The NAS Debate: Other Opinions
*Lancer*, you state:
This is clearly not true. In Australia we have a mandatory radio requirement in Class E airspace. I do not know of any other country that has this requirement. All of the incidents that have been reported in the media in relation to Class E airspace have been alerted see and avoid incidents. If you fly over an airport such at Tamworth the appropriate frequency to be on is that of the tower. The system is not foolproof but it certainly would give as good as an alerted see an avoid system as that to overflying Ayers Rock or Mount Isa.
The most important point is that this airspace has a unique mandatory transponder requirement. Now I know that it is always stated that ICAO will not allow a transponder and TCAS to be used as a safety mitigator. This is extraordinary when you consider that all the proponents of the existing airspace system insist that radio can be used as a safety mitigator in Class G airspace in MBZs. This is despite the fact that ICAO says that no radio is required for VFR in Class E and G airspace. In other words, what the objectors to this modern airspace system insist on, is accepting ICAO recommendations or requirements as compulsory in some cases, but then totally rejected in others.
I can assure you as a pilot that I would prefer to rely on TCAS and transponders as an alerting function than hoping that a pilot has the radio on the correct frequency, the volume turned up, and that the radio is actually working. The advantage of TCAS and transponders is that in most aircraft the transponder is simply left on and comes on with the radio switch. The radio is quite different – you actually have to have to change the radio frequency continuously to be monitoring and provide a correct alerted see and avoid system.
I should also point out that alerted see and avoid is not radio arranged separation. The BASI report never hinted that alerted see and avoid meant radio arranged separation – i.e. that aircraft in VMC conditions had to actually talk to each other and arrange separation to provide a necessary level of safety. In alerted see and avoid, one or more aircraft receive information on the other aircraft, look in that direction and remain clear. After all, that is what happens all the time at airports such as Sydney where you are asked to sight and follow another aircraft. You don’t call the other aircraft and start discussing what you are going to do.
In the US system, there is no radio requirement or transponder requirement in the Class E airspace above Class D towers. In many cases there is no radar in this airspace and the system operates on a totally unalerted see and avoid environment.
As stated by Voices of Reason, there is no pressure from pilots or the FAA to change this system. The reason is that the unalerted see and avoid environment in this situation gives the required level of safety.
And on the other hand propose ‘see-and-avoid’ as the primary collision avoidance measure in class E airspace between VFR/IFR traffic.
The most important point is that this airspace has a unique mandatory transponder requirement. Now I know that it is always stated that ICAO will not allow a transponder and TCAS to be used as a safety mitigator. This is extraordinary when you consider that all the proponents of the existing airspace system insist that radio can be used as a safety mitigator in Class G airspace in MBZs. This is despite the fact that ICAO says that no radio is required for VFR in Class E and G airspace. In other words, what the objectors to this modern airspace system insist on, is accepting ICAO recommendations or requirements as compulsory in some cases, but then totally rejected in others.
I can assure you as a pilot that I would prefer to rely on TCAS and transponders as an alerting function than hoping that a pilot has the radio on the correct frequency, the volume turned up, and that the radio is actually working. The advantage of TCAS and transponders is that in most aircraft the transponder is simply left on and comes on with the radio switch. The radio is quite different – you actually have to have to change the radio frequency continuously to be monitoring and provide a correct alerted see and avoid system.
I should also point out that alerted see and avoid is not radio arranged separation. The BASI report never hinted that alerted see and avoid meant radio arranged separation – i.e. that aircraft in VMC conditions had to actually talk to each other and arrange separation to provide a necessary level of safety. In alerted see and avoid, one or more aircraft receive information on the other aircraft, look in that direction and remain clear. After all, that is what happens all the time at airports such as Sydney where you are asked to sight and follow another aircraft. You don’t call the other aircraft and start discussing what you are going to do.
In the US system, there is no radio requirement or transponder requirement in the Class E airspace above Class D towers. In many cases there is no radar in this airspace and the system operates on a totally unalerted see and avoid environment.
As stated by Voices of Reason, there is no pressure from pilots or the FAA to change this system. The reason is that the unalerted see and avoid environment in this situation gives the required level of safety.
Dick once again you are showing your ignorance of what happens inside most aircraft in Australia and your arrogance for thinking that you know what goes on in GA aircraft in Australia.
First assumption by you is that there is an Avionics Master (as we pilots call them 
) in the said aircraft. My personal experience has been that a large number of GA aircraft do not have one and therefore must still turn on the transponder independent of other radios.
Second, all flight instructors that I know, including the many that I have taught, teach students to turn a transponder to standby after start up and select ALT at the holding point. Then select standby again after landing. You may like to read the AIP ENR 1.6 - 9 & 10.
Thirdly, if an aircraft spends most of its time in G airspace outside radar coverage (most of Australia) when is this transponder checked for accuracy? This accuracy is crucial to TCAS alerting. I know what the maintennace requirements are for transponders, do you?
Dick how many light aircraft other than your own have you travelled in within Australia in say the last twelve months? You claim to know what goes on out here but your own statements show that you do not.
The advantage of TCAS and transponders is that in most aircraft the transponder is simply left on and comes on with the radio switch.
) in the said aircraft. My personal experience has been that a large number of GA aircraft do not have one and therefore must still turn on the transponder independent of other radios.Second, all flight instructors that I know, including the many that I have taught, teach students to turn a transponder to standby after start up and select ALT at the holding point. Then select standby again after landing. You may like to read the AIP ENR 1.6 - 9 & 10.
Thirdly, if an aircraft spends most of its time in G airspace outside radar coverage (most of Australia) when is this transponder checked for accuracy? This accuracy is crucial to TCAS alerting. I know what the maintennace requirements are for transponders, do you?
Dick how many light aircraft other than your own have you travelled in within Australia in say the last twelve months? You claim to know what goes on out here but your own statements show that you do not.
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In alerted see and avoid, one or more aircraft receive information on the other aircraft, look in that direction and remain clear. After all, that is what happens all the time at airports such as Sydney where you are asked to sight and follow another aircraft. You don’t call the other aircraft and start discussing what you are going to do.
As you state, in “alerted see and avoid, one or more aircraft receive information on the other aircraft, look in that direction and remain clear”. So far you are correct. The important point which you appear not to grasp is that in this case, there is no other form of separation.
In the case of a sight and follow (which is a separation standard), alternate full separation is provided until such time as the pilot reports the other aircraft in sight. There is no need to “call the other aircraft and start discussing what you are going to do” as you have already received full instructions on what to do. You follow the other aircraft and maintain the requisite distance.
Please, for the sake of air safety, start learning more about aviation, or consult some of those ‘experts’ you claim to know. Your ignorance is more than embarrassing.
The advantage of TCAS and transponders is that in most aircraft the transponder is simply left on and comes on with the radio switch.
From the other thread…
Voices of Reason, why you are spending so much time on this issue? As other posters have asked, who are you and what is your interest? Airservices Australia is a huge commercial money making machine. Your posts generally support the view of many within Airservices Australia and therefore I believe are commercially based. There is nothing wrong with this of course, but I find it difficult to know why there should be secrecy. Presumably someone is paying you for the time that you expend when making these posts.
When flying by Citation at airline altitudes and operating from main airport to main airport, I tend to agree that we have a system as good as any in the world.
You have conceded that some of the outcomes of the NAS2B changes have been ‘horrific’. If TCAS had not saved the day (e.g. if it had been a regional Saab rather than a TCAS equipped B738) then ‘horrific’ would not even begin to describe it. Your own words – ‘basically criminal’ – might come close.
Why do you still not have the courage to answer your own thread about the Brisbane Virgin incident? What are you afraid of?
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The thread on "The NAS Debate: Voices of Reason & Dick Smith" is proving its value in allowing reasoned discussions to occur without unhelpful static. These dual threads are a good idea Woomera 
Let me pick up on one of VoR's points and add two more, in a holistic sense. To keep it reasoned, I won't mention NAS at all (except where it is in a quote from VoR).
Performance review
Voices of Reason's post on 17th June 2004 06:26 made reference to the Eurocontrol Performance Review Commission site and the performance data on Europe and the United States. A reference for one of reports is at:
http://www.natca.org/assets/Document...03useurope.pdf
It shows a candid and detailed assessment of performance in ATC. This type of performance based assessment is also to found in other spheres of transportation, and in other industry sectors. There is a growing drive to measure performance. In Europe, the US and indeed worldwide. The design and management of publicly funded technology programmes requires effective means for assessing programme performance. In transportation in Australia, the roads sector leads the world in performance based assessment. It is encouraging to see that this type of assessment is being done in airspace performance overseas, where it can give facts and data to help move forward. I am not aware that it is being done in Australia, and would be grateful if anyone can point to such publication(s).
Voices of Reason mentioned two studies that presumably should form part of any performance assessment in Australia airspace:
If these studies have been done, then they should published in the public domain and from VoR's comments, it seems that they have not. As Australian transportation aspires to world class standards, then part of achieving that standard is to be measured and reported on, and that includes publication.
A web search yields the Australian roads sector performance indicators http://www.algin.net/austroads/. I quote This edition, published in 2003, is the ninth National Performance Indicators publication, covering seventy-two indicators. Updated data is published each year to provide important time series information for the transport industry and the community and to facilitate individual comparisons of the performance of the road system and road authorities. That's pretty far advanced, and begs the question 'where is aviation?'
The EuroControl Performance Review Commission obviously does the same sort of thing for airspace in Europe (and the USA). I suggest that it is now time for this in airspace in Australia. With the airspace debate so heated and polarised, benchmarking combined with an annual performance indicator report would go some way to restoring faith in the system.
For clarity, let me say that performance indicators are not just statistics of accidents or incidents, and performance review is not just how many dollars per plane it costs to process. These measures, while important, are too few. They have the problem that they are rather narrowly focussed, often have too small a database to draw from (= few accidents = good outcome), and they can have difficulty in discriminating between system changes. A good many other measures are required.
For benchmarking to materialise, the scope of airspace performance review/indicators will take a while to debate and refine. A quick glance at the performance indicators at the Austroads site will show how some measures used could even be unexpected. I look forward to some response from the many PPRUNE readers in CASA, AA and the Defence Force.
Analysis techniques
The next gap in Australian airspace is knowledge of analysis techniques. These are specific skills and need to be properly taught, including actual problem solving tutorials and statistical analysis. I won't go into the course design details here, but based on my considerable experience of running these sorts of courses, it is unlikely that the scope could be less than 7-10 days, full-time and hands-on.
There is no suitable course in Australia to teach this at present, which says something of why the gap exists. There are certainly enough qualified people (and institutions) in Australia to teach it.
We could do worse then adapt the USA SCSI "Military Course on System Safety Analysis", an 8 day course http://www.scsi-inc.com/SSA.html
This is a course in the practical application of system safety and reliability analysis tools and techniques. It addresses in methods suggested by MIL-STD 882D and SAE ARP 4761 for safety assessment. These include Hazard Analysis, FMECA, Fault Tree, Human Factors Analysis and Common Cause Analysis.
While there are courses in Australia which give part of the knowledge, I believe that these are either too limited in scope, or non-numerical, or non-contact, or made deliberately brief to meet other needs. Players include UNSW (my old alma mater) who have listed "AVIA5021 Aviation Safety Analysis" http://www.student.unsw.edu.au/handb...AVIA5021.shtml And R2AA runs a short course on EEA System Safety Assurance http://www.r2a.com.au/courses/ssa.html
This is not meant to be a criticism of either of these courses, which are aimed at a different market. I'm sure their presenters would be the first to acknowledge that the courses have not been designed to cover the breadth or depth of analysis techniques I am proposing is needed for airspace analysis. And these presenters would probably be in the forefront of people who could present the sort of course I'm suggesting.
There is also a need for financial analysis training, but that uses conventional financial/economics techniques and is well taught at many institutions throughout Australia.
Economic values for evaluation
The comment was made in the VoR posting about on the need to re-evaluate the outdated value of life figures being used in Australia. I also believe that is long overdue, as is a re-evaluation of the other economic values for aviation, such as current values for aircraft, hourly costs and injuries.
These are used for several types of aviation economic analysis such as the cost of control towers. The FAA themselves [(1990) Establishment and discontinuance criteria for airport traffic control towers. Report FAA-APO-90-7. Federal Aviation Administration, Washington], say that this sort of information should be updated annually. That might be a bit often in practice, but the values do need updating and publication.
Only then can we all have the same figures to work to, and we can compare 'apples' with 'apples'. This sort of determination and publication is well within the capabilities and scope of the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics.
Summary
As we work through airspace reform, let's add some measurement, training and standardisation to the process and put these three components formally into the design and management of airspace:
Performance review
Analysis techniques training
Economic values for evaluation
Let me pick up on one of VoR's points and add two more, in a holistic sense. To keep it reasoned, I won't mention NAS at all (except where it is in a quote from VoR).
Performance review
Voices of Reason's post on 17th June 2004 06:26 made reference to the Eurocontrol Performance Review Commission site and the performance data on Europe and the United States. A reference for one of reports is at:
http://www.natca.org/assets/Document...03useurope.pdf
It shows a candid and detailed assessment of performance in ATC. This type of performance based assessment is also to found in other spheres of transportation, and in other industry sectors. There is a growing drive to measure performance. In Europe, the US and indeed worldwide. The design and management of publicly funded technology programmes requires effective means for assessing programme performance. In transportation in Australia, the roads sector leads the world in performance based assessment. It is encouraging to see that this type of assessment is being done in airspace performance overseas, where it can give facts and data to help move forward. I am not aware that it is being done in Australia, and would be grateful if anyone can point to such publication(s).
Voices of Reason mentioned two studies that presumably should form part of any performance assessment in Australia airspace:
5. The Aviation Reform Group initiated a study to determine acceptable safety risk levels – so that a case could be put to your regulator. We understand that a considerable sum of money was involved – and that more than one of the ARG stakeholders contributed. This would appear to indicate that you, and the ARG, were ready to conduct a risk based analysis on the NAS reform package. Do you know where that report has been published.
6. The Australian Department of Transport participated in the cost benefit study that was commissioned to validate NAS cost benefit claims. Presumably the information in the risk study was available to any transport economics section in that Department – possibly including remarks by the organization that conducted that study on the need to reevaluate the outdated value of life figures being used in Australia.
6. The Australian Department of Transport participated in the cost benefit study that was commissioned to validate NAS cost benefit claims. Presumably the information in the risk study was available to any transport economics section in that Department – possibly including remarks by the organization that conducted that study on the need to reevaluate the outdated value of life figures being used in Australia.
A web search yields the Australian roads sector performance indicators http://www.algin.net/austroads/. I quote This edition, published in 2003, is the ninth National Performance Indicators publication, covering seventy-two indicators. Updated data is published each year to provide important time series information for the transport industry and the community and to facilitate individual comparisons of the performance of the road system and road authorities. That's pretty far advanced, and begs the question 'where is aviation?'
The EuroControl Performance Review Commission obviously does the same sort of thing for airspace in Europe (and the USA). I suggest that it is now time for this in airspace in Australia. With the airspace debate so heated and polarised, benchmarking combined with an annual performance indicator report would go some way to restoring faith in the system.
For clarity, let me say that performance indicators are not just statistics of accidents or incidents, and performance review is not just how many dollars per plane it costs to process. These measures, while important, are too few. They have the problem that they are rather narrowly focussed, often have too small a database to draw from (= few accidents = good outcome), and they can have difficulty in discriminating between system changes. A good many other measures are required.
