AMR 587 Airbus Crash (merged)

[RatherBeFlying]

AA's Full Submission (http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/FAA_Inaction/AA_co_files/AA_SUBMISSION_3-1-04.pdf) PROBABLE CAUSE AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS
The probable cause of this accident was the onset of a design-induced, adverse aircraft pilot coupling (APC) event that led to rapid development of excessively high aerodynamic lateral loads resulting in the catastrophic structural failure of the vertical stabilizer and rudder in only six and one-half seconds.

The event was triggered by an unexpectedly sensitive response of the rudder to an initial, single pedal input by the pilot during a wake vortex encounter. Due to the unique characteristics in the aircraft's flight control system design, the pilot became caught in an adverse APC/pilot involved oscillation mode as he attempted to counter the effects of that input. Specifically, after making a control wheel input followed by a rudder input intended to achieve a desired aircraft response, the over-sensitivity of the rudder control system induced the pilot to make additional, essentially cyclic, corrective rudder inputs as he attempted to stabilize the aircraft. Unknown to the pilot, because of the sensitivity of the rudder controls and the powerful nature of the hydraulically driven rudder actuators, these corrective inputs rapidly generated rupture loads. The rudder travel limiter unit (RTLU) and yaw damper failed to protect against the build up of these loads due to deficiencies in the flight control architecture design.

Contributing factors to the accident included:
1. The manufacturer's failure to disclose information learned from prior in-service high-load events demonstrating the adverse APC characteristics of the A300-600 flight control system and the resulting risk of structural overload;
2. Extraordinary rudder sensitivity at increased airspeeds due to a high rudder pedal breakout force relative to the shallow (low) rudder pedal force gradient and a corresponding reduction in rudder pedal travel that makes the A300-600 uniquely susceptible to adverse APC/pilot involved oscillation;
3. The rudder travel limiter unit's inability to protect the aircraft from excessive lateral loads;
4. The inability of the yaw damper, when the rudder pedal is held at the stop, to damp out motions resulting from the adverse APC/pilot involved oscillation tendencies of the aircraft;
5. Industry-wide lack of awareness before the accident of the catastrophic potential of rudder reversals, even at speeds below design maneuvering speed;
6. Industry-common, but incorrect, pilot assumptions about aircraft maneuvering speed based upon prevailing definitions of the term; and
7. The lack of clear regulatory verification requirements to identify and correct adverse characteristics through flight-testing and evaluation of handling qualities of flight control systems during original, as well as subsequent, "derivative" model, aircraft certification. The "best" part is that full available rudder deflection force and pedal travel decreases from 65 pounds and 4 inches at takeoff speed to 32 pounds (over a breakout force of 22 pounds) and 1.2 inches at the accident speed.

Also of note is that no pilot in the static tests was able to modulate rudder at 250 kt. It was either maximum available deflection or nothing:uhoh:
The Committee also found that "the precursor or trigger is pilot related" in many adverse APC events, and that "an environmental or vehicle trigger" often "precedes the pilot trigger." (NRC Study, p. 54.) According to Figure 4a below, reproduced from page 19 of the Group Chairman's Aircraft Performance Study Addendum #1, the initial right wheel input preceded the First Officer's first application of rudder by approximately0.6 seconds. (Time in seconds is listed on the horizontal line of the figures; 839 seconds corresponds with 09:15:47.2 EST and 850.3 with 09:15:58.5 EST (tail separation). The second wake encounter begins at 841.8 seconds/09:15:50 and ends at 845.8 seconds/09:15:54. Therefore, recorded data in these figures account for 11.3 seconds before stabilizer separation.) The initial flight control inputs were triggered by the
second wake turbulence encounter. The pilot's initial full right wheel input did not overpower the wake, and the aircraft roll attitude did not respond. Roll actually increased from about 23 degrees left angle of bank, at the onset of the wake turbulence, to a peak of approximately 25 degrees before reversing toward wings level. (Figures 2 and 4e of Group Chairman's Aircraft Performance Study Addendum #1, pp. 17 and 23, respectively.)
Here we see rudder being called upon to bring bank back under control after full right wheel input was found insufficient to counter the wake induced roll. I'd find it personally difficult to stay off the rudder with the bank going past 25 degrees, especially in a transport a/c. Is the pilot better off throttling back an engine :confused: Looks perhaps like he should on this a/c type:ooh:

Pssst Shadow -- What's with the pic of Tafari Makonnen?

[wsherif1]

RatherBeFlying,

NTSB hearing on AA 587, excerpt.

"PROBABLE CAUSE AND CONTRIBUTING FACTORS"

"The probable cause of this accident was the onset of a design-induced, adverse aircraft pilot coupling (APC) event that led to rapid development of excessively high aerodynamic lateral loads resulting in the catastrophic structural failure of the vertical stabilizer and rudder in only six and one-half seconds."

In the NTSB reports there is no mention of the possibility of a free floating rudder! Fact - NO PILOT would kick the rudder back and forth as recorded on the FDR. Period!!!

When the rudder was struck broadside by the .3 and .4 G forces, first on one side and then on the other, by the rotating vortices from the B-747 "Heavy", the linkages to the rudder actuators failed! (NASA states that, "the rotating forces in a vortex can reach 300'/sec.")

These rotating forces were also striking the large surface area of the vertical stabilizer. When the vertical fin was then struck broadside, by the .8 g force, the abrupt Yaw initiated an inertia force that sheared off both engines from their pylons and the fin from its support structure.

IN THE ATTEMPTED RECOVERY MANEUVER , THE CO-PILOT USED A FULL RIGHT AILERON INPUT, TO COUNTER THE STEEP LEFT BANK. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY RIGHT RUDDER INPUT TO ASSIST IN THE RECOVERY ATTEMPT!! THERE WAS NO RUDDER INPUT AVAILABLE !!!!!!!

If ATC had furnished an extended separation interval behind the B-747 "Super Heavy", (Full Fuel Load, Non Stop to Tokyo!), this accident might not have occurred!!!!

This is the first accident, of this type, in 100 years of flight, where an aircraft is flown, in a perfect formation joinup, on a horizontal tornado. (The vortex off the left wing tip of the B-747 "Heavy".)

[RatherBeFlying]

wsherif1,

After reading all 60-some pages of AA's submission, I am at present persuaded that APC is well supported by the available facts and more probable than an immediate loss of the rudder.

But of course, I'm still waiting for Airbus to hire a 747 and fly a fully instrumented A300-600 through the accident profile -- perhaps with bang seats or flown from the ground:E

[lomapaseo]

wsherif1

You have posted above a confusing, at best, story without a clear delineation of what words are quotes from other sources and what words are your own.

[wsherif1]

RatherBeFlying,

Your comment,

"After reading all 60-some pages of AA's submission, I am at present persuaded that APC is well supported by the available facts and more probable than an immediate loss of the rudder."

AA is correct, the lead up to the accident was APC, and then the real cause was AP-decoupling. When the rudder was struck broadside, from opposite directions, severing the linkages to the rudder actuators, there was no longer any APC.

The rudder loss was not immediate but occurred after the .3 and .4G forces struck it.

What other explanation is there, for the co-pilot not to use right rudder to assist the right aileron input, in the attempted recovery maneuver? There was no rudder input available!!!

[GlueBall]

From NTSB File:
"Person Interviewed: John Francis LaVelle
Position: Captain, B-737, American Airlines,
Represented By: Mr. Ray Duke, Attorney Allied Pilots Association
Date and Time: July 15,2002,0915.EDT
Present: Operations Group members David Ivey, Bart Elias, James Goachee, Delvin
Young, John Lauer
. Location: Telephonehtewiew ,
Captain LaVelle stated that his date of birth was May 21,1960 and that American
Airlines hired him on October 28,1986. He estimated his total flying time to be about
14,000 hours and currently was a captain on the B-737. Positions he had held since being
. hired by American included flight engineer B-727, first officer MD-80, first officer B-
757/767, first officer MD-11 , captain E727 and current was a captain and check aiman
on the B-737. Captain LaVelle estimated his flying times to be about 1,700 hours on the
B-727 while flying as captain, and about 1,200 hours as captain on the B-737.
He stated he had met Ed States, the captain, and stated that they had met in
operations a few times. He only had casual conversations with him.
He knew Sten Molin, the first officer. They had flown together on a number of
occasions on the B-727. When they first met, Captain LaVelle was a junior captain and
Sten Molin was a junior first officer. Both were on reserve in the New York base.
He described Mr. Molin’s personality as that of a perfectionist who worked hard
and did everything by the book. He was a real gentleman as well. He said the first met in
May 1997, and the last time he saw Sten Molin was sometime in the summer of 2001 in
operations. He was just as he always was; a nice person and Captain LaVelle enjoyed his
company.
Captain LaVelle said he flew two or three trips with Mr. Molin over a 12 month
period. He stated that Mr. Molin’s flying skills were excellent. He had excellent flying
ability, however, he had one strange tendency: to be very agressive on the rudder pedals.
Captain LaVelle stated that during a climb out in a B-727, while the airplane was “dirty
of with flaps 5 degrees”, Mr. Molin stroked the rudder pedals “1-2-3, about that fast.”
Captain LaVelle thought they had lost an engine. Captain LaVelle asked him what he
was doing, and Mr. Molin said he was leveling wings due to wake turbulence. Captain
LaVelle stated that Mr. Molin never leveled the wings, and his actions just created
yawing moments on the airplane. M e r they cleaned up the airplane they discussed it
M e r . Mr. Moli told him he was leveling the wings as per the M. Captain
LaVelle told him it was quite aggressive, and that it didn’t really level the wings. They
talked about the AAMP, Mi. Molin insisted that AAMP (Advanced Aircraft
Maneuvering Program) gave him directions to use rudder pedals in that fishion. Captain
LaVelle disagreed, and said he thought the use of rudder was, according to AAMP, for
use at lower airspeeds.’ He disputed Mr. Molin and told him to be less aggressive and
more coordinated using rudder.
- . ..
Captain LaVelle said that on two subsequent occasions Mr. Molin modified his
wake turbulence manuever to comply with his wishes. Mr. Molin used rudder during
these encounters but did not go to the full stop. He was still very quick.
During this first wake turbulence encounter, Captain LaVelle stated that it did not
require any more than aileron to level the wings. Occasion (wake encounter) was nothing
more than needing a little aileron to level the wings. Captain LaVelle thought that Mr.
Molin was more aggressive than he needed to be. He said the B-727 was very a very
stable airplane. He did not have to be that aggressive.
He recalled the fist encounter to be during the “clean up” [ d e r departure] on the
B-727. The altitude was between 1,000 and 1,500 feet. It was somewhere around this
altitude range that the event occurred. He believed Mr. Molin that the rudder was pushed
to fill stops. He said the effect on B-727 was that it created an uncomfortable yaw to the
“left- right- left”. There were heavy side-loads. He said he thought they went to left first,
but was not sure. Mr. Molin stopped using the rudder on his own. Captain LaVelle
thought they had an engine problem so his attention was drawn to the engine instruments.
When asked, he said he did not think Mr. Molin made any aileron inputs during the
encounter. The rudder never leveled the wings. He did not recall the wings moving, but
experienced, “sideload, sideload, sideload”.
.
His experience has been that you have to hold rudder in to get wing leveling fi-om
rudder. The AAMP program was brought up by Mr. Molii in their conversation after the
event. He was adamant that he was complying with AAMP. Captain LaVelle requested
that Mr. Molin review the AAMP program when he got home, and to be less aggressive
when he flew with him. It never came up in conversation again. This was first time he
flew with him. Months later, when they flew together, they encountered wake turbulence
on two separate occasions with him again. During the subsequent times they flew
together, the subject did not come up again in conversation ifMr. Molin had reviewed the
AAMP.
Captain LaVelle knew Mr. Molin had a civilian background and had been a
commuter pilot. He was proud that his dad had been an Eastem Airlines pilot. He told
Captain LaVelle that his father had taught him to fly when he was very young.
Regarding the AAMP program, Captain LaVelle thought he went through it once
in 1995 or 1996. He said he was a first officer on the B-767 at the time. He stated there
was AAMP training in the simulator, Once every checkride there is some kind of
airplane upset training received in the simulator.
had “hands of silk.” He could grease the Bi727 on landings and had good systems
knowledge.
Captain LaVelle when asked, had no recollection of what type of airplane they
were following during the first wake turbulence encounter.
Captain LaVelle stated that he was a C-130 pilot in the United States Air Force
Reserves. On one occasion, he was the last airplane in a 12-ship formation and
experienced wake turbulence. He had some very remarkable full aileron deflection with
full-scde rudder deflection, yet still rolled in the opposite direction. It was not until the
C-130 got out of the vortex that the airplane began to respond to control inputs. He went
to about 60 degrees of bank and was at an altitude of 300 feet during low-level operations
when the upset occurred. Once or twice while flying the MD-80 did he encounter wake
turbulence and he may have hit a control stop with ailerons. He was behind a B-757 on
one occasion. He used aileron only and leveled the wings. It was on an approach to a
domestic airport.
Captain LaVelle said the first event involving Mr. Molin happened about May
1997. The subsequent two wake turbulence encounters were separated by a few months;
perhaps in September 1997 and December 1997. He said that when he is the non-flying
pilot, he follows along on the rudder pedals. He felt Mr. Molin’s inputs on the rudder
pedals during that first wake turbulence event. He said it is typical for him to fly with his
feet on the pedals at critical times when the copilot is flying. He did not know what other
captains did with their feet while flying.
When asked why he remembered the event with such clarity five years later,
Captain LaVeIle stated that it was ti very aggressive maneuver and he had never seen any
other pilot do this but Mr. Molin. When questioned-about the initial direction of the yaw,
Captain LaVelle said he thought it was the left rudder input first but it could have been
the right. He said the wake vortex encounter with Mi. Molin was not much of anything.
Maybe just some choppy air. He thought that Mr. Molin may have been responding to
the choppy air. The ailerons were kept level and he used just the rudder pedals.
He stated that he was not a chkk airman at the time of the encounter. He did not
become a check airman until he became a B-737 captain.
He said he did not document or inform anyone at American Airlines, regarding
the event.
The two or three events did not seem very significant. Usually he did not
encounter wake turbulence very often. Perhaps once every quarter. Captain LaVelle
said he flew with Mi. Molin three times. Three separate trips and both of them were on
reserve status. He did not recall how many legs they flew together.
During the second and third enkounters Mr. Molin applied rudder with
During the first event, he stated he did not think Mr. Molin applied any aileron.
coordinated aileron and it was not aggressive.
Maybe a little, but it was full or close to full rudder deflection. He did not believe it was
the first leg of the first trip together in which‘the turbulence encounter happened. It was
probably the second or third time that Mr. Molin was at a e controls. It startled him
because Mr. Molin had been so smooth on the controls.
Captain LaVelle stated the wake turbulence encounter could have been due to
thermal activities or a preceding airplane. He did not think they were following a heavy
airplane. He did not recall aggressive movements or abnormal rudder inputs fiom Mr.
Molin during approaches or during the last two or three times they flew together.
When asked if he had ever made any accidental inputs to the rudder pedals while he
feet were on the pedals, Captain LaVelIe answered in the negative.
Captain LaVelle’s concluding thoughts were that he considered Mr. Molin a fiiend.
He was a great guy. He was a great pilot in all aspects except the one quirk; his use of
the rudder pedals. When asked why he had waited until now to disclose this event with
the accident first officer, he stated that he believed the NTSB was more interested in
interviewing pilots that flew the A300 and had more recent experience flyihg with the
accident crew. He said he had thought about his prior event when he heard that a wake
turbulence encounter with the accident airplane might have been a factor in the accident..."

[411A]

About says it all, really...:sad:

Why are we not surprised?

[FIRESYSOK]

Why oh why would you use the rudder. Once off the runway, the pedals are for resting your feet! Surely American wouldn't have taught him this technique...

[Wino]

This encounter as described by Lavelle was disputed by the engineers of the trips in question, but lets say for the second that it is absolutely true, and no other motivations were at work here...

So what did we learn?
The Boeings weren't damaged in the slightest, and the Airbus crashed...

THAT my friend, pretty much says it all.

Cheers,
Wino
( American Airlines A300 LGA F/O, and friend of Ed States and Sten Molin, with far more time in the cockpit with these gentlemen than John Francis Lavelle)

[wsherif1]

411A

Your comment,

"About says it all, really...

Why are we not surprised"

Do you mean that an experienced co-pilot would change his mode of operation with each different Captain he flew with? All the other Captains lauded Sten's piloting abilities!

One mans recall against the many, I think not!

[Cejkovice]

Wino.

I totally disagree with your comment "So what did we learn?
The Boeings weren't damaged in the slightest, and the Airbus crashed... "

The two situations were totally different....speeds, size of wake vortecies etc were unknown on this first encounter. Remember the A300 was travelling fairly fast and encountered the wake from a very heavy 747 with a separation less than it should have been.

Both Airbus & Boeing design their tails to meet the same requirements and the NTSB have shown the A300s tail failed way past its ultimate load.

Both Airbus and Boeing produce very good aircraft and both very safe. Many argue that the Airbus has composite tail sections.....but so does B777 and so too will 7E7 and even so both manufacturers meet the same requirements laid out by the FAA and other authorities whether they have composite or 'good old metal' tails.

Healthy competition between Airbus & Boeing is good for both sides, but lets leave advantages/disadvantages to the marketing guys and not use scare tactics relating to safety to try to prove one is better than the other.

Both are great manufacturers, and the high levels of competition will only drive them on to better and more advanced aircraft which benefits all who have a interest and passion in flight.

:ok:

[Rwy in Sight]

Hello all!

I need some help with understanding an issue posted on the Flight Internations dated 9-15 March.

