What Price Safety?
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What Price Safety?
Reprint from today’s Washington Post. Though airline focused, it might well be applied to your airspace debate. We note the use of a “per ticket cost” as was used in the Broome Study.
Airline Safety Costs a) Billions or b) Pennies. Answer Below
By David Evans
Sunday, April 4, 2004; Page B05
You hear it all the time at airline industry meetings: "If you think safety is expensive, try an accident."
Still, how one views the relative cost of airline safety -- and whether it becomes a reason to delay making improvements -- depends an awful lot on how that cost is calculated. Too often, the cost is determined through negotiations between the industry and the agency responsible for ordering improvements, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The FAA's standard method is to assess the total cost to the industry of a particular safety initiative. The resulting figures typically run into the millions or even billions of dollars -- a sure way to delay action.
I have observed air safety deliberations for nearly 10 years, and I think it's time to change the current cost-benefit approach. Discussing the cost of safety improvements in terms of the price per ticket, rather than the overall cost, would make it easier for the FAA to make the necessary fixes.
Often, the per-ticket price works out to a few dollars -- or less.
Taking this approach would help change the industry reaction from "we can't" to "why can't we?"
Besides, all costs ultimately are passed on to passengers, who have no way of knowing that a small increase in the price per ticket would dramatically improve their chances of remaining safe in flight. I'm guessing that if they did know, most would happily pay.
Instead, there's a kind of paralysis in the industry. Safety deficiencies recognized by the FAA persist for years, unnecessarily increasing the risk to air crews and the flying public.
This is precisely the case regarding three major threats to safe flight: smoke, fire and explosion. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which investigates all major accidents in the United States, has recommended that action be taken in all three areas.
For example, eliminating explosive vapors in fuel tanks has been on the NTSB's "Most Wanted" list of aviation safety improvements since May 1997.
That recommendation emerged from the investigation into the fatal July 1996 center fuel tank explosion of TWA Flight 800 over Long Island Sound, which killed all 230 aboard. A joint government-industry task force convened by the FAA said in 1998 that if nothing were done, fuel tank explosions would continue to occur at an average rate of one every 41/2 years. Almost on schedule, a tank exploded on a Thai Airways jet in Bangkok in 2001.
Fortunately, the airplane was on the ground, and only one crew member was killed. Unfortunately, the FAA panel had said, in effect, that eliminating explosive vapors in the fuel tanks would be too expensive.
Another example: Last month, U.S. carriers reported six flights with smoke in the cabin or cockpit. In each case, pilots were forced to make emergency landings. After the 1996 crash of ValuJet Flight 592 into the Everglades, the NTSB had urged the FAA to evaluate emergency vision equipment that would enable pilots to see their instruments and out the windscreen even in a smoke-filled cockpit. The FAA still has not responded to the recommendation with regulatory action.
Now consider the cargo holds in smaller jets, such as the popular Boeing 737 and DC-9. For years, these holds were not required to have an active means of detecting smoke or fire or of spraying a fire-suppressing chemical.
Cheaper fire liners were installed instead. The airlines and the manufacturers argued that, at a cost of more than $300 million to equip all the jets in service, fire protection equipment was too expensive. Then the ValuJet DC-9 crashed because of a raging fire in its forward belly hold, killing all 110 people aboard.
Using the FAA's standard $2.8 million statistical value of a life, this one accident cost more than $300 million, not including the cost of the plane. As a result of the crash, the FAA ordered fleetwide installation of fire protection equipment. The industry mobilized. The job was done in three years -- at a cost that was less than expected.
The ValuJet crash shows the folly of waiting for an accident to justify action. U.S. airlines racked up 52 accidents in 2003, an average of one per week, according to statistics published on March 22 by the NTSB. Twenty-two people were killed in two of those accidents.
To be sure, more people were killed on U.S. carriers in 1996 (342). But with an airline industry still hobbling after 9/11, the 2003 accident rate is the highest posted by the NTSB since 1984: about one accident for every 200,000 departures, or one for every 320,000 flying hours, on average.
With that in mind, let's consider the cost per ticket of addressing some of the major threats posed by smoke, fire and explosion.
• Blinding smoke: In-flight fires have led to the catastrophic crashes of planes whose pilots couldn't maneuver simply because they could not see through the smoke. In a March 15 letter to the FAA, Nick Lacey, former FAA director of flight standards, warned about the danger of fire during a transoceanic flight, which might be hours from the nearest airport.
