Lockhart River on Australian Story
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JetA_OK
On your suggestion I did just that.
Ever decided to get a job as a journo? What rubbish. Maximum rate of descent over the actual approach was 2400 fpm. Because of the lack of CVR over the final stages, the only indication that anyone on board may have known their vnav was wrong was the descent rate decreasing from 2400 to 1200 fpm during the last 10 seconds of the flight. I would suggest that other than the normal nerves of paxing in a 'small' aircraft in IMC, the poor buggers never knew what hit them. And that's a good thing.
On your suggestion I did just that.
Originally Posted by JetA_OK
Those poor people had a terrifying last few mins of their life, and the person responsible for their safety and care while onboard the aircraft was responsible.
The culture at CASA at the time was interesting. Flying Operations Inspectors assigned to airline operations had for some years been in the invidious position of being expected to pass judgement on their peers but with no 'real' flying officially allowed to maintain any credibility or proficiency of their own. There was a limited budget for the airline guys to supposedly maintain proficiency on simulators, but even that was a joke. Most sim sessions that I attended were more like an all-day jolly away from the office playing video-arcade games. There was no structure to the programme whatsoever. Little wonder, given that the guys running the sim were also CASA people with no recent experience and in some cases no actual type experience.
The Team Leader had spivved a couple of endorsements at taxpayers' expense and had a bit of a cosy arrangement going with the operator so that he could get Metro time - all in the line of duty of course. In that culture it was not surprising that anyone in a position to get some free flying would take advantage of every opportunity.
A couple of the other FOIs in the Brisbane office were a standing joke in the industry and within the CASA office itself. One even had a standard audit format that he regurgitated with each new audit, just changing the name of the auditee and minimal other detail to make it look like he was busy.
There were also a few very professional and dedicated FOIs in that office.
Not surprisingly, most have moved on.
CASA would appear to have declined even further since then. At least even the lazy FOIs did have prior flying experience and could pick up on things like overloading, underfuelling etc. Now it's gone totally touchy-feely with all this crap about threat and error management, having a safety management system with huge committees meeting every other week, lots of pie diagrams, statistics and charts etc. Auditors look at manuals and they go ape-**** if a page is missing or an amendment is not up to date or a pilot went 10 minutes over the duty limit without going into intensive care, or a flight attendant tripped on the carpet and didn't get counselling.
As for Airworthiness - when was the last time an AWI got into a wing-box with a mirror and a flashlight? All they seem to do is look at records and part numbers and woe betide if a signature or licence stamp is missing on a turnaround check or someone reset a circuit breaker without a two-page write up.
Many CASA Auditors these days don't even have an aviation background - how does that work?
I have an aviation lead auditor qualification and have also worked for more than one dodgy operation. So I know how easy it is for a smart operator to hide stuff. Only someone who has been in the industry long enough to have operated in the arena that is being overseen, broken a few rules in his time, and seen other creative ways of breaking them, can do this job to the thorough extent that is needed.
Sadly CASA doesn't provide the motivation for old-hand pilots and engineers, so it is increasingly coming uner the control of the psycho-babble brigade. Less scrupulous chief pilots and maintenance controllers will run right over these guys.
The Team Leader had spivved a couple of endorsements at taxpayers' expense and had a bit of a cosy arrangement going with the operator so that he could get Metro time - all in the line of duty of course. In that culture it was not surprising that anyone in a position to get some free flying would take advantage of every opportunity.
A couple of the other FOIs in the Brisbane office were a standing joke in the industry and within the CASA office itself. One even had a standard audit format that he regurgitated with each new audit, just changing the name of the auditee and minimal other detail to make it look like he was busy.
There were also a few very professional and dedicated FOIs in that office.
Not surprisingly, most have moved on.
CASA would appear to have declined even further since then. At least even the lazy FOIs did have prior flying experience and could pick up on things like overloading, underfuelling etc. Now it's gone totally touchy-feely with all this crap about threat and error management, having a safety management system with huge committees meeting every other week, lots of pie diagrams, statistics and charts etc. Auditors look at manuals and they go ape-**** if a page is missing or an amendment is not up to date or a pilot went 10 minutes over the duty limit without going into intensive care, or a flight attendant tripped on the carpet and didn't get counselling.
