Jetstar take-off blooper
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Jetstar take-off blooper
Found this on the ATSB website. From memory a National Jet BAe-146 crew did something similar out of Cairns a few years ago.
FACTUAL INFORMATION
The Boeing 717 aircraft was departing Melbourne for Coolangatta on a regular public transport service. Following a normal take-off the pilot in command (PIC), the handling pilot, called for the landing gear to be retracted. A short time later, he noticed an amber warning appear on the airspeed scale on his primary flight display (PFD) screen. The PIC immediately reduced the aircraft pitch attitude in response to that warning. At about the same time, he noticed that the flaps/slats lever was at the `slats retract' position. The PIC immediately called for the flaps to be re-positioned, but the copilot selected the landing gear up. The PIC again called for the flaps to be re-positioned and the copilot then returned the flap selector to the take-off position. The PIC reduced the pitch attitude further. The airspeed then quickly increased to 15 knots above the reference speed (Vref) as the flaps reached the take-off position. The PIC re-established the normal climb attitude and the flaps and slats were subsequently retracted in accordance with the normal profile. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. Both the PIC and the copilot believed that the stick shaker had activated momentarily during the sequence.
Examination of the flight data recorder from the aircraft revealed the following:
Three seconds after the aircraft became airborne, and at about 30 ft above ground level, the flaps/slats lever was moved from the take-off position and the flaps began to retract.
One second later, as the flaps/slats lever reached the retract position, the stick shaker warning commenced. At that time the aircraft pitch angle was 18.6 degrees and the computed airspeed was 157 kts. Over the next three seconds, the stick shaker warning continued and the aircraft pitch angle reduced to 10.2 degrees. A second later the landing gear handle was recorded in the up position.
The flaps/slats lever began to move from the retracted position about one second after the landing gear handle reached the up position. The flaps reached the fully retracted position less than two seconds later, before immediately beginning to extend again. The slats began to retract but did not reach the fully retracted position before moving back to the extended position. The flaps/slats movement was accompanied by a very brief reactivation of the stick shaker and a further reduction in aircraft pitch angle to about 6 degrees. Computed airspeed at that time was 165 kts. The aircraft then began to accelerate and quickly returned to a normal climb profile.
One altitude loss of 5 feet, and lasting less than three seconds, coincided with the reduction in pitch angle that was made in response to the second stick shaker activation. At that time the aircraft was more than 240 ft above ground level. There was no altitude loss associated with the first stick shaker activation.
Interviews with the PIC and copilot did not reveal any obvious issue that might have led to the copilot retracting the flaps/slats instead of the landing gear. His work schedule, recent life history, and activities leading up to the occurrence were unremarkable. Against that background, the actions of the copilot appear to have been an `action slip', a type of procedural error associated with two actions (landing gear and flaps/slats retraction) that are sequentially linked. As was the case here, in human behaviour there can sometimes be a `spill-over' that triggers the associated action at an inappropriate time.
In this occurrence, by reducing the aircraft pitch angle, the PIC responded appropriately and very rapidly to the `amber foot' warning that appeared on the speed tape as soon as the flaps/slats lever was moved from the take-off position. As a result, the aircraft moved from a deteriorating and potentially unsafe flight performance regime to a safe one.
Anecdotal evidence was received early in the investigation that there may have been other inappropriate/inadvertent flap/slat selections in B717 aircraft. As a result, and in cooperation with the operator, a survey was issued to company pilots who flew the aircraft. The survey revealed three other instances of the flap/slats lever being moved through the flaps zero position to the slats retract position. However, all those events occurred above 3,000 feet altitude during initial `clean-up' flap retraction after take-off and the error was recognised and corrected on each occasion. None was associated with landing gear selection after take-off.
FACTUAL INFORMATION
The Boeing 717 aircraft was departing Melbourne for Coolangatta on a regular public transport service. Following a normal take-off the pilot in command (PIC), the handling pilot, called for the landing gear to be retracted. A short time later, he noticed an amber warning appear on the airspeed scale on his primary flight display (PFD) screen. The PIC immediately reduced the aircraft pitch attitude in response to that warning. At about the same time, he noticed that the flaps/slats lever was at the `slats retract' position. The PIC immediately called for the flaps to be re-positioned, but the copilot selected the landing gear up. The PIC again called for the flaps to be re-positioned and the copilot then returned the flap selector to the take-off position. The PIC reduced the pitch attitude further. The airspeed then quickly increased to 15 knots above the reference speed (Vref) as the flaps reached the take-off position. The PIC re-established the normal climb attitude and the flaps and slats were subsequently retracted in accordance with the normal profile. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. Both the PIC and the copilot believed that the stick shaker had activated momentarily during the sequence.
Examination of the flight data recorder from the aircraft revealed the following:
Three seconds after the aircraft became airborne, and at about 30 ft above ground level, the flaps/slats lever was moved from the take-off position and the flaps began to retract.
One second later, as the flaps/slats lever reached the retract position, the stick shaker warning commenced. At that time the aircraft pitch angle was 18.6 degrees and the computed airspeed was 157 kts. Over the next three seconds, the stick shaker warning continued and the aircraft pitch angle reduced to 10.2 degrees. A second later the landing gear handle was recorded in the up position.
The flaps/slats lever began to move from the retracted position about one second after the landing gear handle reached the up position. The flaps reached the fully retracted position less than two seconds later, before immediately beginning to extend again. The slats began to retract but did not reach the fully retracted position before moving back to the extended position. The flaps/slats movement was accompanied by a very brief reactivation of the stick shaker and a further reduction in aircraft pitch angle to about 6 degrees. Computed airspeed at that time was 165 kts. The aircraft then began to accelerate and quickly returned to a normal climb profile.
One altitude loss of 5 feet, and lasting less than three seconds, coincided with the reduction in pitch angle that was made in response to the second stick shaker activation. At that time the aircraft was more than 240 ft above ground level. There was no altitude loss associated with the first stick shaker activation.
Interviews with the PIC and copilot did not reveal any obvious issue that might have led to the copilot retracting the flaps/slats instead of the landing gear. His work schedule, recent life history, and activities leading up to the occurrence were unremarkable. Against that background, the actions of the copilot appear to have been an `action slip', a type of procedural error associated with two actions (landing gear and flaps/slats retraction) that are sequentially linked. As was the case here, in human behaviour there can sometimes be a `spill-over' that triggers the associated action at an inappropriate time.
In this occurrence, by reducing the aircraft pitch angle, the PIC responded appropriately and very rapidly to the `amber foot' warning that appeared on the speed tape as soon as the flaps/slats lever was moved from the take-off position. As a result, the aircraft moved from a deteriorating and potentially unsafe flight performance regime to a safe one.
Anecdotal evidence was received early in the investigation that there may have been other inappropriate/inadvertent flap/slat selections in B717 aircraft. As a result, and in cooperation with the operator, a survey was issued to company pilots who flew the aircraft. The survey revealed three other instances of the flap/slats lever being moved through the flaps zero position to the slats retract position. However, all those events occurred above 3,000 feet altitude during initial `clean-up' flap retraction after take-off and the error was recognised and corrected on each occasion. None was associated with landing gear selection after take-off.
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Correction - It was an Impulse/QantasLink takeoff blooper!
Also I think it has been discussed here before.
Not good though. I think it has happened more than once. Is it something to do with the layout of the levers? Or is it because due to the pilots pay rates? (Sorry being sarcastic. Just had to mention it before some grudge bearer thought they were being clever
)
Also I think it has been discussed here before.
Not good though. I think it has happened more than once. Is it something to do with the layout of the levers? Or is it because due to the pilots pay rates? (Sorry being sarcastic. Just had to mention it before some grudge bearer thought they were being clever
)
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Yes. But the report didn't say that those inadvertant slat/flap selections happened at 'gear up' (unless sometimes the gear goes up at 3000 ft?!). That's what I was referring to. (We "dollies" can sometimes read lots without many pictures.)
My point was I think it has happened at take off more than once. Dunno.
My point was I think it has happened at take off more than once. Dunno.
Last edited by ditzyboy; 3rd Jun 2004 at 10:16.
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Ditzy, regardless of the company name, the crew and aircraft remains the same. It's all semantics.
Having said that, it could have happened to anyone, regardless of who they work for. They weren't the first, and probably won't be the last.
I didn't think that under normal operating conditions the slats were independently selectable of the flaps, but I'll stand to be corrected.
There is an enormous range of factors which can cause such things to occur. Somebody else can start a list........or you can go to the ATSB website...
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It's better to die on your feet than to live on your knees.
Having said that, it could have happened to anyone, regardless of who they work for. They weren't the first, and probably won't be the last.
But the report didn't say that those inadvertant slat selections happened at 'gear up' (unless sometimes the gear goes up at 3000 ft?!).
There is an enormous range of factors which can cause such things to occur. Somebody else can start a list........or you can go to the ATSB website...
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It's better to die on your feet than to live on your knees.
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Hugh
I believe the noise 2 engine acceleration height for noise abatement is 3000ft. It is possible to retract the flaps and slats in 1 go. However you have to lift the flap lever over a detent. It can be done but rquires a little bit of extra effort.
I believe the noise 2 engine acceleration height for noise abatement is 3000ft. It is possible to retract the flaps and slats in 1 go. However you have to lift the flap lever over a detent. It can be done but rquires a little bit of extra effort.
Chuck,
I repeat, unlike the "Full Price" product who park big jets on golf courses, not to mention taking off with no primary flight instruments (Duh...I'm sure the IRSs will align themselves soon!!).
Got at least as much to do with egos and arrogance as it does with the pay-packet.
I repeat, unlike the "Full Price" product who park big jets on golf courses, not to mention taking off with no primary flight instruments (Duh...I'm sure the IRSs will align themselves soon!!).
Got at least as much to do with egos and arrogance as it does with the pay-packet.
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While we are comparing apples to apples lets also remember how many more a/c QF has compared to the pulse (or whatever their name is today...), how long they have been flying as an airline and i'd also like to compare a/c utilisation.
It seems that there is 717's sitting around everywhere!
Disclaimer: There but for the grace of god go I.
It seems that there is 717's sitting around everywhere!
Disclaimer: There but for the grace of god go I.
While we're at it Wiz, what about fogetting to check "all greens" when landing the new international flagship...?
It seems that no one is immune to mistakes...
It seems that no one is immune to mistakes...
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Have intentionally done the same thing in the sim - operationally it's almost a non-event. Certainly doesn't compare to the sneaky 'inadvertant thrust reverser deployment' at Vr
PS is it at all possible to run a JQ thread without the 'I can piss further than you' sandpit mentality? Stupid question I guess, both sides could do with a nice cup of shut the @#$% up. Have a look at yourselves...
PS is it at all possible to run a JQ thread without the 'I can piss further than you' sandpit mentality? Stupid question I guess, both sides could do with a nice cup of shut the @#$% up. Have a look at yourselves...
Bottums Up
If you trawl through the ATSB accident/incident reports you'll find that QF mainline have done the same thing. True. Ex CG I think, in a 737.
So even when you don't pay peanuts, you still get monkeys!
So even when you don't pay peanuts, you still get monkeys!
