'Hundreds' of close calls (merged)
With the dismantling of AUSFIC, and those duties being placed on the sector controllers, the airspace restructure, and the ATC staffing review, the issue of whether ATC can discharge their current duties should be of more immediate concern - instead of calling for the addition of extra Radar services.
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Facts or rhetoric?:
The Airspace system we have now has in fact been redesigned again and again - with a marked acceleration in it's design changes and characteristics since about....1991 as it happens.
It could be legitimately argued therefore that any perceived increase in 'close-calls' may in fact be partly as a consequence of these changes themselves, or indeed as a result of the sheer number of changes.
Just in the last few years there has been a myriad of changes - and aborted changes - as a result of the NAS system as well as other new technologies and techniques. NAS itself remains very controversial, and widely lauded as an excellent example of how not to implement critical changes to a complex system. That is not just a personal opinion - it is the documented view of various Airline Pilot groups, the Air Traffic Controllers Association, and the Regional Airline Association.
The system we have now is nothing like the 1920's - in fact there was no system in the 1920's as there were only a handful of aircraft in Australia.
Nor is the system we have now recognisable to anything like that of 20, 10 or even 5 years ago.
Well no - in fact there were 309 instances of the following:
Note the phrase - or and Airprox*.
I guess it is not as sensational or sexy to admit that a Technical Breakdown of Separation can mean aircraft passing with barely 100 km between them!
The radar where it exists is used... where it exists! There can not be a greater or lesser use of it. What relation this has to the number of breakdowns of separation is not clear - because the statisitcs do not show where the BOS was in a radar or procedural environment (where radar coverage / surveillance coverage does not/did not exist). The great majority of those BOS are just as likely to be in a non-Radar environment - so any 'increased use of the radar' (whatever that actually means) will have little effect on the statisitcs - unless of course we install radars everywhere (like in the US perhaps?).
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*Airprox (Australian Definition) - An Airprox is an occurrence in which 2 or more aircraft come into such close proximity that a threat to the safety of the aircraft exists or may exist, in airspace where the aircraft are not subject to an air traffic control separation standard or where separation is a pilot responsibility.
Airprox in fact often make the news through a press release:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/2004...e/2004_36.aspx
http://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/2005...e/2005_04.aspx
Reports of Airprox** overseas:
Airprox in the UK has a different definition (see links below)
Link: http://www.ukab.org.uk/
"The skies are getting busier and we have an airspace system designed in the 20s."
It could be legitimately argued therefore that any perceived increase in 'close-calls' may in fact be partly as a consequence of these changes themselves, or indeed as a result of the sheer number of changes.
Just in the last few years there has been a myriad of changes - and aborted changes - as a result of the NAS system as well as other new technologies and techniques. NAS itself remains very controversial, and widely lauded as an excellent example of how not to implement critical changes to a complex system. That is not just a personal opinion - it is the documented view of various Airline Pilot groups, the Air Traffic Controllers Association, and the Regional Airline Association.
The system we have now is nothing like the 1920's - in fact there was no system in the 1920's as there were only a handful of aircraft in Australia.
Nor is the system we have now recognisable to anything like that of 20, 10 or even 5 years ago.
There have been 309 near misses in the past three years, including 57 in the first half of this year.
From the Ministers Response:
A breakdown of separation standards, being a failure to maintain a recognised separation standard (vertical, lateral or longitudinal) between aircraft that are being provided with an air traffic service separation service or an airprox
I guess it is not as sensational or sexy to admit that a Technical Breakdown of Separation can mean aircraft passing with barely 100 km between them!
"increased air traffic required greater use of radar."
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*Airprox (Australian Definition) - An Airprox is an occurrence in which 2 or more aircraft come into such close proximity that a threat to the safety of the aircraft exists or may exist, in airspace where the aircraft are not subject to an air traffic control separation standard or where separation is a pilot responsibility.
