The Atlantic Glider revisited - official report released (Merged)

[Rockhound]

The authorized biography of Capt Robert Piche, who glided his Air Transat A330 to a landing in the Azores after running out of fuel last year, has just been published in French by a Quebec journalist. The book, by Pierre Cayoutte, is entitled "Robert Piche aux commandes du destin (Robert Piche at the controls of destiny). Apparently, Capt Piche has had great difficulty coming to terms with the accolades and hero worship showered on him since the incident. His latest award was a "Medal of Honour", conferred on him on 5 Nov by the Quebec provincial legislature. Capt Piche went on sick leave from Air Transat in March and underwent a seven-week treatment of therapy to help him deal with the intense emotions he experienced over the Atlantic that fateful night. According to Mr Cayoutte, Piche is a gut-level survivor, who sharpened his instincts during the time he spent in a tough Georgia (USA) jail on a drug-running charge in the early 1980's. It was this experience that helped him to save his, his crew's and his passengers' lives.
Portuguese-led authorities are currently completing the final report on the incident.
Rockhound

Piche's biographer's name should read Cayouette - apologies.
Rockhound

[TE RANGI]

Interesting. I've always missed a more complete follow up of the crew's whereabouts after major incidents in most safety publications.

Where are this capt and the rest of his crew nowadays?

[cwatters]

Pull off a save like that and you deserve to retire on full pay.

[golfyankeesierra]

Already picked up rumours about respectable flying schools inroducing classes about drugrunning. This is expected to have several benefits: not only does the drugsrunning dramatically lower training costs, also does a possible subsequent jailterm enhance airmanship.
Other benefits include nitestops at some very nice caribbean destinations and it provides an immediate alternative should one drop out of flightschool.
:cool:

[jetboy]

Certainly, a fantastic bit of flying. Let's wait for the final report to find out what did happen to all that fuel, and why Land Recovery wasn't selected IAW procedures, causing all that nasty gear damage! What should have been a fairly routine precautionary shutdown/diversion followed by a short delay for maintenance to change a leaky fuel pipe turned into a major incident and subsequent recovery procedure!

[Rockhound]

TE RANGI,
I thought by now someone in the know would have told us what the present status of Capt Piche and his crew was but no. I was paraphrasing a story in the Canadian Globe and Mail newspaper, which made no mention of Piche's current status but, in the absence of anything to the contrary, I assume they continue as employees of Air Transat. But...is Piche back on the line? That's a good question.

Jetboy,
"Why wasn't Land Recovery selected IAW procedures?" Huh?? I thought Capt Piche "selected Land Recovery" rather well.
:confused:
Rockhound

[Web-Footed Flyer]

He is reported to be back on duty.

[twistedenginestarter]

Air Transat Pilot Awarded Medal

Captain Robert Piché, the Air Transat pilot who safely glided his A-330 to the Azores in August 2001 after the plane's fuel management system malfunctioned, has been awarded the Medal of Honour by the Province of Quebec.

The presentation was made in Montreal on Tuesday, November 5, by Madame Louise Harel, president of the province's National Assembly.

The dramatic landing of Air Transat Flight TS 236 made headlines around the world.

The aircraft, en route from Toronto to Lisbon, Portugal, lost power to both engines after thousands of kilograms of fuel were dumped, apparently due to mechanical error. Piché guided the jet in a 70-mile glide to Lajes Airport in the Azores for an emergency landing. The aircraft blew out all eight main gear tires, but all 304 passengers and crew members were spared.

Mme. Harel praised the pilot's exceptional courage and calm in maneuvering the jet to safety. In her remarks, she added, "[Capt. Piché] reminded us in a spectacular way of the infinite capacity of the human being to triumph over almost any circumstance."

ALPA has also recognized Captain Piché for the achievement, presenting him and the flight's co-pilot, First Officer Dirk De Jager, with ALPA Superior Airmanship awards at the Association's 2002 Air Safety Forum in August.

[kinsman]

"A superior pilot is one who uses his superior judgement in order to avoide using his superior skill!"

I also await with great interest the conclusion of the accident investigation, having seen the transcript of the events. Very happy end to the flight and land recovery switch or not, nice landing, they all walked away in one piece!

[Roadtrip]

How can a single point fuel leak result in venting all the fuel from the aircraft? Something is very very wrong here. Either the Airbus' design is unsafe, there were multiple system failures, or our drug-running friend, Capt Piche turned a serious emergency into an almost catastrophic one.

[BEagle]

What on earth is 'mechanical error'? Eh??

[Frangible]

Word was that one engine was leaking, fuel imbalance was indicated and that, allegedly, they did not check for a leak before opening cross-feed. Remember the "allegedly".

Kinsman. Where's this "transcript of events" to be had, please?

There was no CVR, apparently, because it cut out with the main power and it isn't powered by the RAT.

Other question. Why the tyre-bursts? High VS or what?

[kinsman]

Frangible

The transcript of events was used in a power point presentation for a tech' refresher course. I have a copy but cannot confirm it's source and would be loath to publish it here before the accident report is out. I can say the cross feed appears to have been opened very early in the chain of events! This certainly did not help matters.

The tyre burst's appear to be the result of heavy braking after a deep fast landing. Not surprising under the circumstances, as I said before they all walked away from it! Some interesting lessons to be learnt from this one I think.

[Roadtrip]

The report should be interesting reading and make ALPA and a few others eat crow. Can you envision the lawyers lining up at the Airtransat cash window?

This certainly did not help matters.

To say the least. Open the crossfeed so you can pump ALL the fuel overboard and turn a serious emergency into an almost fatal one. Basic airmanship.

[kinsman]

Roadtrip

As the official report is not out and clearly the transcript I have seen does not seem to be on general release, I am not willing in the interests of the crew to state my points more strongly, as other information may come to light. But I am sure we can all read between the lines! But thanks for the pointing out the consequences of opening the cross feed we never thought of that !!!!!!!!

But let us not convict the crew until all the facts are in, and even if they did compound the problem we should all be more interested in why and learning from the incident than hanging the guy's. It may save one of us from making the same mistake.

[Safety Guy]

Well said, Kinsman. We should focus on understanding the factors that led this crew to deal with this situation in the first place.

I'm much more interested to hear how a maintenance organisation can be allowed to slip to such a low standard, that an L1011 part was placed onto an A330 engine. :confused:

I know that the vast majority of engineers out there are decent, hard working individuals with very high standards. I just wish we could completely rid the industry of people who are more concerned with getting the aircraft out on time, than with getting it done safely and correctly the first time. I only wish the manager who ordered the installation of that part would have been riding in the back of the A330 that night. That would have given him a new perspective to be sure!

[Roadtrip]

What I have a problem with Kinsman, is organizations like ALPA, the news media, and other pilots raising these guys to hero status before the facts are out . . . . . and the circumstances and facts so far indicate the possibility extremely serious and basic human failures. Everybody should have kept their public mouth SHUT so they wouldn't accidently put their foot there. Certainly the primary objective is education for the rest of the pilot community, but that doesn't relieve anybody of the responsibility of command. To do so cheapens the profession . . . . just like the PIC's federal conviction drug trafficing.

[kinsman]

Roadtrip

I was indicating much the same but perhaps I was more subtle! The elevation to hero status has been premature.

I still hope this will not turn into a witch hunt, the guy at the pointy end may carry the ultimate responsibility but this entire incident has raised a lot of questions. Apportioning blame in my experience gets in the way of finding the real cause. Guess thats why AAIB never apportion blame but report the facts.

How did the L1011 bit get on an A330?

[Web-Footed Flyer]

The bit from the L1011 that got on the 330, was a fuel pump. both aircrafts use RB211 engines. the new engine they put on the 330 is shared by two other owners.

The mechanics could not use the pump form the sent out engine because it was already shipped and the spare engine did not have a pump, so they fitted a pump from a L1011 and fabricated:confused: a piece of piping to fit in the connections on the 330; but ended up to close to somehing else and vibrations pierced the tubing some thirty od flight hours later, resulting in the now famous Atlantic Glider: :eek:

[canberra]

when i saw this post i initially thought it was about the waco glider that was towed across the atlantic by a dc3 during the war. but on the subject of canadian airliner gliders what happened to the crew of the gimli glider, and did they get any gongs? on a final note, the incident got very little coverage in the press in britain i dont think it even made the tv.

[Web-Footed Flyer]

:D As to the other Canadian Glider the crew also got a standing ovation from ALPA, but got work suspention from Air Canada, and were reinstated when coworkers got angry with company.
I personnaly met with the first officer then who is now if I'm not mistaking since last spring a 767 retired captain of said AC ;)

A book and movi were made from that incident.

[Rockhound]

Roadtrip and Kinsman,
I don't think you're being entirely fair when you assert that Capt Piche was elevated to the status of a hero prematurely. While I agree that the desperate situation he found himself in was quite possibly of his own making and that he had a huge amount of luck, you cannot deny that, in gliding a heavy jet to a safe landing at an airfield, he pulled off an amazing feat of airmanship. The two other possible outcomes would have been a crash landing or a ditching. The chances of either of those being fatality-free are pretty well zero. For his seizing his one and only chance and making it, he surely deserves the accolades bestowed on him.
Rockhound

[Lu Zuckerman]

The Air Transat mechanics did not cannibalize a fuel pump and fuel duct from an L-1011. Rolls Royce shipped the new engine minus a fuel pump, a fuel duct and a support bracket. In order to get the aircraft back into the air they removed the pump and duct from the original engine. It was generally agreed that they would have no trouble for the short wait period for the new duct and bracket. Obviously they were wrong because without the bracket the duct rubbed against another piece of hardware and eventually developed a massive leak.

Regarding the actions taken by the pilot it was in direct accordance with the checklist provided for a situation where there was a fuel imbalance. In following the procedure when he received a warning about a fuel imbalance it was too late. It is my understanding that on Air Transat’s 757 Boeing provides a warning when there is a difference of about 1700 pounds. Airbus does not provide a warning until the difference is significantly higher than the warning provided on Boeing aircraft.

IMHO it was the maintenance department and Rolls Royce that should share the blame. I also believe that Airbus should accept some responsibility for the design of the engine installation.


:eek:

[jetboy]

Kinsmen, I believe a jury south of the border beat us to it!!!

[kinsman]

Rockhound

Do not mistake me, I think the crew did a great job in setting the aircraft down. I was alluding to the possible incorrect application of the fuel imbalance drill. As a trainer on the A330 I do find it difficult to reconcile the crews actions prior to the double engine flame out. But as I mentioned in an earlier post there may well be more information that may explain the crews actions.

As it would be very wrong to lay blame on the crew before the completion of a full investigation, it is also wrong to elevate a crew to the position of hero before all the facts are known. I am sure Captain Piche also feels uncomfortable with the accolade.

My point is even if it is proved the crew failed to deal correctly with a serious fuel leak, we as an industry need to move away from looking for some poor sod to blame and learn from the situation. After all a good crew that has made a serious mistake would be the last ones to do it again, at least that's the theory!

[Web-Footed Flyer]

Lu Zuc

I stand corrected ! :eek: :eek: :eek:

Cheers. ;) ;) ;)

[eltel]

Roadtrip: 'Everybody should have kept their public mouth shut...'
but not you, apparently

[gumbi]

Lu Zuc

Thank you for your enlightened comment, it sure sets the maintenance facts straight...

As for the crew, since I personnally know both of them (I've flown with Capt. Piché on the 1011 as an f/o and with F/O DeJager as a Capt. on the 1011 as well), I will refrain from making any kind of comments before the report gets out. I think that anyone who does, is talking through the top of their heads (one way or the other), and like many have said here, instead of laying premature blame (if any), why not try to learn from it.

I've read somewhere that they had 7/1 000 000 000 chances of making somewhat a safe landing from it. Let's, at least, acknowledge that very impressive bit of handling/flying.

:)

[Sikorsky]

Wasn't there a FMC warning that said "USING RESERVE FUEL" at a early stage of that flight ? Or is that only a feature in Boeing FMC's ?

[arcniz]

Anyone who reads aviation accident reports quickly understands that most accidents evolve from a fateful sequence of circumstances and events which lead the participants to their fate. Those up front who share the consequences inevitably play some part in the chain of events.

What distinguishes these two pilots is that they broke the chain of bad luck, mistakes, carelessness, error, or whatever it was and, with considerable skill and really breathtaking coolness conducted that successful long glide to their hot landing on the runway at Lajes.

Sure it could have been better. Sure it could have been worse. The proof is the result - the passengers eventually reached their destination.

Like the rest of you, I don't know if the crew's decision process was right or wrong in managing the crossfeed, but I doubt they had any intention to do other than solve the problem confronting them in the best manner possible. They likely tried to use the best information that training, aircraft systems, and other resources could provide at the moment. If those resources failed - like the hardware - it was probably not primarily due to a character flaw on the crew's behalf, but to various defects in the suppport, training, and operations systems that were behind them.

Ultimately they did what pilots are really supposed to do: stay cool and focussed even when things have gotten way out of the
box; work the problem; steer past the adversity and put down as safely as possible. And they were lucky enough and skillful enough to get that part, the really important part, right.

[gumbi]

Arcniz...

Great post, if english was my first language, that's probably what I would have written...

Sikorsky...

I fly the 310 and we don't have that message available on our FMC's, and I heard some pilots who fly the 757 at our company saying that they do have that message available... so I think it's only Boeing! If I'm not mistaken, the warning for fuel imbalance comes way late on the 330, anyone can comment?

[Plastique]

Not wanting to cast blame (I'll leave that to the DGAC):
QUOTE
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
released by DIRECTION GENERALE DE L’AVIATION CIVILE
Inspection and/or modifications described below are mandatory. No person may operate a product to which this
Airworthiness Directive applies except in accordance with the requirements of this Airworthiness Directive.
Translation of ‘Consigne de Navigabilité’ ref. : 2002-549(B)
In case of any difficulty, reference should be made to the French original issue.
November 13, 2002 AIRBUS
A340 aircraft 2002-549(B)
GSAC
AIRBUS
A340 aircraft
Fuel leak procedure (ATA 28)
1. APPLICABILITY:
AIRBUS A340 aircraft, models -211, -212, -213, -311, -312 and -313, all serial numbers.
2. REASONS:
! Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2001-440(B) has been released in order to introduce the fuel leak
procedure which required the monitoring of the fuel quantity located in the feed tanks of engines
2 and 3 in case of flight with the split valves closed, with or without fuel jettison (case where a fuel
leak is confirmed after an engine failure).
This monitoring was rendered mandatory to avoid a potentially catastrophic situation that is one
engine failed (No. 4 or No. 1) followed by two engine flame-outs (No. 2 and No. 3).
! In August 2001, an A330-200 equipped with Rolls-Royce engines was diverted following an
extensive fuel leak. During the diversion, the two engines shut down due to lack of fuel. An
emergency landing with all engines off was successfully achieved.

The inquiry revealed that fuel management by the crew directly contributed to the total loss of the fuel.

And a similar AD for the A330.

Looks like captain hero is not immume to bad airmanship.

Lady luck was on their side:eek:

[Lu Zuckerman]

As I stated in a previous post on this subject the pilots when made aware of the fuel imbalance followed the applicable checklist to the letter.

In all programs that I have worked on all procedures relative to the operation of the aircraft are written by pilot / tech writers. It is obvious that these tech writers along with the reliability and safety engineers never conceived of this type of problem. If you were to check the Failure Modes Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) you would most likely find that the Rolls Royce RMS engineers never considered the catastrophic failure of the subject duct due to abrasion against another piece of hardware. If they did then the Airbus RMS engineers never carried the failure to the aircraft level.

Blaming the pilots for following Airbus instructions seems to me to be shifting the blame from the locals (Airbus Industrie) and Rolls Royce to the operators of the aircraft. So much for the DGCA analysis.


:cool:

[IcePack]

Wonder how many Pilots/ Engineers would have diagnosed the leak from the first fault msges(Before any imbalance msg)

Low Oil Temp in cruise
High Oil pressure in cruise.

Apologies if the wording is not exactly as the ECAM.

[Tree]

Possibly you mean:

High oil temp. (due to lack of fuel to cool the oil due fuel leak)

Low oil press. (due to high oil temp)

One thing leads to many others in modern aircraft!

[RatherBeFlying]

Possibly he means what he said.

The leaking fuel close to ambient temperature at cruising altitude would cool whatever it leaked/sprayed upon, be that the oil reservoir or other parts of the engine where oil flowed.

And the increased viscosity would result in increased oil pressure.

So very easy to see after the fact. Hands up everybody who would react to Low Oil Temperature by checking for a fuel leak, even before last August?

[pigboat]

Tree, IcePack is correct. The first indication the flight crew had that something was amiss was low oil temperature and high oil pressure.

[Lu Zuckerman]

The leaking fuel close to ambient temperature at cruising altitude would cool whatever it leaked/sprayed upon, be that the oil reservoir or other parts of the engine where oil flowed.

It seems that some of you are overlooking one thing. There is a raging fire inside of the engine, which is constantly radiating heat into the surrounding area. The oil that flows through the engine and back to the tank is picking up heat and that heat is radiating from the oil tank into the surrounding area even if it has passed through a cooler. The ambient temperature of the surrounding air stream is around –45 C or thereabouts but it is doubtful if the fuel has cold soaked to that temperature. If the fuel were to impinge directly on the oil tank it could not generate enough cooling to overcome the heating generated by the engine and the oil to decrease the temperature of the oil to the point of raising the kinematic viscosity of the oil. If there were no heat present the surrounding ambient temperature would raise the viscosity to the point that the pump loads would go up along with the registered pressure. So, once the first engine stopped producing power but continued to aerodynamically spool and cold fuel sprayed on the tank along with a decreased temperature the viscosity would go up to the point of raising the oil pressure and the temperature would drop.

The kinematic viscosity for MIL-PRF-23699F turbine oil is:

@ 100 C 4.90 to 5.40
@ 40 C 23.0 Minimum
@ -40 C 13,000 Maximum

It is just pure luck that the leaking fuel did not ignite. If it did we would not be having this conversation.


:eek: :eek:

[IcePack]

Not that I know alot,But I believe the leak was after the oil cooler.
Hence much fuel flow through the cooler so over cooling the Oil.
Just imagine trying to diagnose that, but I guess if I see those messages now I will take a carefull look at the fuel usage calculated to actual! My sympathies are with the crew.

The final accident report will make interesting reading & I guess will show much mitigating circumstances.

[RatherBeFlying]

Lu, while your scenario when the fire goes out is reasonable, it seems that the first ECAM indications of Low Oil Temp and High Oil Pressure appeared when the engines were still running.

Now while the fuel temperature will be somewhere between ambient temperature at altitude and temperature at takeoff, the cooling effect from a dense fluid of higher temperature can be higher than that of a less dense fluid at lower temperature -- and the density of fuel is some thousands of times that of air.

And we haven't even worked in the heat of evaporation;)

[Tree]

I stand corrected. Thanks to all of you!

[Globaliser]

Not sure whether it's totally appropriate to post it on this thread, but an AD's apparently now been issued. Translation here - http://www.tc.gc.ca/aviation/ad/adfiles/FR2002-548(B).HTM.

[Getting URL to work properly.]

[Lu Zuckerman]

Quote:

"Note: The procedures above have been incorporated into the manufacturer's Flight Manual by
TRs Nos. 4.02.00/13, 4.02.00/15, 4.02.00/16 and 4.02.0017 approved by the DGAC on September 05, 2002, and will be incorporated into the next general revisions of the flight manuals".

The AD blames the pilots for mismanagement of the fuel problem. This may be true if they were trained in accordance with the procedures outlined in the AD and did not follow the AD procedures. The AD however was written after the fact. My question is, did the pilots follow the instructions that were in place at the time of the incident?



:confused:

[Globaliser]

Lu Zuckerman: The AD blames the pilots for mismanagement of the fuel problem.Actually, no. What the AD (at least in this translation) says is:-The inquiry revealed that fuel management by the crew directly contributed to the total loss of the fuel.That much seems to be uncontroversial. Whether that "management" amounted to "mismanagement" or not, and according to what instructions or standards that should be decided, is something which the AD carefully avoids, as one would expect.

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Globaliser

The inquiry revealed that fuel management by the crew directly contributed to the total loss of the fuel.

When the management of a situation ends in a failure then assuming there were instructions to follow then it results in "mismanagement".