The editorial states that the A300-600 rudder is very sensitive. My question is why this should be relevant given that the pilots are normally trained on a single type at a time and thus they are trained to cope or take under consideration that sensitivity?

Any help would be most welcome!

Rwy in Sight

[GlueBall]

wsherif1 says: ... "Do you mean that an experienced co-pilot would change his mode of operation with each different Captain he flew with? All the other Captains lauded Sten's piloting abilities..."

I don't think so, ...but not every flight includes a wake encounter.

Capt LaVelle's recollection and comment to the NTSB about F/O Sten Molin's aggressive manipulation of the rudder on the B727 at an earlier time is a statement of fact and not a judgement about his character or about his overall flying ability. It's an important observation that may help in determining a probable cause for structural failure. Already many carriers have issued revised guidelines and cautions on the use of rudder.

[411A]

Indeed they have Glueball, from hard learned lessons that date from more than thirty years ago.

Stomp on the rudder at higher speeds in a swept wing heavy jet transport, and the results may well not be to your liking.

Maybe...just maybe the younger guys will learn from this accident.

Ain't holding my breath however....from some of the comments on PPRuNe, many of these same younger guys already know it all...:sad:

[Wino]

411a
No one has advocated STOMPING on a rudder pedal in a swept wing jet.

However, there are occasional needs for the use of coordinated rudder.

You too have been left behind. We are a long way from the old 727 707 days when slowing down and putting out flaps would unlock an outboard aileron and give you more roll authority. Indeed, in an aircraft like the A300-605r that Sten and Ed were flying that day, the outboard airlineron was completely deleted in the name of aerodynamic clean up and fuel efficiency, leading to some scary situations where there is not nearly enough aileron effectiveness for the aircraft at times.



Also, The Airbus and Boeing are CERTIFIED under the same criteria they are not built and designed to the same criteria, and boeing has said that they design the rudders to a stronger level than certification requirements (which is all Airbus designed to) though they do not design to the ability to take a doublet (Which Russian certification requires)

CHeers
Wino

[DingerX]

Fine. This AAR is admirable in my book.
Among other things, it dispells the myth that anybody "stomped on the rudder". Heck, they did controlled experiments and none of the test pilots were able to get anything other than no or full deflection on the pedals at that speed.
If you want to know why the rudder control system is a bad design, read this thread from the beginning, or read the AAR.
If you insist it's pilot error, then you'll be forced to explain why several other pilots committed similar errors; and if an error is so routine, why did this manufacturer not act to prevent a catastrophe?

everyone makes mistakes. We've seen many times that even the best flight crews screw up. But this isn't one of those cases.

(oh yeah, and as for the free rudder: principle of parsimony (aka ockham's razor or the tinfoil hat-wearer's enemy) -- don't posit more beings than necessary to explain the phenomena).

[Flight Safety]

The fact that an ALPA F/O, an American Airlines test pilot, and an Airbus test pilot could not command 50 percent rudder deflection at a simulated 250kts, when specifically asked to do so, tells you what you need to know regarding the design of the rudder control system for the A300-600. At this speed the rudder system seems only capable of delivering deflection that is all or nothing, when a reversal is required.

Combine this with a pilot who seemed to like to use the rudder during a wake encounter, and you have this accident in a nutshell.

[TheShadow]

Airbus Submission on AA587 (for comparison)

LINK (.89mb pdf file) (http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/FAA_Inaction/AA_co_files/AA_587_Airbus_Submission_March1.pdf)

Some very dubious contentions therein.

IMHO

All PIO events have a trigger and can be potentially destructive. That's why (in the most part) they are sought out in the design and test phase and eliminated from the design (or compensated out). That's why yaw dampers were invented in the first place (for instance).

Blaming a pilot for an APC development that is built into the airplane design is like blaming the man for an unwanted pregnancy.

And blaming that man for the woman ultimately conceiving is like saying that he was responsible for her deciding not to use contraception or later NOT to have her pregnancy terminated.

*APC = aircraft-pilot coupling

Edited to correct LINK

[patrickal]

After reading both Airbus's and AA's response, I do not see how the A300 Flight ops of AA and the Airbus A300 support Group can continue to work with each other. Each report is an indictment of the other. Where's the trust?

[Ignition Override]

My company has only done a tiny bit of sim training for unusual attitude recovery.

Anyway, it is very unlikely that any pilot, other than with a V1 engine failure, has ever pushed very hard and fast on any rudder pedal(s). It just does not happen, except in a fighter, attack jet or other aerobatic planes during certain violent manuevers (Julie Clark, Patty Wagstaff, Gene Soucy, Ed Johnson)!

On our older twin-engine narrow-bodies, the rudder restriction (powered by air bellows via small tube on leading edge of vertical stabilizer) begins at about 170 knots and is fully restricted at 300. The book also says that only an inch of rudder pedal movement is available at 300 knots. :8

[RatherBeFlying]

The article -- free registration required (http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/21/nyregion/21plane.html)

A bit better than the average journo piece.

[Halfnut]

A rather long read. Print it out and take it on your next layover.

US Read (http://www.usread.com/flight587/coverups_n_foulups/default.html)

[wsherif1]

GlueBall,

All of Captain Lavelle's statements re. co-pilot Sten Molin's pilot abilities are completely irrelevant! Sten did not have control of the rudders!

The 0.3 and 0.4G rotating vortices striking the rudders, broadside, alternately on one side and then the other, severed the linkages to the rudder actuators. (No linkages attached to the actuators, in the haul out pictures, of the vertical stabilizer)

The final 0.8G force striking the vertical stabilizer broadside, initiated an instantaneous left Yaw, which created an abrupt left Dutch Roll into the ground.

The extreme inertia forces involved in the instantaneous left Yaw, tore off both engines from their support structures and the tail from its attachment Lugs.

Although there was evidence that Sten applied a full right aileron input to counter the steep left bank, there is no evidence that he applied any right rudder, to assist in the attempted recovery maneuver! There was no rudder input available!

This is the first accident, of this type, in 100 years of flight! (A perfect formation join-up on the center of a horizontal tornado, the left wing tip vortex of the B747 "Heavy".)

[Tony_EM]

I seem to recall that the rudder deflections corresponded with pedal movement. Since the only system to back-drive the pedals is the autopilot, which was not engaged, I think it is likely that the 5 rudder deflections were a result of pilot input.

Even more conclusive (IMO) is that pedal inputs preceded rudder deflections.

Also looking at the pictures of the rudder fragments, I get the impression that the rudder structure failed first, followed by the actuator and hinge attachements. The reasoning being that the fractures across the rudder surfaces where caused by tensile loads rather than tearing. If the actuator attachments/brackets had failed first, there would be nothing to impart the magnitude and type of loads to cause the structural failures we see.

The fact that Airbus and FAA pilots could not perform partial rudder deflections (i.e. it was all or nothing) during recent tests is also significant.

[safetypee]

wsherif1 you overlook several fundamental points of flight mechanics. First ‘g’ is an acceleration; to generate force you have to specify which mass is being accelerated (F=ma). Was this mass the air or the rudder? If it was the rudder then who moved it?

Second, if it was an external force (air mass) it would have been applied reasonably equal to all of the aircraft or at least the rear end. A vortex may have been local to the fin and rudder in combination but not just one or the other in separate instances. Furthermore, with a nose high / turning climb the forward fuselage should also be under the effect of the vortex, thus the whole aircraft is deemed to move. Or are you suggesting that the earth moved instead?

[wsherif1]

Safetypee


The rotating vortices around the aircraft moved the rudder. The rapid reversal of rudder movements was another indication of a free floating rudder. No pilot would kick the rudder back and forth in this manner, even if it were physically possible to do so.

Your comment,

"A vortex may have been local to the fin and rudder in combination."

Yes, you are right, the 27' tall vertical stabilizer is now an additional flight control surface, inoperable by the pilot!
The rotating vortices striking this large surface area, BROADSIDE, turns the aircraft into a very effective Weather Vane!

[GlueBall]

wsherif1 says: "...No pilot would kick the rudder back and forth in this manner, even if it were physically possible to do so."

How do you know that F/O Stan Molin didn't kick the rudder after the recorded wake encounter during climb out at JFK?

How do you know that Capt Lavelle's report to the NTSB about F/O Sten Molin having kicked the rudder at an earlier time while flying copilot on the B727 was...made up?

:confused:

[wsherif1]

Glueball,

Your comments,

"How do you know that Capt Lavelle's report to the NTSB about F/O Sten Molin having kicked the rudder at an earlier time while flying copilot on the B727 was...made up?"

I did not say it was made up. It was just irrelevant. Sten had no control of the rudder, after the rotating vortices struck it on alternate sides and severed the linkages to the actuators.

"How do you know that F/O Stan Molin didn't kick the rudder after the recorded wake encounter during climb out at JFK?"

Would you kick the rudder in this manner? Hell no, or any other pilot!

[411A]

All this 'spin' about the First Officer not using the rudder in an inappropriate manner is so much AA APA nonsense.

When one places his size twelves on the rudder pedals and pushes hard (as the previous Captain indicated happened before), the results are not pretty, as all can clearly see now.

Strange that only AA have had these problems with the A300-600...and no wonder why.

Less than adequate flying abilities (and certainly poor uninformed training) at the pointy end...not good.
AA, to be avoided whenever possible.

[wsherif1]

411A,

Your comments,

"Strange that only AA have had these problems with the A300-600...and no wonder why."

What other Airline has flown into the center of a horizontal tornado lately? (This is the first such accident in 100 years of flight.)

"When one places his size twelves on the rudder pedals and pushes hard (as the previous Captain indicated happened before), the results are not pretty, as all can clearly see now."

In this case, the previous Captain's comments are irrelevant, as the co-pilot had no control of the rudders, after a certain point in time!

[411A]

Well, have to agree with you, wsherif1...
After the co-pilot pedal biked the rudder, and the fin departed, he certainly didn't have control anymore..:E :yuk:

[OFBSLF]

Would you kick the rudder in this manner? Hell no, or any other pilot!Isn't it true that on the A300, at that speed, that the relationship between the rudder break-out force and full-travel force is such that the rudder pedals act almost as a switch? You either have 0 rudder or 100% rudder. Isn't that a recipe for PIO?

[patrickal]

Although I am not a proponent of conspiracies, I still do not understand the departure of both engines so quickly either during the rudder deflections or immediately after the departure of the fin. I feel that there is a missing link here that none of us see yet. IMHO, the lateral forces the aircraft suffered should not have been great enough to fail both engine pylons. After reading all of the documentation that has come out over the past several weeks, the failure of the engines is never really discussed other than to acknowledge that it happened. I think the key to this discussion is not what we see, but what we don't see. The challenge is to determine the final configuration of the aircraft immediately prior to impact, and to work backwards from there to figure out what it would take to get it to that configuration. Each party has delivered volumes of information, but no one has addressed all of the questions. That bothers me.

[wsherif1]

patrickal,

Your comment,

"I still do not understand the departure of both engines so quickly either during the rudder deflections or immediately after the departure of the fin."

The 27' vertical stabilizer becomes an additional flight control surface in the presence of rotating vortices. The rotating vortices striking this large surface area, broadside, initiated an instantaneous left yaw! The extreme inertia forces, created by this abrupt yaw, tore off both engines from their pylons and the tail from its attachment Lugs. The abrupt left yaw also caused an immediate, left, Dutch Roll.

This was the first such accident in 100 years of flight.

[411A]

Engines being chucked off the pylons (or indeed the pylons failing entirely) is certainly nothing new...happened before in the early sixties with 707 aircraft.

OTOH, the 'training' AA provided their crews, using the rudder in a manner for which it was NOT intended...has led to disaster.
The lessons learned oh so many years ago have been totally ignored...at least with American Airlines, and the idiots in the flight crew training department.

Need examples?
Just look at the AA hull loss record, and the very basic mistakes made by the AA crew concerned.
Cali was the most egregious, IMO.

[wsherif1]

411A

Your comment,

"OTOH, the 'training' AA provided their crews, using the rudder in a manner for which it was NOT intended...has led to disaster."

The crew was not using the rudder!!!

[411A]

wsherif1,

If you choose to believe the AA APA spin nonsense, then be my guest.
The facts say otherwise.

[747FOCAL]

Report: Airbus ‘Manipulated’ Rudder Numbers

By Howard Schwach
A highly-respected German news magazine reported this week that evidence exists that may prove that Airbus Industries, which is headquartered in Hamburg, “manipulated” the engineering test numbers relating to the rudders of its A300-600 aircraft, the same type of jet airliner that flew as American A

You either have to be a subscriber or wait until next week to read the rest here:

http://www.rockawave.com/news/2004/0909/Front_Page/036.html

:cool:

[El lute]

Just a few remarks:
- The original article has a question mark in the headline.
- Airbus (not Airbus Industrie(s)) is not headquartered in Hamburg
- The article does not mention 'evidence', it talks of indications.

[itchy kitchin]

El lute,
welcome to prune!

first post eh?
...so how are things at airbus?

[El lute]

itchy,
Thanks for the welcome.
How would I know about things at Airbus? I'm retired!

[eal401]

Looks like some local rag trying to use dead people to score points over non-American companies!

[itchy kitchin]

el lute,
just a bit of banter!
only joking about the airbus thing, just looked a bit like it, first post, jumping to defence etc.

...i wouldn't be suprised if it was just a bit of airbus bashing. the facts as you point out don't seem to add up. I couldn't get access to the article, but that is a very serious allegation.

regards from the kitchin

[G-Foxtrot Oscar 69]

Sorry to defend Airbus but as a European I am going to. After all we all know Airbus is better than Boeing and no further debate on that as it is fact:O

Anyway I would like to question the sources of the article.

A website called Wave quotes "A highly-respected German news magazine"

So which magazine is that and which page, edition etc?

Also why was it not in FI?

I believe that in the Crash report on the AA accident the test results showed that the tail withstood much more force than was required before failure.

This smacks of poor journalistic style.

[Burger Thing]

Sorry to defend Airbus but as a European I am going to. After all we all know Airbus is better than Boeing and no further debate on that as it is fact

:ugh: Another Pearl of Wisdom. Please shoot me. I am so tired of this. Shoot me, please! :{

[Ghostflyer]

Bang......Bang......Bang....;)

[MarkD]

What's really sad about 747focal is that he has given up finding good things to report about Boeing and now spends his time mining the seams of conspiracy theories about the American Airlines tragedy and what will happen when A380s do upper deck evacs.

The death of the Sonic Cruiser seems to have shattered his will to see any good in the world.

If the A350 ever happens and competes effectively with the short range 7E7 he may have to be institutionalised...

[GearDown&Locked]

747FOCAL, it had to be you again :p :p :p !! Madonna Mia
:hmm: := How much does Boeing pay you? I can do that too, if the euro$$ are right (well for Airbus that is :E ).

Peace
GD&L

[swh]

747FOCAL,

Both Boeing and Airbus have highlighted concerns about rudder usage in their upset recovery literature, warning that too much rudder could lead to loss of control or even structural failure.

Also IFALPA has published literature regarding rudder usage in their upset recovery literature, for both Boeings and Airbus.

You have had a totally unbalanced campaign relating to this incident, facts are that the aircraft does meet the FAR 25 design requirements, and the Flight 587 flight data recorder (FDR) shows three lateral accelerations of 0.3g and 0.4g right, and 0.4g left, in the approximately 7 seconds before it appears that the fin came off. Analysis show that the aircraft may have been in a full slip to produce the high accelerations. During the same period the FDR shows the rudder making about five deflections of 5 to 10-11 degrees, culminating in a rudder reversal immediately before the fin apparently came off. The 10-11-degree deflection is the maximum allowed by the A300's rudder limiter at that airspeed, suggesting it was working correctly.

The FARs paragraph 25.351 covers yaw manoeuvre conditions, and 25.341 covers gust and turbulence loads.

Paragraph 25.351 spells out a simple manoeuvre and requires that the manufacturer analyse the loads at four conditions. The manoeuvre is to:
Fly straight and level, and step on the rudder pedal with a large force (condition A),
Maintain rudder and let the aircraft swing to a peak sideslip angle that is beyond equilibrium slip due to fuselage momentum (condition B),
Maintain rudder and let the aircraft swing back to equilibrium sideslip (condition C), and
Neutralize the rudder while at equilibrium sideslip (condition D).
The rational for these design requirements is that each condition tends to load different parts of the fin, such as the front spar, rear spar, hinges, rudder, etc., but condition D can create the highest fin bending loads, as far as the regulations are concerned.

Ultimate loads as per FAR 25, only needs to be tolerated for 3 seconds (not 7 seconds) and can result in permanent deformation. There is no requirement on what the strength must be after surviving ultimate load.

The A300 rudder is relatively powerful because it is large, about 34% of the total fin chord. Rudder effectiveness also washes out with increasing sideslip, and this affects the critical anti-slip rudder more than pro-slip rudder. The A300 rudder has ±30 degrees of authority at speeds below 165 KIAS, and the limiter progressively cuts this back to 3.5 degrees at maximum speed. It may be tempting to further limit the rudder at higher speeds, but it needs enough authority to handle engine failure with some margin, and serve as a yaw damper. There also are unusual conditions such as multiple leading edge flap failure that may require a large amount of rudder to counteract.

Given the limited amount of FDR data released by the NTSB it is not clear if forces in the rudder exceeded ultimate loads, but the high sideslip and rapid full rudder motions are ripe for this possibility. The exact motions may never be known because the FDR only measured the rudder twice per second, while it can move at 39 deg/s the rudder could go from neutral to the stop and back between samples. And as the NTSB has stated fast rudder motions were distorted by being filtered.

