NAS rears its head again
Grandpa Aerotart
The captain responded to the RA by initiating an estimated 1,500- to 2,000-foot-per-minute rate of descent. Thereafter, the crew initiated a similar rate of climb.
And you CANNOT do them on AP - manual only - and GENTLY.
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The final report will be one to watch.
The RoD might have resulted from an increase beyond what they already had on the go before the RA occurred?!?!
- Did they get an increase cue due the VFR changing altitude?
- Did the VFR see the 737 and try to descend as well?
- Did they receive a TA?, perhaps they only received a late notice RA [happens sometimes when descending above GA aircraft with their TXPDR aerial only on the belly]?
- Did they get a reversal [even though not supposed to happen]?
All questions in my mind!
If the VFR and the jet were being 'positively' separated, would the same have occurred?
I guess we will find out soon enough!
The RoD might have resulted from an increase beyond what they already had on the go before the RA occurred?!?!
- Did they get an increase cue due the VFR changing altitude?
- Did the VFR see the 737 and try to descend as well?
- Did they receive a TA?, perhaps they only received a late notice RA [happens sometimes when descending above GA aircraft with their TXPDR aerial only on the belly]?
- Did they get a reversal [even though not supposed to happen]?
All questions in my mind!
If the VFR and the jet were being 'positively' separated, would the same have occurred?
I guess we will find out soon enough!
Last edited by ARFOR; 8th Apr 2010 at 13:51. Reason: clarity
ARFOR et al,
Wonderful selective stuff, I would recommend you all read ALL the slides from the AEA presentation.
Naturally, however, you pick out the one that shows, Oh!! Shock!! Horror!! that the US system doesn't work, when it obviously does ----- It produces better in-flight collision safety outcomes than the European figures ----- Where you have to take state by state ---- It's all there in publicly available records.
The "one hundred times" ---- what a lovely round figure ---- great for a media grab, but otherwise meaningless --- because there is no information about how the figures were derived ----- a bit like the NAS 2b windback "Safety Study", that had 50-100% error rates for pilots and 1E6 for ATC ---- complete nonsense figures.
Whether it is AEA, European IFALPA members etc, it is all a bit like the Australian domestic pilot attitude to ICAO (Yes! --- ICAO must be collectively wrong, as swell --- because US regard their airspace, including the dreaded E, as ICAO compliant) ----- Nothing the Yanks do can ever be right ------ but more to do with national attitudes than any serious study of safety outcomes. As for the AEA claim that it took the Uberlingen accident for US pilots to understand what to do in the event of an RA ---- What arrogant nonsense ------ it was a number of European countries (and, would you believe Australia) that had to introduce regulatory amendments to legalize following a TCAS RA, contrary to an ATC clearance, so that such was not a criminal offense.
I have to say that, at least in Australia, major airline's procedures were quite clear, follow the RA, well before the law caught up.
Of course, ARFOR, I believe your intended implication is that GA is the problem, there is sod all GA in Europe, particularly around large airports, go read the recent issue of Flight (6-12 April), featuring the future (or lack of one) in (western) Europe, for GA including corporate aviation.
Quite simply, from any rational and genuine collision risk study, the AEA grab is meaningless. Given the vastly different traffic "mix", "rates" of RA's prove nothing, and what many of you probably don't realise, is that RA's do not necessarily (in my personal experience most times) command any aggressive maneuver.
Tootle pip!!
PS: TCAS RAs are quite common in the EGLL London zone, I personally have had three in less than 10 minutes, two being other aircraft in the Bovingdon holding pattern, and one a tethered balloon at White Waltham. None were GA aircraft.
Wonderful selective stuff, I would recommend you all read ALL the slides from the AEA presentation.
Naturally, however, you pick out the one that shows, Oh!! Shock!! Horror!! that the US system doesn't work, when it obviously does ----- It produces better in-flight collision safety outcomes than the European figures ----- Where you have to take state by state ---- It's all there in publicly available records.
The "one hundred times" ---- what a lovely round figure ---- great for a media grab, but otherwise meaningless --- because there is no information about how the figures were derived ----- a bit like the NAS 2b windback "Safety Study", that had 50-100% error rates for pilots and 1E6 for ATC ---- complete nonsense figures.
