Qantas latest engine out
Going Boeing,
I can't tell you, after all this time, how many there were, the memory says three, it was only a small fleet.
These were just the double failures.
One, at least, was on descent into SFO from YVR, old mate of mine on his pre. or final Command Check.
The man from the FAA checked the fuel remaining very carefully, he could not conceive a double failure as being other than shortage of motion lotion.
RR lack of quality control was also the stuff of legend ---- who remembers the RB211-D5 main shafts that RR "forgot" to heat treat.
This "minor" QC lapse manifested itself as two fans falling in the Atlantic within about ten days, with "collateral" damage as they chewed their way out through the cowl. It transpired QF had five "soft" main shafts, only one already in an engine, none ever got onto a wing -- that was luck!
In the QF "Museum" at Sydney, amongst the display is a RB211 "step aside" gearbox, they were a common cause of failure right from the -22 on the Tri Star right through to the -524 on the B747-400.
Rather ironic this should be "featured" in the museum ---- probably because they had a few laying around internally damaged.
Of the engine failures I had of ( always near new) engines on the -400, two were this "traditional" gear train failure, leading to the oil/air separator failing, with the loss of all the oil contents within a short time. Forty or so years of this failure and RR still don't have a fix.
All this nonsense, over the years, caused QF ROS to institute 100% QC inspection, some of the things I have seen, I just can't conceive how they got into a parts box and got delivered to a customer.
Several were the times, over the years, that we ran out of pool engines, with the next QF, CX,BA or SAA failure resulting in the grounding of the aircraft until there was another engine available.
I would suggest that the present failure rate is a combination of the "normal" failure rate, plus QF being on the end of the list, because they can be disregarded by RR.
The ONLY reason QF set records of "on the wing" time with RB211, was because of the excellence of the output from the ROS engine shop ---- not because of RR. QF developed component lives are no no longer relevant, "wait 'till they break" is the order of the day.
The cost in service disruption is calculable, the cost of lost reputation less so.
QF learned the lesson, in very early days, that good maintenance was good business for an airline at the bottom of the world, with long thin routes.
Anybody who knew C.O Turner knew that he never spent a brass razoo on anything, unless there was a return ---- he understood the value of ROS --- the "expensive" QF maintenance was a big saving on the bottom line.
The present management knows the cost of everything, and the value of nothing.
Tootle pip!!
PS: T Green, the JT9 double failure of 16 in Sydney was a multiple bird strike.
I can't tell you, after all this time, how many there were, the memory says three, it was only a small fleet.
These were just the double failures.
One, at least, was on descent into SFO from YVR, old mate of mine on his pre. or final Command Check.
The man from the FAA checked the fuel remaining very carefully, he could not conceive a double failure as being other than shortage of motion lotion.
RR lack of quality control was also the stuff of legend ---- who remembers the RB211-D5 main shafts that RR "forgot" to heat treat.
This "minor" QC lapse manifested itself as two fans falling in the Atlantic within about ten days, with "collateral" damage as they chewed their way out through the cowl. It transpired QF had five "soft" main shafts, only one already in an engine, none ever got onto a wing -- that was luck!
In the QF "Museum" at Sydney, amongst the display is a RB211 "step aside" gearbox, they were a common cause of failure right from the -22 on the Tri Star right through to the -524 on the B747-400.
Rather ironic this should be "featured" in the museum ---- probably because they had a few laying around internally damaged.
Of the engine failures I had of ( always near new) engines on the -400, two were this "traditional" gear train failure, leading to the oil/air separator failing, with the loss of all the oil contents within a short time. Forty or so years of this failure and RR still don't have a fix.
All this nonsense, over the years, caused QF ROS to institute 100% QC inspection, some of the things I have seen, I just can't conceive how they got into a parts box and got delivered to a customer.
Several were the times, over the years, that we ran out of pool engines, with the next QF, CX,BA or SAA failure resulting in the grounding of the aircraft until there was another engine available.
I would suggest that the present failure rate is a combination of the "normal" failure rate, plus QF being on the end of the list, because they can be disregarded by RR.
The ONLY reason QF set records of "on the wing" time with RB211, was because of the excellence of the output from the ROS engine shop ---- not because of RR. QF developed component lives are no no longer relevant, "wait 'till they break" is the order of the day.
The cost in service disruption is calculable, the cost of lost reputation less so.
QF learned the lesson, in very early days, that good maintenance was good business for an airline at the bottom of the world, with long thin routes.
Anybody who knew C.O Turner knew that he never spent a brass razoo on anything, unless there was a return ---- he understood the value of ROS --- the "expensive" QF maintenance was a big saving on the bottom line.
The present management knows the cost of everything, and the value of nothing.
Tootle pip!!
PS: T Green, the JT9 double failure of 16 in Sydney was a multiple bird strike.
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I am sure our market share of the travelling public will continue it's downward sprial as long as incidents such as these keep happening. The only thing these beans counters can see is how to save a buck, not how to lose one.
Unfortunately these clowns will never learn from a smoking hole in the ground. The declining public perception of our safety will be our ultimate downfall and end. When the red rat fails, jackstar will follow suit shortly after.
Unfortunately these clowns will never learn from a smoking hole in the ground. The declining public perception of our safety will be our ultimate downfall and end. When the red rat fails, jackstar will follow suit shortly after.
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Risk
The NASA program was always going to lose shuttles. I cannot recall the exact figures but I studied NASA risk management on the shuttle program back in the 80's. Even with the best mitigation of risk strategies the actual hull loss estimates were around 1 complete loss every 8 missions. They ended up losing 2 craft in around 300 missions. Again, my figures may be a little out but they are close.
Rollers and shuttles are two very different entities I agree, but risk management principles follow a similar path. The fact is that QF obviously don't perform very good risk management as evident by the amount of Roller failures they are encountering ?
Rollers and shuttles are two very different entities I agree, but risk management principles follow a similar path. The fact is that QF obviously don't perform very good risk management as evident by the amount of Roller failures they are encountering ?
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gobbledock, the official figure from NASA was one loss per 100,000 flights. The unofficial (engineering) figure was 1 per 100 flights, which has been shown to be more or less correct.
The 'normalisation of deviance' term is very apt here (both Shuttle and Qantas). You can push things a little further each time there's a problem but eventually it's going to bite you, as happened with Challenger.
The 'normalisation of deviance' term is very apt here (both Shuttle and Qantas). You can push things a little further each time there's a problem but eventually it's going to bite you, as happened with Challenger.
It happened with both Challenger and Columbia. Issues that were known issues but had never caused a major issue until, well they killed people.
Space flight is a risky business, I think you have to accept that unknowns can kill your crews. The problem with these losses was that it was a known issue that wasn't dealt with before it had to have the opportunity to have the devastating effect it had.
Something can have a 1 in 100,000 chance, but it only has to happen once. Imagine what will happen to Qantas, RR, CASA if the next one to let go causes a major incident.
I've said it before but if Qantas was a cat, it would be very nervous at the moment.
Space flight is a risky business, I think you have to accept that unknowns can kill your crews. The problem with these losses was that it was a known issue that wasn't dealt with before it had to have the opportunity to have the devastating effect it had.
Something can have a 1 in 100,000 chance, but it only has to happen once. Imagine what will happen to Qantas, RR, CASA if the next one to let go causes a major incident.
I've said it before but if Qantas was a cat, it would be very nervous at the moment.
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Stats are great at helping bean counters put a cost on safety for a risky exercise, like flying.
Really though, things are fifty/fifty.
They have or haven't happened.
They will or they won't happen.
Thats the reality for the crew and the passengers.
10 to the 7 chance of a hull loss is only good for the muppets in the office making the cost cuts.
Really though, things are fifty/fifty.
They have or haven't happened.
They will or they won't happen.
Thats the reality for the crew and the passengers.
10 to the 7 chance of a hull loss is only good for the muppets in the office making the cost cuts.
"Normalisation of deviance", in a Qantas setting, is that the failure of one engine in a four engine aircraft is "routine".
It is, right up until the second engine fails. That is the lesson Feynman tried to inculcate - just because a double engine failure hasn't happened yet does not mean that it gets to be a more progressively remote possibility just because it hasn't happened.
This is exactly equivalent as believing that just because Zero has not come up on your roulette wheel for the past Five hours, it is never going to come up.
To put it another way, Wirthless will be in the middle of explaining away a single engine failure as "not a serious safety issue" - when her mobile phone will ring...........
It is, right up until the second engine fails. That is the lesson Feynman tried to inculcate - just because a double engine failure hasn't happened yet does not mean that it gets to be a more progressively remote possibility just because it hasn't happened.
This is exactly equivalent as believing that just because Zero has not come up on your roulette wheel for the past Five hours, it is never going to come up.
To put it another way, Wirthless will be in the middle of explaining away a single engine failure as "not a serious safety issue" - when her mobile phone will ring...........
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QANTAS RB211 engine failure raises safety concerns
Originally Posted by Blog Article
Another Rolls-Royce RB211 engine has failed on a Qantas 747-400 putting the airline in a difficult position if it decides to continue operating those jets across long oceanic routes to South Africa and the US before they can be modified.
The latest incident involved last night’s Johannesburg-Sydney flight carrying the Springbok Rugby team to the Tri Nation series in which they will play Australia in the opening match in a week’s time.
After abnormal vibrations and temperatures became apparent in its number 3 engine the flight turned back to Johannesburg about an hour into its long journey across the southern Indian Ocean, and Qantas is making arrangements for a replacement flight.
The safety issue is that there is a known fault in this engine type’s high pressure compressor units in which turbine blades can break free and cause severe damage both inside and outside of the engine. In one of a recent series of at least nine such failures in the Rolls-Royce RB211 version used on Qantas Boeing 747-400s one of them ruptured the engine casing on a flight that had just left San Francisco for Sydney last year.
The latest incident involved last night’s Johannesburg-Sydney flight carrying the Springbok Rugby team to the Tri Nation series in which they will play Australia in the opening match in a week’s time.
After abnormal vibrations and temperatures became apparent in its number 3 engine the flight turned back to Johannesburg about an hour into its long journey across the southern Indian Ocean, and Qantas is making arrangements for a replacement flight.
The safety issue is that there is a known fault in this engine type’s high pressure compressor units in which turbine blades can break free and cause severe damage both inside and outside of the engine. In one of a recent series of at least nine such failures in the Rolls-Royce RB211 version used on Qantas Boeing 747-400s one of them ruptured the engine casing on a flight that had just left San Francisco for Sydney last year.
Obviously these events are newsworthy.
However my perspective is;
Every engine model has known defects which are addressed by a management plan that makes it extremely unlikely that harm will come to the passenger. Of course since any management plan entails some sort of inspections, and/or maintenance versus time interval there may be some incidents of a far less serious impact to the flight as benign as a single engine IFSD.
The latter are expensive and disruptive and as Qantas suggests an indicator of the need to review the timing of implementing corrective action.
My take is that the process being reported on in the papers is normal to the operation of a fleet and unlikely to play any significance to the greater majority of passengers
However my perspective is;
Every engine model has known defects which are addressed by a management plan that makes it extremely unlikely that harm will come to the passenger. Of course since any management plan entails some sort of inspections, and/or maintenance versus time interval there may be some incidents of a far less serious impact to the flight as benign as a single engine IFSD.
The latter are expensive and disruptive and as Qantas suggests an indicator of the need to review the timing of implementing corrective action.
My take is that the process being reported on in the papers is normal to the operation of a fleet and unlikely to play any significance to the greater majority of passengers
there is a known fault in this engine type’s high pressure compressor units in which turbine blades can break free
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Haven't they already been down this path before, eventually ending up with QF1 in BKK? You know - we have been doing this for some time now & nothing has happened, so it must be safe. What a great idea it turned out to be, it's saving the company a fortune!
Isn't the definition of insanity doing the same thing over & over again & expecting different results? Perhaps they can't perceive the similarities or see the big picture. Someone needs to take a step back from the trees & take a look at the forest, before it's too late.
But then, that is working from the assumption that safety & a strong brand in the longer term is what management is striving for. And I'm not sure anymore that that is a valid assumption.
Isn't the definition of insanity doing the same thing over & over again & expecting different results? Perhaps they can't perceive the similarities or see the big picture. Someone needs to take a step back from the trees & take a look at the forest, before it's too late.
But then, that is working from the assumption that safety & a strong brand in the longer term is what management is striving for. And I'm not sure anymore that that is a valid assumption.