Now as for this article for the manipulation of data by airbus, I have news for you Boeing, and just about every other manufacturer I can think of does the same. Compliance with the FAR 25.351 yaw manoeuvre may be shown analytically, and the airframe manufacturers may not actually conduct a full-force manoeuvre. Why take an aircraft to 100% design load in flight, when you can limit loads to the neighbourhood of 80%, and use this data to validate a model, which combined with ground test results shows the aircraft complies with regulations.

What I see is obvious from this accident, so does IFALPA, so does Boeing and Airbus, is that the design regulations that are set by organisations such as the FAA are the legal requirement for manufactures to meet, a type certificate data sheet issued by the FAA is a licence stating that the manufacturer meets the design requirements as specified the FARs.

If an airline then alledgedly subsequently decides to promulgate an upset recovery technique based upon the senior pilots previous military training, and not in accordance with the what the FAA had allowed for in the FARs, one will never know about this alledged deficiency in the check and training procedures until and accident such as this occurs resulting in a lot of finger pointing. Still some airlines say they know better than IFALPA, Boeing, and Airbus, putting their pilots and passengers into the experimental category.

Bottom line, the aircraft met and exceeded the design requirements as specified in the FARs. If the FARs are not covering all the design requirements that the public demands, don’t blame Airbus or Boeing, blame the FAA.

Like your unbalanced campaign for the A380 upper deck evacuations, Boeing NEVER conducted upper deck evacuations for the 747 as part of its certification, but have a certified capacity of 660 people, at least Airbus is going to demonstrate it in certification phase.

Obviously this article was written to appeal to Americans of a certain intellect, interesting social experiment to see who runs with it.



:hmm:

IFALPA Safety & Security Bulletins relating to rudder use :
Use of Rudder on Airbus (http://www.ifalpa.org/sab/03SAB002_Use%20of%20Rudder%20on%20Airbus.pdf)
Use of Rudder on Boeing (http://www.ifalpa.org/sab/03SAB001_Use%20of%20Rudder%20on%20Boeing.pdf)

Edit: added IFALPA links

[747FOCAL]

Oh don't be a tard. I was not saying this was the truth. I just spotted it and thought I would post it. You old granny ladies would have nothing to do, but eat your crumpets and tea if I didn't throw a hot rock in your thongs once in awhile.

I still throw the rocks at Boeing, just search around. :E

[Gillegan]

I don't know if Airbus fiddled with the numbers after the accident but it wouldn't be out of character for any of the manufacterers to try something like that. To the folks who worship at the alter of the Airbus, it appears to be true that both Airbus and Boeing had reservations about American's upset recovery program and let the airline know it. That's a pretty big deal in my opinion.

It appears to me that Airbus' agenda is to place 100% of the blame on AA while AA's agenda is to place 100% of the blame on Airbus. Big surprize there. There is big money involved here and the big corporations involved will always try to place blame on others. (I remember some pretty reprehensible statements from Boeing after the USAir 427 accident) What is interesting is that in the AA accident, even when exceeding the speed at which rudder travel was supposidly limited, that it was possible to achieve the full rudder travel anyway. It seems to me that as in most accidents, there is plenty of blame to go around.

[John Farley]

Methinks one does not often get such an intellectual gap between two posts.

[Rwy in Sight]

It is intresting to see if the "blame the other" campaign would have used by the airline and the manufactured if it were a Boeing 777, or the airline were a major customer of the manufacturer...

Yours sincrely (but not cynically enough)


Rwy in Sight

[cringe]

The original article appeared in last week's edition of Der Spiegel (# 37) and is summarized here:

http://www.vwd.de/vwd/news.htm?id=23138543

Claims of data manipulation by Airbus were put forward by lawyers representing victims' families.

From the link above (Babel Fish translated):
...in the computation, the forces, which affect with turbulences the vertical stabilizer, were reduced by the manipulation - probably, in order to avoid a reinforcement of the tail unit

[RatherBeFlying]

I'm still waiting for Airbus to hire a 747 and fly a fully instrumented A300-B4 through the accident profile (bang seats recommended for the crew) to find out just how the rudder behaves in a double wake encounter.

Hey, I'd settle down if the NTSB, AA or even the ambulance chasers did it.

[747FOCAL]

RatherBeFlying,

There is plenty of video around of Boeing doing just that with a 737 and the 737 did not have the tail come off nor did it have much trouble at all until it was 100 yds behind the 747, then it looked like a bad boat design in rough water. But, the tail did not come off even though the pilot was wagging every control surface trying to keep in control. :hmm:

[crewrest]

swh; excellent post, you obviously know your stuff.

[Captain104]

swh

adequate and competent post.
You just phrased it quite clear:
"If an airline then alledgedly subsequently decides to promulgate an upset recovery technique based upon the senior pilots previous military training, and not in accordance with the what the FAA had allowed for in the FARs, one will never know about this alledged deficiency in the check and training procedures until and accident such as this occurs resulting in a lot of finger pointing. Still some airlines say they know better than IFALPA, Boeing, and Airbus, putting their pilots and passengers into the experimental category."

Nothing to add, as a retired driver on A300-600(310-200,300) and former trainer.
In some threads WINO (Union goon) and others just neglegted all facts and retired from objective assumptions to gard their close friends in the cockpit of AA 587.( BTW my understanding and respect for that). Nevertheless you guide us back to the facts.

John Farley
IMHO it's more than an intellectuell gap, it's an ocean between profs and incompetence, in my old days sometimes boring. :O

Regards

[Cap 56]

swh wrote

Still some airlines say they know better than IFALPA, Boeing, and Airbus, putting their pilots and passengers into the experimental category.

So what can IFALPA do about it ?

Boeing and Airbus will do nothing to upset them, they just want to sell..........

[swh]

Cap 56,

IFALPA cannot do anything more than what it has done by publishing Safety & Security Bulletins relating to rudder use.

The Safety & Security Bulletins promote discussion amongst pilot groups, and hopefully get people to question training they receive if it is perceived to be deficient.

:ok:

[RatherBeFlying]

747Focal, Nice to know that a 737 can handle a 747 wake, but my major curiosity is how an A300-B4 does it.

[Cejkovice]

From what I remember about the original AA587 threads there was a lot of other issues talked around the B744 wake. e.g. strong vortex as the JAL 744 was at max weight, the separation between the two aircraft wasn't the required minimum and the wind direction all added to the vortex being worst case and therefore very strong when it hit the A300.

So it might not be a case of this aircraft is better than this one flying through a 744 wake, but on this particular day under the given conditions and contributing factors, any aircraft would have experienced difficulties.

Can anyone remember what the other contributing factors were on that day??

Cejk

[747FOCAL]

So what you are telling me is that a 744 can out climb an A300 at max weight? I was under the impression that the only reason a 747 climbs is because the earth is round. :E

[catchup]

The <highly-respected German news magazine> linked by "cringe", is talking about an Airbus 330!

Nevertheless, for me as a "frontcustomer" of airbus it's a scandal that the AOM of this ship didn't contain anything about this "behavior". I'm just lucky that I've never stressed the MaxManeuvering speed on this, otherwise lovely, aircraft.

regards

[Captain104]

frontcustomer

1) The "highly respected" journos mixed up A330 with A300-600.
2) cringe mentioned it: "Claims of data manipulation by Airbus were put forward by lawyers representing victims' families."

Statements a bit fishy and obscure until now. If there is any truth in it, no chance for a cover-up. Wait and see. :8

Regards

[catchup]

@captain104

too bad you don't have a "private message" button..:D

[Wino]

adequate and competent post.
You just phrased it quite clear:
"If an airline then alledgedly subsequently decides to promulgate an upset recovery technique based upon the senior pilots previous military training, and not in accordance with the what the FAA had allowed for in the FARs, one will never know about this alledged deficiency in the check and training procedures until and accident such as this occurs resulting in a lot of finger pointing. Still some airlines say they know better than IFALPA, Boeing, and Airbus, putting their pilots and passengers into the experimental category."

Nothing to add, as a retired driver on A300-600(310-200,300) and former trainer.
In some threads WINO (Union goon) and others just neglegted all facts and retired from objective assumptions to gard their close friends in the cockpit of AA 587.( BTW my understanding and respect for that). Nevertheless you guide us back to the facts.

That takes the cake for the biggest crock of sh1t ever posted on here.

Tell me how you can be guiding us back to the facts WHEN YOU NEVER TOOK THE CLASS. I TOOK THE CLASS. And the recurrents, and all the accusations you just floated are flat out lies.

Coordinated rudder if roll authority of the ailerons were exceded was the ONLY thing that was ever preached along with an excellent discussion of crossover speed, which was more germaine to the 737 problems.

You sir know not a thing about which you talk. I was there and I took the class, and I can tell you for certain that you have swallowed a pack of lies hook line and sinker. This is not to defend my friends but to defend the truth.

Congrats on helping airbus prove the one truth of aviation which is that dead pilots have bad lawyers and get hung out to dry, while the people that killed them sit at their nice safe warm desks.

Cheers
Wino

[Lu Zuckerman]

To: Wino

Congrats on helping airbus prove the one truth of aviation which is that dead pilots have bad lawyers and get hung out to dry, while the people that killed them sit at their nice safe warm desks.

I too have questions about the efficacy of the management of Airbus. I made known to the FAA and other certification authorities two known design defects on the A-310. Several major suppliers in order to save money kept these design defects from Airbus. The contract required notification to Airbus of any design defect that would effect reliability, safety, and maintainability. Once the FAA made these defects known to Airbus management they did nothing to correct the design or chastise the subcontractors.

:E :E

[swh]

Wino,

What everyone had assumed was that it was the fault of the "training system" how these rudder inputs were used for the recovery, not the fault of the pilots in the aircraft.

What you are now suggesting does not "defend my friends but to defend the truth" but you are suggesting that the respose they made to the upset was not in accordance with company training/procedures.

Yes, I agree, your friends are not here to defend themself, from the FAA, manufacture, or their company. May everyone who lost their life in the accident RIP.

:uhoh:

[747FOCAL]

http://www.airliners.net/open.file/326530/L/

kinda blows the wake turb arguement out the arse don't it? :p

[SaturnV]

The Airbus memo referenced in a New York Times article today appears to be different than the report cited in a recent thread regarding structural design loads on the A300 fin. Some of this may be 'blame game' maneurvering before the NTSB hearing later this month on AA587, but it does seem a bit untoward that Airbus, based on its analysis of an earlier incident, kept internal a memo warning that swinging the A300 rudder may result in the fin failing.

97 Memo Cited in '01 Queens Airliner Crash
By MATTHEW L. WALD

WASHINGTON, Oct. 11 - An airplane manufacturer's memo written in June 1997 explicitly describes the hazards of the maneuver that caused the November 2001 crash of an American Airlines plane in Belle Harbor, Queens, but the memo was kept within the company, and the pilot was never warned about the procedure.

American Airlines obtained the memo a few months ago from the manufacturer, Airbus, as part of its suit over how the companies will share the payments to the families of the 265 people killed in the crash of Flight 587. The memo is now being cited by American and the pilots' union in an effort to put part of the blame on Airbus.

The maneuver involved swinging the rudder from side to side, and the memo, written after a 1997 episode with a different American Airlines flight in the same kind of plane, an A300, warns that it could cause the tail to break off. That is what happened to Flight 587.

After the crash, the National Transportation Safety Board issued a recommendation against the maneuver. If Airbus had shown the memo to the board before the crash, "instead of concealing it from them, the N.T.S.B. would have issued the recommendation before the crash," said John A. David, an American Airlines pilot who is the chief representative of the union, the Air Line Pilots Association, in the investigation.

Clay McConnell, a spokesman for Airbus, said that at the time the memo was written, Airbus was not a party to the investigation of the first event, and that when it did join, it was involved with crew performance, not structural issues.

The memo, from a German member of the Airbus consortium, Daimler-Benz Aerospace, said that "rudder movements from left limit to right limit will produce loads on the fin/rear fuselage above ultimate design load" - the amount of force that a part is designed to handle without breaking.

The memo's main point was that the tail of the plane in the 1997 event should be inspected. It was, and no damage was found, but it was reinspected more thoroughly after the 2001 crash, when some problems were found.

In the Flight 587 crash, the co-pilot, flying the plane, moved the rudder back and forth when it encountered the wake of a plane that had taken off 140 seconds earlier from Kennedy International Airport. Pilots are warned not to use the rudder above a certain speed, which varies by airplane, but Flight 587 was still below that speed. They were not warned, until after the crash, never to use the rudder in alternating directions.

The safety board warning went to all jet airliner pilots, and experts say that the A300 is no more vulnerable to this maneuver than many other planes. Separately, however, the airline is arguing that a system called the "rudder limiter," which keeps a pilot from moving the rudder farther than is safe at the airplane's speed, does not work well on the A300.

The safety board has scheduled a meeting for Oct. 26 to establish the probable cause of the crash. Under its charter from Congress, the board finds probable cause, not fault, but its findings could influence the outcome of the litigation between the airline and the plane manufacturer.

The union and the airline are contending that in an era of very few passenger airline crashes, reducing the accident rate further will require that all elements of the industry volunteer any information they have on any potential safety problem.

In the 1997 episode, the crew of an American airlines plane near West Palm Beach, Fla., mismanaged the controls and allowed airspeed to fall too low. When the plane slowed down to the point that it could not stay in the air, the crew performed a sloppy recovery but averted a crash. But the investigation focused on the initial error and the poor recovery, and not the rudder issue.

Mr. McConnell of Airbus said his company had stressed to American after the 1997 event that pilots should not use the rudder in recovering stability.

"If the pilots didn't know it, it isn't for our lack of trying," he said. He acknowledged that the advice concerned not using the rudder, and not the more specific case of using the rudder in alternating directions. But, he said, "there is no good piloting reason to use alternating rudder, none, in the history of aviation."

[lomapaseo]

The Airbus memo referenced in a New York Times article today appears to be different than the report cited in a recent thread regarding structural design loads on the A300 fin. Some of this may be 'blame game' maneurvering before the NTSB hearing later this month on AA587, but it does seem a bit untoward that Airbus, based on its analysis of an earlier incident, kept internal a memo warning that swinging the A300 rudder may result in the fin failing.


It seems to me that the applicable words to the issue are contained in this quote lifted from the memo.


"If the pilots didn't know it, it isn't for our lack of trying," he said. He acknowledged that the advice concerned not using the rudder, and not the more specific case of using the rudder in alternating directions. But, he said, "there is no good piloting reason to use alternating rudder, none, in the history of aviation."

[OFBSLF]

What about the breakout force on the A300 rudder? Isn't it true that at higher speeds, the breakout force on the A300 rudder is large enough compared to the force required for full deflection that at higher speeds that the A300 rudder becomes more of an on/off switch -- either zero deflection or full deflection?

If that is the case, wouldn't that be a contributing factor in the incident?

[Wino]

Exactly.

The A300 is a TINY TINY little fleet at american airlines a total of 35 aircraft out of 800 aircraft MD80 size or larger.

Yet this is the ONLY fleet at American that had rudder issues. repeatedly. Somehow none of the boeings or the Douglas aircraft EVER had any problems, yet a miniscule fleet operated at over a short period of time had repeated problems....


Cheers
Wino

[acbus1]

From the first post of this thread.........evidence exists that may prove that Airbus Industries, which is headquartered in Hamburg, “manipulated” the engineering test numbers relating to the rudders of its A300-600 aircraft, the same type of jet airliner that flew as American A
Perhaps of more relevance is the manipulation of the rudder by the pilot in question. :rolleyes:

Maybe some peeps should stop trying to blame the cause of the AA accident upon Airbus Industrie and accept, instead, the glaringly obvious.

[Wino]

And maybe you should stop ignoring the factual impiric evidence from millions of operating hours at AA.

800 jet fleet. No rudder problems anywhere except in one micro fleet. Multiple aircraft flown by different pilots experience same problem. And somehow that ISN'T an airbus problem? Had AA NEVER bought airbus there would have been no crash in Long Islan Nov 12 2001. That is a FACT....

So because AA bought an an airbus product hundreds of people died.

Cheers
Wino

[Mick Stability]

The NTSB conducted extensive research into the pilot application of rudder following the Pittsburgh 737 crash of 1994, and concluded then that they were unable to reproduce the pattern of rapid rudder movement apparent in the accident. Indeed in a survey of some 10000 sectors, the Board was unable to find another incidence in which a pilot had commanded full rudder deflection as a response to an upset. It was this inference that led them to suspect beyond reasonable doubt that the pilot had not mishandled the aircraft involved in the Pittsburgh accident, and that his inputs were attempting to counter the rudder hardover, the flawed design that Boeing later had to rectify.

How then can we now be expected to accept a new paradigm that suggest that pilots should be told that a rapid, reversing application of full rudder might compromise the structural integrity of an aeroplane? It had been shown in the NTSB’s own research before the AA587 accident that such pilot behaviour was uncharacteristic and unnatural.

Are we now suggesting that pilots need to be warned of all possible control inputs that might be hazardous to the aircraft? Should the Airbus 380 Flying Manual include advice not to roll inverted and pull immediately after take-off?

The accusation that Airbus somehow failed to caution operators that such extraordinary manoeuvres might be potentially hazardous is sheer folly. I suspect if it had been a Boeing 737 that crashed at Queens and not an Airbus, we would not be having this conversation.

The Atlantic is getting wider and wider by the day.

[faheel]

you mean to say wino that american don't operate the 737?

What about the rudder problems that caused a couple of crashes on that a/c ?

I dont know if any american airlines a/c were involved there, but it seems to me that rudder problems are not an exclusive airbus problem

[Techman]

How many other operators of the A300-600, and A310 for that matter, have experienced rudder problems?

[RatherBeFlying]

If I were AA's lawyer, I'd have an A300B4 Rudder Response Simulator built.

