Airspace Design - Some Background
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Using Facts, Rather than Emotion
Woomera,
Thank you.
Without wishing in any way to insult or discourage participants in this forum, we have found that whilst subjects such as airspace design can become extremely emotive and at times personal, that emotive argument is next to useless when trying to influence the changes that caused the emotional responses. It would appear that the emotive arguments in other threads on this site, whilst passionate, are having little or no effect.
We find it far better to [try to] remain dispassionate, and to use facts and the truth to achieve our ends. That is why we have placed so much information at your respondents' disposal.
We hope that in the posts that we have made, your respondents will have seen how (relatively) easy it is to find factual information - and to use that information to argue their case. In dealing with Government and its agencies, what is not available in the public domain can be easily obtained through access legislation, such as Freedom of Information.
Let us be clear - we support airspace reform wherever it will derive benefits to the user community - without compromising safety, and without unnecessarily impacting user amenity. Such reforms must, however, be done in an open and inclusive manner, to ensure that they can be implemented safety and effectively.
Thank you.
Without wishing in any way to insult or discourage participants in this forum, we have found that whilst subjects such as airspace design can become extremely emotive and at times personal, that emotive argument is next to useless when trying to influence the changes that caused the emotional responses. It would appear that the emotive arguments in other threads on this site, whilst passionate, are having little or no effect.
We find it far better to [try to] remain dispassionate, and to use facts and the truth to achieve our ends. That is why we have placed so much information at your respondents' disposal.
We hope that in the posts that we have made, your respondents will have seen how (relatively) easy it is to find factual information - and to use that information to argue their case. In dealing with Government and its agencies, what is not available in the public domain can be easily obtained through access legislation, such as Freedom of Information.
Let us be clear - we support airspace reform wherever it will derive benefits to the user community - without compromising safety, and without unnecessarily impacting user amenity. Such reforms must, however, be done in an open and inclusive manner, to ensure that they can be implemented safety and effectively.
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Let it be made clear to all those who think that Australian ATCs are opposed to NAS because we are trying to save jobs that this is utter bull!
Australian ATCs have worked on all the airspace reform projects, AMATS, Airspace 2000, G Demo, NAS, etc. Australian ATCs have a clear, and deep understanding of the implications of any airspace or procedure change.
Australian ATCs are not opposed to airspace reform where it is a clear benefit to the the Australian community, "without compromising safety and without impacting user amenity".
Perhaps those that continually use emotive or dismissive arguments should also stick to the facts.
Et tu Brute.
Australian ATCs have worked on all the airspace reform projects, AMATS, Airspace 2000, G Demo, NAS, etc. Australian ATCs have a clear, and deep understanding of the implications of any airspace or procedure change.
Australian ATCs are not opposed to airspace reform where it is a clear benefit to the the Australian community, "without compromising safety and without impacting user amenity".
Perhaps those that continually use emotive or dismissive arguments should also stick to the facts.
Et tu Brute.
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The missing cheques and balances
Thankyou (Whoever you are)!
All the processes we knew were required, none of which have been undertaken!
What if any power does ICAO hold to lobby/recommend for corrective action as Australia is a signatory to the convention?
All the processes we knew were required, none of which have been undertaken!
What if any power does ICAO hold to lobby/recommend for corrective action as Australia is a signatory to the convention?
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Dirty Pierre et al,
We suspect that you may have misinterpreted our comments – and if we have offended, we apologize. In the course of this thread, we have accessed or have been provided with access to material that clearly indicates that service provider readiness for all airspace changes that have occurred in your country has been exemplary. That means that training material has been readied, delivered, and received well in advance of implementations, and that ATS staff have been operationally – if not emotionally – supportive of all changes. That is clearly evidenced in reports from your Air Transportation Safety Board and its predecessor [we assume] the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation – in particular a report we found on the Class G Demonstration. Such levels of readiness could not, in our experience, be achieved without a great deal of cooperation and collaboration from ATC and support staff.
The points that we were trying to make were simple. We have watched countless responses posted on PPRuNe – not simply in the Australian airspace debate, but on other controversial issues in many countries – where respondents have bemoaned the fact of a change that they do not support and have expected that that would precipitate a return to past practice.
More often than not, assembly of a succinct but factual argument, well presented and well supported, will achieve far more.
In reviewing threads in this site over the last 12-18 months, we have seen pieces of information that, if properly assembled, and placed in correct context, may have achieved your desired outcome.
Unless there is an imminent safety risk [and despite the rhetoric, we do not believe such a risk currently exists], we do not – and cannot – intervene directly. We can provide you with sufficient background material to allow you to assemble your own arguments, and submit those to appropriate authorities.
CapCom,
Despite its aura, the International Civil Aviation Organization hold power only by right of member States - that is, States decide to adopt, or otherwise, ICAO Standards. In that sense, ICAO is powerless. Article 1 of the Chicago Convention states: "The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory". That effectively allows a State to determine its own rules, should it so choose. Article 38 of the Convention requires States that choose to implement Standards that differ from ICAO, to notify those differences.
The United States, for example, has notified ICAO that the levels of service provided in Class G airspace are different to those specified in ICAO Annex 11 - in particular, they have notified that they do not provide certain services to IFR flights as required by ICAO standards. The supplements to Annexes report all of the differences notified to ICAO - it is interesting just how many States do not follow ICAO fully - and do not practice "world's best practice". We are sure that there is an appropriately stocked aviation library in your country that would be able to provide this information to you.
On another matter, we noted in documents accessed from the web-site of the Department of Transport and Regional Services, that statements are made in relation to "harmonisation" of procedures between the United States and Canada. In fact, examination of the airspace management rules of both countries shows that there are substantial differences in application of airspace classifications and procedures between the countries - to the point where special procedures needed to be developed to allow the handling of air traffic in the cross-border regions between the United States and Canada. Effectively, between them, the two countries apply three sets of airspace management procedures.
We suspect that you may have misinterpreted our comments – and if we have offended, we apologize. In the course of this thread, we have accessed or have been provided with access to material that clearly indicates that service provider readiness for all airspace changes that have occurred in your country has been exemplary. That means that training material has been readied, delivered, and received well in advance of implementations, and that ATS staff have been operationally – if not emotionally – supportive of all changes. That is clearly evidenced in reports from your Air Transportation Safety Board and its predecessor [we assume] the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation – in particular a report we found on the Class G Demonstration. Such levels of readiness could not, in our experience, be achieved without a great deal of cooperation and collaboration from ATC and support staff.
The points that we were trying to make were simple. We have watched countless responses posted on PPRuNe – not simply in the Australian airspace debate, but on other controversial issues in many countries – where respondents have bemoaned the fact of a change that they do not support and have expected that that would precipitate a return to past practice.
More often than not, assembly of a succinct but factual argument, well presented and well supported, will achieve far more.
In reviewing threads in this site over the last 12-18 months, we have seen pieces of information that, if properly assembled, and placed in correct context, may have achieved your desired outcome.
Unless there is an imminent safety risk [and despite the rhetoric, we do not believe such a risk currently exists], we do not – and cannot – intervene directly. We can provide you with sufficient background material to allow you to assemble your own arguments, and submit those to appropriate authorities.
CapCom,
Despite its aura, the International Civil Aviation Organization hold power only by right of member States - that is, States decide to adopt, or otherwise, ICAO Standards. In that sense, ICAO is powerless. Article 1 of the Chicago Convention states: "The contracting States recognize that every State has complete and
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory". That effectively allows a State to determine its own rules, should it so choose. Article 38 of the Convention requires States that choose to implement Standards that differ from ICAO, to notify those differences.
The United States, for example, has notified ICAO that the levels of service provided in Class G airspace are different to those specified in ICAO Annex 11 - in particular, they have notified that they do not provide certain services to IFR flights as required by ICAO standards. The supplements to Annexes report all of the differences notified to ICAO - it is interesting just how many States do not follow ICAO fully - and do not practice "world's best practice". We are sure that there is an appropriately stocked aviation library in your country that would be able to provide this information to you.
On another matter, we noted in documents accessed from the web-site of the Department of Transport and Regional Services, that statements are made in relation to "harmonisation" of procedures between the United States and Canada. In fact, examination of the airspace management rules of both countries shows that there are substantial differences in application of airspace classifications and procedures between the countries - to the point where special procedures needed to be developed to allow the handling of air traffic in the cross-border regions between the United States and Canada. Effectively, between them, the two countries apply three sets of airspace management procedures.
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Da’ Voice’s
I should have explained the rhetorical nature of the question i.e.
They claim that AusNAS is “worlds best practice” and in line with “international standards”, yet it is clear that the proponents claim to ICAO commonality (Legitimacy) is scurrilous at best!
That surprises me!
You seem aware that due safety analysis of volumes has not been undertaken yet “believe” such a risk does not exist. Try as I might, I cannot reconcile that one!
If an imminent safety risk is proven i.e. ATSB report 200305235 Launceston and others, then what action should you take or does that not qualify as an “imminent safety risk”?.
We can educate Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers till the cows come home, it will not change a thing, in so far as has been pointed out numerous times, everyone can be doing the right thing and a collision (Including RPT) can still result within volumes of airspace that was "C" (positive clearances and separation) now non- analysed “E”!
An imminent safety risk if ever there was one don’t you think?
Edited to better explain where the risk exists!
I should have explained the rhetorical nature of the question i.e.
They claim that AusNAS is “worlds best practice” and in line with “international standards”, yet it is clear that the proponents claim to ICAO commonality (Legitimacy) is scurrilous at best!
Unless there is an imminent safety risk [and despite the rhetoric, we do not believe such a risk currently exists], we do not – and cannot – intervene directly.
