Chinook ZD576 - The Concealed Evidence

[Chugalug2]

David Hill has now published this final book in his Mull of Kintyre trilogy. As usual it is in both Kindle format for £2.99, and in a paper book version at £6.99 plus P&P (hint, add Citadel of Waste at the same time for free delivery!). It contains the evidence that was submitted to Lord Philip's Mull of Kintyre Review but had been withheld by the RAF/MOD, even from its own BoI. That evidence led to the announcement from SoS for Defence Liam Fox setting aside the infamous Reviewing Officers' Finding of Gross Pilot Negligence and raised the question, then why was ZD576 lost with all 29 occupants? The RAF/MOD has still to answer that question and the cover up continues...

CHINOOK ZD576 - The Concealed Evidence eBook : Hill, David: Amazon.co.uk: Kindle Store

CHINOOK ZD576 - The Concealed Evidence: Amazon.co.uk: Hill, David: 9798877235960: Books

Edited to add that David wishes to emphasise that by its very nature this is more a reference book rather than simply telling a story. I suspect his readers will take it in their customary stride!

[dervish]

Thanks chug. I'd noticed a two part film scheduled on BBC N. Ireland and looks like the first part is this Monday at 2240. Presumably for the upcoming 30th anniversary. I can pick it up here on a good day but it'll be on iplayer. Part 1 is "Catastrophic Loss" and part 2 "Dead Men Don't Talk".

[Chugalug2]

This year will mark the 30th anniversary of the terrible tragedy that occurred on the slopes of the Mull of Kintyre on 2nd June 1994. Little wonder then that a renewed focus on this, the worst of all the airworthiness related fatal accident threads featured on this forum (Nimrod, Hercules, Sea Kings, Tornado, Hawks) is now becoming apparent. The BBC NI is airing a two part programme, "Chinook Zulu Delta 576" next Monday and the week following. It starts at 1040pm for 1 hour. If you can't tune in to BBC NI then it will be on iPlayer too.

BBC One - Chinook: Zulu Delta 576, Series 1, Catastrophic Loss (https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/m001vxy6)

PS Thanks Dervish, we crossed, but all the better to highlight the importance of the occasion. I for one will be setting the PVR to record both programmes.

[PICKS135]

Channel 966 on the Sky box for those who have it

[SLXOwft]

Channel 863 (outside NI) on Virgin - I have set a series link to record on my TiVo box

[spekesoftly]

Channel 966 on Freesat

[DogTailRed2]

What I don't understand with these government style cover ups is why bother. Just admit where you went wrong and then 30-40 years later no one will be talking about it.
Cover it up and have it fester far longer.

[Biggus]

If you "admit where you went wrong" you open yourself up to legal redress, sued for damages, etc. Reputations are also ruined, people do/should lose their jobs, pension, perks etc..

Far simpler for those at the top to deflect attention, blame someone else, invent a false narrative, do a bit of gas lighting - and I'm not just talking about the Chinook here (post office scandal just a recent example), it's widespread.

[Chugalug2]

Agreed Biggus. If you put your hand up to issuing an RTS into squadron service for a knowingly grossly unairworthy aircraft, ignoring a CA clearance permitting switch on use only (for static training), you'll end up doing time. Or should do! Hence the cover up that continues still.

[B Fraser]

See also BBC Scotland on Tuesday evening.

[pulse1]

David Hill has now published this final book in his Mull of Kintyre trilogy.

I do hope that there is another one to come (a quadrology?) in which David describes the events when the Reviewing Officers are publicly stripped of any honours they have received (cf. Paula Vennells).

[Rheinstorff]

I do hope that there is another one to come (a quadrology?) in which David describes the events when the Reviewing Officers are publicly stripped of any honours they have received (cf. Paula Vennells).

I've not read the book, so this might seem an inapt point, but if evidence was denied to the BOI as alleged, why would you assume the reviewing officers would have had it?

Paula Vennells was not stripped of her honour, she elected to return it. That seems justified as it was awarded for he time as CE of the Post Office.

Would you have Sir John Day hand back awards unconnected with the Mull of Kintyre? If so, it'd set an interesting precedent.

[tucumseh]

I've not read the book, so this might seem an inapt point, but if evidence was denied to the BOI as alleged, why would you assume the reviewing officers would have had it?


If you haven't read any of the books its not inapt at all. It's a fair question.

I know you probably mean Wratten and Day, but CAS (Graydon) was also a reviewing officer. The biggest lie of them all was, in my opinion, his claim to Marshal of the RAF Sir John Grandy that they 'were some miles off course'. The letter was submitted to the Mull of Kintyre Review in evidence.

The Board obviously didn't have that 'evidence' as they foolishly assumed the aircraft was heading for a waypoint close to the light house, unaware of Graydon's first hand evidence. However, Graydon has chosen not to reveal what course they should have been on, so it's a fair assumption that the Board was right; and so was the waypoint evidence held in the nav computer, which aligned with the route planning map.

And of course AVM John Day had, he claimed, absolute knowledge of what was seen by the crew from the cockpit; an unimpressed Lord Philip saying 'Sir John Day’s approach places the onus of disproving negligence on the deceased, which is also wrong’.

He also claimed to the Lords that Beinn na Lice was an almost sheer cliff face extending over 600 feet higher at point of impact, and they headed straight for it. No doubt the Board, who actually visited the gentle slopes, were puzzled over that one.

It's easy to get confused, because 600 feet is also the minimum height the cloud base was above the aircraft, according to the statement by the only an eye-witness to the approach. Or at least the only statement published. The RO's position was the cloud base was 700 feet lower, but again they didn't reveal their source. As this statement destroys the RO's case, one can only wonder what the unpublished ones say.

A close second in the porky stakes is the claim by the Air Staff that at the time (2 June 1994) there was no such thing as a Release to Service. (The Master Airworthiness Reference). The Air Staff copy from 7 months before was given to the Review. Lord Philip was distinctly unimpressed with that one, and a Minister was eventually forced to issue an apology.

There's lots more!

[fdr]

If you haven't read any of the books its not inapt at all. It's a fair question.

I know you probably mean Wratten and Day, but CAS (Graydon) was also a reviewing officer. The biggest lie of them all was, in my opinion, his claim to Marshal of the RAF Sir John Grandy that they 'were some miles off course'. The letter was submitted to the Mull of Kintyre Review in evidence.

The Board obviously didn't have that 'evidence' as they foolishly assumed the aircraft was heading for a waypoint close to the light house, unaware of Graydon's first hand evidence. However, Graydon has chosen not to reveal what course they should have been on, so it's a fair assumption that the Board was right; and so was the waypoint evidence held in the nav computer, which aligned with the route planning map.

And of course AVM John Day had, he claimed, absolute knowledge of what was seen by the crew from the cockpit; an unimpressed Lord Philip saying 'Sir John Day’s approach places the onus of disproving negligence on the deceased, which is also wrong’.

He also claimed to the Lords that Beinn na Lice was an almost sheer cliff face extending over 600 feet higher at point of impact, and they headed straight for it. No doubt the Board, who actually visited the gentle slopes, were puzzled over that one.

It's easy to get confused, because 600 feet is also the minimum height the cloud base was above the aircraft, according to the statement by the only an eye-witness to the approach. Or at least the only statement published. The RO's position was the cloud base was 700 feet lower, but again they didn't reveal their source. As this statement destroys the RO's case, one can only wonder what the unpublished ones say.

A close second in the porky stakes is the claim by the Air Staff that at the time (2 June 1994) there was no such thing as a Release to Service. (The Master Airworthiness Reference). The Air Staff copy from 7 months before was given to the Review. Lord Philip was distinctly unimpressed with that one, and a Minister was eventually forced to issue an apology.

There's lots more!

Tecumseh, you have more than a passing interest and knowledge in CAE 5000 etc,, and the previous basis of certification related to MTC and to continued airworthiness, are you able to expand on the "There's lots more"?

Nothing in the handling of the Chinook accident sat well, and the concerns related to the acceptance for use of the DEECs smacks of expediency and has a possibility to have been a factor in the event. The greatest concern is that a defence service which has arguably a tradition of competency fails to remove the stigma of less than independent competent investigation into its own disasters. This is unfortunately a situation that exists in many services but does not sit well with the relabelling of the regulation of defence aviation to include the term "Safety". Where command has oversight of the mishaps, there is an unacceptably high risk of expediency that has potential to continue risks needlessly.

[Rheinstorff]

If you haven't read any of the books its not inapt at all. It's a fair question.

I know you probably mean Wratten and Day, but CAS (Graydon) was also a reviewing officer. The biggest lie of them all was, in my opinion, his claim to Marshal of the RAF Sir John Grandy that they 'were some miles off course'. The letter was submitted to the Mull of Kintyre Review in evidence.

The Board obviously didn't have that 'evidence' as they foolishly assumed the aircraft was heading for a waypoint close to the light house, unaware of Graydon's first hand evidence. However, Graydon has chosen not to reveal what course they should have been on, so it's a fair assumption that the Board was right; and so was the waypoint evidence held in the nav computer, which aligned with the route planning map.

And of course AVM John Day had, he claimed, absolute knowledge of what was seen by the crew from the cockpit; an unimpressed Lord Philip saying 'Sir John Day’s approach places the onus of disproving negligence on the deceased, which is also wrong’.

He also claimed to the Lords that Beinn na Lice was an almost sheer cliff face extending over 600 feet higher at point of impact, and they headed straight for it. No doubt the Board, who actually visited the gentle slopes, were puzzled over that one.

It's easy to get confused, because 600 feet is also the minimum height the cloud base was above the aircraft, according to the statement by the only an eye-witness to the approach. Or at least the only statement published. The RO's position was the cloud base was 700 feet lower, but again they didn't reveal their source. As this statement destroys the RO's case, one can only wonder what the unpublished ones say.

A close second in the porky stakes is the claim by the Air Staff that at the time (2 June 1994) there was no such thing as a Release to Service. (The Master Airworthiness Reference). The Air Staff copy from 7 months before was given to the Review. Lord Philip was distinctly unimpressed with that one, and a Minister was eventually forced to issue an apology.

There's lots more!

Fascinating and thanks for filling in some blanks.

Cock-up or conspiracy?

The latter seems to be suggested but, as is so often the case, the former might be more likely. I know many people gravitate towards the idea of conspiracy, but is there actual evidence of this that would stand up in court were someone to be prosecuted for something like perjury? Your use of porky implies it was a lie, but was it a deliberate falsehood?

[Chugalug2]

Fascinating and thanks for filling in some blanks.

Cock-up or conspiracy?

The latter seems to be suggested but, as is so often the case, the former might be more likely. I know many people gravitate towards the idea of conspiracy, but is there actual evidence of this that would stand up in court were someone to be prosecuted for something like perjury? Your use of porky implies it was a lie, but was it a deliberate falsehood?
The big conspiracy here was to grant an RTS to a knowingly grossly unairworthy aircraft. Too many people knew it was unairworthy and why, except the aircrew who were told nothing but suspected it nonetheless. As tuc suggests, read the book. There is too much to lay it all out here.