Whether it is AEA, European IFALPA members etc, it is all a bit like the Australian domestic pilot attitude to ICAO (Yes! --- ICAO must be collectively wrong, as swell --- because US regard their airspace, including the dreaded E, as ICAO compliant) ----- Nothing the Yanks do can ever be right ------ but more to do with national attitudes than any serious study of safety outcomes. As for the AEA claim that it took the Uberlingen accident for US pilots to understand what to do in the event of an RA ---- What arrogant nonsense ------ it was a number of European countries (and, would you believe Australia) that had to introduce regulatory amendments to legalize following a TCAS RA, contrary to an ATC clearance, so that such was not a criminal offense.
I have to say that, at least in Australia, major airline's procedures were quite clear, follow the RA, well before the law caught up.
Of course, ARFOR, I believe your intended implication is that GA is the problem, there is sod all GA in Europe, particularly around large airports, go read the recent issue of Flight (6-12 April), featuring the future (or lack of one) in (western) Europe, for GA including corporate aviation.
Quite simply, from any rational and genuine collision risk study, the AEA grab is meaningless. Given the vastly different traffic "mix", "rates" of RA's prove nothing, and what many of you probably don't realise, is that RA's do not necessarily (in my personal experience most times) command any aggressive maneuver.
Tootle pip!!
PS: TCAS RAs are quite common in the EGLL London zone, I personally have had three in less than 10 minutes, two being other aircraft in the Bovingdon holding pattern, and one a tethered balloon at White Waltham. None were GA aircraft.
Ledsled,
Exactly. You are obviously implying that the Europeans as spiving the books - who says that the yanks are higher than mighty with their reporting?
What does it matter? Two near-misses occurred within a few months of introduction of terminal E airspace. WHY CAN'T YOU TAKE THE HINT?
Judging by the opinings of at least two of your mates on the "SFO Near Miss" thread, the yanks have NO IDEA about TCAS or how to use it:
P51guy:
and Protectthehornet:
Having killed more RPT pax in Jet/GA midairs than any other country combined that I know of (not to mention injuring crew with inappropriate RA responses; ARFOR's post above - caused by uncontrolled VFR traffic), the yanks are hardly god's-gift to aviation, and reading the diatribes from them (and yourself) about that SFO near miss being no big deal just cements in my mind that you and Dick Smith are living in denial. There are plenty of ways of accommodating VFR in the system. Class E airspace, especially unsurveilled E, is not one of them. You can rave on all you like about statistics, but when the next near miss inevitably occurs in E (as it did in 2003/4), I expect that you and Dick will again run for cover and blame someone else eg the RPT pilots.
Obviously. The TCAS is only setting up a near miss, not a 1000ft vertical/5nm horizontal avoid. 
May I suggest that you point that out to your American aces.
By the way, WHERE IS THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS of E over D?
The "one hundred times" ---- what a lovely round figure ---- great for a media grab, but otherwise meaningless --- because there is no information about how the figures were derived -----
a bit like the NAS 2b windback "Safety Study", that had 50-100% error rates for pilots and 1E6 for ATC ---- complete nonsense figures.
As for the AEA claim that it took the Uberlingen accident for US pilots to understand what to do in the event of an RA ---- What arrogant nonsense
P51guy:
RAs always have a green arc so sometimes a small adjustment makes it happy again. If you can figure out how to lower the nose a tad with automation or manually will usually do that.
the TCAS RA could have been over ridden if the 777 crew had the traffic in sight and was SURE that was the only traffic.
RA's do not necessarily (in my personal experience most times) command any aggressive maneuver.
May I suggest that you point that out to your American aces.By the way, WHERE IS THE COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS of E over D?
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Leadsled
Selective? You tell us where ANY part of the previous linked information has been quoted selectively. The provided links are for the express purpose of readers reading the entire presentation which provides no divergence from that quoted above.
