ATC History
Vulcan crash at LHR 1956
Maybe this needs a new thread but I'll start here.
Does anyone have good knowledge of the outcome of the inquiry into the accident?
Someone on 'Military Aircrew' section here is suggesting that the aircraft was 'talked' into the ground- see 'further BOIs thread'. I believe that is complete rubbish but it would be good if someone could put the 'poster' right.
BW
Does anyone have good knowledge of the outcome of the inquiry into the accident?
Someone on 'Military Aircrew' section here is suggesting that the aircraft was 'talked' into the ground- see 'further BOIs thread'. I believe that is complete rubbish but it would be good if someone could put the 'poster' right.
BW
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VULCAN AIRCRAFT CRASH (REPORT) (Hansard, 20 December 1956)
Sad business. The GCA Controller later became one of my instructors at the College
Sad business. The GCA Controller later became one of my instructors at the College
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The Investigation by Dr Touch of the Ministry of Supply exonerated the GCA (PAR) Controller even though he" failed to warn the aircraft of his closeness to the ground". The actual cause of the crash was the PIC altimeter was reading 150 ft high when he was actually at ground level. Subsequant checks revealed Vulcan altimeters could be as much as 280 ft out in their readings. Weather at LHR was 8/8ths cloud at 700ft,heavy rain,2/8ths cloud at 300ft, visibilty 1,100yds.
The pilot had a Master Green instrument rating and the Heathrow breakoff height was 150ft. The No2 pilot was looking forward for the high intensity lighting and this was not visible at 300ft, on reaching his breakoff height the PIC applied full power to overshoot while the GCA Controller was talking him down in a"calm unhurried manner", a definate jolt was felt by the crew but but neither pilot was unduly disturbed thinking it equivalent to a normal landing and at worst the pilots thought a tyre had burst. Both main legs had been ripped off as they struck a ditch which in turn damaged the flying control surfaces rolling the aircraft to the right which could not be corrected. It impacted at the intersection of runways 1 & 4. The two pilots ejected but the four crew were unable to vacate the aircraft as no ejection seats were fitted for the rear crew and at 150ft, were unable to bale out and survive.
A little knowledge is dangerous and this has caused the GCA Controller to be thought partially responsible for the crash, very unfair as the whole incident was was a classic case of a series of small links of error and omission leading to a chain of disaster. It was the pilots first full GCA approach in a Vulcan, and probably the first ever by this type of aircraft in bad weather. Secondly, the GCA Controller was perfectly competant, he was not very experienced and had been talking aircraft down at LHR for three months. Thirdly, he was confronted by an aircraft that had an approach speed 15-20kts highr than contemporary civilian airliners and he tended to concentrate on directional information at the expense of elevation. I've already mentioned the altimeters error.
This from the accident report and Andrew Brookes excellent book "V-Force".
The pilot had a Master Green instrument rating and the Heathrow breakoff height was 150ft. The No2 pilot was looking forward for the high intensity lighting and this was not visible at 300ft, on reaching his breakoff height the PIC applied full power to overshoot while the GCA Controller was talking him down in a"calm unhurried manner", a definate jolt was felt by the crew but but neither pilot was unduly disturbed thinking it equivalent to a normal landing and at worst the pilots thought a tyre had burst. Both main legs had been ripped off as they struck a ditch which in turn damaged the flying control surfaces rolling the aircraft to the right which could not be corrected. It impacted at the intersection of runways 1 & 4. The two pilots ejected but the four crew were unable to vacate the aircraft as no ejection seats were fitted for the rear crew and at 150ft, were unable to bale out and survive.
A little knowledge is dangerous and this has caused the GCA Controller to be thought partially responsible for the crash, very unfair as the whole incident was was a classic case of a series of small links of error and omission leading to a chain of disaster. It was the pilots first full GCA approach in a Vulcan, and probably the first ever by this type of aircraft in bad weather. Secondly, the GCA Controller was perfectly competant, he was not very experienced and had been talking aircraft down at LHR for three months. Thirdly, he was confronted by an aircraft that had an approach speed 15-20kts highr than contemporary civilian airliners and he tended to concentrate on directional information at the expense of elevation. I've already mentioned the altimeters error.
This from the accident report and Andrew Brookes excellent book "V-Force".
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Sorry tale. I too was trained by the Vulcan talkdown controller and I also worked with the female tracker involved earlier in my working life. Must have been dreadful for both of them.
@ windowjob
Having watched the kids on the skateboard park @ the corner of Stockwell Park Walk, I'd say they exhibit both in equal measure when they come out to play ! 
(in case your'e wondering Malcolm, my m-in-law lived in Aytoun Road - great for spotting LL inbounds on westerlies
)
Fearless and daft are interchangeable for us Stockwell lads
(in case your'e wondering Malcolm, my m-in-law lived in Aytoun Road - great for spotting LL inbounds on westerlies
)
Last edited by Eric T Cartman; 18th Jul 2011 at 21:55.
Re the Vulcan crash; I'm not sure how positional information of the aircraft was presented to the controller on these earlier GCA systems but mention of 'trackers' would indicate it was similar to the system described by Arthur C. Clarke in his autobiographical novel 'Glidepath' whereby the trackers track the aircraft using 3 'A scopes' and the controller reads the position of the aircraft from a series of dials rather than looking at a radar display as with PAR. I once had an 'Eagle Book of Aircraft' dating from the early '50s which I remember showed a photo of the 'GCA' at Heathrow and did indeed show a picture of an 'A scope'.
With this type of approach, to this day, the pilot puts his full trust in the talkdown controller hence the 'calm and unhurried' nature of the talkdown, certainly I always tried to do it this way.
With this type of approach, to this day, the pilot puts his full trust in the talkdown controller hence the 'calm and unhurried' nature of the talkdown, certainly I always tried to do it this way.
GCA
I never worked a full GCA, (only Half-mile SRAs on Plessy 424), but Aldergrove still had a "Federal" (Gillfillan [?]) a wartime American GCA when I was there about 1965. Rumour had it that, when Nutts Corner closed and Civil ATC took over Aldergrove, the Divisional Tels Office forgot to asses the equipment needs until too late and that when they found they had no suitable radar, they asked the RAF to leave theirs, a mobile MPN11. The reply, "Too late, Mate, it's on the boat already" caused the old "Federal" to emerge from retirement. (To be fair, the MPN11 had several features not familiar to civil controllers including Logarithmic rather than linier PAR displays so the high priced help at Division had some real worries)
The whole GCA (Surveillance and PAR) was worked from a "train" of trucks which had to be moved and set up for each runway so a runway change was a real circus and not undertaken lightly! By "worked from" I mean literally, the "Search" and "PAR" Controllers and the "GCA Tracker" sat in a lorry trailer. The one at Aldergrove had, rumour again, been "tropicalised" for the Middle East with lots of extra holes cut in it to improve the ventilation! Just the thing at Christmas 1965 with a howling gale blowing, a foot of snow on the ground and a sub-zero OAT! No wonder the crew spent as much time as possible in the tower, and only went out when it was really necessary!
The point that this ramble is leading towards is that, on this equipment, elevation was "tracked" by a "Tracker" (no surprise there then!) this was a specially trained (and paid!) ATCA who kept a cursor centred on the aircraft response on the vertical scanning radar, this gave a read out, in feet, on a meter alongside the PAR controller's horizontal scanning display, he (always he in those days) had no direct sight of the elevation display but could pass glide-path information from the trackers read out and abort the approach if it went out of limits. The tracker had to report if there was insufficient response to track or she (usually but not always she in those days) lost contact, in that case the controller could continue, with the pilots agreement, in azimuth only with, of course, higher limits. The most dangerous thing that could happen was a Tracker following something they thought was a real response, they were, very fiercely, taught never to continue if there was any doubt. Perhaps the best encouragement to good performance was sitting a few feet to the right of an active Runway, as an authorised obstruction, and running the same risk as the Aircrew after a poor approach!
The Type 2000 PAR which remained at the London Airports for several years later, was the PAR element of the GCA remoted into the ops room, and with the Tracker replaced by an elevation display in front of the Controller, who, thankfully, was no longer burdened by outdoor clothing!
The whole GCA (Surveillance and PAR) was worked from a "train" of trucks which had to be moved and set up for each runway so a runway change was a real circus and not undertaken lightly! By "worked from" I mean literally, the "Search" and "PAR" Controllers and the "GCA Tracker" sat in a lorry trailer. The one at Aldergrove had, rumour again, been "tropicalised" for the Middle East with lots of extra holes cut in it to improve the ventilation! Just the thing at Christmas 1965 with a howling gale blowing, a foot of snow on the ground and a sub-zero OAT! No wonder the crew spent as much time as possible in the tower, and only went out when it was really necessary!
The point that this ramble is leading towards is that, on this equipment, elevation was "tracked" by a "Tracker" (no surprise there then!) this was a specially trained (and paid!) ATCA who kept a cursor centred on the aircraft response on the vertical scanning radar, this gave a read out, in feet, on a meter alongside the PAR controller's horizontal scanning display, he (always he in those days) had no direct sight of the elevation display but could pass glide-path information from the trackers read out and abort the approach if it went out of limits. The tracker had to report if there was insufficient response to track or she (usually but not always she in those days) lost contact, in that case the controller could continue, with the pilots agreement, in azimuth only with, of course, higher limits. The most dangerous thing that could happen was a Tracker following something they thought was a real response, they were, very fiercely, taught never to continue if there was any doubt. Perhaps the best encouragement to good performance was sitting a few feet to the right of an active Runway, as an authorised obstruction, and running the same risk as the Aircrew after a poor approach!
The Type 2000 PAR which remained at the London Airports for several years later, was the PAR element of the GCA remoted into the ops room, and with the Tracker replaced by an elevation display in front of the Controller, who, thankfully, was no longer burdened by outdoor clothing!
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On a school trip to Midland Radar at RAF North Luffenham, I was allowed to have a go on the 'height-finder'. I managed to get the 'level' of a Vulcan over The Wash. I think the kit used a device called a 'resolver' to obtain the aircraft's height. Had a look at the big radar too, (Type 82 maybe?). That was in '68/'69. Fuelled an interest in ATC. Result, I ended up talking to Midland as a Temporary CSC many years later. Nice folks, Midland, - always helpful. Anyone remember when they finally closed?
Ah the T82. I used one at Lindholme as well as remote radars. It was 10cm non MTI with a blank area in the overhead, and strangely the famous 'Midland Radar overhead' was always bigger than other T82s like Lindholme and Watton.
Being a stacked beam receiver array, it didn't need a separate height finding radar like Sopley (T80).
Originally it was never intended for ATC use; with Luffenham being a Thor ICBM base along with two other local airfields, they were protected by a Bloodhound SAM base just next to the A1 at Woolfox Lodge, with the T82 being intended to track incoming targets for the Bloodhounds to engage. The Lindholme one could see traffic climbing out of Amsterdam above about FL100, and they frequently called us at this level!
Being a stacked beam receiver array, it didn't need a separate height finding radar like Sopley (T80).
Originally it was never intended for ATC use; with Luffenham being a Thor ICBM base along with two other local airfields, they were protected by a Bloodhound SAM base just next to the A1 at Woolfox Lodge, with the T82 being intended to track incoming targets for the Bloodhounds to engage. The Lindholme one could see traffic climbing out of Amsterdam above about FL100, and they frequently called us at this level!
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Zooker,
I was at another T82 unit at the same time you visited Midland. Can't remember their being helpful, as any traffic you tried to hand them was refused due to it being in their overhead. Hence the rash of 'Midland Radar overhead starts here' stickers, which could be found in pubs and railway stations all over the UK. And abroad. Would be interesting to hear how far round the globe these were found.
Some interesting types at Midland though. Anyone remember Flt Lt J C trying to be helpful by using the T82 to do home-made SRA's with Vulcans into Waddington when Waddo's AR-1 was out of action?
I was at another T82 unit at the same time you visited Midland. Can't remember their being helpful, as any traffic you tried to hand them was refused due to it being in their overhead. Hence the rash of 'Midland Radar overhead starts here' stickers, which could be found in pubs and railway stations all over the UK. And abroad. Would be interesting to hear how far round the globe these were found.
Some interesting types at Midland though. Anyone remember Flt Lt J C trying to be helpful by using the T82 to do home-made SRA's with Vulcans into Waddington when Waddo's AR-1 was out of action?
I passed out once while on "heights" at Midland, I blamed the paint fumes, but I did smell a bit like a bottle of bacardi. "Volunteered" to be the section baby sitter for a month. Those babies must be nearly 40 now.
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On a similar theme, I remember seeing stickers proclaiming 'Border Radar - an unnecessary overhead' in the 1980's.