For benchmarking to materialise, the scope of airspace performance review/indicators will take a while to debate and refine. A quick glance at the performance indicators at the Austroads site will show how some measures used could even be unexpected. I look forward to some response from the many PPRUNE readers in CASA, AA and the Defence Force.
Analysis techniques
The next gap in Australian airspace is knowledge of analysis techniques. These are specific skills and need to be properly taught, including actual problem solving tutorials and statistical analysis. I won't go into the course design details here, but based on my considerable experience of running these sorts of courses, it is unlikely that the scope could be less than 7-10 days, full-time and hands-on.
There is no suitable course in Australia to teach this at present, which says something of why the gap exists. There are certainly enough qualified people (and institutions) in Australia to teach it.
We could do worse then adapt the USA SCSI "Military Course on System Safety Analysis", an 8 day course http://www.scsi-inc.com/SSA.html
This is a course in the practical application of system safety and reliability analysis tools and techniques. It addresses in methods suggested by MIL-STD 882D and SAE ARP 4761 for safety assessment. These include Hazard Analysis, FMECA, Fault Tree, Human Factors Analysis and Common Cause Analysis.
While there are courses in Australia which give part of the knowledge, I believe that these are either too limited in scope, or non-numerical, or non-contact, or made deliberately brief to meet other needs. Players include UNSW (my old alma mater) who have listed "AVIA5021 Aviation Safety Analysis" http://www.student.unsw.edu.au/handb...AVIA5021.shtml And R2AA runs a short course on EEA System Safety Assurance http://www.r2a.com.au/courses/ssa.html
This is not meant to be a criticism of either of these courses, which are aimed at a different market. I'm sure their presenters would be the first to acknowledge that the courses have not been designed to cover the breadth or depth of analysis techniques I am proposing is needed for airspace analysis. And these presenters would probably be in the forefront of people who could present the sort of course I'm suggesting.
There is also a need for financial analysis training, but that uses conventional financial/economics techniques and is well taught at many institutions throughout Australia.
Economic values for evaluation
The comment was made in the VoR posting about on the need to re-evaluate the outdated value of life figures being used in Australia. I also believe that is long overdue, as is a re-evaluation of the other economic values for aviation, such as current values for aircraft, hourly costs and injuries.
These are used for several types of aviation economic analysis such as the cost of control towers. The FAA themselves [(1990) Establishment and discontinuance criteria for airport traffic control towers. Report FAA-APO-90-7. Federal Aviation Administration, Washington], say that this sort of information should be updated annually. That might be a bit often in practice, but the values do need updating and publication.
Only then can we all have the same figures to work to, and we can compare 'apples' with 'apples'. This sort of determination and publication is well within the capabilities and scope of the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics.
Summary
As we work through airspace reform, let's add some measurement, training and standardisation to the process and put these three components formally into the design and management of airspace:
Performance review
Analysis techniques training
Economic values for evaluation
*Lancer*, in relation to me supporting a tower at Broome and UNICOM operators, there is a “constant” in this. That is, the risk of collision from unalerted see and avoid is greatest within 10 miles of an aerodrome. I have never proposed see and avoid as the primary collision avoidance measure in Class E airspace. This is why it was I who introduced the unique mandatory transponder requirements in all Class E, and also the mandatory radio requirements in Class E above the Class D towers that we now have.
The appropriate frequency to be on when flying in the approach and departure airspace of a Class D tower is the Class D tower frequency. This obviously gives alerted see and avoid.
No doubt you will dismiss TCAS/transponders as an alerting tool, however you would probably support radio as an alerting tool – even though ICAO does not require radio in E or G airspace for VFR traffic.
The reason the USA system relies on unalerted see and avoid in Class E airspace above Class D towers where radar is not present is because the risk of collision further than 5 miles away from an airport is so minimal that in their experience, unalerted see and avoid gives the required level of safety.
scramjet77, you ask why I support the non-mandatory radio carriage rules for the new NAS 2c changes. You are completely wrong. It was I who introduced and had unanimous support for mandatory requirements at all airports where there was a third party operator. This was a unanimous decision at the last ARG meeting.
Yes, it is true that I do not support mandatory radio requirements when there is a calling in the blind system because the BASI/ATSB data shows that the result is many thousands of unalerted see and avoid incidents. This is because pilots in this calling in the blind system can have the radio on the wrong frequency, the volume turned down, or the wrong microphone selected. I have always supported mandatory radio requirements where there is a third party to ensure that the radio is working. This is consistent with ICAO.
The appropriate frequency to be on when flying in the approach and departure airspace of a Class D tower is the Class D tower frequency. This obviously gives alerted see and avoid.
No doubt you will dismiss TCAS/transponders as an alerting tool, however you would probably support radio as an alerting tool – even though ICAO does not require radio in E or G airspace for VFR traffic.
The reason the USA system relies on unalerted see and avoid in Class E airspace above Class D towers where radar is not present is because the risk of collision further than 5 miles away from an airport is so minimal that in their experience, unalerted see and avoid gives the required level of safety.
scramjet77, you ask why I support the non-mandatory radio carriage rules for the new NAS 2c changes. You are completely wrong. It was I who introduced and had unanimous support for mandatory requirements at all airports where there was a third party operator. This was a unanimous decision at the last ARG meeting.
Yes, it is true that I do not support mandatory radio requirements when there is a calling in the blind system because the BASI/ATSB data shows that the result is many thousands of unalerted see and avoid incidents. This is because pilots in this calling in the blind system can have the radio on the wrong frequency, the volume turned down, or the wrong microphone selected. I have always supported mandatory radio requirements where there is a third party to ensure that the radio is working. This is consistent with ICAO.
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Mr Smith,
Firstly, thanks for your participation in all this. Hopefully it can prove educational and constructive for everyone in the industry. My obvious concern is the effectiveness of 'alerting' for alerted see-and-avoid.
You stated: "[you] have always supported mandatory radio requirements where there is a third party to ensure that the radio is working"
Exactly what third party ensures that a transponder is working on a VFR aircraft in Class E airpace?
Additionally, you said: "Now I know that it is always stated that ICAO will not allow a transponder and TCAS to be used as a safety mitigator."
How can you apparently dismiss the radio as an alerting tool on the basis of an ICAO recommendation, and then say 'use your transponders' contrary to an ICAO requirement? Does that not put you in the same group as "the objectors to this modern airspace system [by] accepting ICAO recommendations or requirements as compulsory in some cases, but then totally rejected in others"?
Lancer
Firstly, thanks for your participation in all this. Hopefully it can prove educational and constructive for everyone in the industry. My obvious concern is the effectiveness of 'alerting' for alerted see-and-avoid.
You stated: "[you] have always supported mandatory radio requirements where there is a third party to ensure that the radio is working"
Exactly what third party ensures that a transponder is working on a VFR aircraft in Class E airpace?
Additionally, you said: "Now I know that it is always stated that ICAO will not allow a transponder and TCAS to be used as a safety mitigator."
How can you apparently dismiss the radio as an alerting tool on the basis of an ICAO recommendation, and then say 'use your transponders' contrary to an ICAO requirement? Does that not put you in the same group as "the objectors to this modern airspace system [by] accepting ICAO recommendations or requirements as compulsory in some cases, but then totally rejected in others"?
Lancer
Dick
Referring to your response to VoR 's latest post, all of this has been stated here to you over the past few years:
1. LLAMP was not Adrian Dumsa's or Airservices's proposal. As you well know - but can't bring yourself to acknowledge - it was developed over time by a committee of industry representatives - some 14 or so organisations I recall. The only ones who objected to the final model were (strangely enough) AOPA (whose rep. had agreed until someone replaced him) and the SAAA.
Designated Area Frequency areas. If you had studied the LLAMP model you would have understood that these areas were sized to suit the amount of traffic inside, and were probably around the same size as the then FIAs. Yes, you could have had 30 ADs in one, but it would have been one covering thousands of square KMs in the middle of the country where the traffic is light. The DAFs close to capital cities were reduced in size to ensure that they would encompass relevant traffic, and take into account frequency congestion.
NAS = joint QF & your model. QF have denied this. A QF rep. stated at a RAPAC that NAS was not the organisation's proposed model nor were they indicating support for it (in fact they had endorsed LLAMP), merely that they had provided a staff member to assist you with preparing the document (curiously the same individual you recently bucketed on another thread).
CTAFs in Arnhemland. Created at the suggestion of and supported by the operators who fly in the airspace. It should also be noted that CTAF' & MBZ's and their MTAF predecessors had to be introduced due to the congestion created on FIAs as a result of your AMATS initiatives i.e. the result of a single ATS officer being responsible for many FIA frequencies and thus not being able to operate them individually when the amount of traffic was high. The LLAMP proposal's DAFs were specifically designed to rectify this.
The Wes Willoughby report. I'll leave someone else to comment here, other than to say I'm told that those who really know what is involved were not kind with their opinion of his findings.
Finally, it seems all those who have some knowledge and expertise in the subject matter are against you -
QF
Airservices
ATC
CASA
BASI
AFAP
etc etc.
Doesn't that tell you something? It does me .......
Referring to your response to VoR 's latest post, all of this has been stated here to you over the past few years:
1. LLAMP was not Adrian Dumsa's or Airservices's proposal. As you well know - but can't bring yourself to acknowledge - it was developed over time by a committee of industry representatives - some 14 or so organisations I recall. The only ones who objected to the final model were (strangely enough) AOPA (whose rep. had agreed until someone replaced him) and the SAAA.
Designated Area Frequency areas. If you had studied the LLAMP model you would have understood that these areas were sized to suit the amount of traffic inside, and were probably around the same size as the then FIAs. Yes, you could have had 30 ADs in one, but it would have been one covering thousands of square KMs in the middle of the country where the traffic is light. The DAFs close to capital cities were reduced in size to ensure that they would encompass relevant traffic, and take into account frequency congestion.
NAS = joint QF & your model. QF have denied this. A QF rep. stated at a RAPAC that NAS was not the organisation's proposed model nor were they indicating support for it (in fact they had endorsed LLAMP), merely that they had provided a staff member to assist you with preparing the document (curiously the same individual you recently bucketed on another thread).
CTAFs in Arnhemland. Created at the suggestion of and supported by the operators who fly in the airspace. It should also be noted that CTAF' & MBZ's and their MTAF predecessors had to be introduced due to the congestion created on FIAs as a result of your AMATS initiatives i.e. the result of a single ATS officer being responsible for many FIA frequencies and thus not being able to operate them individually when the amount of traffic was high. The LLAMP proposal's DAFs were specifically designed to rectify this.
The Wes Willoughby report. I'll leave someone else to comment here, other than to say I'm told that those who really know what is involved were not kind with their opinion of his findings.
Finally, it seems all those who have some knowledge and expertise in the subject matter are against you -
QF
Airservices
ATC
CASA
BASI
AFAP
etc etc.
Doesn't that tell you something? It does me .......
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Lie number 1.
Why would VFRs file IFR plans?
Lie number 2.
You state elsewhere that 'C' offers a higher level of safety than 'E'. You are now trying to confuse the issue by claiming that being delayed in a single engine aircraft is more dangerous than just blundering on thru without a clearance (as none is required anymore) WHEN THERE IS GOING TO BE TRAFFIC (hence the reason for being delayed previously). Do you have any evidence to support your claim that holding over water in a SE lighty is MORE dangerous than sharing the sky with jet traffic? Of course you don't- it's just a lie. But it's sooooo much better now that a lighty doesn't get a small delay- yet jets performing TCAS RA manouvres obviously do so for free. I'd love to see a cost comparison between 2 orbits in a 172 and a TCAS climb in a jet.
Lie number 3.
If you REALLY believe RPTs should have alerted see and avoid, why are you encouraging the profileration of non-radar 'E'? Even radar 'E'?
Lies, lies, lies.
Lie number 4
Who cares if they were ALERTED seeand avoid, or UNALERTED see and avoid? THEY WERE FAILURES OF SEE AND AVOID. It is true, liar.
Lie number 5.
YOU are guilty of accepting ICAO where it suits you, and dismissing it where it doesn't, not your detractors. You flip flop back and forward between wanting 'world's best practice' and the 'US system'.
By the way
As a pilot, how does having a 'transponder' provide alerted see and avoid? As a pilot, I thought that having TCAS would've been necessary? How many a/c like, say, chieftains, have TCAS? How does HAVING a transponder ensure it's accuracy, or that's it's even switched on? Or switched to the correct setting? If this isn't a LIE, then it's STUPIDITY. Which is it?
Lie number 6.
I can quote you on many threads saying that your introduction of see and avoid in vast tracts of enroute airspace won't be a problem. You even insist that VFRs don't talk, thereby assuring that it will be UNALERTED see and avoid (unless the aircraft have TCAS fitted etc.) A blatant LIE.
I am sure there are more, but I can't be bothered combing your posts for the frequent lies. I think people have the message.
· Do VFR pay less now than prior to Nov27 2003?
Most certainly they do because in many cases they are not forced to file an IFR flight plan (and pay enroute charges) to be guaranteed a prompt clearance through what was Class C airspace.
Lie number 2.
Do VFR receive the same level of safety in Class E that was Class C prior to Nov 27 2003?
Probably a higher level now as they can track direct and they are not forced over tiger country in single engine aircraft – which often happened. I was recently speaking to a pilot of an aircraft who on numerous times overflying Hamilton Island was kept holding at the control zone boundary over water in a single engine aircraft. Now that aircraft can fly in Class E airspace at a higher level of safety.
Lie number 3.
Where I am different is that I am convinced from the evidence that our system did not provide an alerted see and avoid situation because a calling in the blind procedure resulted in many errors being made and therefore many unalerted see and avoid incidents. That is why I have worked constantly to have third party operators at non-tower airports.
Lies, lies, lies.
Lie number 4
This is clearly not true. In Australia we have a mandatory radio requirement in Class E airspace. I do not know of any other country that has this requirement. All of the incidents that have been reported in the media in relation to Class E airspace have been alerted see and avoid incidents
Lie number 5.
The most important point is that this airspace has a unique mandatory transponder requirement. Now I know that it is always stated that ICAO will not allow a transponder and TCAS to be used as a safety mitigator. This is extraordinary when you consider that all the proponents of the existing airspace system insist that radio can be used as a safety mitigator in Class G airspace in MBZs. This is despite the fact that ICAO says that no radio is required for VFR in Class E and G airspace. In other words, what the objectors to this modern airspace system insist on, is accepting ICAO recommendations or requirements as compulsory in some cases, but then totally rejected in others.
By the way
I can assure you as a pilot that I would prefer to rely on TCAS and transponders as an alerting function than hoping that a pilot has the radio on the correct frequency, the volume turned up, and that the radio is actually working.
Lie number 6.
Jet_A_Knight, in relation to see and avoid everything I have done has been to reduce the amount of unalerted see and avoid.
I am sure there are more, but I can't be bothered combing your posts for the frequent lies. I think people have the message.
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Part 1 of 2
I find that hard to believe Smith. I see lotsa VFR aircraft diverting around D/E zone now because they do not like being forced to be the traffic separator by your airspace system. They obviously have some degree of self-preservation. Thanks to you and AusNAS, they decide to divert around the zone.