As for Airworthiness - when was the last time an AWI got into a wing-box with a mirror and a flashlight? All they seem to do is look at records and part numbers and woe betide if a signature or licence stamp is missing on a turnaround check or someone reset a circuit breaker without a two-page write up.
Many CASA Auditors these days don't even have an aviation background - how does that work?
I have an aviation lead auditor qualification and have also worked for more than one dodgy operation. So I know how easy it is for a smart operator to hide stuff. Only someone who has been in the industry long enough to have operated in the arena that is being overseen, broken a few rules in his time, and seen other creative ways of breaking them, can do this job to the thorough extent that is needed.
Sadly CASA doesn't provide the motivation for old-hand pilots and engineers, so it is increasingly coming uner the control of the psycho-babble brigade. Less scrupulous chief pilots and maintenance controllers will run right over these guys.
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Now it's gone totally touchy-feely with all this crap about threat and error management, having a safety management system with huge committees meeting every other week, lots of pie diagrams, statistics and charts etc. Auditors look at manuals and they go ape-**** if a page is missing or an amendment is not up to date or a pilot went 10 minutes over the duty limit without going into intensive care, or a flight attendant tripped on the carpet and didn't get counselling.
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Welcome to the "Byron in ATI Land" Legacy!
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Welcome to the "Byron in ATI Land" Legacy!
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Yep please JetA_OK none of us who lost our loved ones really want to think that the last few moments of their lives were terrifying. We already live with the nightmares.
Thanks Hempy, I like to think that none of them knew what hit them too.
Shane is trying to keep the fight alive and hey maybe the world needs more people like him!
Fiona
Thanks Hempy, I like to think that none of them knew what hit them too.
Shane is trying to keep the fight alive and hey maybe the world needs more people like him!
Fiona
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Originally Posted by Mach E Avelli
Many CASA Auditors these days don't even have an aviation background - how does that work?
I have an aviation lead auditor qualification and have also worked for more than one dodgy operation. So I know how easy it is for a smart operator to hide stuff.
I have an aviation lead auditor qualification and have also worked for more than one dodgy operation. So I know how easy it is for a smart operator to hide stuff.
I find the whole thing quite alarming, to be honest.
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smells like seaview
Sense of deja vu over this.
Those that were around will remember the Seaview inquiry.
Same accusations of a CAA operative in bed with the operator.
Anything to take the blame off the PIC.
A good man lost his job, lost his marriage and damn near lost his soul because of A-sholes like some here talking about that of which they have no knowledge.
Blackhand
Those that were around will remember the Seaview inquiry.
Same accusations of a CAA operative in bed with the operator.
Anything to take the blame off the PIC.
A good man lost his job, lost his marriage and damn near lost his soul because of A-sholes like some here talking about that of which they have no knowledge.
Blackhand
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Blame Game
The crew of the Metro have already paid the ultimate price for their efforts, they lost their lives, sad and unforgivable part is they took 13 trusting fare paying passengers with them. The facts are they took a reasonably serviceable aircraft and flew it into a hill, why? because they thought it would not happen to them! Complacency and arrogance will eventually get you whether your the operating crew or the operator it is only a matter of time and as history has shown yet again, the operator very rarely if ever survives the outcome.
If you do not regard the people up the back as more important than you then you have no place in the business and your not a professional. It is your job to do that, it is the company's job to give the equipment and training to keep you doing your job and it is the regulatory authorities job to see that your all doing your job the way you said you would. I don't see any evidence that anybody did their job in this tragedy.
If you do not regard the people up the back as more important than you then you have no place in the business and your not a professional. It is your job to do that, it is the company's job to give the equipment and training to keep you doing your job and it is the regulatory authorities job to see that your all doing your job the way you said you would. I don't see any evidence that anybody did their job in this tragedy.
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Yup! I agree. There have been too many people selling "airline" tickets to unsuspecting people with ticket jackets of wide bodies printed on them, only to find they are flying in something like a spent Metro circa '83.
