Airprox above Launceston
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Hey Maggott17,
There are other procedures available than the published missed approach... and therefore a 225 is not warranted... or is it correctly called a 2593 these days....?
check your facts
back to journo school for you.....
There are other procedures available than the published missed approach... and therefore a 225 is not warranted... or is it correctly called a 2593 these days....?
check your facts
back to journo school for you.....
Join Date: Aug 2000
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Only goes to show how run down our ATC system is. Its time that the government took control of Airservices, and ensured that all aerodromes where RPT jets are operating to have ATC coverage.
How bloody silly that the tower ceases operation 10 mins before two jets are due on a foggy night. Its a bit like turning off traffic lights in the cities after midnight to save power.
How bloody silly that the tower ceases operation 10 mins before two jets are due on a foggy night. Its a bit like turning off traffic lights in the cities after midnight to save power.
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Tower close at published time because either 1) airlines did not want to pay for ATC extension to cover their arrivals, or 2) Controller was at max limit of shift time (and no extra staff available).
So, two RPT jet crews who are used to being controlled and separated by ATC, not accustomed to self-separating in a CTAF, who do not necessarily appreciate how much airspace is required to achieve separation in imc, doing what they think is separation.
Except that they end-up pointing at each other - maybe not TCAS close - but close enough - a bit too close.
Happens more than you think, although, not usually with two high-capacity RPT jets!
So, two RPT jet crews who are used to being controlled and separated by ATC, not accustomed to self-separating in a CTAF, who do not necessarily appreciate how much airspace is required to achieve separation in imc, doing what they think is separation.
Except that they end-up pointing at each other - maybe not TCAS close - but close enough - a bit too close.
Happens more than you think, although, not usually with two high-capacity RPT jets!
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from the ATSB
the tassie media has now picked up the story
Following missed approaches for runway 32, the leading aircraft was climbing to 3,100 ft and the following was climbing to 4,000 ft. The leading aircraft then made a shallow turn towards the following aircraft. ATC received a short term conflict alert on both aircraft. As the following aircraft entered VMC at 2,000 ft, the crew observed the leading aircraft approaching from directly ahead. TCAS indicated the aircraft as 5 NM apart. The investigation is continuing.
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Know nothing about this except for this thread, but two things spring to mind:
1. Why would anyone be interested in the lateral guidance provided by TCAS (especially if there are radar tapes)?
2. Who cares by what margin they missed, as long as they had organised to miss? If they hadn't organised it, then it still doesn't matter by how much, because then it was just luck (and hence the problem capt).
1. Why would anyone be interested in the lateral guidance provided by TCAS (especially if there are radar tapes)?
2. Who cares by what margin they missed, as long as they had organised to miss? If they hadn't organised it, then it still doesn't matter by how much, because then it was just luck (and hence the problem capt).
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No TCAS alert....No problem morons
Some pilots seem to forget that TCAS is an aid to safety, not the be all.
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"There are other procedures available than the published missed approach... and therefore a 225 is not warranted... or is it correctly called a 2593 these days....?"
At night, in IMC and RPT jet?
Why did you invade IRAQ Dubya?
At night, in IMC and RPT jet?
Why did you invade IRAQ Dubya?
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CAR 163 Operating near other aircraft
(1) The pilot in command of an aircraft must not fly the aircraft so close
to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard.
(1) The pilot in command of an aircraft must not fly the aircraft so close
to another aircraft as to create a collision hazard.
AIP GEN 1-5 7.2 The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) requires that all TCAS Resolution Advisory alerts, which involve a breakdown in separation only, are to be treated as immediately notifiable occurrences (ENR 1.14 sub-para 2.1.1e. refers).
Sounds to me like they operated within the rules applying at the time.
I hope we don't have another LAUNY witch hunt like the last shameful effort by our 'out of their depth' witch hunters.
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Yes Maggott,
at night, in IMC, and RPT... other procedures are available, and are sometimes different to published missed approaches.
The pilot would also have had available to him (or her) the single engine contingency (aka escape procedure) which can be used in a situation if you get to the bottom of an approach, then suffer engine failure and don't get visual. The published missed approach will kill you. In this case it is okay to use the single engine contingency....
What I am trying to say, is that we can't comment on what the crews did on this occasion. They may have used procedures that you and I have no idea of....and been totally legal in doing it.......
at night, in IMC, and RPT... other procedures are available, and are sometimes different to published missed approaches.
The pilot would also have had available to him (or her) the single engine contingency (aka escape procedure) which can be used in a situation if you get to the bottom of an approach, then suffer engine failure and don't get visual. The published missed approach will kill you. In this case it is okay to use the single engine contingency....
What I am trying to say, is that we can't comment on what the crews did on this occasion. They may have used procedures that you and I have no idea of....and been totally legal in doing it.......