Specifications: Swivel chair with seat belt
Attached platform with rudder pedals that rotates with chair
Mechanism to rotate chair and platform
Rudder pedal travel -- 1 inch
Breakout Force -- 22 pounds
Full Deflection Force -- 35 pounds (as best I can recall)
Yaw rate to pedal position ratios -- same as A300B4 at accident airspeed
Initial external yaw -- same as encountered in wake just before rudder application
Bring to NTSB hearings and videotape reporters and pilots as they attempt to control yaw:E

[Wino]

Farheel.

AA flies NG model 737s. There has never been a rudder problem at AA other than the A300fleet. 100s of boeing and douglas aircraft at very high utilization no problem.
35 airplanes at relatively low utilization, multiple problems with different aircraft and pilots (there fore it can't be an issue with one pilot)

Cheers
Wino

[acbus1]

Wino.....multiple problems with different aircraft and pilots.....
Care to summarise those problems here?

Please include, in your summary, the number of rudders (fins) which snapped off.

[Captain Mercurius]

To whom it may concern:

October 8, 2004
U.S. BUSINESS NEWS
Airbus May Not Have Pressed
Plane-Tail Safety Warnings
By ANDY PASZTOR
Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL



With pilot error expected to be cited as the primary reason for the 2001 crash
of an American Airlines Airbus A300 jetliner, newly reviewed documents
underscore that Airbus engineers years before realized but failed to explicitly
warn pilots or airlines about the potential for such a catastrophic accident.

The new information is likely to renew debate about how much of the cause can be assigned to the American
crew versus the design of the jet's tail, and also whether Airbus, an arm of European Aeronautic Defense &
Space Co., ought to be faulted for what critics allege were shortcomings in raising red flags about possible
hazards.

The National Transportation Safety Board is poised to conclude that the plane's cockpit crew inadvertently
created forces that ripped off the tail and killed 265 people by swinging the rudder rapidly from side to side
during a climb after takeoff. The board is expected to discuss additional questions about design issues and
regulatory approval of the A300 when it holds a public hearing later this month.

Testimony and documents already have revealed that Airbus had warned about the matter, but many of the
warnings were overlooked and the aircraft maker itself failed to push the issue.

The latest internal Airbus
documents shed more light on what the plane maker knew, and how concerned some of its own engineers
appeared to be, about a 1997 incident that didn't result in a crash but seriously stressed the tail of a different
American Airlines A300 aircraft over South Florida.
Airbus strongly disputes that the internal memorandum -- which surfaced in litigation over the 2001 crash --
indicates the company knew more about the dangers than it disclosed at the time, or that it subsequently
failed to promptly or fully advise the airline about the matter.

John Lauber, the top safety official for Airbus
in the U.S., has said that "aggressive use of the rudder" by American pilots in 1997 was "analyzed
preliminarily" by the company and "caused us concern about possible damage in the tail section."
An Airbus spokesman said yesterday that the company "pressed hard" for American, a unit of AMR Corp.,
to take the specific plane out of service for an inspection. The company maintains that it wasn't until 2002
that it was able to use updated techniques to conclude that the stresses on the tail of the plane in the 1997
incident exceeded its "ultimate" design limit -- an all-important limit 50% above the highest stresses any part
is supposed to undergo in flight.

The June 16, 1997, memo warned after the South Florida incident that, based on data from previous flight
tests and simulators, "rudder movement from left limit to right limit will produce [structural] loads" on the
rear of the A300 exceeding the "ultimate design load" the parts were expected to withstand. The memo
circulated among Airbus engineers seems to include a more-explicit and definitive warning about the
potential for structural failure than other Airbus documents examined by investigators.
When Airbus participated in the safety board's investigation of the 1997 incident, it told the board that pilots
"using too much rudder" to recover from an upset "can lead to structural loads that exceed the design strength
of the fin and other associated airframe components." But recently, current and former board investigators
have told industry representatives that those conclusions weren't highlighted by Airbus and their full significane it was missed ,according to ailine and pilots-union officials.



Page 1 of 2 WSJ.com - Airbus May Not Have Pressed Plane-Tail Safety Warnings
10/11/2004 http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB109718341307439650,00.

[SaturnV]

RatherBeFlying:

In America's overly litigious society*, I expect plaintiffs' lawyers will try to make much of Airbus, after the near-crash of another AAL A300, writing a memo in 1997 assessing the likelihood of a fin failing when subjected to certain maneuver-induced loads and not sharing that assessment with anyone. If the Airbus spokesperson's statement is fairly reported, the memo was not shared because Airbus' participation in the 1997 post-incident investigation was confined to human factors; i.e., pilot performance.

* No better evidence of the unpredictable results that American courts and American juries can produce, amid their search for 'deep pockets' and a prevalent desire to generously compensate victims than the recent jury decision in a Los Angeles County Superior Court, in which Parker Hannefin was found solely responsible for the crash of SilkAir 185 because it had poorly manufactured a servo-control; a conclusion no other investigation into that crash reached.

ACBus1
I have not the time to search through the over 400 posts on PPRuNe on AA587, but I have a recollection that the fin from the AAL 1997 incident was pulled from that aircraft and subjected to destructive analysis as part of the AA587 investigation. However, I did a quick search through the the NTSB's extensive, albeit partial, list of exhibits related to AA587 and did not come across a reference to that. The NTSB web address is below.

[lomapaseo]

I have a recollection that the fin from the AAL 1997 incident was pulled from that aircraft and subjected to destructive analysis as part of the AA587 investigation.

I was of the understanding that the investigation by the NTSB and American was concluded without a strutural inspection of the fin and that it was years later that damage was discovered during a routine shop visit in spite of the fact that recommendations for inspection were pronunced by Airbus sometime after the NTSB had dropped their interest.

Lots of self serving pronouncements by the parties, claiming that if they had only known , however one of the responsible parties, the NTSB, is immune from litigitious blame finding.

I suggest that those of us on the sidelines wait for the NTSB hearing to sort out the details and ignore the stuff in the news print.

[cringe]

Structural damage on the aircraft from the 1997 incident was identified only during the 587 investigation in 2002. Six other planes that were also inspected around that time came out clear. From NTSB Press releases:

Feb 25, 2002:
As a safety precaution, Airbus and American Airlines are removing the vertical stabilizer of that aircraft for non-destructive inspection; Safety Board investigators will be present later this week when the stabilizer undergoes ultrasonic inspection to determine whether the stabilizer sustained any damage during that incident. Mar 11, 2002:
Investigators report that an indication of damage (possibly delamination) has been found that apparently was not present at the time of manufacture. The indication is at the pin bushing of the right rear lug. Apr 12, 2002:
In addition, the FAA and Airbus identified seven Airbus A300-600 and A310 aircraft whose vertical stabilizers needed to be ultrasonically inspected because of possible high lateral loads experienced by those aircraft. Three of the aircraft were from American Airlines, and the other four were from FedEx, Tarom and Interflug (two European carriers), and the German air force. The FAA reports that all seven have been checked and only one exhibited any damage to the vertical stabilizer. That was the previously reported American Airlines flight 903 aircraft that experienced an upset event in 1997.http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2002/020225.htm

http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2002/020311.htm

http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2002/020412b.htm

[Wino]

You got it a little backwards lompasso.

AA wanted to pull the tails of the airbuses at various times and was "Advised" in the strongest manner not to, that the risk of damage from removing the tails for NDI was higher than the probability of finding anything wrong with them and that Tap tests and partial ultra sound (it is not possible to get an accurate full ultrasound while installed) of the tail would be more than enough.

Airbus was doggedly sticking to this position because they were claiming that there were no aging aircraft issues with composites and were presenting it as a cost savings over aluminum. When they pulled the tail of the other airplane and found damage, THEN airbus changed their position on inspections of the tail.

That the aircraft had flown for 5 years with that damage undiscovered at various C and D checks means the aircraft ALL need to be ultrasounded as part of a heavy check. Again, Airbus is fighting that tooth and nail....

CHeers
Wino

[lomapaseo]

Wino

I thought that not recommended to inspect applied only to normal wear and tear and not necessarily following an event

I'm happy to be corrected on this and hope that the NTSB hearing will clear this up.

[Pontious]

Did anybody see the BBC's Horizon documentary about AA587 shown last night on BBC World?

I found it very informative and if anybody didn't see it then I recommend you try to obtain it possibly from the Beeb's Archive section although it could be repeated as a fair bit of the BBC World schedule is.

I was quite shocked to see the Chief of the American Airlines A300 fleet Training Department re-enacting the conditions in the Sim'. with a group of independant analysts who applied Airbus's own G factor limitations monitoring his rudder control inputs AFTER the Head of Airbus had done the same demo. showing that it was recoverable. Airbus recommended NEVER APPLY A FULL RUDDER REVERSAL yet this vastly experienced AA trainer was kicking the rudder pedals like David Beckham kicks a football and,as the sensors showed, he completed a couple of full rudder reversals WITHOUT the rudder separating from the fin.

When Airbus applied the NTSB supplied data from the accident aircrafts FDR's, Airbus ran it through their computer's and simulators and were astounded at the severity of the rudder inputs applied and doubly astounded at the 'punishment' the control surface withstood before failiure. It suffered 3 or 4 full rudder reversals prior to failiure and it exceeded Airbus's own figures by quite a margin.

One of the most memorable interviews was of an AA Senior Captain who was almost ghostly white when presented with the Airbus bulletin concerning FULL RUDDER REVERSAL. He simply said that he didn't know that such a manouvre could have such catastrophic consequences.

Shortly after the accident both Airbus and Boeing re-issued bulletins concerning rudder applications during flight. AA however haven't reviewed their training policy on recovery from jet upset or a wake turbulance encounter.

According to the FAA 7 aircraft needed checking, 3 of them belonging to AA and 1 other to the largest operator of A300/A310's in North America - Fedex.

3 out of a fleet of 30 something. Is it me or does something look wrong here?

[Flight Safety]

There are a number of good exhibits available on the NTSB website for this accident.

This link included excerpts from the AA A300-600 Operations Manual, both before and after the accident, indicating how to use the rudder:

AA Operations Manual (http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2001/AA587/exhibits/240006.pdf)

This link covers the FDR and simulator sessions showing exactly what happened in the final seconds of flight AA587. Page 19 particularly shows what happened to the rudder and the ailerons, when the pilot attempted to coordinate them.

NTSB FDR and sim analysis with graphs (http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2001/AA587/exhibits/283528.pdf)

The AA Operations manual discusses using the rudder in coordination with the ailerons to assist with rolls during certain upset recovery maneuvers. Wino mentioned that this was in the training course. The accident data shows that the ailerons were sometimes at their limits as the pilot tried to roll the aircraft level during the second wake encounter.

However its seems to me that the mere mention of using the rudder to coordinate with ailerons to effect roll maneuvers in both the AA manuals and the training course, assumes that the pilot MUST have the ability to control the amount of rudder (and side force) being applied. The rudder limiter of the A300-600 (and its all-or-nothing design flaws) basically prevents the pilot from controlling the amount of side force generated at high airspeeds, therefore the ability to affect good coordination between the ailerons and the rudder is compromised. To me, this is clearly shown in the FDR and sim analysis in the above link. I don't think that this accident was caused by a training problem, because the AA training program assumed that the rudder system operated correctly. Clearly after the accident, the training program had to be modified to accommodate the limitations of this particular rudder system on this particular aircraft.

I personally think that a really good lawyer should be able to tag Airbus for this one, without too much trouble.

(edited to fix a link)

[Shore Guy]

During the investigation of this accident much has been made of the design, material, and construction of the vertical stab on the A-300. We now all are aware that Part 25 certification does not cover the loads associated with a rudder reversal…….but…….I, and many other folks have wondered………would the fin have separated on the Boeing equivalent?

For you engineering types, inquiring minds would like to know.

[Pontious]

Flight Safety.

With regard to your comments concerning 'a really good lawyer...', I wouldn't be so sure. If anything it was AA's training that was under the spotlight after the independant analysts provided data that showed the aircraft could take more punishment than it was designed to take by quite a significant margin.

Shore Guy.

I've recently trained to fly Airbuses after 4000+ hours on Med/Heavy Boeings. The instructors on my previous types were Boeing trained and one was a former Heavy Jet Test Pilot. They stressed from very early in the training course the use and misuse of the rudder at high speed and high altitude and we were taught that full rudder reversals were to be avoided.
Something that was beaten into me again when I re-trained to fly the Airbus.
One of my instructors was a former Airbus Test Pilot and A300/A310 development pilot. According to him, Airbus had raised concerns with AA Training prior to AA587. After trawling the 'net and watching the documentry on BBC World, it is readily apparent that this is anything but an 'open and shut case'.


The aircraft proved it could absorb more punishment than it was designed and certified to encounter to such an extent that the actual figures of what the aircraft endured leading up to the failiure surprised the manufacturer. Witnessing the Chief of AA's A300 Fleet Training' rudder technique coupled with AA's own track record of 'overstressed' rudders - almost 10% of such a small fleet (and those were the FAA's own figures) it didn't look good for AA's A300 Training Department.

I, personally, think the outcome is far from 'cut and dried'.
If it WAS the aircraft then how come airlines such as AF,LH,IB,AI,PIA...the numerous Chinese and Japanese operators haven't had a problem? But AA with a fleet of 30 something have had multiple problems? I think we'll let the investigation decide.

[Wino]

from Pontious

If it WAS the aircraft then how come airlines such as AF,LH,IB,AI,PIA...the numerous Chinese and Japanese operators haven't had a problem? But AA with a fleet of 30 something have had multiple problems? I think we'll let the investigation decide.

Sorry but since Airbus flat out refused to provide all that data to the NTSB and the APA you can't make that claim. THe only fleets we were able to look out turned out to be ones under the jurisdiction of the FAA. I wonder why that was?

Had you trained to fly Airbus BEFORE the 587 crash I sincerely doubt you would have received all that attention. There is VERY little turn over on the fleet and those that went through training from Toulouse when the aircraft were new and training was done by Airbus say exactly the same thing.

The fact that they emphasize it now just proves that there is an issue specific to the aircraft that they are correcting with training. (closing the barn door after the aircraft left). BTW. Been through training recently in Miami at AIRBUS again on the 320. No such emphasis for that aircraft....

Sorry dude.

Cheers
Wino

[Flight Safety]

Pontious, you said:
I've recently trained to fly Airbuses after 4000+ hours on Med/Heavy Boeings. The instructors on my previous types were Boeing trained and one was a former Heavy Jet Test Pilot. They stressed from very early in the training course the use and misuse of the rudder at high speed and high altitude and we were taught that full rudder reversals were to be avoided.
You are extremely correct, the rudder should never be abused at high speeds, and full rudder reversals should (indeed must) be avoided.

However I doubt seriously that this pilot, who obviously used the rudder to assist the fully deflected ailerons in rolling the aircraft level, ever intended to move the rudder to full deflection. Furthermore, I doubt seriously that he even knew the rudder was fully deflected, perhaps thinking the larger than expected heading changes were caused by the wake turbulance rather than a fully deflecting rudder.

Since all if this happened in the space of a few seconds, the pilot probably never realised that he was actually performing a full rudder reversal. A 25% deflected rudder reversal for example would be no big deal, well within the Part 25 structural limits for the fin. However, an unintentional full rudder reversal is a completely different matter.

I'm just about certain that this pilot never knew that he was performing full rudder reversals, and I'm pretty sure he didn't know about the design limitations of the rudder limiting system on this aircraft.

[747FOCAL]

http://www.zwire.com/site/news.cfm?BRD=1860&dept_id=109522&newsid=13141181&PAG=461&rfi=9

[Jackonicko]

Wino,

In the interests of helping you to prove that you're not a xenophobic, trouble making, stirring, anti-Airbus idiot, perhaps you'd like to publicly agree with the following:

"Had TWA NEVER bought Boeing there would have been no crash in Long Island on July 17, 1996. That is a FACT.... So because TWA bought an a Boeing product hundreds of people died."

It's no more inane than what you wrote about Airbus, and rather more people have been killed as a result of Boeing fuel tank explosions, 737 rudder hardovers, etc. than as a result of Airbus fin failures....

Hope that helps.

[Wino]

Jackonito.

I would say instead it is you and the others that have some perverse Hard on for Sten Molin and Ed States. But you can't pin it on ONE crew when the same problem has been run into by other crews.

Furthermore because American has very rigid standardization they perform uniformly across their fleets in their operations of aircraft, yet this problem has ONLY manifest itself in one extremely small subfleet.

So this particular problem is specific to the A300600R in the cofiguration ordered by American, which is a unique and specific type not EXACTLY ordered by any other airline. It was however manufactered by Airbus. It is the manufacturers responsibility to release a safe product complete with accurate training.

I do not disagree that more people have died in boeing aircraft. But FAR more boeing aircraft are flying around the world than Airbus so that is not nearly a fair comparison. While I have provided an Apples to Apples comparison.



Cheers
Wino

[faheel]

aw c'mon wino are you saying that when american ordered the A300-600 they specified either a weaker fin attachment or a rudder that could move thru a greater range?

When airlines order "different" a/c from manufactures that is definately not an option.

The rudder /fin exceeded the design and certified load thats why it parted company with the rest of the a/c, unfortunately caused by a combination of pilot input and wake turbulence.

Thats all there is to it.

[ferrydude]

American Airlines, Airbus Position for Flight 587 Final Hearing
Aviation Week & Space Technology
10/25/2004, page 45


Michael A. Dornheim
Los Angeles

Frances Fiorino
Washington



Three-year-long probe ends: American Airlines and Airbus position for final Flight 587 hearing


NTSB Wraps Up AA587

American Airlines and Airbus will soon engage in their final Flight 587 showdown.