Some still transit but call us anyway so as to let us and other traffic know they are there. ATC cannot separate them from IFR any more thanks to YOU, but you can be damn sure if we can assist a pilot or pilots to miss each other we will. So who is right?, I have radar and voice data to back my claim, how bout you?
To be totally objective on this you need to back it with examples, data and cause and effect analysis.
Now I know you turn various shades of violet and start frothing at the mouth at the mere mention of the word analysis, it is however the only accurate way of determining exactly what is happening.
The 'D' that I am completely familiar with has overlying E. I can categorically say that before 2b (Nov), O/flying below A100 were very very rarely inconvenienced as far as delay by diversion or OCTA hold. FACT.
How do I know, because I spend hours each day watching the traffic and making those decisions. I personally cannot remember how long ago it would be that an O/flying VFR was delayed or diverted off track.
Your response will no doubt be, that is not true.
Well how do you or I prove our case to be correct?.
Tis nigh on impossible. One way might be to ask the question here, to the pilots IFR and VFR and Air Traffic Controllers who operate in these areas, to provide examples of when and perhaps why a delay might have occurred. How bout it?
Nice try, no cigar.
ATC have a large number of separation standards available to ensure aircraft are not going to infringe each others position such that proximity is a serious collision risk.
Those standards enable efficient and SAFE traffic management to proximity’s such as;
500’ with traffic information, 1000’ and/or 1nm ie either side of a prominent topographical feature and/or lateral by radial, track, clearance limit on track etc. There are lots, each with a specific use in a given set of traffic circumstances.
If, and it is a big if, a delay or diversion track were required for separation, I am certain it would not be based on the simplistic reasoning of an IFR descending or climbing through his requested overflight level.
It is certainly not 10mins each time a confliction occurs!, nasty, typical misrepresentative little furphy that one Smith!
Even if the traffic density was such that a clearance for overflight were not readily available and a diversion around the CTR/CTA were necessary, an arc around is not going to be an additional 30nm or 10 mins.
If direct traverse track across a D or C CTA that was say radius 15nm, then you will travel 30nm through controlled airspace during an overflight. To divert at say 40deg off nominal track from 20nm out to a position 17nm adjacent the aerodrome OCTA, then back 40deg off parallel to be back on track at 20nm the other side, you will have travelled an additional 12nm. (Do the triangulation).
You can however assume that from the abeam position, most pilots would then track direct to next waypoint, which means a very shallow track intercept and negligible additional miles from the abeam position.
Assuming an extra 10 track miles as an absolute worse case in most circumstances every once in a Mars eclipse because of complex/busy traffic densities and/or the VFR pilot not calling for clearance until the boundary, would seem a small price to pay for ensuring everybody lives.
Compared to:
What happened within 4 weeks of your E airspace implementation!. Silently traversing in front of a B737 opposite direction, who thought the 737 would pass on the right, only then to pass on the left at close, close proximity. Passengers down one side of the 737 do not get to see a 4 seater that clearly unless is dangerously close!
Mr Smith, what cost will there be to the Industry both Commercial and GA of a YMLT type situation that results in a Mid-air collision?
What will happen when one of these airprox events that are inevitable is not just a near miss?
Mid-airs have occurred, and will continue to occur in your utopian US airspace system Class E, even though pilots do the correct things. Most reports from NTSB have a common theme: “the pilot failed to see and avoid”. The pilots failed to see and avoid, Hmmmm perhaps most of them should read something like: “The pilot had little opportunity to see, let alone avoid.”
I do not believe for one second that pilots are flying VFR vice IFR so they can just traverse E over D without a supposed delay. IFR rated pilots are not that silly!, as to blast on through, oblivious of the collision risk.
To the audience.... Am I wrong on this?
Clutching at straws again!
Tiger country, direct, ya mate you were talkin to the other day holding over water
Come on Smith, we are to take your word on this baseless waffle?, Nah, sorry, where is the evidence?.
The question as you well know because you continue to avoid it is “Un alerted see and avoid”
You know damn well that IFR no longer know about VFR in E, “Un-alerted see and avoid” which replaced separation services provided by ATC in C.
IT IS LESS SAFE, IMHO a lot less safe. Be a man and admit it, because nothing you say in denial of that fact gives you any legitimacy or credibility with those of us (most of the industry) who KNOW categorically that your AusNAS E is LESS SAFE THAN the C it replaced.
C dwongraded to E at huge cost for no apparent reason! GREAT REFORM!
Do you accept any responsibility for that? No, thought not, how preposterous I hear you bellow.
Such as the American, European, Canadian, AusNAS system that is not really any of the above cause certain subtle but critical bits were missed?
You big fibber you. Conservative, copying a successful system that has recorded mid-airs. Ya almost had me there…....NOT
OH brother….....You seriously believe your own dribble
Really?, Oh I see, I have to ask twenty questions and until I ask the right one…
How bout this:
After the AusNAS is safer routine blurb, and the showing off your US alphabet airspace pocket card. Much discussion and explanation of the TW specific airspace arrangements ensued, after which, did you state that the Tower E airspace was not as safe as that it replaced?
I’m gunna send you a wall plaque that says “CONTEXT” ……..Anyhow, You talk about non-towered, I refer to towered D/E. Oh well lets do both:
MBZ’s v’s your CTAF’s
Un-alerted see and avoid incidents eh. OK so what is your remedy!……..remove the mandatory broadcast requirement or MBZ, and replace it with CTAF (use it if ya got it, radio that is), threatening pilots with hefty fines is one thing, but to then say, o-well, if ya ain’t got a radio you can play as well?. That is allowing un-alerted see and avoid!
Inconsistent and contradictory!
If what you are trying to fix is inadvertent frequency error, make it compulsory to receive a ‘beep back’ specific to each MBZ or a response from another aircraft in the MBZ if the beep back is activity timed. God sakes, it is not that hard.
Oh yeh, I forgot it has to change name to be seen to be reforming something, doesn’t it
AusNAS Towered E (above D)
- No RADAR
- No VFR Broadcasts
Explain to me how that is ‘alerted see-and-avoid’.
- How are you ensuring VFR are monitoring the correct frequency (Tower)?
- How are the IFR’s and ATC supposed to know the VFR is lurking, by bloody Osmosis?
Inconsistent and contradictory!
Remind me again what it was you signed in the tower.......Oh Yeh "RPT should have alerted see and avoid"
What have I missed?...... Are you stroking your ego or something else or are you just taking the piss with peoples safety?
Part 2 of 2
Bollocks. Workload limitations, equipment limitations, radar coverage, all play a part. It ain’t all beer and skittles. Read the link on the other thread (Fantabulous US)and learn
Oh come on, you know it is so, I certainly do. Australia is a signatory to the Convention.
ICAO is a mates network according to you, like every other organisation and agency you have crossed.
Are there any that are not?
Will not fly!. If you want us to make them miss each other, give us the tools (Airspace classification) to do it, Or, be happy with the intent of E and G, (traffic information IFR/VFR E and IFR/IFR G) and they sort themselves. One or the other.
American pilots cannot distinguish classes of airspace in reality, that’s why American ATC’s effectively run radar D everywhere, but the VFR’s are not cleared, SO the ATC’s are expressly immune to blame or question if IFR/VFR or VFR/VFR swap paint!. Prove me wrong!
Awwwwwww Suuuure……….(Otherwise known as the industry proposal)
Honestly.....What is the point of debating a loon!
Good day to you all
· Does AusNAS save money for our Aviation Industry?
Most certainly. Already aircraft are not having to divert many extra miles in Class C airspace above Class D. I’m getting reports all the time of the quite substantial savings being made by aircraft.
Most certainly. Already aircraft are not having to divert many extra miles in Class C airspace above Class D. I’m getting reports all the time of the quite substantial savings being made by aircraft.
Some still transit but call us anyway so as to let us and other traffic know they are there. ATC cannot separate them from IFR any more thanks to YOU, but you can be damn sure if we can assist a pilot or pilots to miss each other we will. So who is right?, I have radar and voice data to back my claim, how bout you?
To be totally objective on this you need to back it with examples, data and cause and effect analysis.
Now I know you turn various shades of violet and start frothing at the mouth at the mere mention of the word analysis, it is however the only accurate way of determining exactly what is happening.
The 'D' that I am completely familiar with has overlying E. I can categorically say that before 2b (Nov), O/flying below A100 were very very rarely inconvenienced as far as delay by diversion or OCTA hold. FACT.
How do I know, because I spend hours each day watching the traffic and making those decisions. I personally cannot remember how long ago it would be that an O/flying VFR was delayed or diverted off track.
Your response will no doubt be, that is not true.
Well how do you or I prove our case to be correct?.
Tis nigh on impossible. One way might be to ask the question here, to the pilots IFR and VFR and Air Traffic Controllers who operate in these areas, to provide examples of when and perhaps why a delay might have occurred. How bout it?
For example, the pilot of the VFR aircraft involved in the Launceston incident says that before the 27 November 2003 changes, on up to 50% of occasions when he overflew Launceston he would be diverted up to 15 miles off track in CAVOK conditions if there was an IFR aircraft – even a Navajo – present in the controlled airspace. This was because there was no radar at Launceston and so procedural separation of 10 minutes had to be given quite often if aircraft passed through the same levels. 10 minutes at 180 knots is 30 miles. That is a lot of extra flying and a lot of extra cost.
ATC have a large number of separation standards available to ensure aircraft are not going to infringe each others position such that proximity is a serious collision risk.
Those standards enable efficient and SAFE traffic management to proximity’s such as;
500’ with traffic information, 1000’ and/or 1nm ie either side of a prominent topographical feature and/or lateral by radial, track, clearance limit on track etc. There are lots, each with a specific use in a given set of traffic circumstances.
If, and it is a big if, a delay or diversion track were required for separation, I am certain it would not be based on the simplistic reasoning of an IFR descending or climbing through his requested overflight level.
It is certainly not 10mins each time a confliction occurs!, nasty, typical misrepresentative little furphy that one Smith!
Even if the traffic density was such that a clearance for overflight were not readily available and a diversion around the CTR/CTA were necessary, an arc around is not going to be an additional 30nm or 10 mins.
If direct traverse track across a D or C CTA that was say radius 15nm, then you will travel 30nm through controlled airspace during an overflight. To divert at say 40deg off nominal track from 20nm out to a position 17nm adjacent the aerodrome OCTA, then back 40deg off parallel to be back on track at 20nm the other side, you will have travelled an additional 12nm. (Do the triangulation).
You can however assume that from the abeam position, most pilots would then track direct to next waypoint, which means a very shallow track intercept and negligible additional miles from the abeam position.
Assuming an extra 10 track miles as an absolute worse case in most circumstances every once in a Mars eclipse because of complex/busy traffic densities and/or the VFR pilot not calling for clearance until the boundary, would seem a small price to pay for ensuring everybody lives.
Compared to:
What happened within 4 weeks of your E airspace implementation!. Silently traversing in front of a B737 opposite direction, who thought the 737 would pass on the right, only then to pass on the left at close, close proximity. Passengers down one side of the 737 do not get to see a 4 seater that clearly unless is dangerously close!
Mr Smith, what cost will there be to the Industry both Commercial and GA of a YMLT type situation that results in a Mid-air collision?
What will happen when one of these airprox events that are inevitable is not just a near miss?
Mid-airs have occurred, and will continue to occur in your utopian US airspace system Class E, even though pilots do the correct things. Most reports from NTSB have a common theme: “the pilot failed to see and avoid”. The pilots failed to see and avoid, Hmmmm perhaps most of them should read something like: “The pilot had little opportunity to see, let alone avoid.”
· Do VFR pay less now than prior to Nov27 2003?
Most certainly they do because in many cases they are not forced to file an IFR flight plan (and pay enroute charges) to be guaranteed a prompt clearance through what was Class C airspace.
Most certainly they do because in many cases they are not forced to file an IFR flight plan (and pay enroute charges) to be guaranteed a prompt clearance through what was Class C airspace.
To the audience.... Am I wrong on this?
· Do VFR receive the same level of safety in Class E that was Class C prior to Nov 27 2003?
Probably a higher level now as they can track direct and they are not forced over tiger country in single engine aircraft – which often happened. I was recently speaking to a pilot of an aircraft who on numerous times overflying Hamilton Island was kept holding at the control zone boundary over water in a single engine aircraft. Now that aircraft can fly in Class E airspace at a higher level of safety.
Probably a higher level now as they can track direct and they are not forced over tiger country in single engine aircraft – which often happened. I was recently speaking to a pilot of an aircraft who on numerous times overflying Hamilton Island was kept holding at the control zone boundary over water in a single engine aircraft. Now that aircraft can fly in Class E airspace at a higher level of safety.
Tiger country, direct, ya mate you were talkin to the other day holding over water
Come on Smith, we are to take your word on this baseless waffle?, Nah, sorry, where is the evidence?.
The question as you well know because you continue to avoid it is “Un alerted see and avoid”
You know damn well that IFR no longer know about VFR in E, “Un-alerted see and avoid” which replaced separation services provided by ATC in C.
IT IS LESS SAFE, IMHO a lot less safe. Be a man and admit it, because nothing you say in denial of that fact gives you any legitimacy or credibility with those of us (most of the industry) who KNOW categorically that your AusNAS E is LESS SAFE THAN the C it replaced.
C dwongraded to E at huge cost for no apparent reason! GREAT REFORM!
· On what criteria did you decide that AusNAS was superior to the LLAMP?
It basically would have destroyed GA as we know it today in Australia – and it is already half destroyed.
It basically would have destroyed GA as we know it today in Australia – and it is already half destroyed.
Also, most importantly, LLAMP was a unique invention I have only ever supported proven systems.
I am very conservative when it comes to air safety. I like copying the success of others in everything in life.
· Did you set out the reason for your decision to progress your AusNAS to Minister Anderson?
First of all, it wasn’t just my decision, it was the unanimous decision of the Aviation Reform Group, who are all people of independent minds, views and expertise. People like Ted Anson (the Chairman of CASA at the time), who whilst not an aviator took extensive advice from people at CASA. The reasons were obvious. The LAMP system was invented and would have resulted in a system that was like nothing ever used anywhere else in the world before – even Australia. Whereas the NAS system was highly proven. Remember, the NAS plan was (and still is) to follow the US procedures that they use in radar airspace, and to follow the US procedures that they use in non-radar airspace.
First of all, it wasn’t just my decision, it was the unanimous decision of the Aviation Reform Group, who are all people of independent minds, views and expertise. People like Ted Anson (the Chairman of CASA at the time), who whilst not an aviator took extensive advice from people at CASA. The reasons were obvious. The LAMP system was invented and would have resulted in a system that was like nothing ever used anywhere else in the world before – even Australia. Whereas the NAS system was highly proven. Remember, the NAS plan was (and still is) to follow the US procedures that they use in radar airspace, and to follow the US procedures that they use in non-radar airspace.
· During face to face discussions (Jan 2004 YSTW tower) with controllers in the tower cab, and after explanation of the airspace specifics by those controllers did you agree that the terminal airspace above TW that was “C” should at the very least be class “D” below A065 (Outside RADAR coverage)?
No I did not.
No I did not.
How bout this:
After the AusNAS is safer routine blurb, and the showing off your US alphabet airspace pocket card. Much discussion and explanation of the TW specific airspace arrangements ensued, after which, did you state that the Tower E airspace was not as safe as that it replaced?
· Did you during that discussions sign a statement that said “RPT aircraft should have alerted see-and-avoid”? If so do you stand by that statement?
