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QF near miss over Great Australian Bight

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QF near miss over Great Australian Bight

Old 20th Sep 2013, 14:27
  #21 (permalink)  
 
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I always thought the term near miss is highly misleading because when you think about it if two planes nearly miss then they actually hit.... It would be more correct to call it a near-hit....
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Old 20th Sep 2013, 19:06
  #22 (permalink)  
 
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SLOP in 'straya?

Holy smoke, No!
YBBB ATCers with the super duper ADS C shit will catch you red handed and send nasty letters to your CAA authorities and operator! You are deemed to have committed mass murder!
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Old 20th Sep 2013, 20:26
  #23 (permalink)  
 
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No matter – problem solved; move along, nothing to see here.

Sandilands - However it has now been confirmed by CASA that an AirServices Australia controller has been stood down following the incident.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 00:13
  #24 (permalink)  
Nemo Me Impune Lacessit
 
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When flying long haul I used to fly offset if I could, not always possible though. The late Rod Cane, (QF,SIA and Qatar) did an external degree whilst in Singapore and wrote his thesis on offset navigation, put a lot of work in too, be interested to know where that paper is now.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 00:53
  #25 (permalink)  
 
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Plane talking vent

Ben's not holding back on ASA/CAsA/ATsB critique!
Adelaide fall-out: Airservices is dangerously incompetent

One of the truly alarming memes thatcirculates in incidents like yesterday’s ‘near hit’ near Adelaide is that TCAS,the automated collision avoidance system would always save the day. It isdeeply troubling that such a notion should gain traction.

A day after as many as 600 passenger lives could have been snuffed out by an AirServices Australia blunder involving two Qantas A332s near Adelaide, the unadorned unairbrushed truth about this persistently dangerous and incompetent organisation needs to be taken onboard by the new federal government.

In recent years the ATSB has investigated numerous instances of loss of separation incidents in which air traffic controllers were found to have been incompletely checked or trained for the duties they were undertaking.

It has even in some instances published summaries of field training notes in which the controller at the centre of an incident was deemed unsuitable for the tasks given to him by a management that has persistently failed to adequately resource the service.

Incredibly, the findings in ATSB final reports are released after the final draft is read by all parties and discussed with Airservices, meaning that those reports can hardly be described as unfair or unbalanced.

This is a very dangerous situation not just for Australian airlines and their travellers, but foreign nationals and carriers entrusting their lives and airliners to Australian controlled airspace.

The take away line from this is that Australia is persistently failing to meet the civil aviation obligations that adhere to a supposed tier one state in terms of air safety standards.

This is not a popular position to take.In general, media reporting of AirServices failures is stymied by PR messaging, and a lack of resources in the general media in terms of allowing reporters with a knowledge of aviation issues to take the time to read the actual reports, which often bear little relationship to the anodyne ATSB summaries which can get printed without the real story being picked up.

This is not withstanding some very incisive individual reporting in the general media. An example of this was the use of FOI by the ABC to uncover CASA’s own damning assessment of the state of affairs in AirServices Australia earlier this year.

As also reported here in relation to the FOI disclosures, and the lies told by AirServices Australiawhen it lost a Virgin Australia 737:

For years Australia has tolerated a situation in which foreign airlines flying to Australian airports have been denied the safe and efficient air traffic control procedures expected under international safety rules.

One of the truly alarming memes that circulates in incidents like yesterday’s ‘near hit’ near Adelaide is that TCAS, the automated collision avoidance system that is mandatory for airliners and some other aircraft relating to their size and capabilities, would always save the day.

It is deeply troubling that such a notion should gain traction. When airliners infringe the required separation from other aircraft, including those that may not be TCAS equipped, everything depends on adherance to the resolution advisory that one or more aircraft may receive, subject to the split second judgement of the captains of the flights involved.

There is also a concern, at least insome quarters, that the TCAS unit on one of the Qantas A330s may not have been working as intended at the time of the encounter, as reported yesterday. Qantas hasn’t clarified the situation, indeed it may not know what the truth of that suggestion is at this stage. But while a bit of a worry on the side, it doesn’t change the fact that an incorrect ATC approval was given for one Qantas A330 to climb through the flight level occupied by another Qantas A330 flying directly toward it.

There is no excuse for this. AirServices will kill on a very large scale unless something is done to cut through to the causes of endemic unprofessionalism in its delivery of service and remedy it.

Isolated incidents are one thing. Persistent stuff ups are another.

At the top of this screen is an illustration of the Adelaide incident created by the Aviation Herald. Reading its report concerning this incident is strongly recommended.


And avherald report link: Incident: Qantas A332 and Qantas A332 near Adelaide on Sep 20th 2013, loss of separation

ps comments also worth a read!
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 00:54
  #26 (permalink)  
 
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From the look of the Flightradar24 tracks, offset tracking would not apply because the most efficient route meant that they crossed tracks, in this case just west of Adelaide. So in reality the situation wasn't really any different from any other where aircraft cross tracks at different altitudes. These two just happened to be less of angle than other crossing points.

In addition, the aircraft would not have hit even if the altitudes had matched. Sure, they came inside the mandatory separation distances and IF they were actually on a collision course they were less than 20 seconds apart, but it's very clear from the radar tracks that were never going to collide.

Sure, it's an incident and whatever tightening of procedures is required will be undertaken and we will all be safer as a result, but to suggest it was a near miss or that without evasive action the aircraft would have collided is baloney. Without evasive action the result would have been less separation, that's all.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 01:09
  #27 (permalink)  
 
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Im certainly not an apologist for Airservices. However, Ben is way out of line on this one. This incident is a mistake pure and simple. It has nothing to do with training, standards, procedures, recruiting, or any other corporate rubbish that you can normally attribute to an incident.

Im not downplaying the potential severity but dont over analyse what actually happened. Human systems will always have human errors. Im sure the ATC had a sleepless night but Im equally sure they wouldnt make that mistake again.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 01:38
  #28 (permalink)  
 
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Finally some perspective. Yes, this was a mistake. Yes, this was a breakdown of separation. Yes, it's a serious incident. But part of high-reliability industries like aviation is the awareness that the operators are human, and that human error is inevitable whenever humans are involved. So the systems have defences in place to catch those errors before they end in disaster. And those defences worked.
Mr Sandilands clearly has a bee in his bonnet about AsA and in many cases that's equally clearly warranted. But this one isn't one of those. A controller made a human error and the system defences stepped in, more or less as designed. It's unfortunate, but it happens. That's why those defences exist.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 01:41
  #29 (permalink)  
 
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A question: if, as it would appear, the lower aircraft requested a climb and that request was approved, surely to God (if the TCAS was serviceable) the lower aircraft's crew had a TCAS readout of the conflicting traffic on screen. If everything was serviceable, why did they accept a climb with the other aircraft visible on their nav display?
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 01:48
  #30 (permalink)  
 
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Nojowood, that plot is not the radar tracks, it is from uncalibrated web based ADSB information. Don't base absolute judgement on that either way.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 02:02
  #31 (permalink)  
 
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Pavement, it's common knowledge on here that I'm an ATC. I know that there are several ATC's that post on Prune that are directly involved in training. I'm pretty good mates with an ATC directly involved with recruitment.

I have to be very careful about what I say here. But I can say that you are wrong in several of the factors you listed. I would suggest to you that Ben Sandilands is getting pretty accurate information from somewhere, I don't know where (no really, I don't). But it's accurate.

I should add that I have no knowledge of what happened, I'm not making any judgement of the controller involved (there but for the grace of god go I) it's a bloody horrible spot to be in.

If less time was spent on bullshit & spin, more on the actual systemic causes of these problems the better off we'd all be as an industry.

Last edited by Jack Ranga; 21st Sep 2013 at 02:14.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 02:26
  #32 (permalink)  
 
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Jack

The investigation (and I mean internal not the waste of time ATSB) will identify the factors. I have observed your 'bent' I guess for want of better words. Some times Ive agreed but this time I dont. We can investigate by hearsay if you want to but that would not serve any purpose.

I stand by my previous post by the information I know. If I subsequently learn of new facts which contradict what Ive said I will gladly apologise to Mr Sandilands.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 02:27
  #33 (permalink)  
 
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MTOW: I cannot recall the number of times I've had requests from pilots that you would think they could see are unavailable (potential RA resulting) due very close proximity traffic. Makes me wonder how much TCAS is used enroute for situational awareness.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 02:27
  #34 (permalink)  
 
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P.S Totally agree with your last sentence.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 02:48
  #35 (permalink)  
 
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Show me the money

Jack,
I to am an ATC, have been for a long time and Ive got your back on this one. Sandilands is on the money.
Might I suggest that we are now enjoying the legacy of the previous CEO.

Last edited by longtermatc-career; 21st Sep 2013 at 03:08.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 02:57
  #36 (permalink)  
 
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Many of us take cheap shots at Asian ATC, in particular Indonesia. They have very poor infrastructure, including radio quality, poor radar coverage, limited ADSB etc etc. despite this, I am no less safe in their hands.

For this type of error to occur in primary Australian airspace with full benefit of radar coverage and ADSB is not acceptable and heads should roll; Be it because of reduced manning levels, poor training or whatever as middle managers chase the elusive KPI's.

To quote that retiring American Pilot of years gone by:

"Second best air traffic controllers in the world".

Unfortunately, the net result will be less track shortening and commonsense as everyone covers their arse but continue taking home some of the most generous salary packages available.

Last edited by The Banjo; 21st Sep 2013 at 02:58.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 03:21
  #37 (permalink)  
 
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Originally Posted by wasbones
MTOW: I cannot recall the number of times I've had requests from pilots that you would think they could see are unavailable (potential RA resulting) due very close proximity traffic. Makes me wonder how much TCAS is used enroute for situational awareness.
Some TCAS units provide a pretty limited display. All of ours have a max display range of 12NM for instance. If there is something further out than 12NM we won't see it.

What surprises me is the number of times I hear pilots cleared to non-standard levels. I thought that was to be for operational requirements only after the Darwin incident, yet recently I was offered a non-standard level by ATC after being told that the standard level I'd asked for was not available.

Last edited by AerocatS2A; 21st Sep 2013 at 03:23.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 05:29
  #38 (permalink)  

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I'm confused,

Can we assume both aircraft on the same frequency and monitoring traffic in their immediate surrounds. Airmanship?

Both ADSB equipped.

Conflict Resolution part of ATC equipment??

Haven't checked but crossing airways??

Both TCAS equipped and no doubt RVSM?

5 defences I count.

Trouble in River City?
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 05:50
  #39 (permalink)  
 
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wasbones tcas we are taught shows relative travel direction, not actual.

afaik we all use it for sa and because pilots dont have the whole picture, im not surprised you get some requests that appear odd to you.

and without having a reference to hand, i thought we needed an operational reqmnt to justfy asking for a non std lvl? any mention of that yet?

found this
cutnpaste frm jepp

3.3.2.1 Pilots must only request a level not conforming to the table of cruising levels when it is determined by the pilot in command to be essential to the safety of the flight and its occupants. In such circumstances, the phrase “DUE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT” must be included with the level change request. 3.3.3 ATC will only assign cruising levels not conforming to these tables when traffic or other operational circumstances require.
and didnt this relatively recent amendment come about because of a near hit over darwin or somewhere?

Last edited by waren9; 21st Sep 2013 at 06:04.
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Old 21st Sep 2013, 06:08
  #40 (permalink)  
 
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I thought every level request was an operational requirement?
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