BIK 116.8;

Hate to say it mate, but you are looking at some OLD data. The FAA doesn't have old computers anymore. We have gotten rid of most of the old stuff. We do indeed have some older software around in the host processing in the new hardware, but our computers don't fail very much anymore. We are also working with new displays and some of the enroute facilities are working with new data systems also. More are to come on line in the next 8 to 12 months.

We are also working on the new HOST replacement hardware and software. The design is being ironed out and the requirements are set in firm jello as of now. Hopefully we will see some good direction on this new program by next year (ERAM)....

regards

Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Region
Safety and Technology Chairman

116.8;

While I am at it <G>... The Boeing plan does look sexy doesn't it. The problem with it though is when you get into it, it lacks substance and the HOW they are going to do it. We have talked with them about the PLAN... They can never answer the questions of just how they are going to be able to do it, nor can they answer how much is it going to cost and who is going to pay for it...

While working on projects ( I enjoy working out of the box ) we have asked the engineers to come up with some really neat stuff that we controllers would like to have to make our jobs eaiser so that we can move more aircraft. It is something that we like to do here if you aren't to familiar with the US ATC... The answer from the experts who are writing all this wonderful code ( Don't work for the FAA or any other part of the govt. they are private enterprise. ) is that we can't do that yet. Even the more or less minor things that we would like to do we are told that we can't afford it even if we can make it work. So, if it is unaffordable, then it is for now unobtainable.

There are indeed things that we can do better, and hopefully we can come up with an integrated solution for it that is not cost prohibitive. But many of the things that are going to be needed to improve the through put of aircraft is going to require equipment not just on the ground and in space, but in the cockpit, and as we have found out with datalink. The airlines are not in a position to desire to upgrade their fleets and spend the money. Nor are they in a position to upgrade the nav in the 70's and 80's era glass cockpit aircraft that use DME/DME for navigation. This is leaving them out of some of the leading edge nav stuff that we are trying to do to improve efficiencies of getting about in both the terminal and enroute airspace. So it isn't just the problem of the ATC provider.

While we are speaking of equippage. For us to do our jobs as controllers, we have to have everyone doing things about the same. When we start mixing navigation equipage which in the future may determine separation criteria it makes our jobs a LOT harder. If we want to increase our output, then we have to make the job easier and not harder...

Would like to go on, but my brain is mush right now after a nice evening shift with thunderstorms about...

regards

Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Region
Safety and Technology Chairman

Impressive post BiK. I can share your views on the datalink future. We will probably be heading into that general direction. Like it or not.

Good Lord BIK !!!!

How long did it take you to do all that !!!

My finger is hurting just from scrolling down :p

I found Bik's post so impressive that as an amateur I am wary of dissenting, but two points seemed to be a generalisation a little too far:
---------------------
"By classifying the AIAAs as class G the UK government is tacitly suggesting that it’s perfectly safe - anyone is allowed to fly there at anytime. If it wasn’t safe to fly there then the government would not have classified it as class G."
-------------------

Perfect safety is unattainable - if the Government/CAA/NATS or whoever has a tacit position, it is that there is an acceptable level of risk, which is around 10 to the -8 or so per flight. If you look at what actually kills people in UK airliners, collisions with military (or anything else) in class G is historically less than dropping Tridents onto Staines, fires at Manchester, hitting motorway embankments after shutting down the wrong engine, and taking your chances with various foreign places. Including risks to third parties, there is also the issue of getting lumps of blue ice, inter alia, or even whole Korean airliners, fall out of the sky.

------------------------
"Which leaves those aircraft without an automatic altitude reporting function. Various flying magazine advertisements show altitude encoding blind altimeters available in the UK, tax paid, for under £150. Is this too much to ask? I think not. "
------------------------------------------------
There is more to it than that. I fly a non-transponder glider and weigh 205 pounds including parachute, with a max cockpit weight allowed of 208. I use up the last three with water, food, and a logger (a black box recording my flight).

There is no £150 solution for me. What would be the price, even if I could accommodate the weight including another battery, the size in my already crowded cockpit, and whatever on my already full panel, for a transponder, + alt encoder, + fitting, + certification, for a non-standard installation?

