Again, for radar, would you want a blank background? No maps, no extended centrelines, no danger areas marked?

No emergency squawk highlights, no STCA, no selected flight level?

HD, imagine doing Air Deps in marginal weather; SVFR is waiting and waiting for you to get Helimed visual.

Equipped with binoculars, you strain to determine where Helimed would be out of the window. You look at the ATM, then back to the window, then back to the ATM, then back to the window. You spend 10, 20 seconds to just spot it, and inform SVFR. It comes over to you, but you need to spend an unequal amount of time keeping it visual, more than you need to because it would take precious seconds to re-acquire it visually if you loose it.

Now imagine that there's a box drawn on the window, around Helimed, telling you exactly where it is, so you don't have to spend any time at tracking it unaided. Just the odd quick glance and you know exactly where it is.

Is that not a benefit?

Good egg may have gone someway towards convincing me that "digital towers" are a good thing. But, why do they have to be part of a "remote tower" operation ? Why not just apply the benefits that they provide to a TWR situated & manned on the aerodrome concerned ?

Because City want to demolish the current one, and don't want to spend money/sacrifice land to build another one.

They don't have to be remote. Hence the term "digital tower".

In theory, I guess, you could have HUDs with the same information over a traditional tower's glass windows. But then, depending on where you are looking at it from your perspective is skewed.

A solution for that would be to use cameras and display eqpt and no windows.

From there it's a question of cable length and susceptibility.

Then you hit additional opportunities to reduce costs, both as Gonzo mentioned for the airport and for potential pooling of ATCOs at a remote centre.

Remote facilities will not suit all airports. Digital towers, I suspect, would provide benefits for most.

OK so City tower is done remotely from Swanwick.
But City Airport owners then decide it's still not cost effective and maybe a change of ANSP is called for.
Who owns the 'kit'? Can it be moved to another location? Where could it be done from if not City itself? If done from a room at City, does the room have windows in the walls? If you can see out of this room at City, why bother with all this expensive stuff, why not let the controllers look for themselves directly at the airfield?

Chevvron, I imagine that the first few points are covered by the ANSP contract for City Tower.

Your subsequent points, well, they're covered in posts above. Digital tower technology potentially gives you the ability to provide more information to the ATCO. But to do that effectively you might need to remove windows from the picture, pardon the pun.

To overlay data on top of visuals, you've got a few methods:

-Plot it on top of a video feed displayed on screens
-Project it on to windows a la HUDs (not viable where more than one person is operating due to parallax.
-Equip each operator with a personal HUD/Helmet mounted display (medical restrictions? Comfort? Serviceability of equipment? How do I know I'm seeing the same data/view/functions as the person I'm co-ordinating with? How is that recorded for investigation? Even more hurdles with this one).

Why do you need all this complicated kit to do what is, in essence, a fairly simple job.

Why do you need to overlay 'data' on top of visuals? It doesn't matter if it's on windows, screens, or a HUD/Virtual Reality Hat.

What data will be displayed?

The controller has still got to look down at the strips/EFD display to update it, and consult the ATM as to the local traffic situation/distances from touchdown/turns onto track, etc.

If someone can't work out/remember the identity of the a/c they can see out the windows, which are under their control, could i suggest that they may be in the wrong profession?

If you can't see out of the windows, chances are you'll be in LVPs, and working from the EFD Panel/ATM/A-SMGCS screens anyway?

There's something I read about incorporating 'heat-sensing technology' too. How can you positively identify an aircraft based on an infra-red camera spotting a few flames? What are the EGT limits which will ensure identification is maintained?

I hope I'm proved wrong, but this seems to be the over-complication of a fairly straight-forward task, for the benefit of managers, share-holders and accountants......With the possibility of 'information-overload thrown in, too boot.

Ok. Good, concise answer. Thank you. So, this happens to be the case at LCY, but at other aerodromes will not the temptation be to do it because it can be done - linked to obtaining maximum utilization of staff i.e. one ATCO performing TWR at various locations. Good egg has a far more difficult task to persuade me (not that I matter) that this can ever be a good idea !