Do the readers the courtesy of providing supporting evidence. Throughout these discussions, you and Mr Smith have made grand pronouncements, but never provide documentary support. In this case, the member airlines of the AEA [which include:- ADRIA, Aer Lingus, AeroSvit, Air France, Air Malta, Air One, Alitalia, Austrian, bmi, British Airways, brussels airlines, Cargolux, Croatia Ailines, Czech Airlines, Cyprus Airways, Finnair, Iberia, Icelandair, Jat Airways, KLM, LOT, Lufthansa, LUXAIR, MALEV, Olympic Airways, SAS, Spanair, Swiss, TAP, TAROM, Turkish, Ukraine, and Virgin Atlantic] say differently.
Who do we believe? You and Mr Smith? or the research provided by these international airlines presented to EASA and the FAA at an international conference, as well as the large volume of other internationally based studies from the likes of the NTSB, TSB Canada, ATSB and many others on this subject?
I hope you will not be offended if I choose to believe the work of international groups and agencies, rather than yours and Mr Smith's whining!
That is a silly statement to make. No one has said ICAO must be wrong, rather that the FAA style ICAO [as you described it in your post on the SFO thread] is just that, different [filed differences]. It has been explained many times why it is different, it seems you are finally acknowledging that fact:-
Bravo, we have that bit nailed. 
You believe incorrectly. GA volume is a fact of life in the US. Do the airspace services and rules need reviewing in the US? That would be up to the US Government. Would you agree, there has, and continues to be a steady stream of Class B and C protected areas being rolled out/reclassified from E and D in the US? That is also fact.
You may ‘believe’ whatever you like regarding GA in Europe or Australia, the fact remains, the comparative VFR volumes are lower, and the ATS infrastructures are fundamentally different from those in the US. This is the fundamental reason for volume specific risk analysis to ensure infrustructure AND Airspace Classification is correct.
The volume of VFR in Australia [with the exception of the soon to be doomed GAAP airports] does not necessitate the use of Class E or FAA Class D type services. ICAO classifications without FAA style capacity filters are perfectly workable in Australia [except for the GA only GAAP's] and elsewhere around the world.
Meaningless? In your personal experience most times 
!
Leadsled, this is the baseline it seems. You want a system where ACAS RA’s are used as a first [and in some cases only] line of defence against catastrophic mid-air collision. There are so many reasons why that view is fundamentally flawed, although it does explain why you motor on past subject matter such as the Southwest Accident info above with nary a glance. Telling!
None, repeat none of what is being discussed here regarding ATS services and systems has any bearing on GA or corporate aviation viability. I raise you your Flight article with the cold hard realities facing the GA Mecca in the US - Van Nuys.
Officials consider cost cuts and new fees for Van Nuys Airport - Los Angeles Times
Airport costs sky rocketing! Why would that be? Surely not the US ATS system!?! I suggest you read the three pages of the linked article.
Let us dispense with the silly games shall we! These issues are far to serious.
Selective? You tell us where ANY part of the previous linked information has been quoted selectively. The provided links are for the express purpose of readers reading the entire presentation which provides no divergence from that quoted above.
It produces better in-flight collision safety outcomes than the European figures ----- Where you have to take state by state ---- It's all there in publicly available records.
Who do we believe? You and Mr Smith? or the research provided by these international airlines presented to EASA and the FAA at an international conference, as well as the large volume of other internationally based studies from the likes of the NTSB, TSB Canada, ATSB and many others on this subject?
I hope you will not be offended if I choose to believe the work of international groups and agencies, rather than yours and Mr Smith's whining!
Yes! --- ICAO must be collectively wrong, as swell --- because US regard their airspace, including the dreaded E, as ICAO compliant
Given the vastly different traffic "mix"
I believe your intended implication is that GA is the problem
You may ‘believe’ whatever you like regarding GA in Europe or Australia, the fact remains, the comparative VFR volumes are lower, and the ATS infrastructures are fundamentally different from those in the US. This is the fundamental reason for volume specific risk analysis to ensure infrustructure AND Airspace Classification is correct.
The volume of VFR in Australia [with the exception of the soon to be doomed GAAP airports] does not necessitate the use of Class E or FAA Class D type services. ICAO classifications without FAA style capacity filters are perfectly workable in Australia [except for the GA only GAAP's] and elsewhere around the world.
Quite simply, from any rational and genuine collision risk study, the AEA grab is meaningless. Given the vastly different traffic "mix", "rates" of RA's prove nothing, and what many of you probably don't realise, is that RA's do not necessarily (in my personal experience most times) command any aggressive maneuver.