[Rheinstorff]

The big conspiracy here was to grant an RTS to a knowingly grossly unairworthy aircraft. Too many people knew it was unairworthy and why, except the aircrew who were told nothing but suspected it nonetheless. As tuc suggests, read the book. There is too much to lay it all out here.

But here I am and so is this subject, so forgive me if I try to elicit some information on it. I wasn't asking for all the information, just some views it and of course no-one is obliged to answer. I don't think that's unreasonable.

[tucumseh]

Tecumseh, you have more than a passing interest and knowledge in CAE 5000 etc,, and the previous basis of certification related to MTC and to continued airworthiness, are you able to expand on the "There's lots more"?

Nothing in the handling of the Chinook accident sat well, and the concerns related to the acceptance for use of the DEECs smacks of expediency and has a possibility to have been a factor in the event. The greatest concern is that a defence service which has arguably a tradition of competency fails to remove the stigma of less than independent competent investigation into its own disasters. This is unfortunately a situation that exists in many services but does not sit well with the relabelling of the regulation of defence aviation to include the term "Safety". Where command has oversight of the mishaps, there is an unacceptably high risk of expediency that has potential to continue risks needlessly.

I've done attaining and maintaining airworthiness a lot more recently than continuing! I've always felt your career should work backwards through this sequence, but that's no longer MoD policy, and it shows. In my day, many moons ago, you were examined in both MoD and CAA procedures before being allowed to do continuing; then the others were formal appointments whereby you were (uniquely) named in the contracts. So never believe MoD when it says responsible individuals can't be identified.

When I say there are lots more examples, I'm also referring to the book 'Citadel of Waste' and (I haven't counted them, but probably over 40) case studies, across air, land and sea domains, over a period of 35 years.

Many of these examples of waste led directly to fatal accidents; and in the ZD576 case this can be seen in a Director Flight Safety report of August 1992 in which he complains of that year's 25% cut in direct airworthiness funding (the second of three successive cuts). What he didn't know was it was done to compensate for quite deliberate waste, and the book explains why, by whom, and quotes from the warnings they were given as to the effect their fraud would have on air safety. If you're warned of that, by specialist staff, auditors, and other senior officers and officials, and continue, then that is deliberate. If more than one person is involved, and the act serves to conceal an offence, then (to address Rheinstorff's question) that is a conspiracy.

Might I suggest, for the price of a cup of coffee, you get the Kindle version and then ask anything you like. I'm happy to explain.



Rheinstorff. Cock-up or conspiracy. What more do you need than Lord Philip confirming that it was mandated upon the Air Staff that the Chinook HC Mk2 was not to be relied upon in any way, and he was prohibited from signing an RTS; but he did? MoD has been invited many times by various parts of the media to debate this openly, but has always refused.

The book(s) list those who knew, by name. Not one said anything, or came forward during the Mull of Kintyre Review. There's even written evidence the Senior Reviewing Officer knew this before he wrote his remarks. A letter was written shortly after the accident demanding that the work to declare the Mk2 airworthy be hastened. (Not much Boscombe can do when all they have is an unrepresentative prototype). While the House of Lords did well overall, their act of allowing this to be concealed extended the campaign for 10 years. That's an awful lot of people involved, just in that one example.

[Rheinstorff]

I've done attaining and maintaining airworthiness a lot more recently than continuing! I've always felt your career should work backwards through this sequence, but that's no longer MoD policy, and it shows. In my day, many moons ago, you were examined in both MoD and CAA procedures before being allowed to do continuing; then the others were formal appointments whereby you were (uniquely) named in the contracts. So never believe MoD when it says responsible individuals can't be identified.

When I say there are lots more examples, I'm also referring to the book 'Citadel of Waste' and (I haven't counted them, but probably over 40) case studies, across air, land and sea domains, over a period of 35 years.

Many of these examples of waste led directly to fatal accidents; and in the ZD576 case this can be seen in a Director Flight Safety report of August 1992 in which he complains of that year's 25% cut in direct airworthiness funding (the second of three successive cuts). What he didn't know was it was done to compensate for quite deliberate waste, and the book explains why, by whom, and quotes from the warnings they were given as to the effect their fraud would have on air safety. If you're warned of that, by specialist staff, auditors, and other senior officers and officials, and continue, then that is deliberate. If more than one person is involved, and the act serves to conceal an offence, then (to address Rheinstorff's question) that is a conspiracy.

Might I suggest, for the price of a cup of coffee, you get the Kindle version and then ask anything you like. I'm happy to explain.



Rheinstorff. Cock-up or conspiracy. What more do you need than Lord Philip confirming that it was mandated upon the Air Staff that the Chinook HC Mk2 was not to be relied upon in any way, and he was prohibited from signing an RTS; but he did? MoD has been invited many times by various parts of the media to debate this openly, but has always refused.

The book(s) list those who knew, by name. Not one said anything, or came forward during the Mull of Kintyre Review. There's even written evidence the Senior Reviewing Officer knew this before he wrote his remarks. A letter was written shortly after the accident demanding that the work to declare the Mk2 airworthy be hastened. (Not much Boscombe can do when all they have is an unrepresentative prototype). While the House of Lords did well overall, their act of allowing this to be concealed extended the campaign for 10 years. That's an awful lot of people involved, just in that one example.

Very helpful response, thank you.

[Lordflasheart]

Rheino ...

But here I am and so is this subject, so forgive me if I try to elicit some information on it. I wasn't asking for all the information, just some views it and of course no-one is obliged to answer. I don't think that's unreasonable.

'It' is now seven books long ... covering thirty years of 'undetected crime' mostly via bad head-office decisions, followed by conspiracy, lies and self-serving, blame-shuffling cover-ups that has so far killed over a hundred service folk unnecessarily. Not on the scale of several dear leaders elsewhere, I admit, but with no apology, no visible change of practice and no come-uppance.

Much of it is still going on today and there is still little but prayer to prevent further similar accidents and further MoD-inflicted unnecessary loss of life.

Back to Mr Hill's new book - 'The Concealed Evidence' - referring to Appendix 5 dealing with AMSO (later to become AML) and AP830 - Leaflet DM87.

In 1987 the 'cold war' had a couple of years to run and the invasion of Kuwait was not far off. AMSO and DM87 were so damaging to UK military posture over so many years, that under other regimes, this would have been treated as sabotage and treason and the perpetrators punished accordingly.

Just an obliging view... - ... LFH
...

[dervish]

Rheino ...

Back to Mr Hill's new book - 'The Concealed Evidence' - referring to Appendix 5 dealing with AMSO (later to become AML) and AP830 - Leaflet DM87.

In 1987 the 'cold war' had a couple of years to run and the invasion of Kuwait was not far off. AMSO and DM87 were so damaging to UK military posture over so many years, that under other regimes, this would have been treated as sabotage and treason and the perpetrators punished accordingly.
...

If I'm not mistaken, AMSO himself from 1987 used to post here on the Mull of Kintyre thread for many years, saying the pilots were guilty as charged. He would never explain why, just throwing random accusations around, and IIRC never answered any questions from other posters. The book is astonishing and probably made Lord Philips job pretty easy.

[BEagle]

He was AMSO from 1985-1987 and used to post as 'John Purdey'.

He died on 25th December 2022.

[ShyTorque]

Was I rude to him? Was he the one saying the pilots were already grossly negligent because they didn’t take breakfast in the Officers’ Mess? I can’t remember.

I hope so. During my time there I seldom was in a position to eat there at the normal mealtimes, same as many other crews. That’s why the crew room had rations delivered every day.

[dervish]

Watched both episodes. Excellent. Quite a lot about the effect on the families, which is the way the BBC advertised it. But let rip at MoD and especially the labour government in part 2. The Air Marshal interviewed by Paxman came across as a slimy toad in the snippet they showed. The test pilot Mr Burke was brilliant.

[MrBernoulli]

Whilst I realise the two episodes of 'Chinook: Zulu Delta 576' are now available to view via BBC iPlayer, I don't understand why these episodes were only screened by the BBC in Northern Ireland. Does anyone here know why the BBC felt the rest of the license-paying public should be excluded from being able to view this on mainstream BBC channels?

[pulse1]

An excellent programme and I agree that Mr Burke was superb. But why was this programme almost hidden away by being only shown in Scotland and Northern Ireland? Even there it was put on late at night. I only knew it was on because of this thread. On the other hand, Radio Times was plastered with pictures and articles about Masters of the Air which seemed to be only available on Apple TV.

Oops! I'm glad I'm not the only one asking this question.

[tucumseh]

Whilst I realise the two episodes of 'Chinook: Zulu Delta 576' are now available to view via BBC iPlayer, I don't understand why these episodes were only screened by the BBC in Northern Ireland. Does anyone here know why the BBC felt the rest of the license-paying public should be excluded from being able to view this on mainstream BBC channels?

The production company, Fine Point Films, is based in Belfast. They make numerous excellent documentaries aimed at, mainly, Northern Ireland, and flog them to the BBC.

This was the umpteenth attempt to get a decent, truthful documentary out, and each time canned by London. FPF first tried in 2016, others before them. The crash happened in Scotland, and killed a lot of Irishmen and military. So, no interest in London. Perhaps to get through the BBC censors, the producers decided this time to concentrate on the effect on the families. But the final part of Part 1, with Rob Burke, sets up Part 2 nicely and MoD get both barrels through the simple device of telling the truth.

The families were amazing. Chris Cook, the pilot's brother. Former RAF pilot Niven Phoenix and his mum Susan. Ann Magee. Stephen Foster.

David Walmsley of the Toronto Globe & Star got all the right points across. The weather was good. A long history of Undemanded Flight Control Movements. The RAF were prohibited from flying the aircraft. Wratten and Day said there could only be 'speculation' as to cause, but that speculation met the test of absolutely no doubt whatsoever.

Be warned. My telly only just survived the extract of Wratten sneering at Paxman.

[MrBernoulli]

Tuc, thanks very much for your thorough response. You confirmed my suspicions of a 'nobody cares about this' attitude from the BBC, a truly biased and warped organisation, if ever I saw one.

Be warned. My telly only just survived the extract of Wratten sneering at Paxman.
I saw Wratten at work, in Bahrain, in a pre-sortie briefing during the 1991 Gulf War. He was a good example of a highly dislikeable, self-interested, pompous ass. To find out much later, after this tragic Mull of Kintyre event, that he also had a metaphorically close interest in visual examination of his lower colon, came as no surprise. 🙄

[Union Jack]

Tuc, thanks very much for your thorough response. You confirmed my suspicions of a 'nobody cares about this' attitude from the BBC, a truly biased and warped organisation, if ever I saw one.


I saw Wratten at work, in Bahrain, in a pre-sortie briefing during the 1991 Gulf War. He was a good example of a highly dislikeable, self-interested, pompous ass. To find out much later, after this tragic Mull of Kintyre event, that he also had a metaphorically close interest in visual examination of his lower colon, came as no surprise. 🙄
He was certainly incredibly fortunate to be advanced from KBE to GBE in the circumstances.

Jack

[Thud_and_Blunder]

Just taught myself iPlayer (yes, really - I never watch the telly these days...) to view the 2-parter. They used the 2 hours very well to get the important points across - fortunately everyone involved is articulate. I'm particularly impressed by the way the Belfast Telegraph/ Toronto Globe and Mail reporter realised his error then set out to correct it - an example many of the people featured over and over again in Mr Hill's books could learn from.

I'm pretty sure I've written in the original thread about my afternoon with Wratten in Bosnia (where he arrived resplendent in his flying suit with 56 Sqn scarf - in the colours of the Bosnian flag, ISTR). As a QHI on task, when first encountering an individual you only ask questions to which you already know the answer. I'd checked with the Sqn and spoken to the previous Chinook mate who'd flown him in the front seat - so I wasn't in the least surprised when his answer to my question about any previous Chinook flying experience was an emphatic "no". I agree with Tuc - Wrotten positively oozed out of the screen during his interview.

[SLXOwft]

I recently watched part of the 2016 series The Somme 1916:Both Sides of the Wire. One of the themes Peter Barton extracted from reading the evidence was Germans were expected to identify and report on their failings so lessons could be learnt, the British tried cover up theirs. Plus ça change.

[farefield]

"Wrotten positively oozed out of the screen during his interview."

Was he not called Barsteward Bill on a certain fighter station in Scotland?

[Flipster130]

Programs were very good and stirred the heart strings! Although, I would have liked to have it had more-openly discussed exactly what 'new evidence' (previously undisclosed by MoD) eventually swayed Lord Philip and the panel. I would imagine that the whole CHART report detailing so many airworthiness issues was key and the previously well-hidden BD signal about the ac automatics not doing what was required after a long while in a S&L transit (i.e. turning right instead of left) would have been right up there.

Interestingly, I had not previously heard the lighthouse keeper quite so clearly describing that the ac 'turned inland'.... for me, that says "UFCM" and tallies with Rob B and Tony C's reading of the odd rudder and flight control positions on impact - but guess we'll never know exactly.

But ultimately, Day and Wrotten were never, ever justified in making their adjudication of gross negligence - I think that is now an accepted fact by anyone with a modicum of nous. The legal advice was equally poor - any barrack room lawyer could have seen that 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever' was an impossible burden of proof (it was meant to be) and D&W could not meet it.

However, if we are to be fair (a concept denied to Jon, Rick and their families for far too long), then whilst D &W come across as 'oily' in the extreme, they too, are only human and prone to errors. Whilst they seem reluctant to admit that, they must have had some reason for abandoning any grasp of logic and understanding - no-one could be that stupid without some exceptional 'motivation' to find against those could not answer back. I doubt it was money that was motivating them, or a sense of wider duty (both far too self-centred for that), so it was likely to be external and/or peer pressure - warning of possible loss of face/kudos if they didn't be good little boys and toe the party line. Wonder who it was who applied the pressure ? I doubt it was the PM or senior MoD politicians because they came out in favour of clearing the pilots eventually. Rifkind especially seemed aggrieved that he'd been played for a fool by senior officers. So, who got the ear-worms into D&W - was it CAS? or ACAS? Or Controller Aircraft and his side-kicks DGA2/1, or some faceless civil servant from the MoD/Foreign Office/T&I possibly driven by business execs from across the pond? Perhaps D&W will be fall-guys yet - unless they come clean before they go (doubtful)? There is a good book in there somewhere for conspiracy theorists.....

[falcon900]

Programs were very good and stirred the heart strings! Although, I would have liked to have it had more-openly discussed exactly what 'new evidence' (previously undisclosed by MoD) eventually swayed Lord Philip and the panel. I would imagine that the whole CHART report detailing so many airworthiness issues was key and the previously well-hidden BD signal about the ac automatics not doing what was required after a long while in a S&L transit (i.e. turning right instead of left) would have been right up there.

Interestingly, I had not previously heard the lighthouse keeper quite so clearly describing that the ac 'turned inland'.... for me, that says "UFCM" and tallies with Rob B and Tony C's reading of the odd rudder and flight control positions on impact - but guess we'll never know exactly.

But ultimately, Day and Wrotten were never, ever justified in making their adjudication of gross negligence - I think that is now an accepted fact by anyone with a modicum of nous. The legal advice was equally poor - any barrack room lawyer could have seen that 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever' was an impossible burden of proof (it was meant to be) and D&W could not meet it.

However, if we are to be fair (a concept denied to Jon, Rick and their families for far too long), then whilst D &W come across as 'oily' in the extreme, they too, are only human and prone to errors. Whilst they seem reluctant to admit that, they must have had some reason for abandoning any grasp of logic and understanding - no-one could be that stupid without some exceptional 'motivation' to find against those could not answer back. I doubt it was money that was motivating them, or a sense of wider duty (both far too self-centred for that), so it was likely to be external and/or peer pressure - warning of possible loss of face/kudos if they didn't be good little boys and toe the party line. Wonder who it was who applied the pressure ? I doubt it was the PM or senior MoD politicians because they came out in favour of clearing the pilots eventually. Rifkind especially seemed aggrieved that he'd been played for a fool by senior officers. So, who got the ear-worms into D&W - was it CAS? or ACAS? Or Controller Aircraft and his side-kicks DGA2/1, or some faceless civil servant from the MoD/Foreign Office/T&I possibly driven by business execs from across the pond? Perhaps D&W will be fall-guys yet - unless they come clean before they go (doubtful)? There is a good book in there somewhere for conspiracy theorists.....
The motive is something which has troubled me too. Why did they need to invest so much capital is such an egregious cover up. An interesting snippet from the programme was Richard Cooks brother saying that when they were travelling to hear the findings ahead of their publication, his father had suggested that they should perhaps prepare themselves for the possibility that the pilots had made a mistake. Had the cover up confined itself to “simple” pilot error, the relatives might have, reluctantly accepted the finding. Gross negligence was so absurd, they knew it wasn’t right.
The programme didn’t really address the RTS issue and the motivations for that being signed either. The behaviours at the slightly more junior level don’t stand much scrutiny either.

[Timelord]

I think the answer to motive is in Wratten’s character. I don’t know if it’s in the documentary but I remember the Paxman interview. Paxman pointed out the “no doubt whatsoever” requirement and Wratten replied,” Well, I am in no doubt whatsoever” . And to him, that was that.

I too was accused of gross negligence under his regime, but I was alive to fight it and “clear my name”

[SLXOwft]

I have wondered if fear that any adverse technical findings would prevent government approval of the order for HC.3 which presumably was already in 1 Group's and Strike Command's plans, played a role. However, if so, I do wonder why they have never admitted their mistake - watched too much John Wayne? (Never apologize, it's a sign of weakness.)

[wiggy]

I think the answer to motive is in Wratten’s character.

Yep, very much agree with that observation. I don't think much if any pressure would have needed to have been applied from above to produce a finding of Gross negligence.

[falcon900]

Yep, very much agree with that observation. I don't think much if any pressure would have needed to have been applied from above to produce a finding of Gross negligence.
Possibly so, but why was Pilot error not sufficient for their purpose? Why did it have to be gross negligence?

[Timelord]

“Pilot Error” was not one of the choices available. If it’s judged to be their fault the possible “verdicts”;were:
1. Error of judgement
2. Negligence to a minor degree
3. Negligence to a gross degree.

The relevant document had definitions of each but I can’t remember them . I believe there is a record somewhere of Wratten directing, prior to this event, that if an aircraft crashed it was because someone had been negligent, or words to that effect.

[Chugalug2]

Flipster130 :-
...whilst D &W come across as 'oily' in the extreme, they too, are only human and prone to errors. Whilst they seem reluctant to admit that, they must have had some reason for abandoning any grasp of logic and understanding - no-one could be that stupid without some exceptional 'motivation' to find against those could not answer back. I doubt it was money that was motivating them, or a sense of wider duty (both far too self-centred for that), so it was likely to be external and/or peer pressure - warning of possible loss of face/kudos if they didn't be good little boys and toe the party line. Wonder who it was who applied the pressure ?
I think that flipster has it about right. The aircraft captain was also the detachment commander and had pleaded that the task be allotted to the Mk1 Chinook. He (and others) clearly had great misgivings about the Mk2. It was one thing to risk their own lives in the Mk2 on operational tasks but this was completely different, a glorified jolly to Fort George for the cream of our security personnel to network and play a game or two of golf. The order stood to fly them in this troubled aircraft. Who confirmed it? Group, Command, higher? The ROs 'finding' was so over the top that it rather smacks of impressing their seniors rather than expressing their own thoughts. Why take such a reckless risk when the RAF High Command knew just how compromised the Mk2 was? Wanting to impress the Army in particular that the upgrade was in squadron service and available to them? We've had enough conspiracy theories in the original accident thread but at least now we know how grossly unairworthy the aircraft was and how the RAF/MoD has striven from the get-go to enforce a cover up.

Episode 1 was superb to my mind. The testimony of the families was humbling. Having lost husbands, fathers, sons, brothers, and then been blatantly lied to, they still demand to know why their loved ones died and are prepared to be interviewed and filmed 30 years after the tragedy to keep it in the public eye. BBC Central clearly thinks differently and confined it to their NI and Scotland regions for local consumption. Wishing to satisfy others? Certainly they would be in good company; Assistant Chief Constables, HM Coroners, HSE, Select Committees, QCs, all have avoided crossing lines in the sand and done their 'duty'.

Airworthiness, or rather the lack of it, is an arcane subject that has had to be sold hard to aviation professionals, never mind the poor bloody licence payer. So perhaps little mention of it here is hardly surprising. I've yet to view Part 2 but from others' comments it seems for 'Series 1' that's it. Let us hope that a Series 2 will follow and that the entire series be broadcast nationally. In the meantime, all the more reason to read David Hill's three Mull books to better understand the depths of this evil conspiracy. It is no less!

[tucumseh]

I believe there is a record somewhere of Wratten directing, prior to this event, that if an aircraft crashed it was because someone had been negligent, or words to that effect.

The letter was written on 16 February 1995, after the crash but very importantly before the gross negligence decision was made by Day on 20 March 1995.

It is clear from the sequence of events, and the wording of Day's remarks, that Station Commander Odiham (Gp Capt Crawford) amended his remarks after he was criticised in Day's remarks for not finding blame. As published, Crawford's remarks make no sense at all, and as one senior officer said 'the join is very clear'.

CAS, Graydon, was even more critical of the BOI president for not apportioning negligence, calling his investigation 'barely adequate'.

A key player is Malcolm Rifkind. Campaigners were largely ignored and left alone by MoD, but correspondence with Rifkind made them twitch violently, and led to 'visits' and serious pressure to desist. I speak from personal experience, a deputation of four accosting me at a private event and warning me not to speak to Rifkind again. (Which I ignored). He's said it was Day and Graydon who misled him (lied by omission), failing to tell him that it was mandated upon the RAF that the Mk2 must not be flown in service. They also omitted that Textron were being sued over the engine software, and that the Senior Reviewing Officers had disagreed with the Board, and with each other. Whatever you think of politicians in general, Rifkind made a lot of enemies with this breach of parliamentary protocol. As did John Major and Jeremy Hanley. That a former Secy of State and prime minister can come out and publicly say the findings were wrong, and nothing be done, is a clue someone or something else is being protected. MoD later gave a clue, admitting UK/US relations were paramount.

[Abbey Road]

Whatever you think of politicians in general, Rifkind made a lot of enemies with this breach of parliamentary protocol. As did John Major and Jeremy Hanley. That a former Secy of State and prime minister can come out and publicly say the findings were wrong, and nothing be done, is a clue someone or something else is being protected. MoD later gave a clue, admitting UK/US relations were paramount.

Several of the postings on this thread ask about what it is we don't yet know, about motivation for the utterly unjust and farcical position put forward by Day and Wratten. It is so 'off the planet' that I have never discounted involvement by the manufacturer of the Chinook, Boeing (and perhaps the engine manufacturer?), likely assisted by parts of the US government. It wouldn't be good for the US aviation manufacturing reputation to be sullied by the abysmal performance of the Chinook HC2 uncovered, and documented, by Boscombe Down testing, would it? 🙄

tucumseh's last sentence, in the quote above, makes me think I was thinking along the correct lines!

Did Day and Wratten's coveting of Honours influence their willingness to pervert the course of justice, following 'orders' from elsewhere, even though so many could clearly see they had exceeded their remit? I am not excusing Day and Wratten's behaviour with this theory, because they are both self-serving 🔔🔚's, I am merely musing about some of the motivations.

[tucumseh]

Did Day and Wratten's coveting of Honours influence their willingness to pervert the course of justice, following 'orders' from elsewhere, even though so many could clearly see they had exceeded their remit? I am not excusing Day and Wratten's behaviour with this theory, because they are both self-seeking 🔔🔚's, I am merely musing about some of the motivations.

Thank you AR.

As Flipster mentioned above, a key event in the campaign was the uncovering of the complete Chinook Airworthiness Review Team report in early 2011, issued by the Director of Flight Safety (RAF) to the RAF Chief Engineer (Alcock) and Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Bagnall) on the latter's first day in post in 1992. Importantly, the author came forward, one of the RAF's most qualified engineers, and Lord Philip asked to see him personally.

CHART is dissected elsewhere, but a telling effect is seldom commented on. Hitherto, the only very senior officers we heard of were Wratten and Day.

Day didn't say much after the Lords confirmed his approach, that it was for the deceased pilots to clear themselves. (A not dissimilar approach to that taken post Sea King ASaC mid-air in 2003, when MoD rejected the evidence of technical problems with 'the (deceased) pilots didn't report any failures after the flight' - therefore there weren't any). He retired and Tony Blair waved the rules and allowed him to take up a senior position in industry.

Wratten of course continued to speak out at every opportunity, always ignoring the known facts.

But when CHART was revealed, we heard not a word from either. Suddenly, ACMs Alcock and Graydon were pushed forward. Apparently they were now the God-given experts, yet had never been mentioned in any inquiry or hearing.

I cannot speak for Day or Wratten, but I am prepared to admit the possibility, even probability, that the detail of CHART came as an almighty shock to both, as it fully backed (a) MoD's airworthiness specialists, (b) Boscombe Down and (c) the likes of Air Cdre John Blakeley, who had written a superb paper in 2003, only to be denigrated by the VSOs and MoD. It also provided supporting evidence that Sqn Ldr Rob Burke, the Odiham Unit Test Pilot, was correct about UFCMs, when MoD and Ministers had persisted with very personal attacks, calling him a liar. All the while, sitting on CHART knowing here was independent evidence he was 100% right.

Alcock and Graydon. The new Wratten and Day. What was the common denominator between them? CHART, and its subject matter.

Wratten later admitted he was aware the Mk2 wasn't airworthy. A post-crash letter to Bagnall demanding it be formally declared airworthy is a bit of a giveaway; although he later claimed a temporary predecessor, Johns, wrote it. Another one with a vested interest who dissembled.

I just don't think Wratten realised the scale of its immaturity. If Alcock and Bagnall could conceal CHART for all those years, and take no action on DFS's recommendations, it's easy to see how Wratten and Day wouldn't know the detail. Certainly Controller Aircraft, Sir Donald Spiers, didn't, and put this in writing during the Review; despite the RAF claiming it was HE who issued the authority to fly the Mk2, not Bagnall. When someone does the dirty on you like that, to protect the Air Staff , and you still support them, then you're deeply involved. There is something else you know about that all of you want to remain hidden.

When Dr Fox spoke in August 2011, clearing Rick and Jon, what did he lie about? CHART, saying it never mentioned the 'Mk2'. It did, 284 times. Hardly an easily overlooked footnote Liam. He was inundated with complaints and quite quickly retracted; but not publicly, only in letters to MPs. So Hansard still says CHART is all about Mk1. You only have to read to Terms of Reference.

And then of course there's the Chinook Project Director, who in February 1999 threatened senior MoD(PE) and Army staff 'I'll publish my book telling the truth about Mull of Kintyre'. I was there when he said it. Please do. He didn't know of CHART either.





.

[falcon900]

The fact that the Mk 2 was not yet airworthy would have been a commercial matter at that point rather than a US/UK relationship issue surely? I don’t see how the US Government were responsible for the faults at that point, and any attempt to lay blame for the crash at their door would have received short shrift. Similarly any attempt to blame Boeing etc would have led to the whole situation regarding the trials at Boscombe Down quickly becoming public.
The whole situation went pear shaped when the aircraft was released to service. What was the motivation for that? Showing off to the Army all seems a bit flimsy as a justification, and I doubt whether any of the SLF on the fateful flight knew or cared whether it was a MK2 or a MK1. Was there a big picture justification at all, or was it overzealous showing off to senior officers?
I am wondering whether cock up preceded the conspiracy.