"Current flight deck smoke masks do not provide the ability for the pilots to see their checklists or fundamental flight instruments in the presence of dense and continuous smoke."
I've seen too many post-crash accident reports that read, "Cockpit voice recorder indicates crew unable to see instruments due to smoke." The doomed ValuJet pilots reported smoke in the cockpit.
The 1970 crash of a Swissair jet is particularly poignant. "We have fire on board," the pilots radioed, asking ground control for landing help. "I can't see anything." Twenty seconds later: "Goodbye, everybody." Investigators concluded that the otherwise flyable aircraft overshot the Zurich airport while attempting to land.
In 1993 the crew of another Swissair jet with smoke in the cockpit resorted to flapping an emergency checklist booklet back and forth to see their instruments. Unable to see anything outside the airplane during landing, the captain came to a screeching halt on a Munich runway, averting disaster.
German investigators later recommended the use of an "inflatable view channel between the crew, their instruments and the cockpit windows."
Indeed, this inflatable channel has been deployed as emergency equipment on hundreds of corporate and military aircraft worldwide. And, most telling of all, the FAA has committed to installing such equipment on its own dozens of aircraft, but it has not ordered that airlines do the same. The equipment would cost 2 or 3 cents per ticket, according to passenger advocacy groups using data supplied by the manufacturer.
• Fire: One of the biggest challenges to in-flight safety is fire in concealed spaces. Case in point: an American Airlines DC-9 that was struck by lightning on Nov. 29, 2000, while climbing out of Washington's Reagan National Airport.
The energy from the lightning bolt entered the tail cone, traveled up wires located above the overhead bins, arced in the forward area of the cabin and started a small fire between the cabin sidewall panel and the outer aluminum skin of the airplane. A flight attendant borrowed a penknife from a passenger and cut a hole through the plastic wall, into which the flight attendant was able to insert the nozzle of a portable extinguisher and douse the fire while the pilots made an emergency landing at Dulles.
As a result of this and similar incidents, the NTSB has called for improved in-flight firefighting capability in the cabin, the cockpit and inaccessible spaces.
The Fast-Port apertures offered by a small company in New York were designed specifically for aviation applications. Cost per ticket: less than 1 cent to have six of them placed strategically about the cabin. Keep in mind that in this post-9/11 era, the crash axe stored in the cockpit must remain in the cockpit, and passengers no longer have penknives on board.
• Exploding fuel tanks: After the TWA disaster, the NTSB challenged the industry's fuel system design practices. The chief designers of the fuel tanks said repeatedly in meetings that they designed the electrical fuel systems to minimize the number of heat sources that could ignite the vapors. NTSB investigators rejected this reasoning, saying that the hunt for ignition sources clearly had failed and that, instead, the explosive vapors would have to be eliminated.
The FAA convened a government-industry task force to assess technologies that might solve the problem. Its 1998 report concluded that eliminating explosive vapors could cost $5 billion to $35 billion over 10 years -- a lot more than the $2 billion cost of future accidents if the change were not made.
Wrong answer. To its credit, the FAA convened a second task force, which in 2001 reported that eliminating the vapors would cost $10 billion to $20 billion over 16 years. The internal documents of this second look showed that the panel had considered the cost on a per-passenger basis. Its conclusion? About 25 cents per ticket. Late last month, the FAA announced that it would require a partial fix to the center fuel tank. It has yet to act on the wing tanks.
In 1996, Victoria Cummock, a member of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, proposed a $4 per ticket surcharge to provide a source of funding for all safety and security initiatives then under consideration. Cummock had lost her husband in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Her proposed surcharge, which might have plugged some of the gaps in aviation security that were exploited on Sept. 11, 2001, was not endorsed.
A month after the 9/11 attacks she told me, "It breaks my heart to say it, but for a per passenger surcharge about the price of a McDonald's 'Happy Meal' this tragedy might have been prevented."
As the saying goes, one can pay a little now or a whole lot later. At a few dollars per ticket, safety is anything but expensive. And worth every penny.
Author's e-mail:
[email protected]
David Evans is editor of Air Safety Week, a newsletter for the aviation industry.
Airline Safety Costs a) Billions or b) Pennies. Answer Below
By David Evans
Sunday, April 4, 2004; Page B05
You hear it all the time at airline industry meetings: "If you think safety is expensive, try an accident."