Also the flying training in civvie street during the hiring frenzy went to sh!t.
Also the flying training in civvie street during the hiring frenzy went to sh!t.
Aviation training is very much a pass-down experience type of event in which the junior flyer learns from the guidance and the teaching of his senior.
With this thought in mind, one is drawn to the conclusion that it is unlikely that the "shooting hole approach" reportedly quoted by the late PIC was some invention of his own.
One might be excused from surmising from the PIC's reported comments that this type of approach was condoned by the operator of the Airline in question.
Perhaps the real instigator of the events leading to this tragic accident is still lurking out there and is now awaiting a new alignment of the holes in the Swiss cheese for the next disaster?
The accident was a terrible loss to all those involved, But, if we fail to learn from the mistakes that were resposible for this event, then we will be doomed to repeat them.
With this thought in mind, one is drawn to the conclusion that it is unlikely that the "shooting hole approach" reportedly quoted by the late PIC was some invention of his own.
One might be excused from surmising from the PIC's reported comments that this type of approach was condoned by the operator of the Airline in question.
Perhaps the real instigator of the events leading to this tragic accident is still lurking out there and is now awaiting a new alignment of the holes in the Swiss cheese for the next disaster?
The accident was a terrible loss to all those involved, But, if we fail to learn from the mistakes that were resposible for this event, then we will be doomed to repeat them.
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Maybe Maybe Not
Never really taken to the shooting the hole explanation. LHR is an evil place at the best of times with the strip in a funnel valley with constant strong SE winds and high hills and a mountain at the end. Given it away many times there simply because of the sheer and turbulence in an approach from the west will push you up and down really hard (Seen +/-1000 fpm in the holding pattern on a bad day). Think they caught caught at LHR in an unstable approach at a point on the GPSNPA where the minima is literally that 300ft. The wind is always across the range at that point pushing a stream of eddies and lee turbulence at that critical point if they encountered even isolated sheer at the speed they were travelling and uncontrolled ROD it was game over! Sensible course is to take the NDB or the let down over water to the east at about 5-10 nm to 1500ft any day to the GPS NPA as currently published. They haven't produced one from the east because in my view with the prevailing winds it would always result in a circling approach which would be an ask in anything above CAT B.
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Grip Pipe, A rational statement which underlines the difficulty in self designed approach procedures.
Local knowledge is a powerful tool but misuse of that knowledge will end up in grief almost always if one strays onto the dark side and "goes it alone".
Local knowledge is a powerful tool but misuse of that knowledge will end up in grief almost always if one strays onto the dark side and "goes it alone".
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Grip-Pipe:
http://www.airservices.gov.au/public...HRGN02-116.pdf
Done it many a time in Dash8. I would do this AND CIRCLE over the western RNAV anyday.
Your right about the Western RNAV. Done it in VMC, 300' RADALT is rather tight coming in over Iron Range at the FAF.
BR
http://www.airservices.gov.au/public...HRGN02-116.pdf
Done it many a time in Dash8. I would do this AND CIRCLE over the western RNAV anyday.
Your right about the Western RNAV. Done it in VMC, 300' RADALT is rather tight coming in over Iron Range at the FAF.
BR
As JetA OK suggested, I went to the ATSB site and watched the animation. It was a very sobering experience and any professional airline pilot viewing that animation would question how it was possible and why?
The ATSB report on the accident, which documents in painful detail, the lack of adherence to standard procedures, the incompetant execution of operational procedures and other errors of the AOC holder and the ineffective oversight by the Aviation Regulator are so shocking, that one wonders if they aren't referring instead to some impoverished African nation rather than to Australia.
The ATSB report on the accident, which documents in painful detail, the lack of adherence to standard procedures, the incompetant execution of operational procedures and other errors of the AOC holder and the ineffective oversight by the Aviation Regulator are so shocking, that one wonders if they aren't referring instead to some impoverished African nation rather than to Australia.
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Hempy,
Am I missing something here? Are you suggesting that 2400fpm is an acceptable rate of descent at any point on an approach? Shouldn't the standard be about 600-650fpm? I would have thought that even 1200fpm would be unacceptable after the IF.
