Crossair RJ100 ZRH: Crash Report?

[Capn Bloggs]

Flight Intl recently published some of the findings of the German BFU's interim report into the Crossair RJ100 prang at ZRH. Unfortunately, no mention was made of the more technical findings (if any) eg FDR and CVR readouts. Does anybody know of any website that has published the interim report in full for perusal?

Tks!

[773829]

http://www.bfu.admin.ch/de/pdf/medienmitteilung_21nov02.pdf

[Lu Zuckerman]

That's easy for you to say.

:D

[DCS99]

If the Taiwanese authorities can manage to produce reports in English on the SQ crash, is it too much to ask the Swiss to do the same?

And yes before you ask, I can understand most of it and I also speak French and Spanish, so I'm not a complete language bigot despite coming from the Republic of Manchester;)

[PaperTiger]

Here's what a (non-aviation) German speaker reckons it says: (I edited out what I considered irrelevant)

The investigation of the accident of Crossair flight CRX 3597 has incurred a delay of approximately three months as a result of asbestos contamination of the documents. The analysis of the flight recorder (DFDR) as well as the tape recording of the cockpit discussions (CVR) is final. The detailed investigation of the engines, the hydraulic, electronic and electrical systems are still in progress. Indications so far suggest that these systems were functional up to the time of the accident. The digital Flight Guidance computer, and the symbols generator were examined. No indications of a malfunction of these devices was found. These findings agree with the recordings of DFDR and CVR.

The investigation of the engine Life computer (ELC) still is under way.

So far eight safety recommendations were transferred to the BAZL:
1. Concerning the composition of crews (crew pairing) comprehensive criteria should be specified.
2. The criteria, guidelines and procedures, which define the selection and the training of pilots, should be examined.
3. The BAZL should examine those pilots who have shown exceptional or special incidents, with regard to competence, abilities and knowledge.
4. To what extent the procedures may be adapted relative to non precision approach by the airline (standard flight procedure) from the recommendations of the airplane manufacturer should be examined.
5. Large airplanes without the latest terrain avoidance and warning systems should be upgraded as soon as possible.
6. Weather reports issued for runways 14/16 should be rassessed with regard to their applicability to runway 28 in critical weather conditions.
7. The approach to runway 28 should be equipped like that of the runways 14 and 16 with a minimum safe altitude warning system (MSAW).
8. The BAZL should ensure that flight obstacles are completely registered on the Jeppesen route manual.

Berne, 21 November 2002

[RatherBeFlying]

BAZL translates to CAA

[bblank]

An anglophone who trips over Flugunfalluntersuchungen may
prefer the French version (http://www.bfu.admin.ch/fr/pdf/communique_21nov02.pdf) but PT's translation should suffice.

[Capn Bloggs]

Tks All.

The item I am most interested in is #4 on Paper Tiger's list. In what way were the NPA procedures used by the crew "adapted" from the manufacturers procedures?

Cheers and Merry Xmas.

[beerstop]

Basically it means you should be visual before decending below the minimum published altitude . the accident would not have happened if published procedures where followed.

[320DRIVER]

PaperTiger, does point 3/ of your translation imply that a member of the crew involved in this incident had had some incident or accident earlier in their careers?

[JetFixer]

From Aviation Safety Network

http://aviation-safety.net/database/1990/900221-0.htm

First Saab 340 written off...

The undercarriage was erroneously retracted while the aircraft was on the ground during a training session. The captain of this training session was later killed in a Crossair accident November 24, 2001 when his Avro RJ.100 crashed on approach to Zürich.

[Loc-out]

So, the captain made a mistake earlier in his career.

Hands up those who haven`t made a mistake.

Off course their are certain races (the master race, being one) who don`t make mistakes.

Were there not 2 pilots on board? What was the other pilot doing when things were going wrong?

[scanscanscan]

IMHO...The other pilot was probably overwhelmed by the situation like the nh pilot on the flight deck of Gf 072 who possibly observed the approach going wrong then failed to monitor the flight path instruments and step in and take control as the hp gradualy lost flight path control.
Strangely it appears to take a huge effort of will to speak up positively and break the chain of events as things go wrong and takeover control if the hp is overwhelmed by events and is about to kill you. Why is this?
I feel this effort is especially hard if you are a very low hours and inexperianced nh monitoring pilot.
This was the case in both these young low hours fo crewed fatal crashes.
A possible solution is the old Ba system also used on the GF L1011 where the fo flys the approach and the Captain monitors.
Correct me if I am wrong but I have not heard of a fo flying captain monitoring non precision or low vis autoland crash.
Young low hours low line experiance pilots have passed all the pshco tests and licence training and can perform to an impressive very high standard indeed, however it is in the phase when these pilots are required to monitor where it appears to go wrong.
Young low time fo pilots required to monitor appear to lack effective training to step in and save the ship in these low level situations and it is here where accident record shows it all falls apart.
Do these fo deserve better training in this area where the Capt monitored fo flying in imc approaches are not sop?