I would guess that gliders comprise more of the UK traffic on good summer days than all the rest put together (an educated guess, based on extrapolation from the last published survey of UK airspace utilisation). Hardly any have, or could at present have, transponders. Ditto for many permit PFA-type aircraft.

I have no more wish to have a collison than anyone else, but what kills UK glider pilots historically is mostly self-inflicted - other forms of bad airmanship; then collision with other gliders; then collisions with GA traffic; and not yet with heavy stuff. Of course, the first time the latter happens it may swing the figures if the airliner is also mortally afflicted, and of course we don't want any of these things to happen, but the solutions have to practicable and affordable.

On a more general note, I am on the side of those who see airliners leaving controlled airspace by choice and mixing it with the military, me, and everyone else, to save fuel and/or keep routes "viable", as compromising their attitude to safety. It is an arguable position where there is no linking airspace, but questionable, showing profit triumphing over safety, where there is a protected but longer route available.

Where I found the BBC programs disturbing was the apparent continuing lack of willingness by the big professional outfits to invest in safety until forced to do so. E.g. Milan and ground radar. Or even Leeds. It just confirmed what I have seen over three decades - the big boys want safety when somebody else pays for it, e.g. by more controlled airspace which takes from me at no expense to them, but not in equally urgent and probably more life-saving potential but costly measures such as rear-facing seats, ways of getting passengers out of burning aircraft (a la Manchester), this new data link, video cameras to show which engine is really on fire (Kegworth), etc.

Chris N.

Bik_116.80
 

Well well, aint it amazing the responses you get when you turn to reasoned discussion rather than your previous method of debate. Having read your post I have reassessed my opinion of you. I may not agree with what you say a great deal, but thats the point of a discussion thread. At least now I can respect your viewpont as one coming from an intelligent human being.

To answer your question, a False RA, or at least my definition of it with regard to my post, is an RA given byTCAS when there was never any danger of an infringement of separation. In my case the action taken by the pilot, which was correct in accordance to airline policy, was to divert from my safe clearance, and climb into opposite traffic, which I had to turn away to avoid a loss of separation.

As you say, TCAS if left to its own devices will keep a/c apart, but we have separation minima to respect, TCAS will not adhere to that. If you are happy with that scenario then you're a braver man than me.

There are many quotes I could use from your post which show quite clearly to me that you do not understand fully the job of an ATCO in a busy radar environment. I do not pretend to be aware of the intricacies of piloting an aircraft even though I have many freinds, and indeed family who are pilots.

For example, you seem to think that TCAS gives enough situational awareness to know the controllers plan. Enough to question the plan. It doesn't matter how much traffic you can see on TCAS, until you know the flight plan data of every target you see you CANNOT have situational awareness. Doesn't matter how good the user is.

I could go on but my break is at an end, gotta go keep the skies safe again!!
Cheers Bik for a well reasoned post. Sure we will meet again.:ok:

Last Episode...


"Crowded Skies
Sun 17 Aug, 9:00 pm - 10:00 pm 60mins

Made by the company behind the 2001 Emmy-nominated 'Challenger: Go For Launch', this major documentary series looks at the most terrifying air collisions and near misses of the past - and explores how we can avoid these catastrophes in the future.

In the wake of the tragic mid-air collision over Switzerland last year, the series takes a detailed look at the world's air traffic control system, looking at the people and technology responsible for handling some 5 million air passengers every day.

Through detailed examination of disastrous air collisions, the series asks whether the lessons of the past have been learnt and how, with a system already running at full capacity, the industry will cope with the expected doubling of air traffic by 2020.

The Blame Game

Last summer the unthinkable happened when two modern airliners collided 35 thousand feet above Switzerland. This accident sent shock waves throughout the industry, not least because of the resulting 71 deaths - including a party of Russian schoolchildren making their first trip abroad having won an essay writing competition to win a holiday in Spain.

With moving testimony from the families who lost their children in the crash, along with accident investigators and colleagues of the Zurich air traffic controller who was blamed by many for the accident, this programme forensically examines exactly what happened that night. Mid air collisions are very rare, but near misses are not uncommon over British skies and the programme goes on to ask if a Lake Constance collision could happen over here.

Stereo Widescreen"

http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctwo/listings...0_4224_1228_60


LXGB

BIK116.8
 

Well, what a marathon. I'm sure you'll get more respect shown to you after that civil and well-thought out post.

As I said, I agree totally that we, like just about everyone, is facing automation. It won't necessarily do it better, but if the bosses could shift the traffic at a cheaper price, they will. When my son is asked "what do you want to do when you grow up?", his answer is "not ATC". "Why?". "Because my dad says there wont be any in the future". Like everything else that is automated, it will be less flexible, more specialised and be a painful transition. Hopefully I'll be old enough to accept my redundancy with good grace.

A couple of points. You misunderstood my position about CPDLC and HF. I was making the point that (in the oz experience), CPDLC was better than HF voice communication. You know, over the ocean and in the boonies where pilots have to use HF. CPDLC is a marked improvement. But where VHF voice comms are available, they are far superior (if both pilots and ATC speak the same language). I estimate I could do 10 times the amount of ATC with VHF voice, than with CPDLC. You certainly couldn't attempt to use CPDLC in high traffic environments. Until you take the pilots out of the loop. I'm pretty sure it's developers were fully aware of this, but had the 'big picture' in mind. All the elements are already there. The TAAATS platform, the 'maestro' flow control program, CPDLC. It's not a huge step to have it all talking together to the avionics controls on a/c. Of course, all the individual elements would need to work significantly better:hmm: but you get the idea.
Secondly, your faith in TCAS is a worry. You mention the idea that pilots can have sit. awareness if they use it correctly. Absolute crap. Whether it's the tech aspects, or the human side, it isn't happening. TCAS has limited ability to process targets, and if it gets too many (more than 25??), it just drops them off. Even engineers can't explain to me how or which targets it drops. Frequently, the threat a/c is merging/same direction, and TCAS seems particularly poor at identifying said threats (something to do with rate of change of threat). Planning in ATC frequently requires more than 9000' forward. eg. last week I had an arrival stopped at FL200 vs a departure on a different freq (at that time) climbing to FL180 (note to pilot- 2000' sep to stop false RAs - efficient?). The descender thru FL240 queried where his traffic was (it was climbing thru FL110 and crossing) as he couldn't see it on TCAS. That wastes my time when I could be doing something else. It never used to happen. It is becoming more and more common (see other thread this forum), and I could go on and on, but I won't.

At the end of the day, capacity enhancements are governed more by available airports and runways than anything to do with ATC.

Happy holding.

Wow. And there was silly old me thinking that ATC was just about stopping aircraft from bumping into each other.:ooh:

433...

I am intrigued by your definition of a "False RA". I would define a "False RA" as one that was given, when if no further action was taken by the one/both aricraft, no risk of collision would occur.

You seem to say that if you clear, say a climber to FL150, and an opposing descender to FL160, or even FL170, then if an RA is generated it is "false" because your clearance would separate the aircraft. True, your clearance would, but only if BOTH pilots follow your clearance. If one fails, a collision may result...

What to do about this? It comes down to the airmanship of the pilots - we need to avoid high rates of climb / descent, particularly close to the assigned FL / Altitude. In the USA they brought in a rule something like >1000'/m until ~1000' to go, then 500'/m. This would avoid most of these RAs. In addition, most RAs are preceded by a TA, and if that is not a clue to reduce the RoC/D, then I do not know what is.

Please remember (both pilots and controllers) what TCAS is for - it is the backup system for when the ATC system fails - which may be for all sorts of reasons (aircraft or ground induced). There seem a few posts here a bit "anti TCAS" - having flown with it for some years now, I had an aircraft the other day without it, and felt very vulnerable.