Still, how one views the relative cost of airline safety -- and whether it becomes a reason to delay making improvements -- depends an awful lot on how that cost is calculated. Too often, the cost is determined through negotiations between the industry and the agency responsible for ordering improvements, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).
The FAA's standard method is to assess the total cost to the industry of a particular safety initiative. The resulting figures typically run into the millions or even billions of dollars -- a sure way to delay action.
I have observed air safety deliberations for nearly 10 years, and I think it's time to change the current cost-benefit approach. Discussing the cost of safety improvements in terms of the price per ticket, rather than the overall cost, would make it easier for the FAA to make the necessary fixes.
Often, the per-ticket price works out to a few dollars -- or less.
Taking this approach would help change the industry reaction from "we can't" to "why can't we?"
Besides, all costs ultimately are passed on to passengers, who have no way of knowing that a small increase in the price per ticket would dramatically improve their chances of remaining safe in flight. I'm guessing that if they did know, most would happily pay.
Instead, there's a kind of paralysis in the industry. Safety deficiencies recognized by the FAA persist for years, unnecessarily increasing the risk to air crews and the flying public.
This is precisely the case regarding three major threats to safe flight: smoke, fire and explosion. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which investigates all major accidents in the United States, has recommended that action be taken in all three areas.
For example, eliminating explosive vapors in fuel tanks has been on the NTSB's "Most Wanted" list of aviation safety improvements since May 1997.
That recommendation emerged from the investigation into the fatal July 1996 center fuel tank explosion of TWA Flight 800 over Long Island Sound, which killed all 230 aboard. A joint government-industry task force convened by the FAA said in 1998 that if nothing were done, fuel tank explosions would continue to occur at an average rate of one every 41/2 years. Almost on schedule, a tank exploded on a Thai Airways jet in Bangkok in 2001.
Fortunately, the airplane was on the ground, and only one crew member was killed. Unfortunately, the FAA panel had said, in effect, that eliminating explosive vapors in the fuel tanks would be too expensive.
Another example: Last month, U.S. carriers reported six flights with smoke in the cabin or cockpit. In each case, pilots were forced to make emergency landings. After the 1996 crash of ValuJet Flight 592 into the Everglades, the NTSB had urged the FAA to evaluate emergency vision equipment that would enable pilots to see their instruments and out the windscreen even in a smoke-filled cockpit. The FAA still has not responded to the recommendation with regulatory action.
Now consider the cargo holds in smaller jets, such as the popular Boeing 737 and DC-9. For years, these holds were not required to have an active means of detecting smoke or fire or of spraying a fire-suppressing chemical.
Cheaper fire liners were installed instead. The airlines and the manufacturers argued that, at a cost of more than $300 million to equip all the jets in service, fire protection equipment was too expensive. Then the ValuJet DC-9 crashed because of a raging fire in its forward belly hold, killing all 110 people aboard.
Using the FAA's standard $2.8 million statistical value of a life, this one accident cost more than $300 million, not including the cost of the plane. As a result of the crash, the FAA ordered fleetwide installation of fire protection equipment. The industry mobilized. The job was done in three years -- at a cost that was less than expected.
The ValuJet crash shows the folly of waiting for an accident to justify action. U.S. airlines racked up 52 accidents in 2003, an average of one per week, according to statistics published on March 22 by the NTSB. Twenty-two people were killed in two of those accidents.
To be sure, more people were killed on U.S. carriers in 1996 (342). But with an airline industry still hobbling after 9/11, the 2003 accident rate is the highest posted by the NTSB since 1984: about one accident for every 200,000 departures, or one for every 320,000 flying hours, on average.
With that in mind, let's consider the cost per ticket of addressing some of the major threats posed by smoke, fire and explosion.
• Blinding smoke: In-flight fires have led to the catastrophic crashes of planes whose pilots couldn't maneuver simply because they could not see through the smoke. In a March 15 letter to the FAA, Nick Lacey, former FAA director of flight standards, warned about the danger of fire during a transoceanic flight, which might be hours from the nearest airport.
"Current flight deck smoke masks do not provide the ability for the pilots to see their checklists or fundamental flight instruments in the presence of dense and continuous smoke."