The NTSB meets this week in Washington for the final hearing that will determine the probable cause of the Nov. 12, 2001, accident, in which the vertical tail assembly separated from an American Airlines Airbus A300-600 shortly after takeoff from New York JFK International Airport. The crash killed 260 people on board and five on the ground. It was Airbus' first accident in the U.S.

There is much speculation on what the board will deem probable cause--pilot error, lapses in airline training and nonsharing of safety data by the aircraft manufacturer.

The consensus is that the copilot applied the rudder from stop to stop in what may have been pilot-induced oscillations. The PIOs (also called aircraft-pilot coupling, or APC) in turn caused a large sideslip plus rudder deflection that overloaded the tail fin and ultimately resulted in the inflight structural failure.

What led to the PIOs is at the heart of the hearing. Airbus, in its submission to the NTSB on probable cause, states the pilot's rudder pedal inputs were conditioned by American's Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program (AAMP), which "advocated aggressive use of rudder for roll control" and reinforced by negative training in simulators.

On the other hand, American's submission says the cause was "the onset of a design-induced, adverse APC event." American's A300 fleet captain-flight operations, Delvin Young, said the pilot was "part of the process, not the cause" of the accident. American believes the broader issue for the board is examination of system safety issues.

American is concerned that the NTSB final hearing might not adequately weigh prior instances involving the A300-600 and A310 in which fin limit loads were exceeded through rudder overcontrol or Airbus' apparent failure to inform operators and regulators about the events. Airbus has claimed it informed American about one such event--a May 1997 inflight upset incident involving American Flight 903 near Miami.

Airbus has stressed that the NTSB should scrutinize American's training procedures. Airbus maintains it warned airlines not to use rudder for roll control--unless as a last resort--in the Upset Recovery Training Aid, a manual generated by both Airbus and Boeing and first released in 1998.

American claims Airbus never informed it about use of rudder for roll control. Further, Airbus has argued that AAMP training emphasized use of rudder for roll control purposes in classroom lectures, in written material and in the simulator. This encouraged pilots to make the kind of motions the Flight 587 pilot made in response to wake encounters with a Boeing 747-400 that had departed prior to the A300-600.

Airbus claims that training emphasis on use of rudder for roll control was unfavorable for several reasons. First, the only way roll control through use of rudder is achieved is to develop a sideslip and the aircraft will roll in response. However, as there's a long delay between control input and response, when the aircraft responds, it does so with alacrity. Secondly, the only experience Flight 587's pilot had with upset recovery had been in the simulator--which likely had given him false expectations of how an airplane in flight would respond to control inputs.


NTSB graph shows that the rudder limiter on the A300-600 makes the pedal more sensitive at higher speeds. At the 250 kt. of the Flight 587 accident, it is six times more sensitive than its A300B2/B4 predecessor.

Airbus said another critical training issue is that American made a simulator modification which had not been cleared with either Airbus or the FAA. The modification was such that in order to teach the pilot to use rudder in a simulated upset due to wake vortex encounters, the instructor would push a button in the simulator cab to stop all roll control. A rolling moment was then induced, and when the aircraft reached a large bank angle, it washed back at a gradual rate to be control-effective. Airbus is saying the modification, in effect, forced pilots to make full control inputs on the roll and yaw axes.

IN ADDITION, Airbus might argue that even American's own staff voiced concerns about upset training. Airbus points to a letter from Paul Railsback, American's managing director of flight operations-technical, at the time of the Flight 903 event. Addressing American's vice president of flight ops, Railsback states his "grave concerns about some flawed aerodynamic theory and flying techniques that have been presented in AAMP . . . [that] I believe . . . are validated by the recent AA903 accident. Pilots are told to use rudder as the primary means of roll control in unusual attitude recoveries. This is not only wrong, it is exceptionally dangerous. . . . American Airlines is at grave risk of a catastrophic upset."

American is also pointing to the NTSB's findings in a prior accident involving an ATR 72 turboprop operated by Simmons Airlines/American Eagle that crashed after wing icing behind the deice boots caused unstable aileron forces of an estimated 60 lb. snatching the control away from neutral. The Flight 4184 accident occurred near Roselawn, Ind., in October 1994, and earlier incidents and accidents had made the problem known within ATR (AW&ST July 15, 1996, p. 41).

THE BOARD concluded that a contributing factor was ATR's inadequate response to continuing icing roll upsets and failure to provide procedures for these conditions. Factors also include the French DGAC certification authority's failing to ensure ATR 72 airworthiness in icing conditions, and failing to give the FAA timely information developed from previous ATR incidents and accidents in icing. The crew and airline were not mentioned as a probable cause or contributing factor.

American argues that Airbus knew that the A300-600 and A310 were prone to rudder overcontrolling from three or four prior incidents dating back to at least 1991 that were presented in NTSB testimony (AW&ST Nov. 25, 2002, p. 44).

Calculations showed that these rudder motions overloaded the fin beyond limit load in several cases, and beyond ultimate load (1.5 times limit load) in at least two instances--a point at which the fin might be expected to break off. One of those ultimate load violations was on American's Flight 903 in May 1997 and the other was on an Interflug A310 in 1991. Other cases include an Air France Flight 825 incident in December 1999 on an A310 where limit load was exceeded.

A key document, American says, is a June 19, 1997, Airbus internal memorandum stating that in Flight 903's "rear fuselage, fin and empennage the ultimate design loads may have been exceeded." This knowledge did not come to the NTSB or American until the document was revealed after the Flight 587 accident more than four years later.

"With Interflug, you could say it was a one-off," says Bruce Hicks, an American spokesman. "But with 903 you have to connect the dots, and Air France 825 clinched it."

American claims Airbus knew of overloads but did not inform operators or authorities in sufficiently specific language that would catch their attention, nor did the manufacturer convey data about the series of rudder overcontrol incidents on the A300-600 and A310.

An independent study requested as part of the NTSB Flight 587 investigation showed that at higher speeds, where pilots rarely use the pedals, the rudder of these two types is 3.2-10 times more sensitive (in terms of deflection per incremental force) than other transports, with a breakout force several times larger than the incremental force for full deflection (see graph, p. 45). An NTSB poll of Boeing, Douglas and Airbus histories showed that no other type had this history of fin overload.

By analogy with the ATR 72 accident, American argues that it and its copilot should not be a probable cause of the Flight 587 crash because the A300-600 has a unique propensity to rudder PIO and fin overloads at the higher speeds of the accident, and that Airbus did not disclose these characteristics to operators.

A distinction between the Roselawn case and Flight 587 is that the ATR 72 aileron snatch happened by itself, whereas the Flight 587 rudder oscillation started with the copilot applying full right rudder for little apparent reason. Investigators have concluded that the aircraft was crossing the wake of a preceding Boeing 747 at that point, but the flight data recorder (FDR) shows only about 2 deg. of roll increase, from 23 to 25 deg. The FDR samples roll angle only once per second, and some roll acceleration felt by the crew may be missed--but the net result is just a small blip in roll. The copilot had previously been chastised by another captain for excessive rudder usage while crossing a mild wake, apparently in response to his interpretation of upset recovery training given by American.

"Let's say the copilot was way too aggressive and should have waited to see if the aileron worked," Hicks says. "Still, pushing the rudder a small amount shouldn't kill all those people." The initial push is believed to have started the PIO, which took off the tail. "Where in pilot training does it say you can't use rudder to assist roll? Where does it say to 'let go of the controls,' as Airbus suggested in the hearing? You can't say he used 'too much' rudder because it's so sensitive it's an on-off system. Certification requirements say it shouldn't have caused an immediate PIO. You can't have flight controls so unforgiving that one pulse gives a PIO that results in the tail coming off in 6.5 sec."

AS FOR THE ISSUE of rudder sensitivity, Airbus claims that in 16 million flight hours, there have only been two upset events, both involving American Airlines, and both involving large amplitude rudder inputs--Flights 587 and 903. American points to other cases: Air France 825 in 1999 and Interflug Flight 103 in 1991. Airbus has also pointed out that it came to light in previous Flight 587 testimony that First Officer Sten Molin had a history of using excessive rudder and had, in the case of Flight 587, exerted a force of 140 lb. on the initial rudder input.

"The NTSB may say the copilot started the oscillation so it's the probable cause," Hicks says. "Yes, the copilot's use of rudder is a factor, but was it wrong? Not based on his training, widespread misconceptions about maneuvering speed, and how we thought the flight controls worked.

"I think hiding knowledge is a cause--with that knowledge we have no accident. Had what happened in Flight 903, Interflug and Air France Flight 825 been known, Flight 587 wouldn't have happened. If we have 587 again today then it's the pilots' fault because they are now trained. But not back then."

[Rosbif]

Are they saying that above certain speeds, any force which would be required to "breakout" (ie use) the rudder would also be enough to hurt the tail?
If this the case, you might as well "lock out" the rudder above certain speeds.

[Wino]

Actually what they are saying is that above a certain speed (around 230 kts) that the force required to get the rudder moving is virtually identical to the force required to get it to the full stop.

So once you clean the aircraft up the rudders aren't controlled in the conventional sense. You should consider the rudder pedals full left and right toggle switches. Something that would guarantee an overcontrol should you suddenly need them in the heat of battle (which is something you might go your entire career without needing, like an engine failure, but that one time you need it, it will let you down)

Cheers
Wino

[Rosbif]

So you agree with me then. The rudder can't be used with any degree of precision or finesse. If your boot is on it hard enough to breakaway, then you could also hurt the tail by using it.
It sounds a bit like trying to break a rusty nut free with a wrench. You are pulling harder and harder, until ****xyz. Skinned knuckles.

[Wino]

Yes, I agree with you.

It is a serious design shortfall of the aircraft that could have been overcome by proper notification from Airbus that was not carried out.

Better yet would be conversion back to the original A300B4 rudder load limiter system, but that would not be so simple.


Small fleet with a lot of incidents and an accident related to this problem. A problem unique to the A300600.

If you have that once in a career reaon to use the rudder when the aircraft is going faster (like crossing a 747s wake turbulence at a distance below the minimum safe distance) you are walking into a killer trap laid there by a poor design, which will lead to a POI.

And as I stated, it wasn't an American Airlines only problem. A couple of European airlines have stumbled across the trap as well.

Cheers
Wino

[ORAC]

Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62636-2004Oct25.html): Pilot, Rudder May Share Blame for Airbus Crash

An American Airlines pilot is likely to be blamed by government investigators for causing the crash of Flight 587, which plunged into a Queens neighborhood on Nov. 12, 2001, killing all on board and five people on the ground, according to sources familiar with the probe, but aircraft design is also likely to be cited as a contributing factor.......

[TheShadow]

A compilation of A300 rudder events from various sources (possibly incomplete)

A300 rudder events (http://210.50.111.251/asai/PDF/AA_Flight_587_NotePad.doc)

= 345kb Word Document

[epreye]

Link to AP report on NTSB findings here.

http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=514&e=12&u=/ap/20041026/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/ntsb_flight587

[Pontious]

Perhaps with the outcome of the NTSB report, we can now put this one to bed before it dissolves into a US vs. EU bun fight. Heart felt sympathies and condolonces to all.

[ironbutt57]

"That's all there is to it"...'cept you left out the part that the pilot acted in accordance with his training, and that training may have been based on inaccurate information from airbus...that's a bit more to it....

[Ptkay]

I am just a simple PPL pilot, just completed my training,
and my ground school, but I really don't understand something.

One of the most important (and basic) things thought to me was
the Va speed (on any aircraft, the highest speed for "brutal steering").

On every plane (single piston or 4 jet) there must be in the
manual a clear declaration of the Va.

So, what is the Va for A300-600 ?

Is it stated clearly in AOM ?

If so, what is all this disscusion about ?

If the co-pilot applies full ruder above the Va,
he's to be blamed without daubt for the crash,
if below of the Va, that's the manufacturer's fault.

Fullstop.


PTKay

[Captain104]

Sorry,you missed more than something.

Cpt. Evey in Washington just said loud and convincing that it was a misconception to assume that rudder reversals (stomping the rudder without any reason) 5 times full right and full left below Va is within the envelope.

regards

read http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2001/AA587/presentations.htm
last item Operations
and
follow hearing in Washington in 35 Min. http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/aviation.htm

[Airbubba]

Co-pilot blamed for deadly 2001 jet crash

Actions caused Airbus to crash in N.Y., killing 265, NTSB report says

The Associated Press
Updated: 11:42 a.m. ET Oct. 26, 2004


WASHINGTON - The co-pilot of American Airlines flight 587 caused the November 2001 crash that claimed the lives of 265 people, the staff of the U.S. airline safety agency reported Tuesday.

Investigator Robert Benzon of the National Transportation Safety Board said the copilot's response to turbulence, just seconds after the Airbus A300-600 plane took off from New York's John F. Kennedy International Airport, was "unnecessary and aggressive."

Benzon said investigators also concluded that American Airlines improperly trained its pilots to use the aircraft's rudder while recovering from upsets and said the problem could have been exacerbated by the airline's simulator training.

Benzon also said that the rudder control system on the aircraft is sensitive at higher air speeds, which is potentially hazardous.

The safety board itself was expected later Tuesday to rule on the staff's findings.

Repeated shifts of rudder

On Nov. 12, 2001, First Officer Sten Molin, the co-pilot, moved the plane's rudder back and forth after takeoff, trying to control the climbing aircraft, not realizing he was sealing the grim fate of those on board, the report said.

Molin was at the controls when the plane hit turbulence almost immediately after taking off for the Dominican Republic.

"Hang onto it, hang onto it," Capt. Edward States implored.

"Let's go for power, please," Molin said.

A second later came a loud bang, which investigators believe was the tail breaking off. Then came the roar of air rushing against the aircraft and alarms sounding in the cockpit.

"What the hell are we into (inaudible)?" Molin said. "We're stuck in it."

States' last recorded words came five seconds later: "Get out of it! Get out of it!"

Both Airbus Industrie, which manufactured the jetliner, and American Airlines, which trained Molin, agree that if he had taken his foot off the rudder pedal, the tail wouldn't have broken off, the plane wouldn't have plunged into a New York City neighborhood.

It was the second deadliest plane crash on U.S. soil.

Airline, Airbus dispute blame

But Molin didn't know he was putting more pressure on the tail than it could bear. Why he didn't — and who's to blame for that — is the subject of a bitter fight between Airbus and American.

According to investigators, Molin tried to steady the aircraft using pedals that control the rudder, a large flap on a plane's tail. When his initial movement failed, Molin tried again and again. His actions placed enormous stress on the tail.

American, the only U.S. airline to use that type of Airbus plane for passenger service, claims Airbus didn't alert it to the danger of sharp rudder movements until after the crash. The airline also contends the Airbus A300-600 has uniquely sensitive flight controls that can cause more severe rudder movements than the pilot intends.

"Airbus had the ability to truly red-flag the issue," American spokesman Bruce Hicks said.

Airbus says it told American a number of times and in a number of ways that the airline was improperly training pilots about how to use the rudder.

An Airbus spokesman declined to comment on the investigation before the hearing. However, the company has provided the NTSB with a number of documents to support its claim.

Letter warned against abrupt movement

For example, a letter dated Aug. 20, 1997, warned American chief pilot Cecil Ewing that rudders should not be moved abruptly to right a jetliner or when a plane is flown at a sharp angle. The letter was signed by representatives from The Boeing Co., the Federal Aviation Administration and Airbus.

Airbus contends that even people within American Airlines were concerned about how the airline was training its pilots. A letter to Airbus dated May 22, 1997, from American technical pilot David Tribout expressed concern about the airline's then-new training course on advanced maneuvers.

"I am very concerned that one aspect of the course is inaccurate and potentially hazardous," Tribout wrote. His concern: Pilots were being taught that the rudder should be used to control a plane's rolling motion.

Hicks countered that Airbus didn't share important safety information about the rudder after a problem with American Flight 903 in May 1997. During that incident, pilots used the rudder to steady an Airbus A300-600 plane on approach to West Palm Beach airport. The plane nearly crashed and one person was seriously injured.

‘Rapid loss of controlled flight’

Afterward, Airbus told the NTSB that it included a warning that abrupt rudder movement in some circumstances "can lead to rapid loss of controlled flight," and, in others, could break off the tail.

Hicks said Airbus' comments didn't specifically say the rudder movements on Flight 903 had exposed the tail to so much pressure that it could have been ripped off.

Immediately after the Flight 903 incident, an inspection found no damage to the tail. But five years later, the plane was inspected more closely because of concerns aroused by the crash of Flight 587. Cracks were found and the tail was replaced.

John David, a spokesman for American Airlines' pilots union, said pilots had always thought that they could use rudders to the full extent without hurting the airplane. He also believes Airbus didn't properly communicate what it knew.

American now gives its pilots specialized training on the rudder control system based on information learned during the investigation.

[Ptkay]

Ohhh....
That's really interesting !

So what is the meaning of Va and "flight envelope" at all,
if you cannot apply full controls below Va ????

Did I really miss something in my ground school ????

[Flight Safety]

Ptkay, the accident has nothing to do with Va, please read the entire thread.

The accident was caused by the pilot trying to use the rudder to assist the roll of the aircraft during a wake encounter. He did not intend to use full rudder, but a strongly suspected design flaw in the rudder control system, caused the pilot to apply full rudder deflection when he did not intend to.

Again please read the entire thread, and the other thread regarding this accident.

[Ptkay]

I still don't get it, sorry.

Intended or unintended, applying full controls below Va
is allowed, according to all FAR, JAR or whatever you wish...

"VA – the calibrated design maneuvering airspeed. This
is the maximum speed at which the limit load can be
imposed (either by gusts or full deflection of the control
surfaces) without causing structural damage."

Quote from:
PILOT’S HANDBOOK
of Aeronautical Knowledge
2003 (FAA-H-8083-25), page 9-19.