Zooker.....

Please accept this in the spirit in which it's intended!:ok:

Why did we introduce radar? Procedural was perfectly good, and any controller worth his or her salt could keep the picture in their heads. I mean this new-fangled radar is so unreliable. It'll never catch on. Picks up cars, buildings, weather, anaprop, I can hardly tell if there's an aircraft there at all!

Why did we introduce SSR? Primary radar was perfectly good, any controller worth his or her salt could keep the picture using primary. And any, half the time pilots enter the wrong codes any, and the other half of the time the Mode C readout is wrong! It'll never catch on.

Why did we introduce code-callsign conversion? Raw SSR codes were perfectly good. Any controller worth his or her salt could keep the picture using the codes. I mean they're even written on the strip! I keep yelling at my radar trainees to look at their strips, not the radar.

Why did we introduce labelled ground radar systems? Primary SMR was perfectly good. I controlled before A-SMGCS introduction and GMC was fine, even in low vis. Anyone good enough could keep the picture in their heads. And now we'd probably even put spacing on inbound if it failed, in good visibility! Shocking I tell you. Good controllers don't need a ground radar!

Why did we introduce Mode S Vertical Stack Lists? Any radar controller worth their salt can manage the stack using their strips.

Why on earth does our electronic strip system automatically highlight any aircraft positioning to other LTMA airfields so that the controller doesn't forget to co-ordinate before start? When I trained we had paper strips and any GMP controller worth their salt would just remember!

And why does our electronic strip system automatically highlight certain flights by certain aircraft types on certain routes which require release by radar? Any GMP controller worth their salt could remember all the 'release subject...' flights, surely?

Why have we just introduced a pushback indicator on the Lighting panel? Surely any controller worth their salt could keep the picture of GMC in their head......surely any good controller wouldn't need a back up in case they forget that they have just routed an aircraft along a taxiway on to which they have also just approved a pushback.

I think the main problem with all this is putting the virtual tower in swanwick. What happens when London city want to chuck nats? Can they just reroute the feed somewhere else and keep on working?

I was about to reply to Gonzo, but GASA has raised a good point.

How will future EGLC ATCOs undertake aerodrome familiarisation runs?

Surely, there are plenty of locations adjacent to EGLC where this facility could be located?

Gonzo, most of what you list above are improvements to the ATCOs task. No problems with any of that......But I'm yet to be convinced on this one.

When vertical stack lists were introduced at my unit, I rang approach, who were sitting 20 feet away and asked them to set up the VSL for the XXX Hold.

"Sorry I can't", was the reply......."Why not?", I enquired.

"Because it belongs to 'NERL', and NSL won't pay for us to have it", came the reply.

Accountancy rules, apparently.

Yes, as I've noted upthread, it will be interesting to see how familiarisation with the real world environment will be maintained.

Zooker, I think many of us are 'yet to be convinced', including me, but let's not just dismiss it out of hand and hark back to the days of bandboxed GMC with paper strips and no radar, when men were men etc etc.

Not aiming this at you personally by the way.

Controllers as a bunch are cynical, and I'm one of the most cynical out there, believe me. However, when faced with a new development/technology, many just seem to turn away from it (it'll never work! bah humbug!) rather than asking themselves "how could this work? How could we use this to improve the ATCO task?"

Such as the example I quoted above about highlighting low level traffic, or perhaps displaying WIP on the visual picture, and providing warnings if aircraft turn towards it or cross an imaginary line? Or providing instant 'deemed separation' by drawing a vertical line on the screen.....as long as the aircraft stay their respective sides of the line, they are considered separated. Etc etc.

We live in interesting times. Why not experience them first before judging, that's all I'm saying.

Gonzo, all the points you raised were good. And I certainly ran into all of them during the progression of my ATCO career. But, although this equipment does enhance the assistance to performance of the ATCO's task, it surely also makes it harder to actually do the job safely in the case of multiple TWRs being controlled by just the one ATCO. I do not think that new equipment (as you mentioned) introduced in the past served to make the task harder for the ATCO.
I can accept that it does enable this "multiple TWR controlling" to be done, but I seriously doubt that , in an overall sense, that in doing so it is enhancing safety.