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" 2. Who cares by what margin they missed, as long as they had organised to miss? ... "
The problem is that they may have organised their own separation, but not being used to non-controlled CTAF ops, RPT jet crews underestimate what is required to achieve separation and because they are not used to clearly defining their actions sometimes their "separation" as understood by one crew is not the same as understood by the other.
In this case, I think that they were lucky the were visual on top, 'cause if they had all been in imc it might have been a much different story.
The problem is that they may have organised their own separation, but not being used to non-controlled CTAF ops, RPT jet crews underestimate what is required to achieve separation and because they are not used to clearly defining their actions sometimes their "separation" as understood by one crew is not the same as understood by the other.
In this case, I think that they were lucky the were visual on top, 'cause if they had all been in imc it might have been a much different story.
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Just a thought, how about the airspace reverting to Class E instead of G when the tower closes (as it does in the US - even when there is no radar coverage in the terminal area)?
The critics of the NAS did not want procedural E at LT, the result was reverting to the previous airspace model and the installation of radar at LT. Now we have radar why can't the airspace be changed to E and have MC provide positive separation between IFR and traffic information on VFR?
In G there is no separation standard listed therefore there was no airprox. The ATSB will say this in the report, just as they did in both the previous LT and ML incidents (if my memory serves me correctly) where IFR/VFR aircraft converged in Class E (in the ML case observed on radar) and an RA occured (if my memory serves me correctly again - please correct me if I am wrong as i don't have time to re-read the reports).
As previously stated TCAS the last line of defence, this was made abundantly clear by the critics of Class E last time. Therefore it would be unwise to say that in Class G if you don't get an RA everything is okay.
The critics of the NAS did not want procedural E at LT, the result was reverting to the previous airspace model and the installation of radar at LT. Now we have radar why can't the airspace be changed to E and have MC provide positive separation between IFR and traffic information on VFR?
In G there is no separation standard listed therefore there was no airprox. The ATSB will say this in the report, just as they did in both the previous LT and ML incidents (if my memory serves me correctly) where IFR/VFR aircraft converged in Class E (in the ML case observed on radar) and an RA occured (if my memory serves me correctly again - please correct me if I am wrong as i don't have time to re-read the reports).
As previously stated TCAS the last line of defence, this was made abundantly clear by the critics of Class E last time. Therefore it would be unwise to say that in Class G if you don't get an RA everything is okay.
'What If's' - don't count
With Virgin making an approach, Jetstar should have held at 4100ft (in case Virgin went round). With Jetstar following Virgin on the approach and Virgin having gone round to 3100ft, when Jetstar went round Virgin should have climbed to 4100ft (to allow Jetstar to climb as per the published missed approach).
Excerpt from the Hobart Mercury
........ATSB director of aviation safety investigation Julian Walsh confirmed the investigation of last week's occurrence involving Jetstar and Virgin Blue aircraft.
Mr Walsh said the planes did not pass each other in opposite directions and the pilots had been communicating with each other.
"Jetstar made a missed approach and as it climbed away the aircraft were on a converging path but preliminary investigations indicate they were not closer than five miles," he said.
Mr Walsh said the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System had not been triggered.
He said both aircraft were in contact with the Melbourne control tower because the Launceston tower had closed.
Radar data would show the flight paths of the aircraft, speed and altitude information.
"That will give us a replay of what the two aircraft were doing and the audio data from the aeroplanes will tell us what they knew of each other," he said.
Virgin Blue spokeswoman Amanda Bolger said: "Virgin Blue has made its own internal inquiries and the ATSB will follow its processes but from our investigations we're satisfied that at no stage were the aircraft less than five miles apart."
Jetstar spokesman Simon Westaway said the airline had provided an incident report to the ATSB.
Mr Westaway said a "go-around" had been undertaken by pilots.
Mr Walsh said the planes did not pass each other in opposite directions and the pilots had been communicating with each other.
"Jetstar made a missed approach and as it climbed away the aircraft were on a converging path but preliminary investigations indicate they were not closer than five miles," he said.
Mr Walsh said the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System had not been triggered.
He said both aircraft were in contact with the Melbourne control tower because the Launceston tower had closed.
Radar data would show the flight paths of the aircraft, speed and altitude information.
"That will give us a replay of what the two aircraft were doing and the audio data from the aeroplanes will tell us what they knew of each other," he said.
Virgin Blue spokeswoman Amanda Bolger said: "Virgin Blue has made its own internal inquiries and the ATSB will follow its processes but from our investigations we're satisfied that at no stage were the aircraft less than five miles apart."
Jetstar spokesman Simon Westaway said the airline had provided an incident report to the ATSB.
Mr Westaway said a "go-around" had been undertaken by pilots.
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Safety First
'Only goes to show how run down our ATC system is. Its time that the government took control of Airservices, and ensured that all aerodromes where RPT jets are operating to have ATC coverage.'
Those from within would have no problem if this occurred and safety became the #1 priority vice profit, as of course it should be.
Those from within would have no problem if this occurred and safety became the #1 priority vice profit, as of course it should be.