So just to satisfy my curiosity:

What is the Va for Airbus 300-600 ?

[cringe]

Ptkay, this excerpt from Airbus' response to AA may be of some help:

Item: Design Maneuvering Speed (VA) - From the American Airlines submission (p. 42): "Pilots worldwide had ... the erroneous belief that rudder movements at any airspeed below the design maneuvering speed could not cause structural failure." The definition of VA impacts certification requirements, which presently require the structure to withstand the force of full control surface movement in one direction, then a return to neutral, but not the greater loads imparted by reversals (i.e., the air loads due to large induced sideslip angles). Comments: Both the airline and Airbus believe that the term VA needs to be clarified. In its June 2002 technical bulletin on the use of rudder, Boeing's comments about VA suggest an improved working definition: A speed at or below which "a single input to any set of control surfaces (elevators, ailerons, rudders to the maximum available authority ... to be in one axis (not in combination) and do not include control input reversal or oscillatory inputs." This Boeing bulletin was issued in response to an NTSB recommendation coming out of the AA 587 investigation. Airbus issued a comparable document, which cautioned: "Certification regulations do not consider the loads imposed on structure when there is a sudden, full, or nearly full, rudder movement that is opposite the sideslip."http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UBT/is_13_18/ai_114714587/pg_2

[RRAAMJET]

In my opinion, the origin of this, and several other US accidents, lies in the method of training here in the USA and not necessarily in the content.

Specifically: a great deal of the training is done by rote parrot-fashion Air Training Command-esque "repeat after me...".

There is very little " let's check your understanding of that ".

This is highly controversial stuff, for which there are great implications involving cost and time, both for the student and the employer. I know many of my colleagues will be saying to themselves right now " ooooh hang on a minute mate, let's not open up that can of worms. Trouble....". But it has to be said, and it has to be dealt with.

For example: I went through that same Maneuvering programme, and from previous experience had no doubt whatsoever that the co-ordinated, circumspect use of rudder was for very low speed already-departed situations, and then only as a last resort. I had always, from previous experience and aerodynamic theory, been aware of the limitations on a fin during divergent phugoid motions, especially at high speeds. This is well documented from the early days of jet transport, not to mention DP Davies' excellent works. I was also acutely aware of the limits on engine pylon mounts during yawing/pitching.

Now here's the bit that's going to get me in trouble, but if it saves someones a$$ in the future:

Many times I have been through training here in the US and some of my fellow students have come out with a blank stare on their faces. Nobody checks their understanding of the material being taught, and by that I mean in depth on the theory and principles behind it. It's just "repeat to me the Memory Items" so that we can fill in a square.

The US ATP exam is a prime example.

In many cases that I have seen, students are trying to make a basically unsupervised leap from slower, smaller, domestic equipment to widebody international, in many cases to end up sitting on reserve lacking practice instead of being supervised and intimately challenged by senior staff, such as happens at BA, CX, etc.

International training is just ticking the boxes. Look around at US pilots' reputations in overseas ops if you are in denial.

The union tries extremely hard to prevent extra examination, or no-notice sim-checks.

I am absolutely convinced that a prime factor in this accident is that the pilot involved may have left training having misunderstood the ideas being presented, but there was no in-depth examination of his understanding of the material. WINO has put this more eloquently than I, in a posting many months ago. Most of us were quite clear that the rudder was still a footrest at high speed, but 100% of us? Without follow-up in-depth checking, who knows?

Despite the dire straits of the US airline industry, it needs to get it's standards in order, and pay less attention to "filling squares" and graduating gradesheets. :mad:

[Airbubba]

>>Despite the dire straits of the US airline industry, it needs to get it's standards in order, and pay less attention to "filling squares" and graduating gradesheets. <<

Yep, we need to make things more complex, expensive and paperwork intensive and ask great questions like how many notches on the Airbus speedbrake quadrant.

Been there, done that, no thanks...

[411A]

Strange that only AA has had this problem with the A300-600.

Several times.

Clearly the buck stops at the way AA trains their pilots.
The head folks in the AA training department have had ample opportunity to read and understand the problems that can occur with large rudder inputs at higher speeds...they are all quite documented in incident data.

The fact that AA advised the abrupt use of the rudder at higher speeds, to their line pilots is...gross negligence, plain and simple.

Shark-type lawyers...line up to the left on the courthouse steps please, and prepare for big-time settlements.

AA's actions are nothing less than disgusting....period.:mad: :mad:

[RRAAMJET]

AirBubba: no, not my point at all. Precisely less emphasis on paperwork and more on practicality, application and understanding. It does not need to be more complex.

For instance: it is one thing to be able to regurgitate a "red box" in the classroom, but in a smoke-filled cockpit it is far more practical to have emphasis on what your hands are actually doing, not getting brackets and commas in place.

The toughest checkrides I have had, by far, were all at foreign carriers. Funnily enough, the people who complained about them the most being too tough were all from the US.

[Ralph Cramden]

Flight Safety
All due respect but how do you know whether he intended to apply full rudder or not. Slapping the rudder around is a no, no, for any large A/C IMHO. An 300 ain't no Pitts.

[Flight Safety]

Ralph, I find it very difficult to believe that a professional pilot would apply full rudder to assist the roll of fully deflected ailerons. He would apply only as much rudder as was needed to assist the roll. Applying full rudder would negate the finess required to assist a roll, while preventing too much disturbance to the passengers in the cabin at the same time. Of course we now know that in the A300-600, you should NEVER use the rudder at high speed, to assist a roll or anything else.

I just can't see a professional pilot kicking his passengers around like that. Granted, during the climbout shortly after take off, the passengers would be belted in, but during most of the flight some would not be. A 0.3G or 0.4G sideslip (caused by the fully deflected rudder) could cause serious injuries to the passengers who are not belted in.

I just can't see a professional pilot doing this, so I feel certain that this pilot did not intend to deflect the rudder fully.

To the moon Alice. :D

[Pontious]

Ironbutt 57

It is as cut and dried as that. It is that simple.

What part of the issue of a JOINT 'Upset and Recovery Training Aid' issued JOINTLY by Airbus AND Boeing in 1998 PLUS a signed letter from AA's MD-Flight Ops- Technical to Airbus expressing grave concerns over AA's 'In-House' Upset Recovery training can't you grasp?

Kicking the rudder around at speeds greater than Va, Vref80, Green Dot or whatever is a big No-No! First Officer Mollins wasn't taught that. Ignorance of the system is scant defence. If he was taught an incorrect technique then the blame rests squarely on the shoulders of the training department.

You can't hold the spotlight on Toulouse for this. Other operators of the A300-600/A310-300 DID NOT have as many rudder concerns or problems as what AA had. This was a 'Home Grown' problem whatever way you look at it and AA training has to take a long hard look at itself. The bottom line is AA WERE informed otherwise we'd have heard from all the other A300-600/A310-300 operators screaming that they hadn't got the bulletin but they are silent meaning they probably had notification of the OEB's and other Advisories. If it 'got lost in the post' then that's unfortunate. If, however, it was sent but not acted upon then that is nothing short of Gross Negligence.

I implore anyone to watch the BBC documentary before apportioning blame.

Flight Safety

Please watch this documentary and judge for yourself the AA training procedures demonstrated in the sim' by their own guys. It was quite scary to watch and the techniques demonstrated easily induced a PIO at speeds greater than Va with HUGE rudder inputs. Please judge for yourself.
What this Co-pilot intended to do cannot be assertained. What he was trained to do can.

[Rollingthunder]

Would the same rudder control inputs under the same circumstances have resulted in the same outcome with any other widebody aircraft?

[whauet]

I don't believe that accidents such as this are due to a single factor, but a series of failures...

There was a training issue at fault at AA for rudder input, but if Airbus was aware that excessive rudder input could cause structural failure, do they not have an obligation to modify systems to compensate? Dampen rudder input at higher speeds as to avoid this very situation from taking place?

(Not taking sides, just trying to take an objective viewpoint)

[SaturnV]

While the NTSB findings are not yet published on its website, press reports (New York Times and Washington Post and excerpted below) of yesterday's board hearing indicate the following:

1.) The board said that the copilot pushed the rudder too far to one side and then overcorrected by pushing hard in the other direction, and that the crash would not have occurred had he not touched the rudder. The five-member board agreed unanimously on the causes of the accident, but disagreed over whether the training or the tail sensitivity should rank second.

2.) The co-pilot had attended American's advanced training program, which sought to teach pilots how to better recover after an unexpected, dangerous incident. In one scenario similar to the Flight 587 accident, American's training video prompted pilots to respond to dramatic wake turbulence after following a 747 into the sky. American's simulation taught pilots to use the rudder, which controls the vertical tail's back-and-forth movements, along with the wings to stabilize the plane. But the safety board said the training was inaccurate because it taught pilots to associate wake turbulence with using the rudder. The co-pilot incorrectly perceived these reactions of the aircraft as being caused by outside turbulence rather than his own actions.

3.) The safety board concluded that the Airbus rudder was more sensitive than those on comparable aircraft and that its performance differed dramatically on the ground, in the air and at high speeds.

For all airliners there is a "maneuvering speed" above which rudder use is unsafe, but the A300's system for limiting rudder use as speed increases is unusual. On most planes, as speed increases, the pedal must be pushed farther and farther to get a given amount of movement out of the rudder. On the A300 and the A310, the system simply limits how far the pedal can move. The result is that very small pedal movements produce relatively large rudder changes. Since pushing the rudder produces a delayed result, pilots may push too far when they get no immediate response, then overshoot.

Dr. Malcolm Brenner, a psychologist with the board, called it "an inherently unfriendly design."

The Board recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration require manufacturers and aviation operators to provide better pilot training on rudder capabilities and proper rudder use in flight. It also recommended the FAA review the rudder design of Airbus A300-600 and the similar rudder on A310 aircraft. Airbus said it would work with the FAA if the agency decides to review its rudder design.

4.) The board voted to discuss developing more formal standards to have the FAA receive reports of overseas safety incidents that might help prevent similar incidents in the United States.

The issue arose after investigators said they were "disappointed" that Airbus and American were less than forthcoming in providing information about the rudder performance of another A300-600 involved in a non-fatal accident four years before Flight 587 crashed.

American alleged that Airbus withheld information about its rudder system in the 1997 incident, in which the plane stalled and its rudder was damaged; pilots regained control of that plane. The safety board ruled that incident was unrelated to the rudder-design issues raised by Flight 587.

5.) In the board meeting, staff members and members of the board engaged in extended discussions intended to disprove the idea that the crash was caused by sabotage.

6.) The board also rejected the idea that the tail failed because it was made of composite materials.

7.) The "tragic coupling of both the pilot and the aircraft really was the precipitating event that took down Flight 587," NTSB Vice Chairman Mark V. Rosenker said.

[lomapaseo]

Would the same rudder control inputs under the same circumstances have resulted in the same outcome with any other widebody aircraft?

Each manufacturer of aircraft meets the design regulations, and often employs differences in their novelty of design, avoiding patent infingements while still meeting the regulation. An obvious example of this was the sidestick vs the crotch stick control as well as more subtle items like auto-throttles.

Thus, it is a mute point to attempt to answer the quoted question.

[Ranger One]

411A:

Strange that only AA has had this problem with the A300-600. Several times.


Yes. But AA fly many other types - have they had problems on other types when the PF pedals it at high speed?

Are there significant differences between the way AA taught the rudder (and upset recovery generally) on the 300-600, and on other types on their fleet?

Not stiring or axe-grinding, just thinking out loud. Seems to me there's clearly both a training issue and a rudder sensitivity issue, and even the board couldn't agree on which was more significant.

R1

[lomapaseo]

Not stiring or axe-grinding, just thinking out loud. Seems to me there's clearly both a training issue and a rudder sensitivity issue, and even the board couldn't agree on which was more significant.

Right on!

It's like buying a new high performamce sports car after driving a cushy soft limo style.

All of a sudden in an avoidance manuever you snap the steering back and forth and you now find youself quickly in the ditch with the much nore responsive steering.

It seems that you chose the sports car but failed to anticipate its differences from your ingrained skills.

So who's fault?

Should there be a level playing field in designed response of aircraft to pilot inputs?

Better petition the regulators then, because clearly your taining departments may not adjust your training for such difference.

[OFBSLF]

And doesn't change the fact that you should be trained NOT to use full rudder to recover from an airplane upset conditionIf that's true, doesn't that mean that on the A300-600 you should be trained not to use the rudder at all at higher speeds? Given that the rudder break-out force is so high, relative to the force required for full rudder deflection, at high speeds, isn't the A300-600 rudder effectively on (full deflection) or off (no deflection)?

[RRAAMJET]

A lot of use of the term " recovery from an upset condition " has been used, both by the NTSB and by users of this thread.

One of my points is that I think there may be a case that this was not an "upset condition" - a la remarks of the Board member who stated that the inputs were inappropriate - but Molin, for some reason, thought it was. It is very unlikely that you are going to get a full upset at low altitude at 250 knots/ 1g flight/ climbout due to wake turbulence in a heavy jet, but perhaps the training Molin received did not instill in him this idea.

Of course, AOA indicators might have helped him realise that the A-300 was nowhere near a departed condition on the wings, rendering aileron inputs secondary. If you fly through wake turb in the 777, which has AOA on the PFD, you'll see very little deflection towards red, even clean/heavy.

[Shore Guy]

In what has now become a PPrune tradition, my ancestry and aeronautical knowledge was called into question when I posted this on an early thread on AA587....

"At the altitude/speed these events occurred, normally a pilots feet are on the floor, letting the yaw damper system do its job. "

'An A-300 or any other large twin is not a Pitts Special, nor should it be flown as one. There are different skills/disciplines required to fly each one well – and sometimes those skills are mutually exclusive."

[AntiCrash]

Read the reports on the rudder servo mechanism that is peculiar to that model. The forces can get to the extreme. I don't understand why they changed the bits from the ones used on previous marks. They did not produce simular forces or results. If it ain't broke don't fix it.:ugh:

[Kaptin M]

I am astounded that an NTSB investigator would make the following statement (wrt the November 2001 accident of American Airlines Flight 587, in which the A300-600 lost its tail.)

From AP comes the following:-

"NTSB investigator David Ivie said "The only time pilots should use the rudder is when they're landing or taking off in a crosswind.......the rest of the time, your feet should be on the floor." :mad:

Has this guy ever had any flying lessons?
If he has, it seems he's forgotten the most BASIC rules of using aileron AND rudder together.

What hope is there for aviation, when an INVESTIGATOR sprouts this sort of stuff??!!

[kishna]

Kaptin M
I agree that its a bit of a profound statement to make given that he hasn't mentioned engine failures....BUT If he has, it seems he's forgotten the most BASIC rules of using aileron AND rudder together In a swept wing aircraft? I think not.

[Joyce Tick]

Kaptin M

Anyone who uses rudder with aileron in a Boeing with me gets a (nice) bollocking!

Anyone who doesn't in a Piper also gets a bollocking!

You might like to extract foot from mouth, Kaptin, after displaying that level of ignorance!

[Flight Safety]

RRAMJET, I might disagree with you regarding the question of whether or not there was an upset condition. According to the Hess report (NTSB exhibit link below) Molin did not use the rudder during the first wake encounter, but did during the second wake encounter.

NTSB exhibit - Hess report - possible PIO (http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2001/AA587/exhibits/288388.pdf)

The nature of the 2 wake encounters are different for the following reasons. At the time that AA 587 encountered the first wake, it was in a left turn (previously requested by ATC) with a bank angle of about 25 degrees left. The first wake is believed to have been from the left wingtip of the JAL 747, thus its rotation was clockwise (as the pilot would "look" straight ahead into the vortex). Since the aircraft was in a left banking turn, this wake did not disturb the aircraft that much.

However when the second vortex was encountered a few seconds later, while still in the left turn, the plane reacted more severely. The second vortex is believed to have come from the right wingtip of the JAL 747, thus is was rotating counter-clockwise. Since the aircraft was already in a left banking turn, the vortex only exacerbated the left bank. Molin responsed to this by applying full right aileron, and then tried to assist the right roll with the rudder. This in turn started the rapid chain of events that lead to the loss of the fin.

So the question may be, did Molin believe that his aircraft had entered, or was about to enter an "upset condition", when the left banking turn began to roll left even more severely with the rotating vortex of the second wake encounter?

[Knackered Nigel]

I can't comment on other types of commercial airliners, but on the Airbus 319/20/21 series, rudder is only to be used in the following circumstances:

On take-off roll to maintain centreline
On landing to align a/c with runway in the flare
In single engine flight with autopilot disengaged - no auto trim

Rudder should not be used in wake turbulence encounters for this type of a/c.

[Ranger One]

Kaptin M:

Has this guy ever had any flying lessons? If he has, it seems he's forgotten the most BASIC rules of using aileron AND rudder together.


On a JET? Have you ever had any flying lessons in anything bigger than a PA-28??!! :rolleyes:

R1

[Ignition Override]

Using only aileron inputs (sufficient according to the NTSB guy) was not enough on a heavily-loaded 747-400 on departure from San Francisco (SFO) years ago. While an engine surged/had numerous compressor stalls etc, rudder input was required to compensate for too much yaw. Using more than a small amount of aileron also extends flight spoilers, which decreases lift.

Do all NTSB investigators have no pilot experience, other than in planes with centerline thrust? If so, their specialties must be very compartmentalized. Which investigators have broad enough aviation experience (as a pilot), to realistically determine the primary cause(s)?:suspect:

[411A]

Indeed, Ignition Override, that UAL incident was a close one...they missed the hill by about 100 feet, as I recall.

Of course, one must remember...
it is one thing to use sufficient rudder as required in the aysemetric case, and quite another to pedal-bike the rudder...ala, AA style.