However, as has been stated, it is not an alternative to ATC. Quite often it does not "display" proximate aircraft we are visual with. Anyone who decides they can propose an alternative course of action based on TCAS is being unfair to the ATCO. On the other hand, ATC should not mind an instruction being queried if TCAS shows the instruction may be hazardous - that's the value of a backup system...

All IMHO of course!

NoD

NigelonDraft

True, but there is no solution to aircraft not following and adhering to restrictions. I would not consider it to be a "false RA" if separation were infringed when the RA was issued. My problem is when RA's are given when I have a controlled situation and still nearly 2000' separation, and it is suddenly turned into an uncontrolled situation with less than 1000' separation, forcing me to turn traffic away which was previously not traffic. Its a frightening feeling sitting behind the radar and not being in control of the picture, watching aircraft getting closer and not being allowed to do anything about it because a pilot is following company policy and reacting to an RA.

For the record I am NOT anti TCAS, I can see the benefits of such a system, but I do believe the criteria for an RA should be changed, and controllers able to override an RA. Not the generally held view I know, but there ya go!

There has been a lot of talk about types of service in this thread, a couple questioning why we give avoiding action against unknown traffic in class G airspace, instead of trying to explain, the follwing are the rules for RAS wich we are BOUND by, so if you ask for RAS these are the rules which will guide you to your destination.

A RAS.
RAS is an air traffic radar service in which the controller will provide advice necessary to maintain prescribed separation between ac participating in the advisory service, and in which he will pass to the pilot the bearing, distance and if known, level of non-participating traffic, together with advice on the action necessary to resolve the confliction. Where time does not permit this procedure to be adopted, the controller will pass advice on avoiding action followed by information on the conflicting traffic.


"RAS will only be provided under IFR irrespective of met conditions.

The controller will expect pilots to accept radar vectors or level allocations which may require flight in IMC. Pilots not qualified to fly in IMC should accept RAS only where compliance with ATC advice permits the flight to be continued in VMC.

There is no legal requirement for a pilot flying outside CAS to comply with instructions because of the advisory nature of the service. However, a pilot who chooses not to comply with advisory avoiding action must inform the controller. the pilot will then become reponsible for initiating any avoiding action that may subsequently prove necessary.

the pilot must inform the controller before changing heading or level.

The avoiding action instructions which a controller may pass to resolve a confliction with non-participating traffic will, where possible, be aimed at achieving separation which is not less than 5nm or 3000ft, except where specified otherwise by the regulating authority. However, it is recognised that in the event of the sudden appearance of unknown traffic, abd when unknown a/c make unpredictable changes in flight path, it is not always possible to achieve these minima.

Information on conflicting traffic will be passed until the situation is resolved.

The pilot remains responsible for terrain clearance, although ATSU,s providing a RAS will set a level or levels below which RAS will be refused or terminated. "

So, if you want RAS outside CAS, in s busy class G area, this is why you are given a turn or three! :ok:

Bik re "When ready, descend..., cross xxx at FL nnn" For more than 30 years that.s been my normal way of doing things. I've always tried to do it in such a way as to allow plenty of leeway for the pilot i.e. in such time that the average rate need not be more than 2000fpm, Unfortunately, as i stated, many pilots are now automaticallly questioning the clearance.
I agree entirely with the American method of reducing vertical rate within the last 1000ft - much more comfortable for the pax. We;re having some success in educating our military into doing ir when in proximity to civil traffic.
Perhaps classing them as False RAs is wrong, Nuisance RA is maybe better, but when a pilot follows a False/Nuisance RA it will, one day, lead to the mid air the system is supposed to help avoid.
Nothing,either on ths ground or in the air, is a substitute for good airmanship and "controllership"

edited for spelling

Agree entirely with Lon More.

The RAs are not 'false' since the TCAS is doing what it is designed to do ... predict the closest point of passage and issue a resolution to make sure that the pilot does something about it to prevent a collision.

They can of course be considered 'nuisance' RAs since they do not take account of the whole story (cleared levels) and may affect ATCs plan, however we have to understand that the pilot needs to heed the warnings which may save his and others lives.

And of course the PR which came with TCAS when introduced many years ago said that pilots will generally only deviate by about 400' before returning to their cleared level (hahahahaha :) )

433

<< but there is no solution to aircraft not following and adhering to restrictions>>
There is in fact - TCAS!

<<My problem is when RA's are given when I have a controlled situation and still nearly 2000' separation>>
The solution here lies with the pilots, and them not using stupid RoD/C close to assigned Level off Altitudes. And if necessary, prescriptive maximum RoC/D need to be introduced as law i.e. as in the USA.

<<suddenly turned into an uncontrolled situation with less than 1000' separation>>
I can see it must be frightning for a controller - if both pilots follow their RA, it is actually "controlled", but by TCAS. And his separation criteria is tight - I have had an RA and with 500' of separation it was "Maintain Vertical Speed" throughout...

<<because a pilot is following company policy and reacting to an RA>>
It is not, or at least should not be "company policy". It MUST be National / ICAO policy. TCAS will only work if we ALL ALWAYS follow its commands, or bin the whole thing...

<<and controllers able to override an RA>>
Disagree - this was what in effect led to the German / Swiss midair. TCAS is a very "close in" tool, and in "reversal" type scenarios it is quite hard work to react to it in its timescales in the FD - there is no time to check, or get overriddden from the ground. All we can do is follow it, as quickly and accurately as possible, and only then inform ATC.

I do come back to the original point. As an ATCO, and providing legal separation minima, aircraft under your control should hardly see a TA, and never an RA. If they do, it is either an error on your part, which is what TCAS is for, or (far more likely) one or both aircrew using inappropriate RoD/C. And as an aside, ATC clearances requiring high RoD/C e.g. outside the 3x table, are in turn more likely to generate TAs/RAs....

Good debate as ever!

NoD

Nigel

Couple of points, first, the Swiss tragedy was, in the beginning, a controller error, in that two aircraft were converging at the same level. In this case TCAS gave instructions which were tragically overridden by ATC, amongst much confusion. The scenario I am talking about is somewhat different, where there is no chance of loss of separation, I would like the chance to inform pilots of this fact so that when they recieve a nuisance RA (agreed, better terminology) they can choose to disregard it. I can give traffic info to pilots in such a case, indeed I often do, but it seems it is just a waste of time and breath. If I have screwed up and TCAS can save my butt (not to mention the lives of those on board) then naturally I will be glad to let that happen.

Now I don't know that much about the technical side of TCAS, but would I be correct in saying that different operators can calibrate theis TCAS differently? I only ask because there is one particular operator who, in my limited experience, have more RA's than others. A few weeks ago, I had two of their aircraft, one climbing, one descending, cleared levels separated by 1000 feet, opposite direction. Neither were high roc/d, both had traffic info. At 1800' separation, both had simultaneous RA's and both reacted. I have similar situations nearly every day, but never before with the same outcome. In this case it was not busy, and there was no other tfc to effect, but next time?

As I said, it is against the instinct of any controller to sit back and let a machine which is not aware of the traffic picture carry out your separation for you, but it is what we are legally obliged to do. Let me put it this way, if you were on the operating table for major heart surgery, what would you prefer, an experienced surgeon trained to deal with all scenarios, or a robot who knows only the programmed operation? Not a perfect analogy I know but you get the picture.

DoD;

Slowing climb or descent 1000 prior to level is not rule in the US. It is merely a suggested operating practice...

regards

Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Region
Safety and Technology Chairman

REALITY CHECK
 

I have been reading with avid interest as these threads sway from one topic to the next some with heated exchanges. I am also fascinated by the space age technology purported to be just around the corner; changing all of our jobs to one of management rather than control (promotion at last). One question vexes me however, in the utopia that will obviously be all our futures, will aircraft transponders be able to select 8s and 9s and will ATC systems be able to read them? As this octal system has prevailed since the 1960s forgive me for being slightly cynical if I do not immediately sign up to, the dream of a worldwide-integrated ATC system watched over by big brother just yet.

Jack-oh;

Actually with the advent of ADS-B or whatever comes after that <G>, there won't be a need for the old transponder as we know it in the future. The ADS-B will have it's own unique identifier which will tell you the aircraft identification as well as the type of aircraft...

regards

Scott

PS. It is just going to take a long while to mandate equippage so that everyone can use the newer systems. Costs money and that is hard to get mandated.

Tonight's programme - Skyguide - Peter "X"
 

I am watching the latest in this series and am appalled that it would appear, at least from what I believe I just heard, that the Danish ATC who was working two screens, who had no working telephone service, whose screen was faulty therefore not showing a collision alert, is being blamed for what happened over Lake Constance??!! Surely this can't be true .. OK so maybe he could have called a colleague back from break to work the second station but neither of them would still have been able to telephone the airport control tower.

My heart goes out to him ...

It also appears that the Tupolev's pilots were (1) 8yrs experience (in command) and (2) airline chief pilot (second in command) and the second in command overruled TCAS and overruled the captain...


:(

Agree Brocken -

This was a very good reconstruction, and there were all kinds of difficult and unusual circumstances that he was being asked to deal with. Including having to talk with telephone engineers asking him to take the primary phone system offline while dealing with two workstations - en route and approach control. He agreed and was left without a phone. Which would have averted the accident if it was online.

If he is being blamed for what happened, I'm appalled.

I wouldn't want to be a Controller if this is the environment they have to work in.


If anybody is going to stand trial for Manslaughter it should be his managers. To make a scapegoat of this controller for the gaping flaws in the system would be shameful.

Did anybody carch the programme mentioned at the end of tonight's episode?

Thought I heard someting about the lo-cost sector of the market.

Sounded like channel 4 in ten minutes, but kids flipped the remote before i heard the rest.

Any clues?

Does anyone know what the current situation is with regards to the Controller?

I've just watched the program and am as appalled as BS and Wedge that the Controller, under crazy conditions, is being blamed. What were the Management thinking????

Oggy. program referred to is on BBC4 - I only get 1 and 2 so who knows!

dd

Thanks dd,

I don't have access at the moment either.

If anyone knows if it'll be repeated or if it was worth watching I'd be grateful.

Brockenspectre

The program suggested that the Captain was being checked by his boss, who was in in the right hand seat, ie, a more senior pilot acting as examiner AND first officer (possible nightmare scenario there).

The captain, it seems, wanted to obey the TCAS, which is what we are all trained to do, but he was overuled by the examiner.

Like your other writer, I feel for the poor ATCO, there can be no way he carries any of the blame. He was just the last link in a very flawed chain.

I didn't see the BBC4 prog but it was about the revolution in the budget airline market.

New ATC documentary on BBC2
 

I saw the programme about the low cost airlines. Not too bad and the moral of the programme, the passengers now have a choice for their money.

Can't remember where I saw it, either on another thread here, or in a report at work, but there was a statement that many of the old Eastern Block states required the pilot to follow ATC instructions, even when conflicting with the RA.

As I interpreted it, they weren't blaming only the Danish ATCO on duty at the time, but also the confusion caused on the flight deck of the Tu154, SkyGuide management, the Tu154 Chief Pilot and one or two other aspects.

It did make the point, though, that there was a whole chain of error factors and that the chain could have been broken at any one point.

Like the Reason Model - watching that programme with a sense of mounting horror, watching all the holes in the swiss cheese line up...

The thing that really got to me (as a pilot) was the report that the Russian crew were alive for a further two minutes after impact, all the way down to the ground, and that the 757 carried on from the impact for quite some distance/time (5 minutes?) knowing that, minus a tail, there was only one way they were going to go...:ooh:

Horrible thought. I know many pilots whose two most fervent prayers are that, if aviation kills them, it is quick and clean, and that people don't think they died being a !!!!!!!!.

Interesting comment Lon, although I'd better not comment further given that the press are watching....

Fairly early in my ATC career I was talking to a passenger a/c which crashed... it too was being flown by a captain being "checked out" from the RH seat. It was quite different circumstances to the one portrayed last night but it makes you wonder. Peter X will never forget - I know for sure.

Huggy.... remember the Vanguard which crashed in Belgium? The guy talked all the way down from cruising level. What effect that must have had on the ATCO I dread to think.

Yes, by far the best programme out of the three in the series, and a comprehensive account of the terrible sequence of events that led to the tragedy.

If it highlighted one thing to me more than any other, it was that pilots must always, always follow the TCAS when they are in an RA situation. There is a school of thought that says that controllers should only give avoiding action in the horizontal plane in such a situation, and let the TCAS take care of the vertical element. Controllers have no way of knowing how the TCAS systems on each aircraft will "agree" to resolve the conflict, and the result can often be differing instructions from the voice in the cockpit and the voice on the ground. Pilots should always follow the TCAS, but there is bound to be a split-second of doubt when ATC is telling you the opposite.

However, this is in no way criticism of Peter X, who was entirely a victim of bad management and circumstance - the incident could have happened to any ATCO. I only hope that he is not charged.

A very disturbing, but in my opinion, excellent programme. The makers seemed to have based it on facts and there seemed to be little uniformed comment.

It was interesting to see the news reports from just after the event where many (including a DHL spokesman) were quick to blame the Russian's saying they had repeatedly ignored ATC instructions. If the programme was accurate then the first they knew about a problem (apart from the TCAS warning) was 43 seconds before impact. If any blame can be laid on the Russian crew it is that they chose to follow the ATC command rather than TCAS. The disagreement between the RH and LH seats is a classic example of CRM failing.

I agree that the programme was a good representation, but did I imagine that at one point during the reconstruction the DHL aircraft was cleared to the "Tango Golf October" beacon? :)

At the risk of upsetting a lot of people, could those who are blaming the management please explain why they think the management bear more responsibility than the controller and the Russian training captain involved.

One could argue all day long about reconstructions. I didn't catch the "TGO" beacon comment. But the "DHL flightdeck" certainly wasn't a 757.

LTP's point is a good one; best practice must surely be that controllers only give avoiding action TURNS rather than level changes. Whether or not the controller in question felt that this was an avoiding action scenario is arguable.

As for the chain of events [and although I'm a controller myself] I have to say that I disagree that the controller was entirely free from blame. He was one of the last links in "the chain", and could have told the engineers to get lost. I fully accept that he should never have been placed in that position to start with, but he must shoulder at least a modicum of responsibility as he chose to continue providing two different services singlehandedly even knowing that the system was seriously degraded.

I have been through the "then you'll be unplugged!" scenario, it leaves a very bad taste in your mouth - bottom line is, however, it's my licence and my responsibility and I'll call it as I see it.

Fair points 1261.

I suppose the question is did he act reasonably at all times and to the best of his ability. The answer has to be no, but at the same time he was not negligent in my view.

He did make mistakes, but understandable mistakes, and he is only human after all.

Re: the telephones - he could, and should, have told them to get lost, but he was trying to cooperate and would have felt he was being unhelpful not to.

The real error was his failure to call his colleague back when things got busy. But again, he was I suppose only trying to be cooperative with those around him. He was not being negligent in my opinion. It's easy with the benefit of hindsight to point out where he went wrong, and when he took those decisions he could have had no idea of their ramifications. Stating the obvious I know, but it's worth bearing in mind that this was just another quiet evening and he would not have been anticipating any of the circumstances that contrived to cause this terrible accident.

I do feel the utmost sympathy for him, I suspect many good controllers would have acted as he did and if just one chink in the armour had remained disaster would have been averted. Like almost all aviation accidents. He will have to live with this for the rest of his life, and with the knowledge that he was just unlucky for this to occur while he was on duty, and incredibly unlucky in that if things had been just a little different (ie the Boeing had been 20ft higher) it would have gone down as just a very dangerous airprox.

One lesson that I think should not be forgotten from this accident is that the Captain should always call the shots whoever is on the flight deck. The apparent argument between him and the more senior check Captain was crucial to the accident, the Captain of the TU knew he was being checked and could not have felt good about contradicting a direct command from a senior pilot. But his reaction to follow the TCAS RA was the correct one. The Captain's decision should never be compromised. Even if all around him think it's the wrong decision - and even if it is the wrong decision.

