Airservices’ impressive US Class D towers
Dick,
Oh, come on! They reversed the change because your fantastic E airspace almost killed hundreds of people in near misses with RPT jets shortly after it was introduced, no other reason.
A number of months after they introduced the NAS 2b changes, it was pointed out that the change process they used was flawed – namely that they did not do their own safety study. Because of this they were advised to reverse the change.
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Then Capn Bloggs, given your statement that E airspace is so dangerous in Australia, how do you reconcile the obvious success of this same airspace in North America, where it is ever so larger, goes to much lower levels and does not have a transponder requirement for operations within it? Surely, given your pronunciation that
they would have had many very serious mid-airs in the US by now due entirely to the application of E airspace? And if this were to be the case, why would the FAA have not shut it down long ago!
your fantastic E airspace almost killed hundreds of people in near misses with RPT jets shortly after it was introduced, no other reason
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I plead ignorance Mr. OS. You’re a man who obviously has a handle on the figures; perhaps you can tell me exactly how many mid-airs there have been in the US in the last 12 months, (or whatever other time frame you care to nominate), that have been directly attributed to aircraft being flown in E airspace as the cause of the accidents? That is, had the aircraft involved been operating in any other type of airspace, the accident would not have occurred.
Thread Starter
Capn Bloggs, I can only quote what the Airservices management said both verbally and in writing in relation to the need to reverse NAS 2b. The ATSB made no recommendation to reverse the NAS 2b changes after the incidents you have referred to.
Here is a diagram of the US airspace system.
As stated by Voices of Reason (see here) Class E airspace is transited by airline aircraft in North America thousands of times every day in total safety.
Why then do you think that after a few weeks of operation, at an incredibly low traffic density airport such as Launceston, an incident would take place that would be used to reverse this airspace? It sounds suspicious, doesn’t it?
First of all, if you read the ATSB report or talk to the VFR pilot involved, he said there never was the chance of a collision. He had heard the radio call from the Virgin aircraft descending into Launceston, he sighted the aircraft, kept it in sight at all times, and at any time could have changed his course if necessary. He said that this was not necessary, and at no time was there a chance of a midair collision. By the way, this procedure is called “alerted see and avoid.”
This is what you and your fellow airline pilots believe is very safe in the enormous amount of Class G airspace in Australia where airlines operate.
Now let’s look at the airline crew in the Launceston incident. In fact they never saw the light plane. All they knew about the plane came from their TCAS. TCAS requires a transponder to operate. Before NAS 2b, the airspace was Class C and there was no requirement for a transponder in this airspace. If the light plane had been flying through the airspace before the NAS 2b changes, an incident would never have been reported as the airline crew would have had no knowledge of the VFR aircraft’s presence.
So we have a situation where the NAS 2b changes, which introduced a transponder requirement in airspace which previously did not require a transponder, were then used to reverse the airspace.
By the way, if the Class E airspace above Launceston with mandatory transponder was not satisfactory, why do you accept that we have jet airline aircraft operating in Class G airspace at those levels every day at places from Ballina to Proserpine, and from Ayers Rock to Broome, with no transponder requirement at all? That is, they are purely relying on see and avoid if a radio is on the wrong frequency or the volume is turned down.
Surely Capn Bloggs, it is all about resistance to change – i.e. keeping airline aircraft in Class G without a transponder requirement, and resisting any introduction to Class E because we don’t want to change anything or copy the successful allocation of airspace that happens in other leading aviation countries.
Here is a diagram of the US airspace system.
As stated by Voices of Reason (see here) Class E airspace is transited by airline aircraft in North America thousands of times every day in total safety.
Why then do you think that after a few weeks of operation, at an incredibly low traffic density airport such as Launceston, an incident would take place that would be used to reverse this airspace? It sounds suspicious, doesn’t it?
First of all, if you read the ATSB report or talk to the VFR pilot involved, he said there never was the chance of a collision. He had heard the radio call from the Virgin aircraft descending into Launceston, he sighted the aircraft, kept it in sight at all times, and at any time could have changed his course if necessary. He said that this was not necessary, and at no time was there a chance of a midair collision. By the way, this procedure is called “alerted see and avoid.”
This is what you and your fellow airline pilots believe is very safe in the enormous amount of Class G airspace in Australia where airlines operate.
Now let’s look at the airline crew in the Launceston incident. In fact they never saw the light plane. All they knew about the plane came from their TCAS. TCAS requires a transponder to operate. Before NAS 2b, the airspace was Class C and there was no requirement for a transponder in this airspace. If the light plane had been flying through the airspace before the NAS 2b changes, an incident would never have been reported as the airline crew would have had no knowledge of the VFR aircraft’s presence.