You seem aware that due safety analysis of volumes has not been undertaken yet “believe” such a risk does not exist. Try as I might, I cannot reconcile that one!
If an imminent safety risk is proven i.e. ATSB report 200305235 Launceston and others, then what action should you take or does that not qualify as an “imminent safety risk”?.
We can educate Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers till the cows come home, it will not change a thing, in so far as has been pointed out numerous times, everyone can be doing the right thing and a collision (Including RPT) can still result within volumes of airspace that was "C" (positive clearances and separation) now non- analysed “E”!
An imminent safety risk if ever there was one don’t you think?
Edited to better explain where the risk exists!
Last edited by Capcom; 6th Feb 2004 at 06:58.
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AOPA - A Source of Excellent Information
The United States Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association – US AOPA – represents more that 400,000 pilots. Their web-site is easily located: www.aopa.org. On that website, member or not, you may access a range of interesting material. One sub-site that may be accessed from the main AOPA site is the AOPA Air Safety Foundation. The AOPA Air Safety Foundation is a “ …non-profit, tax exempt organization promoting safety and pilot proficiency in general aviation through quality training, education, research, analysis, and the dissemination of information…”.
The Air Safety Foundation site contains a range of excellent material, including on-line courses, safety topics, and accident analysis.
In the Airport Operations section of that site, you may freely access a document entitled “Operations at Non-Towered Airports”. This is a 16 page document that describes how pilots – IFR and VFR – should operate at the 12,000 non-towered airports in the United States. It is highly recommended that you access that site and document, and read the entire publication. Following are extracts that may encourage you, in the interests of safety, to access the site:
“….Nontowered airports—it’s a shorthand way to refer to airports not served by operating air traffic control towers, and that includes most of the airports in the United States. At present, some 12,000 airports are nontowered, compared to approximately 400 that have FAA towers. Millions of safe operations in all types of aircraft are conducted at nontowered airports in a variety of weather conditions. It works because pilots put safety first and use commonly known procedures….
….Right-of-way rules, and nontowered airport traffic patterns and procedures, exist for only one purpose—to prevent collisions in the air and on the ground. There are other benefits to adhering to the rules, such as an orderly traffic flow, noise abatement, and defusing potential right-of-way conflicts, but traffic separation is the prime concern…..
….Communication: VFR charts depict towered airports in blue, and nontowered airports are shown in magenta. The basic difference between operating at a tower-controlled airport and one without an operating control tower is the difference between instructions and advisories. Tower controllers issue taxi, departure, and arrival instructions for pilots to follow on specific air traffic control frequencies. At nontowered airports, you will hear advisories on a CTAF, but the responsibility for collision avoidance, sequencing, and knowing the local procedures lies solely with the pilot…..
….Safety Tip: All aircraft should monitor the CTAF when operating in the vicinity of nontowered airports…..
….Nontowered airports without a flight service station (FSS) generally will have a unicom frequency. These usually are staffed by fixed-base operation (FBO) employees who provide airport information. The unicom is usually the CTAF…..….Note: Unicom operators are not required to communicate with pilots, and if they do, there are no standards for the information conveyed…..
….Nontowered communication is not always easy, though, especially in metropolitan areas where there never seem to be enough frequencies to go around. It’s not unusual for several airports within radio range to share the same CTAF. The result is an aeronautical party line traveling at more than 100 knots…..
….Safety Tip: The CTAF should be used for two reasons only: Collision Avoidance, Airport Advisory…..
….Listening to a busy CTAF for only a few minutes will reveal too many long-winded conversationalists. Don’t use this vital collision-avoidance resource for aircraft or lunch scheduling, formation flying, saying hello to old friends on the ground, discussing sports scores, or expressing your displeasure at the guy who just pulled out on the runway while you were on short final…..
….Safety Tip: ASF recommends that pilots of no-radio aircraft use a hand-held transceiver at busy nontowered airports. This is an essential piece of safety gear…..
…..Collision Avoidance: At nontowered fields, it’s possible that pilots in noradio aircraft are shooting landings, IFR students and their instructors are practicing instrument approaches, helicopter pilots are perfecting their autorotation skills, or sailplanes are floating overhead. Not all pilots in the area are announcing their positions and intentions on the CTAF, or even looking out the window!.....
…..Midair collisions are the primary hazard associated with flying at nontowered airports. Most midair collisions occur in clear weather within 5 miles of an airport and below 3,000 feet, which is where aircraft congregate. Most collisions occur on final approach, generally with a faster aircraft overtaking a slower one. See ASF’s safety advisor on Collision Avoidance, www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf/.......
…..Safety Tip: An aircraft on a collision course will have no apparent movement relative to you, and the target will “blossom” just a few seconds before impact. Survivors of midair collisions frequently have no recollection of seeing the other aircraft. It is easy to lose a target in the ground clutter—be at pattern altitude before entering the pattern……
…..Collisions also occur on the ground, both on taxiways and runways. This is a problem at dusk, night, or during periods of low visibility. In calm or nearly calm wind conditions, be especially cautious. Another pilot may choose a different runway from the one you have selected. If the runway has a blind intersection or you cannot see the opposite end, be prepared. Remember that not everyone is on the CTAF……
…..Departing the Airport: When departing a nontowered airport, monitor and communicate on the CTAF from engine start until you’re 10 miles from the airport, so you’ll be aware of other traffic that could conflict with your route. The exception is if you need to switch frequencies after departure to talk to ATC or an FSS specialist……
…..Safety Tip: Remember to scan for traffic while talking on the radio……
…..Safety Tip: Air carrier aircraft and many larger aircraft seem to make more straight-in approaches than light singles. In many cases, they cannot fly a pattern much slower than 120 knots, which is faster than the cruise speed of most trainers. They might not see you, and although there may be cases where they should yield right of way, they sometimes don’t. Pursue the discussion on the ground, not on the radio……
…..A situation that poses special risks is when a nontowered airport is blanketed by a broken or overcast cloud ceiling or visibility is reduced—due to haze, for example—yet VFR conditions exist below the cloud layer. In that case, it’s possible for a pilot flying an actual IFR approach in the clouds to break out below the ceiling and suddenly encounter a VFR pilot turning base for a practice touch and go. It helps if both pilots are diligent in communicating on the CTAF, but even that doesn’t guarantee against a conflict on the final approach, because they can’t see each other until the IFR aircraft has descended below the cloud layer…..
…..Safety Tip: If possible, monitor the IFR approach frequency simultaneously with the CTAF, if your aircraft has more than one radio. It can provide valuable warning as to when an IFR inbound is about to pop out of the clouds…..
….The way to fly safely at nontowered airports is to REACT:
Radio - Listen to the automated weather observations, if available, and the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) for airport information and traffic advisories.
Eyes - Use them! Look for other traffic. This is the top priority when operating in the vicinity of a nontowered airport. Use landing lights so other pilots can see you more easily.
Announce - Report your position and intentions using standard phraseology.
Courtesy - A little courtesy will smooth out most problems. The “me first” attitude can be dangerous and rude.
Traffic Pattern - Follow the recommended procedures. before you fly. Research the necessary information about your departure and destination airports.
There are many other valuable documents which may be of interest – in particular a document entitled: “Collision Avoidance – Strategies and Tactics”. It contains, amongst other tactics, the following statement:
“…Become a target: If you operate an aircraft without radios or transponders, consider installing them….”
“HEAD TO HEAD” by Bruce Landsberg (From AOPA Pilot, January 2000.)
Midair collisions are one of the few types of accidents where seconds of inattention can lead to disaster. Everything is normal and then, in a split second, one or both aircraft may be out of control and spinning earthward. Fortunately, these collisions are relatively rare. In 1998 there were 14. Small details play significant roles in the accident chain, and in the case below, a transponder figures prominently.
On April 4, 1998, at about 10:34 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST), a Cessna 525 (CitationJet or CJ) and a Cessna 172 collided over a residential area in Marietta, Georgia. The CJ had departed from the Dekalb-Peachtree Airport at about 10:30 on an instrument flight plan to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. According to radar data, the 172 departed Mathis Airfield, near Cumming, Georgia, at about 10:25. The 172 was on a power line patrol and did not file a flight plan.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The visibility at nearby reporting stations ranged from seven to 10 miles, with broken to overcast skies varying from 2,800 to 3,100 feet agl. Radar information showed that the collision occurred at 3,425 feet msl. This was approximately 2,400 feet agl or just about 500 feet below the clouds.
After takeoff, ATC assigned the CJ 3,000 feet and a heading of 280 degrees. At 10:33:01, ATC cleared the jet to a heading of 360 degrees with a climb clearance to 14,000 feet. According to radar data, the CJ had just vacated 3,000 feet msl and was passing 3,400 feet msl when a primary target merged with the radar target of the jet. The CJ pilot’s acknowledgment of the climb clearance was interrupted at about 10:34.
The Atlanta ATC radar showed a primary target (radar energy reflected from the skin of the airplane without electronic enhancement; i.e., no transponder) beginning at 10:25:07. The target appeared approximately two miles southwest of Mathis Airport and traveled to the southwest, intersecting the flight path of the CJ at the collision site.
At about 10:34, the 172 contacted the Dobbins Air Force Base Tower and identified itself as Seven-Whiskey-Delta. The controller responded, "Seven-Whiskey-Delta, Dobbins Tower." The aircraft replied, "Good morning, sir, Seven-Whiskey-Delta, Cessna One-Seventy…." The controller stated, "Seven-Whiskey- Delta, you were cut out." No further transmissions were received from the airplane, and the controller was unable to reestablish contact.
A reconstruction of the accident sequence based upon radar data showed that the CJ was tracking north, while the primary target that merged with the CJ target exhibited a southerly track with an approximate closure rate of 300 knots. A study was done to determine how long each pilot might have had the other aircraft in sight, based on radar data.
The data plots indicated that the 172 was either behind the CJ’s center windshield post or may have been visible to the right of the center windshield post for 35 seconds prior to collision. The plots indicate that the CJ would have been visible to the 172 pilot in the lower left quadrant of the pilot’s windshield somewhere be-tween 35 to five seconds before impact. The 172 was in level flight and collided with the climbing jet at an angle of about 52 degrees to the left of head-on.
The CJ came to rest inverted in the rear of a residence, and the 172 crashed inverted about a half-mile away. The commercial pilot of the 172, the airline transport pilot of the CJ, and the CJ’s three passengers were killed.
The wreckage of the CJ was scattered over an area of approximately 1.5 square miles. The horizontal stabilizer, elevators, and the top one-quarter of the vertical stabilizer separated from the airplane. Black tire marks were found on the vertical stabilizer leading edge. A small five-inch-long section, separated from the outboard end of the left horizontal stabilizer leading edge, was crushed aft, forming a tight three-inch-diameter U shape. This section was among the first debris located on the wreckage path. Additionally, blue paint that was similar to the blue paint of the 172 was found on the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer. All of the fractures to the empennage exhibited overload failures.
The 172 wreckage was also scattered over an area of approximately 1.5 square miles. Witnesses observed the aircraft hit trees before reaching the ground. The wreckage burned in a post-impact fire. There was evidence of metal scrape marks on the underside of the tail cone. The nose landing gear, which was found with the main wreckage, exhibited fire damage. The upper strut housing evidenced an indentation between five and seven inches below the upper end of the strut. The indentation on the outboard left horizontal stabilizer leading edge of the CJ matched the indentation on the nose landing gear strut housing of the 172.
The CJ pilot held a type rating for single-pilot operation of the jet with 1,825 hours’ total flight time and 86 hours in the CitationJet. He had learned to fly in 1994 and moved rapidly through a series of high-performance aircraft, including a Beech 60 Duke and a Beech 90-series King Air. The pilot’s instructor, who had trained him from the beginning and attended FlightSafety International CJ training with him, described the pilot as highly qualified, competent, and detail-oriented. The pilot had enrolled in a CJ proficiency course that required attendance every three months.
The pilot of the 172 held commercial pilot and flight instructor certificates, as well as a mechanic’s certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings. He had logged almost 14,000 hours and in August 1997 had completed a flight review in the accident aircraft. FAA records indicated that the pilot’s certificate had been suspended on three occasions. In 1987, he received a 30-day suspension for a violation involving minimum safe altitudes. He received another 45-day suspension in 1990 regarding an ATC clearance for operations in Class B airspace.
In 1993, a 60-day suspension was given for violation of various sections of FAR Parts 23 and 91 that dealt with miscellaneous markings and placards on the airplane, airman certificate requirements, careless operation, and airworthiness of the airplane.
The 172 pilot’s power line patrol contract required that the pilot adhere to FAA regulations on certification of aircraft, special permits, etc., and that the surveillance aircraft must have an observer on board at all times. The observer’s job was to look at the lines while the pilot flew the airplane. According to the power company maintenance manager, who maintains the lines, if a pilot were discovered conducting surveillance flights without an observer, he would be counseled first and possibly terminated from employment if the action were repeated.
The pilot’s power line patrol records, however, showed multiple flights that did not reflect an observer, or "self" was recorded in the observer block.
The accident investigation team determined that the 172’s transponder function switch was in the Off position. The unit was returned to the manufacturer for testing. The ATC code switch wafers were burned but readable. The wafers and the function switch were compared to an undamaged unit that corresponded to a VFR code of 1200 and Off.
The pilot’s son, who had flown often with his father, stated that because of the type of flying involved, his father would leave the transponder in the Off position during normal flight until he approached airspace in which he needed the transponder. At that point, he would turn on the transponder before entering the airspace. According to FAR 91.215, the Cessna 172 was required to have an operating transponder while flying within the "Mode-C veil" extending 30 nautical miles from the Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport—and the accident occurred within this veil.
During interviews, the air traffic controllers stated that they did not observe the primary target associated with the 172 and therefore did not provide advisories to the CJ pilot. As mentioned earlier, the 172 was not in contact with ATC despite a call just before the collision occurred. In visual conditions, ATC will call observed traffic on a time-permitting basis to aircraft for which it is providing radar service, but that is not guaranteed. The controller’s handbook states, "Additional services are provided to the extent possible contingent only upon the controller’s capability to fit them into the performance of higher-priority duties and on the basis of limitations of the radar, volume of traffic, frequency congestion, and controller workload."
The workload in a single-pilot cockpit, regardless of aircraft type, can be significant. Even momentary and necessary distractions such as tuning a radio or programming the autopilot may mean less time for looking outside. The CJ pilot’s instructor reported that the FlightSafety training course recommended the use of the autopilot as soon as possible after takeoff, to reduce the workload (wheels up, flaps up, autopilot on). According to the instructor, to initiate a climb in the CJ with the autopilot engaged involves looking down, locating and turning the altitude select knob, checking the readout on the electronic attitude primary flight display, and then rotating the pitch wheel to begin the climb.
A pilot familiar with the aircraft can do this by feel, since the controls are differentiated by feel and the EADI altitude readout is just below the glareshield. The distraction, by design, is minimal to enhance single-pilot operation. FlightSafety also recommended that the aircraft recognition lights be illuminated below FL180. It is not clear from the accident report whether they were in use.
When on a collision course, the target aircraft with which you are converging will appear to remain stationary. It just "blossoms" suddenly in the windshield, assuming the pilot is in a position to see it at all. A closure speed of 300 kt equates to five miles per minute and allows little time to identify a threat and react.
This accident chain involved failure to follow procedures requiring an observer, high closure speeds, operation without a transponder, not using VFR flight following, and aircraft structure that may have blocked the other airplane from the pilot’s vision. An aircraft operating without a transponder in high-density airspace may not only be illegal, but it may also deprive the ATC system of an opportunity to spot a threat that the pilots involved could not.
Talking and squawking will help when scanning alone may not do the job.
The Air Safety Foundation site contains a range of excellent material, including on-line courses, safety topics, and accident analysis.
In the Airport Operations section of that site, you may freely access a document entitled “Operations at Non-Towered Airports”. This is a 16 page document that describes how pilots – IFR and VFR – should operate at the 12,000 non-towered airports in the United States. It is highly recommended that you access that site and document, and read the entire publication. Following are extracts that may encourage you, in the interests of safety, to access the site:
“….Nontowered airports—it’s a shorthand way to refer to airports not served by operating air traffic control towers, and that includes most of the airports in the United States. At present, some 12,000 airports are nontowered, compared to approximately 400 that have FAA towers. Millions of safe operations in all types of aircraft are conducted at nontowered airports in a variety of weather conditions. It works because pilots put safety first and use commonly known procedures….
….Right-of-way rules, and nontowered airport traffic patterns and procedures, exist for only one purpose—to prevent collisions in the air and on the ground. There are other benefits to adhering to the rules, such as an orderly traffic flow, noise abatement, and defusing potential right-of-way conflicts, but traffic separation is the prime concern…..
….Communication: VFR charts depict towered airports in blue, and nontowered airports are shown in magenta. The basic difference between operating at a tower-controlled airport and one without an operating control tower is the difference between instructions and advisories. Tower controllers issue taxi, departure, and arrival instructions for pilots to follow on specific air traffic control frequencies. At nontowered airports, you will hear advisories on a CTAF, but the responsibility for collision avoidance, sequencing, and knowing the local procedures lies solely with the pilot…..
….Safety Tip: All aircraft should monitor the CTAF when operating in the vicinity of nontowered airports…..
….Nontowered airports without a flight service station (FSS) generally will have a unicom frequency. These usually are staffed by fixed-base operation (FBO) employees who provide airport information. The unicom is usually the CTAF…..….Note: Unicom operators are not required to communicate with pilots, and if they do, there are no standards for the information conveyed…..
….Nontowered communication is not always easy, though, especially in metropolitan areas where there never seem to be enough frequencies to go around. It’s not unusual for several airports within radio range to share the same CTAF. The result is an aeronautical party line traveling at more than 100 knots…..
….Safety Tip: The CTAF should be used for two reasons only: Collision Avoidance, Airport Advisory…..
….Listening to a busy CTAF for only a few minutes will reveal too many long-winded conversationalists. Don’t use this vital collision-avoidance resource for aircraft or lunch scheduling, formation flying, saying hello to old friends on the ground, discussing sports scores, or expressing your displeasure at the guy who just pulled out on the runway while you were on short final…..
….Safety Tip: ASF recommends that pilots of no-radio aircraft use a hand-held transceiver at busy nontowered airports. This is an essential piece of safety gear…..
…..Collision Avoidance: At nontowered fields, it’s possible that pilots in noradio aircraft are shooting landings, IFR students and their instructors are practicing instrument approaches, helicopter pilots are perfecting their autorotation skills, or sailplanes are floating overhead. Not all pilots in the area are announcing their positions and intentions on the CTAF, or even looking out the window!.....
…..Midair collisions are the primary hazard associated with flying at nontowered airports. Most midair collisions occur in clear weather within 5 miles of an airport and below 3,000 feet, which is where aircraft congregate. Most collisions occur on final approach, generally with a faster aircraft overtaking a slower one. See ASF’s safety advisor on Collision Avoidance, www.aopa.org/asf/publications/sa15.pdf/.......
…..Safety Tip: An aircraft on a collision course will have no apparent movement relative to you, and the target will “blossom” just a few seconds before impact. Survivors of midair collisions frequently have no recollection of seeing the other aircraft. It is easy to lose a target in the ground clutter—be at pattern altitude before entering the pattern……
…..Collisions also occur on the ground, both on taxiways and runways. This is a problem at dusk, night, or during periods of low visibility. In calm or nearly calm wind conditions, be especially cautious. Another pilot may choose a different runway from the one you have selected. If the runway has a blind intersection or you cannot see the opposite end, be prepared. Remember that not everyone is on the CTAF……
…..Departing the Airport: When departing a nontowered airport, monitor and communicate on the CTAF from engine start until you’re 10 miles from the airport, so you’ll be aware of other traffic that could conflict with your route. The exception is if you need to switch frequencies after departure to talk to ATC or an FSS specialist……
…..Safety Tip: Remember to scan for traffic while talking on the radio……
…..Safety Tip: Air carrier aircraft and many larger aircraft seem to make more straight-in approaches than light singles. In many cases, they cannot fly a pattern much slower than 120 knots, which is faster than the cruise speed of most trainers. They might not see you, and although there may be cases where they should yield right of way, they sometimes don’t. Pursue the discussion on the ground, not on the radio……
…..A situation that poses special risks is when a nontowered airport is blanketed by a broken or overcast cloud ceiling or visibility is reduced—due to haze, for example—yet VFR conditions exist below the cloud layer. In that case, it’s possible for a pilot flying an actual IFR approach in the clouds to break out below the ceiling and suddenly encounter a VFR pilot turning base for a practice touch and go. It helps if both pilots are diligent in communicating on the CTAF, but even that doesn’t guarantee against a conflict on the final approach, because they can’t see each other until the IFR aircraft has descended below the cloud layer…..
…..Safety Tip: If possible, monitor the IFR approach frequency simultaneously with the CTAF, if your aircraft has more than one radio. It can provide valuable warning as to when an IFR inbound is about to pop out of the clouds…..
….The way to fly safely at nontowered airports is to REACT:
Radio - Listen to the automated weather observations, if available, and the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) for airport information and traffic advisories.
Eyes - Use them! Look for other traffic. This is the top priority when operating in the vicinity of a nontowered airport. Use landing lights so other pilots can see you more easily.
Announce - Report your position and intentions using standard phraseology.
Courtesy - A little courtesy will smooth out most problems. The “me first” attitude can be dangerous and rude.
Traffic Pattern - Follow the recommended procedures. before you fly. Research the necessary information about your departure and destination airports.
There are many other valuable documents which may be of interest – in particular a document entitled: “Collision Avoidance – Strategies and Tactics”. It contains, amongst other tactics, the following statement:
“…Become a target: If you operate an aircraft without radios or transponders, consider installing them….”
“HEAD TO HEAD” by Bruce Landsberg (From AOPA Pilot, January 2000.)
Midair collisions are one of the few types of accidents where seconds of inattention can lead to disaster. Everything is normal and then, in a split second, one or both aircraft may be out of control and spinning earthward. Fortunately, these collisions are relatively rare. In 1998 there were 14. Small details play significant roles in the accident chain, and in the case below, a transponder figures prominently.
On April 4, 1998, at about 10:34 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST), a Cessna 525 (CitationJet or CJ) and a Cessna 172 collided over a residential area in Marietta, Georgia. The CJ had departed from the Dekalb-Peachtree Airport at about 10:30 on an instrument flight plan to Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. According to radar data, the 172 departed Mathis Airfield, near Cumming, Georgia, at about 10:25. The 172 was on a power line patrol and did not file a flight plan.
Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The visibility at nearby reporting stations ranged from seven to 10 miles, with broken to overcast skies varying from 2,800 to 3,100 feet agl. Radar information showed that the collision occurred at 3,425 feet msl. This was approximately 2,400 feet agl or just about 500 feet below the clouds.
After takeoff, ATC assigned the CJ 3,000 feet and a heading of 280 degrees. At 10:33:01, ATC cleared the jet to a heading of 360 degrees with a climb clearance to 14,000 feet. According to radar data, the CJ had just vacated 3,000 feet msl and was passing 3,400 feet msl when a primary target merged with the radar target of the jet. The CJ pilot’s acknowledgment of the climb clearance was interrupted at about 10:34.
The Atlanta ATC radar showed a primary target (radar energy reflected from the skin of the airplane without electronic enhancement; i.e., no transponder) beginning at 10:25:07. The target appeared approximately two miles southwest of Mathis Airport and traveled to the southwest, intersecting the flight path of the CJ at the collision site.
At about 10:34, the 172 contacted the Dobbins Air Force Base Tower and identified itself as Seven-Whiskey-Delta. The controller responded, "Seven-Whiskey-Delta, Dobbins Tower." The aircraft replied, "Good morning, sir, Seven-Whiskey-Delta, Cessna One-Seventy…." The controller stated, "Seven-Whiskey- Delta, you were cut out." No further transmissions were received from the airplane, and the controller was unable to reestablish contact.
A reconstruction of the accident sequence based upon radar data showed that the CJ was tracking north, while the primary target that merged with the CJ target exhibited a southerly track with an approximate closure rate of 300 knots. A study was done to determine how long each pilot might have had the other aircraft in sight, based on radar data.
The data plots indicated that the 172 was either behind the CJ’s center windshield post or may have been visible to the right of the center windshield post for 35 seconds prior to collision. The plots indicate that the CJ would have been visible to the 172 pilot in the lower left quadrant of the pilot’s windshield somewhere be-tween 35 to five seconds before impact. The 172 was in level flight and collided with the climbing jet at an angle of about 52 degrees to the left of head-on.
The CJ came to rest inverted in the rear of a residence, and the 172 crashed inverted about a half-mile away. The commercial pilot of the 172, the airline transport pilot of the CJ, and the CJ’s three passengers were killed.
The wreckage of the CJ was scattered over an area of approximately 1.5 square miles. The horizontal stabilizer, elevators, and the top one-quarter of the vertical stabilizer separated from the airplane. Black tire marks were found on the vertical stabilizer leading edge. A small five-inch-long section, separated from the outboard end of the left horizontal stabilizer leading edge, was crushed aft, forming a tight three-inch-diameter U shape. This section was among the first debris located on the wreckage path. Additionally, blue paint that was similar to the blue paint of the 172 was found on the leading edge of the horizontal stabilizer. All of the fractures to the empennage exhibited overload failures.
The 172 wreckage was also scattered over an area of approximately 1.5 square miles. Witnesses observed the aircraft hit trees before reaching the ground. The wreckage burned in a post-impact fire. There was evidence of metal scrape marks on the underside of the tail cone. The nose landing gear, which was found with the main wreckage, exhibited fire damage. The upper strut housing evidenced an indentation between five and seven inches below the upper end of the strut. The indentation on the outboard left horizontal stabilizer leading edge of the CJ matched the indentation on the nose landing gear strut housing of the 172.
The CJ pilot held a type rating for single-pilot operation of the jet with 1,825 hours’ total flight time and 86 hours in the CitationJet. He had learned to fly in 1994 and moved rapidly through a series of high-performance aircraft, including a Beech 60 Duke and a Beech 90-series King Air. The pilot’s instructor, who had trained him from the beginning and attended FlightSafety International CJ training with him, described the pilot as highly qualified, competent, and detail-oriented. The pilot had enrolled in a CJ proficiency course that required attendance every three months.
The pilot of the 172 held commercial pilot and flight instructor certificates, as well as a mechanic’s certificate with airframe and powerplant ratings. He had logged almost 14,000 hours and in August 1997 had completed a flight review in the accident aircraft. FAA records indicated that the pilot’s certificate had been suspended on three occasions. In 1987, he received a 30-day suspension for a violation involving minimum safe altitudes. He received another 45-day suspension in 1990 regarding an ATC clearance for operations in Class B airspace.
In 1993, a 60-day suspension was given for violation of various sections of FAR Parts 23 and 91 that dealt with miscellaneous markings and placards on the airplane, airman certificate requirements, careless operation, and airworthiness of the airplane.
The 172 pilot’s power line patrol contract required that the pilot adhere to FAA regulations on certification of aircraft, special permits, etc., and that the surveillance aircraft must have an observer on board at all times. The observer’s job was to look at the lines while the pilot flew the airplane. According to the power company maintenance manager, who maintains the lines, if a pilot were discovered conducting surveillance flights without an observer, he would be counseled first and possibly terminated from employment if the action were repeated.
The pilot’s power line patrol records, however, showed multiple flights that did not reflect an observer, or "self" was recorded in the observer block.
The accident investigation team determined that the 172’s transponder function switch was in the Off position. The unit was returned to the manufacturer for testing. The ATC code switch wafers were burned but readable. The wafers and the function switch were compared to an undamaged unit that corresponded to a VFR code of 1200 and Off.
The pilot’s son, who had flown often with his father, stated that because of the type of flying involved, his father would leave the transponder in the Off position during normal flight until he approached airspace in which he needed the transponder. At that point, he would turn on the transponder before entering the airspace. According to FAR 91.215, the Cessna 172 was required to have an operating transponder while flying within the "Mode-C veil" extending 30 nautical miles from the Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport—and the accident occurred within this veil.
During interviews, the air traffic controllers stated that they did not observe the primary target associated with the 172 and therefore did not provide advisories to the CJ pilot. As mentioned earlier, the 172 was not in contact with ATC despite a call just before the collision occurred. In visual conditions, ATC will call observed traffic on a time-permitting basis to aircraft for which it is providing radar service, but that is not guaranteed. The controller’s handbook states, "Additional services are provided to the extent possible contingent only upon the controller’s capability to fit them into the performance of higher-priority duties and on the basis of limitations of the radar, volume of traffic, frequency congestion, and controller workload."
The workload in a single-pilot cockpit, regardless of aircraft type, can be significant. Even momentary and necessary distractions such as tuning a radio or programming the autopilot may mean less time for looking outside. The CJ pilot’s instructor reported that the FlightSafety training course recommended the use of the autopilot as soon as possible after takeoff, to reduce the workload (wheels up, flaps up, autopilot on). According to the instructor, to initiate a climb in the CJ with the autopilot engaged involves looking down, locating and turning the altitude select knob, checking the readout on the electronic attitude primary flight display, and then rotating the pitch wheel to begin the climb.
A pilot familiar with the aircraft can do this by feel, since the controls are differentiated by feel and the EADI altitude readout is just below the glareshield. The distraction, by design, is minimal to enhance single-pilot operation. FlightSafety also recommended that the aircraft recognition lights be illuminated below FL180. It is not clear from the accident report whether they were in use.
When on a collision course, the target aircraft with which you are converging will appear to remain stationary. It just "blossoms" suddenly in the windshield, assuming the pilot is in a position to see it at all. A closure speed of 300 kt equates to five miles per minute and allows little time to identify a threat and react.
This accident chain involved failure to follow procedures requiring an observer, high closure speeds, operation without a transponder, not using VFR flight following, and aircraft structure that may have blocked the other airplane from the pilot’s vision. An aircraft operating without a transponder in high-density airspace may not only be illegal, but it may also deprive the ATC system of an opportunity to spot a threat that the pilots involved could not.
Talking and squawking will help when scanning alone may not do the job.
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Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics
One of the respondents to a parallel thread on this site has cited a number of statistics and incident reports to demonstrate a point. We have previously cautioned against the validity of these arguments, as it is exceptionally difficult to place these incidents and causal factors in context. Statistics can be used to tell many different stories. As a very simplistic example, we provide the following:
The US AOPA Air Safety Forum site contains a collaborative link to the United States National Transportation Safety Board database, and enables viewers to access accident data tracking back to 1983.
The ASF data relates strictly to ACCIDENTS involving FIXED WING AIRCRAFT OF 12,500 POUNDS [5,700 KILOGRAMS] OR LESS in the United States of America.
A basic search of that database for the LAST TEN (10) YEARS found the following statistics:
Accidents where there were no injuries: 8818
Accidents where there were minor injuries (as the highest outcome): 2540
Accidents where there were serious injuries (as the highest outcome): 1724
Accidents involving fatalities (as the highest outcome): 3432
Total accidents: 16,514
This means that on average, there are 1,652 accidents per year in the United States, involving fixed wing aircraft of 5700 kilograms or less. On average, there are 343 fatal accidents involving fixed wing aircraft of 5700 kilograms or less per year.
A claim that has been made in your airspace design debate is that the United States represents best practice. This would seem to indicate that by the logic of your NAS architects, US accident rates of 1652 per year, and fatal accident rates of 343 per year are acceptable.
In (very) simplistic terms, if, as has been stated in documentation relating to your airspace debate, the amount of traffic in the United States is 20 times that of Australia, then using the logic of a proponent of airspace change in your country, an accident rate of 1652 divided by 20 – or 83 accidents per year - would be an acceptable safety target in Australia. That would translate to 17 being an acceptable target number of fatal accidents (involving light [GA and commuter] aircraft) per year.
Now, it is reasonable to assume that a fatal accident involves at least one fatality. So at least 17 deaths is acceptable. On reviewing statistics on fatal accident in the US over one recent month in last year (December 2003) it was found that out of 29 fatal accidents, there were 47 fatalities – so, on average, each fatal accident involved 1.6 fatalities.
This would seem to indicate, by the logic of your NAS architects, that 27 fatalities per year in light GA and commuter aircraft is an acceptable annual fatality rate in Australia.
This does not, of course, include statistics on accidents involving helicopters, and accidents involving aircraft at weights greater than 5700 kilograms.
Accessing the US NTSB site direct, it is possible to determine the total number of accidents that have occurred [as far back as the 1960’s] – including helicopters and aircraft heavier than 5700 kilograms. In 2003, there were 377 FATAL accidents in total in the United States – this includes all air operations, including Part 135 Air Taxi and Commuter Operations, and Part 121 Scheduled Operations.
Those 377 accidents resulted in 703 fatalities, at an average of almost 2 (1.9) per accident.
There were 2 fatal accidents involving Scheduled Operations, and 14 fatal accidents involving Air Taxi – Commuter Operations, for a total of 45 (fare paying passenger) fatalities – at an average of around 4 (4.2) per accident.
Using the “5% of the traffic” argument, and the suggestion that you should move to so-called best (United States) practice, it would appear that in Australia, you should be prepared to accept air accident fatalities at a rate of 35 DEATHS PER YEAR, with fare paying passenger fatalities at a rate of 2 DEATHS PER YEAR.
We must state that whilst the US ASF and NTSB statistics are accurate, the simplistic logic applied here in interpolating to Australia would NOT stand proper mathematical scrutiny – but then neither would the simplistic comparisons being done in other threads.
Given the amount of experience that the NTSB must have (over 1600 accidents per year), might it not be proper for them to examine your safety record, and operating conditions, carry out a proper comparative analysis, and suggest acceptable safety targets, or measure whether or not the safety levels apparently being achieved now in Australia are, perhaps, a better measure of “best practice”.
The US AOPA Air Safety Forum site contains a collaborative link to the United States National Transportation Safety Board database, and enables viewers to access accident data tracking back to 1983.
The ASF data relates strictly to ACCIDENTS involving FIXED WING AIRCRAFT OF 12,500 POUNDS [5,700 KILOGRAMS] OR LESS in the United States of America.
A basic search of that database for the LAST TEN (10) YEARS found the following statistics:
Accidents where there were no injuries: 8818
Accidents where there were minor injuries (as the highest outcome): 2540
Accidents where there were serious injuries (as the highest outcome): 1724
Accidents involving fatalities (as the highest outcome): 3432
Total accidents: 16,514
This means that on average, there are 1,652 accidents per year in the United States, involving fixed wing aircraft of 5700 kilograms or less. On average, there are 343 fatal accidents involving fixed wing aircraft of 5700 kilograms or less per year.
A claim that has been made in your airspace design debate is that the United States represents best practice. This would seem to indicate that by the logic of your NAS architects, US accident rates of 1652 per year, and fatal accident rates of 343 per year are acceptable.
In (very) simplistic terms, if, as has been stated in documentation relating to your airspace debate, the amount of traffic in the United States is 20 times that of Australia, then using the logic of a proponent of airspace change in your country, an accident rate of 1652 divided by 20 – or 83 accidents per year - would be an acceptable safety target in Australia. That would translate to 17 being an acceptable target number of fatal accidents (involving light [GA and commuter] aircraft) per year.
Now, it is reasonable to assume that a fatal accident involves at least one fatality. So at least 17 deaths is acceptable. On reviewing statistics on fatal accident in the US over one recent month in last year (December 2003) it was found that out of 29 fatal accidents, there were 47 fatalities – so, on average, each fatal accident involved 1.6 fatalities.
This would seem to indicate, by the logic of your NAS architects, that 27 fatalities per year in light GA and commuter aircraft is an acceptable annual fatality rate in Australia.
This does not, of course, include statistics on accidents involving helicopters, and accidents involving aircraft at weights greater than 5700 kilograms.
Accessing the US NTSB site direct, it is possible to determine the total number of accidents that have occurred [as far back as the 1960’s] – including helicopters and aircraft heavier than 5700 kilograms. In 2003, there were 377 FATAL accidents in total in the United States – this includes all air operations, including Part 135 Air Taxi and Commuter Operations, and Part 121 Scheduled Operations.
Those 377 accidents resulted in 703 fatalities, at an average of almost 2 (1.9) per accident.
There were 2 fatal accidents involving Scheduled Operations, and 14 fatal accidents involving Air Taxi – Commuter Operations, for a total of 45 (fare paying passenger) fatalities – at an average of around 4 (4.2) per accident.
Using the “5% of the traffic” argument, and the suggestion that you should move to so-called best (United States) practice, it would appear that in Australia, you should be prepared to accept air accident fatalities at a rate of 35 DEATHS PER YEAR, with fare paying passenger fatalities at a rate of 2 DEATHS PER YEAR.
We must state that whilst the US ASF and NTSB statistics are accurate, the simplistic logic applied here in interpolating to Australia would NOT stand proper mathematical scrutiny – but then neither would the simplistic comparisons being done in other threads.
Given the amount of experience that the NTSB must have (over 1600 accidents per year), might it not be proper for them to examine your safety record, and operating conditions, carry out a proper comparative analysis, and suggest acceptable safety targets, or measure whether or not the safety levels apparently being achieved now in Australia are, perhaps, a better measure of “best practice”.
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More Statistics!
We accessed the databases for the Australian Transportation Safety Board (ATSB), and found the following aviation statistics, which may be useful in comparing the data presented in a previous post.
Fatalities in Australian aviation accidents in the 10-year period from 1993 to 2002 (inclusive):
High Capacity Air Transport: 0
Low Capacity Air Transport: 17
General Aviation – Agriculture: 23
General Aviation – Charter: 105
General Aviation – Flying Training: 11
General Aviation – Other Aerial Work: 46
General Aviation – Private/Business: 384
TOTAL: 586
That would provide an average of 58.6 fatalities per year total (compared to the US Best Practice prediction of 35 per year), and 1.7 fatalities per year in fare paying passenger type operations (compared to US Best Practice prediction of 1.9 per year).
You MIGHT interpret this to mean that you do NOT have a safety issue related to passenger carrying operations that needs to be remedied immediately – that is, it would appear that current practice is achieving satisfactory results.
What the statistics MIGHT be interpreted as saying is that you might better focus resource on looking at means to INCREASE SAFETY LEVELS FOR GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS.
Fatalities in Australian aviation accidents in the 10-year period from 1993 to 2002 (inclusive):
High Capacity Air Transport: 0
Low Capacity Air Transport: 17
General Aviation – Agriculture: 23
General Aviation – Charter: 105
General Aviation – Flying Training: 11
General Aviation – Other Aerial Work: 46
General Aviation – Private/Business: 384
TOTAL: 586
That would provide an average of 58.6 fatalities per year total (compared to the US Best Practice prediction of 35 per year), and 1.7 fatalities per year in fare paying passenger type operations (compared to US Best Practice prediction of 1.9 per year).
You MIGHT interpret this to mean that you do NOT have a safety issue related to passenger carrying operations that needs to be remedied immediately – that is, it would appear that current practice is achieving satisfactory results.
What the statistics MIGHT be interpreted as saying is that you might better focus resource on looking at means to INCREASE SAFETY LEVELS FOR GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS.
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There has been considerable debate in threads on this site about the motivation for moving ahead with an airspace reform program in your country. The web-site of the Department of Transport and Regional Services makes reference to a report to your Minister Anderson entitled “Review of the National Airspace System and Competition for Airport Related Services Report”. Minister Anderson tabled this report, prepared by Wes Willoughby and Associates, in the House of Representatives on 28 May 2003.
One of our team accessed a copy of that report and found a number of statements relating to air traffic control efficiency as being a substantial justification for proceeding with the National Airspace System.
We were also easily able to access the following document on the web, produced by your ATC service provider, Airservices Australia.
BENCHMARKING BROAD PARAMETERS ACROSS SERVICE PROVIDERS
The following table provides a high level comparison of broad parameters across the ATNS providers of the United States, Europe and Australia during the year 2000. This table was compiled by Airservices Australia utilising benchmarking data provided by the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) in its Performance Review Report – An Assessment of Air Traffic Management in Europe during the Calendar Year 2000. The 2003 Performance Review Report (due in April 2003) will, for the first time, also include Australian data in its assessment. For further information please refer to the Performance Review System of the EUROCONTROL at its website - http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/index.html.
HIGH LEVEL COMPARISON FAA / EUROCONTROL / AIRSERVICES
Passenger departures (million) 641 / 450 / 41
Number of major hub airports 31 / 27 / 8
Size of en-route 9,820,000 / 10,545,000 / 11,830,000
controlled airspace (km2)
Size of core area (km2) 2,563,000 / 1,485,000 / 2,184,000
(high density traffic)
Number of en-route 9 / 17 / 2
centres in core area
Average number of sectors 37 / 8 / 36
per en-route centre
Average kilometres per flight 772 / 795 / 824
Average flight hours per flight 1.4 / 1.3 / 1.2
Total ANS costs (AUD) per IFR flight 590 / 1,126 / 347
Total ANS costs (AUD) per 1000km 763 / 1,416 / 421
ANS costs (AUD) per ATCO 530,844 /540,698 / 384,737
En-route ATCO/sector working position 9.8 / 17.9 / 6.1
IFR km flown/sector working position 15,908,254 / 14,091,342 / 12,231,662
IFR flights/total ATC’s 900 / 480 / 1,109
IFR km flown/total ATC’s 695,349 /381,747 / 914,156
Flight hours controlled/total controllers 1,254 / 621 / 1,331
By our assessment of this data, and with the benefit of some experience of current performance enhancement initiatives both in the United States and Europe, we would argue that the ATC efficiency of Airservices Australia is better, in all respects, that the so-called best practices of the United States, and substantially better than European practices. That is not to say that further efficiencies can’t – and should not – be pursued – but it is not a compelling argument for change in a hurried and unsafe manner.
In summary, and using the arguments and data we have provided previously, it is possible to draw the following conclusions:
1. SAFETY: The safety of your system, based purely on an analysis of incident and accident reports and statistics would appear to indicate that the current system of operation provides better levels of safety protection to fare-paying passenger operations, but exposes general aviation activity to higher levels of risk that those in the United States. This would prompt us to suggest a program to reduce risk to general aviation aircraft would better serve aviation in Australia.
2. PROCESS: From what we have been able to freely access on the web, and through your posts, the airspace design and implementation management process has been mishandled, and certain assumptions that have been used to underpin decisions in relation to the National Airspace System may be wrong. It would also appear that the comparative or reference system argument may not have been correctly applied.
3. COSTS AND EFFICIENCY: Comparative analysis – again freely available on the web – would appear to indicate that ATC service provision in your country is, at worst, as good as that in the United States, and most certainly better in many respects. It is also substantially better than European practice.
In short, there appears no safety or efficiency justification to have pursued the reform program and to have subjected your system to unnecessarily high levels of risk.
We must stress that we have formed these opinions on a limited source of information – but we are confident that a considered effort by participants in this forum to access more complete data would bear out our conclusions.
One of our team accessed a copy of that report and found a number of statements relating to air traffic control efficiency as being a substantial justification for proceeding with the National Airspace System.
We were also easily able to access the following document on the web, produced by your ATC service provider, Airservices Australia.
BENCHMARKING BROAD PARAMETERS ACROSS SERVICE PROVIDERS
The following table provides a high level comparison of broad parameters across the ATNS providers of the United States, Europe and Australia during the year 2000. This table was compiled by Airservices Australia utilising benchmarking data provided by the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL) in its Performance Review Report – An Assessment of Air Traffic Management in Europe during the Calendar Year 2000. The 2003 Performance Review Report (due in April 2003) will, for the first time, also include Australian data in its assessment. For further information please refer to the Performance Review System of the EUROCONTROL at its website - http://www.eurocontrol.int/prc/index.html.
HIGH LEVEL COMPARISON FAA / EUROCONTROL / AIRSERVICES
Passenger departures (million) 641 / 450 / 41
Number of major hub airports 31 / 27 / 8
Size of en-route 9,820,000 / 10,545,000 / 11,830,000
controlled airspace (km2)
Size of core area (km2) 2,563,000 / 1,485,000 / 2,184,000
(high density traffic)
Number of en-route 9 / 17 / 2
centres in core area
Average number of sectors 37 / 8 / 36
per en-route centre
Average kilometres per flight 772 / 795 / 824
Average flight hours per flight 1.4 / 1.3 / 1.2
Total ANS costs (AUD) per IFR flight 590 / 1,126 / 347
Total ANS costs (AUD) per 1000km 763 / 1,416 / 421
ANS costs (AUD) per ATCO 530,844 /540,698 / 384,737
En-route ATCO/sector working position 9.8 / 17.9 / 6.1
IFR km flown/sector working position 15,908,254 / 14,091,342 / 12,231,662
IFR flights/total ATC’s 900 / 480 / 1,109
IFR km flown/total ATC’s 695,349 /381,747 / 914,156
Flight hours controlled/total controllers 1,254 / 621 / 1,331
By our assessment of this data, and with the benefit of some experience of current performance enhancement initiatives both in the United States and Europe, we would argue that the ATC efficiency of Airservices Australia is better, in all respects, that the so-called best practices of the United States, and substantially better than European practices. That is not to say that further efficiencies can’t – and should not – be pursued – but it is not a compelling argument for change in a hurried and unsafe manner.
In summary, and using the arguments and data we have provided previously, it is possible to draw the following conclusions:
1. SAFETY: The safety of your system, based purely on an analysis of incident and accident reports and statistics would appear to indicate that the current system of operation provides better levels of safety protection to fare-paying passenger operations, but exposes general aviation activity to higher levels of risk that those in the United States. This would prompt us to suggest a program to reduce risk to general aviation aircraft would better serve aviation in Australia.
2. PROCESS: From what we have been able to freely access on the web, and through your posts, the airspace design and implementation management process has been mishandled, and certain assumptions that have been used to underpin decisions in relation to the National Airspace System may be wrong. It would also appear that the comparative or reference system argument may not have been correctly applied.
3. COSTS AND EFFICIENCY: Comparative analysis – again freely available on the web – would appear to indicate that ATC service provision in your country is, at worst, as good as that in the United States, and most certainly better in many respects. It is also substantially better than European practice.
In short, there appears no safety or efficiency justification to have pursued the reform program and to have subjected your system to unnecessarily high levels of risk.
We must stress that we have formed these opinions on a limited source of information – but we are confident that a considered effort by participants in this forum to access more complete data would bear out our conclusions.
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
It would seem that Voices of Reason understands the pilot psyche perfectly - almost all of us need spoon-feeding.
We have all been extremely well tutored by VoR on this thread as to HOW to methodically and diligently research the subject to make a PROFESSIONAL presentation - even to the point where VoR has SUPPLIED us with the material.
Obviously it has been no small project for our benefactor who has spent not an inconsiderable amount of time gleaning the subject matter.
It is now up to US (Australians) to take advantage of VoR's tuition and use it as the backbone of a Safety campaign.
It has been humbling to read your posts, VoR - Thank you (one/all) and Thank Heavens we still have PROFESSIONALS to give assistance to other professionals.
Thank you.
We have all been extremely well tutored by VoR on this thread as to HOW to methodically and diligently research the subject to make a PROFESSIONAL presentation - even to the point where VoR has SUPPLIED us with the material.
Obviously it has been no small project for our benefactor who has spent not an inconsiderable amount of time gleaning the subject matter.
It is now up to US (Australians) to take advantage of VoR's tuition and use it as the backbone of a Safety campaign.
It has been humbling to read your posts, VoR - Thank you (one/all) and Thank Heavens we still have PROFESSIONALS to give assistance to other professionals.
Thank you.
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****su-Tonka,
Please forgive us for being blunt - your "government safety authorities" ALREADDY HAVE all of this information - they CANNOT but have it! We have accessed this information from open sources - easily. We are not trying to partonise the readers and participants on this site - we are trying to say that if it is so obvious to us that something untoward is "going on" - then it MUST be obvious to intelligent people in your safety and service provider organisations.
We have little or no ability to access the behind the scenes discussions that have either deliberately ignored it, chosen deliberately to misinterpret it, or, God forbid, have been directed to ignore it.
We cannot be more direct - use the information we have supplied as a means of building a legitimate case to access the "behind the scenes" information through Freedom of Information legislation.
Then ALL will know the truth.
Please forgive us for being blunt - your "government safety authorities" ALREADDY HAVE all of this information - they CANNOT but have it! We have accessed this information from open sources - easily. We are not trying to partonise the readers and participants on this site - we are trying to say that if it is so obvious to us that something untoward is "going on" - then it MUST be obvious to intelligent people in your safety and service provider organisations.
We have little or no ability to access the behind the scenes discussions that have either deliberately ignored it, chosen deliberately to misinterpret it, or, God forbid, have been directed to ignore it.
We cannot be more direct - use the information we have supplied as a means of building a legitimate case to access the "behind the scenes" information through Freedom of Information legislation.
Then ALL will know the truth.
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****zu-Tonka,
You are getting dangerously close to the truth.
What we are about to say will compromise our position, and make it impossible for us to continue further in this particular forum under this particular bi-line. We also need to be exceptionally careful that we do not inappropriately malign any particular person and run the risk of legal action.
We were shown information which prompted our participation in this forum. That information outlines a complex matrix of interactions between senior airspace management personnel in your country, leading to the highest levels. It is possible to interpret how and why certain airlines have taken certain positions to protect other initiatives - how certain senior airspace management staff have been influenced to adjust or re-interpret their positions, and how certain infuences have been brought to bear to ensure certain outcomes. That is why we have suggested that you attempt to access all of the relevant documentation through legal process.
You will immediately respond conspiracy - that is not, we believe, the case - though you may prove differently. We believe that the proponent(s) of change are not that clever, and that is not their motivation. This is being driven by a few people with sufficient aura or position to directly influence - by reason of that aura - the normal checks and balances. We believe that this process has developed such momentum that it will be impossible to stop cleanly - hopefully it will stop without an accident.
Let us be clear - we are NOT accusing anyone of deliberately seeking to undermine safety levels in your country. We believe that the proponents of change genuinely believe that the outcome of their process will be better than your current system.
We have provided factual evidence that challenges this assumption. We have also provided factual evidence that the process is incorrect.
We have enjoyed participating in this forum - we hope you have success in your endeavours.
WE NOW RELUSE OURSELVES.
Woomera - if you believe what we have written in this message could in any way be interpreted as identifying and maligning any individual(s), please delete it immediately. Our thanks for your support.
You are getting dangerously close to the truth.
What we are about to say will compromise our position, and make it impossible for us to continue further in this particular forum under this particular bi-line. We also need to be exceptionally careful that we do not inappropriately malign any particular person and run the risk of legal action.
We were shown information which prompted our participation in this forum. That information outlines a complex matrix of interactions between senior airspace management personnel in your country, leading to the highest levels. It is possible to interpret how and why certain airlines have taken certain positions to protect other initiatives - how certain senior airspace management staff have been influenced to adjust or re-interpret their positions, and how certain infuences have been brought to bear to ensure certain outcomes. That is why we have suggested that you attempt to access all of the relevant documentation through legal process.
You will immediately respond conspiracy - that is not, we believe, the case - though you may prove differently. We believe that the proponent(s) of change are not that clever, and that is not their motivation. This is being driven by a few people with sufficient aura or position to directly influence - by reason of that aura - the normal checks and balances. We believe that this process has developed such momentum that it will be impossible to stop cleanly - hopefully it will stop without an accident.
Let us be clear - we are NOT accusing anyone of deliberately seeking to undermine safety levels in your country. We believe that the proponents of change genuinely believe that the outcome of their process will be better than your current system.
We have provided factual evidence that challenges this assumption. We have also provided factual evidence that the process is incorrect.
We have enjoyed participating in this forum - we hope you have success in your endeavours.
WE NOW RELUSE OURSELVES.
Woomera - if you believe what we have written in this message could in any way be interpreted as identifying and maligning any individual(s), please delete it immediately. Our thanks for your support.
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VoR
VoR
Dear sir,
I am amazed at your volume of information, on another thread "No Radio Dick" I have writen a post which I would seek your comment on.
Our independent consultants are currently completing a design safety case for terminal airspace at Broome International Airport Australia's busiest uncontrolled regional airport with medium sized RPT aircraft.Namely 737 300,400,800 Bae146 Braziliers Metroliners.
Current total movements 25,000pa. In 1998/9 we found our MBZ procedures were not working 5 incidents in 6 weeks involving RPT aircraft after discusion with CASA we increased the MBZ to 30nm and installed a CAGRS equivalent to an ASS in USA: dedicated and manned in a tower by exFSS or ATC personnel and auditored yearly by CASA.
We have placed a FOI on all gov departments re 2c and now placed the matter in our lawyers hands as they have exceeded the regulated information supply date.
We are cosidering all avenues available to us, would you know of an international person willing to discuss this further? My email is [email protected] our web site is www.broomeair.com.au
I will bring this thread to the attention of our study team who include two of Australia's most qualified persons as well as universtity statisticians. We would gladly pay for a review by your nominated expert.
There are at least five other airports within 20% of our usage also servicing a/c upto 737 800, our sole aim is to avoid a disaster, unfortunately our airlines and authorities have been placed under pressure to implement NAS, I refer to to the Ministers "letter of charter" to the new CASA CEO which is on the CASA site.
I had discussed our concerns with the former CEO of CASA the last time being 48hrs before his resignation which he did not mention to me or his senoir staff before it was submitted. This occurred just after the change of legislation that placed the CEO under ministerial control and the axing of the CASA board.
The public is hard to convince while our major airlines accept the change and the airlines need ministerial approvals for route expansion so there is a deafening silence.
Complaints from professional pilots asociations and ATC are publically dismissed as self interest scare mungering. We can't raise a legal case due to our laws protecting the minister so we can't get it into a court and have the NAS methodology exposed on an even playing field untill there is an accident.
Even our state government Western Australia and the Australian Transport Council a coucil of all state ministers of transport are being stymied. The Council demand for a design case is being challenged as the Federal Minister, the Chair of the council was not at the meeting when this resolution was passed.
We have advised the Australian Senate subcommittee of misleading information given to it by NASIG. It is chaired by a Gov Senator and the subcommitte has not been reconvened since our letter some 2 months ago.
I am the Chairman of Broome Inernational Airport and am willing to state the above as I would welcome a slander case so we could be in court before the feared loss of life.
These facts I place before as they show the difficult task we have in using data analysis mathmatical modelling and risk and safety assessment to stop 2c being implimented.
In other words this is a plea for further professional consultancy to help us try to present the best case to the current NPRM which has to be answered by CASA. In such a determination by CASA the minister is not supposed to be able to direct the CEO either on its findings or decision.
regards Mike Caplehorn
Chairman Broome International Airport Group
Dear sir,
I am amazed at your volume of information, on another thread "No Radio Dick" I have writen a post which I would seek your comment on.
Our independent consultants are currently completing a design safety case for terminal airspace at Broome International Airport Australia's busiest uncontrolled regional airport with medium sized RPT aircraft.Namely 737 300,400,800 Bae146 Braziliers Metroliners.
Current total movements 25,000pa. In 1998/9 we found our MBZ procedures were not working 5 incidents in 6 weeks involving RPT aircraft after discusion with CASA we increased the MBZ to 30nm and installed a CAGRS equivalent to an ASS in USA: dedicated and manned in a tower by exFSS or ATC personnel and auditored yearly by CASA.
We have placed a FOI on all gov departments re 2c and now placed the matter in our lawyers hands as they have exceeded the regulated information supply date.
We are cosidering all avenues available to us, would you know of an international person willing to discuss this further? My email is [email protected] our web site is www.broomeair.com.au
I will bring this thread to the attention of our study team who include two of Australia's most qualified persons as well as universtity statisticians. We would gladly pay for a review by your nominated expert.
There are at least five other airports within 20% of our usage also servicing a/c upto 737 800, our sole aim is to avoid a disaster, unfortunately our airlines and authorities have been placed under pressure to implement NAS, I refer to to the Ministers "letter of charter" to the new CASA CEO which is on the CASA site.
I had discussed our concerns with the former CEO of CASA the last time being 48hrs before his resignation which he did not mention to me or his senoir staff before it was submitted. This occurred just after the change of legislation that placed the CEO under ministerial control and the axing of the CASA board.
The public is hard to convince while our major airlines accept the change and the airlines need ministerial approvals for route expansion so there is a deafening silence.
Complaints from professional pilots asociations and ATC are publically dismissed as self interest scare mungering. We can't raise a legal case due to our laws protecting the minister so we can't get it into a court and have the NAS methodology exposed on an even playing field untill there is an accident.
Even our state government Western Australia and the Australian Transport Council a coucil of all state ministers of transport are being stymied. The Council demand for a design case is being challenged as the Federal Minister, the Chair of the council was not at the meeting when this resolution was passed.
We have advised the Australian Senate subcommittee of misleading information given to it by NASIG. It is chaired by a Gov Senator and the subcommitte has not been reconvened since our letter some 2 months ago.
I am the Chairman of Broome Inernational Airport and am willing to state the above as I would welcome a slander case so we could be in court before the feared loss of life.
These facts I place before as they show the difficult task we have in using data analysis mathmatical modelling and risk and safety assessment to stop 2c being implimented.
In other words this is a plea for further professional consultancy to help us try to present the best case to the current NPRM which has to be answered by CASA. In such a determination by CASA the minister is not supposed to be able to direct the CEO either on its findings or decision.
regards Mike Caplehorn
Chairman Broome International Airport Group
Last edited by WALLEY2; 10th Feb 2004 at 00:31.
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Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics
We (!) continue to be enlightened by the discussion on this thread. Whilst the post by VoR on the above topic (like the others) is comprehensive, it should be noted that the numbers quoted are in relation to all accidents and not to airspace only related accidents.
The level of safety can be gauged in many ways and reducing occurrences by using establish risk management methodology is (and must be) common practice.
An activity is often referred to as “ultra-safe” if the number of occurrences is less than one per million. In aviation this is usually per sectors or departures. World-wide the number of fatal accidents in the airlines is less than 1 per million departures, however in Australia it is 0 and tragically in Africa it is over 10. Using the similar guidelines it would be interesting to compare the GA rate of fatal accidents (worldwide estimate or domestic) against this or a similar benchmark. And more to the point, the number of airspace related occurrences?
Of course it means that an activity that is ultra safe may have occurrences which involve fatalities. Like everything we do, the application of appropriate risk management techniques is/should be normal practice, however often we don’t even think about it (like crossing the street). In airspace management, it is procedures and education that are the major risk mitigators. It would be good if the proponents of NAS understood this.
The political interference (because that is what it is) in the NAS project has been and will be its downfall. This is especially so, when there are no proven benefits and the truth is not a priority.
I have expanded some of my own views on the “rollback” thread as I believe it appropriate that this one remain on topic.
VoR… keep up the good work....and don't bail out! Your words of advice and wisdom are needed.
The level of safety can be gauged in many ways and reducing occurrences by using establish risk management methodology is (and must be) common practice.
An activity is often referred to as “ultra-safe” if the number of occurrences is less than one per million. In aviation this is usually per sectors or departures. World-wide the number of fatal accidents in the airlines is less than 1 per million departures, however in Australia it is 0 and tragically in Africa it is over 10. Using the similar guidelines it would be interesting to compare the GA rate of fatal accidents (worldwide estimate or domestic) against this or a similar benchmark. And more to the point, the number of airspace related occurrences?
Of course it means that an activity that is ultra safe may have occurrences which involve fatalities. Like everything we do, the application of appropriate risk management techniques is/should be normal practice, however often we don’t even think about it (like crossing the street). In airspace management, it is procedures and education that are the major risk mitigators. It would be good if the proponents of NAS understood this.
The political interference (because that is what it is) in the NAS project has been and will be its downfall. This is especially so, when there are no proven benefits and the truth is not a priority.
I have expanded some of my own views on the “rollback” thread as I believe it appropriate that this one remain on topic.
VoR… keep up the good work....and don't bail out! Your words of advice and wisdom are needed.
Grandpa Aerotart
Voice of reason,
Let me add my voice (sic) to those thanking you for this information.
The ATSB statistics are particularly interesting in light of the general feeling that standards having been slipping for many years in Australian GA.
It has been said, by more than one participant in this forum, that the practical standards of licence applicants for CPL in the last few years, say 10, wouldn't have seen them pass a PPL flight test 20+ years ago. As someone who has done my fair share of training in the Charter/Supplemental airline/Corporate jet areas of the industry I can only agree.
I have stated recently, in this forum, that if the 'influential individual' who has been so instrumental in airspace reform had placed his influence behind a drive to raise standards I might begin to respect him.
The likelyhood of that is, in my opinion, very low as this individual was the head of CASA when that body saw fit, undoubtedly driven by political issues, to outsource most of the standards oversight to industry. This led to our present system of Authorised Testing Officers who replaced, in large part, the previous Departmental Examiners of Airmen. the few Examiners who remained within CASA became Flying Ops Inspectors and spend an inordinate amount of their time in the office doing paperwork. A discouragingly large % of FOIs, but not all by any means, are essentially individuals who 'could not make it' in industry and retreated to CASA. From discussions I have had with peers this is not an unknown problem in most western aviation regulatory bodies.
It doesn't take a brain surgeon to see that an ATO who applies 'too high a standard' on licence skills tests won't be asked back to that training facility in the future....as the ATOs income depends on how many tests he conducts per annum the pressure is obvious. The stories I have heard from an ATO friend would make your hair stand on end!!
I have also stated on this forum that airspace reform, particularly the kind we have had in the last 10+ years, is fiddling while rome burns. As you have suggested we already equal or better worlds best practice in airspace utilisation etc.....something those of us who spend our working lives crewing internationally already knew....what we need is a drive towards higher standards.
Unfortunately that requires money that succesive Australian Govts have proved they are not prepared to spend.
Much better to waste tens of millions of dollars of taxpayers money on ill advised airspace tinkering, driven largely by one idiot (yes emotional...I know), than spend a fraction of that money on striving for worlds best practice in pilot skill/knowledge standards.
Chuck.
Let me add my voice (sic) to those thanking you for this information.
The ATSB statistics are particularly interesting in light of the general feeling that standards having been slipping for many years in Australian GA.
It has been said, by more than one participant in this forum, that the practical standards of licence applicants for CPL in the last few years, say 10, wouldn't have seen them pass a PPL flight test 20+ years ago. As someone who has done my fair share of training in the Charter/Supplemental airline/Corporate jet areas of the industry I can only agree.
I have stated recently, in this forum, that if the 'influential individual' who has been so instrumental in airspace reform had placed his influence behind a drive to raise standards I might begin to respect him.
The likelyhood of that is, in my opinion, very low as this individual was the head of CASA when that body saw fit, undoubtedly driven by political issues, to outsource most of the standards oversight to industry. This led to our present system of Authorised Testing Officers who replaced, in large part, the previous Departmental Examiners of Airmen. the few Examiners who remained within CASA became Flying Ops Inspectors and spend an inordinate amount of their time in the office doing paperwork. A discouragingly large % of FOIs, but not all by any means, are essentially individuals who 'could not make it' in industry and retreated to CASA. From discussions I have had with peers this is not an unknown problem in most western aviation regulatory bodies.
It doesn't take a brain surgeon to see that an ATO who applies 'too high a standard' on licence skills tests won't be asked back to that training facility in the future....as the ATOs income depends on how many tests he conducts per annum the pressure is obvious. The stories I have heard from an ATO friend would make your hair stand on end!!
I have also stated on this forum that airspace reform, particularly the kind we have had in the last 10+ years, is fiddling while rome burns. As you have suggested we already equal or better worlds best practice in airspace utilisation etc.....something those of us who spend our working lives crewing internationally already knew....what we need is a drive towards higher standards.
Unfortunately that requires money that succesive Australian Govts have proved they are not prepared to spend.
Much better to waste tens of millions of dollars of taxpayers money on ill advised airspace tinkering, driven largely by one idiot (yes emotional...I know), than spend a fraction of that money on striving for worlds best practice in pilot skill/knowledge standards.
Chuck.
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WALLEY2.
The wheels have fallen off your email address.
"...refused (blackholed by bl.spamcop.net); Blocked..."
No good posting uncontactable email addresses in PPRuNe!
Woomera
The wheels have fallen off your email address.
"...refused (blackholed by bl.spamcop.net); Blocked..."
No good posting uncontactable email addresses in PPRuNe!
Woomera
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Nas Supporters Where Are You?
Is it just me or have we suddenly lost the pro NAS voice?
Additional Safety Enhancements... C Everywhere over terminal areas D&C; elsewhere C above FL125 (in radar J curve); C above FL180 (in "non radar" areas).
70 Sydney mile circle; 40 miles at CB (higher needs less distance on 3 degrees); 50 miles at BN, CG, AD, PH, CS; PRE 27 November C steps back into D tower airspace... All to caputre the FL125 at three degrees; so some extra C steps to some D towers... Generally RPT protection; fantastic!
E space corridors, might come back to DU and MIA. It's all about reducing risk to pre 27/11 levels.
All in all it looks like rollback to me; sorry "Additional Safety Enhancements."
Additonally, isn't this what was suggested by Civil Air, the union that allegedly doesn't support me professionally just industrially, right from the start.
Does it look similar to LLAMP??? It was so long ago...
Bottle of Rum
Additional Safety Enhancements... C Everywhere over terminal areas D&C; elsewhere C above FL125 (in radar J curve); C above FL180 (in "non radar" areas).
70 Sydney mile circle; 40 miles at CB (higher needs less distance on 3 degrees); 50 miles at BN, CG, AD, PH, CS; PRE 27 November C steps back into D tower airspace... All to caputre the FL125 at three degrees; so some extra C steps to some D towers... Generally RPT protection; fantastic!
E space corridors, might come back to DU and MIA. It's all about reducing risk to pre 27/11 levels.
All in all it looks like rollback to me; sorry "Additional Safety Enhancements."
Additonally, isn't this what was suggested by Civil Air, the union that allegedly doesn't support me professionally just industrially, right from the start.
Does it look similar to LLAMP??? It was so long ago...
Bottle of Rum