Airbus ECAM Actions - Breaking Down the Wall

[Airmann]

Having flown the Airbus now for some years I often find that during our sims there is a 'wall' that develops between PF and PM during ECAM Actions. The PF tends to focus on aviating, navigating, communicating while the PM is reconfiguring the aircraft. Often times as PF I find myself so absorbed by the task of doing all three (especially if the failure increases the complexity of flying e.g. alternate/direct law, AP inop etc.) that I'm honestly completely disconnected and not really watching what the PM is doing. I understand that Airbus requires the PF to cross check that all actions are completed before clearing the ECAM, but this is sometimes a little too late. Do the more experienced Airbus drivers in this forum have any specific advise on how to avoid this negative tendency, or is it just an inevitable part of how abnormal procedures are conducted in the Bus?

[Uplinker]

PM should wait and verbally ask you, the PF to check and confirm before clearing any ECAM line; e.g: "OK to clear Green HYD OVHT ?." (for example).

You look at the ECAM and read it, and then say "OK to clear". Or if you are busy with a PF task, you say "stand by", and look at the ECAM when you can.

That's how we were taught - it's a two crew cockpit and both pilots should work together to work through the ECAM and config changes. And PF dictates what you do and when. If PM is rushing ahead and doing things and clearing ECAM lines without your confirmation, you need to remind them to wait for you to confirm each action first.

This is really important because if the wrong thing is actioned or cleared by PM your emergency could get a lot worse.

The Airbus manual has this all written out - or it used to. I cannot remember exactly where off the top of my head, but it's there - possibly the FCTM.

If things are going too fast, or you are very busy with hand flying; YOU slow it down - there is nothing that needs instant or fast action, except putting on an oxygen mask if required, or keeping straight with the rudder during an EFATO.

Everything else should be done methodically and carefully with both of you in the loop, cross-checking each other.
.

[tolip1]

I'm just intrigued as to why the flying is taking so much of your capacity. By the time you get to ecam you can be flying level (maybe descending), in a straight line, already safe from weather and terrain.

Not objectively a hard task. Have you set yourself up for success by making the flying easier? Not much different from flying a Cessna and doing some checklist items simultaneously.

[Sidestick_n_Rudder]

I have found it to be the other way around.

Whatever pops up on ECAM (especially in real life, when things happen rarely) is a powerful attention magnet and more often than not, it results in both pilots staring at ECAM, with nobody minding the airplane. Conveniently located between pilots, it can be a powerful distraction to the PF - unlike in older airplanes, where the PM is performing checklists from the QRH.

Keep it simple, the PF’s job is mostly to fly the plane and PM’s job is to read the checklists. There’s only a handful of items that require a confirmation from both pilots.

trust your PM, he should be trained to handle the ECAM in a proper way - and if he doesn’t, the ECAM will tell them.

[Uplinker]

Your SOPs must be very different. Ours were that every underlined ECAM fault heading line needs to be confirmed by both pilots before clearing it.

Not the action lines - unless they contained an irreversible action such as a fire PB or something.

[Fursty Ferret]

Often times as PF I find myself so absorbed by the task of doing all three (especially if the failure increases the complexity of flying e.g. alternate/direct law, AP inop etc.) that I'm honestly completely disconnected and not really watching what the PM is doing. I understand that Airbus requires the PF to cross check that all actions are completed before clearing the ECAM, but this is sometimes a little too late.

Are you the captain? Give control to the FO and run the ECAM yourself.

[dream747]

If the ECAM concerns actioning switches on the overhead panel, which usually takes more effort for the PM to monitor whilst flying the aircraft manually especially in degraded conditions, this is where the FCTM recommended technique of handling the overhead panel switches should help:

When the ECAM/QRH/OEB procedure requires the flight crew to perform an action on the overhead panel or when the flight crew performs a system reset, the flight crew is able to rapidly identify and find the correct system panel via the white label (uppercase) that is on the side or on top of each panel. To perform any action requested by a procedure, the PM should indicate the related panel and control and announce in sequence: ‐ The name of the system ‐ The name of the control, or system reset ‐ The action. E.g. “AIR, XBLEED, CLOSE". The use of this type of approach enables the PM to keep the PF informed of the progress of the procedure and reduces the risk of the PM operating the wrong control. It is important for the flight crew to remember that, most of the time, in the case of a system failure, the FAULT light of the applicable control comes on in amber. This enables the flight crew to correctly identify the applicable system control on the overhead panel. After the selection of a control, the PM should check the SD page, in order to verify that the selected action was performed (e.g. The closure of the crossbleed valve should change the indications that appear on the SD page).

[Bleve]

FCTM:In flight, the PF and PM must crosscheck before any action on the following controls:

ENG MASTER lever

IR MODE selector

All guarded controls

RESET buttons.


The flight crew must crosscheck the above-listed controls, in order to prevent any inadvertent action by the flight crew with irreversible effects (e.g. when the flight crew operates red guarded controls). If the flight crew inadvertently operates a black guarded control, the subsequent effect is reversible. The flight crew must restrict the reset of systems to those listed in the FCOM/QRH.

[330Heavy]

If you find yourself disconnected, that's when you need to slow things down, it shouldn't be a race. If you can utilize automation let it, and try to take a step back to see the situation. If in direct or complex, get things stable before acknowledging. A good idea of systems knowledge will help, so when it happens you'll have an idea of what to expect. If there's doubt or confusion, ask the PM. Transfer control if you can or must to further understand the situation. Getting things right is greater than time. Overall I think Airbus does a wonderful job on the ECAM and SOP.

[swh]

Often times as PF I find myself so absorbed by the task of doing all three (especially if the failure increases the complexity of flying e.g. alternate/direct law, AP inop etc.) that I'm honestly completely disconnected and not really watching what the PM is doing. I understand that Airbus requires the PF to cross check that all actions are completed before clearing the ECAM, but this is sometimes a little too late. Do the more experienced Airbus drivers in this forum have any specific advise on how to avoid this negative tendency, or is it just an inevitable part of how abnormal procedures are conducted in the Bus?


Command the PM to stop ecam until your workload is manageable.

if your at the stage of clearing ecams, the critical initial actions have been completed and all you are doing is reconfiguring the systems.

[Uplinker]

Not necessarily; PM might in their haste, or accidentally; clear an ECAM fault heading line when they have NOT properly completed the action lines. That is partly what the cross checking is for.

[321XLR]

nobody should clear ECAMS until both agree

[Escape Path]

I found myself agreeing with Sidestick_n_Rudder , usually both pilots can be quite fixated on ECAM and then no one's really dedicating their full attention to flying the aircraft, thus breaking one of the golden rules.

As far as the topic being discussed: From the FCTM (Handling of ECAM -> ECAM Tasksharing)
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1032x416/screenshot_2024_05_06_120421_d2a1c4d740c61069db089f1527ebc63 1e33dfffb.png

I've always interpreted the "ECAM actions performed... Check" on the PF column as taking a look at the EWD and indeed verifying that there isn't any action line pending when asked by PM to "Clear [System Failed]". Yes, I know some will remain there even when performed, but you can take a couple of seconds to get the picture of what has been done. Only then you will confirm to "Clear (name of system", which is the next step for the PF. This will ensure the proper actions were taken. The FCTM even mentions that "before the PM presses the CLR pb, the flight crew (not just the PM) should carefully check that all actions have been performed"

Not necessarily; PM might in their haste, or accidentally; clear an ECAM fault heading line when they have NOT properly completed the action lines. That is partly what the cross checking is for.

Uplinker : if proper tasksharing is used, the name of the failure should have been mentioned when first troubleshooting it. Hence, if a failure title magically disappears, that should be a hint that something was mistakenly or improperly cleared. Use the Recall button

[Uplinker]

Yes, I know :ok:

It is Airmann and sidestick_n_rudder who seem to be unsure about the Airbus procedures.

Thanks for quoting the FCTM, my copy is unavailable at the moment, (not on the line right now).

[Sidestick_n_Rudder]

Yes, I know :ok:

It is Airmann and sidestick_n_rudder who seem to be unsure about the Airbus procedures.

Thanks for quoting the FCTM, my copy is unavailable at the moment, (not on the line right now).

I never said I was unsure of the Airbus procedures. I just shared my observation, that in real life situations, ECAM tends to absorb more PF’s attention, than it should. It takes quite a lot of self-discipline to focus on flying, not on whatever popped up on the ECAM - at least I had this feeling when I flew the Bus…

[Uplinker]

OK, I'll get my coat............

But this is what confused me:

Keep it simple, the PF’s job is mostly to fly the plane and PM’s job is to read the checklists. There’s only a handful of items that require a confirmation from both pilots.
trust your PM, he should be trained to handle the ECAM in a proper way - and if he doesn’t, the ECAM will tell them.
Seemed to imply that PF and PM do their own jobs without cross checking. And the ECAM will not necessarily warn you if an action line has been cleared , (unless it appears on STATUS page later). Apologies if I was wrong.

[sonicbum]

Having flown the Airbus now for some years I often find that during our sims there is a 'wall' that develops between PF and PM during ECAM Actions. The PF tends to focus on aviating, navigating, communicating while the PM is reconfiguring the aircraft. Often times as PF I find myself so absorbed by the task of doing all three (especially if the failure increases the complexity of flying e.g. alternate/direct law, AP inop etc.) that I'm honestly completely disconnected and not really watching what the PM is doing. I understand that Airbus requires the PF to cross check that all actions are completed before clearing the ECAM, but this is sometimes a little too late. Do the more experienced Airbus drivers in this forum have any specific advise on how to avoid this negative tendency, or is it just an inevitable part of how abnormal procedures are conducted in the Bus?

Hi!

To be honest it feels like a training issue more than anything. The ECAM handling as a very simple but very strict discipline which will help overcome all those sort of issues you described.

People tend to get lost and lose SAW during the handling of failures because of poor ECAM discipline. And it doesn’t matter if you have been flying the plane for 1 year or 30 years, it will always be the same routine.

Most commonly observed errors:

- when a master caution “bing” comes on, the first pilot who notices it does not cancel the caution leaving the distracting light in sight.
- the PM does not read the title of the failure and confirms with SD/overhead before the PF calls for OEB/ECAM actions. This is crucial as now the PF knows what is going on and can decide to delay the ECAM actions whenever suitable.
- When carrying out ECAM actions the PM does not mention the name of the system on the overhead panel and the action performed, e.g. ECAM calls for BLEED 2 OFF, PM points the overhead and states AIR-BLEED 2-OFF, hence granting the PF to stay in the loop while flying.
- PF and PM come up with all sort of funny callouts such as read ecam, standby status,etc..
Unless your operator has changed the ECAM callouts there is only space for:
ECAM ACTIONS-STATUS?-STOP ECAM-CONTINUE ECAM-REMOVE STATUS-ECAM ACTIONS COMPLETE (very important as it restores the normal PF/PM roles). In addition of course to the “CLEAR” (system).
- Unclear discipline on the use of summaries. Crew going back and forth several times with the status or losing time in reading the whole summary before starting the decision making process (only the cruise part is needed for this purpose, the rest is to prepare and brief the approach).
- PM not giving the correct emphasis when reading the Status to the different INOP systems using the same tone of voice to state Cargo door inop and Nose wheel steering inop…

Just a handful of rules to be applied which will make all the difference when dealing with abnormals.

[RHINO]

Ooohhhh....sonicbum has most of it covered in a nice friendly manner!

a few points for education

there is no PF calling 'standby' when doing the ECAM it is 'STOP ECAM' it ensures the PM does just that. FCTM covers it in detail.

the chart above from the FCTM is misleading as it misses a fundamental tenet of Airbus. You need the whole chart reproduced. It is the PM who starts the ECAM. There are very good AIRBUS reasons for this. If you don't understand why this is then I am happy to explain as it is fundamental to operating an Airbus..

[Uplinker]

My reference to the phrase "standby" was if PM asks e.g. "Clear Green HYD?", but at that moment PF needs to do something with the flight path or listen to an RT call for example. In other words, "hang on a sec."

It's a general multi crew phrase, I didn't mean to imply it was an Airbus SOP.

[IBMJunkman]

As SLF I have a question. PM says “CLEAR (name of the system)?

To me that depends on the PM using the correct inflection in his voice and the PF hearing and understanding it.

To me it should be a spoken question. “SHOULD I CLEAR (name of the system)?

I found myself agreeing with Sidestick_n_Rudder , usually both pilots can be quite fixated on ECAM and then no one's really dedicating their full attention to flying the aircraft, thus breaking one of the golden rules.

As far as the topic being discussed: From the FCTM (Handling of ECAM -> ECAM Tasksharing)
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1032x416/screenshot_2024_05_06_120421_d2a1c4d740c61069db089f1527ebc63 1e33dfffb.png

I've always interpreted the "ECAM actions performed... Check" on the PF column as taking a look at the EWD and indeed verifying that there isn't any action line pending when asked by PM to "Clear [System Failed]". Yes, I know some will remain there even when performed, but you can take a couple of seconds to get the picture of what has been done. Only then you will confirm to "Clear (name of system", which is the next step for the PF. This will ensure the proper actions were taken. The FCTM even mentions that "before the PM presses the CLR pb, the flight crew (not just the PM) should carefully check that all actions have been performed"



Uplinker : if proper tasksharing is used, the name of the failure should have been mentioned when first troubleshooting it. Hence, if a failure title magically disappears, that should be a hint that something was mistakenly or improperly cleared. Use the Recall button

[321XLR]

As SLF I have a question. PM says “CLEAR (name of the system)?

To me that depends on the PM using the correct inflection in his voice and the PF hearing and understanding it.

To me it should be a spoken question. “SHOULD I CLEAR (name of the system)?

No, that is not the phraseology. it is "Clear (system) ?" asked as a question.

The PF will expect it to be asked like that. He will respond, "Clear (system)"

Not yes, not go ahead, not approved, not I concur, not proceed

the proper answer is "Clear"

[Uplinker]

To IBM Junkman; The PF will be closely following the ECAM process, (while primarily flying the 'plane). So they will have heard the fault heading spoken by PM and have noticed PM performing the action lines - confirming certain switches and actions where appropriate.

So when PM finishes that section and says "Clear Green Hyd ?" for example, PF can see where PM is in the ECAM and knows that PM is asking a question.

This is partly the purpose of SOPs; so that each pilot knows what is going on and where in the process they are. Avoids confusion and errors.

[marksmit]

Having flown the Airbus now for some years I often find that during our sims there is a 'wall' that develops between PF and PM during ECAM Actions. The PF tends to focus on aviating, navigating, communicating while the PM is reconfiguring the aircraft. Often times as PF I find myself so absorbed by the task of doing all three (especially if the failure increases the complexity of flying e.g. alternate/direct law, AP inop etc.) that I'm honestly completely disconnected and not really watching what the PM is doing. I understand that Airbus requires the PF to cross check that all actions are completed before clearing the ECAM, but this is sometimes a little too late. Do the more experienced Airbus drivers in this forum have any specific advise on how to avoid this negative tendency, or is it just an inevitable part of how abnormal procedures are conducted in the Bus?
The dynamic you're describing between PF and PM during ECAM actions is common, but it's crucial to find ways to break down that "wall" for effective teamwork. Communication is key - establish clear expectations between PF and PM regarding responsibilities and updates during abnormal procedures. Consider implementing a structured callout procedure to ensure both pilots are aware of each other's actions. Practice scenarios where PF and PM roles are switched to foster better understanding and empathy. Ultimately, maintaining situational awareness and mutual support is vital in handling complex situations effectively on the Airbus.

[CVividasku]

No, that is not the phraseology. it is "Clear (system) ?" asked as a question.

The PF will expect it to be asked like that. He will respond, "Clear (system)"

Not yes, not go ahead, not approved, not I concur, not proceed

the proper answer is "Clear"
Don't forget airbus engineers are mostly non native english speakers.
So they often write some simplified english. They even say it's voluntary, because most airbus users aren't native english speakers as well.

It leads to confusion for native speakers and proficient non native speakers, at least those who have an interest in the language.

For example, the callout for go around is "go around flaps".
I'm unable to say "go around flaps", which is a call for the PM to set the go around setting of the flaps, when I really mean "I'm going around". So when I flew the 320 I used to say most of the times "go around.. go around flaps".
On boeing it's "Go around, flaps xx"

[Uplinker]

.............but it's crucial to find ways to break down that "wall" for effective teamwork. Communication is key - establish clear expectations between PF and PM............Consider implementing a structured callout procedure to ensure both pilots are aware of each other's actions........

This has already all been worked out and specified in fine detail by Airbus; see the FCTM, quoted above. And it is something that we all practise multiple times during every 2 day recurrent SIM and LPC/OPC, that we do twice every year. So the methodology and calls certainly should not be a new concept for Airbus pilots.

If pilots simply follow the Airbus SOPs and calls as per the FCTM; there will be no "wall" - There is no wall.

[Airmann]

Firstly, thanks to all those who replied. There are some good tips. But to be completely honest I've just upgraded and the issue is that any ECAM naturally leads to a hundred thoughts about declaring MAYDAYs, diversions, contacting the company, cabin crew etc. Caught up in those thoughts I feel that I'm not engaged enough with the FO doing the actions and I'm not comfortable with that reality.

It's rare in my company to find any pilots, let alone FOs, that actually know the correct ECAM handling technique. Therefore simply stating that everything will be fine if the PM follows the correct ECAM handling procedures is pointless, the reality is I cannot expect that either in the sim or on the line.

Maybe what I should have asked is: is there any technique that the captains on this forum use to organize the decision making/thought process during an emergency in order to free up the mental capacity to be able to fly the plane and focus on the ECAM. I suppose the easy answer is to simply leave all decision making to after the ECAM Actions but this is easier said then done. Maybe this only comes with time and experience and it's simply part of the job on the left seat. But in the mean time in simply trying to see if there are any tips that could help me.

[321XLR]

Firstly, thanks to all those who replied. There are some good tips. But to be completely honest I've just upgraded and the issue is that any ECAM naturally leads to a hundred thoughts about declaring MAYDAYs, diversions, contacting the company, cabin crew etc. Caught up in those thoughts I feel that I'm not engaged enough with the FO doing the actions and I'm not comfortable with that reality.

It's rare in my company to find any pilots, let alone FOs, that actually know the correct ECAM handling technique. Therefore simply stating that everything will be fine if the PM follows the correct ECAM handling procedures is pointless, the reality is I cannot expect that either in the sim or on the line.

Maybe what I should have asked is: is there any technique that the captains on this forum use to organize the decision making/thought process during an emergency in order to free up the mental capacity to be able to fly the plane and focus on the ECAM. I suppose the easy answer is to simply leave all decision making to after the ECAM Actions but this is easier said then done. Maybe this only comes with time and experience and it's simply part of the job on the left seat. But in the mean time in simply trying to see if there are any tips that could help me.

ECAMS should not cause a "hundred thoughts" about declaring emergencies or notifying the company. Once an ECAM appears, just handle the ECAM. Some or more important than others. Adjust your mental processing to process the ECAM, then worry about notifying company etc, if even needed.

[Uplinker]

It is extremely concerning if the OP has got to the LHS without a clear idea or plan of how to deal with an emergency and how to prioritise your decision making. All pilots and TREs, TRIs in your company should be following Airbus SOPs.

You should by now have had years of practice of how to deal with emergencies correctly by following the Airbus SOPs and the Airbus Flight Crew Training Manual, the FCTM.

PF flies the plane and keeps it safe with regard to terrain and flightpath. PM announces the emergency, e.g. "engine fire".

When the aircraft is under control and on a safe flightpath PF asks PM to identify the problem - and in this case which engine - from the engine gauges, the ECAM and the overhead panel. PM will say e.g. "engine fire number two engine". PF then also checks the engine gauges and reads the ECAM and checks the overhead panel, then instructs PM to start working through the checklists by saying e.g. "My radios, your ECAM Actions please". PM works through the ECAM action lines; reading them out loud and with both pilots confirming any engine controls and other irreversible actions first. When they get to the end of the first failure section on ECAM, PM will ask "Clear Engine Fire?", or whatever the failure is.

Any other failures on ECAM are worked through this way until you get to STATUS page.

Then PF says "Stop ECAM" and you both read STATUS carefully. Then PF will say "Any OEBs or Computer resets?", at which point any relevant procedures are carried out by PM.

Then you check STATUS again and now you apply:

TDODAR.

T ime. Is there any time critical factor, e.g. low fuel.

D iagnose. What has happened? what has failed?

O ptions. Can you continue to destination, or restrict cruise flight level etc., or do you need to divert and land. PM will need to get the latest weather and operational status for diversion airfields for this step.

D ecide. Based on this and the STATUS page make a decision about what you are going to do.

A ssign tasks. When all the initial ECAM actions are complete you can swap PF and PM roles now as you see fit. Normally it is best to have the F/O be PF and you become PM leaving you freer to better manage the situation and do all the radio calls and cabin crew calls etc. without also flying the 'plane.

R eview. Go through your plan together to check it is the best course of action. Perform TDODAR again if further information prompts a re-think.


This frankly, is Airbus emergency management 101. You should all be very well used to this.

You are giving me the impression that your company does not follow Airbus SOPs or methodology, which is extremely concerning.
.

[sonicbum]

It is extremely concerning if the OP has got to the LHS without a clear idea or plan of how to deal with an emergency and how to prioritise your decision making. All pilots and TREs, TRIs in your company should be following Airbus SOPs.

You should by now have had years of practice of how to deal with emergencies correctly by following the Airbus SOPs and the Airbus Flight Crew Training Manual, the FCTM.

PF flies the plane and keeps it safe with regard to terrain and flightpath. PM announces the emergency, e.g. "engine fire".

When the aircraft is under control and on a safe flightpath PF asks PM to identify the problem - and in this case which engine - from the engine gauges, the ECAM and the overhead panel. PM will say e.g. "engine fire number two engine". PF then also checks the engine gauges and reads the ECAM and checks the overhead panel, then instructs PM to start working through the checklists by saying e.g. "My radios, your ECAM Actions please". PM works through the ECAM action lines; reading them out loud and with both pilots confirming any engine controls and other irreversible actions first. When they get to the end of the first failure section on ECAM, PM will ask "Clear Engine Fire?", or whatever the failure is.

Any other failures on ECAM are worked through this way until you get to STATUS page.

Then PF says "Stop ECAM" and you both read STATUS carefully. Then PF will say "Any OEBs or Computer resets?", at which point any relevant procedures are carried out by PM.

Then you check STATUS again and now you apply:

TDODAR.

T ime. Is there any time critical factor, e.g. low fuel.

D iagnose. What has happened? what has failed?

O ptions. Can you continue to destination, or restrict cruise flight level etc., or do you need to divert and land. PM will need to get the latest weather and operational status for diversion airfields for this step.

D ecide. Based on this and the STATUS page make a decision about what you are going to do.

A ssign tasks. When all the initial ECAM actions are complete you can swap PF and PM roles now as you see fit. Normally it is best to have the F/O be PF and you become PM leaving you freer to better manage the situation and do all the radio calls and cabin crew calls etc. without also flying the 'plane.

R eview. Go through your plan together to check it is the best course of action. Perform TDODAR again if further information prompts a re-think.


This is all in the Airbus manuals, and frankly, is Airbus emergency management 101. You should all be very well used to this.

You are giving me the impression that your company does not follow Airbus SOPs or methodology, which is extremely concerning.

Hi, just a little nitpicking if I may :)

Failure analysis is a PM duty. The PF should not be distracted by cross-analysis (unless the PM is unsure of what is going on and a transfer of control is required), especially in a critical phase of flight.

Unless your airline SOPs are different, the callout is: “ECAM ACTIONS”.

The OEBs if any are applied prior to the initiation of the ECAM actions :)
Before reading the Status we check the acceleration flow has been completed, normal checklists, comp. Resets and eng relight if any.

[Uplinker]

Sorry, but it is absolutely vital that PF makes an independent cross check of all information; ECAM, engine gauges, overhead panel and rudder etc to confirm which engine has failed or caught fire.

Shutting down the wrong engine or pushing the wrong Fire PB is a very very very bad thing, as you know.

Our airline SOPs obviously differ slightly. We dealt with ECAM down to STATUS before thinking about OEBs and computer resets.

But the main point for the OP is, there are SOPs to deal with emergencies and failures which should be followed. No captain or F/O should be unsure about how to deal with emergencies or the task sharing.

[lurkio]

Surely OEBs come before ECAM Actions as they may supercede those very ECAM actions and/or QRH procedures?

[sonicbum]

Sorry, but it is absolutely vital that PF makes an independent cross check of all information; ECAM, engine gauges, overhead panel and rudder etc to confirm which engine has failed or caught fire.

Shutting down the wrong engine or pushing the wrong Fire PB is a very very very bad thing, as you know.

Our airline SOPs obviously differ slightly. We dealt with ECAM down to STATUS before thinking about OEBs and computer resets.

But the main point for the OP is, there are SOPs to deal with emergencies and failures which should be followed. No captain or F/O should be unsure about how to deal with emergencies or the task sharing.

Hi,

Yes but one thing is to analyze the failure, and another thing is to cross check mandatory actions on controls and switches such as Thrust levers, masters, guarded switches, IRs, and so on, as per Airbus STD.
Point is when an ECAM triggers the PM must (unless busy with something more important, I.e. monitoring the flight path) announce the failure and confirm it with SD and overhead indications. The PF flies, especially if it’s hand flying. I have seen on several occasions both heads up to the overhead or down to the SD whilst hand flying. Doesn’t look so good from the back. Mandatory items confirmation is another topic, that’s a must to avoid Messing up, regardless of the usage of autopilot or not of course.

[safetypee]

"… is there any technique that the captains on this forum use to organize the decision making/thought process during an emergency in order to free up the mental capacity to be able to fly the plane and focus on the ECAM"

This question may involve the delicate issue of trust.

How do new P1s develop an appropriate sense of trust with P2. CRM pundits have good theoretical ideas, but in practice they are difficult to implement.
Without justification, which suggest aspects of tacit knowledge, it may help to first trust yourself - confidence.
Second reflect on your position when P2 with a new P1, consider the other person's viewpoint.

From experience these aspects are influenced both by national and organisation culture, thus compare views with other operators - heeding unsubstantiated advice via Pprune.

Practice, experience, thinking, updating beliefs and knowledge; the transition from novice type behaviour to expertise.'

Novices don’t feel comfortable going with the first option— they don’t have the experience to trust the first option, or to gauge its quality except by contrasting it to others. : novices tend to deliberate about which option to select, whereas experts deliberate about what is going on in the situation.'
'… the experts primarily relied on a single type of information, whereas the novices tried to use all the data'
- from must read book - 'Street lights and Shadows' G Klein, available via Safety, CRM forum: Websites #27

[Airmann]

"… is there any technique that the captains on this forum use to organize the decision making/thought process during an emergency in order to free up the mental capacity to be able to fly the plane and focus on the ECAM"

This question may involve the delicate issue of trust.

How do new P1s develop an appropriate sense of trust with P2. CRM pundits have good theoretical ideas, but in practice they are difficult to implement.
Without justification, which suggest aspects of tacit knowledge, it may help to first trust yourself - confidence.
Second reflect on your position when P2 with a new P1, consider the other person's viewpoint.

From experience these aspects are influenced both by national and organisation culture, thus compare views with other operators - heeding unsubstantiated advice via Pprune.

Practice, experience, thinking, updating beliefs and knowledge; the transition from novice type behaviour to expertise.'

Novices don’t feel comfortable going with the first option— they don’t have the experience to trust the first option, or to gauge its quality except by contrasting it to others. : novices tend to deliberate about which option to select, whereas experts deliberate about what is going on in the situation.'
'… the experts primarily relied on a single type of information, whereas the novices tried to use all the data'
- from must read book - 'Street lights and Shadows' G Klein, available via Safety, CRM forum: Websites #27

Thank you very much this is sound advice. I will check out the reference.

[Uplinker]

Hi,

Yes but one thing is to analyze the failure, and another thing is to cross check mandatory actions on controls and switches such as Thrust levers, masters, guarded switches, IRs, and so on, as per Airbus STD.
Point is when an ECAM triggers the PM must (unless busy with something more important, I.e. monitoring the flight path) announce the failure and confirm it with SD and overhead indications. The PF flies, especially if it’s hand flying. I have seen on several occasions both heads up to the overhead or down to the SD whilst hand flying. Doesn’t look so good from the back. Mandatory items confirmation is another topic, that’s a must to avoid Messing up, regardless of the usage of autopilot or not of course.

We are going to confuse the OP instead of help them.

Fundamentally with a two crew Airbus FBW cockpit; certain failures MUST be independently analysed and cross checked.

Those talking about trusting the PM are missing the point. It's nothing to do with trust, it is to do with being human and potentially making mistakes. This is why we check each other.

If PM announced "ENG 2 fail/fire" but actually ENG 1 had failed and PF did not independently look and check and confirm which engine was in fact the faulty engine, PM might shut down the only good engine they had left !

PF flies the 'plane, PM runs the ECAM - on command from the PF. When something needs to be crosschecked, confirmed or analysed, PM waits and PF does it when they can. These were our SOPs.

It only takes a few seconds to look at the overhead panel to see which warning lights are showing, and confirm that those warning lights; the ECAM; and your feet on the rudder pedals all confirm which engine has failed. OR if PM has actually spoken or nominated the wrong engine.

PF must not take PMs word for it. They must check for themselves.

Like other regular line pilots, I have practised this hundreds of times, both as PM and as PF while hand flying. I am no Chuck Yeager but I have no difficulty looking up at the overhead panel to confirm which Fire PB was illuminated, and reading the instrumentation and the ECAM while I was hand flying. This only takes a few seconds to do, and there is no desperate rush.

When you are driving a car on the motorway and you look in your mirrors every 20 seconds or so, you don't crash every time you look away from the road.

During a flying emergency; if we were turning or happened to be just levelling at MSA or there was a radio call when I was asked to confirm, I would say "stand by" and look to confirm as soon as I could after my primary job of flying the aircraft.

The notion that PF and PM remain in their separate spheres while dealing with an emergency is a potential problem and the theme of this thread. Emergencies in Airbus FBW aircraft are initially commanded by PF until the aircraft systems are secured and STATUS has been read. If PF is busy while some vital cross check is needed then PM should wait or be told to wait.

[sonicbum]

If PM announced "ENG 2 fail/fire" but actually ENG 1 had failed and PF did not independently look and check and confirm which engine was in fact the faulty engine, PM might shut down the only good engine they had left !

You are confusing between failure analysis and mandatory actions confirmation.
The PM cannot act on the trust lever and master switch without prior PF confirmation, I.e. the PF must confirm that the correct engine is been shut down. Failure analysis is the PM job. There are barriers in place to catch a wrong analysis, I.e critical switches confirmation.

[deja vu]

Big mistake to disagree with Uplinker, never wrong, just ask him-her.

[sonicbum]

Big mistake to disagree with Uplinker, never wrong, just ask him-her.

It is all about exchanging point of views, as we all know there are multiple ways to reach safely and efficiently the same goal, just like EBT shows us.
Feeding information helps the OP pickup whatever might be of interest, keeping in mind that the most important aspect is to always comply with company policies (good or bad as they can be) which might differ from advices given herein.

[Uplinker]

I am not confusing anything - we practised this every recurrent SIM. Our SOPs and our methodology were quite clear and specific:-

PF must make an independent analysis of an engine failure and NOT take PMs word or analysis.

Our SOPs stated that before calling for "ECAM actions", PF must independently check the ECAM, the engine gauges, the overhead panel warning lights and their rudder pedals to ensure that both pilots and the ECAM all agree about which engine has failed.

I did not write those SOPs, but they seem very sensible to me.

ECAM might be wrong because engine sensor inputs could have been cross-wired. Or PM might accidentally state the wrong engine number.

It is very concerning if any airlines do not have both pilots independently analysing and confirming which engine has failed before shutting one down. There are sadly many instances of crews shutting down the only good engine they had remaining; leading to accidents with fatalities.

[sonicbum]

I am not confusing anything - we practised this every recurrent SIM. Our SOPs and our methodology were quite clear and specific:-

PF must make an independent analysis of an engine failure and NOT take PMs word or analysis.

Our SOPs stated that before calling for "ECAM actions", PF must independently check the ECAM, the engine gauges, the overhead panel warning lights and their rudder pedals to ensure that both pilots and the ECAM all agree about which engine has failed.

I did not write those SOPs, but they seem very sensible to me.

ECAM might be wrong because engine sensor inputs could have been cross-wired. Or PM might accidentally state the wrong engine number.

It is very concerning if any airlines do not have both pilots independently analysing and confirming which engine has failed before shutting one down. There are sadly many instances of crews shutting down the only good engine they had remaining; leading to accidents with fatalities.

Before shutting an engine down it is mandatory to cross check the mandatory actions, as stated in the FCTM. This is your safety net before applying irreversible actions.
When PM calls “Thrust lever number 2…. IDLE” the PF looks at the engine parameters before asking confirmation to move back the THR LEVER. Same goes again for the Engine Master; the PF before granting confirmation to the PM to switch off the Master will look at the engine parameters. Same goes again for the fire push button; the PF will look at the engine parameters and where the hand of the PM is placed before granting confirmation. This is what avoids shutting down the wrong engine. You can chat with the PF as long as you want before initiating the ECAM and still shut down the good one if the crew lacks discipline in those steps.

Airbus Standard does not require the PF to independently analyze the failure before calling out the appropriate actions (ECAM, QRH, whatever) unless the PM analysis is not appropriate or effective.

It is required to have a shared mental model (I.e. shares situational awareness) by appropriate task sharing (Workload management) and act accordingly.

[vilas]

It's not as complicated as some perceive. When ECAM warning comes first person noticing announces it and cancels it. PF has to notice it because control law may have changed, take his time to fly may be he needs to level off, or hold at PP so inform ATC accordingly and once he is satisfied order ECAM action. PM can read actions under particular title PF acknowledges but before clearing that title he needs to glance and see actions done or grasp the meaning. Even in Alternate Law only bank is not held with FBW but flight path is stabilized periodic scan of basic parameters is sufficient and not so difficult. The duties are split but there's no wall.

[Uplinker]

Before shutting an engine down it is mandatory to cross check the mandatory actions, as stated in the FCTM. This is your safety net before applying irreversible actions.
When PM calls “Thrust lever number 2…. IDLE” the PF looks at the engine parameters before asking confirmation to move back the THR LEVER. Same goes again for the Engine Master; the PF before granting confirmation to the PM to switch off the Master will look at the engine parameters. Same goes again for the fire push button; the PF will look at the engine parameters and where the hand of the PM is placed before granting confirmation. This is what avoids shutting down the wrong engine. You can chat with the PF as long as you want before initiating the ECAM and still shut down the good one if the crew lacks discipline in those steps.

Airbus Standard does not require the PF to independently analyze the failure before calling out the appropriate actions (ECAM, QRH, whatever) unless the PM analysis is not appropriate or effective.

It is required to have a shared mental model (I.e. shares situational awareness) by appropriate task sharing (Workload management) and act accordingly.

Our SOPs had PF make an independent check of which engine had failed before ordering ECAM actions for engine failure*. Your SOPs have that independent check after ordering ECAM actions.

The point is, we agree that an independent check and confirmation of which engine has failed must be made by PF instead of them blindly trusting that PM has got it right.

So for the OP; the PF does not just fly the 'plane in their own little bubble; they are very closely involved with the ECAM process - in fact they command the ECAM process. So there is no "wall".


*Our SOPs - which were Airbus SOPs with a few extras - then also required confirmation of correct thrust lever, master switch, and fire PB as well.
.

[sonicbum]

Our SOPs had PF make an independent check of which engine had failed before ordering ECAM actions for engine failure*. Your SOPs have that independent check after ordering ECAM actions.

The point is, we agree that an independent check and confirmation of which engine has failed must be made by PF instead of them blindly trusting that PM has got it right.

So for the OP; the PF does not just fly the 'plane in their own little bubble; they are very closely involved with the ECAM process - in fact they command the ECAM process. So there is no "wall".


*Our SOPs - which were Airbus SOPs with a few extras - then also required confirmation of correct thrust lever, master switch, and fire PB as well.
.

I fully agree.

EBT shows us there are multiple ways to reach a safe and efficient goal, this is the big change with the old school training where people were taught tasks rather then competencies.

Hence any way of proceeding between the crew that enhances safety is always welcome.

[RHINO]

It's not as complicated as some perceive. When ECAM warning comes first person noticing announces it and cancels it. PF has to notice it because control law may have changed, take his time to fly may be he needs to level off, or hold at PP so inform ATC accordingly and once he is satisfied order ECAM action. PM can read actions under particular title PF acknowledges but before clearing that title he needs to glance and see actions done or grasp the meaning. Even in Alternate Law only bank is not held with FBW but flight path is stabilized periodic scan of basic parameters is sufficient and not so difficult. The duties are split but there's no wall.

This is very much NOT Airbus. Re read your FCTM carefully. There is a lot that must happen before you get to this stage. And I'll say it again for the avoidance of doubt it is PM that starts the ECAM. There are very good reasons in AIRBUS why this is the case. PM must firstly be sure that the Aviate is safe and also the Navigate and Comms are appropriate before PM does ANYTHING with the ECAM. Prompt, Direct, Intervene as appropriate and if you are going to intervene then it is I have Control and press the red button and hold it. Only when PM is 100% happy with ANC may they commence identifying the failure. When PF is happy with the failure and has confirmed it then they may order the ECAM. Because you cannot see the other pilots side stick action it has to be like this before any ECAM happens. Ask the crews of 447or 8501 what they would do with hindsight.......remember the PMs in both case did not stick to this disciplined approach and paid a terrible price. . Please re read your FCTM regarding ECAM handling.

Safe flying....

[321XLR]

This is very much NOT Airbus. Re read your FCTM carefully. There is a lot that must happen before you get to this stage. And I'll say it again for the avoidance of doubt it is PM that starts the ECAM. There are very good reasons in AIRBUS why this is the case. PM must firstly be sure that the Aviate is safe and also the Navigate and Comms are appropriate before PM does ANYTHING with the ECAM. Prompt, Direct, Intervene as appropriate and if you are going to intervene then it is I have Control and press the red button and hold it. Only when PM is 100% happy with ANC may they commence identifying the failure. When PF is happy with the failure and has confirmed it then they may order the ECAM. Because you cannot see the other pilots side stick action it has to be like this before any ECAM happens. Ask the crews of 447or 8501 what they would do with hindsight.......remember the PMs in both case did not stick to this disciplined approach and paid a terrible price. . Please re read your FCTM regarding ECAM handling.

Safe flying....

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/653x345/airbus_ecam_fcom_ce975396035f1b6ce54ba4e4d695805fd671a0b3.pn g

[RHINO]

Sorry old bean but that is not ECAM handling...try again....that is just a molecule of operating an airbus...

[SloppyJoe]

Sometimes you just have to trust the person you are sitting next too. Some faults do saturate the PF, dual hydraulic, smoke fire fumes etc and looking to get it on the ground asap. Sometimes the cockpit does split, it's not exclusive to Airbus either. It occasionally ends up being trying your best to stay in the loop, but flying the plane always comes first, what's the point of being in the loop but the plane is soon to be not flying. Guarded switches of course have a look and try to have a think about the consequences and what is trying to be achieved before confirming, same with the clearing of ECAM, it can just be a case of doing your best in a bad situation.

[hans brinker]

This is very much NOT Airbus. Re read your FCTM carefully. There is a lot that must happen before you get to this stage. And I'll say it again for the avoidance of doubt it is PM that starts the ECAM. There are very good reasons in AIRBUS why this is the case. PM must firstly be sure that the Aviate is safe and also the Navigate and Comms are appropriate before PM does ANYTHING with the ECAM. Prompt, Direct, Intervene as appropriate and if you are going to intervene then it is I have Control and press the red button and hold it. Only when PM is 100% happy with ANC may they commence identifying the failure. When PF is happy with the failure and has confirmed it then they may order the ECAM. Because you cannot see the other pilots side stick action it has to be like this before any ECAM happens. Ask the crews of 447or 8501 what they would do with hindsight.......remember the PMs in both case did not stick to this disciplined approach and paid a terrible price. . Please re read your FCTM regarding ECAM handling.

Safe flying....

Sorry, but you are not making a lot of sense. But what 321XLR quoted is definitely what Airbus wants. The PF is the only one who can asses if they are ready to start the ECAM. The PM cannot start or delay ECAM actions without being told to do so by the PF. The PF should not order ECAM actions if there is other things that require attention more than the ECAM, but it is the PF who makes that call. If that leads to a problem, the PIC will have the authority to make that decision, not the PM.
What happened with 447&8501 had nothing to do with ECAM handling or airbus procedures. 447 was a result of bad aircraft handling by both pilots, 8501 was a result of unauthorized procedures used in flight.

[VariablePitchP]

This is very much NOT Airbus. Re read your FCTM carefully. There is a lot that must happen before you get to this stage. And I'll say it again for the avoidance of doubt it is PM that starts the ECAM. There are very good reasons in AIRBUS why this is the case. PM must firstly be sure that the Aviate is safe and also the Navigate and Comms are appropriate before PM does ANYTHING with the ECAM. Prompt, Direct, Intervene as appropriate and if you are going to intervene then it is I have Control and press the red button and hold it. Only when PM is 100% happy with ANC may they commence identifying the failure. When PF is happy with the failure and has confirmed it then they may order the ECAM. Because you cannot see the other pilots side stick action it has to be like this before any ECAM happens. Ask the crews of 447or 8501 what they would do with hindsight.......remember the PMs in both case did not stick to this disciplined approach and paid a terrible price. . Please re read your FCTM regarding ECAM handling.

Safe flying....

Negative, you’ve been given a textbook explanation of the process of PF doing a full FNC before PM is ordered to start the ECAM, that’s how Airbus want it.

Not sure as PM I’d be jumping straight to the takeover PB if I wasn’t quite happy with the FNCing from PF..!

You’ve talked about ANC, are you a Boeing-ist? Good chance they have a different setup, which is great. But you can’t shoehorn that onto an Airbus.

[321XLR]

This is very much NOT Airbus. Re read your FCTM carefully. There is a lot that must happen before you get to this stage. And I'll say it again for the avoidance of doubt it is PM that starts the ECAM. There are very good reasons in AIRBUS why this is the case. PM must firstly be sure that the Aviate is safe and also the Navigate and Comms are appropriate before PM does ANYTHING with the ECAM. Prompt, Direct, Intervene as appropriate and if you are going to intervene then it is I have Control and press the red button and hold it. Only when PM is 100% happy with ANC may they commence identifying the failure. When PF is happy with the failure and has confirmed it then they may order the ECAM. Because you cannot see the other pilots side stick action it has to be like this before any ECAM happens. Ask the crews of 447or 8501 what they would do with hindsight.......remember the PMs in both case did not stick to this disciplined approach and paid a terrible price. . Please re read your FCTM regarding ECAM handling.

Safe flying....

very wrong information posted above.

[BoeingDriver99]

Either someone is pretending to know what they are they talking about on here orrrrrr their understanding of Airbus/their airline’s training department is deeply and fundamentally flawed.

One is sort of funny and the other is tragic… :eek: