Lockhart River - ATSB GPWS RNAV (GNSS) report just released
Maybe I am dumb bringing this up. Why can't the LHR rwy12 NPA be designed to run along the valley alignment? Surely, a 5degree offset from rwy alignment at the MAP can be a situation that can be handled easily?
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As far as I can tell, it's saying there were 2 warnings that the approach was unacceptable and it's taken a fatal accident to actually do something about it.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)
expects that the safety issue identified in this
investigation should be addressed by the relevant
organisation(s). In addressing that issue, the ATSB
prefers to encourage relevant organisation(s) to
proactively initiate safety action, rather than to
issue formal safety recommendations or safety
advisory notices.
That seems to be working well.
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)
expects that the safety issue identified in this
investigation should be addressed by the relevant
organisation(s). In addressing that issue, the ATSB
prefers to encourage relevant organisation(s) to
proactively initiate safety action, rather than to
issue formal safety recommendations or safety
advisory notices.
That seems to be working well.
Surely, a 5degree offset from rwy alignment at the MAP can be a situation that can be handled easily?
Thread Starter
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Fatal approach 'quietly' changed
Sunday, 29 November 2009 13:07
Federal Aviation Authorities have quietly changed the aircraft approach over South Pap and into Lockhart River Airport.
The new approach is basically a straight alignment down the valley and avoids the 5 degree off-set of South Pap Ridge altogether.
Shane Urquhart, the father of Sally Urquhart, who was one of the “Lockhart 15” who died in the South Pap crash on 7 May, 2005, says this is a typical CASA (Civil Aviation Safety Authority) response to a situation that they knew was a problem all along.
“Many experienced pilots and other technical experts had recommended the new approach as the one that should have been approved in the first place.
“Arguments in the Lockhart River Inquest proceedings saw CASA deny this continually and strongly defend the safety and integrity of the South Pap approach.
“They specifically cited the proximity of Mt Tozer, the highest point in the area as a safety risk for the ‘down-the- valley approach.’ Much evidence was presented to the contrary.
“Here we have CASA up to its usual tricks, finally responding to actions sought by the ATSB in 2007 and tacitly conceding that South Pap is not an appropriate approach.
“Mt Tozer is still there yet it is ok for the new approach. The supporting comments around satellite navigation technological advances etc are just a smokescreen to hide what was originally a poor decision. In my opinion, very little has changed in the internal operations of CASA.”
Mr Urquhart says it is also understood that the CASA spin team referred questions from a journalist to the Queensland Transport Department.
“This is puzzling, as the Civil Aviation industry in Australia is directly governed by the Australian Transport Department and its agencies.
“Both Airservices Australia and Jeppesen have belatedly updated their charts in colour to depict the new approach. Both these organisations were also asked by the ATSB to respond in 2007.
“The charts took effect from 19 November, 2009.”
Mr Urquhart said this turn of events is cold comfort for the families of the victims and is an appalling case of “too little, too late.”
“I will be further progressing responses to this turn of events, in a range of forums,” said Mr Urquhart.
Di
Sunday, 29 November 2009 13:07
Federal Aviation Authorities have quietly changed the aircraft approach over South Pap and into Lockhart River Airport.
The new approach is basically a straight alignment down the valley and avoids the 5 degree off-set of South Pap Ridge altogether.
Shane Urquhart, the father of Sally Urquhart, who was one of the “Lockhart 15” who died in the South Pap crash on 7 May, 2005, says this is a typical CASA (Civil Aviation Safety Authority) response to a situation that they knew was a problem all along.
“Many experienced pilots and other technical experts had recommended the new approach as the one that should have been approved in the first place.
“Arguments in the Lockhart River Inquest proceedings saw CASA deny this continually and strongly defend the safety and integrity of the South Pap approach.
“They specifically cited the proximity of Mt Tozer, the highest point in the area as a safety risk for the ‘down-the- valley approach.’ Much evidence was presented to the contrary.
“Here we have CASA up to its usual tricks, finally responding to actions sought by the ATSB in 2007 and tacitly conceding that South Pap is not an appropriate approach.
“Mt Tozer is still there yet it is ok for the new approach. The supporting comments around satellite navigation technological advances etc are just a smokescreen to hide what was originally a poor decision. In my opinion, very little has changed in the internal operations of CASA.”
Mr Urquhart says it is also understood that the CASA spin team referred questions from a journalist to the Queensland Transport Department.
“This is puzzling, as the Civil Aviation industry in Australia is directly governed by the Australian Transport Department and its agencies.
“Both Airservices Australia and Jeppesen have belatedly updated their charts in colour to depict the new approach. Both these organisations were also asked by the ATSB to respond in 2007.
“The charts took effect from 19 November, 2009.”
Mr Urquhart said this turn of events is cold comfort for the families of the victims and is an appalling case of “too little, too late.”
“I will be further progressing responses to this turn of events, in a range of forums,” said Mr Urquhart.
Di
A sad affair for all but I don't think the approach design (apart from Foxtrot being a waypoint
) had much to do with why the aircraft crashed.