! Leadsled, this is the baseline it seems. You want a system where ACAS RA’s are used as a first [and in some cases only] line of defence against catastrophic mid-air collision. There are so many reasons why that view is fundamentally flawed, although it does explain why you motor on past subject matter such as the Southwest Accident info above with nary a glance. Telling!
None, repeat none of what is being discussed here regarding ATS services and systems has any bearing on GA or corporate aviation viability. I raise you your Flight article with the cold hard realities facing the GA Mecca in the US - Van Nuys.
Officials consider cost cuts and new fees for Van Nuys Airport - Los Angeles Times
Airport costs sky rocketing! Why would that be? Surely not the US ATS system!?! I suggest you read the three pages of the linked article.
Let us dispense with the silly games shall we! These issues are far to serious.
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PS: TCAS RAs are quite common in the EGLL London zone, I personally have had three in less than 10 minutes, two being other aircraft in the Bovingdon holding pattern, and one a tethered balloon at White Waltham. None were GA aircraft.
Fact Versus Bluff, Bluster, Arrogance, Condescension and just plain Stupidity
I have not quoted publicly available information, because it is exactly that, publicly available ---- instead of ranting, why don't yo avail yourselves of the available information.
The FACT remains, the US produces a better air safety outcome, as far as midairs are concerned, than European countries or Australia. Once again, your reference to alleged totals killed or injured only illustrates your inability to understand statistical analysis.
Tootle pip!!
Ah, statistics ...
I reckon you could put up a case that the US is safer than Australia, based on number of hours flown, aircrafty registered and passengers carried etc. I'm not going to try, it'll just give me a headache, but .. I'm going to accept your figures Leadsled.... and assume it is the case.
HOWEVER, statistics is just that, figures.
What if the following is the real situation?
Say Australia has less MACs because it has a better system, not because it has less movements.
What if our movement rate suddenly increased ten fold? Would you expect our MACS to increase proportionately? What if they didn't, and they stayed at, say, NIL?
How would that affect airspace management by statistics?
Who says we can't compare by absolutes? That is, say, US has 100 deaths, Australia has 10 ... Australia is safer.
Who says the US has to have more deaths because it has more aircraft, movements, passengers etc?
My long winded point is .... who says the only safety comparison method has to be statistics?
I reckon you could put up a case that the US is safer than Australia, based on number of hours flown, aircrafty registered and passengers carried etc. I'm not going to try, it'll just give me a headache, but .. I'm going to accept your figures Leadsled.... and assume it is the case.
HOWEVER, statistics is just that, figures.
What if the following is the real situation?
Say Australia has less MACs because it has a better system, not because it has less movements.
What if our movement rate suddenly increased ten fold? Would you expect our MACS to increase proportionately? What if they didn't, and they stayed at, say, NIL?
How would that affect airspace management by statistics?
Who says we can't compare by absolutes? That is, say, US has 100 deaths, Australia has 10 ... Australia is safer.
Who says the US has to have more deaths because it has more aircraft, movements, passengers etc?
My long winded point is .... who says the only safety comparison method has to be statistics?
I for one am getting tired of this going in circles.
Dick, the industry needs to see a safety case and costing for E over D and a safety case for C over D. Then we can compare apples with apples.
All this comparison with US procedures is a side show. They have almost universal radar coverage and a FS system. Two very different environments. We can all pull out examples to "prove" our case. What we really need is to "prove" E over D is as safe and cheaper than C over D otherwise why not use C over D?
Dick I still have not heard a statement of why we should have E over D instead of C over D.
I think E airspace can work, with surveillance available. I fly passenger jets and do not like the idea of E without surveillance low level.
What is the benefit Dick? Sell it to me.
Dick, the industry needs to see a safety case and costing for E over D and a safety case for C over D. Then we can compare apples with apples.
All this comparison with US procedures is a side show. They have almost universal radar coverage and a FS system. Two very different environments. We can all pull out examples to "prove" our case. What we really need is to "prove" E over D is as safe and cheaper than C over D otherwise why not use C over D?
Dick I still have not heard a statement of why we should have E over D instead of C over D.
I think E airspace can work, with surveillance available. I fly passenger jets and do not like the idea of E without surveillance low level.
What is the benefit Dick? Sell it to me.
Icarus - you say
Icarus
I have said it again and again. Have you ever stopped and thought why other countries have E over D? It’s all about improving safety. If we had C over D and there was adequate staffing and tools (ie. surveillance radar), it would of course be safer. But we don’t do that. We give large amounts of Class C airspace - often without radar – to the low level Class D Controller.
This means that the Controller’s attention is taken away from the D airspace close to the circuit area because the Controller also has to separate two aircraft twenty miles away in the C airspace. Surely it’s obvious to you?
The only reason the FAA says they have E over D is so the resources (ie. Controller expertise) can be concentrated where the risk is greatest.
Of course, I know the standard answer … our Controllers say that they can do both jobs – ie. the D airspace below and huge amounts of C above - without any problems at all.
This is absolute rubbish – just why they would make such a claim is quite extraordinary. I think I know the reason and it will come to the fore one day.
Dick I still have not heard a statement of why we should have E over D instead of C over D
I have said it again and again. Have you ever stopped and thought why other countries have E over D? It’s all about improving safety. If we had C over D and there was adequate staffing and tools (ie. surveillance radar), it would of course be safer. But we don’t do that. We give large amounts of Class C airspace - often without radar – to the low level Class D Controller.
This means that the Controller’s attention is taken away from the D airspace close to the circuit area because the Controller also has to separate two aircraft twenty miles away in the C airspace. Surely it’s obvious to you?
The only reason the FAA says they have E over D is so the resources (ie. Controller expertise) can be concentrated where the risk is greatest.
Of course, I know the standard answer … our Controllers say that they can do both jobs – ie. the D airspace below and huge amounts of C above - without any problems at all.
This is absolute rubbish – just why they would make such a claim is quite extraordinary. I think I know the reason and it will come to the fore one day.
Sorry Icarus, the circle must continue ...
Dick,
Dick,
- If a Controller can't do D + C, how can he do D + E?
- I don't think Controllers are pushing for a D+C Controller ... they are suggesting a D Controller + a C Controller
Owen and Friends,
Been doing it for years, along with thousands of other pilots, also through G and F, and even before TCAS was invented, likewise before VFR Exempt Controlled Airspace was called E. Since when the London TMA ( outside the then EGLL/EGKK SRZs) were a free go for VFR up to 10,000' (not any longer, of course, just setting the time line).
What so many of you seem unable to take in is that, outside Australia, such operations are un-exceptional, everybody, including QF international pilots (and now Jetstar) take them in their stride -- all in a days work.
As to my views on Australian ATC, they are more or less the views of most international pilots working in an out of Australia, the service provided is regarded as pedantic and inflexible, and designed for the convenience of controllers, rather than the aircraft.
I recommend to everybody the FSF study of Australian pilot, engineer and controller attitudes to air safety, published in 2003 or 2004, where the attitude of controllers to pilots is pretty much what is illustrated in previous post by (presumably) present or former ATC persons.
Just one example, we have had the capacity to do continuous descent approaches for more than 20 years, to pre-nominated touchdown time, +/- less than 60 sec, most places around the world continuous descent approaches are more or less the norm, (but not yet nominated touchdown times) for minimum noise/minimum fuel burn ---- so, despite all the talk, are continuous descent approaches the norm in Australia??
Tootle pip!!
Are you seriously telling me that you would happily command a B747 on descent through Class E airspace KNOWING that there COULD BE a VFR aircraft INTENTIONS UNKNOWN that you MIGHT get an RA on?
What so many of you seem unable to take in is that, outside Australia, such operations are un-exceptional, everybody, including QF international pilots (and now Jetstar) take them in their stride -- all in a days work.
As to my views on Australian ATC, they are more or less the views of most international pilots working in an out of Australia, the service provided is regarded as pedantic and inflexible, and designed for the convenience of controllers, rather than the aircraft.
I recommend to everybody the FSF study of Australian pilot, engineer and controller attitudes to air safety, published in 2003 or 2004, where the attitude of controllers to pilots is pretty much what is illustrated in previous post by (presumably) present or former ATC persons.
Just one example, we have had the capacity to do continuous descent approaches for more than 20 years, to pre-nominated touchdown time, +/- less than 60 sec, most places around the world continuous descent approaches are more or less the norm, (but not yet nominated touchdown times) for minimum noise/minimum fuel burn ---- so, despite all the talk, are continuous descent approaches the norm in Australia??
Tootle pip!!
Sorry - but reading some of the comments he has made, I simply don't believe it.
All that proves is you don't know much about the job RPT Captains do, do you.
Tootle pip!!
This means that the Controller’s attention is taken away from the D airspace close to the circuit area because the Controller also has to separate two aircraft twenty miles away in the C airspace. Surely it’s obvious to you?
Dick, the tower is also responsible for the surrounding E airspace. Why is it that the TOWER is given responsibility for this airspace and not Melbourne? E is supposed to be perfectly safe for IFR ops, so why the tower and not ML?
The tower should only be responsible for the immeadiate airspace around the runway, you say....Yet, ML is not given control of the surrounding E....WHY??
Local knowledge? Visual range? Situational awarness better from a tower and not a console some 4000km away???? Why would the SA be better for the tower and not the console? ...BECAUSE THERE IS NO SURVEILLANCE!
Dick, NO E WITHOUT SURVEILLANCE!
Separating IFR from VFR cannot be mitigated by IFR using TCAS to detect VFR. Un-alerted SEE and AVOID is proven not to be safe. Procedural C over D is inordinately safer than E over D. You cannot justify E over D because it is cheaper.
What a dog's breakfast of an argument...You cannot have C because you do not have radar yet...it's OK to have E
Dick, when are you going to concede that one of those aircraft in your argument MUST be guaranteed a level of separation by that same tower controller that you think you are trying to save a bit of workload...more like helping into an early grave from the increased stress levels
Leadsled,
They may very well take it in their stride and accept it as part of their day's work ... because they HAVE TO ... in those airspace volumes that depend on E to work to any degree.
The difference in Australia is ... we DON'T HAVE TO ... there is no pressing need that we HAVE to have E over Broome .. to cope with the traffic levels.
What so many of you seem unable to take in is that, outside Australia, such operations are un-exceptional, everybody, including QF international pilots (and now Jetstar) take them in their stride -- all in a days work.
The difference in Australia is ... we DON'T HAVE TO ... there is no pressing need that we HAVE to have E over Broome .. to cope with the traffic levels.
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Lead sled
Not disagreeing with you, just interested to know where they actually work to touchdown.
If you could actually point the site out where I could find the information, rather than tell me to go and find it because it's out there it would be appreciated.
most places around the world continuous descent approaches are more or less the norm,
If you could actually point the site out where I could find the information, rather than tell me to go and find it because it's out there it would be appreciated.
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With regard to the CDA's into Heathrow, it is not generally par of the course to allocate a CDA from cruise. It is worked out more of a CDA from leaving the hold.
In the Uk (talking mainly about heathrow) they dont work on feeder fix times, everything bundles towards the 4 holds and are taken off in the order approach have worked out (from many miles away), the are *usually* allocated descent and given a range to touchdown to allow pilots to decide hw quickly to descend.
And beyond that, you cant really compare the traffic situation in Australia to that of the UK. The density is so much higher you dont have the space to allocate descent from the 300s down to 9000ft! you've got 5 other intl airports in the way. And if you gave a departure all the way to cruise from 5000ft he/she would think all his xmases have come at once and will agree to have your baby!
(can you tell im ex-UK TMA approach?????)
In the Uk (talking mainly about heathrow) they dont work on feeder fix times, everything bundles towards the 4 holds and are taken off in the order approach have worked out (from many miles away), the are *usually* allocated descent and given a range to touchdown to allow pilots to decide hw quickly to descend.
And beyond that, you cant really compare the traffic situation in Australia to that of the UK. The density is so much higher you dont have the space to allocate descent from the 300s down to 9000ft! you've got 5 other intl airports in the way. And if you gave a departure all the way to cruise from 5000ft he/she would think all his xmases have come at once and will agree to have your baby!
(can you tell im ex-UK TMA approach?????)