Clearly AA pilots received poor training for the 'upset' case...I wonder if the Sky Gods have actually learned anything from this accident...such is their preoccupation with...'we know better than others'.:mad: :mad:

[411A]

Quite a few folks don't seem to agree with you, wsherif1, including those with a whole lot of accident investigation experience.


So, for your part...wishful thinking.:rolleyes: :rolleyes:

[swh]

wsherif1,

As a pilot you know that an A300 being a land aeroplane cannot land in water, but as a pilot what do you know about the limitations certified by FAR 25 ?

The FDR showed a total acceleration of 0.8g, 0.4 left and 0.4 right. The NTSB does not have an axe to grind, its just reporting the facts.

To quote what I have said before ...

the Flight 587 flight data recorder (FDR) shows three lateral accelerations of 0.3g and 0.4g right, and 0.4g left, in the approximately 7 seconds before it appears that the fin came off. Analysis show that the aircraft may have been in a full slip to produce the high accelerations. During the same period the FDR shows the rudder making about five deflections of 5 to 10-11 degrees, culminating in a rudder reversal immediately before the fin apparently came off. The 10-11-degree deflection is the maximum allowed by the A300's rudder limiter

This is not the first wake turbulance accident, one of the more high profile, however educational material has been around for a while because of previous enounters.

Everyone knows all US major airlines are hurting at the moment, and this accident may be the end of AA. AA and their pilots do have an axe to grind to ensure their survival. The international community is not that uneducated to come up with their own conclusions.

I feel sorry for the families thats have lost as a result of this accident, may they RIP.

[Arkroyal]

I take it wsherif1 removed a post.

What it say?:confused:

[wsherif1]

411A,

Your comment,

"Quite a few folks don't seem to agree with you, wsherif1, including those with a whole lot of accident investigation experience."

Those with a whole lot of accident investigation experience, especially the NTSB, are guilty of the following.

1. Removal of the ATC Chairman's factual report, on the United B737 accident over Colorado Springs,CO March 3, 1991. The report included the sworn testimony of the final controller, who was handling the aircraft, and he tells exactly what happened! (Not what the NTSB claims!)

2. The NTSB misread the FDR Chart in the United Boeing 747 severe air turbulence accident. (1 fatality, 5 broken necks,6 broken backs, on 12/28/97.) The NTSB read the chart and reported the reading as 0.8 negative G, the actual G reading was 1.8 negative G! (A senior NTSB investigator, when asked, said, "You start from the zero G line and then count down to the maximum reading! When did we start flying around at zero G?)

3. The NTSB removed essential evidence from the FDR chart in the TWA 800 accident and then issued a modified chart.

There are other incidents, but for the sake of brevity I will stop here.

All of the above are substantiated by copies of the actual reports and the FDR Charts involved.

NTSB ignorance, or cover-ups? Both!

[Ignition Override]

The latest "Aviation Week and Space Technology" issue published a very interesting letter from a reader. The reader refers to AA flight 587, and highlights some possible contradictions between certification temperatures, pressures and assumed g-loads for the composite vertical stabilizers, and actual 'real world' temperatures, altitudes, g-loads. He then questions design loads assumed (?) for the horizontal stabilizers. (How about engine pylons?)

The multiple, graphite (fiber)-epoxy layers must require a very unique approach in 'C' and 'D-Check' inspections, do they not?

Do all certification authorities (FAA/CAA/B**/DGAC...), especially in countries where such composite airframe components are fabricated (good pun?), assume that all questions about composite parts have been answered long ago, or are any remaining cert./testing questions moot and purely academic?:suspect::ouch:

Do the A-300/310 rudders not have some "fly-by-wire" components, and are such inputs in the FDR data very easy to distinguish from pilot inputs?

[wsherif1]

Gentlemen:

The following statement by Dr Hess is in his report on the AA 587 accident. "In addition, the rudder is probably the most powerful aerodynamic surface on the A300-600. It constitutes 30% of the area of the entire vertical stabilizer, itself nearly 490 square feet in area."

When this total, 490 square foot flat plate area, of the vertical stabilizer and rudder combined, was struck broadside by the rotating forces in the left wing tip vortex of the "Heavy B 747, an instantaneous left "Yaw" maneuver was induced, along with the resultant, abrupt, left "Dutch Roll" into the ground. (Low altitude!)

NASA states that the rotating forces in an aircraft wake vortex can reach 300'/sec. AA 587 made a formation join up on the center of a virtual, horizontal tornado!

AA 587 did not encounter two vortices, the first encounter was when they entered the fringe of the left wing tip vortex and the second encounter was when they entered the core of the vortex.

A pilot cannot shear off both engines, from their support structures, by pilot induced rudder inputs alone!

This is the first accident, of this type, in 100 years of flight!
(An aircraft join-up on a virtual horizontal tornado.)

The NTSB will again cover-up the real cause of the accident and blame the pilot for over-use of the rudder!

This accident was not, "Pilot Error"!!!

[411A]

Unfortunately...wsherif1, you have positively no idea what you are talking about.

[swh]

wsherif1,

Don’t know what game you are playing, deleting posts then posting them again, I find it very annoying.

You seem to pushing the APA line ..... if you are can you just come out and say so !

To quote that same report by Dr Hess ....

"Flight Data Recorder (FDR) information indicates that both wheel and pedal were moved repeatedly to their maximum positions"

Now nobody..FAA/CAA/DGAC/IFALPA/NTSB and your Dr Hess will say this is a good thing to do, or something an FAR 25 aircraft is certified to do whilst in-flight.

Dr Hess is an eminent academic who’s analytical opinion I have a lot of time for.

:\

[Ignition Override]

Could some of Wsherif1's information be valid, whether from a pilot, or maintenance perspective, actual or assumed by the audience?

Did somebody else in this "thread" state that the A-310/300 rudder control input becomes very sensitive after a certain rudder angle or pedal pressure? I suppose that carbon-fiber aircraft structure always behaves as designed during preliminary engineering tests...no matter what the pressure/temp ranges. On the FAR 25 plane which "we" fly (main series max takeoff weight 108,000 lbs.) , we have no limitations, warnings or prohibitions concerning rudder pedal pressure and when the pedals can or can not be pushed, trimmed or anything about the speed of rudder input. The rudder restrictor is relied upon. And except for a tiny bit of rudder trim now and then, using the grey knob, nobody here uses the rudder pedals except a little bit during landing in a strong crosswind and during engine failure training in the simulators.

It still seems very strange to me that any pilot would use rudder pedals in wake turbulence, when our first reaction is to move the yoke, in order for ailerons to correct for any sudden, unwanted roll. At AA, did only one pilot state that he had seen the FO use them aggresively, and did he actually see the guys legs moving? Could the NTSB's "impartial" investigation have become biased by such a statement? We once had a yaw damper go out of control and smoothly yaw several times a jet transport back and forth, as if we had pushed on the pedals to near both left and right limits. It was departing Knoxville (TYS) many years ago. After turning the yaw damper switch off and pulling the rudder power knob to manual, the problem stopped as we quickly did a climb/descent checklist and turned back soon onto base leg . That problem was never solved.

What about with a much more complex system on a heavy jet? An Air South (?) B-737 crew suffered an uncommanded rudder "hardover" and was probably the only crew to have survived such an incident. This was very similar to the United 737 and USAir 737 tragedies. Do larger, more complex aircraft never misbehave? How about documentation? It is 'alleged' by a local pilot that a very large cargo airline "misplaced" or "altered" numerous aircraft logbook pages concerning main gear cracks (which were documented BEFORE both accidents) after at least two heavy jets suffered collapsed main landing gears. Major accidents were involved, and company aircraft insurance, for all fleets, was allegedly in jeopardy :suspect: . Apparently the insurance policies work out much better when lack of (or altered/substituted?) documentation on known aircraft problems can help "prove" (or at least direct blame) that it was the Captains' fault(s)? I doubt that a Maintenance VP or line maintenance supervisors always want an early retirement:ooh: .

[wsherif1]

411A

Your comment,

"Unfortunately...wsherif1, you have positively no idea what you are talking about.

"Send me a fax no. and I will forward copies of the NTSB deleted sections of the accident reports, and the removal, by the NTSB, of essential evidence from the modified FDR charts, I referred to.

[swh]

wsherif1,

I trust you understand that is procedure to let relevant parties comment on a preliminary report before it is made final, in an accident such as this I would image that the FAA/Airbus/AA/Pilot Unions/ATC Unions would have been consulted prior to its release, they would have been provided a confidential copy of a preliminary report, provided feedback, and the NTSB then taking onboard this feedback amend the preliminary report to come up with the final report.

It’s not uncommon for the preliminary report to change when it becomes final.

If however you are suggesting that NTSB is removing information not at the request of one or more of the interested parties, but a wilful deception of the public, I think you are duty bound to report the same with any evidence you have to the relevant law enforcement agency. If this is true I think you have every right to be angry at the NTSB.

:suspect:

[411A]

Type it all out here, wsherif1, if you dare.
I'm sure we would all like to know....:E :uhoh:

[bluepilot]

411A

you are an arrogant person (want to use more extreme language but edited for pprune), cannot beleive that you have ever been near a flight deck, if you have you must have been an extreme nightmare to work with! the hole in your body that is wiped after use is the best discription for you!

[411A]

Gosh, bluepilot, I take it you don't like my style...:p
Oh well, you can't please everybody.:E

Why not stick to the topic (AA A300-600) instead of attacking others?

[wsherif1]

411A,

Your comment,

"Watsa matter with here...?"

"Type it all out here, wsherif1, if you dare.
I'm sure we would all like to know...."

O.K. Here is one example of an NTSB cover-up! I would need a fax No.to forward copies of the modified FDR Charts in the NTSB cover-up of the TWA 800 accident.

A section of the the ATC Chairman's factual report on the UA 585 B 737 accident, over the Colorado Springs,CO airport on 3/3/91, was removed. This section of the report pertained to the sworn
statements of the final ATC controller, who was handling the aircraft!

ATC controller's sworn statement, "He glanced up and it appeared that United 585 had changed pitch, possibly up, with a slight movement to the right towards Cessna 875. The nose seemed to come off of final approach course indicating to him the possibility of a go-around. He quickly glanced at Cessna 875 and immediately went back to United 585. At this point, United 585 was already in a straight, vertical nose-down attitude. The wings were silhouetted to the tower, in a plan-form view. There was no rotation or roll. He observed the same silhouette all the way down, but could not state positively if he was viewing the top or the bottom of the aircraft.
The transition from level flight to vertical flight was an instantaneous transition."

[411A]

Good gosh, not yet another 'conspiracy theory' with regards to TWA800.

And...more or less the same about UAL at COS.

Too much listening to late night radio, I think.

[wsherif1]

411A,

Your comments,

"Huh? Again....
Good gosh, not yet another 'conspiracy theory' with regards to TWA800.

And...more or less the same about UAL at COS."

You dared me to type it out and I did. There is no conspiracy theory here, it is a statement of the professional, eye witness who was there.

[411A]

And, your point being wsherif1, is exactly...what?
And this refers to the AA A300-600 exactly ....how?

[Flight Safety]

411, there's really not much point is debating wsherif1.

In his mind, wake turbulence (or other forms of turbulance) is fully documented as causing failure of flight control surface PCAs, which leads to the uncontrolled flutter of control surfaces that break and bring down airplanes. The pilots are never at fault because they are helpless bystanders, and the NTSB and other government organizations have been covering it up for years, blaming it on other causes. End of story.

[wsherif1]

Flight Safety & 411A

Flight safety's comment,

"411, there's really not much point is debating wsherif1."

I have illustrated one occasion when this NTSB cover-up occurred. The United 585 accident over Colorado Springs, CO, where the NTSB removed the sworn statements of the ATC final controller, who described what actually happened. The NTSB recognized the facts and then removed them! You have the facts, from a previous submission. An NTSB cover-up?

I have offerred to forward a copy of the NTSB modified, TWA 800 FDR Chart, by Fax, for your information. (The offer continues.) However, you do not seem to be influenced by the facts, as opposed to the NTSB that does!

[Ignition Override]

The 'NTSB Wraps Up AA587' article in 'Aviation Week and Space T'. (Oct 25, 2004) is enlightening:

"One of those ultimate (rudder) load violations was on American's Flight 903 in May 1997 and the other was on an Interflug A310 in 1991. Other cases include an Air France Flight 825 incident in December 1999 on an A310 where limit load was exceeded."

"A key document, American says, is a June 19, 1997, Airbus internal memorandum stating that in Flight 903's 'rear fuselage, fin and empennage the ultimate design loads may have been exceeded'. This knowledge did not come to the NTSB or American until the document was revealed after the Flight 587 accident more than four years later".

There are similarities with the ATR-42 icing certification and the cover-up, which involved some ATR-42s in Europe. "The flight accident...and earlier incidents and accidents had made the problem known within ATR (AW&ST July 15, 1996, p.41)." Certain administrators in the ( US) FAA were, long before the crash at Roselawn, aware of problems with some European ATRs during icing conditions, involving aileron "snatch".

:suspect:

"An independent study requested as part of the NTSB Flight 587 investigation showed that at higher speeds, where pilots rarely use the pedals, the rudder of these two types is 3.2-10 times more sensitive (in terms of deflection per incremental force) than other transports.... An NTSB poll of Boeing, Douglas and Airbus histories showed that no other type had this history of fin overload".

[swh]

IO,

While ATR, Airbus, DHC, EMB, BAe, SAAB etc are not manufactured in the USA, they fly around when US registered meeting US FAA certification and hold US certification to the US FARs.

The US FARs are not exactly the same as the JAR, DGAC, LBA, TC etc design rules, so to say loads that were allegedly exceeded in one state does not imply that they are exceeded under another certification basis.

Please remember that the A300 of AA587 was certified to US FARs, and held a US type certificate.

An important legal point, manufacturers manufacture aircraft, governments certify aircraft safe for public use, and issues the manufacturer with a certificate stating that aircraft type meets the government set design standards.

Likewise it has been mooted as "cost of doing business" in the media when a large US manufacturer has directed not to touch, replace, inspect some wiring as any disruption to the wiring may cause the insulation to come off.

This is where I see wsherif1 coming from, the government one hand has a charter to promote business, regulate business, and investigate business. At some point there will be a conflict, or a mistake made by government, government rarely admits fault, so who do the victims turn to ?


:hmm:

[74tweaker]

I'm still torn on this whole rudder overstress/brings the tail off thing. Perhaps it's partly that I'm not a big fan of Airbus, however - here is something to ponder.

http://www.atwonline.com/indexfull.cfm?newsid=4734


US National Transportation Safety Board in a letter to the DGAC has recommended that the French aviation regulator "review the options for modifying the A300-600 and the A310 to provide increased protection from potentially hazardous rudder inputs at high airspeeds,"

This action flows out of the Safety Board's investigation of the Nov. 12, 2001, crash of an American Airlines A300-600R that killed all 260 persons onboard as well as five people on the ground.

"excessive rudder pedal inputs by the first officer led to the separation of the vertical stabilizer and the crash of the aircraft, it also found that the A300-600 rudder design was a contributing factor to the catastrophe"

[wsherif1]

Eidolon,

Your comment,

"This is where I see wsherif1 coming from, the government one hand has a charter to promote business, regulate business, and investigate business. At some point there will be a conflict, or a mistake made by government, government rarely admits fault!"

IN NTSB aircraft accident hearings, no one is allowed to speak except the NTSB Staff!

The NTSB is attempting to quell the facts which, they believe, might alarm the flying public. However, when the industry is misled as well, safety of flight is affected, and similar type accidents may be repeated! (And have been!)

[ShotOne]

delighted to see 411 is still managing to wind folks up -why rise to it guys?

If this incident involved a Boeing or DC aircraft which crashed after mishandling by a non-US crew, would the NTSB now be telling them to consider modifying their aircraft?

[wsherif1]

Gentlemen,

The NTSB Claims,

"excessive rudder pedal inputs by the first officer led to the separation of the vertical stabilizer and the crash of the aircraft, it also found that the A300-600 rudder design was a contributing factor to the catastrophe"

Forget the rudder!

No pilot would kick the rudder back and forth as recorded! No pilot could induce an 0.8 G force on the rudder and shear off both engines from their support structures, through pilot control inputs alone!

However, a 200 mph rotating vortices striking the 27' tall vertical stabilizer, BROADSIDE can! (NASA says that the rotating forces in an aircraft wake vortex can reach 300'/sec., a virtual horizontal tornado!)

The 0.8 G force striking the vertical stabilizer broadside, induced an instantaneous YAW maneuver, which sheared off both engines from the structure, through the forces of INERTIA! The 0.8 G force striking the vertical stabilizer broadside, sheared it off and induced an abrupt "Dutch Roll" into the ground!

The large flat plate surface area of the vertical stabilizer and rudder, become an additional flight control surface, when struck broadside by the clockwise rotating vortices of the Heavy B 747,s
vortex.

The engineers, not aware of the possibility of Broadside strikes on the tail surfaces, have inadvertantly designed a large and a very effective, "Weather Vane"!

However, this is the first accident, of this type, in 100 years of flight! (A perfect formation join-up on the center of a horizontal tornado!)

[lomapaseo]

No pilot would kick the rudder back and forth as recorded! No pilot could induce an 0.8 G force on the rudder and shear off both engines from their support structures, through pilot control inputs alone!


Endless repeating of this opinion does not necessarily convince anybody else but yourself.

If you have new facts then introduce them, but rehashing the same old opinions over and over in this thread shed no new light on the subject.

[wsherif1]

lomapaseo,

Your comment,

If you have new facts then introduce them.

These are not new facts as they have been present from the beginning of the investigation, but no one has paid much attention to them.