) had much to do with why the aircraft crashed.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 1st Dec 2009 at 14:47. Reason: correcting a failed spellcheck.
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Bloggs,
with your exception, you and I agree.
the sad part is why the father of one pax has responded, whilst clearly not having the whole reason why the approach had to change.
It was due to the ATSB insisting on ONE unsubstantiated EGPWS claim rather than an improvement to safety. Having been aboard an acft conducting the original approach with EGPWS and TAWS-A there is video showing that neither system alarmed at 200kts.
the vertical profile has NOTchanged as it is based on the same obstacle, and the lateral is now based on narrower ICAO empirical work rather than the original "VOR" shaped protection. The lateral would have been even more contained except for a desire not to be less than RNP type fix tolerances.
The change was not an attempt by CASA to hide a dangerous approach. It was due to new rules being available thru ICAO, and a desire to take advantage of the new criteria for public good, at every location where possible.
Would the new procedure have prevented the May 2005 accident? Probably, at that location. Given that if he'd flown the same vertical profile [650ft lower than min safe, 1000ft lower than profile and diverging - ref ATSB report] some 500m left of centreline he would have hit higher terrain earlier, or if 500m right he would have missed everything, the procedure probably was not the cause.
It is very easy to say, in hindsight, that the current procedure is safer [and it most likely it is] and the revision was a reaction to the accident. It is harder to see that the revision [including colour contours] is occurring at all locations identified by ICAO guidance rather than as a kneejerk reaction.
with your exception, you and I agree.
the sad part is why the father of one pax has responded, whilst clearly not having the whole reason why the approach had to change.
It was due to the ATSB insisting on ONE unsubstantiated EGPWS claim rather than an improvement to safety. Having been aboard an acft conducting the original approach with EGPWS and TAWS-A there is video showing that neither system alarmed at 200kts.
the vertical profile has NOTchanged as it is based on the same obstacle, and the lateral is now based on narrower ICAO empirical work rather than the original "VOR" shaped protection. The lateral would have been even more contained except for a desire not to be less than RNP type fix tolerances.
The change was not an attempt by CASA to hide a dangerous approach. It was due to new rules being available thru ICAO, and a desire to take advantage of the new criteria for public good, at every location where possible.
Would the new procedure have prevented the May 2005 accident? Probably, at that location. Given that if he'd flown the same vertical profile [650ft lower than min safe, 1000ft lower than profile and diverging - ref ATSB report] some 500m left of centreline he would have hit higher terrain earlier, or if 500m right he would have missed everything, the procedure probably was not the cause.
It is very easy to say, in hindsight, that the current procedure is safer [and it most likely it is] and the revision was a reaction to the accident. It is harder to see that the revision [including colour contours] is occurring at all locations identified by ICAO guidance rather than as a kneejerk reaction.
Now we can blame ICAO for being retroactive after we have death on an industrial scale. 
Check Attitude
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The new, correctly aligned approach is a safer approach.
I flew the old approach numerous times in VMC before committing to flying it in IMC. Quite scary to see the hills popping up under you.
Invariably it was safer to fly the Runway 30 NDB approach with a letdown over water.
I do not argue that the original design was the cause of the crash, it wasn't.
If the approach had been flown to the published profile at the correct Category speeds,
and with the Co pilot trained and rated on the type of approach,
and with proper CASA surveillance of the operator
(read " a fullsome audit" as proffered by CASA in the Senate and recorded in Hansard),
there would not have been a tragedy.
The new, more sensible approach now has a better tolerance for out of tolerance deviations.
It now completely misses South Pap and instead runs down a safer valley to the runway.
Hindsight is always great, it was and still is Australia's worst aviation disaster in over 40 years, no matter what excuses and justifications are offered.
I flew the old approach numerous times in VMC before committing to flying it in IMC. Quite scary to see the hills popping up under you.
Invariably it was safer to fly the Runway 30 NDB approach with a letdown over water.
I do not argue that the original design was the cause of the crash, it wasn't.
If the approach had been flown to the published profile at the correct Category speeds,
and with the Co pilot trained and rated on the type of approach,
and with proper CASA surveillance of the operator
(read " a fullsome audit" as proffered by CASA in the Senate and recorded in Hansard),
there would not have been a tragedy.
The new, more sensible approach now has a better tolerance for out of tolerance deviations.
It now completely misses South Pap and instead runs down a safer valley to the runway.
Hindsight is always great, it was and still is Australia's worst aviation disaster in over 40 years, no matter what excuses and justifications are offered.
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Offset Approach
Not wishing to be flippant, but the suggestion that a 5 degree offset approach should not be too hard brought back memories of many IGS approaches to Rwy 13 at the old Kai Tak airport in Hong Kong. The IGS approach was flown down to about 650' on a track of around 087 degrees M where a right turn through almost 50 degrees was made to finals with the roll out of the turn completed at about 150-200'. Certainly brought many post-flight comments from "jump seat riders", in the days when they could.