So we have a situation where the NAS 2b changes, which introduced a transponder requirement in airspace which previously did not require a transponder, were then used to reverse the airspace.
By the way, if the Class E airspace above Launceston with mandatory transponder was not satisfactory, why do you accept that we have jet airline aircraft operating in Class G airspace at those levels every day at places from Ballina to Proserpine, and from Ayers Rock to Broome, with no transponder requirement at all? That is, they are purely relying on see and avoid if a radio is on the wrong frequency or the volume is turned down.
Surely Capn Bloggs, it is all about resistance to change – i.e. keeping airline aircraft in Class G without a transponder requirement, and resisting any introduction to Class E because we don’t want to change anything or copy the successful allocation of airspace that happens in other leading aviation countries.
Thread Starter
CaptainMidnight, oh yes it was. The NAS implementation might have been “driven by the NASIG” to use your words but the actual introduction was done by Airservices and was its legislative responsibility.
Airservices had a full time manager as a member of the NAS Implementation Group. His name was Stephen Angus. He was totally responsible for the liaison between the Implementation Group and Airservices Australia, and it was clearly agreed at all times that Airservices Australia was solely responsible for the implementation of NAS 2b as this was the law of the land. Stephen Angus has now been promoted to General Manager ATC Reversals at Airservices. They obviously thought he did a good job in relation to NAS 2b!
The minutes of the Queensland RAPAC and the Western Australian RAPAC show quite clearly that the members had simply no idea of the advantages of the North American NAS airspace system.
Then again, why would they? Most would never have flown in it, and the education program (which they spent over $1 million on) with a tour around Australia by John and Martha King was pretty well boycotted by professional pilots. After all, many had made up their minds that they did not want any changes to the airspace system that they originally learnt to fly in.
CaptainMidnight, admit it – there has been a constant resistance to any change.
At the present time we still do not use our excellent radar coverage between Hobart and Cairns effectively below 8,500 feet in the enroute environment. Many professional pilots state that they don’t need to use radar in this airspace – they would prefer to talk plane to plane. The problem is that a mountain shrouded in cloud and at night does not talk.
I know many professional pilots do not believe there is a risk that they will have a controlled flight into terrain. The evidence from the Benalla, Mount Hotham and Lockhart River fatal accidents shows that this is not 100% true.
Perhaps Creampuff could come on and tell us who was responsible for the airspace changes of NAS 2b. Was it the NAS Implementation Group (which if I remember correctly was part of the Department) or was it Airservices Australia?
Airservices had a full time manager as a member of the NAS Implementation Group. His name was Stephen Angus. He was totally responsible for the liaison between the Implementation Group and Airservices Australia, and it was clearly agreed at all times that Airservices Australia was solely responsible for the implementation of NAS 2b as this was the law of the land. Stephen Angus has now been promoted to General Manager ATC Reversals at Airservices. They obviously thought he did a good job in relation to NAS 2b!
The minutes of the Queensland RAPAC and the Western Australian RAPAC show quite clearly that the members had simply no idea of the advantages of the North American NAS airspace system.
Then again, why would they? Most would never have flown in it, and the education program (which they spent over $1 million on) with a tour around Australia by John and Martha King was pretty well boycotted by professional pilots. After all, many had made up their minds that they did not want any changes to the airspace system that they originally learnt to fly in.
CaptainMidnight, admit it – there has been a constant resistance to any change.
At the present time we still do not use our excellent radar coverage between Hobart and Cairns effectively below 8,500 feet in the enroute environment. Many professional pilots state that they don’t need to use radar in this airspace – they would prefer to talk plane to plane. The problem is that a mountain shrouded in cloud and at night does not talk.
I know many professional pilots do not believe there is a risk that they will have a controlled flight into terrain. The evidence from the Benalla, Mount Hotham and Lockhart River fatal accidents shows that this is not 100% true.
Perhaps Creampuff could come on and tell us who was responsible for the airspace changes of NAS 2b. Was it the NAS Implementation Group (which if I remember correctly was part of the Department) or was it Airservices Australia?
Thread Starter
Owen Stanley, most of the midairs in the USA (as in any country) take place below 3,000 feet and often within 5 miles of an airport. I have researched midairs for over 25 years in the USA and I cannot find one involving an air transport aircraft in Class E above Class D.