It was my understanding (not from the BBC program) that the Russian check pilot insisted on following ATC instructions, because that is the rule in Russia. :eek:

The underlying problem is that TCAS has been brought into the avaiation system without a clear understanding of how it works to those on the ground and in the air. Nor has it been properly integrated into ATC procedures. Furthermore, the ICAO rules on TCAS are open to different interpretations - perhaps why the Russian wanted to follow ATC instructions instead of TCAS?

I thought I understood TCAS, until I attended a 2 day briefing, and my eyes were opened - wide. :O TCAS works, and works well - however, it is imperative that once a pilot commences an RA, that s/he inform ATC immediately, and that ATC DO NOT ATTEMPT to resolve the problem once an RA has been declared. It is this last bit which is very difficult for a controller to accept, and to follow. After all, controllers spend their whole time actively trying to prevent flights banging into each other, and never to just sit and watch it happen. However, once a TCAS RA is commenced, both pilots must follow it and ATC must keep quiet - then it will work.

There is still a huge lack in training controllers to do this, and in making clear operational instructions that they must do so. I doubt Peter X had received such instruction, otherwise I am sure he would have told the Russian pilot "follow your TCAS" and not tried to intervene.

It is also very worrying to hear controllers speaking of telling pilots about potential traffic which may cause a TCAS RA, and suggesting/implying the pilot should then avoid following it, if forewarned. A pilot must follow an RA. If he doesn't TCAS will detect the lack of change of profile and instruct the other pilot to a greater deviation. Most nuisance RAs (as they are called) can be resolved by asking a pilot to reduce his rate of climb/descent, so that TCAS does not generate the RA in the first place.

When I attended the TCAS briefing, I was disappointed that many of the controllers feel affronted by TCAS, and that it is a suggestion that they have failed in their job. Well sadly, sometimes it is, but that can't be a bad thing if it stops people being killed, can it? It should be appreciated, though, that TCAS works with information which a controller does not have, and which is more up-to-the-second than the information displayed on the ATC screen. Nuisance RAs which are a problem, can be resolved by a more active profile management by the flight crews, and improvements to the FMS software to reduce rates of climb/descent when close to the target level.

Better TCAS information and training for controllers and pilots is essential, especially in an increasingly crowded sky, to avoid a repitition of what happened at Ueberlingen.

Well, TCAS works well most of the time. We have too many documented reports of when TCAS didn't work. Everything was done correctly by the flight crew, but the machine was doing things that were not healthy... It is NOT a perfect piece of equipment...

regards

Scott H. Voigt
NATCA Southwest Regioin
Safety and Technology Chairman

Name me a piece of equipment that does work perfectly. And how many reports constitutes "too many"?

Put simply, having TCAS is more useful than not having it. ICAO needs to ensure that all pilots know to follow TCAS when its instructions are contradicted by ATC, and all ATCOs need to provide turns rather than climb/descent for avoiding action.

TCAS did not cause the Lake Constance accident. One factor was the Russian crew failing to follow it.

Incidentally, and given 20/20 hindsight, if the controller wanted to spend some time on the other screen, why would he not give the Tu154 1000' descent immediately he got on his screen - then he knew there could be no conflict. Instead, he had only two aircraft to play with, and had them at the same level... :confused:

Hug...agree totally.You have answered your own question earlier when you said the holes where lining up and the chain could have been broken at any stage.As to giving descent..I agree...he could also have called his mate back into the ops room(we are encouraged to do so).Management could also have had some sort of "quality assurance" in place whereby it could be shown that to remove a principal piece of equipment e.g. direct dial telephones the standby equipment would be serviceable and routing the calls correctly. As to TCAS ...I may be dim ..but is there a stage in the process where(as it appears on the documentary)the second aircraft is not responding in the manner agreed by the two transponders that one says (electronically) ****** this lets look for another solution and changes its' mind...for example BOTH aircraft now descending.TCAS thinks lets try CLIMBING one?

Bring back fam flights!!