Yes, I certainly did sign that statement and that has always been a view of mine. Where I am different is that I am convinced from the evidence that our system did not provide an alerted see and avoid situation because a calling in the blind procedure resulted in many errors being made and therefore many unalerted see and avoid incidents. That is why I have worked constantly to have third party operators at non-tower airports.
Yes, I certainly did sign that statement and that has always been a view of mine. Where I am different is that I am convinced from the evidence that our system did not provide an alerted see and avoid situation because a calling in the blind procedure resulted in many errors being made and therefore many unalerted see and avoid incidents. That is why I have worked constantly to have third party operators at non-tower airports.
MBZ’s v’s your CTAF’s
Un-alerted see and avoid incidents eh. OK so what is your remedy!……..remove the mandatory broadcast requirement or MBZ, and replace it with CTAF (use it if ya got it, radio that is), threatening pilots with hefty fines is one thing, but to then say, o-well, if ya ain’t got a radio you can play as well?. That is allowing un-alerted see and avoid!
Inconsistent and contradictory!
If what you are trying to fix is inadvertent frequency error, make it compulsory to receive a ‘beep back’ specific to each MBZ or a response from another aircraft in the MBZ if the beep back is activity timed. God sakes, it is not that hard.
Oh yeh, I forgot it has to change name to be seen to be reforming something, doesn’t it
AusNAS Towered E (above D)
- No RADAR
- No VFR Broadcasts
Explain to me how that is ‘alerted see-and-avoid’.
- How are you ensuring VFR are monitoring the correct frequency (Tower)?
- How are the IFR’s and ATC supposed to know the VFR is lurking, by bloody Osmosis?
Inconsistent and contradictory!
Remind me again what it was you signed in the tower.......Oh Yeh "RPT should have alerted see and avoid"
What have I missed?...... Are you stroking your ego or something else or are you just taking the piss with peoples safety?
Part 2 of 2
· Do you believe Air traffic controllers can separate/segregate/initiate collision avoidance between 2 aircraft when only one or both may not be subject to clearance and therefore not under ‘control’ rules?
Yes, I believe an excellent safe service can be provided as this is what happens 365 days a year with 20 times the density of traffic in the USA.
Yes, I believe an excellent safe service can be provided as this is what happens 365 days a year with 20 times the density of traffic in the USA.
· Are you aware that ICAO provide for ATS ‘collision avoidance advice’ in classes C (VFR/VFR) and D (IFR/VFR) only?
This could well be so, but I’m not sure what it has to do with anything. I have found that ICAO is simply an organisation which takes most of its airspace advice from air traffic controllers who have a vested interest in the outcome of the regulation. ICAO also has some very strange rules in relation to airworthiness requirements and I have been told these are mainly in place for poor third world countries!
This could well be so, but I’m not sure what it has to do with anything. I have found that ICAO is simply an organisation which takes most of its airspace advice from air traffic controllers who have a vested interest in the outcome of the regulation. ICAO also has some very strange rules in relation to airworthiness requirements and I have been told these are mainly in place for poor third world countries!
ICAO is a mates network according to you, like every other organisation and agency you have crossed.
Are there any that are not?
· Do you expect Air Traffic Controllers to accept responsibility for ‘collision avoidance’ between IFR/VFR and VFR/VFR in classes E and G?
I believe it is a shared responsibility. I would be quite happy to follow the responsibility requirements that exist in the USA. After all, I’ve never yet heard from an American controller that their airspace gives unfair responsibility.
I believe it is a shared responsibility. I would be quite happy to follow the responsibility requirements that exist in the USA. After all, I’ve never yet heard from an American controller that their airspace gives unfair responsibility.
American pilots cannot distinguish classes of airspace in reality, that’s why American ATC’s effectively run radar D everywhere, but the VFR’s are not cleared, SO the ATC’s are expressly immune to blame or question if IFR/VFR or VFR/VFR swap paint!. Prove me wrong!
· Do you support the latest ‘VRA’ proposition in E areas above terminal areas?
No, I have no idea what it is.
No, I have no idea what it is.
Honestly.....What is the point of debating a loon!
Good day to you all
Last edited by Capcom; 17th Jun 2004 at 13:24.
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I do not believe for one second that pilots are flying VFR vice IFR so they can just traverse E over D without a supposed delay. IFR rated pilots are not that silly!, as to blast on through, oblivious of the collision risk.
And I sympathise with them, in much the same way as I sympathise with the poor bastards trying to make a training organisation pay its way when they are presented with a doubling, tripling, in some cases 20-fold increase in charges to pay for our services.
As ferris has pointed out on many occasions, it's the charging regime that needs to be savaged, not some fanciful attempt to pretend that VFR GA is saving money by the introduction of E airspace.
I think it's very sad that political ideology appears to have taken over the debate. A somebody who has spent a good percentage of time at Hamilton Island over the last 15 years, I find Dick Smith's insinuation of SE VFR aircraft being forced to hold over water, far from home, offensive in the extreme. Yes, VFR acft get moved out of the way of inbound IFR RPT. Should we divert the RPT?
Let me quote a fundamental rule of air traffic control for those too thick to have grasped it yet. It often happens that more than one aircraft wants to be in the same piece of airspace (eg, final for the duty runway) at the same time. ATC's job is to make sure that doesn't happen, and that means somebody is not going to get exactly what they want. Big deal. Grow up and look further than the extra mile and a half you are forced to travel.
Smith, you are a dangerous ideologue. I repeat that you stand condemned by every air traffic controller in Australia and a majority of airline pilots. Seek what support you may among your fellow private flyers, and I sincerely hope that your simplistic notions are never put to the ultimate test. If they are, I hope my family is not on board.
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I again ask that no unrelated posts are made to the Debate thread. One unrelated post is currently being moved to this thread.
Mr Dumsa's post will remain in the interests of fairness and in response to Dick Smith's allegation.
OverRun has suggested the many questions be summarised into a series of headers. Time precludes me doing that - at least during the week - so I asked OverRun to summarise the questions. His listing so far:
1. Was NAS model a joint Dick Smith/Qantas effort
2. ARG members safety qualifications?
3. ARG – NAS proposal had wrong reference system
4. ARG – its incorrect that no design safety case needed
5. ARG – where is study on acceptable safety risk levels?
6. Is DoT cost benefit study available?
7. Qualifications of person doing cost/benefit study for ARG?
8. Were $100+ million dollars spent on reform agenda?
9. Why was T&E for initial phases of NAS so poor?
10. Was most/all NAS material vetted by you?
11. Have FAA analysis methods been applied to NAS, to Broome study?
Perhaps OverRun could separate the listing into three lists:
For Dick Smith
For Voices of Reason
For Both
No assurance they will respond to individual questions, but it would give both an understanding of the issues of concern by PPRuNe users.
Woomera
Mr Dumsa's post will remain in the interests of fairness and in response to Dick Smith's allegation.
OverRun has suggested the many questions be summarised into a series of headers. Time precludes me doing that - at least during the week - so I asked OverRun to summarise the questions. His listing so far:
1. Was NAS model a joint Dick Smith/Qantas effort
2. ARG members safety qualifications?
3. ARG – NAS proposal had wrong reference system
4. ARG – its incorrect that no design safety case needed
5. ARG – where is study on acceptable safety risk levels?
6. Is DoT cost benefit study available?
7. Qualifications of person doing cost/benefit study for ARG?
8. Were $100+ million dollars spent on reform agenda?
9. Why was T&E for initial phases of NAS so poor?
10. Was most/all NAS material vetted by you?
11. Have FAA analysis methods been applied to NAS, to Broome study?
Perhaps OverRun could separate the listing into three lists:
For Dick Smith
For Voices of Reason
For Both
No assurance they will respond to individual questions, but it would give both an understanding of the issues of concern by PPRuNe users.
