EASA Partners with IATA to Counter Safety Threat from GNSS Spoofing & Jamming

[slfool]

Cologne – The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) announced the conclusions of a workshop jointly hosted at EASA’s headquarters to combat incidents of GNSS spoofing and jamming.The workshop’s high-level conclusion was that interference with satellite-based services that provide information on the precise position of an aircraft can pose significant challenges to aviation safety. Mitigating these risks requires short-, medium- and long-term measures, beginning with the sharing of incident information and remedies.

“GNSS systems offer tremendous advantages to aviation in increasing the safety of operations in a busy shared airspace,” said EASA Acting Executive Director Luc Tytgat. “But we have seen a sharp rise in attacks on these systems, which poses a safety risk. EASA is tackling the risk specific to these new technologies. We immediately need to ensure that pilots and crews can identify the risks and know how to react and land safely. In the medium term, we will need to adapt the certification requirements of the navigation and landing systems. For the longer term, we need to ensure we are involved in the design of future satellite navigation systems. Countering this risk is a priority for the Agency.”
https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/2024-releases/2024-01-26-01/

[slfool]

See also The Register: GPS interference now a major flight safety concern for airline industry (https://www.theregister.com/2024/01/29/satellite_navigation_jamming_now_a/)

[hoistop]

GPS / GNSS signals are relatively weak, frequencies/protocols are known and anyone with a bit of knowledge and malicious intents can build a GPS jammer. I do not understand how anyone came up with the idea to use such vulnerable system as primary means of navigation for vehicles, where safety risks in case of wrongdoing are considerable. The only way is to have paralel navigation system, that does not rely on such signals and of course, with monitoring of the integrity/comparators used. Inertial systems (with enough redundancy) shall be the primary means, combined/corrected with GNSS / DME... as it currently is, but I see pressure to move entirelly to GNSS/satnav more and more. Being involved in future design of satelite navigation systems will not prevent jamming. How hard is it to understand that?

[51bravo]

In the late 90s modernised Loran-C was discussed in USA and Europe as complementary Nav system with signal characteristics and power hardly to jam and/or spoof with small equipment. Antenna of several 100 feet needed and power output in MW range (Long Wave). But ... EGNOS, WAAS piggy up was deemed enough for primary use qualification.

Well, worked until today, I suppose.

[speedrestriction]

I’ll have one of these (https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-objects/sr-71-astroinertial-navigation-system-ans/nasm_A20090019000) please.

[hunterboy]

Low power GPS jammers were available in the Shanghai and Beijing markets a decade ago for £30. It also jammed mobile phone signals.

[Sallyann1234]

The need for a backup was recognised way back in 2009

https://rntfnd.org/wp-content/uploads/Benefit-Cost-of-eLoran-Volpe-Center-2009.pdf

[Magplug]

These organisations are YEARS behind the times, there is nothing new about jamming aircraft GPS reception. My first encounter was in the mid 90s over Bosnia where the early stand-alone GPS receiver would regularly go to the Azores when passing over Pula. Later around 2014 I regularly overflew some military field close to CAI during an RNAV approach only to find the Airbus 'Pipping' with NAV ACCURACY DOWNGRADE on final approach. The B744 would regularly lose one or both GPS flying over Kurdistan on the way to the Gulf, often not recoverable until after landing. Lucky there was no oceanic transit to follow otherwise reverting to old-school procedures is a serious PITA.

[Una Due Tfc]

Important to remain cognisant of the difference between jamming and spoofing here. Jamming can be crude and an inconvenience. Spoofing is malicious, targeted and highly dangerous.

[krismiler]

GPS spoofing isn’t the sort of thing you need with ground based beacons being gradually removed. NDBs are well on the way out and I wonder how much longer VOR will be kept on.

INS was self contained and whilst subject to drift, it couldn’t be interfered with.

[fox niner]

The houthi’s have tried to persuade an EL-AL flight to make an intermediate landing while flying near the red sea. Not exactly spoofing of the gps system, but certainly spoofing in a broader sense. This somali FIR should be avoided entirely.
https://avherald.com/h?article=5151e170&opt=0

[blue up]

https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/71MN0D6KLyL._AC_UF1000,1000_QL80_.jpg

Spoofing was known about back in 1990. John McClane warned us about it back then. Nobody listened?

[ATC Watcher]

INS was self contained and whilst subject to drift, it couldn’t be interfered with.
Indeed but was very expensive and you could not re-initiate it in flight. Now a few modern aircraft are equipped with cheaper IRS , but in their wisdom the manufacturers decided to use GPS to augment its accuracy during flight ! :rolleyes: mitigation is disabling GPS to get some form of NAV in case of GPS jamming or spoofing..
But the main issue in lost of Time , as most modern a/c use GPS clock to update their avionics. On the 787 for instance you will loose almost everything . Another issue is spoofing is in ADS-B controlled airspace. Risk of collisions there.
​​​​​​​NDBs are well on the way out and I wonder how much longer VOR will be kept on
VOR/DME and DME/DME are the main mitigation for loss of GPS in continental airspace, Now with the current world instability nobody is going to remove all of them . the plans were there but are now shelved. . Reducing the number , yes, eliminating them , no, not anymore, not in Europe at least. .

[Magplug]

GPS works on really weak signals from satellites. If you are able transmit a stronger signal at the same freqency, then you might just be able to seduce the receiver into using that signal to calculate an erroneous position. Bear in mind however, that GPS equipment does not simply receive one signal, but multiple signals from all the satellites that currently above the earth horizon. The algorithm that sorts out these signals is capable of voting out the data from any satellite that does not conform to it's known disposition of satellites. There is also the fundamental problem of the aircraft being closer to the satellite than any ground-based jammer, so the relative power comes into play.

The upshot of all this is....... Whilst it is quite easy to jam a GPS receiver and even make it useless, causing it to indicate a particular spoofed position is almost impossible.

What is more worrying is the possibility of interference to GBAS systems. These have a ground-based transmitter that augments GPS signals to permit RNAV precision runway approaches. As the replacement for ILS, GBAS permits RNP APCH and RNP AR APCH with a performance as good as ILS Cat 1. In fact, complex approaches can be defined to guide the aircraft down valleys and avoid noise hotspots in a manner previously impossible with ILS. Clearly, interference with that system is highly undesirable so it employs suitably encrypted data.

[Abrahn]

GNSS Jamming and Spoofing, aka Galileo's Authentication Algorithm Part 3 (https://berthub.eu/articles/posts/galileos-authentication-algorithm-part-3/)

[BoeingDriver99]

causing it to indicate a particular spoofed position is almost impossible.

And yet here we are.

[ATC Watcher]

And yet here we are.
Yes, indeed , it is because Spoofing is military electronic warfare and it evolves all the time to avoid countermeasures. . cat an mouse situation . As I understood it you have 2 sorts of " spoofers transmitters " shoulder made ones , limited range, point to point target , no going to affect a civil aircraft unless it is very close. Mostly used against drones. The other is much bigger and powerful, , vehicle based ,which can spoof you , but as a collateral damage not intended target. . That is what we see today in Iraq and in Tel Aviv FIR .
There is also a powerful navy version we saw that one in the North of Norway, most probably a test by the Russian navy Lot of fishing ships found suddenly themselves 30 NM in the mountains. and the local airline had to cancel many flights.
For ATC using ADS-B it can be a nightmare.
If you google GPS Spoofing on Images , you will see some photos of the equipment used.