Airservices’ impressive US Class D towers
I'm in one of those moods
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".. dispatch, .. we are enroute 
from Terry Hills"
.
.
.... meanwhile back on the Cybersea's
.
.... sound of klaxon's ..
.
“ ….. clear the bridge
…… prepare to dive”
from Terry Hills" .
.
.... meanwhile back on the Cybersea's
.
.... sound of klaxon's ..
.
“ ….. clear the bridge
…… prepare to dive”
Last edited by Scurvy.D.Dog; 16th Dec 2007 at 14:56.
Thread Starter
Scurvy, the US has an average of about 15 midairs per year and Australia has an average of one. Considering that the US has about 15 times the amount of traffic in approximately the same land area, it shows that the US system is indeed pretty effective when you consider that the experts say the chance of a collision goes up by the square of the traffic density.
You can close your mind as much as you want to anything that happens anywhere else.
The US controllers insist that if they are going to provide a Class C service – as you provide above Launceston – they need to be provided with correct staffing levels and a full approach radar, including primary and secondary surveillance.
I know you say you can do it without the extra staffing and without the extra equipment. You can in the short term – but why you would want to is beyond me considering that the Government policy is to follow the North American NAS which requires the proper staffing levels and equipment.
I’m sure everyone admires your charitable devotion to aviation. However your bosses are just as ruthless as Qantas bosses. If I were you, I would ask for the correct equipment – i.e. approach radar.
Creampuff, as a legal man you would know that just because an opposition senator stated that CASA had no legal basis to run a trial that this is not necessarily true. I can assure you that everything done at the time complied with the law.
By the way, the Class G trial was to use the radar effectively for the first time between Canberra and Ballina. That is, handing the airspace to air traffic controllers who had a radar screen, rather than the FSOs who were in a room and were not allowed to use radar.
After an effective campaign by those against the change – where the radar was used to “create” incidents – BASI recommended that the trial be stopped. Yes, I kid you not, the airspace was handed back to the FSOs without any radar, so they couldn’t see any incidents!
I did have the final win. I worked behind the scenes and eventually, about three years later, the airspace was handed to the air traffic controllers, and that is as it is now.
Any thinking person was amazed about the resistance to change which clearly resulted in lower safety.
Of course, Airservices Australia was undermining the demonstration – for some unknown reason they would not provide any traffic information (even to IFR) in the demonstration airspace. As stated above, I worked behind the scenes. Quietly and without any hullabaloo, Airservices eventually provided a traffic information service using radar as they do today.
I had a total victory at the time. You can go on as much as you like, however that is a fact. At least I now know that air traffic controllers are running that airspace and providing a traffic information service to IFR using radar where it is available.
I’m now working on moving that airspace up to Class E, where ATCs will actually provide a separation service to IFR and a traffic information service on VFR – a big improvement in safety. Of course, there will be a strongly orchestrated campaign of creating “incidents” in the Class E to try to stop the change – but eventually I am confident that it will come in. Twelve months after it is in, everyone will be very comfortable with it and say, “Why didn’t we do this 20 years ago?”
Scurvy, I have been talking to the light aircraft pilot who was involved in the Launceston incident. He confirms that the ATSB investigation was totally inaccurate and almost impossible to believe. He said that it became apparent after a while during the investigation that their whole aim was to reverse the North American NAS airspace – which they did.
If a VFR aircraft flew through that airspace at that position today, you would not know it. You cannot see that far – even with binoculars. However if you were properly provided with an approach radar (as per the Minister’s directive) the dedicated approach controller would obtain a primary return and at least be able to give traffic on the aircraft that was there without a clearance.
You can close your mind as much as you want to anything that happens anywhere else.
The US controllers insist that if they are going to provide a Class C service – as you provide above Launceston – they need to be provided with correct staffing levels and a full approach radar, including primary and secondary surveillance.
I know you say you can do it without the extra staffing and without the extra equipment. You can in the short term – but why you would want to is beyond me considering that the Government policy is to follow the North American NAS which requires the proper staffing levels and equipment.
I’m sure everyone admires your charitable devotion to aviation. However your bosses are just as ruthless as Qantas bosses. If I were you, I would ask for the correct equipment – i.e. approach radar.
Creampuff, as a legal man you would know that just because an opposition senator stated that CASA had no legal basis to run a trial that this is not necessarily true. I can assure you that everything done at the time complied with the law.
By the way, the Class G trial was to use the radar effectively for the first time between Canberra and Ballina. That is, handing the airspace to air traffic controllers who had a radar screen, rather than the FSOs who were in a room and were not allowed to use radar.
After an effective campaign by those against the change – where the radar was used to “create” incidents – BASI recommended that the trial be stopped. Yes, I kid you not, the airspace was handed back to the FSOs without any radar, so they couldn’t see any incidents!
I did have the final win. I worked behind the scenes and eventually, about three years later, the airspace was handed to the air traffic controllers, and that is as it is now.
Any thinking person was amazed about the resistance to change which clearly resulted in lower safety.
Of course, Airservices Australia was undermining the demonstration – for some unknown reason they would not provide any traffic information (even to IFR) in the demonstration airspace. As stated above, I worked behind the scenes. Quietly and without any hullabaloo, Airservices eventually provided a traffic information service using radar as they do today.
I had a total victory at the time. You can go on as much as you like, however that is a fact. At least I now know that air traffic controllers are running that airspace and providing a traffic information service to IFR using radar where it is available.
I’m now working on moving that airspace up to Class E, where ATCs will actually provide a separation service to IFR and a traffic information service on VFR – a big improvement in safety. Of course, there will be a strongly orchestrated campaign of creating “incidents” in the Class E to try to stop the change – but eventually I am confident that it will come in. Twelve months after it is in, everyone will be very comfortable with it and say, “Why didn’t we do this 20 years ago?”
Scurvy, I have been talking to the light aircraft pilot who was involved in the Launceston incident. He confirms that the ATSB investigation was totally inaccurate and almost impossible to believe. He said that it became apparent after a while during the investigation that their whole aim was to reverse the North American NAS airspace – which they did.
If a VFR aircraft flew through that airspace at that position today, you would not know it. You cannot see that far – even with binoculars. However if you were properly provided with an approach radar (as per the Minister’s directive) the dedicated approach controller would obtain a primary return and at least be able to give traffic on the aircraft that was there without a clearance.
I'm in one of those moods
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I know you say you can do it without the extra staffing and without the extra equipment.
.
.... more staff and more equipment does not change the difference arguments between US NAS arc and OZ!!
Dick
The Senator was merely summarising the effect of evidence given at committee hearings, including by Bernie Smith, Bill Pollard, and various senior officers from various agencies. There was also the small matter of advice from the Australian Government Solicitor, referred to in the 1 December 1999 hearing …..
The Chief Operating Officer of Airservices said Airservices was, at that time of the G 'trial', busy doing something else. So if Airservices wasn't running the trial, who was?
You tell me: Who outside Airservices had power at that time to, for example, decide that a 'trial' would occur in a particular parcel of 'G' airspace, and to decide what kind of services would or should be provided to aircraft in 'G' airspace. What was the source of their power?
I’m not interested in motherhood statements: I want to know the person's name and the section of the act or the regulation number granting power on that person to do that. I can give you precisely that in respect of Airservices' powers at the time. But Airservices were busy doing something else during the G 'trial': implementing TAAATS (unless Bernie Smith lied to the committee)
I think you'll find that then, as now, ATC'ers have an order of priority in which services are to be provided. Service to IFR aircraft in G was not and is not high in the order.
When are IFR aircraft in G more likely to need the service? Precisely when the adjacent controlled airspace is busy - bad WX, peak traffic periods etc.
If you have been talking to the lighty pilot involved in the Launceston incident, please ask him, and report verbatim on this forum the answer to, this question: Which of the things reported as 'facts' by the ATSB are inaccurate or incomplete, and in what respects?
The Senator was merely summarising the effect of evidence given at committee hearings, including by Bernie Smith, Bill Pollard, and various senior officers from various agencies. There was also the small matter of advice from the Australian Government Solicitor, referred to in the 1 December 1999 hearing …..
The Chief Operating Officer of Airservices said Airservices was, at that time of the G 'trial', busy doing something else. So if Airservices wasn't running the trial, who was?
You tell me: Who outside Airservices had power at that time to, for example, decide that a 'trial' would occur in a particular parcel of 'G' airspace, and to decide what kind of services would or should be provided to aircraft in 'G' airspace. What was the source of their power?
I’m not interested in motherhood statements: I want to know the person's name and the section of the act or the regulation number granting power on that person to do that. I can give you precisely that in respect of Airservices' powers at the time. But Airservices were busy doing something else during the G 'trial': implementing TAAATS (unless Bernie Smith lied to the committee)
I think you'll find that then, as now, ATC'ers have an order of priority in which services are to be provided. Service to IFR aircraft in G was not and is not high in the order.
When are IFR aircraft in G more likely to need the service? Precisely when the adjacent controlled airspace is busy - bad WX, peak traffic periods etc.
If you have been talking to the lighty pilot involved in the Launceston incident, please ask him, and report verbatim on this forum the answer to, this question: Which of the things reported as 'facts' by the ATSB are inaccurate or incomplete, and in what respects?
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I have been talking to the light aircraft pilot who was involved in the Launceston incident. He confirms that the ATSB investigation was totally inaccurate and almost impossible to believe. He said that it became apparent after a while during the investigation that their whole aim was to reverse the North American NAS airspace – which they did.
Cheers,
NFR.
Thread Starter
SM4 Pirate, you ask if there were substantial differences in the way we put in Class E above D in Australia compared to the USA, and whether these differences were so substantial that they would lower safety in a similar way to building a 747 with only two engines, no pressure kit and missing a little bit of the wing.
There were some differences, but not differences that would make a measurable decrease in safety.
For example, in the Class E airspace above Class D in Australia we had to additional mandatory requirements compared with the USA. Firstly, we had a mandatory transponder requirement for all aircraft in Class E airspace. In the United States there is no such general requirement below 10,000 feet.
We also had a mandatory requirement for radio for VFR aircraft operating in Class E airspace – so VFR aircraft could listen to IFR aircraft position reports and obtain an alerted see and avoid system. This is exactly what happened at Launceston. In the United States there is no requirement for VFR aircraft to have radio in Class E, there is no way for the VFR pilot to know what the enroute IFR ATC frequency is, and there is no recommendation that a VFR pilot should monitor the tower frequency when over-flying Class D in Class E. And of course there is lots of Class E in the USA without radar. (See here).
In effect, the only differences were some additional so-called safety features.
Why then do you think we ended up with different results to those in the USA, and why do you think there are few complaints here when the same airline aircraft descend in Class G airspace without any transponder requirement at all?
There were some differences, but not differences that would make a measurable decrease in safety.
For example, in the Class E airspace above Class D in Australia we had to additional mandatory requirements compared with the USA. Firstly, we had a mandatory transponder requirement for all aircraft in Class E airspace. In the United States there is no such general requirement below 10,000 feet.
We also had a mandatory requirement for radio for VFR aircraft operating in Class E airspace – so VFR aircraft could listen to IFR aircraft position reports and obtain an alerted see and avoid system. This is exactly what happened at Launceston. In the United States there is no requirement for VFR aircraft to have radio in Class E, there is no way for the VFR pilot to know what the enroute IFR ATC frequency is, and there is no recommendation that a VFR pilot should monitor the tower frequency when over-flying Class D in Class E. And of course there is lots of Class E in the USA without radar. (See here).
In effect, the only differences were some additional so-called safety features.
Why then do you think we ended up with different results to those in the USA, and why do you think there are few complaints here when the same airline aircraft descend in Class G airspace without any transponder requirement at all?
I'm in one of those moods
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If a VFR aircraft flew through that airspace at that position today, you would not know it. You cannot see that far – even with binoculars.
However if you were properly provided with an approach radar (as per the Minister’s directive) the dedicated approach controller would obtain a primary return and at least be able to give traffic on the aircraft that was there without a clearance.
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Owen Stanley
But obviously not so dangerous that the FAA or anyone else for that matter, considers it necessary to change their E airspace, let alone abolish it. And Qantas is happy to fly in it, yet they don’t want it in Australia with the added safety mitigators mentioned above???
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Vans, Suggest you look at plans from Europe and ICAO re future Airspace design; no such thing as E is included in the future; more along C or ICAO G only lines. Known and involved or unknown and no help and not in the way of someone who want to be known.
But demonstrably less safe than what 'used to' exist; reduction in safety without CBA or safety work; that was unacceptable under the terms available to ASA; they just took a while to own up to it. This is all old ground; why beat this dead horse again?
Lets work out a way of doing it better; smarter.
The USA controllers "claim" you can't do this and that without this and that; well we and many others prove you can, it's the same argument you are using in reverse; claims that OZ ATCs can't do this or that because they are change resistant. I suggest that if you prove why it's a good idea, not just shout at us that you are right, we are more likely to get on your train, instead of saying that train driver is a lunatic
I 100% am for change, but I want it for the better, improved safety, improved participation, less paranoia, and less rhetoric.
Put this against the background of the current skipper. He has moved on his 2nd's faster than anyone else ever has and the problems are worse than ever; doesn't like the bad news or can't play with anyone that won't play his rules.
We see controllers leaving; 3 in a week in ML alone, Recruits deliberately failing to escape the 'bond' being applied; more TIBA than ever; training managers saying you don't need ATCs to teach trainees you need educators, The flightwatch debacle, the reduction of TWR hours by NOTAM, OS recruits saying the system is crap, fatigue management program in the toilet, Certified agreement due for negotiations, money up to triple elsewhere in the world, constant arguments about increments, shaving hours from minimum staffing, amendments to base rosters without consultation, AWA (only) supervision despite staff saying they didn't want them, moves to the SDE despite the board endorsed plan re numbers needed being ignored, SMS in name only not by nature, personal aggression at every turn to dissenters; oh yeah and then we are called change resistant conservatives; and we need to get away from being 'rules driven and more focused on outcomes'.
Dick if you have any influence at the Board level, and I'm sure you do They have to seriously consider the question, despite the skippers charms and verbal appeals, is he steering the ship in the right direction or are we seconds from the waterfall whilst the next round of cucumber sandwiches are being served?
but not differences that would make a measurable decrease in safety.
Lets work out a way of doing it better; smarter.
The USA controllers "claim" you can't do this and that without this and that; well we and many others prove you can, it's the same argument you are using in reverse; claims that OZ ATCs can't do this or that because they are change resistant. I suggest that if you prove why it's a good idea, not just shout at us that you are right, we are more likely to get on your train, instead of saying that train driver is a lunatic
I 100% am for change, but I want it for the better, improved safety, improved participation, less paranoia, and less rhetoric.
Put this against the background of the current skipper. He has moved on his 2nd's faster than anyone else ever has and the problems are worse than ever; doesn't like the bad news or can't play with anyone that won't play his rules.
We see controllers leaving; 3 in a week in ML alone, Recruits deliberately failing to escape the 'bond' being applied; more TIBA than ever; training managers saying you don't need ATCs to teach trainees you need educators, The flightwatch debacle, the reduction of TWR hours by NOTAM, OS recruits saying the system is crap, fatigue management program in the toilet, Certified agreement due for negotiations, money up to triple elsewhere in the world, constant arguments about increments, shaving hours from minimum staffing, amendments to base rosters without consultation, AWA (only) supervision despite staff saying they didn't want them, moves to the SDE despite the board endorsed plan re numbers needed being ignored, SMS in name only not by nature, personal aggression at every turn to dissenters; oh yeah and then we are called change resistant conservatives; and we need to get away from being 'rules driven and more focused on outcomes'.
Dick if you have any influence at the Board level, and I'm sure you do
They have to seriously consider the question, despite the skippers charms and verbal appeals, is he steering the ship in the right direction or are we seconds from the waterfall whilst the next round of cucumber sandwiches are being served?
Last edited by SM4 Pirate; 17th Dec 2007 at 09:59.
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From a drivers point of view. I had 1 hours worth of TIBA in class A ML-PH recently and it was not comfortable. I also had TIBA SY-ML recently and it was downright scary. I, for one moment, do not blame the controllers but bungling from the top end.
The travelling public on one of the world's busiest air routes dererve better than see and avoid and I am astonished that the media hasn't picked up on this.
ASA, wake up.
The travelling public on one of the world's busiest air routes dererve better than see and avoid and I am astonished that the media hasn't picked up on this.
ASA, wake up.
Thread Starter
Scurvy, you state:
Why then isn’t the radar used in an effective way?
In relation to the Secondary Surveillance Radar, the aircraft are forced by law to be on your tower frequency, and I understand that you and the other tower controllers are not rated to use radar.
If the airspace followed the North American system – and as far as I know the system in every other modern aviation country in the world – the radar covered airspace is controlled by air traffic controllers who are in the Centre or TRACON and are radar rated. It sounds sensible, doesn’t it? It has the advantage that when the tower closes down at night (or due to staffing problems) the Centre would keep providing a full radar separation service to the lowest level of radar coverage.
The fact that the tower “owns” the airspace to 8,500 feet (or is it 12,500 feet?) is a hangover from the old pre-radar days. It is a bit like the FSOs keeping their airspace for many years after radar was introduced – and therefore unintentionally lowering safety.
To anyone with an open mind who is reading this, in other modern aviation countries Class D airspace changes to Class E when the tower closes and a full separation service is still provided to IFR aircraft from the Centre. In Australia, airline pilots are forced to change off the radar frequency to a “calling in the blind” CTAF frequency – even when in good radar coverage.
It is all about resistance to change – i.e. “This is the way we used to operate it in the 1950s – no one must ever change it.”
Scurvy, by the way, there won’t be much data on non-transponder VCAs in non-radar Class C airspace as no one would know the aircraft was there! Surely you must understand this. In many cases the only way you would know the aircraft was there would be because of a collision.
LT is one of the only D regionals with PRIM and SSR Radar to surface
In relation to the Secondary Surveillance Radar, the aircraft are forced by law to be on your tower frequency, and I understand that you and the other tower controllers are not rated to use radar.
If the airspace followed the North American system – and as far as I know the system in every other modern aviation country in the world – the radar covered airspace is controlled by air traffic controllers who are in the Centre or TRACON and are radar rated. It sounds sensible, doesn’t it? It has the advantage that when the tower closes down at night (or due to staffing problems) the Centre would keep providing a full radar separation service to the lowest level of radar coverage.
The fact that the tower “owns” the airspace to 8,500 feet (or is it 12,500 feet?) is a hangover from the old pre-radar days. It is a bit like the FSOs keeping their airspace for many years after radar was introduced – and therefore unintentionally lowering safety.
To anyone with an open mind who is reading this, in other modern aviation countries Class D airspace changes to Class E when the tower closes and a full separation service is still provided to IFR aircraft from the Centre. In Australia, airline pilots are forced to change off the radar frequency to a “calling in the blind” CTAF frequency – even when in good radar coverage.
It is all about resistance to change – i.e. “This is the way we used to operate it in the 1950s – no one must ever change it.”
Scurvy, by the way, there won’t be much data on non-transponder VCAs in non-radar Class C airspace as no one would know the aircraft was there! Surely you must understand this. In many cases the only way you would know the aircraft was there would be because of a collision.
Thread Starter
SM4 Pirate, I do know a couple of members of the Airservices Board, and I have spoken to them about the problems regarding staffing levels. Unfortunately this has had no influence on the decisions of the Airservices Management.
One Board member even said to me, “Dick, they take no notice of me.” What an extraordinary statement. It sounds as if we need some Board members who have a bit of spine, doesn’t it?
Another interesting point is that for the last three years I have tried to arrange a meeting with the Chairman of Airservices to no avail. Imagine that! He knows that I have been publicly critical of Airservices, and rather than meeting with me to find out the validity of this criticism and to get me on side, he won’t even allow a meeting.
Here is a challenge. Has anyone who posts on this site actually ever met the Chairman of Airservices?
By the way, regarding the safety of Class C, I agree that it would be safer than Class E if you could just look at that airspace in isolation. However the way we operate the Class C above D in Australia is to use the already often overloaded single controller of the Class D to provide the extra service in the Class C.
All of the studies that Airservices have performed in looking at Class C airspace have not looked at the reduction in safety that obviously results when the controller has to do both types of airspace.
As I have mentioned before, controllers in other countries – who are just as professional – have said that they would never agree to providing a Class C service without adequate staffing levels and without the adequate tools – i.e. an approach radar.
I know we have done the Class C in the past without an accident. It is a bit like the argument that was used when I was involved in the decision to move to two pilot operations for aircraft of up to 30 passengers. The argument used by some of the airline owners was that we had operated these aircraft single pilot in the past and so it would be OK for the future – despite what happened internationally. Fortunately we made the decision to upgrade and follow what was happening internationally, and all of our airlines now have two pilots. If they were properly trained as a two pilot crew we would probably not have accidents like the one at Lockhart River.
Let’s look at a place like Albury. There are times when the controller is flat out trying to keep aircraft apart in the circuit area, and a VFR aircraft calls up at 6,500 feet twenty miles away.
This is where I believe (from what I have been told) is where the extra overloading of the controller could cause a resultant accident in the Class D airspace. This has never been looked at in any Airservices safety study for obvious reasons – they don’t want to put in the proper staffing levels and radar for Class C because it will reduce their profits.
One Board member even said to me, “Dick, they take no notice of me.” What an extraordinary statement. It sounds as if we need some Board members who have a bit of spine, doesn’t it?
Another interesting point is that for the last three years I have tried to arrange a meeting with the Chairman of Airservices to no avail. Imagine that! He knows that I have been publicly critical of Airservices, and rather than meeting with me to find out the validity of this criticism and to get me on side, he won’t even allow a meeting.
Here is a challenge. Has anyone who posts on this site actually ever met the Chairman of Airservices?
By the way, regarding the safety of Class C, I agree that it would be safer than Class E if you could just look at that airspace in isolation. However the way we operate the Class C above D in Australia is to use the already often overloaded single controller of the Class D to provide the extra service in the Class C.
All of the studies that Airservices have performed in looking at Class C airspace have not looked at the reduction in safety that obviously results when the controller has to do both types of airspace.
As I have mentioned before, controllers in other countries – who are just as professional – have said that they would never agree to providing a Class C service without adequate staffing levels and without the adequate tools – i.e. an approach radar.
I know we have done the Class C in the past without an accident. It is a bit like the argument that was used when I was involved in the decision to move to two pilot operations for aircraft of up to 30 passengers. The argument used by some of the airline owners was that we had operated these aircraft single pilot in the past and so it would be OK for the future – despite what happened internationally. Fortunately we made the decision to upgrade and follow what was happening internationally, and all of our airlines now have two pilots. If they were properly trained as a two pilot crew we would probably not have accidents like the one at Lockhart River.
Let’s look at a place like Albury. There are times when the controller is flat out trying to keep aircraft apart in the circuit area, and a VFR aircraft calls up at 6,500 feet twenty miles away.
This is where I believe (from what I have been told) is where the extra overloading of the controller could cause a resultant accident in the Class D airspace. This has never been looked at in any Airservices safety study for obvious reasons – they don’t want to put in the proper staffing levels and radar for Class C because it will reduce their profits.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 18th Dec 2007 at 00:17.
However the way we operate the Class C above D in Australia is to use the already often overloaded single controller of the Class D
If either situation existed, I'm very sure they'd be vocal here and their union would be active on the subject.
That tells all of us - except it seems you - that those with the real knowledge and expertise on the subject matter - ATCs - know what they are doing and are happy with the airspace.
In fact I dare say they were relieved when class C was sensibly reinstated.
SM4 - Beautiful words...
Worth a second display!!
"We see controllers leaving; 3 in a week in ML alone, Recruits deliberately failing to escape the 'bond' being applied; more TIBA than ever; training managers saying you don't need ATCs to teach trainees you need educators, The flightwatch debacle, the reduction of TWR hours by NOTAM, OS recruits saying the system is crap, fatigue management program in the toilet, Certified agreement due for negotiations, money up to triple elsewhere in the world, constant arguments about increments, shaving hours from minimum staffing, amendments to base rosters without consultation, AWA (only) supervision despite staff saying they didn't want them, moves to the SDE despite the board endorsed plan re numbers needed being ignored, SMS in name only not by nature, personal aggression at every turn to dissenters; oh yeah and then we are called change resistant conservatives; and we need to get away from being 'rules driven and more focused on outcomes'.
Yes folks..and now TFN is blaming "previous administrations" for all his problems. Like a little kid...can't take responsibility for all his actions.
Gee...this guy make Bernie S and Andrew F top class managers!!
Anyone know what they are doing at the moment. The board might need their phone numbers...
"We see controllers leaving; 3 in a week in ML alone, Recruits deliberately failing to escape the 'bond' being applied; more TIBA than ever; training managers saying you don't need ATCs to teach trainees you need educators, The flightwatch debacle, the reduction of TWR hours by NOTAM, OS recruits saying the system is crap, fatigue management program in the toilet, Certified agreement due for negotiations, money up to triple elsewhere in the world, constant arguments about increments, shaving hours from minimum staffing, amendments to base rosters without consultation, AWA (only) supervision despite staff saying they didn't want them, moves to the SDE despite the board endorsed plan re numbers needed being ignored, SMS in name only not by nature, personal aggression at every turn to dissenters; oh yeah and then we are called change resistant conservatives; and we need to get away from being 'rules driven and more focused on outcomes'.
Yes folks..and now TFN is blaming "previous administrations" for all his problems. Like a little kid...can't take responsibility for all his actions.
Gee...this guy make Bernie S and Andrew F top class managers!!
Anyone know what they are doing at the moment. The board might need their phone numbers...
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Airservices Chairman
The Airservices Chairman's term is up at the end of January 08, so hopefully the new Minister will send him packing and appoint someone who doesn't have Mark Vaile's hand up his backside