I've seen too many post-crash accident reports that read, "Cockpit voice recorder indicates crew unable to see instruments due to smoke." The doomed ValuJet pilots reported smoke in the cockpit.
The 1970 crash of a Swissair jet is particularly poignant. "We have fire on board," the pilots radioed, asking ground control for landing help. "I can't see anything." Twenty seconds later: "Goodbye, everybody." Investigators concluded that the otherwise flyable aircraft overshot the Zurich airport while attempting to land.
In 1993 the crew of another Swissair jet with smoke in the cockpit resorted to flapping an emergency checklist booklet back and forth to see their instruments. Unable to see anything outside the airplane during landing, the captain came to a screeching halt on a Munich runway, averting disaster.
German investigators later recommended the use of an "inflatable view channel between the crew, their instruments and the cockpit windows."
Indeed, this inflatable channel has been deployed as emergency equipment on hundreds of corporate and military aircraft worldwide. And, most telling of all, the FAA has committed to installing such equipment on its own dozens of aircraft, but it has not ordered that airlines do the same. The equipment would cost 2 or 3 cents per ticket, according to passenger advocacy groups using data supplied by the manufacturer.
• Fire: One of the biggest challenges to in-flight safety is fire in concealed spaces. Case in point: an American Airlines DC-9 that was struck by lightning on Nov. 29, 2000, while climbing out of Washington's Reagan National Airport.
The energy from the lightning bolt entered the tail cone, traveled up wires located above the overhead bins, arced in the forward area of the cabin and started a small fire between the cabin sidewall panel and the outer aluminum skin of the airplane. A flight attendant borrowed a penknife from a passenger and cut a hole through the plastic wall, into which the flight attendant was able to insert the nozzle of a portable extinguisher and douse the fire while the pilots made an emergency landing at Dulles.
As a result of this and similar incidents, the NTSB has called for improved in-flight firefighting capability in the cabin, the cockpit and inaccessible spaces.
The Fast-Port apertures offered by a small company in New York were designed specifically for aviation applications. Cost per ticket: less than 1 cent to have six of them placed strategically about the cabin. Keep in mind that in this post-9/11 era, the crash axe stored in the cockpit must remain in the cockpit, and passengers no longer have penknives on board.
• Exploding fuel tanks: After the TWA disaster, the NTSB challenged the industry's fuel system design practices. The chief designers of the fuel tanks said repeatedly in meetings that they designed the electrical fuel systems to minimize the number of heat sources that could ignite the vapors. NTSB investigators rejected this reasoning, saying that the hunt for ignition sources clearly had failed and that, instead, the explosive vapors would have to be eliminated.
The FAA convened a government-industry task force to assess technologies that might solve the problem. Its 1998 report concluded that eliminating explosive vapors could cost $5 billion to $35 billion over 10 years -- a lot more than the $2 billion cost of future accidents if the change were not made.
Wrong answer. To its credit, the FAA convened a second task force, which in 2001 reported that eliminating the vapors would cost $10 billion to $20 billion over 16 years. The internal documents of this second look showed that the panel had considered the cost on a per-passenger basis. Its conclusion? About 25 cents per ticket. Late last month, the FAA announced that it would require a partial fix to the center fuel tank. It has yet to act on the wing tanks.
In 1996, Victoria Cummock, a member of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, proposed a $4 per ticket surcharge to provide a source of funding for all safety and security initiatives then under consideration. Cummock had lost her husband in the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Her proposed surcharge, which might have plugged some of the gaps in aviation security that were exploited on Sept. 11, 2001, was not endorsed.
A month after the 9/11 attacks she told me, "It breaks my heart to say it, but for a per passenger surcharge about the price of a McDonald's 'Happy Meal' this tragedy might have been prevented."
As the saying goes, one can pay a little now or a whole lot later. At a few dollars per ticket, safety is anything but expensive. And worth every penny.
Author's e-mail:
[email protected]
David Evans is editor of Air Safety Week, a newsletter for the aviation industry.
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VoR me ole mate, it may come as some surprise to you to learn that just about everyone who opens a new thread here thinks that their thread is incrediblly important, and I'm no exception to this.
However, most of us are content to let other people's reactions to our thread dictate as to whether it will stay at the top of Page 1 or sink into oblivion. I see that the moderators have removed them, but until a few days ago, your 'stickys' took up half of Page 1, and now you're starting another batch. No offence, Digger, but enough already.