Gonzo,

Not taking it personally at all, just all good fun, and, as you say, "We live in interesting times".

Safe controlling. as always.....And get some JCBs in to build that new runway, you'll be able to control it 'digitally' from Swan Wick.......And do EGLCZT on your breaks. :E

going all digital is great, works wonders ---- just ask British Airways ........

......but the worst thing about remote/digital/virtual/whatever towers? No more sunset photos that the Daily Telegraph can nick without asking permission and print, blown up to almost half a page.......:}

Kcockayne, trust me I'm not here to persuade anyone about multiple validations (and certainly not about controlling more than one aerodrome simultaneously).

My view is that digital towers offer safety benefits for controlling, some of which are detailed above.

Multiple validations at a remote centre are an endgame concept which throws up all sorts of issues. Issues which will be faced once more than one suitable aerodrome operation has moved to a remote centre. As yet this scenario is hypothetical...LCY (the first aerodrome) isn't due to "move" until late 2019. Will others follow? When? Will ATCOs have the capacity to maintain validations at 2 aerodromes?

Each aerodrome has its own peculiarities despite efforts to push for "standardisation" (i.e. trying to push a one-size-fits all ethos) across them.
Sure Aerodrome Control responsibilities are the same, but rules are applied differently at different airports for good reason - a simple example of this is the variety of definitions in MATS Part 2s regarding what constitutes "runway vacated".
In this regard I don't think it's as simple as comparing it to multiple radar validations where, by and large, the same rules apply. There would also be equipment issues - radar workstations are, by and large, the same...I doubt the same can be said for remote tower workstations due to the operational differences and equipage of individual aerodromes.

There are obvious safety risks with the concept of multiple aerodrome validations but are there any safety benefits? I'm yet to see anything that suggests there are/will be. The only driver I see for multiple validations is cost. So I too am unconvinced about that concept.

In short I believe digital towers have safety benefits and, as yet, I see no safety benefits in multiple aerodrome validations.

I read somewhere that the space presently occupied by the air traffic control tower is needed for a new 'lounge'.

Mind you, if Brexit happens and all the banks move to the EU, Wapping International Airport will be much less-busy.......And ideally-suited for r-TWR operations.

This could be the basis of NATS' thinking?

I don't see any safety benefits in aerodrome controllers doing approach radar control and aerodrome control simultaneously good egg. In fact, for all of my ATC career it was illegal to do so.

But I see it's gradually being 'shoehorned' in.

And I bet someone down at the 'Ministry Of Bright-Ideas' has already worked out that you could easily put the APS picture on one of the big 'window-screens'.

I already asked that at #137

Feels slightly off-topic, but hey, I'll give it a go regardless...

What are the safety risks AND how have they been mitigated?

How naive do you think the airport is? Do you not think they will have explored this topic? I'd suggest that they have and are satisfied with whatever provisions have been made.
We could all postulate about possible outcomes of switching ANSPs but any arrangements are highly unlikely to be made public. They'd be set out in contractual agreements between the two parties.

On the subject of controlling endorsements at multiple units, many moons ago at RAF Linton on Ouse, I held 14 of the available 18 endorsements as the Unit operated 4 aerodromes: Linton, Topcliffe, Dishforth and Church Fenton. My Blue Book had Linton Tower, Ground, Talkdown (PAR and SRA), Departures and Zone; Church Fenton Tower, Ground, PAR and Approach/Director; and Topcliffe Tower, Ground, Approach/Director and SRA (on ACR 430). The only ones I didn't have were Linton Approach, Director and Supervisor, and Dishforth Tower.
I had no bother staying current as there was plenty of traffic but most of that traffic was Tucanos and Fireflies flying academic training sorties, so there was little variety other than the swarms of gliders and GA that used to monster Fenton Approach.
I do not like the sound of controllers being expected to control different remote towers simultaneously at all, so I see little saving in manpower terms, but I see no reason why they could not control different towers from the same location at different times within the limit of their licences. Imagine a tower controller operating in the Scottish Highlands; he/she could control both ends of all the short island-hops in sequence from, say, Prestwick. The savings will come in reducing the required infrastructure at aerodromes.
Once they sort out the bandwidth and display issues, I could work from home!

Two aspects regarding Digital tower implementation:

1. Rules / Regulations - i.e. the rule for reduced separation in the vicinity of an aerodrome - ATCO has both aircraft in sight. Now an electronic device is to be used and not glass windows. EASA has already looked at some words to try and manage this change, ICAO is doing the same but with a different approach, but does any electronic display method, with or without additional tools, equate to the same as glass windows? Maybe a bigger question, if electronic tools are added to the "visual" can the ATCO use those added tools to provide reduced separation? (As Gonzo showed a potential usage in post #133) We already have pilots reporting when asked to report visual with other traffic - "I see him on my TCAS!"

2. Complexity - So we presently have glass windows (needs cleaning occasionally) and the controller's eyeball.
Digital towers - LCY glass window is to be replaced with 14 fixed cameras and 2 mobile cameras with power sources - computer / data transfer to another location - computers / data retrieval at this new location / display methods at new location (14 for a 360 by the looks of it). All of these have points of failure in them, so increase risks. Anyone who has worked with ATC simulators my appreciate how often display devices can have issues or fail. All of this to replace the simple glass window, without any fancy add on tools, before the controller's eyeball. Sounds like an increased risk of failure to me - lots of expensive mitigation measures required to reduce the risk, yet still the possibility exists. Unfortunately the long term costs of all this added electronic and mechanical complexity still appears to be less than either land or staff costs.

I would have rather seen money spent on an "augmented reality" idea of Google Glass be introduced into existing towers - with all these useful digital tower tools to be as overlays to supplement the ATCOs safety, whilst not changing the window view - but all of this would have just been extra cost, therefore not so interesting to people interested in saving money.

LCY have specific ideas for the land that the normal glass tower takes up, so they want this to happen. Other areas of the world have introduced remote towers to specifically to reduce staff costs at remote / quiet airfields. However I understand that Dubai World Central was looking at digital towers for when more runways were to be built - looking to be the first "Tower-less" airport in the world!!

Can we stop it happening, probably not. Should we raise every safety concern we have, based on our experience - absolutely. But views of risks will vary from ATCO to ATCO, so some see this as a great step forwards, whilst others are more cautious or even anti.

It all sounds great if all this added complexity works - time will tell. Just maybe not so good for our working terms and conditions in the long run.

You make a lot of valid points. Just curious...do you mean "added complexity" - from an ATCO perspective? Or from a system perspective?

Just out of interest, were there many differences between how each airfield operated? Obviously each airfield layout is different but are the practices across them more similar than the diversity amongst civil airports? E.g. (as I cited earlier as an example) does the application of "runway vacated" vary between the fields you held simultaneous endorsements at?

(At some civil airfields ATC are permitted to treat a landing aircraft as "vacated" the moment the tail has cleared the active runway....at others it won't be considered "vacated" until the tail has cleared the runway stop-bar.)

good egg,

I can't answer post 153 as I have no access to the relevant documentation. I suspect that the MATS 2 for EGPF may contain some of the answers though.

Distraction is one of them

The history of ATC is littered with incidents caused by distraction.....Or by pairs of eyeballs not being in place to look at things said eyeballs should have been looking at.

If EGLC need to demolish ATC to build another parking stand, why don't they fill in that bit of the dock south of the runway, instead of demolishing one of the 'nerve-centres' of the airport?

That stretch of waterway, filled in with clay and aggregates, would provide possibly 20 additional a/c stands. It's hardly a great destination for shipping, with several car-parks on the south bank and a taxiway-loop/runway on the north bank.

Raw material supply shouldn't be a problem......They're always tunnelling under London, (amazing the city is still standing.........., actually), and there will be more clay/rocks on offer when they build the new R/W over at Gonzo's place.

Surely NATS should be working with it's customers and "thinking outside the box"?.......Planning ahead? :E

Neptune 262,

Some good points.