I am referring to the final position of the two engines as illustrated by the debris graphics. Actually the graphics of the engine positions show that the right engine was on the left side of the aircraft's track and the left engine was to the right of the track!

The large inertia force of the instantaneous left Yaw maneuver would toss the right engine to the left of the aircraft's track and the left engine to the right of the track!

As reported, the aircraft was turning at a rate of 10 degrees per second into a dive angle of 30 degrees!

[Ignition Override]

What about those other reported incidents on the A310/300 at American, (German) Interflug and Air France?

First of all, this data was apparently unknown except between Airbus Inc,. Air France and Interflug, but not American.

And if those rudder incidents were NOT caused by their pilots, caused by strong, opposite rudder "kicks" as alleged onboard AA flight 587, THEN, what is the common denominator here? Strange coiincidence (merkwurdiger Zufall?) that it involved German and French airlines, but maybe this was another problem which our "friends" at the (US) FAA did not want any US airlines to read about, as with the ATR-42's "aileron snatch".

Were there any problems with A-310/300 rudder overstresses at South American, Asian/Pac Rim, or African airlines which are unknown outside their maintenance departments (but shared with Airbus)?

This is not an attempt to put down Airbus. I would like to "fly" the A-319/320 one day, but with much more seniority. Really enjoyed visiting the Fedex 300 'front office' during a jumpseat ride years ago, and was impressed with the layout. I'm also well aware of the questions about the B-737 (200) rudder systems.

:D

[747FOCAL]

Would one of you geniuses like to tell me how vortices that trail off an airplane and head straight for the ground engaged this aircraft? The A300 would have been so high in the air over the 747’s flight path in front of it that it would never have seen the air coming from its wings.

[swh]

Would one of you geniuses like to tell me how vortices that trail off an airplane and head straight for the ground engaged this aircraft?

How many contrails have you seen 747focal that "head straight for the ground " ?

Would you care to rephrase your question, and then maybe someone could give you and answer.

:ok:

[punkalouver]

>No pilot would kick the rudder back and forth as recorded! No >pilot could induce an 0.8 G force on the rudder and shear off >both engines from their support structures, through pilot control >inputs alone!

Do you mean intentionally or accidentally. It sounds like these rudders are awfully sensitive and perhaps more input happened than was intended. How do you know that no pilot would do this . I bet most professional pilots on this board have come across someone in their career who who either wanted to or did do something that was ridiculous.


<However, a 200 mph rotating vortices striking the 27' tall <vertical stabilizer, BROADSIDE can! (NASA says that the rotating <forces in an aircraft wake vortex can reach 300'/sec., a virtual <horizontal tornado!)

I don't doubt what NASA has said but is this in the immediate vicinity of the airplane or is it still this strong after 90 seconds.

[wsherif1]

Ignition Overide,

Your comments,

"And if those rudder incidents were NOT caused by their pilots, caused by strong, opposite rudder "kicks" as alleged onboard AA flight 587, THEN, what is the common denominator here?"

When your flying a virtual "Weather Vane", (A300-600), you must expect some rough rides in weather and aircraft wake induced wind shear forces. Especialy if your flyinmg in the center of a virtual horizontal tornado! (AA 587 in the B 747's left wing tip vortex)

[Ignition Override]

Yes, wsherif1, by excluding the pilots as the cause of several incidents (because the AA 587 pilot can not defend himself, and those at the other airlines are not accused of violently pushing their rudder pedals), my point therefore was to solicit comments about the alleged over-sensitive characteristics of the A-300's rudder system.

[wsherif1]

Ignition Overide,

Your comment,

"my point therefore was to solicit comments about the alleged over-sensitive characteristics of the A-300's rudder system."

Whether the rudder was over-sensitive or not has little to do with the accident! The large, total flat plate surface area of the 27' tall, vertical stabilizer and the rudder combined, when struck broadside by the 0.8 G force of the rotating vortices of the B 747's wake, induced an instantaneous left YAW maneuver. The resultant, tremendous inertia force sheared off both of the massive engines from their support structure, and tossed the right engine to the left of the aircraft's track and the left engine to the right of the track, as indicated in the engine ground location graphic! This same left YAW motion induced the abrupt, left "Dutch Roll" into the ground!

[74tweaker]

wsherif1,
While I find your thought refreshing and theoreticly plausable, trying to convince us all that this "tornado" effect is what brought down the aircraft is irresponsible - as this is your own theory, and not entirley based on fact. Yes I know that you are a sort of conspiricy theroist, but you are not an investigator. Please stop trying to force this on us. You are entitled to your own opinion, but I prefer to deal with facts.

Your repeated statements are not dealing with facts - but theories. Case in point....
The large, total flat plate surface area of the 27' tall, vertical stabilizer and the rudder combined, when struck broadside by the 0.8 G force of the rotating vortices of the B 747's wake, induced an instantaneous left YAW maneuver. The resultant, tremendous inertia force sheared off both of the massive engines from their support structure, and tossed the right engine to the left of the aircraft's track and the left engine to the right of the track, as indicated in the engine ground location graphic! This same left YAW motion induced the abrupt, left "Dutch Roll" into the ground!

I suppose you've run the computer simulations and can tell me exactly how much force was applied? And how much force is required or applied in order to rip the engines off in this type of manouver? And how you can predict what the engines will do after they have come off the aircraft? What about aerodynamic forces on an engineless and V/stab less A-310 - how does it react? I'm also sure it's wacked out C of G plays a big part. What was it's c of g and what were those consiquences?

There are too many questions that need to be answered before you or anyone could say that this IS what happened.

[wsherif1]

74tweaker,

Your comment,

"And how much force is required or applied in order to rip the engines off in this type of manouver? And how you can predict what the engines will do after they have come off the aircraft?"

Obviously more than enough force was applied to tear the engines from their support structure. This is a fact! If you can't figure out in what direction the engines would be tossed, from a left YAW motion of 10 degrees/second, as reported, you have a problem. The physical location of the engines is a matter of record, and is illustrated by the engine location graphic. This is a fact!

NASA states that the rotational forces in an aircrft wake vortex can attain 300'/sec. I trust you have seen many pictures of wake vortices and are aware of their structure, and will admit that they are quite similiar to the structure of a tornado, except that they lie in a horizontal plane.

If the total left surface area of the vertical stabilizer and rudder are struck, broadside by a force of 0.8 G the aircraft is going to move into a left YAW (10 degrees/second, as reported, a fact!

A left instantaneous YAW will induce an immediate left "Dutch Roll", another fact!

.

[Cejkovice]

People keep refering to the over-sensitive rudder, perhaps it is more sensetive than other aircraft, however the pilots were trained to fly this aircraft and were therefore used to the "feel" of this aircraft.

In addition, the NTSB report states that 140lbs of force were applied to the rudder pedals which would have given full deflection no matter whether the aircraft was an A300 or B767.

[Green Guard]

True

And whan we talk facts, can anybody give data,

how close was that 747, in what position, direction etc

[punkalouver]

<NASA states that the rotational forces in an aircrft wake vortex can attain 300'/sec.

Someone conveniently didn't respond to my last post on this thread.

[wsherif1]

Green Guard,

Your question,

"how close was that 747, in what position, direction etc"

The NTSB claims that AA 587 was at the legal four miles in trail.

Look up USRead's web page and there are graphics of the actual positions of both aircraft.

[wsherif1]

punkalouver,

Your comment, below

Text, (NASA says that the rotating forces in an aircraft wake vortex can reach 300'/sec., a virtual <horizontal tornado!)

Your quote, "I don't doubt what NASA has said but is this in the immediate vicinity of the airplane or is it still this strong after 90 seconds."

I experienced severe wake turbulence 45 miles, (5 minutes time wise), in trail of another B707. (distance reported by ATC) This happened in a completely stable air mass. The ride was smooth as glass, until the point I penetrated his wake, 500' below our assigned cruising altitude of 37,000'.

[punkalouver]

How can you be sure it was wake turbulence and not something that was in the atmosphere to begin with. We have all hit unexplained sudden bumps in smooth air. Don't you think five minutes in trail is a bit long to be getting severe wake turbulence from an aircraft not even in a high lift configuration. How many airplanes have followed 707's on final approach less than five minutes in trail without experiencing severe wake turbulence

[411A]

I really do think that wsherif1 has lost the plot, punkalouver, but hey, at least he is entertaining with the ...horizontal tornados'.;) ;)

[henry crun]

wsherif1: In many of your posts you quote NASA as saying that the wake vortex can reach 300ft/sec.

Can you post a link to the page which will show:
1. which aircraft this refers to ?
2. the configuration and weight of that aircraft ?
3. at what range behind the aircraft the reading was taken ?

[NoJoke]

Dumb pilot asking. Did the pilot use Rudder to correct his 'course'. I have 12,000 hrs, of which are about 4,000 in Command on various types

[Wino]

No,
The pilot attempted to use coordinated rudder, something that is difficult (actually impossible) to do in the A300 because of a design deficiency.

The A300 had VERY poor roll response in certain regimes (when they went from the B4 to the 600r model that AA has they deleted the ouboard ailerons and went to just about spoilers only for roll, in the quest for aerodynamic clean up of the aircraft)

The airplane crossed one wake rolling the aircaft one way, then another one rolling the aircraft in the other direction, the second wake caught the copilot by suprise and he attempted coordinated rudder.

It just so happens that in the A300 though, breakout force is about the same as the force required to reach the stop. so the rudder pedals at 250 knots are really full left and right toggle switches. Something you would never know because to need rudder at 250 knots is a once in a career sort of thing.

Cheers
WIno

[wsherif1]

henry crun:

Your comment,

"In many of your posts you quote NASA as saying that the wake vortex can reach 300ft/sec."

Can you post a link to the page which will show:
1. which aircraft this refers to ?
2. the configuration and weight of that aircraft ?
3. at what range behind the aircraft the reading was taken ?

I would refer you to NASA , they issued the statement.

[wsherif1]

411A,

Your comment,

"I really do think that wsherif1 has lost the plot, punkalouver, but hey, at least he is entertaining with the ...horizontal tornados'"

What is your name for the 0.8 G rotating force recorded by the FDR?

[swh]

wsherif1,

You prob already know this, 0.8G is not a force its and acceleration.

As previously posted, the FDR recorded acceleration corresponding with a series of rudder movements, to the limit of those rudder movements.

There is no suggestion by any party to say the aircraft experienced 0.8g acceleration in yaw without any movement of the rudder.

The wake vortex figure you mention (300 ft/sec) would not be the figure 4-5 nm behind the lead 747, due to mixing with the atmosphere the vortex would be significantly weaker.

The wake vortex from the preceeding 747 was reduced as the aircraft gained distance from the departure point, induced drag (hence vortex) reduced with an increase in speed, stowing of high lift devices, and burn off of fuel.

Many aircraft have experienced this level or greater vortex passing esp in the north west pacific where the sub tropical jet stream is the strongest when flying through any of the jet streams.

:rolleyes:

[henry crun]

wsherif1: Before you threw the question back at me I had done a search of NASA without success.

I have now done another search under Wake Vortex and can still not find anything that suggests a wake vortex of 300ft/sec at an approx distance of 4 miles behind the target aircraft.

The only reference to speed I found was
"can exceed 150mph " (220ft/sec.), without a distance being specified.

Please improve my search skills and help me track down the source of your information.

[wsherif1]

Eidolon,

Your comment,

"There is no suggestion by any party to say the aircraft experienced 0.8g acceleration in yaw (without any movement of the rudder.")????


The NTSB says at 16.04.5 the FDR shows lateral acceleration increases to 0.8g, yaw rate of 10 degrees/sec. left bank through 25 deg WITH PILOT APPLYING RIGHT WHEEL, pitch down -30 deg.! (Textbook description of a, Yaw induced left Dutch Roll!) (Reading from FDR released by the NTSB at 2/8/02 press conference.)

[cringe]

From AIM (7-3-3. Vortex Strength):

Peak vortex tangential speeds exceeding 300 feet per second have been recorded.http://www.faa.gov/ATpubs/AIM/Chap7/aim0703.html#7-3-3

There is a similar sentence in a 1991 FAA advisory circular:

Peak vortex tangential speeds up to almost 300 feet per second have been recorded.http://www.asy.faa.gov/safety_products/WakeAC.html

[wsherif1]

Henry Crun,

Your comment,

"Please improve my search skills and help me track down the source of your information."

From AIM (7-3-3. Vortex Strength):

Quote:
Peak vortex tangential speeds exceeding 300 feet per second have been recorded.

There is a similar sentence in a 1991 FAA advisory circular:

[UNCTUOUS]

wsherif1, cringe, henry crun

Suggest looking at:

AA587 Crow Instability and Wake Turbulence Augmentation (http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/RiskManagement/crowinstability.html#wve)

Are Wake Turbulence Standards Adequate? (http://www.iasa.com.au/folders/Safety_Issues/RiskManagement/crowinstability.html#A3)

UNC

[swh]

wsherif1,

I cannot find comments to that effect or in that context on the NTSB web site.

I had another look at the aimantions of the pilot inputs and the FDR recreation from http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2001/AA587/board_mtg_anim.htm without any conclusion to support the statement you made.

I am aware that the NTSB have said the probable cause is as follows : The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.

The following conclusions were also drawn :
[list=1]
The captain and the first officer (the flying pilot) were properly certificated and qualified under Federal regulations. No evidence indicates any preexisting medical conditions that may have adversely affected the flight crew’s performance during the flight. Flight crew fatigue was not a factor in this accident.

The accident airplane was properly maintained and dispatched in accordance with Federal regulations.

The air traffic controllers who handled American Airlines flight 587 were properly trained and qualified. The local controller complied with Federal Aviation Administration wake turbulence spacing requirements when handling flight 587 and Japan Air Lines flight 47, which departed immediately before flight 587.

The witnesses who reported observing the airplane on fire were most likely observing a fire from the initial release of fuel or the effects of engine compressor surges.

Flight 587’s cyclic rudder motions after the second wake turbulence encounter were the result of the first officer’s rudder pedal inputs.

Flight 587’s vertical stabilizer performed in a manner that was consistent with its design and certification. The vertical stabilizer fractured from the fuselage in overstress, starting with the right rear lug while the vertical stabilizer was exposed to aerodynamic loads that were about twice the certified limit load design envelope and were more than the certified ultimate load design envelope.

The first officer had a tendency to overreact to wake turbulence by taking unnecessary actions, including making excessive control inputs.

The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program ground school training encouraged pilots to use rudder to assist with roll control during recovery from upsets, including wake turbulence.

The American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program excessive bank angle simulator exercise could have caused the first officer to have an unrealistic and exaggerated view of the effects of wake turbulence, erroneously associate wake turbulence encounters with the need for aggressive roll upset recovery techniques, and develop control strategies that would produce a much different, and potentially surprising and confusing, response if performed during flight.

Before the flight 587 accident, pilots were not being adequately trained on what effect rudder pedal inputs have on the A300-600 at high airspeeds and how the airplane’s rudder travel limiter system operates.

The A300-600 rudder control system couples a rudder travel limiter system that increases in sensitivity with airspeed, which is characteristic of variable stop designs, with the lightest pedal forces of all the transport-category aircraft evaluated by the National Transportation Safety Board during this investigation.

The first officer’s initial control wheel input in response to the second wake turbulence encounter was too aggressive, and his initial rudder pedal input response was unnecessary to control the airplane.

Certification standards are needed to ensure that future airplane designs minimize the potential for aircraft-pilot coupling susceptibility and to better protect against high loads in the event of large rudder inputs.

Because of its high sensitivity (that is, light pedal forces and small pedal displacements), the A300-600 rudder control system is susceptible to potentially hazardous rudder pedal inputs at higher airspeeds.

To minimize the potential for aircraft-pilot coupling events, transport-category pilots would benefit from training about the role that alternating full control inputs can play in such events and training that emphasizes that alternating full rudder inputs are not necessary to control a transport-category airplane.

There is a widespread misunderstanding among pilots about the degree of structural protection that exists when full or abrupt flight control inputs are made at airspeeds below the maneuvering speed.

Federal Aviation Administration standards for unusual attitude training programs that take into account industry best practices and are designed to avoid inaccurate or negative training would lead to improvement and standardization of industry training programs.

The use of lower levels of automation, such as simulators without motion or simple computer screen displays, may be more appropriate to provide the necessary awareness training with less danger of introducing incorrect information.
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:rolleyes:

[Ignition Override]

Cejkovice: You raised an interesting subject.

You said that pilots are used "to the feel" of an aircraft.

How often do pilots training on an FMC airplane actually fly the simulator by hand, without engaging an autopilot and/or autothrottles? Even in the US, where all but a few pilots with major airlines have thousands of hours experience in multi-turbine planes, there are stories that many training programs rarely want pilots to hand fly the plane up to 16,000 feet, for example, OR even the whole way around a quick simulator "visual" pattern. I doubt that they do it on the A-320 or the older FEDEX A-310/300 etc or MD-11/10.

Many pilots hand-fly 757s to at least 14,000-FL180 after Initial Op. Experience is over, but this is rare during simulator or IOE, is it not? The focus of the training consists mostly of learning the automation to comply with ATC (we never used VS mode except below 10.000' or on a non-precison approach)-but NOT to hand-fly up to 320 knots and even 12,000 feet, based on my experience several years ago in the 757.

Do many foreign airlines avoid letting pilots ever fly without autopilots etc fully engaged? If this is the case with twin-engine turboprops and smaller jets, then when can pilots acquire solid experience which they can quickly apply if they must turn off most automation during a system problem (i.e. slow autothrottle response, sloppy level-off, or when the AIRCRAFT, for a split second or more, tries to "throttle up" while using MANUAL throttles (!) at the normal glideslope intercept altitude etc?:uhoh: