone above has made comments on the Capt and FO roles and behaviour etc and I certainly agree with most of those comments.
The point I want to make, and not just in this particular incident and for every pilot is that these type of extreme manouvres suggest a get in at all costs mentality in order to save potentially nothing more than a few minutes of time.
A few lousy minutes at what cost?
In this case a potentially crashed large aeroplane and 53 lives lost! Seriously?
Surely even before commencing descent from MDA if it is apparent the cloud, viz or aircraft positioning is not going to enable a safe normal, stabilized appch and landing then flying another low level circuit to better position oneself will take at most another what, 0.1 hr, ie 6 odd minutes.
If the cloud , viz doesnt allow this then the conditions are obviously below circling mins in which case a MAppch is required and maybe another approach and circling attempt , another 10-20 odd min max or at most a diversion to altn or a brief holding period before a reattempt depending on conditions, fuel etc.
In NO CIRCUMSTANCE does the saving of a few minutes of time and thus a relatively few associated dollars justify any attempt to do so at the risk of an accident and loss of any number of lives.
How would any of us be able to live with ourselves afterward if we did so and survived a disaster when others did not??
If we were running late for work, how many of us would drive 30kmh plus or more over the speed limit and run every red light in order to make up the 5-15min we might be late??
Our lifelong training to operate efficiently and thus save time and money even if only a few minutes sets up a sub conscious mentality to do the type of things Ive described above that only clear rational thought and consideration of the consequences can override.
At 0751:36, at 730 ft, the peak rate of descent derived from the recorded data was about 2,500 ft/min. At 0751:48, while passing 300 ft the derived rate of descent was still about 1,800 ft/min, the speed was 11 kt above the reference approach speed (Vref) and the aircraft was banked 23° to the left as the runway centreline was intercepted. At 0751:55, at 100 ft, the derived rate of descent was about 1,200 ft/min as the landing flare was commenced and a small amount of power reintroduced. The touchdown on the 1,800 m paved runway was normal at 0752:12.
A circling approach in IMC requires a normal RoD and normal manoeuvres for the type for a landing within the runway touchdown zone in order to descend below MDA along with the required viz and clear of cloud etc.
Everything stated is obviously grossly in excess of that requirement. According to the above report they went from 730' to touchdown including a power on flare in 36sec total!!
This extreme dive for the runway is beyond exceptional in any circumstance. A jet commencing a 3 degree descent from altitude at a 500KTAS / GS would be using a 2500fpm descent rate. This rate was achieved at some point above 1000 ft and was still maintained passing 730!
Everyone above has made comments on the Capt and FO roles and behaviour etc and I certainly agree with most of those comments.
The point I want to make, and not just in this particular incident and for every pilot is that these type of extreme manouvres suggest a get in at all costs mentality in order to save potentially nothing more than a few minutes of time.
A few lousy minutes at what cost?
In this case a potentially crashed large aeroplane and 53 lives lost! Seriously?
Surely even before commencing descent from MDA if it is apparent the cloud, viz or aircraft positioning is not going to enable a safe normal, stabilized appch and landing then flying another low level circuit to better position oneself will take at most another what, 0.1 hr, ie 6 odd minutes.
If the cloud , viz doesnt allow this then the conditions are obviously below circling mins in which case a MAppch is required and maybe another approach and circling attempt , another 10-20 odd min max or at most a diversion to altn or a brief holding period before a reattempt depending on conditions, fuel etc.
In NO CIRCUMSTANCE does the saving of a few minutes of time and thus a relatively few associated dollars justify any attempt to do so at the risk of an accident and loss of any number of lives.
How would any of us be able to live with ourselves afterward if we did so and survived a disaster when others did not??
If we were running late for work, how many of us would drive 30kmh plus or more over the speed limit and run every red light in order to make up the 5-15min we might be late??
Our lifelong training to operate efficiently and thus save time and money even if only a few minutes sets up a sub conscious mentality to do the type of things Ive described above that only clear rational thought and consideration of the consequences can override.
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Tee Emm was inferring to not giving the FO the leg from the outset.
I do this often, simply by saying that that particular leg is mine. No need to give an explanation and if one is sort for, I just say I need an RNAV/ILS or whatever for recency.
I do this often, simply by saying that that particular leg is mine. No need to give an explanation and if one is sort for, I just say I need an RNAV/ILS or whatever for recency.
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Tee Emm was inferring to not giving the FO the leg from the outset.
I do this often, simply by saying that that particular leg is mine. No need to give an explanation and if one is sort for, I just say I need an RNAV/ILS or whatever for recency.
I do this often, simply by saying that that particular leg is mine. No need to give an explanation and if one is sort for, I just say I need an RNAV/ILS or whatever for recency.
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Nope not at all. But if in the planing stage you are already in the mindset of possibly taking over for whatever reason, then way give it to the other pilot in the first place? BTW, I was more referring to the wx hovering around the conditions where our Ops manual states should be a captains approach or departure. I personally would rather fly it from the get-go instead of taking over during an approach or once it gets out of hand.
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something along the lines of "The conditions are going to be a bit challenging - I'm sure you can handle it and I'd like to give you the chance to try, however if my comfort level is being stretched, I may take over - don't take this as a slight against your abilities, just understand that the responsibility is mine and I like to be conservative."
Why say in 60 words when you can say it in three "I have control".
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Fair enough Mono, and in the instance you describe, you would expect a professional pilot in the F/O role to be cognizant of that, and who you would hope would have a similar level of expectation.
A good commander IMHO should be able to identify the legs where their superior experience allows them to avoid situations that require their superior piloting skills
i.e. the mythical Capts weather...
A good commander IMHO should be able to identify the legs where their superior experience allows them to avoid situations that require their superior piloting skills
i.e. the mythical Capts weather...
Monopole- I must admit to being perplexed here. In my company, the FO cannot do cat II/III approaches, that is for the skipper. But if I am going to a cat I only destination, like sydney, for example, and the weather is happens to be hovering around minima, I am still perfectly happy for the FO to fly it. Why? because, he is just as capable to do the job as I am. If we get to minima and not visual - Then I expect him to say "go around Flaps" and off we go.
If the FO is capable of doing a non precision approach and the weather was around minima, it makes no difference. As I have stated, the problem here goes way beyond the Captain taking the leg. Basic command skills, Pilot monitoring skill, SOP stability adherence, EGPWS alerts, and non reporting of the event are all serious issues that appear to swept aside by those who simply state-
"The Captain should have taken the leg", to which I reiterate - is bollocks.
If the FO is capable of doing a non precision approach and the weather was around minima, it makes no difference. As I have stated, the problem here goes way beyond the Captain taking the leg. Basic command skills, Pilot monitoring skill, SOP stability adherence, EGPWS alerts, and non reporting of the event are all serious issues that appear to swept aside by those who simply state-
"The Captain should have taken the leg", to which I reiterate - is bollocks.
...... Also consider that the FO probably flew that circ app without seeing the runway because it was on the Capt's side
The blind leading the blind?
The blind leading the blind?
Originally Posted by Buttscratcher
...... Also consider that the FO probably flew that circ app without seeing the runway because it was on the Capt's side
The blind leading the blind?
The blind leading the blind?
Originally Posted by Havoc
In my company, the FO cannot do cat II/III approaches, that is for the skipper. But if I am going to a cat I only destination, like sydney, for example, and the weather is happens to be hovering around minima, I am still perfectly happy for the FO to fly it.Why? because, he is just as capable to do the job as I am. If we get to minima and not visual - Then I expect him to say "go around Flaps" and off we go.
If the FO is capable of doing a non precision approach and the weather was around minima, it makes no difference.
If the FO is capable of doing a non precision approach and the weather was around minima, it makes no difference.
Do you expect a FO with 100 hours or less in the aircraft to do as good a job as the skipper in crap weather? Of course not. Would you give him the leg or not change your mind and take over before the approach if things were nastier than forecast? Of course not. I see no reason to give a tricky approach to an FO who then may reasonably put me in a position that forces me to either take over or issue a GA command, or scare himself so much that he decides to GA.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 7th Dec 2013 at 15:31. Reason: Spell-checker failure.
Bloggs-
Well, do you mean fly a non precision approach in an RPT aircraft, for which you have been rated on, trained on etc to minima?
Yes I do expect them to be able to do it. Do i expect the Captain to be effective in a Pilot Monitoring role - Yes.
Nastier than forecast how? Crosswinds? Turbulence, snow showers? Yes.
If it is a 'Tricky approach' like the RNP-AR approach into Seychelles, then surely there would be company SOPS outlining who gets to fly it.
I am sorry, we will have to agree to disagree on this one.
