What if London radar failed?
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What if London radar failed?
Flying a departure the other day going southbound and one of those random thoughts occured to me, what if for some unexpected reason all the radar screens for the London TMA went blank?
I understand that all aircraft details are duplicated on strips of paper, but surely when your dealing with the volume of traffic that London is that'd be near impossible? It must take a particular type of person to be able to look at scribbled bits of information and mentally place them in 3D space?
Also on the same topic what are the chances of all the screens going blank, or are there several back up generators, back up radar instillations, and if all else fails get the military in with AWACS, or something along those lines?
I understand that all aircraft details are duplicated on strips of paper, but surely when your dealing with the volume of traffic that London is that'd be near impossible? It must take a particular type of person to be able to look at scribbled bits of information and mentally place them in 3D space?
Also on the same topic what are the chances of all the screens going blank, or are there several back up generators, back up radar instillations, and if all else fails get the military in with AWACS, or something along those lines?
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I've seen and dealt with radar failure both at Heathrow Tower and the old LATCC at West Drayton and not too many lives were lost. I believe that separate power supplies are employed, say for every other display, so that it should not possible for all screens to go blank (says he). Controllers can always peer over their colleagues' shoulder... in a state of utter terror!! It never lasts (too) long though and the backup flight progress strips are a God-send. Now don't dare ask what happens if the new electronic flight progress strips pack up...
Probably worse than straight radar failure was bad weather on radar back in the old days when heavy rain would virtually blank out the screen and there were no SSR labels. Didn't need Ex-Lax after that.
Probably worse than straight radar failure was bad weather on radar back in the old days when heavy rain would virtually blank out the screen and there were no SSR labels. Didn't need Ex-Lax after that.
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In that very highly unlikely scenario there are several fallbacks, none of which could be discussed in a public forum but the use of fighter Controllers in AWACS isn't one 
BD
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Well you would immediatley stop all outbounds getting airborne, phone all of the adjacent sectors ie french, manchester etc etc, and ensure that they dont handover anymore traffic(hold them, divert them). Then you are left with the traffic you have when the radars went. You then control these planes procedurally, using the paper strips. They will all be level seperated, and you would then negotiate with adjacent sectors who have radar, how you are going to present these planes to them. But yes we would use the paper strips and control procedurally.
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It must take a particular type of person to be able to look at scribbled bits of information and mentally place them in 3D space?
Those people would be air traffic controllers.
As HD says it is a nightmare if your radar fails...but you pick up the pieces and get on with it!
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Not giving anything away by saying that if there was a fire in the building, but not in the Ops room, the Ops rooms have a slight positive pressure compared to the rest of the building and also have measures to make it safe (allegedly) for operational staff to stay in situ whilst the building burns around them for quite a long time... longer than I'd want to stay there, and longer than it would take to transfer every aircraft to other sectors outside of the Swanwick AOR.
As for controlling aircraft procedurally and them all being level seperated - maybe more likely on airways (but still not 100%), but certanly not in the TMA - it would be carnage if it (total failure) happened when it was anywhere near busy, TCAS might save the day.
However it is not a concern because instantaneous failure through loss of power or complete loss of radar displays is almost impossible... there are of course other ways that a facility could be brought to a complete standstill instantaneously, but if that happened the controllers and staff would not be around or in a fit state to do anythng.
As for controlling aircraft procedurally and them all being level seperated - maybe more likely on airways (but still not 100%), but certanly not in the TMA - it would be carnage if it (total failure) happened when it was anywhere near busy, TCAS might save the day.
However it is not a concern because instantaneous failure through loss of power or complete loss of radar displays is almost impossible... there are of course other ways that a facility could be brought to a complete standstill instantaneously, but if that happened the controllers and staff would not be around or in a fit state to do anythng.
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I am always amazed of the flexability that controllers have. We all stick to procedures and work the sector as they are designed for, but everytime you need help from an adjacent sector(weather etc), everyone is accomodating and it seems that no matter what you ask for, the response is always," yes no problem do this , do that", it is very reassuring.
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This artical was in the Observer Newspaper the following Sunday.
At 6.30 a.m. on 15 November 1986 the London Air Traffic Control Centre (LATCC) at West Drayton suffered a total loss of mains power as the morning rush of flights began. A standby generator also failed. Radar screens covering Wales and England south of Newcastle went blank. The IBM 9020 computer shut down, halting updating of flight progress strips. Controllers had to revert to writing strips manually.
Radio contact with aircraft was precariously maintained by a battery supply with a life of 30 minutes. Pilots continued to fly in the busy airspace without radar by scrupulously maintaining their separation from other planes. But without radar monitoring by controllers on the ground little could have been done if a jet had strayed.
Power was restored five minutes before the batteries gave out. The fault was blamed on a freak sequence of events started by the failure of a small capacitor.
Managers were eager to clear the backlog of flights but the computer would not function normally. It displayed some radar returns but not others.
A LATCC controller said: 'We were pushed to handle more aircraft but refused because the computer could have gone down at any time. We were lucky. If the same sequence of events occurs in the summer, the effect does not bear thinking about.'
At 6.30 a.m. on 15 November 1986 the London Air Traffic Control Centre (LATCC) at West Drayton suffered a total loss of mains power as the morning rush of flights began. A standby generator also failed. Radar screens covering Wales and England south of Newcastle went blank. The IBM 9020 computer shut down, halting updating of flight progress strips. Controllers had to revert to writing strips manually.
Radio contact with aircraft was precariously maintained by a battery supply with a life of 30 minutes. Pilots continued to fly in the busy airspace without radar by scrupulously maintaining their separation from other planes. But without radar monitoring by controllers on the ground little could have been done if a jet had strayed.
Power was restored five minutes before the batteries gave out. The fault was blamed on a freak sequence of events started by the failure of a small capacitor.
Managers were eager to clear the backlog of flights but the computer would not function normally. It displayed some radar returns but not others.
A LATCC controller said: 'We were pushed to handle more aircraft but refused because the computer could have gone down at any time. We were lucky. If the same sequence of events occurs in the summer, the effect does not bear thinking about.'
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Of course when we have our all singing and dancing electronic strips, it might be even more interesting...
Obviously though, the EFPS displays will never ever fail. Just like the VCCS never has.
Obviously though, the EFPS displays will never ever fail. Just like the VCCS never has.
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Not Long Now
I think the VCCS is workng as it was supposed to. We, the users, were told by management that there would be one failure in 49 years.
That was a mistake, management heard the supplier wrong.
What they actually said was "it would fail for the first 49 years"
Mind you, easy mistake to make... we also bought it in the belief we could cross couple more than two frequencies.
I think the VCCS is workng as it was supposed to. We, the users, were told by management that there would be one failure in 49 years.
That was a mistake, management heard the supplier wrong.
What they actually said was "it would fail for the first 49 years"
Mind you, easy mistake to make... we also bought it in the belief we could cross couple more than two frequencies.
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BD
I am aware of that - I'm being cynical.
The same management who were supposedly addressing the issue 8 months ago. Never mind, functionality of ATC equipment takes less priority than turning a profit
The fact that TC bandboxes regularly (and has to, to satisfy the same management teams restrictive manpower allocation at night makes it a joke).
I am aware of that - I'm being cynical.
The same management who were supposedly addressing the issue 8 months ago. Never mind, functionality of ATC equipment takes less priority than turning a profit
The fact that TC bandboxes regularly (and has to, to satisfy the same management teams restrictive manpower allocation at night makes it a joke).