The midair that is always quoted (the one at Cerritos near Los Angeles) occurred because a VFR aircraft inadvertently climbed into the Class B airspace above. This is exactly what could happen at Hornsby tomorrow – i.e. a 500 foot error in altimeter setting could put a VFR aircraft right on the approach of an airline aircraft in Class C.
In Australia at the present time there is no transponder requirement at Hornsby for VFR aircraft, whereas in the USA within 30 miles of Class B (i.e. the major city airports), since the Cerritos accident there has been.
Don’t kid yourself. Our system is potentially less safe. Do we need to have a Cerritos type accident before we put a transponder veil in? I wonder.
The midair that is always quoted (the one at Cerritos near Los Angeles) occurred because a VFR aircraft inadvertently climbed into the Class B airspace above. This is exactly what could happen at Hornsby tomorrow – i.e. a 500 foot error in altimeter setting could put a VFR aircraft right on the approach of an airline aircraft in Class C.
In Australia at the present time there is no transponder requirement at Hornsby for VFR aircraft, whereas in the USA within 30 miles of Class B (i.e. the major city airports), since the Cerritos accident there has been.
Don’t kid yourself. Our system is potentially less safe. Do we need to have a Cerritos type accident before we put a transponder veil in? I wonder.
Thread Starter
Scurvy.D.Dog, the overheads of everyone at the Airservices building in Canberra are added on to the costs of the tower at Launceston.
Are you telling me that you don’t think these overheads in Canberra can be reduced? If so, I don’t agree with you.
Maybe a little less involvement by the Canberra people in overseas businesses may be a start to reducing high head office overheads.
Are you telling me that you don’t think these overheads in Canberra can be reduced? If so, I don’t agree with you.
Maybe a little less involvement by the Canberra people in overseas businesses may be a start to reducing high head office overheads.
At the time of the 'trial', AA had the formal power to determine that a volume of airspace was a specified class of airspace, and the responsibility to provide services in each class of airspace, subject to obligations with respect to ICAO and safety. CASA had formal power to develop and promulgate safety standards, and secure compliance with them.
It is unfortunate that at the time, neither AA nor CASA had the corporate integrity to resist those who brought political pressure to bear on the organisations to acquiesce in the running of a trial that was illegal. (It was illegal - that was admitted at subsequent Senate Committee hearings.)
We could drag up all those old threads, Dick.
It is unfortunate that at the time, neither AA nor CASA had the corporate integrity to resist those who brought political pressure to bear on the organisations to acquiesce in the running of a trial that was illegal. (It was illegal - that was admitted at subsequent Senate Committee hearings.)
We could drag up all those old threads, Dick.
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...In fact they never saw the light plane. All they knew about the plane came from their TCAS. TCAS requires a transponder to operate. Before NAS 2b, the airspace was Class C and there was no requirement for a transponder in this airspace. If the light plane had been flying through the airspace before the NAS 2b changes, an incident would never have been reported as the airline crew would have had no knowledge of the VFR aircraft’s presence.
My undertsanding of the VFR in that particular incident was 'off track' and the Virgin passed down the wrong side; not exactly full 'alerted see and avoid'; cause it wasn' reciprocated; ie the VFR knew of the B737 but the other player knew naught; hence possibly the [over] 'reaction'. Trust is earned not assumed.
Thread Starter
Creampuff, surely you are mixed up here. We are not talking about a trial – possibly you are referring to the Class G trial. We are actually referring to the introduction of the NAS 2b change. Can you give us an answer about that one?
Blockla, I’m not gilding the lily. A VFR aircraft could have flown across that airspace inadvertently (it happens) without a clearance and the airline crew would have been none the wiser.
I think you are getting “alerted see and avoid” mixed up with “radio arranged separation” – i.e. where aircraft talk to each other. In VMC, “alerted see and avoid” is where one or the other aircraft has traffic information, sees the other aircraft and keeps clear of it. It is a pretty safe option.
Blockla, I’m not gilding the lily. A VFR aircraft could have flown across that airspace inadvertently (it happens) without a clearance and the airline crew would have been none the wiser.
I think you are getting “alerted see and avoid” mixed up with “radio arranged separation” – i.e. where aircraft talk to each other. In VMC, “alerted see and avoid” is where one or the other aircraft has traffic information, sees the other aircraft and keeps clear of it. It is a pretty safe option.
Yes, I was confusing the 'G' trial with the 2b … hmmmm …. 'adventure'. My apologies. I don't have enough insight into how that was implemented to work out who was pulling all the strings.
I will say this: any light aircraft pilot who says:
is in my view, and with respect, over-estimating their and their aircraft's capabilities.
Your point about the aircraft in the YSBK LOE northbound, and its broader application in principle, is, in my view, a valid one.
I will say this: any light aircraft pilot who says:
there never was the chance of a collision. [ I ] heard the radio call from the Virgin aircraft descending into Launceston, [ I ] sighted the aircraft, kept it in sight at all times, and at any time could have changed [my] course if necessary. [T]his was not necessary, and at no time was there a chance of a midair collision.
Your point about the aircraft in the YSBK LOE northbound, and its broader application in principle, is, in my view, a valid one.
Quote from the report:
[Bolding added; footnote 8 omitted]
So the lighty pilot 'believed' something about the 737's track that turned out to be wrong. The near miss was therefore the result of good luck, not the result of good judgment of collision risk and 'see and avoid'. Thank heavens he didn't decide to change course - he would have turned in the wrong direction.
The pilot of the Tobago reported that he had selected the aircraft’s navigation, strobe and landing lights ‘ON’. He subsequently saw the 737 and he believed that it would pass safely to his right. The pilot reported that he flashed the Tobago’s landing lights at the 737 several times, but become[sic] concerned when the 737 appeared to turn to the right across the nose of the Tobago. The Tobago pilot reported that he observed the 737 climbing above him ‘appearing to come from starboard to port’. However, he said that, as the 737 was ascending in front of the Tobago and at his 11 o’clock position, there was no need to consider whether there should be an alteration of course or a decision to descend. A review of track and heading information from the 737’s flight data recorder (FDR) did not reveal any indication of a tracking change, although there was a minor heading change of 4 degrees. The wind at 8,500 ft recorded on the 737’s FDR was about 266 degrees M at 43 kts. Appendix A shows the track of the 737 obtained from the FDR. The ATSB also examined the data recorded on the GPS carried on the Tobago, however, by the time the ATSB requested access to the GPS, the data for the incident flight had been overwritten by data from a subsequent flight. The Tobago pilot subsequently advised ATSB investigators that he was aware that the appearance of cross-tracking was probably an illusion which resulted from the strong wind.
So the lighty pilot 'believed' something about the 737's track that turned out to be wrong. The near miss was therefore the result of good luck, not the result of good judgment of collision risk and 'see and avoid'. Thank heavens he didn't decide to change course - he would have turned in the wrong direction.
The NAS implementation might have been “driven by the NASIG” to use your words but the actual introduction was done by Airservices and was its legislative responsibility.
There were also many claims at the time the NASIG were in regular contact with you and that you were pulling the strings and vetting the work - was that so?
The NASIG also stated on many occasions that the time for consultation was over, and what was being introduced was at the (then) government's directive. Those sound familiar words?
The reversal of the E over D occurred because Airservices belatedly but correctly decided that the characteristic should have first been subject to a thorough safety and CBA before implementation, and that instead reliance on claims of a "proven" system in the U.S. was not sufficient to bypass this assessment for suitability of the characteristic in Australia.
Why do we have to keep going over old ground -
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15-luv Creampuf.
A VFR aircraft could have flown across that airspace inadvertently (it happens) without a clearance and the airline crew would have been none the wiser.
As for the AOPA mob accepting the transponder argument and needing pay-back (or something like that) surely you folks jest. Flying in a modern world without a transponder is sheer lunacy (if you're able to have one), maybe I need another terry towelling hat?
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and that instead reliance on claims of a "proven" system in the U.S. was not sufficient to bypass this assessment for suitability of the characteristic in Australia.
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see a situation where if the local airport owner runs the tower it would become like a mini Sydney Airport, ripping off huge profits from aviation and further destroying it.
I'm in one of those moods
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His Nib’s
http://www.airservicesaustralia.com/...nlytd06_07.pdf
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Readers will note (for Fin year 06/07):-
1. the ‘total’ movements - LT (20,322) and AV (9,406)
2. moves between 7 and 136 tonnes – LT (9,744) and AV (7,204)
.
Also note the Later figure when compared with other regional D and D/C TWR/APP airports!
.
... you really need someone other than your typist to do some research for you!!
it was not the only ‘incident’!! …. Remember one of the others, you called ATC negligent, and another you called the VB B737 crew negligent!
.. you need help Dick!
http://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/...305235_001.pdf
.. from the ATSB report
.. 2 degrees at that distance (tracking via VOR) is virtually the same position! …. It goes on
.. and
the 73 in the end actually passed him on the left … good thing there was vertical segregation (via TCAS RA)
… ****!
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His Nib’s then asserts
…. they missed because the 737 was climbing due TCAS RA …. *&^$%
.. THE FECKIN 737 CREW NEVER SAW HIM! …. HOW IS THAT SEE and avoid … and all the while the TOBA pilot thought 2 degress VOR and visual aquisition i.e.
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’oh he will pass me out to the right …… errmmm perhaps he won’t ….. oh gee he is now left 11 ’clock’
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…. THAT IS SEE and MISJUDGE SAFE DISTANCE TO AVOID … obviously because a TCAS RA was REQUIRED BY THE 737 CREW to avoid the collision!
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. and all the while the ATC was sitting there blissfully unaware of the whole thing unfolding because it was your Class E rather than C as it was before your E and is again now CLASS C!!
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… stop seeking to misrepresent what it is to SEE and AVOID!!
was the Tobago equipped with a TXPDR before AusNAS 2b???? … irrespective, in C the TOBA would have been subject to a clearance, and safely separated from the B737 by ATC
how many VCA’s result in TCAS RA’s or collisions?
… because political interference has delayed the regulatory gazetting of Part 71 that would determine the appropriate service in those locations …… I ask you again … why was Part 71 not gazetted??? ... because that is your answer to why B737's and A320's are hooting through 'dirt road airspace in and out of places like Ballina!!! .... who is responsible for that travesty??
UNALERTED see and hope to avoid …. Perhaps many of the lighties have TXPDR’s … wonder how many have accurate mode C though … and offcourse the ones that do not have one … well lets read on for that scenario in your beloved US of A!
the rent for the building (we the people, use to own) cost us a fortune in rent …. Why have it?? … not sure, there seems to be no one around in Operations Support or Procedures Design or any other section really!
.. to be frank, I do not give a stuff what you agree with …. I will say though there is a lot of money being spend on a small number of people who IMHO are nothing more than paid wrecking balls!!
no argument there!
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.. other than that last statement, Mate … you’ve got nothing!!!!
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Here is a flavour of your beloved US of A airspace outcomes:-
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From the NTSB (US) Database:-
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp
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Leave the default fields, then enter ‘midair collision’ in the word string box
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This will provide 6 Pages of Midair collisions data for the past 5 years
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Some samples for readers:-
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal - US Class D ‘Contract Tower’ i.e. same rules as OZ GAAP … this is what Dick wants instead of our ‘proactive’ ICAO D at OZ regionals that are servicing high capacity RPT
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...5FA158A&rpt=fa
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IFR/VFR Midair collision Class E Hawker800
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...6FA277A&rpt=fa
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A few relevant quotes:-
.. and
.. and
.. and
… yet Dick wants us to become less safe i.e. use E instead of D or C when the FAA have already identified the need to change their system! 
yer goose 
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…. thinking TXPDR’s and ADS-B
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This does not mean TCAS can be the primary means of separation where acceptable options exist i.e. Class D or C (subject to frequency loading and resourcing) …. AH HAH ……anyone see where his Nib’s want’s us to go with all this in Oz?!
.
…. given his involvement CAA, CASA, AOPA, ARG, and the infamous ‘Task force’ ….. and his often stated (as recently as yesterday) and long standing drive to reduce ATS costs (via his mates in the now sacked former Fed Gov’t) …. Well, his input over the last 15+ years has arguably left us (ATS) at a point of system breakdown! … to quote you Dick
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Some other sample data from the last five years in the US Class E
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MIL/VFR Midair collision – Fatal - Class E
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...5FA055A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal - Class E
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...6FA025B&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4FA185B&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4FA083B&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E Possible Inst training
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...3FA007A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E ATPL & TCAD
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4FA095A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E VFR Flight following
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...3FA124A&rpt=fa
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… and few samples of the ‘vanishingly small’ risk in G
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Class G CTAF - One aircraft no-radio
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...5LA134A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal - Class G CTAF – Both aircraft no radio
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4FA016A&rpt=fa
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IFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class G
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4FA043A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class G
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4FA301B&rpt=fa
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… and another worthy of mention from 93’
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IFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class G CTAF AC690B
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...3FA302A&rpt=fa
.
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.. now lets look at a couple of US NMAC’s involving RPT in the last couple of decades shall we:-
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IFR/VFR Near midair collision – Class A AND Class G DO228
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...89IA144&rpt=fa ..and
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...13X28764&key=1
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… explain the two overlapping classes of airspace Dick ….. cause we have already told you about this situation that uniquely exists in the US!
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…and surprise surprise your favourite Alaskan Tower and those pesky US Class D (DTI only to IFR/VFR) rules again …
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IFR/VFR Near midair collision – US Class D Alaska Airlines B734
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4IA075A&rpt=fa
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… this is what you REALLY want Dick??? … nah .. even you could not be that mental ….. this is nothing really to do with improving our system is it?
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Profile …. Profile …. Profile!!!!
Why then do you think that after a few weeks of operation, at an incredibly low traffic density airport such as Launceston,
.
Readers will note (for Fin year 06/07):-
1. the ‘total’ movements - LT (20,322) and AV (9,406)
2. moves between 7 and 136 tonnes – LT (9,744) and AV (7,204)
.
Also note the Later figure when compared with other regional D and D/C TWR/APP airports!
.
... you really need someone other than your typist to do some research for you!!
an incident would take place that would be used to reverse this airspace?
It sounds suspicious, doesn’t it?
First of all, if you read the ATSB report or talk to the VFR pilot involved, he said there never was the chance of a collision.
He had heard the radio call from the Virgin aircraft descending into Launceston, he sighted the aircraft, kept it in sight at all times, and at any time could have changed his course if necessary.
As the pilot of the Tobago was tracking via the 007 VOR radial he considered that there would be sufficient lateral spacing with the 737 on the 009 VOR radial at the point where they were likely to pass each other
He subsequently saw the 737 and he believed that it would pass safely to his right.
The Tobago pilot reported that he observed the 737 climbing above him ‘appearing to come from starboard to port’. However, he said that, as the 737 was ascending in front of the Tobago and at his 11 o’clock position,
there was no need to consider whether there should be an alteration of course or a decision to descend.
.
His Nib’s then asserts
He said that this was not necessary, and at no time was there a chance of a midair collision.
By the way, this procedure is called “alerted see and avoid.” .
.
’oh he will pass me out to the right …… errmmm perhaps he won’t ….. oh gee he is now left 11 ’clock’
.
…. THAT IS SEE and MISJUDGE SAFE DISTANCE TO AVOID … obviously because a TCAS RA was REQUIRED BY THE 737 CREW to avoid the collision!
.
. and all the while the ATC was sitting there blissfully unaware of the whole thing unfolding because it was your Class E rather than C as it was before your E and is again now CLASS C!!
.
… stop seeking to misrepresent what it is to SEE and AVOID!!
Before NAS 2b, the airspace was Class C and there was no requirement for a transponder in this airspace.
If the light plane had been flying through the airspace before the NAS 2b changes, an incident would never have been reported as the airline crew would have had no knowledge of the VFR aircraft’s presence.
By the way, if the Class E airspace above Launceston with mandatory transponder was not satisfactory, why do you accept that we have jet airline aircraft operating in Class G airspace at those levels every day at places from Ballina to Proserpine, and from Ayers Rock to Broome, with no transponder requirement at all?
That is, they are purely relying on see and avoid if a radio is on the wrong frequency or the volume is turned down.
Scurvy.D.Dog, the overheads of everyone at the Airservices building in Canberra are added on to the costs of the tower at Launceston.
Are you telling me that you don’t think these overheads in Canberra can be reduced? If so, I don’t agree with you.
Maybe a little less involvement by the Canberra people in overseas businesses may be a start to reducing high head office overheads.
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.. other than that last statement, Mate … you’ve got nothing!!!!
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Here is a flavour of your beloved US of A airspace outcomes:-
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From the NTSB (US) Database:-
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/query.asp
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Leave the default fields, then enter ‘midair collision’ in the word string box
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This will provide 6 Pages of Midair collisions data for the past 5 years
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Some samples for readers:-
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal - US Class D ‘Contract Tower’ i.e. same rules as OZ GAAP … this is what Dick wants instead of our ‘proactive’ ICAO D at OZ regionals that are servicing high capacity RPT
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...5FA158A&rpt=fa
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IFR/VFR Midair collision Class E Hawker800
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...6FA277A&rpt=fa
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A few relevant quotes:-
1.10.3 Previous Near Mid Air Collisions in the Reno Area
1.10.3.1 ATC Reports
The RNO TRACON personnel indicated that it is not uncommon for arriving and departing air traffic to obtain a TCAS warning from transponder-equipped gliders operating in the area. The facility keeps track of any Resolution Advisories (RA - as noted previously in this report, the TCAS-II systems provide collision avoidance advisories on the vertical plane; climb/descend instructions) that pilots receive from their TCAS equipment, as many of the pilots must deviate from an air traffic control clearance to comply with the RA. The TCAS RAs are only retained for 30-day-intervals, and the last 30 days worth of reports were provided to the NTSB (4 total). They all included airplanes conducting operations under 14 CFR Part 121. TRACON personnel also reported that they receive numerous VFR transponder codes and/or reports from transport category airplanes indicating that gliders are operating over the final approach course for RNO. In addition, the controllers can sometimes see primary radar returns from a suspected glider, but are not able to ascertain its altitude and if it is a glider.
A number of the RNO TRACON personnel indicated that they were not surprised that a midair collision had occurred between a transport category airplane and a glider, and that it was just a matter of time before it happened.
1.10.3.1 ATC Reports
The RNO TRACON personnel indicated that it is not uncommon for arriving and departing air traffic to obtain a TCAS warning from transponder-equipped gliders operating in the area. The facility keeps track of any Resolution Advisories (RA - as noted previously in this report, the TCAS-II systems provide collision avoidance advisories on the vertical plane; climb/descend instructions) that pilots receive from their TCAS equipment, as many of the pilots must deviate from an air traffic control clearance to comply with the RA. The TCAS RAs are only retained for 30-day-intervals, and the last 30 days worth of reports were provided to the NTSB (4 total). They all included airplanes conducting operations under 14 CFR Part 121. TRACON personnel also reported that they receive numerous VFR transponder codes and/or reports from transport category airplanes indicating that gliders are operating over the final approach course for RNO. In addition, the controllers can sometimes see primary radar returns from a suspected glider, but are not able to ascertain its altitude and if it is a glider.
A number of the RNO TRACON personnel indicated that they were not surprised that a midair collision had occurred between a transport category airplane and a glider, and that it was just a matter of time before it happened.
Review of the ASRS database revealed that, since 1988, there were 56 reports of NMACs between air carrier/corporate jet traffic and gliders. Of the 56 reports, 8 focused on the airspace around
RNO.
RNO.
In April 1991, the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) issued a research report on the Limitations to the See-and-Avoid Principle. The ATSB reprinted the report in November 2004. In that report the ATSB referenced studies conducted throughout the aviation industry (both civilian and military) and cited reports issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The research report indicated that there were numerous limitations to the see-and-avoid principle, including those of the human visual system, the demands of cockpit tasks, and various physical and environmental conditions. These limitations combine to make see-and-avoid an uncertain method of traffic separation. Though it was acknowledged that the see-and-avoid principle undoubtedly prevented many collisions, the concept was a flawed and unreliable method of collision avoidance.
The report also indicated that there was considerable data available that was against the reliance on see-and-avoid. Although see-and-avoid was often effective at low closing speeds, it usually failed to avert collisions at higher speeds. It was estimated that see-and-avoid prevents 97 percent of possible collisions at closing speeds of between 101 and 199 knots but only 47 percent when the closing speed is greater than 400 knots. In addition, the human visual system is better at detecting moving targets than stationary targets, yet in most cases, an aircraft on a collision
The report also indicated that there was considerable data available that was against the reliance on see-and-avoid. Although see-and-avoid was often effective at low closing speeds, it usually failed to avert collisions at higher speeds. It was estimated that see-and-avoid prevents 97 percent of possible collisions at closing speeds of between 101 and 199 knots but only 47 percent when the closing speed is greater than 400 knots. In addition, the human visual system is better at detecting moving targets than stationary targets, yet in most cases, an aircraft on a collision
A FAA study concluded that although see-and-avoid was usually effective, the residual collision risk was unacceptable.
yer goose .
…. thinking TXPDR’s and ADS-B
The FAA, having recognized the limitations of the concept, has turned to other methods such as TCAS to ensure traffic separation. The ATSB concluded in its report that because of its many limitations, the see-and-avoid concept should not be expected to fulfill a significant role in future air traffic systems.
This does not mean TCAS can be the primary means of separation where acceptable options exist i.e. Class D or C (subject to frequency loading and resourcing) …. AH HAH ……anyone see where his Nib’s want’s us to go with all this in Oz?!
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…. given his involvement CAA, CASA, AOPA, ARG, and the infamous ‘Task force’ ….. and his often stated (as recently as yesterday) and long standing drive to reduce ATS costs (via his mates in the now sacked former Fed Gov’t) …. Well, his input over the last 15+ years has arguably left us (ATS) at a point of system breakdown! … to quote you Dick
It sounds suspicious, doesn’t it?
Some other sample data from the last five years in the US Class E
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MIL/VFR Midair collision – Fatal - Class E
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...5FA055A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal - Class E
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...6FA025B&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4FA185B&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4FA083B&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E Possible Inst training
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...3FA007A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E ATPL & TCAD
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4FA095A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class E VFR Flight following
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...3FA124A&rpt=fa
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… and few samples of the ‘vanishingly small’ risk in G
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Class G CTAF - One aircraft no-radio
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...5LA134A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal - Class G CTAF – Both aircraft no radio
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4FA016A&rpt=fa
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IFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class G
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4FA043A&rpt=fa
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VFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class G
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4FA301B&rpt=fa
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… and another worthy of mention from 93’
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IFR/VFR Midair collision – Fatal – Class G CTAF AC690B
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...3FA302A&rpt=fa
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.. now lets look at a couple of US NMAC’s involving RPT in the last couple of decades shall we:-
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IFR/VFR Near midair collision – Class A AND Class G DO228
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...89IA144&rpt=fa ..and
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...13X28764&key=1
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… explain the two overlapping classes of airspace Dick ….. cause we have already told you about this situation that uniquely exists in the US!
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…and surprise surprise your favourite Alaskan Tower and those pesky US Class D (DTI only to IFR/VFR) rules again …
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IFR/VFR Near midair collision – US Class D Alaska Airlines B734
http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...4IA075A&rpt=fa
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… this is what you REALLY want Dick??? … nah .. even you could not be that mental ….. this is nothing really to do with improving our system is it?
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Profile …. Profile …. Profile!!!!
Last edited by Scurvy.D.Dog; 14th Dec 2007 at 07:17.
I received a PM addressed to ‘Clinton’, in which ‘Dick Smith’ asked for information about my statement about the admission of the illegality the ‘G’ trial.
From pages 6 & 7 of the Hansard of the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee hearing of 1 May 2000, copy here: http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/s967.pdf
[bolding added]
The dissembling and obfuscating responses in the earlier 1 December 1999 hearing had put the writing on the wall (see pages 91 onwards): http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/s2803.pdf
As I said on this forum in earlier threads: CASA (driven by different Mr Smiths) did the equivalent of planting road signs it had no authority to plant. CASA purported to exercise powers it did not have.
From pages 6 & 7 of the Hansard of the Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee hearing of 1 May 2000, copy here: http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/s967.pdf
Senator O’BRIEN— … There are a couple of questions that I have stemming from points that you made. If I understood you correctly, it has now been clearly established that it is Airservices and not CASA who have the responsibility of designing and implementing new air space arrangements. Is that correct?
Mr [Bernie] Smith [Chief Operating Officer, Airservices Australia]—No, Senator. The responsibility is Airservices. CASA have the responsibility to assess the safety.
Senator O’BRIEN—Airservices, not CASA, have that responsibility?
Mr Smith—Yes, correct.
Senator O’BRIEN—And that is consistent with the advice that Airservices had some time ago during the G class air space trial.
Mr Smith—I am not sure what advice you are referring to.
Senator O’BRIEN—It was the advice that we received from Mr Pollard on 1 December last year regarding that situation in estimates on 1 December. I do not have a page reference. In any case, we have cleared that up. It has therefore been established that CASA had no legal basis to run the G class trial, but it went ahead and did that because Airservices was busy with the TAAAT system implementation. Is that correct?
Mr Smith—Airservices had, at that time, taken a decision that to try and run an air space reform program, or to initiate such a program, whilst introducing such a large and complex system was not in the best interests of the industry.
Mr [Bernie] Smith [Chief Operating Officer, Airservices Australia]—No, Senator. The responsibility is Airservices. CASA have the responsibility to assess the safety.
Senator O’BRIEN—Airservices, not CASA, have that responsibility?
Mr Smith—Yes, correct.
Senator O’BRIEN—And that is consistent with the advice that Airservices had some time ago during the G class air space trial.
Mr Smith—I am not sure what advice you are referring to.
Senator O’BRIEN—It was the advice that we received from Mr Pollard on 1 December last year regarding that situation in estimates on 1 December. I do not have a page reference. In any case, we have cleared that up. It has therefore been established that CASA had no legal basis to run the G class trial, but it went ahead and did that because Airservices was busy with the TAAAT system implementation. Is that correct?
Mr Smith—Airservices had, at that time, taken a decision that to try and run an air space reform program, or to initiate such a program, whilst introducing such a large and complex system was not in the best interests of the industry.
The dissembling and obfuscating responses in the earlier 1 December 1999 hearing had put the writing on the wall (see pages 91 onwards): http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/s2803.pdf
As I said on this forum in earlier threads: CASA (driven by different Mr Smiths) did the equivalent of planting road signs it had no authority to plant. CASA purported to exercise powers it did not have.