What I stated several posts above was that when the pilots became aware of the fuel imbalance conditions they followed the checklist to the letter. In other words, everything they did was in direct accordance with Airbus published procedures. By following those procedures they ran out of fuel and had to dead stick into a landing field many miles away.

Knowing how the various certification authorities work (FAA has a tombstone mentality) and the DGCA accuses the pilots and then creates an AD that fully explains what a pilot should have done when faced with a severe loss of fuel. I would strongly suggest that you check the instructions that existed at the time of the incident and compare it with the instructions contained in the AD.

I am personally aware of a situation where the DGCA told the FAA that a major design fault had been corrected when it had not and that the aircraft in question still has that design defect. Believe me the certification authorities do not always get it right.

[Globaliser]

You could reach that view if you add in other information or assumptions.

The AD, though, does not itself contain any criticism of the crew. That's as I read it, and that's as I would expect. We may be seeing different things from the same words. But I would myself wait for the accident report for the necessary information.

[apfds]

Lu is not correct in his assumptions.

The fuel imbalance check list states that it should not be used unless a fuel leak has been completely ruled out. The previous page give step by step instructions on how to diagnose a fuel leak,which includes indications of fuel imbalance.

[Lu Zuckerman]

The inquiry revealed that fuel management by the crew directly contributed to the total loss of the fuel.

As I previously stated I did not read the AD. I was quoting from comments made by another poster who supposedly was quoting from the AD.

I also previously stated that by the time the crew were made aware of the problem they followed the check list to the letter.
I had also stated that on the A-330/340 the announcement of fuel imbalance comes well into the problem as opposed to the 757 which is announced when there is a difference of approximately 1700 pounds.

:rolleyes:

[aardvark2zz]

This is my timeline for Air Transat which lasted over 81 minutes. There is a time period of approximately 60 minutes between the first indications and the last engine out. (Of course some of the info is approximated). Merry Xmas.

http://www.airdisaster.com/user-uploads/0006.gif

In the following image the top of the triangle is where diversion occurred (42 20N 22 30W). Right corner is Lisbon. Left corner Lajes Island.

http://www.airdisaster.com/user-uploads/0007.gif

[Frangible]

Very interesting timeline that Aardvark. Been trying to work out something similar, but have not yet seen published quantities of fuel on board at take-off or rate of loss through the gash in the fuel line. Is this educated guesswork or reliable sources?

[aardvark2zz]

Mostly research and a spread sheet. I reversed engineered the fuel backwards from Lisbon and Lajes back to the fuel line break point. Assuming 1 hr reserve. The hardest estimation was the time at which the break occured. I read an article on the web (I believe from aviationsafety.com) that they were losing 550 lbs/min. I was able to get reasonable agreement with that.

You can also calculate fuel from start up to near break but is more error prone since they were closer to the destination.

It's interesting how so much can be calculated using fundamental physics and aerodynamics.

Last November I met the Captain at his biography signing. I won't go into certain details here but it was a very interesting conversation about how so much of his instrumentation was lost during his night-time gliding phase over a dark ocean. I got the impression that a worldly barn door pilot with a lot of "bush" flying as compared to "urban" flying is wonderful experience in a stressful situation. We talked, amougst other things, about what technique he used to fly and estimate his glide. I was polite and did not ask him about the closure of the cross-feed fuel valve.

Previous postings of mine on other sites:
----------------------------------------------------

I just read a good chunk of his biography. It didn't take much time as it is in 18 point font. He seems to have paid his dues, especially in prison with the tough guys, the gay guys, the racist guys, and some of the guards. Many of these didn't like the fact that he ended up leading kitchen duties with over 70 men under him in the kitchen. He held quite a few of the blue collar jobs before jail and just after jail. He was a bar man in Montreal in between jail and Air Transat. He had a few ****ups as a teenager while doing his pilot training in college and almost lost his student position several times. Many college flying instructors hated his guts except for 1 particular instructor. He eventally moved to top of class even after half of the 30 students failed. What got him a job on big planes was letters of reference from earlier profs and co-students.

The Air transat glider story and its pilot's biography may be on TV in the future.
Captain Piché Makes a Perfect Landing at Pixcom

MONTREAL, Dec. 2 /CNW Telbec/ - Airline captain Robert Piché is about to have his story dramatized on the small screen. Pixcom, the Montreal-based television production firm, announced today that it had signed agreements with
Piché, his biographer, Pierre Cayouette, and the publishing house "Libre Expression" to proceed with a drama production inspired by the larger-than-life story of the now-famous pilot. The French book, "ROBERT PICHE, Aux commandes du destin", is already a best-seller just two weeks after its
release.
In August 2001, Robert Piché was at the controls of Air Transat flight TS-236 when his Airbus A-330 encountered serious technical difficulties. He made a spectacular and successful emergency landing in the Azores, saving the lives
of the 304 people on board.
Following the signing, Piché said he was very moved by the remarkable interest in his story and the positive things people had to say about him. "This dramatization will allow me to share with as many people as possible
those moments that marked my life forever."
Pixcom will be counting on development and broadcasting support from Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Société Radio-Canada. ... are confident that "the incredible story of Robert Piché will attract large audiences and be an important milestone for
Pixcom."
.... Pixcom ... is an integrated corporation involved in the development, production, postproduction
and distribution of hundreds of television programs every year. Pixcom exports its products around the world and also provides television engineering services to ensure the coverage of large-scale events in international
markets.

Met Robert Piché the Captain himself last November and I finally bought his autographed biography. Of course it was an awkward meeting considering all the things that have happened to him and all the attacks from the media. It was cute and funny to see all the non-aviation "little ladies" praise him for his heroics and putting him up there as if he was Jesus. I'm sure he was Jesus to most of his passengers. It seemed to me that every friend, and stranger in his life and his past lives came to see him and shake his hand.

He seemed to be distracted by a whole bunch of details behind him. But, I did get to talk to him about flying but I did not dare ask him THE question "Why wasn't the cross-feed valve not closed?" for which all my friends were asking me to ask. But he did mention to me some things that I won't discuss here. We both did laugh when I reminded him about what he wrote in his book about it being a surreal moment when pieces of the wheels continued rolling on down the runway just after the plane stopped. He told me he lost ALL navigation except for the altimeter, artificial horizon, airspeed, compass, VHF. He lost GPS, VOR, etc .... But he was easily able to see the lights of the island from over 20000 feet since the sky was clear. The airport was flashing its lights. He did not have any flaps but only had some slats. The emergency break system only had one shot.
I really got the impression that his experience of thousands of hours flying barn doors all over the world helped him keep his calm. And that a pilot who did not fly barn doors all over the world may be too squeaky clean.

There is a 1:30 minute video clip of the televised biographical interview with Air Transat's Captain Piché yesterday where he talks about his financial woes which led him to Jamaica, many women, and 500 Kg of marijuana in a twin in the states. On the complete televised interview he talks about the continuous crisis you feel months after the Transat incident. It took him the 3rd therapist to understand his continuous state of "crisis" and he's been sober for 8.5 months (congrats). I believe he's also had some extremely serious crisis with his son (and I believe it may have been death related) but I missed most of that part. He's quite open. Too bad I don't have the transcript. His biography is coming out this week. The video clip is in french.

http://emission.tva.ca/medias-31/robertpiche.ram
http://emission.tva.ca/31-emission.shtml

Air Transat's ocean-glider-pilot's great biography in print. Over Newfoundland he asked Air Traffic for a higher altitude and got it but with one condition, that he flies parallel to the same air highway but 60 miles south. If he would of stayed on the originally planed route he would of glided 15 miles short of the airport and would of had to ditch in the ocean.
I read some of Robert Piché's bio that came out this week and it's a simple read. They could of written a book just about the details of the Air Transat Flight 236 incident but they kept it short but talked quite a bit about his life. He was interviewed on TV this week and he seems to have had quite a life: drug smuggling, jail, sons death??, airline, alcohol, etc... He was born very close to where my father was born.

If there would of been a complete layer of clouds like the day before and after then he would of not seen the airport (it was before dawn); he asked the airport to flash the runway lights. I don't know what radio navigation instruments were working to help him find the runway alignment. In the book they barely cover the "early" alarms that were hinting at engine # 2 problems and the plane's prior maintenance woes.

During the debugging phase he seemed to be convinced that it was a software problem and couldn't believe that he was running out of fuel. His "stewardesses" took flashlights to try to see if an engine was leaking fuel but they saw nothing. When he landed he was still convinced that he had plenty of fuel on board but found out that he had almost nothing when they powered up his plane with an external electrical generator.

When his plane came to a screeching halt (literally) on the runway, after doing a 230 mph touchdown without flaps nor slats (normally it's less than 150), with the dead silence around him he saw part of his wheels continue rolling ahead and beyond the airplane, which game him an eerie feeling. Because he locked his wheel brakes the tires blew causing the metal rims to scrape on the runway. One of his first comments after getting out of the plane and after doing the obligatory swearing in french was that his " #$%#$ wheels were square".

Air Transat Pilot's R. Piche web page at http://www.io-ms.com/piche/en/index.asp He's now doing conferences. Maybe he can do one on this Forum :-)

Keep the blue side up; wherever up is ?
Practice random acts of kindness and senseless beauty.

[aardvark2zz]

Tan when gliding when looking for max range one looks for an optimum IAS (Indicated Airspeed). But in actual fact a better number is the angle of attack to maximize the CL to CD (Coefficient of Lift to Drag) to approximately 17 with flaps and slats in.

In training they emphasize IAS, especially in small planes, but I was wondering if the angle of attack was used instead for max glide range.

[Frangible]

Thanks for that. And I had read your earlier postings. Very restrained of you not to ask the Xfeed question.

The only thing I'd add is that I understood that they were carrying a much higher reserve so as not to have to buy so much fuel in Lisbon, where it's more expensive. How much I don't know. No doubt the report will have the correct figure. It's expected next month.

[GotTheTshirt]

Lu,

One thing I dont understand about the fuel pump.

It is not unusual to get engines for change with bits missing. It often happens where you get a Bare Engine, a Non handed QEC or a Handed QEC.
To remove parts of the original engine is normal provided those parts are not lifed or within life and the previous engine did not suffer a failure that renders the parts unusable.
So having removed the pump from the old engine why did they not just take the duct and bracket at the same time ??