I would argue that in a modern, surveillance equipped tower, 'RSVA' is an outdated concept.

To do 2.5nm spacing (delivered to 4DME - as soon as the leader gets to 4MDE that starts to reduce) I need to be visual with the follower at 6.5DME.

This implies that being visual with both aircraft provides an added level of safety. However, when looking at a pair of aircraft heading virtually straight for me, I cannot tell if they are 2.7nm apart or 2.4nm apart, nor if they are closing or diverging. However, I can do that if I look at my surveillance system.

Zooker, good grief, your post just highlights how ignorant you are.

Have you seen/studied the airport's master plan?

"why don't they fill in that bit of the dock south of the runway"....They are. (In actual fact it will be the same construction type as the East Apron, which added 4 stands to the airport).

"That stretch of waterway, filled in with clay and aggregates, would provide possibly 20 additional a/c stands." ...Great idea Zooker - you are such a visionary!
Just a shame the airport thought of it a long time ago (and finally received planning permission for it last year) or you could've sold them that idea...

"Surely NATS should be working with it's customers"...ummmmm, mind-boggling that you think NATS isn't. From the airport's own press release I quote "NATS, the UK’s leading provider of air traffic control services, endorses the decision to replace the existing 30-year old control tower with a digital tower".

I always try to entertain other people's point of view Zooker, but you make it really, really hard to take anything you say seriously.

Top post, good egg. :ok:

Sadly, the EGLC master-plan hasn't been high on my reading-list lately. Must check it out.

The east-end of London seems to have more 'Master-Plans' than you can shake a big stick at........I can't find the airport one.

If EGLCZT is 30 years old, why wasn't the potential future growth of the airport spotted and acted-on back in the day?

There's a list of 10 "key features" that 'digital towers' would have, on the NATS public web-site.

All but 2 of them already exist in the 'analogue models'.

@ Zooker
Back in the 70's & even the 80's, I don't think anyone envisaged the massive growth that has occurred in the East End. The Docklands Light Railway opened in 1987 with 11 EMUs & 15 stations along 8 miles. Today there are 145 EMUs & 45 stations along 24 miles. I reckon EGLC would be even bigger if it wasn't for the environmental impact......
p.s. I visited the VCR in 2012 - I would quite liked to have ended my career there :-)

I see the added complexity from a system perspective - lots of physical items that can potentially fail - or extra layers of potential swiss cheese (for Reason fans)!

I would say that RSVA is still very useful in some tower operations, it depends on the nature of the traffic and airspace. Yes, maybe for predominantly IFR traffic into a busy airport, RSVA is not that used, but for others with mixed mode traffic, it is a tool that ATCOs still utilise.

The difference now is the "visual" part (as understood to be glass window and eyeball) is being replaced by an electronic display and eyeball.

Three of the four were part of the same Flying Training School (Dishforth was the odd one out, being Army Air Corps), so similar rules and procedures with only the aerodrome layout and SIDs/STARs being different. Plenty of commonality and a lot of military latitude with regards to runway occupancy (landing same speed or slower aircraft behind aircraft already touched down/just airborne) applied across all three.

As in my original post, the types were limited to what the School operated but Linton would get a more diverse clientele (the Harrier OCU would do its fnial exercise based out of there, which made things interesting). In most cases the big differences were limited to the rwy hdgs and the immediate surroundings.

For "mixed mode" do you mean IFR/VFR interactions?

If so, in Class D they are not provided with separation per se so RSVA is a bit of a misnomer.

Three of the four were part of the same Flying Training School (Dishforth was the odd one out, being Army Air Corps), so similar rules and procedures with only the aerodrome layout and SIDs/STARs being different. Plenty of commonality and a lot of military latitude with regards to runway occupancy (landing same speed or slower aircraft behind aircraft already touched down/just airborne) applied across all three.

As in my original post, the types were limited to what the School operated but Linton would get a more diverse clientele (the Harrier OCU would do its final exercise based out of there, which made things interesting). In most cases the big differences were limited to the rwy hdgs and the immediate surroundings.

Yes, the resiliency and redundancy of the system will be vital.