Edit by this W to fix the bold print at the beginning.
However, most of us are content to let other people's reactions to our thread dictate as to whether it will stay at the top of Page 1 or sink into oblivion. I see that the moderators have removed them, but until a few days ago, your 'stickys' took up half of Page 1, and now you're starting another batch. No offence, Digger, but enough already.
Edit by this W to fix the bold print at the beginning.
Last edited by Woomera; 6th Apr 2004 at 08:17.
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Clarification
To Spad and others who contribute to this forum.
We are primarily focused on the issue of aviation safety - and try to provide information and clarification whenever we can, so that safety debates can take place based on fact, and not rhetoric. We do not post simply for the sake of posting.
We did not ask for, nor set, the sticky on any threads we initiated. We were pleased to note that there were over 16,000 hits on one particular thread, which encouraged us to continue participation and exchange of information.
You might note in this thread a number of valuable points.
The first is an open admission of the value of human life in the United States, which far exceeds that shown in the Broome study, and if applied therein, would force a substantial re-evaluation of airspace change in Australia.
The second is the seeming validation of the Broome study's use of a per ticket or per capita cost-of-safety, rather than the broadbrush whole of industry approach chosen in many other cases - including assertions made by your Government in relation to NAS.
Amortised across all passengers flying each year in Australia, the purported savings of 70 million dollars would equate to something less than 50 cents per passenger per flight - for a disproportionate increase in risk.
The third is the admission that FAA, like Australian authorities, is reluctant to move from a fixed and fixated strategy - until an accident occurs. If this represents best practice, we ARE very concerned.
We are primarily focused on the issue of aviation safety - and try to provide information and clarification whenever we can, so that safety debates can take place based on fact, and not rhetoric. We do not post simply for the sake of posting.
We did not ask for, nor set, the sticky on any threads we initiated. We were pleased to note that there were over 16,000 hits on one particular thread, which encouraged us to continue participation and exchange of information.
You might note in this thread a number of valuable points.
The first is an open admission of the value of human life in the United States, which far exceeds that shown in the Broome study, and if applied therein, would force a substantial re-evaluation of airspace change in Australia.
The second is the seeming validation of the Broome study's use of a per ticket or per capita cost-of-safety, rather than the broadbrush whole of industry approach chosen in many other cases - including assertions made by your Government in relation to NAS.
Amortised across all passengers flying each year in Australia, the purported savings of 70 million dollars would equate to something less than 50 cents per passenger per flight - for a disproportionate increase in risk.
The third is the admission that FAA, like Australian authorities, is reluctant to move from a fixed and fixated strategy - until an accident occurs. If this represents best practice, we ARE very concerned.
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VoR,
Your posts are excellent, keep posting.
What is especially good about your posts are the clinical, logical way you completely disect the arguments of your detractors. Cold logic and sound reasoning are your steamrollers of truth.
Keep up the good work. I for one appreciate your efforts.
Your posts are excellent, keep posting.
What is especially good about your posts are the clinical, logical way you completely disect the arguments of your detractors. Cold logic and sound reasoning are your steamrollers of truth.
Keep up the good work. I for one appreciate your efforts.
Prof. Airport Engineer
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The historian judges things on facts and not rhetoric, and at some time in the future, NAS will be judged the same way.
If the judge is ATSB, with a re-run of their 'systemic investigation into the Class G airspace demonstration' report, that will be one thing.
If the judge is ATSB with a report that ends 'the aircraft impacted the ground near ***** and was destroyed. There were no survivors.' then that will be another thing, and we don't want it.
Either way, history will judge Voices of Reason, PPRUNE and Woomera favourably for what they've done in the interests of aviation safety.
If the judge is ATSB, with a re-run of their 'systemic investigation into the Class G airspace demonstration' report, that will be one thing.
If the judge is ATSB with a report that ends 'the aircraft impacted the ground near ***** and was destroyed. There were no survivors.' then that will be another thing, and we don't want it.
Either way, history will judge Voices of Reason, PPRUNE and Woomera favourably for what they've done in the interests of aviation safety.
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COST OF SAFETY
Some 14 months prior to 9/11 we had a largely unreported incident at Broome- a pax took sticks of explosives onto an ANSETT flight bound for Perth, he also had possible detonation materials.
He was caught as he stumbled on the apron and an alert hostie spotted the sticks in his open carry bag, ground crew using a rouse got him of the aircraft.
He was arrested and charged. Why little press exposure? he killed himself before it came to trial. We(the airport) then decided to go secure at Broome and got verbal egreement from AN, QF and DoTRS.
After we installed the equiptment and trained the staff QF and DoTRS backed out and later AN followed. We continued to screen pax as the fight on who had the right to impose screening raged.It was a $150,000 fight as it took about 6 months to get QF and AN to agree.
As a last resort we said "lets ask the users directly" we surveyed them over one week, about 80% of all enplaining pax. We gave them the facts including the incident that prompted our installation of security equiptment and procedures, we advised them the cost was $3.75 per return flight.
The result of the survey was 97% of pax said they were happy to pay and wanted the security, only then did the airlines agree to put the charge on the tickets and reinburse us starting the next month.
We now sit across the table with some of the same people deciding whether batteries need to be removed from laptops etc.I don't go to the meetings as I would not cope with these "after the horse has bolted" experts.
VoR please keep posting on NAS you are helping and guiding many to forsee the danger and the proper procedures that are being ignored by some of our agencies. We need to stop and force assessments of dangers before they occur. We needed the AN bomb scare to alert us to security action and the DoTRS needed 9/11 before they finally saw the issue.
You help alert us to the fault prevention procedures that may result in proper assessment of airspace changes before a mid-air collision which appears to be the only stimulus some officials and pilots need to see the errors,shortfalls and dangers of certain aspects of the the NAS.
No matter how scientifically we approach the NAS2c we are a player and are seen as self interested you are not and the hits on your posts show the respect your postings deserve.
Thank you
He was caught as he stumbled on the apron and an alert hostie spotted the sticks in his open carry bag, ground crew using a rouse got him of the aircraft.
He was arrested and charged. Why little press exposure? he killed himself before it came to trial. We(the airport) then decided to go secure at Broome and got verbal egreement from AN, QF and DoTRS.
After we installed the equiptment and trained the staff QF and DoTRS backed out and later AN followed. We continued to screen pax as the fight on who had the right to impose screening raged.It was a $150,000 fight as it took about 6 months to get QF and AN to agree.
As a last resort we said "lets ask the users directly" we surveyed them over one week, about 80% of all enplaining pax. We gave them the facts including the incident that prompted our installation of security equiptment and procedures, we advised them the cost was $3.75 per return flight.
The result of the survey was 97% of pax said they were happy to pay and wanted the security, only then did the airlines agree to put the charge on the tickets and reinburse us starting the next month.
We now sit across the table with some of the same people deciding whether batteries need to be removed from laptops etc.I don't go to the meetings as I would not cope with these "after the horse has bolted" experts.
VoR please keep posting on NAS you are helping and guiding many to forsee the danger and the proper procedures that are being ignored by some of our agencies. We need to stop and force assessments of dangers before they occur. We needed the AN bomb scare to alert us to security action and the DoTRS needed 9/11 before they finally saw the issue.
You help alert us to the fault prevention procedures that may result in proper assessment of airspace changes before a mid-air collision which appears to be the only stimulus some officials and pilots need to see the errors,shortfalls and dangers of certain aspects of the the NAS.
No matter how scientifically we approach the NAS2c we are a player and are seen as self interested you are not and the hits on your posts show the respect your postings deserve.
Thank you
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VoR, getting back to my first post. I've got no complaints about the merits of your posts nor of their importance. But I stand by my original request. Most people think that the thread they introduce is important - or why post in the first place?
If everyone made every thread they thought to be important a Sticky, no one would know if or when a new thread was posted. Last week, your 'stickies' took up half my screen when I opened D&G.
If everyone made every thread they thought to be important a Sticky, no one would know if or when a new thread was posted. Last week, your 'stickies' took up half my screen when I opened D&G.
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The W that did.
Spad old chap, no one and that includes the V o R, except a moderator can sticky a thread.
The use of the "sticky" by mods, is to keep a thread "at the top" that he/she/they think is of sufficient importance/interest for all to see. How long it stays depends on the response, posts or views.
Some PPRuNers don't get to the boards every day or even week due to their rosters or work pattern.
It's also why we have more than one W.
If it doesn't or stops "flying" it will go.
We have no idea beyond the registration email address who the V o R, or any other PPRuNer for that matter, is or may purport to be.