I was not aware that they had changed an engine , the original story I heard was that they were carrying out a mod kit that had bits missing ( which to me makes more sense)

:confused:

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Got The T Shirt

I believe they did use the duct from the removed engine however this duct did not incorporate the change that would prevent abrasion on adjacent parts. Air Transat felt that the use of the old parts would not cause a problem in the relatively short period (flight hours) that would transpire before receiving the correct parts from Rolls Royce. (I THINK)

:cool:

[Lu Zuckerman]

The English, Canadian, German and I believe the Italian Discovery channel will be running a program in the near future covering the Air Transat A 330 Glider incident. The program is in the Mayday series.

All of the facts were not available for the program so they may be included in a voice over at the end of the program. These facts will raise a lot of eyebrows and they will silence a lot of the commentary on these threads.

Here are some facts that the readers of these threads may not be aware of: Very shortly after the incident Airbus Industrie published an AD outlining the changes to the pilots manual governing management of fuel leakage. In the first page of the AD Airbus said it was the pilots fault. I have been involved in the aviation industry since 1949 and I have never seen an AD that assigned blame. The AD went into every conceivable scenario relative to the management of a major fuel leak.

And just about everyone required the physical observation of the leak to ascertain where the leak was located which in turn would generate the counter effort by the pilot(s). This involved the flight crew or cabin crew making the observation. No consideration was given to the fact that if the leak occurred at night the observation could not be made. This is what happened on the Air Transat A330. Even if the information in the AD were available at the time the pilots could not respond correctly because it happened in the dark of night. Nothing was mentioned in the AD about the fact that the A 330 system provides a warning well into the leak as opposed the 757 which requires a very small differential in order to generate a warning.

The AD was a cover your ass effort and it was not very well thought out.

Here is another fact. An AD was issued to cover abrasion of lines on P&W and GE engines used on the A-330, which would result in loss of fuel. This AD was issued long before the Air Transat incident, which means that both Airbus Industrie and Rolls Royce, were well aware of the potential for the problem to manifest itself on the Trent-700. There is more and hopefully it will be covered in the Mayday program. If it isn’t, I will publish it on these threads.



:E

[411A]

Lu,

Ah....the L1011 was not fitted with Trent engines.:uhoh:

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: 411A

I made corrections to my post which moots your post. Sorry about that.

:E

[quarefellah]

Hindsight is ALWAYS 20/20 but I'm curious about the info. provided to the crew by the FMGS during all of this.

On a Honeywell fit I can think of at least two pages that show EFOB at dest. (FLT PLAN & FUEL PRED). On a typical 7 hour flight that number might vary by a couple of hundred kilos (depending on the accuracy of forecast winds, amongst other things). If fuel was leaking at a rate of 550 lbs/min (250 kgs/min) as mentioned earlier then I would have thought that the EFOB would be reducing at an alarming rate whilst ETA would remain the same. If it's going to take the same time to get somewhere and fuel=time then something's not right.

To confirm what has been mentioned earlier fuel imbalance ECAMs are at hopelessly high levels thus only telling you that you've HAD a fuel leak. Also the Trim Tank Transfer System for CG management can obscure any imbalance by transferring fuel forward from the trim tank asymmetrically!!

As has been said so many times before let's see the final report.

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: quarefellah

As has been said so many times before let's see the final report.

The report is finished however it has not been released due to some of the principals taking exception to the findings. The faults as identified have very little to do with the actions of the pilots.

Hopefully these points of contention will be discussed in the Discovery Mayday program that is supposed to be aired this month.

:E

[CD]

MAYDAY: Flying on Empty - episode air times (http://www.exn.ca/onTv/episode.asp?episode=43807787&TZ=0)

Mayday: Flying on Empty

An Air Transat Airbus runs out of fuel over the Atlantic and has to glide to a power-free landing; explore the causes that contributed to the near catastrophe and how the crew landed safely.

[Lu Zuckerman]

Please note that the times shown in the preceding post are for the Showing of the Mayday program in Canada. This same program will be aired in the UK, France, Germany and Italy. Check your local listings.

:E

[Plastique]

There is no doubt in anybody's mind that it took a pretty neat bit of flying to get an aircraft from 17 minutes out with no fuel to on the ground with no injuries.
HOWEVER...
It took pretty questionable airmanship on the part of the captain to find himself in that situation in the first place (even allowing for Air Transat Engineering's poor config control which caused the fuel pipe/hydraulic line chafe in the first place).

It was a fiendish bit of good luck that the Azores are where they are. Another 1/2 hour further out and the story would have ended a lot differently...

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Plastique

(even allowing for Air Transat Engineering's poor config control which caused the fuel pipe/hydraulic line chafe in the first place).

Watch the Mayday program to see who was at fault.

:E

[Winstun]

Accolades to this crew is an absolute outrage !
It is plainly obvious that they failed to monitor their fuel quantitiy closely enough, and when disparity found, failed to keep fuel sources isolated. A failure of basic airmanship. That they very luckily survived this incident is mute point. These jokers should be thrown in jail for a very long time for placing their good fare paying passengers lives at very significant risk through their negligence ....:ooh:

[HotDog]

Winstun, you don't have to be an outstanding human being to make a mistake but you have to be a damn good one to rectify it!

[RaTa]

aardvark2zz

I don't know much about Airbus and I may be incorrect here, but I doubt angle of attack was used as there is no way of measuring it, pitch attitude yes.
On large jet aircraft I have flown we have used IAS for Min drag, you have to remember that this speed is not fixed and will change with weight reduction.

[broadreach]

Winston,

Were it as simple as we would all undoubtedly like, discussion would have ended months ago. It seems it's not, and it hasn't, so why not wait a little prior to the invective? In due course this thread will give loads of room for opinion but why not wait a while for the scope for same to narrow down just a bit. Unless, of course, you have inside knowlege beyond - well beyond - that of posters here.

[Frangible]

Crew fuel management may not necessarily be the main issue here.

When the leak sprung, it gushed out, soaking the oil pipes, leading to oil temperature and pressure alerts. They spent a good 7 or 8 minutes dealing with that, consulting base etc. before clearing it. Once cleared, next message was "fuel imbalance", another hardly ever seen message. If no leak suspected, says manual, open crossfeed. They had recently checked fuel, nothing odd found, opened crossfeed and then the rest is history.

One oddity is that if the Fuel Imbalance warning is your first warning of a leak, the statement "if no leak is suspected" doesn't make sense (circular logic). Perhaps they should have done a manual fuel check ater that warning appeared (we don't know yet if they did or not as the official report is not yet out) but the manual nowhere states that this warning could be due to a fuel leak.

Another oddity is that the A330, despite automating almost everything except meal service, does not compare fuel remaining to fuel loaded against the rate of burn. Rumours suggest (anybody know for sure out there?) Airbus is adding this function to the automation now.

[A310GUY]

If the crew had referred to the checklist they may have read some of the points made in the above post. My information is that the crew did not use the checklist in reference to the fuel leak problem. The Captain opened the crossfeed line - or should I say - crossfeed in-line (airbus speak) without reference to any checklist.
Furthermore, any professional crew when confronted with an abnormal situation carries out the checklist and performs each item on the list at that time. You don't just assume the fuel is OK because you recently did a check. It takes just a few seconds and some simple math to do a check.
Captain Piche's poor CRM knowledge or acceptance was a main contributing factor. It will be interesting to see if this is pointed out in the official accident report.
A310Guy

[QAR ASR]

If Captain Piche was at the controls of destiny, then maybe the most important question needs to asked, who was at the controls of the fuel cross feed switch.

The reason he has struggled to deal with the subsequent accolades is because he knows how he got into that position.

[Lu Zuckerman]

The root cause of the loss of fuel will soon be disclosed. Watch the Mayday program on Discovery in your viewing area. Sometime in October.

:E

[sooty3694]

I have noticed a propensity among some of the correspondants of pprune to generally seeks to critizise the actions of other pilots whenever the opportunity arises, particularly in cases such as this.

Irrespective of what may have been the root cause of the incident, the pilots clearly pulled off a display of outstanding skill and airmanship - and certainly a feat that only a very tiny minority from our profession would be able to repeat given the circumstances.

Of course we would all love to believe that we are excellent pilots, and could indeed have pulled off the same feat - but in reality most of us would never have rescued themselves from such a situation, IRRESPECTIVE of what may or may not have been the initial cause.

I sense that those correspondants who choose to draw to our attention possible ommissions made by the crew are simply those whose jealousy has got the better of them - or perhaps it's their insecurity - they haven't yet had the chance to display the skill they are not sure they posses!

[John Farley]

Well said sooty

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: sooty3694

Right on

:E

[skydriller]

Just watched what I thought was quite an informative/objective/ non sensationalist program about this affair on France 5, in French (funnily enough) at about 5pm local time this evening.

First a disclamer:

1- I do not know if the show I saw is the one talked about above, though Discovery Canada/France 5 was mentioned in the credits.
2- My French is still not 100%, but I understand it pretty well having lived here for 2 years now.

The thrust of the program appeared to be that the crew thought they had a computer glitch, they only knew they were losing fuel just before the engines quit and they were damn good pilots to rescue the situation afterwards. The initial screwy(as they saw it) temp readings on the engine were checked with base and they were told moniter situation, there is no problem. Later fuel imbalance was then regarded with the initial idea of a computer glitch firmly in the forefront of their minds, the reconstruction showed them following procedures & also getting cabin crew to look in the back and see if fuel was venting overboard and only then opening fuel crossfeed. This was then left open for the system to stabilise bearing in mind they were thinking computer glitch, not fuel loss.

The tone of the show was summed up by passengers comments to the question ‘are the crew heros?’, Reply’s along the lines of – ‘Heros no, but regardless of whether they made any mistakes, brilliant pilots who’s flying skills that day saved our lives’.

Incidentally, one thing mentioned was that ‘the only interested party to hold the crew responsible for the incident is Airbus Industry….who have now made changes to their aircraft fuel management software…’

Anyone else also see this program? Preferably with a better command of French than I? - I now want to see the show in English !!

[Winstun]

Irrespective of what may have been the root cause of the incident, the pilots clearly pulled off a display of outstanding skill and airmanship - and certainly a feat that only a very tiny minority from our profession would be able to repeat given the circumstances. :sad: .....well. let me see, next time I'm a good fare paying pax across the atlantic, I'm gonna hope like hell that I got an insecure, less skillful, less excellent pilot that can manage his fuel situation rather than take me for an unnecessary joyride in a several thosand tonne piece of metal...hotshot or not..:rolleyes: they only knew they were losing fuel just before the engines quit and they were damn good pilots to rescue the situation afterwards. ...:ooh: .....did not notice fuel quantity reducing? did not notice lateral trim inbalance? did not consider fuel leak (until too late)? :rolleyes: 'computer glitch' is wishful thinking...:hmm: This is a blatant display of incompetance and negligence. This crew should be locked up for a very long time for time for placing unecessary loss of life risk on the good pax. That they skillfully, luckiliy, and selfishly (saving their own ass) pulled off the glide feat is of no consequence to their lack of credibility. :zzz:

[coopervane]

Reading some of the comments on here about this heroic act makes me wonder if all aircrew have some sort of self righteous brain cell implanted at flight school.

You have all trained for disaster days but fortunately only the few who have experienced such trauma can comment on how they would actually react.

Fear is a key player in these events even to the most experienced of crews.

He should have done this or that is all very well in the comfort of your cockpiit while waiting for a slot.

Give the guy a break. Everyone lived to tell the tale and even if he didnt follow every procedure in the book,his airmanship saved the day.

Would you have coped any better? Lets hope you never have to find out.

Coopervane & Bear

[faheel]

As my wife would say Wintsun you really are a dick !

You really do have a chip on your shoulder don't you?
I guess you are pissed off that you were not on board to save the day, and I am sure that given your outstanding skills you would have.

From what I have read from your previous posts all you do is whine and criticise, nothing ever constructive escapes your pearly whites.

[Winstun]

Give the guy a break. Yes, I would give the guy a long break....in jail.Everyone lived to tell the tale ....:hmm: small comfort....kind of like saying its ok the pilot penetrated a severe thunderstorm, cause the wings didnt break off and we lived...this time..:rolleyes: even if he didnt follow every procedure in the book,his airmanship saved the day. Not following procedures and mismangement of your fuel situation I would class as lack of airmanship . His ass saved the day. Would I have coped better? Yes. By not opening the crossfeed valve. Quite simple really...:hmm: Jokers like this should be held accountable for their negligence.

[slice]

Just to put everyone in the picture, Winnie has been posting for some time over in the D&G forums, much to everyone's amusement. If you do a search for his posts in those forums you will get the picture pretty quickly.:=

[HotDog]

Jesus Winstun, you are one brave hombre. What fantastic airmanship you must posses. Hopefully that same airmanship will keep you honest enough to tell us all about your next stuff up so we can all learn from it.:rolleyes:

[Danny]

Just thought I'd fire this shot across the bows as a wake up call:

There are quite a few bona-fide, self absorbed, blowhards with a British, Australian or Kiwi accent lurking on PPRuNe mixed with the obligatory, awestruck wannabes. There are also quite few awestruck wannabes masquerading as self absorbed blowhards with a British, Australian or Kiwi accent.

The above observation was made by a visitor to PPRuNe and I thought it very pertinent. This thread is turning into one of those classical examples where we all need to sit back and analyse the posts and decide who knows what they are talking about and who only thinks they know what they are talking about. I may even make that the PPRuNe motto! :hmm:

[Kaptin M]

Blasted colonials - not spiffing cricket, is it!
Eh what.

[coopervane]

Hey Witsun, only one joker on this forum.

It blokes like u that make aviation the ministry of self importance.

Factors like stress and fear do play a big part in emergencies but I guess a Mr. Perfect plonker like you would be imune to such human emotions.

We aint robots and even you must have have cocked up at some point in your perfect career.

Coop & human bear.

PS just looked at Witsun's profile. Under location. It says "planit"

But doesn't say which one he comes from.

Coop

[Frangible]

Hauling thread sluggishly back on topic...

Have heard rumour that Airbus has now changed the A330 FMGS so that it does now calculate fuel remaining against what it's been burning and what was loaded and so can alert low fuel irrespective of manual checks.

If true, this is, no doubt, just another product improvement and unrelated to any incidents past present or future.

[OzPax1]

If true, this is, no doubt, just another product improvement and unrelated to any incidents past present or future.

And do Pigs Fly! :mad: Like hell it wasn't related. Horse, bolt and stable door come to mind!

[gumbi]

Well said Sooty!

it just goes to show what kind of solidarity pilots display...
no wonder our profession is in "dire straits"!

Frangible! that's a good one...;) like u say I'm sure it has no relation whatsoever to the incident at cause, or all others BTW

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Frangible

If true, this is, no doubt, just another product improvement and unrelated to any incidents past present or future.

This change is as a direct result of the Air Transat incident and closely follows an AD issued by Airbus changing the directions in the operating manual relative to managing a leak or suspected leak. It was in this AD that Airbus stated that it was the pilots’ fault.

Note to all: As for UK transmission of the Mayday program, we (Discovery Canada) know that three programs will be broadcast in
November and three in January at 8pm on Mondays on Channel Five. But,
unfortunately we do not yet know which order the programs are being
transmitted.

:E

[Idle Thrust]

Not sure if I missed the schedule in the many posts here but just in case, the MAYDAY program "Flying on Empty" is planned to air on the Discovery Canada channel on

October 8 @ 2200
October 9 @ 1700
October 12 @ 2200

All times Eastern, and it will be in English.

[India Four Two]

OzPax1 and Lu,

I think Frangible and Gumbi were being more than slightly sarcastic.

[Frangible]

Thanks IFT. Irony can be dangerous...

[India Four Two]

Frangible,

You are quite right - irony in the wrong hands is extremely dangerous. In retrospect, I should have used 'ironic' rather than 'sarcastic' in my message (it had been a long day!).

I see that 'irony' is defined as being more subtle than 'sarcasm'. In this case it might have been too subtle;)

[Plastique]

Just for info:
The Fuel Used/FOB disagree message is calculated by the FCMC and is contained in FCMC9.0 and above. A FWC change is required in parallel to 'activate' the warning.
This is active on all new deliveries and Service Bulletins are available to apply the change retrospectively.
The Fuel Used/FOB disagree occurs when there is over 5t mismatch between the departure fuel minus fuel used, and the FOB figure.

This warning was conceived about 6 years ago, as an A340 operator and an A320 operator both lost significant amounts of fuel from the engine HP fuel filter cover which came off due to the helicoil inserts in the housing giving away. The A340 lost about 20 tonnes of fuel (xfeed valves were not opened), the A320 lost a lot more because the pilot did exactly as per the Air Transat pilot and opened crossfeed. The A320 landed with something like 200kg FOB.

There was resistance in some of the operators contacted (including the two operators, A320 and A340 cases above). The resistance was due to the fact that the Flight Ops departments considered en-route fuel checks to be basic airmanship, and they were concerned that the existance of such a warning could cause complacency.

Airbus eventually decided to inplement the function, as it was considered that it was beneficial to alert crew as soon as the threshold is exceeded. In theory if the leak is from one wing tank or engine, the fuel imbalance message should come first (in most cases).
There was one case about 9 years ago when an A330 had an excessive transfer to the trim tank due to a leaking vent, a pipe disconnected in the trim and pushed about 5 tonnes overboard (trim transfer continued as the tank was not reaching the trim tank fuel quantity requried for the aft CG target). This problem was due to incorrect pipe installation.

I think the FU/FOB Disagree function is a good thing, but hopefully it will be the last defense.

[G fiend]

Hers an interesting fact for you all,

Years ago my airline had to ground it's entire fleet of b757 a/c (only 19 a/c but hell, still *ucks your day in ops) for inspection, after a fault was found with one of the clips that 'restrain'(sic) the fuel line and an AD was issued.

Guess what engine our 757's our equipped with?

A clue?
can't say Derby 'cos GE engines are also made there. but you get the point!

Makes me wonder if the MX organisation was up to speed.

[jettison valve]

Plastique,

my papers quote a discrepancy threshold of 3.5t for the FU/FOB warning.

Given the number of scenarios in which this warning is inhibited and the fact that monitoring fuel consumption is one of the primary duties of a flight crew en route, I somehow doubt whether this feature is really worth its money.

BTW: The modification consists of a pin programming between FCMCs (9 and on) and FWCs (8 and higher, if I remember right).

Happy Landings,
J.V.

[India Four Two]

Well, I've just seen "Flying on Empty" on Discovery Canada. A fairly typical Discovery production - about 10 minutes of facts strung out to an hour's show by some speculative and not very well done re-construction of events on-board, although it looks like they borrowed a simulator. Whose, I wonder, since Air Transat declined to participate in the filming.

Nothing new in the facts that hasn't already been raised in this thread, but the highlight for me was seeing a real live Ppruner - Lu Zuckerman :D

Lu, were those your model aircraft in the background?

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: India Four Two

Lu, were those your model aircraft in the background?

Yes but they represented less 1/20th of the total collection. If you are ever in the are in the area you are welcome to come for a visit and see all of the models.

:E

[pigboat]

Hi Lu. That's a great model collection Are they all from from kits, or are they manufacturers models? :cool:

Couple of quick comments:
Why oh why didn't they get the f:mad: g radio terminology correct? If the producers cannot get that simple fact right, it doesn't say dick for the rest of the research that went into the program.
I didn't see that they'd closed the x-feed after the loss of the first engine. Loss of an engine is a pretty good indication that your fuel problem is something other than a computer glitch.

That being said, after their balls were in the crack they pulled off a pretty fine piece of airmanship.

[India Four Two]

Lu,

I can see it now - "The Juno for the best aircraft model collection goes to ..... ":D

Thanks for the invitation - I'll have to see if I can manage a trip Down East some time.


PB,

I agree - the radio terminology made me cringe - they couldn't even get the calling and receiving callsigns in the correct order!

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Pigboat

Hi Lu. That's a great model collection Are they all from kits, or are they manufacturers models?

Almost all of ny helicopter models are manufacturers models and some are custom built. A good portion of my fixed wing models are manufactures models. I have quite a few that are custom built and and a lot were purchased from a local model store. I have several factory model amphibs but I'm sorry to say no PBY. My favorite is a 1:72 model of a Coast Guard HO3S in the livery of a helicopter I maintained and flew in when I was in the Guard. This was built from a kit.

I didn't build any of them. My hands are too shakey and my fingers would most likely get super glued together.