Woomera
Last edited by Woomera; 18th Jun 2004 at 03:10.
Four Seven Eleven, you state:
Can you tell me the particular question you would like me to answer? I will answer it promptly.
Why do you still not have the courage to answer your own thread about the Brisbane Virgin incident? What are you afraid of?
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Binoculars
I understand what you say. I was not aware the costs were having such a dramatic effect. Tis not as visible here, I am sure you can imagine why!.
This whole mess is an appauling double edge sword for the struggling industry, is it not.
His meddling has meant charges going through the roof (Full cost recovery; Pay our own way have our own say) for IFR, creating the cost pressures you accurately describe that have an effect on safety by creating a negative incentive to fly VFR when normally they would not.
It is not quite as obvious yet from our neck of the woods, but given the circumstances that prevail, I guess it is only a matter of time.
Concur, Concur. What a sad, sad state of affairs.
Viva la revolution
I understand what you say. I was not aware the costs were having such a dramatic effect. Tis not as visible here, I am sure you can imagine why!.
This whole mess is an appauling double edge sword for the struggling industry, is it not.
His meddling has meant charges going through the roof (Full cost recovery; Pay our own way have our own say) for IFR, creating the cost pressures you accurately describe that have an effect on safety by creating a negative incentive to fly VFR when normally they would not.
It is not quite as obvious yet from our neck of the woods, but given the circumstances that prevail, I guess it is only a matter of time.
Concur, Concur. What a sad, sad state of affairs.
Viva la revolution
Dick,
On June 4 I quoted you and asked you some questions. When you get a chance, can you please answer the questions I posed.
Questions:
1. Could you please elaborate on what you believe to be the correct establishment formula study?
2. From what I have heard, establishment/disestablishment hinges on the figure used for loss of life. What loss of life figure are you suggesting should be used?
On June 4 I quoted you and asked you some questions. When you get a chance, can you please answer the questions I posed.
At the present time Airservices is not instigating the correct establishment formula study because they know that the loss they will make will be reflected in their figures and the take home pay of their top management group.
Questions:
1. Could you please elaborate on what you believe to be the correct establishment formula study?
2. From what I have heard, establishment/disestablishment hinges on the figure used for loss of life. What loss of life figure are you suggesting should be used?
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Dick, you have stated your dislike to Llamp and that it was a totally new unproven system.
I disagree, Llamp was very similar to the proposed new European system of "Known and Unknown" airspace. The result was very similar even though they came form totally different operational requirments.
As for it being unproven, the main element in Llamp was the DAF, just think "Big CTAF". Since they have been introduced, no, I repeat NO saftey incidents have taken place within these areas relating to traffic conflicts. They work, and you want to get rid of a PROVEN SAFE system.
Sometimes one has to be a leader, not a follower.
You also state that Llamp wanted to abolish DTI in "G", well so does AUSNAS!
quote: NASIG
"E" airspace Stage 3 (third phase)
23. Class E terminal airspace will be introduced at two specific locations.
24. Pop-up clearance (en-route VFR upgrading to IFR rules) procedures introduced.
25. Introduce low level Class E corridors, where required, above 1200FT AGL and above A085.
26. E corridors, where implemented, will be designed to a GPS cross track error dimension.
27. An on-request radar flight following service for VFR aircraft will be available on a sector specific and workload-permitting basis.
"G" airspace Stage 3 (third phase)
30. Directed traffic information services for en-route IFR aircraft will be withdrawn.
31. A radio frequency will be allocated for IFR pilot to pilot communication.
32. A directed traffic information service will be provided for IFR aircraft on other IFR aircraft in terminal areas, with published instrument approach procedures.
end quote
So we end up with lower "E" in non radar Australia (MORE ATC), NO DTI, NO Radio requirment, all for REDUCED COST?
We will have more ATC to control "E", so where is the cost saving. This will really boost the bonusus for the hated ones and it will be provided by you! How can you sleep at night?
Another Point.
During the last round of RAPAC's this month, ASA outlined the stage 2b class "E" fix with an "Industry" proposal".
This INDUSTRY proposal was QF, VB, AOPA and Gliders. No regionals, Charter organisations, Flying Schools, Aeroclubs etc.
Interestingly, AOPA and Gliders have acknowledged the need to use a radio, the one and only thing that stopped Llamp was their refusal to do so.
So we will have enroute "E", "E-R" (R for VFR Radio) for "E" over "D", CTAF, CTAF-M for mandatory radio (think MBZ - letter from CEO CASA to ASA).
This model will be the "CHOSEN ONE", as one cannot go against QF, AOPA and Gliders, so the poor VFR sucker will be even more confused than he is now.
IT IS TIME TO STOP BEFORE SOMEONE IS KILLED WHILST ROME BURNS
PS. AD "Just Do It"
I disagree, Llamp was very similar to the proposed new European system of "Known and Unknown" airspace. The result was very similar even though they came form totally different operational requirments.
As for it being unproven, the main element in Llamp was the DAF, just think "Big CTAF". Since they have been introduced, no, I repeat NO saftey incidents have taken place within these areas relating to traffic conflicts. They work, and you want to get rid of a PROVEN SAFE system.
Sometimes one has to be a leader, not a follower.
You also state that Llamp wanted to abolish DTI in "G", well so does AUSNAS!
quote: NASIG
"E" airspace Stage 3 (third phase)
23. Class E terminal airspace will be introduced at two specific locations.
24. Pop-up clearance (en-route VFR upgrading to IFR rules) procedures introduced.
25. Introduce low level Class E corridors, where required, above 1200FT AGL and above A085.
26. E corridors, where implemented, will be designed to a GPS cross track error dimension.
27. An on-request radar flight following service for VFR aircraft will be available on a sector specific and workload-permitting basis.
"G" airspace Stage 3 (third phase)
30. Directed traffic information services for en-route IFR aircraft will be withdrawn.
31. A radio frequency will be allocated for IFR pilot to pilot communication.
32. A directed traffic information service will be provided for IFR aircraft on other IFR aircraft in terminal areas, with published instrument approach procedures.
end quote
So we end up with lower "E" in non radar Australia (MORE ATC), NO DTI, NO Radio requirment, all for REDUCED COST?
We will have more ATC to control "E", so where is the cost saving. This will really boost the bonusus for the hated ones and it will be provided by you! How can you sleep at night?
Another Point.
During the last round of RAPAC's this month, ASA outlined the stage 2b class "E" fix with an "Industry" proposal".
This INDUSTRY proposal was QF, VB, AOPA and Gliders. No regionals, Charter organisations, Flying Schools, Aeroclubs etc.
Interestingly, AOPA and Gliders have acknowledged the need to use a radio, the one and only thing that stopped Llamp was their refusal to do so.
So we will have enroute "E", "E-R" (R for VFR Radio) for "E" over "D", CTAF, CTAF-M for mandatory radio (think MBZ - letter from CEO CASA to ASA).
This model will be the "CHOSEN ONE", as one cannot go against QF, AOPA and Gliders, so the poor VFR sucker will be even more confused than he is now.
IT IS TIME TO STOP BEFORE SOMEONE IS KILLED WHILST ROME BURNS
PS. AD "Just Do It"
I notice a common thread in DHs' (oops sorry) DSs' arguments...
4 seven 11 MUST have been an ASA manager on a bonus, and VOR MUST be an ex ASA Gm. Why? Because they consistently make intelligent points which show up the farcical nature of the whole NAS process.
Anyone dissagreeing with the master MUST have a vested interest...right?
4 seven 11 MUST have been an ASA manager on a bonus, and VOR MUST be an ex ASA Gm. Why? Because they consistently make intelligent points which show up the farcical nature of the whole NAS process.
Anyone dissagreeing with the master MUST have a vested interest...right?