The Captain was within his rights to and showed no lack of airmanship in allowing the FO to do the leg (as I said, provided it did not contravene SOPS).
All the Focus of this discussion should be on the subsequent poor flying and poor pilot monitoring that went on and the issues it raised of insufficient training in EGPWS warnings and stabilisation awareness.
Do you expect a FO with 100 hours or less in the aircraft to do as good a job as the skipper in crap weather?
Yes I do expect them to be able to do it. Do i expect the Captain to be effective in a Pilot Monitoring role - Yes.
Would you give him the leg or not change your mind and take over before the approach if things were nastier than forecast?
If it is a 'Tricky approach' like the RNP-AR approach into Seychelles, then surely there would be company SOPS outlining who gets to fly it.
I am sorry, we will have to agree to disagree on this one.
The Captain was within his rights to and showed no lack of airmanship in allowing the FO to do the leg (as I said, provided it did not contravene SOPS).
All the Focus of this discussion should be on the subsequent poor flying and poor pilot monitoring that went on and the issues it raised of insufficient training in EGPWS warnings and stabilisation awareness.
PPRuNe Handmaiden
Just as an aside, Flight Safety Foundation via Skybrary say
SKYbrary - Stabilised Approach
during a circling approach wings should be level on final when the aircraft reaches 300 feet above airport elevation;
For all intents and purposes, the first officer, no matter his experience level, becomes the PF or captain and is encouraged to make all the command decisions while the real captain sits somewhat uneasily in his new role as PNF or co-pilot
Sometimes it is more appropriate for the f/o to fly a non precision in poor weather, the FSF lists Captain as PF as a risk factor for CFIT, it's pretty obvious why.
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As an outsider looking in, it sounds like the crew gradient at Skippers is poor. Some Human Factors issues coming into play. The 2007 Garuda at Yogyakarta is the perfect example. The F/O had around 10 opportunities to take control of the aircraft and tell the Captain he was 'taking over'. The aircraft was horribly unstable and the aural warnings were repetitive. Ironically post accident the Captain went to jail, and the F/O never received so much as a written warning!
The point being is that a Captain and F/O work as a team, with only a slight authority gradient. I thought we had come a lot further than this in 2013.
The point being is that a Captain and F/O work as a team, with only a slight authority gradient. I thought we had come a lot further than this in 2013.
Originally Posted by Gobona Stick
When I pranged my dad's new car, he didn't blame the 'safety culture' of my family. He taught me to take some damn responsibility for my driving.
The F/O had around 10 opportunities to take control of the aircraft and tell the Captain he was 'taking over'.
In the example of captain as PNF and F/O as PF, if the captain doesn't like the way the F/O is flying an approach, all he has to do is say "I have control" and it is generally accepted the F/O will immediately relinquish control to the captain without an argument.
Place the boot on the other foot and the captain is now PF and the F/O gets nervous and doesn't like what he sees, so he does what his company SOP says and says "I have control"
Can you honestly imagine that the captain will meekly abrogate his command responsibility and saying "Handing over, Bloggs"? Of course not. If the F/O grabs the controls from the captain the chances are there will be a struggle for control. That will be infinitely more dangerous.
During a court case in Singapore on the Silk Air B737 suicide crash, evidence was given in court of the same captain of that flight, pressing on regardless, during a previous flight. His approach was high and fast and he then used the technique of using full aileron to the stops in each direction in a misguided attempt to use spoiler operation to increase drag and reduce speed on short final. His New Zealand F/O urged him to go-around but the captain was having none of it. He was going to get in or else.
The F/O knew it would be impossible to fight the captain for control even all the time he called for the captain to go-around. Finally as the 737 passed 900 ft agl over the fence, the F/O shoved open the thrust levers while the captain still had both hands on the control wheel. In other words the F/O used that window of opportunity to force a go-around. It worked and the captain had no choice except to go-around.
So while airline management can blithely come up with an SOP that says the F/O should take over control (disregarding the obvious case of incapacitation of course), there is no guidance as to how to physically take over control if the captain refuses to acquiesce.
Selecting gear up is the last resort to force a go-around if there is a battle over the controls and no captain will then deliberately land gear up to make his point. So why not have that as SOP for the F/O to hang his hat on. Better than nothing which is the current situation...
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Agree that as a last resort all the F/O can do is put the gear up to force a go around . Aussie told me he did it at mapati many years ago so as to force a go around from a high , fast app into a valley with a cpt who's ego was out of control . Lost his job .