Airprox in fact often make the news through a press release:
http://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/2004...e/2004_36.aspx
http://www.atsb.gov.au/newsroom/2005...e/2005_04.aspx
Reports of Airprox** overseas:
Airprox in the UK has a different definition (see links below)
19 APR 2005 UK Airprox Board publishes 2004-Q1/2 report
The twelfth report of the UK Airprox Board (UKAB) was published today. It covers the 109 Airprox reported by pilots and air traffic controllers between January and June 2004. Although the 109 Airprox compares with an average of 93 for the first six months of the years 2000-2003 inclusive, more than half the 109 incidents were assessed as `no collision risk`. During the first six months of 2004, there were eight risk category A Airprox (actual risk of collision), none of which involved civil airliners. (CAA)
The twelfth report of the UK Airprox Board (UKAB) was published today. It covers the 109 Airprox reported by pilots and air traffic controllers between January and June 2004. Although the 109 Airprox compares with an average of 93 for the first six months of the years 2000-2003 inclusive, more than half the 109 incidents were assessed as `no collision risk`. During the first six months of 2004, there were eight risk category A Airprox (actual risk of collision), none of which involved civil airliners. (CAA)
Last edited by Shitsu_Tonka; 16th Oct 2006 at 14:01.
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IMHO, if today's airways were designed in 1991, like far too many Government projects, the specs used were from 1958.
The following is copied from a similar thread on the main board.
The following is copied from a similar thread on the main board.
FACT: the laws that govern our airways use were drafted in a time when tracking was done with VAR/radio range, ADF or VORs.
FACT: the vast majority of jet aircraft using today's airways are equipped ith some form of precision tracking aid like INS, IRS or GPS.
FACT: the human element is still in there somewhere, and humans, even the most professional, make mistakes.
FACT: in the days of VAR and ADFs, two aircraft flying on reciprocal tracks at the same level on the same airway had a better chance of BOTH being struck by lightning at the same instant in time than of hitting (or even seeing!) each other.
FACT: with GPS navigation, the same no longer applies. Two aircraft flying at the same level on opposite tracks will fly within a wingspan of each other and their altimeters now HAVE to be so accurate (to be allowed to fly within RVSM airspace) that they WILL be within 50' of each other (ie, they won't miss vertically either). They WILL hit each other unless timely (ie, very rapid and juts as importantly, CORRECT) avoiding action is taken by BOTH pilots. The tragic midair between the DHL freighter and the CIS passenger aircraft over southern Germany some years ago proved that that cannot be relied upon.
These lead me to a final FACT: it's well past the time that someone in authority bit the bullet and accepted that technology has overtaken the rules we work under. We simply HAVE to accept that even with all the high tech safeguards that have been introduced, all the holes in the cheese can still tragically align, as they seem to have done so in this case.
It's time we re-design our airways to accommodate a small right offset, at least in the cruise phase.
... and 'someone in authority' will only act after there's an outcry from the professional pilot group that is so loud and long lasting it cannot be ignored.
FACT: the vast majority of jet aircraft using today's airways are equipped ith some form of precision tracking aid like INS, IRS or GPS.
FACT: the human element is still in there somewhere, and humans, even the most professional, make mistakes.
FACT: in the days of VAR and ADFs, two aircraft flying on reciprocal tracks at the same level on the same airway had a better chance of BOTH being struck by lightning at the same instant in time than of hitting (or even seeing!) each other.
FACT: with GPS navigation, the same no longer applies. Two aircraft flying at the same level on opposite tracks will fly within a wingspan of each other and their altimeters now HAVE to be so accurate (to be allowed to fly within RVSM airspace) that they WILL be within 50' of each other (ie, they won't miss vertically either). They WILL hit each other unless timely (ie, very rapid and juts as importantly, CORRECT) avoiding action is taken by BOTH pilots. The tragic midair between the DHL freighter and the CIS passenger aircraft over southern Germany some years ago proved that that cannot be relied upon.
These lead me to a final FACT: it's well past the time that someone in authority bit the bullet and accepted that technology has overtaken the rules we work under. We simply HAVE to accept that even with all the high tech safeguards that have been introduced, all the holes in the cheese can still tragically align, as they seem to have done so in this case.
It's time we re-design our airways to accommodate a small right offset, at least in the cruise phase.
... and 'someone in authority' will only act after there's an outcry from the professional pilot group that is so loud and long lasting it cannot be ignored.
If we're worried about jits ending up in the same place at the same time ... wouldn't it be better to concentrate our efforts on NOT letting that happen ... rather than letting them wander off course, in case they do?
It's a bit like stopping your car at every green light ... incase someone drives through the red and hits you. That concern might be better allayed by supporting more driver training, or installing bigger or better red lights ... to reduce the driver's inclination to go through the red light, or the light not being seen, or the electronics failing on the lights.
The bottom line being that you will NEVER prevent all stuff ups ... you can only work to reduce them.
It's a bit like stopping your car at every green light ... incase someone drives through the red and hits you. That concern might be better allayed by supporting more driver training, or installing bigger or better red lights ... to reduce the driver's inclination to go through the red light, or the light not being seen, or the electronics failing on the lights.
The bottom line being that you will NEVER prevent all stuff ups ... you can only work to reduce them.
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I think you actually answered yourself in your last sentence peuce if you are refering to andu's post directly above yours.
100 metres offset - that's all we need for the stuff ups. That's all we ever needed since we went glass/IRS/GPS. But people on the ground know better. I think it must be because it would look untidy.
Regards
Rob
100 metres offset - that's all we need for the stuff ups. That's all we ever needed since we went glass/IRS/GPS. But people on the ground know better. I think it must be because it would look untidy.
Regards
Rob
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Peuce, as has been said by others quite some years ago on this site, the current situation is akin to walking directly in line with a machine gun that the shooter assures you is 'safely' aimed over your head. Or driving down the highway at high speed with your lights off straddling the centreline *knowing* that no one's coming the other way because some traffic cop has assured you over the phone that he's stopping all opposite direction traffic.
Sometimes, the cop gets it wrong or the machine gunner slips with his aim. Wouldn't it be easier - or smarter? - to drive on one side of the road or stand out of the machine gunner's azimuth?
JUST
IN
CASE?
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****su, like many other ATCOs, you seem to take the offset idea as a personal affront to your professionalism. It's anything but - just a all too easy to implement last ditch LIFE SAVER if all the other 'holes in the cheese' line up one day - as they unfortunately do.
It would be so damned easy to implement. The offset kicks in whenever LNAV is selected. If track select or or heading select is active, the aircraft points directly at the next waypoint. If that's too simple, surely it wouldn't be too difficult to have the offset disabled when the aircraft is within certain lat and long co-ordinates, (the busy areas ATCOs say offsetting would be a problem).
154 Brazilians would still be alive today if the suggestion, I think pushed very heavily by 410 on this site ten or more years ago, had been implemented. And they're not the first. The Luftwaffe and USAF crews who died off the West African coast in very similar circumstances would also still be with us.
If the 154 dead had been US citizens, I'd be guessing that there'd be a class action suit hitting the courts within weeks against ICAO for not implementing offsetting years ago.
Sometimes, the cop gets it wrong or the machine gunner slips with his aim. Wouldn't it be easier - or smarter? - to drive on one side of the road or stand out of the machine gunner's azimuth?
JUST
IN
CASE?
----
****su, like many other ATCOs, you seem to take the offset idea as a personal affront to your professionalism. It's anything but - just a all too easy to implement last ditch LIFE SAVER if all the other 'holes in the cheese' line up one day - as they unfortunately do.
It would be so damned easy to implement. The offset kicks in whenever LNAV is selected. If track select or or heading select is active, the aircraft points directly at the next waypoint. If that's too simple, surely it wouldn't be too difficult to have the offset disabled when the aircraft is within certain lat and long co-ordinates, (the busy areas ATCOs say offsetting would be a problem).
154 Brazilians would still be alive today if the suggestion, I think pushed very heavily by 410 on this site ten or more years ago, had been implemented. And they're not the first. The Luftwaffe and USAF crews who died off the West African coast in very similar circumstances would also still be with us.
If the 154 dead had been US citizens, I'd be guessing that there'd be a class action suit hitting the courts within weeks against ICAO for not implementing offsetting years ago.
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Andu,
Offset is good for reciprocal tracks, but it wouldn't stop a Lake Constance happening again.
Oz is full of one way routes that cross other one way routes.
Offset is good for reciprocal tracks, but it wouldn't stop a Lake Constance happening again.
Oz is full of one way routes that cross other one way routes.
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Andu,
Calm down mate.
I have no problem with offset in the enroute environment. Don't try it in the TMA however as the controller will get very snakey, as well as earn many frequent short holidays preceded by tea and bikkies.
As DirtyPierre beat me to it however - Offset is only useful for exact opposite direction routes (i.e. two-way routes, where Radar generally doesn't exist).
Anywhere else it does nothing - just changes the point of the potential MAC.
In 'practical terms', offset (within reason)- in a procedural environment has no effect on ATC.
Andu - what angle did the GOL 737 and Legacy collide? If it wasn't at 180 degrees, what would offset as a mitigation concept achieve?
Calm down mate.
I have no problem with offset in the enroute environment. Don't try it in the TMA however as the controller will get very snakey, as well as earn many frequent short holidays preceded by tea and bikkies.
As DirtyPierre beat me to it however - Offset is only useful for exact opposite direction routes (i.e. two-way routes, where Radar generally doesn't exist).
Anywhere else it does nothing - just changes the point of the potential MAC.
In 'practical terms', offset (within reason)- in a procedural environment has no effect on ATC.
Andu - what angle did the GOL 737 and Legacy collide? If it wasn't at 180 degrees, what would offset as a mitigation concept achieve?
Last edited by Shitsu_Tonka; 18th Oct 2006 at 15:04.
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FACT: in the days of VAR and ADFs, two aircraft flying on reciprocal tracks at the same level on the same airway had a better chance of BOTH being struck by lightning at the same instant in time than of hitting (or even seeing!) each other.
Airservices Australia General Manager ATC announced a national route restructure based upon enroute nav RNP1 or RNP2 for completion by 2010 early this month. Offsets in enroute phase, if you're talking 100m, are to all intents and purposes invisible to us. If you're ADS-C we might know about it by alerts (dependent upon parameters in our system) because your intent group doesn't match your flight plan that you submitted. Route structure really determines if offset is going to help.
The only real fact that matters is if you're planning to be at the same point, at the same time, at the same level as another aircraft, these days "big sky" theory ain't gunna help.
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What I'd like to see is something that avoids a TCAS RA in as many cases of potential conflict as possible, because a TCAS RA relies on both pilots reacting instantly - and correctly - to avoid what happened in Brazil. Unfortunately, the Lake Constance collision proved that despite the best will in the world and God knows how much training by airlines, you can't rely on the other pilot to do the right thing. 100m offset won't stop an RA being generated (nor would .5NM, but I'd feel happier with that if it didn't upset ATC too much).
You're never going to come up with a system that covers all eventualities. With a crossing conflict, both aircraft have to reach that one point in the sky at the very wrong moment. With reciprocal tracks, the two aircraft could be occupying the exact same line along the ground for hours.
Surely Andu's idea of the offset being enabled only when in LNAV has some merit. Failing that, just give pilots permission to use offset in the cruise in all but certain designated areas, (as they already do over the North Atlantic). Offhand, I can't think of any area in the cruise that would need to be excluded, (but I'm sure someone will come up with one or two).
You're never going to come up with a system that covers all eventualities. With a crossing conflict, both aircraft have to reach that one point in the sky at the very wrong moment. With reciprocal tracks, the two aircraft could be occupying the exact same line along the ground for hours.
Surely Andu's idea of the offset being enabled only when in LNAV has some merit. Failing that, just give pilots permission to use offset in the cruise in all but certain designated areas, (as they already do over the North Atlantic). Offhand, I can't think of any area in the cruise that would need to be excluded, (but I'm sure someone will come up with one or two).
Okay Rob, I take your point.
So, some pilots already do it now in enroute ... ATC surveillance tolerances aren't good enough to see it ... what's the problem? Continue doing it. No rule required.
So, some pilots already do it now in enroute ... ATC surveillance tolerances aren't good enough to see it ... what's the problem? Continue doing it. No rule required.
I agree with Andu here. Where I fly in Oz, there are hardly any oneway routes outside radar/ID coverage and I marvel at how little lateral sep exists when I pass jets going the opposite direction every day. And I certainly concur with the comment that when tracking with VORs/Omega, there was always an "inbuilt" track error that helped the big-sky theory work.
We are already officially allowed to offset to the right in Australian OCA, so why not by a little bit in continental airspace?
There are problems that will need to be overcome though:
+ some FMSs cannot be set to terminate an offset at a downtrack waypoint, so the crew has to remember to do that later on,
+ some FMSs cannot have an offset of less than 1nm,
+ many NPAs are flown in LNAV, and there would have to be some FMS reprogramming to prevent a crew inadvertently leaving an offset in during a approach.
We are already officially allowed to offset to the right in Australian OCA, so why not by a little bit in continental airspace?
There are problems that will need to be overcome though:
+ some FMSs cannot be set to terminate an offset at a downtrack waypoint, so the crew has to remember to do that later on,
+ some FMSs cannot have an offset of less than 1nm,
+ many NPAs are flown in LNAV, and there would have to be some FMS reprogramming to prevent a crew inadvertently leaving an offset in during a approach.
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Some ATC routes/boundaries require exact tracking for coordination purposes and even the smallest offset can make a difference. Pilots will be largely unaware of which routes this applies to. Tracking offset, without approval from ATC can result in additional workload and in some case, technical breakdowns of separation.
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A couple of good articles in the latest "Controller" magazine about automation in ATC and ACAS and down linking of RAs. One article referred to 70+ RAs a day in Europe, many without needing variation to the clearance as the VNAV approaching the cleared level was too great for TCAS parameters i.e. the boxes don't yet share Cleared level info.
More interesting was a French study about TCAS RAs, where up to 28% failed to respond adequately to an RA either in time or within the range of the vertical 'Resolution' and further over 10% fail to comply at all even post 2002.
Wish I could quote more accurately but I did read it at 3am last night.
I also saw a ppt presentation of the Brazil incident, it would appear that the Embraers winglet took off the 737 outer wing near the aileron thus making the left aileron inoperable or missing shortly after the impact.
More interesting was a French study about TCAS RAs, where up to 28% failed to respond adequately to an RA either in time or within the range of the vertical 'Resolution' and further over 10% fail to comply at all even post 2002.
Wish I could quote more accurately but I did read it at 3am last night.
I also saw a ppt presentation of the Brazil incident, it would appear that the Embraers winglet took off the 737 outer wing near the aileron thus making the left aileron inoperable or missing shortly after the impact.
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It’s understandable that we have a hard time convincing those who sit on the ground and write regulations about the benefits of offsetting, but what amazes me is the incredible lack of imagination in so many of my colleagues who fly the line and daily watch a succession of aircraft (with a closing speed of near 1000 kts) fly directly - and I mean directly over or under their aircraft. And still the majority of them resist offsetting and don’t use it even when it’s allowed.
It's been said before on this thread, but I'll say it again - if offsetting was made SOP – or even better, made mandatory – in all but terminal areas, or at the very least, whenever outside radar coverage, 154 people would still be alive today.
I'm told that journalists read these threads. If that's the case, maybe one of you could dredge up some 'shock! Horror!' headlines over this point - that today's supposedly modern air traffic system forbids pilots from using this simple ‘last ditch’ procedure that would undoubtedly save lives should all other safety procedures fail - as they did in this case, and have done in the past.
*****
Here to Help, how in the world could an aircraft that it .2 of a mile off track on an airway be infringing military airspace? Even if he was 2 miles off track, he’d still be well within the confines of a standard enroute airway. (No one is asking for offsets within terminal areas.)
It's been said before on this thread, but I'll say it again - if offsetting was made SOP – or even better, made mandatory – in all but terminal areas, or at the very least, whenever outside radar coverage, 154 people would still be alive today.
I'm told that journalists read these threads. If that's the case, maybe one of you could dredge up some 'shock! Horror!' headlines over this point - that today's supposedly modern air traffic system forbids pilots from using this simple ‘last ditch’ procedure that would undoubtedly save lives should all other safety procedures fail - as they did in this case, and have done in the past.
*****
Here to Help, how in the world could an aircraft that it .2 of a mile off track on an airway be infringing military airspace? Even if he was 2 miles off track, he’d still be well within the confines of a standard enroute airway. (No one is asking for offsets within terminal areas.)
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Wiley,
Only through very poor design of Military Airspace boundaries vs. Routes.
We have a fairly crappy one out of BN - admittedly it's Radar so not really a problem, but have a look at the IBUNA track (BN R-286) vs. the AM Military area.
As far as the non-radar areas are concerned, I agree the .2nm should never cause a real problem. (In the world of common sense).
how in the world could an aircraft that it .2 of a mile off track on an airway be infringing military airspace?
We have a fairly crappy one out of BN - admittedly it's Radar so not really a problem, but have a look at the IBUNA track (BN R-286) vs. the AM Military area.
As far as the non-radar areas are concerned, I agree the .2nm should never cause a real problem. (In the world of common sense).