NAS on the 730 report Tonight (Wed)

[twodogsflying]

Wow Dick, good post!!!!!

The only people who have this ability to bring in cultural change are the people who are in positions of authority.

Hitler, Amin, Osama, Smith? come to mind.

No Dick, we live in a democracy, only the military in our "Culture" have the luxury of only doing as they are told without question.

One cannot change "Culture" over night. The difference between us is simple.

An American has a regulation, they will ask "How do I comply?"

An Australian has the same regulation, the aussie will ask, "How do I get around it?"

This is ingrained from childhood and will take a number of generations, if at all to change.

Please, if you like the US so much, feel free to move there, or is being a Big Fish in a Small Pond more to your liking?

[Lodown]

Dick,

You're condemning your NAS with your own words:

Of course, in a vacuum, you end up with a situation where the least informed “fundamentalists” communicate their fears of change and dictate the agenda.

And you class yourself with your NAS agenda as...?

They [design safety cases] are all based on subjective opinion from people who have made up their minds

And NAS is based on...?

There's a saying that goes something like, "Be careful pointing a finger because there are three fingers pointing back at you."

Virtually every controller came up with ideas on how we could make improvements in Australia. I don’t believe any of these ideas have ever been introduced.

As you would be aware, coming up with ideas is not hard. Evaluating those ideas and implementing the best ideas to get the most benefits is the difficult part. What was done to establish the groundwork for ideas evaluation and implementation teams? What tools were provided to people for evaluation and implementation? Without these functions and resources, ideas stay just ideas.

[Four Seven Eleven]

triadic, I couldn’t agree with you more in relation to the US culture compared to the Australian culture. I’ve been talking about it for over 10 years. When I was Chairman of CAA I arranged a program where Australian controllers regularly visited the USA and many came back to Australia and wrote positive reports. I’ve still got copies of those reports – they are excellent. Virtually every controller came up with ideas on how we could make improvements in Australia. I don’t believe any of these ideas have ever been introduced.

Whilst I cannot comment specifically upon the content of those controller reports, I do know that Australia has changed a lot over the last ten years. Much of the change has been positive, in terms of safety and economics. The introduction of RNAV separation standards, GPS standards, reduced oceanic time standards, integration of ATC and FS into TAAATS, etc were all Australian initiatives, often uniquely Australian.

Having said that, more change is required and is inevitable. The industry will need to recover from the current debacle before meaningful change can be effected, but those players who survive this low point will no doubt take up the challenge. It is just a shame that so much money is being wasted on political recklessness.

You do not seem to understand that I am not in a position of authority.
The only people who have this ability to bring in cultural change are the people who are in positions of authority.

This displays a remarkable lack of understanding of what culture (and more specifically safety culture) is all about. Your idea that culture is only changed from the top down is one of the notable flaws in the way NAS has been introduced. Your lack of understanding about safety management, change management, safety culture etc. combined with your undoubted political influence, are one of the greatest dangers to aviation safety and the viability of the aviation sector in Australia today.

You asked the question in another thread about why Class E apparently works in the US but has been a ‘horrific’ failure here. To this point, you have not had the courage to respond to you thread, nor to my later thread asking you to do so. Instead, you resorted once again to a typical Dick Smith tactic: you ignored the safety issue and made up a lie about the identity of the person asking the question. Whilst that distraction diverts some attention away from safety, most people here recognise it for what it is and realise that you are fast running out of answers to justify your dangerous debacle.

If you have any integrity left, or wish to restore any credibility in the safety debate, I once again challenge you to respond to your own thread –or do you lack the answers and the courage to do so?

Unfortunately there seem to be none who have the courage and leadership abilities to accept that a Government has the right to set policy and then expect that the policy will be followed.

Yes, there was a failure of ‘corporate governance.’ Airservices senior management have acknowledged that if proper policy (and legislation) had been followed, the NAS2B changes should not have gone ahead on 27 November 2003. The cost to at least one board member (John Forsyth) is already apparent.

The management of both Airservices and CASA have done everything they can to undermine the Government’s decision to move to the NAS.

And I suppose you have evidence of this? Or is this 'fact' like all of your other statements?

I point out that I was in a position of authority when we introduced the AMATS changes. There was resistance to change, however I made sure competent experts were employed. When you consider it is the airspace we have been flying in for the last 13 years with very high levels of safety, and it has now been generally accepted. It shows it was a competent process.

I will not start another argument here about the safety or otherwise of the pre-NAS2B system. I will take you to task on your statement that “ it has now been generally accepted. It shows it was a competent process..” It shows no such thing. What it shows is that there have been few adverse consequences to this date. If that is the extent of your understanding of what constitutes evidence of a ‘competent process’ then it is no wonder that Australian air safety is in the parlous state it is.

It is simple. You can’t blame me as I have no position of authority and most advice I give to those who do have a position of authority is ignored.

If you can’t be held accountable, and you have no authority, then what are my tax dollars paying you for? You have enough of your own money; stop taking the tax-payers’ money if you are unwilling to accept the responsibility that comes with it.

From my experience, the management in Airservices and CASA are so insecure with their leadership abilities they are simply not prepared to copy the world’s best practice.

So exactly when was a modified version of the US system suddenly accepted as ‘world’s best practice”? Without wishing to defend Airservices and CASA management unduly, perhaps they are indeed looking for the best practice, incorporating all of the world’s experience and expertise with a bit of locally produced know-how. A ‘cut-and-paste’ of the North-American/hybrid/US system, without a basic understanding of the culture and experience that makes it work, is not ‘leadership’. It is dangerous folly.

For example, you may know that I have worked for three years to attempt to get US experts out to help with the cultural and training issues. Both CASA and Airservices have done everything they can to make sure this does not happen. Basically the management’s view is “it wasn’t built here”.

And I suppose you have evidence of this?

A good example of not asking advice is the most ridiculous “design safety cases” which are now taking place at Airservices. They are all based on subjective opinion from people who have made up their minds – just like the Broome study. Andrew Fleming, General Manager Air Traffic Management, was surprised that the USA could not supply a design safety case for their Class E airspace. The facts are simple. The airspace in the USA, including Class E, has evolved over 100 years of experience. You only need a design safety case if you are inventing something. The reason I have always pushed for copying proven systems is that you can readily obtain objective evidence on the safety result you will achieve.

Very few people would argue with the basic premise that copying a proven system is a valid response to a demonstrated need. However, NAS implementation has led to ‘horrific’ consequences precisely because of the way that political interference has caused what should have been a sound plan to be rushed, steps to be ignored and dangerous practices to be introduced.

1. The US system has indeed evolved over some time. 100 years is somewhat exaggerated, but we will forgive the hyperbole in this case.
2. Similarly, the Boeing 747 aircraft has evolved over a number of years.
3. It is axiomatic that any airline with a certain level of experience and infrastructure should be able to adopt this ‘proven’ aircraft, with little difficulty.
4. You make the point that a country should be able to adopt a proven airspace system with little difficulty.
5. Ansett, an airline with considerable experience attempted to introduce the B743, with specularly unsuccessful results some years ago.
6. Australia, a country with considerable experience, attempted to adopt a modified US style system, with spectacularly ‘horrific’ results last year.
7. The two experiences have many parallels, and the lessons should be learned now.
What are the similarities?
· In both cases, it was accepted that there should be no problems introducing the new system.
· In both cases, there were significant external pressures, which imposed an unrealistic time frame upon implementation. In Ansett’s case, commercial/political pressures dictated a specific ‘first flight date. In AusNAS’s case, the political pressure imposed largely by you led to unrealistic start dates for an immature and untested system.
· The very fact that the US system has ‘evolved’ is one of the prime safety mitigators in that system. Just as the system evolved, so did the culture. You deliberately removed that safety opportunity from AusNAS, expecting a new system to work without the requisite culture, knowledge, experience and procedures.
· In the case of Ansett, their procedures, documentation and training were cobbled together, with flight crews using different versions of operating manuals. In the flight deck, the experience gradient was extremely steep, leading to a serious break-down of CRM and the command structure. In normal circumstances (and with the benefit of hind-sight), the decision by a B743 crew to continue and approach and landing after a ‘four-greens’ call seems astonishing. It is only explicable when one considers what went before.
· In the thread in which you asked the question ‘what are the facts’ and in your defamatory remarks about the pilots and air traffic controllers in the Brisbane incident similar parallels are apparent. Your introduction of some parts of the US system without any of the safety mitigators led to a situation in which neither the controllers or either aircrew were able to prevent the incident. Eventually, it was only by falling back on known procedures (TCAS is one example) that an accident was avoided.
· Perhaps tellingly, in the Ansett case there were examples of procedures which were not followed by the aircrew. In the AusNAS case, it is important to realise that all parties followed the procedures introduced by AusNAS, but that these procedures were not enough to prevent the ‘horrific’ incident. That is one of the major failings of AusNAS. If you follow the procedures, it will still go wrong.

At Airservices, the management gives no leadership at all in relation to the change process. Of course, in a vacuum, you end up with a situation where the least informed “fundamentalists” communicate their fears of change and dictate the agenda.

Unfortunately, this lack of leadership extends to the highest levels. The reasons why the Minister appointed someone ‘who no-one takes seriously on aviation except Dick Smith himself” are not yet apparent. The results of appointing you, an ill-informed fundamentalist, are becoming starkly and frighteningly clear. We have now had four high profile and more lesser known incidents, directly as a result of the failed implementation of AusNAS.

The fact that the US system was inexpertly copied, without recognition of the safety mitigators which were omitted has been a direct causal factor in the reduced levels of safety in the Australian airspace system.

The fact that systems have been introduced without proper safety analysis is another.

The fact that the truth became such an early casualty of your crusade, with you spreading lies in the public arena, has meant that rectification of the safety flaws has been delayed.

The expected, but inexcusable, unwillingness of the minister to acknowledge the dangers in the new system is leading to delays in restoring air safety in Australia. One of the unfortunate characteristics of politics in Australia is that politicians who admit a mistake are hung out to dry by both the political system and by the media. The minister, having caved into political pressure at the last election, must be questioning the wisdom of that decision now.

[Capcom]

Creampuff and 4711

Poignant exposé

Will R.H.Smith reply?

Nah, probably not, far too busy in the Ministers office.....

Or;

Perhaps he is learning about safety management.....


When ALL ELSE FAILS.............. ......... ........... ................




AusNAS

[PGH]

Where would you copy a model for adopting World's Best Practice in seeking political favours for you pet project - would it be the good ol' USA? Is it from there that RHS imported the practice where any honourable or dishonourable backer with enough $$ can earn favour from politicians - especially with those politicians frightened of a bad result at the polls! Why wouldn't current discusions surround how much $$ might be needed to sure up support in an electrate while making make sure RHS remains the white knight of aviation in OZ.