Am I missing something here? Are you suggesting that 2400fpm is an acceptable rate of descent at any point on an approach? Shouldn't the standard be about 600-650fpm? I would have thought that even 1200fpm would be unacceptable after the IF.
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and the ineffective oversight by the Aviation Regulator are so shocking, that one wonders if they aren't referring instead to some impoverished African nation rather than to Australia.
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I have read the transcripts from the Coroner's Inquest and, from both flight operations and airworthiness perspectives, the oversight by the regulator was, in fact, most comprehensive. En-route surveillance was conducted on EVERY RPT sector (BAM & LHR included) in an audit immediately prior to the accident.
No number of such inspections, however, could prevent such a "shooting hole approach" induced crash if the PIC was that way inclined - and evidence from a previous coronial suggests that he was.
What is most disturbing is that this evidence by the PIC at this previous coronial was not reported to anyone - his employer, the regulator or anyone! The ATSB reportedly were in attendance at this coronial and did not forward this intelligence to anyone.
Not reporting this intelligence is, I believe, just as big a threat to aviation safety as the PIC actually conducting such "shooting hole approaches."
As has been stated previously, the FDR data says it all. I believe that, in this case, the coroner delivered a correct finding.
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Am I missing something here? Are you suggesting that 2400fpm is an acceptable rate of descent at any point on an approach? Shouldn't the standard be about 600-650fpm? I would have thought that even 1200fpm would be unacceptable after the IF.
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Absolutely correct. Such descent rates in no way constitute a stabilised approach and a MA should have been conducted. "Cowboy flying" reflects poorly on the reputation of every professional pilot.
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I have read the transcripts from the Coroner's Inquest and, from both flight operations and airworthiness perspectives, the oversight by the regulator was, in fact, most comprehensive. En-route surveillance was conducted on EVERY RPT sector (BAM & LHR included) in an audit immediately prior to the accident.
No number of such inspections, however, could prevent such a "shooting hole approach" induced crash if the PIC was that way inclined - and evidence from a previous coronial suggests that he was.
What is most disturbing is that this evidence by the PIC at this previous coronial was not reported to anyone - his employer, the regulator or anyone! The ATSB reportedly were in attendance at this coronial and did not forward this intelligence to anyone.
Not reporting this intelligence is, I believe, just as big a threat to aviation safety as the PIC actually conducting such "shooting hole approaches."
As has been stated previously, the FDR data says it all. I believe that, in this case, the coroner delivered a correct finding.
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Am I missing something here? Are you suggesting that 2400fpm is an acceptable rate of descent at any point on an approach? Shouldn't the standard be about 600-650fpm? I would have thought that even 1200fpm would be unacceptable after the IF.
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Absolutely correct. Such descent rates in no way constitute a stabilised approach and a MA should have been conducted. "Cowboy flying" reflects poorly on the reputation of every professional pilot.
Last edited by Casper; 18th Mar 2009 at 21:13.
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Originally Posted by Barry Bernoulli
Hempy,
Am I missing something here? Are you suggesting that 2400fpm is an acceptable rate of descent at any point on an approach? Shouldn't the standard be about 600-650fpm? I would have thought that even 1200fpm would be unacceptable after the IF
Am I missing something here? Are you suggesting that 2400fpm is an acceptable rate of descent at any point on an approach? Shouldn't the standard be about 600-650fpm? I would have thought that even 1200fpm would be unacceptable after the IF
Yes, I think you are missing something. My reply was to JetA_OK, who stated "Those poor people had a terrifying last few mins of their life". I'm not suggesting anywhere that the pilots were flying the correct approach, the proper way, or as you say 'acceptable'...obviously they weren't or they wouldn't have plowed into a hill. I AM suggesting that 2400 fpm, in my experience, certainly isn't "terrifying", nor do I think anyone on that aircraft believed their life was in mortal danger (except, as I said, perhaps by the pilots in the last ten seconds before impact). It's OK to apportion blame based on the evidence, but to insinuate how the pax on the aircraft were feeling? please...