Sometimes we, like you guys, wish we did so we could send the bruvvers around to have a bit of a chat wiv em like, around the back of the bike shed
. We, like everybody else have our theories but that is all. 
Our 9 or so years experience around here, yeah verily since the beginning of PPRuNe, tells us that they are worth listening to.
This is a subject exciting National interest.
We always support calm rational discussion about all and any important aviation matters, something not always evident around here.
Given that is the case what other objections do you then have?
W
Spad old chap, no one and that includes the V o R, except a moderator can sticky a thread.
The use of the "sticky" by mods, is to keep a thread "at the top" that he/she/they think is of sufficient importance/interest for all to see. How long it stays depends on the response, posts or views.
Some PPRuNers don't get to the boards every day or even week due to their rosters or work pattern.
It's also why we have more than one W.
If it doesn't or stops "flying" it will go.
We have no idea beyond the registration email address who the V o R, or any other PPRuNer for that matter, is or may purport to be.
Sometimes we, like you guys, wish we did so we could send the bruvvers around to have a bit of a chat wiv em like, around the back of the bike shed
. We, like everybody else have our theories but that is all. Our 9 or so years experience around here, yeah verily since the beginning of PPRuNe, tells us that they are worth listening to.
This is a subject exciting National interest.
We always support calm rational discussion about all and any important aviation matters, something not always evident around here.
Given that is the case what other objections do you then have?
W
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The posts of VoR have been timely. articulate and sage.
They are another argument for or against NAS.
Who can now decide who,what or which argument is reasonable?
Which splinter group do you heed? The ATC "henny penny" argument? The good of aviation Australia wide argument? God forbid there is common ground. Government departments to decide this? How as an industry can we find a way forward?
There must be a way.
We are professionals, all of us.
Sort it
They are another argument for or against NAS.
Who can now decide who,what or which argument is reasonable?
Which splinter group do you heed? The ATC "henny penny" argument? The good of aviation Australia wide argument? God forbid there is common ground. Government departments to decide this? How as an industry can we find a way forward?
There must be a way.
We are professionals, all of us.
Sort it
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TCAS and Safety
TCAS and Safety
(cross-posted from the TCAS thread)
We agree that TCAS is a valuable safety tool – and where it is cost effective and justifiable to fit, it should be fitted. We also support the carriage and operation of secondary surveillance radar transponders – Mode C or mode S – to support the operation of TCAS.
BUT we DO NOT support the use of TCAS and adjunct transponders as an airspace design tool. We have enunciated this more forcefully in other threads.
TCAS is acknowledged by ALL leading aviation States, and by ALL leading aviation organizations and authorities, as a LAST LINE OF DEFENCE – not an aid to separation or traffic information. It is meant to be independent of the air traffic system – not a supporting concept.
Carriage and operation of transponders in the United States should NOT be assumed to be a fundamental support to TCAS and aircraft based traffic information to IFR aircraft – it is principally related to the extensive radar coverage in the continental United States – primary and secondary. The carriage and operation of transponders allows air traffic control to provide traffic information and collision avoidance advice as a part of the design of airspace in the United States.
Ask any expert in the United States if TCAS is a design tool, or if TCAS resolution is a good design and safety aid, and the answer would be a resounding NO!
We cannot stress strongly enough – if your airspace system is being “rescued” on a regular basis by TCAS observation and reaction, your airspace deign is fatally flawed, and it is only a matter of time (or statistics) until the ultimate sanction.
(cross-posted from the TCAS thread)
We agree that TCAS is a valuable safety tool – and where it is cost effective and justifiable to fit, it should be fitted. We also support the carriage and operation of secondary surveillance radar transponders – Mode C or mode S – to support the operation of TCAS.
BUT we DO NOT support the use of TCAS and adjunct transponders as an airspace design tool. We have enunciated this more forcefully in other threads.
TCAS is acknowledged by ALL leading aviation States, and by ALL leading aviation organizations and authorities, as a LAST LINE OF DEFENCE – not an aid to separation or traffic information. It is meant to be independent of the air traffic system – not a supporting concept.
Carriage and operation of transponders in the United States should NOT be assumed to be a fundamental support to TCAS and aircraft based traffic information to IFR aircraft – it is principally related to the extensive radar coverage in the continental United States – primary and secondary. The carriage and operation of transponders allows air traffic control to provide traffic information and collision avoidance advice as a part of the design of airspace in the United States.
Ask any expert in the United States if TCAS is a design tool, or if TCAS resolution is a good design and safety aid, and the answer would be a resounding NO!
We cannot stress strongly enough – if your airspace system is being “rescued” on a regular basis by TCAS observation and reaction, your airspace deign is fatally flawed, and it is only a matter of time (or statistics) until the ultimate sanction.
What Price Safety?
Statistically we are probably overdue for another fire/smoke accident. So I think it is a good and timely post from Voices of Reason.
Talking of Safety in terms of price per ticket, didn’t thre Aus Govt put a “sticky” of $10 on the price of all Aus pax tickets to help the payout of the retirement benefits of the Ansett staff who lost their jobs and due to their company going broke? That seemed to be a worthy cause.
I wonder if Safety will also get a look-in sometime soon?
Talking of Safety in terms of price per ticket, didn’t thre Aus Govt put a “sticky” of $10 on the price of all Aus pax tickets to help the payout of the retirement benefits of the Ansett staff who lost their jobs and due to their company going broke? That seemed to be a worthy cause.
I wonder if Safety will also get a look-in sometime soon?
Spad,
Your previous posts have made you seem like an arrogant, self important know-it-all.
Your efforts here confirm this, plus make it obvious that you can't grasp simple concepts (Like it's the MODERATORS who make things stickies- always been obvious to me!!)
VOR- Well done, informative and timely as always.
Your previous posts have made you seem like an arrogant, self important know-it-all.
Your efforts here confirm this, plus make it obvious that you can't grasp simple concepts (Like it's the MODERATORS who make things stickies- always been obvious to me!!)
VOR- Well done, informative and timely as always.
Last edited by Wizofoz; 9th Apr 2004 at 17:04.
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The most stident examples of TCAS resolution have been the public displays of NAS failures. In LT,CANTY, AY and MC all have been TCAS resolutions. What does that say about a system which according to ICAO requires no such back-up?
This has to be a sad joke and who is going to be the punch line?
This has to be a sad joke and who is going to be the punch line?
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
IMHO, Safety has been - and still is - ALWAYS the singular, most important decision making criteria for pilots, whether they be PPL's or ATPL's.
Unfortunately, pilots are not directly responsible for overseeing precisley HOW the levies collected in the name of "Safety/security" are spent.
Whilst the (recent) scenario you describe was obviously life-threatening, WALLEY2, would you be at all surprised to learn that a DC9 was hi-jacked out of Coolangatta Airport some 30 years ago, by a pax carrying a shotgun under his overcoat?
That something similar happened three decades later, indicates - to me, at least - that most governments treat aviation security as a token "given".
Personally, I am EXTREMELY "bemused" at the amateurish levels afforded commercial airline aviation today, at the undoubtedly ludicrous prices they are charged!
The gaping holes have been pointed out to my company, but with no response - perhaps because it's a case of "We've always done it this way", and to include the EXTRA security means re-balancing the budget.
Without a doubt, the "user pays" system is the most simple, cost-effective method - and matter-of-factly is the one that the company "beanies" will eventually utilise ANYWAY!
Companies no longer "absorb" costs - they are always passed on to the end user (together with suitable "add-ons"), and usually with great fanfare indicating that it was all out of managements' control!!
Unfortunately, pilots are not directly responsible for overseeing precisley HOW the levies collected in the name of "Safety/security" are spent.
Whilst the (recent) scenario you describe was obviously life-threatening, WALLEY2, would you be at all surprised to learn that a DC9 was hi-jacked out of Coolangatta Airport some 30 years ago, by a pax carrying a shotgun under his overcoat?
That something similar happened three decades later, indicates - to me, at least - that most governments treat aviation security as a token "given".
Personally, I am EXTREMELY "bemused" at the amateurish levels afforded commercial airline aviation today, at the undoubtedly ludicrous prices they are charged!
The gaping holes have been pointed out to my company, but with no response - perhaps because it's a case of "We've always done it this way", and to include the EXTRA security means re-balancing the budget.
Without a doubt, the "user pays" system is the most simple, cost-effective method - and matter-of-factly is the one that the company "beanies" will eventually utilise ANYWAY!
Companies no longer "absorb" costs - they are always passed on to the end user (together with suitable "add-ons"), and usually with great fanfare indicating that it was all out of managements' control!!