Just one example, we have had the capacity to do continuous descent approaches for more than 20 years, to pre-nominated touchdown time, +/- less than 60 sec
You might be interested in the Boeing Intent trials we're involved in - collecting data on accuracy of feeder fix estimates. Qantas 737-800s untouched by controller hands. Doesn't always work as advertised on the box, believe me.
All this automated stuff is great until you get aircraft anywhere near each other because they're doing their own thing without any regard for an overall "plan".
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The fragmented and desperate fundamentalists arguments here are as astounding as they are devoid of any logic.
ARFOR continues to mislead with specious arguments that are factually bankrupt.
ARFOR you state
Horsefeathers ARFOR! Of the 100 busiest airports in the United States almost half are Class D airports (43 at last count).
Class D towers alone in the US handled over 200,000 AIR CARRIER operations with over 10 million passengers. That’s the equivalent of 10 Avalon airports in Australia being serviced by Class E over D towers. Total aircraft movements at FAA Class D towers exceeds 16 million annually. Averaging over 40,000 each.
In excess of 40 of the more than 300 Class D airports in the United States service Part 135 and 121 airlines including high capacity RPT jet traffic. Virtually all have Class E above them. 71 Class E above D airports do not have radar-covered airspace above them or do not have radar feed to the tower (BRITE).
I’m certain that your research has already found this on the public record or have you chosen to ignore these facts?
ARFOR further states
How absurd! Firstly Class E, both in terminal and enroute areas is for the benefit of IFR not VFR, despite the availability of Flight Following. By this ridiculous logic, Australia should replace Class C with Class E only when the traffic load increases to a level where ATC cannot provide a sufficient class C service. Amazing!
Peuce supports Class E above D in Broome if there was surveillance and everyone had a transponder. Do you also support the original NAS proposal to upgrade existing radar covered class G to Class E in the J curve? I look forward to your response.
Scurvy D Dog, a tower controller in Launceston is vehemently opposed to E over D even with the radar down at Launy! You controllers do not seem to be on the same page here.
Mike Barry wants to go back to full VFR reporting with controlled and uncontrolled airspace while most controllers on here want airliners descending in enroute Class C into class G. Are you controllers all on the same page here? It seems not.
Howabout is still under the illusion that somehow an airliner descending into Class G now is somehow in less danger of colliding with a NORDO VFR should that same airspace be renamed Class E. Extraordinarily illogical!
ARFOR continues to mislead with specious arguments that are factually bankrupt.
ARFOR you state
Most US airports servicing the level of RPT traffic serviced by Australian regional towered airports have Class C services.
Class D towers alone in the US handled over 200,000 AIR CARRIER operations with over 10 million passengers. That’s the equivalent of 10 Avalon airports in Australia being serviced by Class E over D towers. Total aircraft movements at FAA Class D towers exceeds 16 million annually. Averaging over 40,000 each.
In excess of 40 of the more than 300 Class D airports in the United States service Part 135 and 121 airlines including high capacity RPT jet traffic. Virtually all have Class E above them. 71 Class E above D airports do not have radar-covered airspace above them or do not have radar feed to the tower (BRITE).
I’m certain that your research has already found this on the public record or have you chosen to ignore these facts?
ARFOR further states
Why do the US utilise Class E outside busy RPT Terminal Area’s? The density of VFR traffic that cannot be serviced to the same level it is in Europe, Australia and elsewhere.
- Does that mean the US system with Class E components is better? No, it is simply a necessity.
- Does that mean the US system with Class E components is better? No, it is simply a necessity.
Peuce supports Class E above D in Broome if there was surveillance and everyone had a transponder. Do you also support the original NAS proposal to upgrade existing radar covered class G to Class E in the J curve? I look forward to your response.
Scurvy D Dog, a tower controller in Launceston is vehemently opposed to E over D even with the radar down at Launy! You controllers do not seem to be on the same page here.
Mike Barry wants to go back to full VFR reporting with controlled and uncontrolled airspace while most controllers on here want airliners descending in enroute Class C into class G. Are you controllers all on the same page here? It seems not.
Howabout is still under the illusion that somehow an airliner descending into Class G now is somehow in less danger of colliding with a NORDO VFR should that same airspace be renamed Class E. Extraordinarily illogical!