When they signed me for the interview they asked if there was some place with an aviation atmosphere where they could conduct the interview. I told them wait until you get in my basement office. They were very impressed. They took a lot of footage of the collection but it never got on the show. They spent almost 4 hours in the interview and 80% of it ended on the cutting room floor.

:E

[B767300ER]

Danny Fine---"Capt.PPrune"...

I wholeheartedly agree with your post. I suspected as much from a few posters.

As far as the "Atlantic Glider", I was flying a trans-Atlantic sector that night to LGW in a 767 and heard the Air Transat flight at the beginning, before they got out of range on 123.45; I was VERY impressed with the coolness and the professionalism of this crew, trying to make Lajes. When I heard the next day that they made it, I was very relieved and even though this incident has human factors and obvious errors associated with it, I am VERY impressed with the airmanship of that crew in landing safely. ALPA awarded them the "Superior Airmanship Award" last year, which says alot.

I'm sure the investigation will highlight the original mistakes, but applaud the crew for their reaction to the potential loss of the aircraft and souls on board.

Man, I wish I could see that "Discovery Channel" program in the US.

[keepin it in trim]

A lot of people are getting awful high and mighty about "computer glitches" and indications which the crew should have acted on and "how they should have known / noticed what was actually happening".

Well, I enjoy the luxury of operating a twin engine, full glass-cockpit, single pilot IFR helicopter built by a well known european corporation. It is a wonderful machine and tremendously capable, HOWEVER..... We have had a number of incidents recently, all of which led to MORs, of electrical glitches or failures. On each occasion the indications and warnings that the crew observed should not have been possible ( the manufacturers words ), the actions in the emergency procedures cards did not resolve the situation and the crew had to analyse the fault in the air and use their best judgement to resolve the situation.

Computer glitches ARE a reality in very electric aircraft, confusing indications with drills that do not resolve the problem ARE a reality. Manufacturers subsequently changing procedures given the benefit of someones often painful experience (and often denying this as the reason) ARE a reality.

The crew may have made errors, but if the manufacturer saw fit to change the drills or update the software as a result of this incident then things cannot have been entirely right when this crew found themselves in trouble.

One last thought, we all make mistakes or end up in situations we wouldn't choose, how you cope with those situations is what matters. On this occasion exceptional flying skill and airmanship averted disaster, big hand of respect to these guys for pulling it out of the fire - how many of us can be sure we would have handled the whole situation as well?

[Winstun]

"how they should have known / noticed what was actually happening". ..What they did or did not know of what was actually happening is mute point....you don't open the crossfeed valve in this situation...:rolleyes: ..pretty basic really. we all make mistakes or end up in situations we wouldn't choose, how you cope with those situations is what matters. ..:ooh: ..pretty BIG mistake...you make these kinda mistakes, you have no business being in a cockpit.
Same deal for crews of UA DC-8, LM DC-9, AC 767, HF A310.exceptional flying skill and airmanship averted disaster, big hand of respect to these guys for pulling it out of the fire ....my friggin gawd!!.. :rolleyes: Try "pure arse". Really don't know where some here are coming from... In my dictionary, airmanship includes not running outta gas..:hmm:

[scanscanscan]

I think these guys really needed a good old flight engineer to look after their fuel system problem in the first place.

[keepin it in trim]

scanscanscan

I have always felt that a good flight engineer is worth his weight in gold, especially when life starts to get interesting.

Only thing is, given some of the flight engineers I've worked with that could be an awful lot of gold!

[arcniz]

Agree that a good Flight Engineer might have made it all go away, but what can you do when the company doesn't want to pay the freight for a third set of eyes, ears, and lobes?

Answer has to be: Make the G**#% aircraft tell you what it knows whenever the heck you want to find out.

The aircraft either knew or could have quickly reckoned what was happening in regard to fuel ....problem was the crew evidently had no procedure available to depart from the SOP menus and ask the airframe the pointy kind of questions that would have quickly illuminated the bolix. Cost to add this class of function is not big, but it is a departure from the "we'll tell you what you know when you need to know it" philosophy -- a banality suffisant to offend the highly artistic senses of the designers.

Give it another hundred years and the surviving airframe companies are sure to have this sort of thing figured out.

[innuendo]

As posted on AEF, the report on this incident can be found at:

http://www.GPIAA-portugal-report.com

[rotornut]

Transat report blames pilots

By PAUL KORING
Associated Press


POSTED AT 5:58 AM EDT Monday, Oct 18, 2004

The harrowing, engines-out, emergency landing of a Canadian airliner that ran out of fuel over the Atlantic Ocean three years ago could have been avoided if the Air Transat pilots had followed established fuel-leak procedures, the official report into the accident concludes.

Instead of a near-disaster, a routine diversionary landing with plenty of fuel remaining would have resulted if proper produces were followed, Portugal's Aviation Accidents Prevention and Investigation Department says.

Passengers aboard Air Transat's Airbus A-330 cheered and applauded Captain Robert Piché as a hero after he slammed the unpowered jet onto the runway at Lajes air base in the Azores after gliding for 19 minutes after the second engine failed.

But accident investigators determined that the pilots turned a fuel leak into a near-disaster by failing to recognize it and trying to correct from memory -- rather than by following a checklist -- what they believed was a weight imbalance, during which time they pumped tonnes of fuel overboard.

The Globe and Mail obtained a copy of the Portuguese final report into the Aug. 24, 2001, accident. The report is expected to be released today.

Efforts to contact Air Transat yesterday for comment about the findings were unsuccessful.

Capt. Piché's extraordinary airmanship, including making a steep, 360-degree turn only a few kilometres from the threshold of the Lajes runway to lose sufficient height, then gliding to a landing, impressed the Portuguese investigators.

"The captain's skill in conducting the engines-out glide to a successful landing averted a catastrophic accident and saved the lives of the passengers and crew," the report says.

However, the report makes clear that such heroics would not have been needed had the pilots shut down the right-side engine (where the fuel was leaking) or had not pumped tonnes of fuel from the undamaged left wing into the right-wing tanks, from where it was poured overboard at more than three kilograms a second.

"Either of these actions would have conserved the fuel in the left-wing tanks and allowed for a landing at Lajes with the left engine operating," the report says.

Instead, "opening the crossfeed valve put the fuel in the left tank at risk, and initiated a worsening of the serious fuel-leak situation."

The crew failed to comprehend that the aircraft had a major fuel leak, even after the second engine died.

"Notwithstanding indications that there had been a massive loss of fuel, the crew did not believe that there was an actual fuel leak," the report says. Instead, the crew believed they were dealing with a computer malfunction.

Details of the flight-crew conversations were lost to investigators because the pilots inadvertently recorded over the 90-minute cockpit voice tape after the landing.

Investigators established that fuel began leaking from the twin-engined, wide-bodied jet more than an hour before the pilots noticed anything amiss. When they did, they treated the problem as a fuel imbalance and failed to heed the checklist warning of fuel-leak possibility.

They did not call up the checklist on the computer screen, relying instead on memory for their actions. Fifteen minutes later, with the fuel level dropping alarmingly and below the minimum needed to reach Lisbon, the crew elected to divert to the Azores. But they continued to transfer the dwindling fuel from the left wing to the leaking right side.

At 6:13 a.m., with the aircraft more than 240 kilometres from Lajes, the right-side engine flamed out for lack of fuel. At 6:23, the crew radioed a full-scale mayday. Flight attendants were told to prepare the passengers for a ditching. Three minutes later, more than 100 kilometres from the nearest land, the left engine flamed out. During the next 19 minutes, in darkness and with only limited instruments, Capt. Piché nursed the unpowered aircraft to a landing.

Investigators determined that the fuel leak was caused by improper installation of the right-side engine nearly a week earlier. Air Transat technicians, dealing with a slightly different model of Rolls-Royce engine than they were familiar with, had improperly attached fuel and hydraulic lines to the engine. The lines chafed, eventually fracturing the fuel line.

The report says that the Air Transat flight crew were inadequately prepared to recognize and deal with fuel leaks.

"The flight crew members had never experienced a fuel leak situation during operations or training," the report says, adding the "lack of training in the symptoms of fuel-leak situations resulted in this crew not being adequately prepared."

[Chutney]

Wonder if anyone will want to swing handbags at the report above. Or have we found a mainstream media journo who meets aviators' hopes and expectations?

Pip Pip!!

[rotornut]

Details of the flight-crew conversations were lost to investigators because the pilots inadvertently recorded over the 90-minute cockpit voice tape after the landing.
Inadvertently?

[M.Mouse]

Yes, inadvertently.

It's all there in the report.

[Budgie69]

Rotornut

I know it's an awful drag to actually read the report, but why don't you give it a try. It doesn't have any joined up writing and doesn't use many terribly long words.

If you do read the relevant section you will see that deletion of the CVR data was inadvertent. However it is obviously much more fun to make sly insinuations.

[Frangible]

Inadvertently recorded over CVR?
Two engines out, no power except through the RAT in flight.
How is that possible?

[M.Mouse]

When you have read the report, ask the question again.

Assuming of course the answer isn't there.

[Frangible]

Pardon me, I'll answer my own qustion. It was overwritten following application of ground power later on.

[rotornut]

OK (deep breath) to be fair I'll read the report :(

[EDDNHopper]

rotornut,
:ok:

[Miserlou]

Our SOP says to pull the c/b's on the recorders after an incident. Shame their's didn't.

So, apart from the convenience, it may well have been inadvertant .

[mac_scott]

Interesting read. As with all accidents there is a chain of events that leads to the incident taking place. Blaming the Captain/FO for doing the checklist from memory misses any number of factors. Interesting ones for me were:

1) Training at the time did not seem to cover fuel leaks - so the crew were not trained to look for this.

2) Fuel leaks only appeared as a caution note on the fuel imbalance proceedure!

Overall sounds like the crew did an amazing job on getting this one down and putting all the blame on their doing a "check list from memory" is a gross oversimplification of the man steps that led to this incident.

Mac

Report says that the procedures on pulling CBs were not clear and the crew pulled 2 out of 3 - hence the data got zapped.

Mac

[RatherBeFlying]

The part I like is the recommendation for mandating the pin change to the Flight Warning Computer programming to present an amber warning message when Fuel Used + Fuel on Board compared to Initial Fuel on Board at Departure exceeds 3500 Kg.:ok:

The part I don't like is that this capability was already in the FWC, but disabled:confused:

[jettison valve]

RatherBeFlying,

Not entirely true: The FU/FOB calculation is done in the FCMCs, and there only at standard 9 and above. FCMC 9 came up sometime late 2001, I seem to remember.
You only need to modify the FWC to make it "responsive" to the information from the FCMCs.

BTW: As of 2006, you need to have this warning function activated to perform ETOPS...

Cheers,
J.V.

[Rockhound]

In asserting that the Portuguese authorities have laid "all the blame on [the crew] doing a check list from memory", Mac_Scott is, I believe, misreading their report, a report which appears eminently comprehensive and fair to me.
Mac is right when he points out that, as usual, a whole chain of events led to the emergency. However, the Portuguese investigators, in their report and particularly in their recommendations, draw attention to deficient training of aircrew in fuel leak detection and to inadequate provision of warning systems to alert crew to abnormal fuel situations. Certainly, had the Air Transat crew referred to their Quick Reference Handbook when dealing with the fuel imbalance they might have noticed the caution not to follow the procedure in the case of a suspected fuel leak - but this was only one of the events in the chain.
What shook me (SLF) most about this incident at the time - and still does - was the fact that the crew of a modern airliner on a long-haul flight had only 53 minutes notice of total fuel exhaustion.
Rockhound

[dfish]

http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2004/10/18/transat041018.html

[rotornut]

OK, guys, I read the report. This is an ADvertent erasure of my previous post:\

[Globaliser]

Original post deleted: Thread now merged, sarcy comment superfluous.

[plt_aeroeng]

For Mac:

You are being overly kind to the crew. After reading all 103 pp. of the report, my conclusion is that the Portuguese are also being overly kind.

To begin, one of my old instructors said "A superior pilot is one who uses his superior judgment to avoid having to use his superior skill." This crew failed that directive.

I don't understand why the crew felt the need to use a crossfeed valve when they didn't understand what was going on. Unless there was significant aerodynamic evidence, i.e. one wing very heavy, there was no urgency to cross feed. This is one of the reasons why regulators now ensure that cross feed is only done by very purposeful actions of the crew.

There should be no remotely normal situation, with all engines operating, when a lateral imbalance gets out of hand. Once one of the engines is out, any half competent multi engine crew should be able to work out that the dead engine side will be heavy. Until that is clear, why break the isolation of the two sides?

"Computer malfunction" suspected is a pure cop out. If it was a computer malfunction, there would be no reason to cross feed, unless the crew suspected that the computer had performed some side to side transfer. In that case, cross feed is an uncontrolled reaction to an undiagnosed situation. The crew made a bad situation dire by lack of basic airmanship. (What ever happened to "dead foot - dead engine" and the corresponding effect on heavy wing?)

Nevertheless, once they had placed themselves in such a glider situation, they did not need the altitude they kept approaching Lajes. In their defense, I have been to Lajes at night, and you really can't see anything until you are almost lined up on the runway. (The lights have some directionality, and there is high ground - not a cliff, but a rise - north of the runway). Still, 13,000 feet up at 8 miles distance suggests that they could have planned their final approach a little better. They had time to do the old descent vs. distance calculation in their minds when they could see their stabilized descent rate.

As an ex-military pilot, perhaps the oft practiced calculation of altitude needed to get to one of:
1. Overhead on runway heading at 2 mins. worth of altitude, or
2. Downwind at 1 min. worth of altitude plus a buffer to drop gear and flap, or finally
3. Join on base at something less than 1 minute of altitude

is too simplistic for an airline crew long separated from such thoughts. Still, it does not show a good appreciation of time/altitude/distance to get so close so high.

They did, however, scrub their altitude and speed successfully. 200 K over the threshold is not a terrible result. However, in light winds there does not appear to be a good reason to hammer the gear onto the ground as hard as they appear to have. Full braking was perhaps their best decision.

I'm not at all impressed by this crew. Obvious comparisons are to the crew of an Air Canada 767 glider which successfully landed on a 6500' runway from over 100 NM out, or the celebrated DC-10 pilot who saved most of the passengers after physically losing an engine and all flight controls.

The accident report focuses heavily on training re the computer pages and fuel imbalance situations. It appears that the investigators have accepted that airline crew are essentially automatons. This line of thinking will eventually lead to robot airliners. Only recently a fellow engineer told me that the high rate of human error means the machine must avoid human input at all times. Crews who show the lack of airmanship and understanding of mechanical systems evident here reflect badly on our community.

[gumbi]

plt_aeroeng

"they did not need the altitude they kept approaching Lajes."

"Still, 13,000 feet up at 8 miles distance suggests that they could have planned their final approach a little better."

"They had time to do the old descent vs. distance calculation in their minds when they could see their stabilized descent rate. "



Are you out of your mind?????



"As an ex-military pilot"


OK, I see...


Hasn't your old instructor also told that your better off losing extra altitude than... not making the field?

[post213]

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20041019.wtransat19/BNStory/National/

http://www.cbc.ca/story/world/national/2004/10/18/transat041018.html

http://finance.lycos.com/qc/news/story.aspx?symbols=CNW:100&story=200410180021_CNW_c1156

[Sky Wave]

plt_aeroeng

It's very easy for you talk the talk of a superior pilot whilst sat at your computer. In the cold light of day and especially with the benefit of hindsight everyone will question why they chose to cross feed as it's obvious that they should not have done. At the time that the imbalance was noticed they were already trying to fault find a fault which was not covered in the QRH and like the fuel leek fault one that they had not previously experienced in the sim. This was obviously enough to have hampered their thought process and made them doubt the ECAM. You must also remember that the Air France pilots did exactly the same thing.

"Still, 13,000 feet up at 8 miles distance suggests that they could have planned their final approach a little better"

I would have thought it was much better to go for best glide range arrive high and then lose the height whilst preparing for the landing rather than increasing your workload trying to accurately plan your glide angle only to find that you've c**cked up and end up in the drink.

"200 K over the threshold is not a terrible result"

I would have though that it was very close to the stalling speed for an A330 with only slats deployed. A very good result I would imagine.

"However, in light winds there does not appear to be a good reason to hammer the gear onto the ground as hard as they appear to have"

When you consider that they had no flaps, no spoilers, no reverse thrust, no autobrake, no antiskid limited pitch control and no second chance I would of thought that getting the thing down was all that mattered. Perhaps a superior pilot such as yourself would have managed to do a perfect landing and controlled the braking sufficiently to allow the aircraft to coast to the gate, however I think that they did a stunning job of getting themselves out of the mess that they got themselves into.

I'm only a wanabbie so maybe my thoughts are a little off the mark, and if so I apologise. I'd be very interested to hear if any line pilots agree with me.

[unwiseowl]

Well I agree with you Sky Wave.

That crew were let down by Airbus, Rolls, their own engineers their sim trainers and themselves.

I wouldn't like to try that glide. Aside from the practical challenges of it, imagine the fear, stress, guilt, panic and embarresment they must have been feeling.

[NigelOnDraft]

plt_aeroeng

Out of order... Once the Engines had flamed out, I think the crew did exceptionally well.

Interesting report, shame about no FDR for the glide in!

If you have not flown a modern Airbus, they are fine when everything works. However, once you get to Emer Elec Config, life gets quite hard, but more significantly very different to normal ops. We practice it in the Sim - but that's with the engines working. I have also done, in the Sim, (successfully) the glide approach and landing - but with an APU, and having planned it. This crew at night, with most systems not working (remember we are talking a FBW aircraft here, with the FBW system in it's final degraded mode short of packing up), got the aircraft down and all OK. It doesn't get much worse than this in a FBW Airbus, short of total disaster... and cannot be compared to a Boeing in this situation.

I also flew the A340, and an early turnback, and dumping required caused a number of "anomalies" to occur e.g. it failed to actually dump while this Trim Xfr was going on, despite the pretty screens showing it dumping (just the quantity did not reduce!). Hopefully the system has been improved, but when you have computers shifting fuel around largely at their whim, this will mask some of your basic observations / analysis.

IMHO that went some way to recover the siutation that they did, to be fair, contribute to in the first place. These things happen - let's learn, not 20:20 hindsight sniping at the crew. Could be you next time?

NoD

[SLFguy]

Will they now be asked to hand the awards back?

[Smurfjet]

NoD you said
...in it's final degraded mode short of packing up

Does that mean, you will loose the use of the control surfaces eventually?

[Del Prado]

Interested to see the rates of descent. 1000-1100 fpm gliding to field. 1700-2000 during orbit, then 1800 fpm when established on final approach.

Would these be typical for most modern jet aircraft ? (I imagine the A330 makes a particularly good glider ?)

[NigelOnDraft]

Smurfjet

...in it's final degraded mode short of packing up There are various degrades on an Airbus. You start with "Normal Law", then some flavours of "Alternate Law" (fairly similar to Normal), then "Direct Law". Direct is where the control positions are directly related to the sidestick - rather like any other aircraft, and you need to use the trim wheel. A330 might be a bit different... It might sound easy, but when you're not used to trimming, and have all the other degrades, it gets rather complex.

Whatever, the next degrade for FBW is "nil"! You do now have Rudder and Pitch Trim... It's flyable, and some people practice that that to landing - but with engines <G>

NoD

[aardvark2zz]

On an extremely popular, funny, and smart TV show the Captain Piché will be one of the main guests and will be interviewed and humored.

Sunday 8pm - 10pm Radio-Canada

le commandant Robert Piché,

http://radio-canada.ca/television/toutlemondeenparle/

[plt_aeroeng]

Gumbi:

After rereading the report, I agree with you: the crew did do a 360 before landing (P 8), and thus did handle their descent profile well.

In any case, I had no real issues with their approach to Lajes, my primary point was their actions before the double flameout.


Sky Wave:

The quote was from early student days being told what a fool I was, and it stuck. I stand by my position that there is a need for reasoning using basic airmanship. This should have suggested to the crew that crossfeed was a bad idea until either they better understood what was going on, or the imbalance got so bad that control became difficult.

My note re 200K over the threshold should have been interpreted as being a good result after the previous flight path. However, if an A330 is near stall at 200K, why did it float 1,800 feet during the first bounce? I do accept that with the very degraded flight control mode, it may be unreasonable to expect a smoother landing.


Just as a comment, I never suggested that I personally should be regarded as a superior pilot. Given that I have never had to practise a glider approach in a large aircraft, who knows whether I would have displayed superior skill. The real point is that judgment is generally more important than stick and rudder skill. Still, other large aircraft crews in glider situations seem to have done at least as well, perhaps better, and this is really the standard. I do think that the press reports describing the crew as "heroes" is somewhat excessive.

Nigel:

Perhaps you are right, in that modern aircraft do get very ropy with systems out. (Although - what about the DHL crew who suffered missile damage ex Baghdad, and successfully brought the aircraft back?) The real point, as I suggested, was the period before both engines flamed out.

Del Prado:

Fair analysis, although as Gumbi has pointed out, one would not want to guess wrong on final. Up to final, it should be relatively straightforward to predict altitude at destination. However, modern jet aircraft do have very large fans. With no fuel to turn them, these tend to worsen glide performance.

[Lu Zuckerman]

I noticed in the various postings since the release of the report some individuals have taken sides as to who was at fault and why. Granted I did not read the report (loss of concentration) and this may have been covered. I have spent the last 35 years as an assurance engineer. I have seen how airframe manufacturers skim over potential problems due to time constraints or financial constraints and in some cases not wanting to follow the input of assurance engineers like myself.

This problem did not start at 35,000 feet over the Atlantic. It did not start in the Air Transat maintenance facilities at Mirabel, Quebec. It started at the Rolls Royce facility in (I assume) Derby, England.

Had a proper maintainability program been implemented by Rolls Royce they wold have prepared a design checklist. One aspect of this checklist would be directed at parts or assemblies that could be installed backwards. In the case of the Air Transat engine this would include the fuel line and the hydraulic line both of which could be installed backwards. It is obvious that such a checklist was never prepared. Since the parts could be installed backwards the technical manual for the engine should have contained a cautionary note telling the mechanic that caution should be taken when installing the respective lines. If the line(s) was/were installed incorrectly the design clearance between the two lines would close up allowing one line to abrade on the other resulting in a leak and in the case of the Air Transat engine total structural failure of the fuel line.

This problem had been experienced on both General Electric and Pratt & Whitney engines resulting in minor leakage that was discovered during inspection of the engine and pylon support.
Both companies issued ADs outlining the problem and providing detailed instruction relative to establishing the clearance between the two lines as well as periodic checks to see if the clearance had closed up.

This happened long before the Air Transat incident so Rolls Royce should have known about the potential for the same type of incident on their engines.

I don’t have access to Rolls Royce tech manuals and if any of the readers of this forum do please check to see how Rolls Royce is handling this situation.

According to my sources Air Transat took delivery of a brand new A-330 after the Atlantic Glider incident and during receiving inspection they found that the hydraulic and fuel lines were contacting each other.




:E :E

[aardvark2zz]

His book came out 2 years ago and I got a copy and got it autographed by him at a book signing.

He was quite talkative considering the legal stuff was going on. This detailed conversation wouldn't have happened in the states.

Robert Piché aux commandes du destin

http://images.amazon.com/images/P/2764800037.15._PE5_SCMZZZZZZZ_.jpg

http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/2764800037/qid%3D1098423373/701-7405940-4644328

[aardvark2zz]

Here are plots from the official Incident report

Glide data from the moment the plane became a glider until "landing"

http://www.airdisaster.com/user-uploads/Transat236TableV2.gif

Distance and Speed vs Time

http://www.airdisaster.com/user-uploads/Transat236Figure.gif

Speed, Glide Ratio (10x), and Vertical Rate (fpm)

http://www.airdisaster.com/user-uploads/Transat236Figure2.gif

I'm surprised they were able to get an initial glide ratio of 24 which is very high !! I was expecting 17 or less.

Note: The distance and speed is obtained from radar data; in other words it's the radial distance to the radar.

[Dengue_Dude]

I've just seen a program on TV about this with the normal media 'hero worship'.

Journo's love a good story, facts are sometimes inconveniences that have to be ignored. Heroes sell papers etc

You WANT heroes - then look to Sioux City, those guys were heroic.

Hero is a most over-used term these days.

Fact: the crew were dealt a really nasty incident.

Conjecture: You could argue that this fell outside the checklist.

BUT am I wrong in thinking that blind, slavish acceptance of checklist is WRONG?

If it isn't then you've made the case for the trained monkey instead of individuals who do LOFTs, CRM, Tech Refreshers, Line Checks etc etc.

It became obvious early doors that the drill wasn't making the situation better. Surely any thinking person can differentiate between a fuel imbalance and a leak. Fuel imbalance IMPROVES when you take action, Fuel LEAK doesn't.

My old time military checklists used to add a phrase along the lines of:

This checklist constitutes the best advice currently available but may have to be modified and is no substitute for sound judgement and good airmanship (can't remember the exact phrase).

When do you STOP feeding a fuel leak?

It's NOT brain surgery. You're in the middle of the pond and your crossfeed is open and downstream fuel is disappearing too damn quick.

So, lets just keep going until it's empty?

Sound judgement and good airmanship? I don't think so.

Given they were IN the position, they did well to get to land.

Wouldn't any of you made the same decision given the lack of noise?

This to me, smacks of slavish following of checklist without any thought of 'what are the implications of what I'm doing?'. Poor CRM and poor judgement. Smacks of some more heroes - Kegworth.

Personally, my view is that had the questions been asked, and the gauges been viewed and interpreted, they could have landed at Santa Maria with an engine running.

OK, I'm now ducking to avoid incoming.

It's incidents like this of 'heroes' that remind me of the Viscount that ran out of noise just short of Bournemouth a few years back.

Due to fuel gauge problems and a failure to reconcile fuel uplift, this crew ran out of fuel short of their DESTINATION let alone their ALTERNATE. They flopped into a field and everybody got out.

The passengers clapped as the pilots came out of the cabin, the press hailed them as 'HEROES'.

I rest my case.

The Edit: Marks have been deducted for spelling and grammar- apologies for the stuff I've missed.

[NigelOnDraft]

LZ

One aspect of this checklist would be directed at parts or assemblies that could be installed backwards. In the case of the Air Transat engine this would include the fuel line and the hydraulic line both of which could be installed backwardsI don't think anybody has said that anything was installed backwards. If your post was making this assumption, than a very elequant post it is, but nothing to do with this incident.

The problem was a properly documented RR mod package, which was only half incorporated (some pre-Mod bits and some post-Mod).

The problem was not really RR's. It was with the procedures (or lack of) when the engine change occurred. It was not helped by some of the contractual arrangements and expectations in the "pool" engine arrangments, and who was responsible for incorporating mods etc.

NoD

[aardvark2zz]

4 u space-cadettes out there, one more figure, for the gipper ...

Air Transat 236's last 31 minutes just as the 2 engines were starving for fuel.

He did very good stable gliding at the beginning and on final to the runway !!

What I was mainly interested in was the Glide Ratio which is rarely ever mentioned. In this case it was 24 which is very good/high (but i was expecting 17). A well designed glider-plane will do 40 - 50 (or 40 miles distance whilst losing only 1 mile in altitude). From 10000ft you could glide 100 miles without any power on these professional gliders. For a Boeing or Airbus it could glide 100 miles from an altitude of 20000 feet without power !!

He seemed to have glided at approx 250 knots ground speed (nautical miles per hour) (or 200 knots indicated airspeed). So next time you have to glide-in your Boeing or Airbus make sure you keep that airspeed of 200 knots on the instrument !!! Too fast or too slow and you lose more altitude !!!!!

Glossary:
min: minutes
nm: nautical miles
FL: Flight Level (almost exactly same as altitude)
Speed: speed towards radar on island
Descent: vertical speed in feet per minute
Glide Ratio: Forward speed divided by downward speed

http://www.airdisaster.com/user-uploads/Transat236Figure3.gif

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: NigelOnDraft

I don't think anybody has said that anything was installed backwards. If your post was making this assumption, than a very elequant post it is, but nothing to do with this incident.

The cannibalized parts (tubes) that were taken from the RB-211 engine were installed backwards. These parts were interchangeable with the tubes that should have been delivered with the engine (but they were not). Both tubes had identical "B" nuts at each end of the respective tubes. Good design would have dictated different types/sizes of "B" nuts or at the very least specific instructions as to how the tubes should be installed including the establishment of clearance between the two tubes.

That’s the story I got from my sources and I’m sticking with it.

:E :E

[Sootikin]

Mr Z, you seem very insistent on blaming the engines...a previous bad experience ?

Rereading the official report, page 16 :

In fact, it’s a requirement for the airline who installs the core engine to check its configuration and receipt and ensure that it complies with the manufacturers specifications.

and on page 18 :

the scratches and scores were directionally aligned and that they could have been caused from repeated contact from a blunt instrument, such as a screwdriver being inserted be-tween the tubes in order to force a clearance between them. There were no cracks initiated from the score or scratch marks

So, it appears to me that someone inspected the (incorrect) arrangement of tubes etc, and attempted to force them into a suitable clearance.

On page 17 :
It was evident that the interference and chafing occurred due to the mismatched installation of the post-mod fuel tube (P/N: FK30383) and pre-mod hydraulic tube (P/N: LJ51006).

The Mod in question, SB72-C625 says (on page 7 of the SB) :

Interchangeability of Parts : (1) It is essential that the parts are fitted as a set.

So. What are the facts about this "backward pipe fitting" story?

[Dengue_Dude]

Don't we live in a BLAME culture?

The crew had ONE failure - be completely clear about it. ONE failure should not cause the potential loss of the aircraft.

Let's substitute the word RESPONSIBILITY for the word 'blame'.

Given the HANDLING of their one failure, once it had resulted in the double hush - they then did quite well.

When they shave in the morning they are looking at the people responsible for getting into the more serious situation in the first place.

Computer fault, engine component failures, Murphy's etc aside - they were NOT the reason for a double flameout.

The crew WERE.

Remember a SINGLE component failure - isn't ETOPS based upon that? But, competently handled, it is SAFE.



They are paid as professionals, trained as professionals, trusted by the pax as professionals and sadly didn't act like professionals UNTIL they ended up with no engines - then in many respects they redeemed themselves (out of sheer desperation probably, nevertheless everybody got out and I suppose that's the result that sticks in the travelling public's mind).

It's really that simple. All the rest is moving air around at 37 degrees C.

edited for grammar this time DD