[tucumseh]

The fact that the Mk 2 was not yet airworthy would have been a commercial matter at that point rather than a US/UK relationship issue surely? I don’t see how the US Government were responsible for the faults at that point, and any attempt to lay blame for the crash at their door would have received short shrift. Similarly any attempt to blame Boeing etc would have led to the whole situation regarding the trials at Boscombe Down quickly becoming public.
The whole situation went pear shaped when the aircraft was released to service. What was the motivation for that? Showing off to the Army all seems a bit flimsy as a justification, and I doubt whether any of the SLF on the fateful flight knew or cared whether it was a MK2 or a MK1. Was there a big picture justification at all, or was it overzealous showing off to senior officers?
I am wondering whether cock up preceded the conspiracy.


The biggest cock-up was the FADEC procurement strategy in the late 80s. Breached every known rule going. When the RAF's Training Development Team ('train the trainers') visited Boeing in 1992/3 seeking a briefing on FADEC, Boeing were sitting waiting to be briefed, because they were not in the contractual loop. That also breached every rule. The problem was perpetuated on Mk3 and Nimrod, the same procedural cock-ups encouraged (not just permitted) by the same 2-Star Director General.

But context is important, and the opening paragraph of CHART is revealing. The reason for the Review was a spate of airworthiness related Chinook Mk1 accidents, some fatal. None more so than ZA721 in the Falklands in 1987. The 721 AAIB report is utterly damning about Boeing, and CHART simply repeated the comments in 1992. A hole not even drilled for a split pin in an actuator? Seals fitted the wrong way round? Seals not fitted at all? And MoD claimed cause was unknown, while Boeing stayed silent. Bollix. It took the AAIB and Sqn Ldr Burke a morning to work it out. That's more Quality Control failures than the recent door falling off. Boeing were actively protected, and to 'go there' would reveal very plausible potential causes of ZD576. (There, a second hole was drilled for a pin, weakening the rod).

The company were deemed by DFS in 1992 not to be a suitable off-shore Design Authority. Everyone knew that anyway, so what waiver was issued allowing their appointment? Even setting that aside, the company should not have accepted the Mk2 contract, as there was no stable baseline. (Remember, FADEC was not part of the Mk2 contract, it was a Mk1 enhancement. Boeing's contract said the Mk1 would turn up for conversion with FADEC fitted. It didnt). And of course MoD should not have offered the contract. The MoD person who makes the DA appointment is named in the contract. As he sits at one of the two lowest technical levels in MoD(PE), then I'm confident he was directed for political reasons. Such political directives were common at the time, but more often 'benefitted' a defence minister's constituency.

When ACAS issued his illegal Release to Service in November 1993, Boscombe's aircraft was an unrepresentative 'prototype', not a Mk2. Why even start testing and trialling the new bits, when you have to start over again when a Mk2 arrives? But MoD wouldn't be able to get anywhere legally or commercally, because Boeing delivered what was (poorly) contracted.

The reasons for unairworthiness (FADEC primarily, but also the likes of MoD refusing to scheme 'essential' mods for the DASH after ZA721) were largely down to MoD. Relatively 'minor' things like Boeing selecting the wrong battery type, and its installation design being unsafe, would have been easily fixed had Boscombe been listened to. So too the fact the emergency radio didn't work in an emergency... Which was academic at the time, as no intercom was cleared to be in the aircraft. A bit of a bugger's muddle I'm afraid, and little wonder no inquiry went there.

I hope that context explains why the Mk2 not being airworthy was not a commercial matter. In that sense, MoD commercial tend only to be involved once a fault investigation becomes a defect investigation, as the technical issues are by definition settled. Attaining and maintaining airworthiness are areas they seldom get involved in.

[ShyTorque]

Possibly so, but why was Pilot error not sufficient for their purpose? Why did it have to be gross negligence?

Possibly if it were upheld because it might have helped to scrape egg off the faces of some who should have kept it on the peaks of their SD hats.

Pilots didn’t trust the Mk2. Additionally, this crew had very few hours on it and it was a very different aircraft to that on which they had a lot of experience. As is well known they asked to take a Mk1 instead but it seems that this high profile flight was seen by those in higher authority as a “flagship” mission to show management confidence. When it went wrong in the worst possible way, blame was deflected in the most egregious way possible. Disgracefully so.

[Just This Once...]

I hope that context explains why the Mk2 not being airworthy was not a commercial matter. In that sense, MoD commercial tend only to be involved once a fault investigation becomes a defect investigation, as the technical issues are by definition settled. Attaining and maintaining airworthiness are areas they seldom get involved in.

Yet it became a MoD Commercial 'crisis' as so few of the basics were set before individual aircraft hit the Mk2 programme. For example, the build standard of the aircraft going into the programme was not set, nor were they set for the final output. This was particularly critical for items or systems that the MoD expected to remain undisturbed or returned with the aircraft on completion.

It may sound like trivia to some but during the strip-down phase of the build anything that was not recognised or thought to be part of the Mk2 output was removed by Boeing personnel. By removed, I mean brutally, with looms being cut to save time rather than using the LRU connectors as one would normally expect. A clause in the contract had the MoD being responsible for such systems marked as GFE and the scale of the problem only became apparent when Boeing started to order new looms from the MoD to make good all the damage to the 'undisturbed' systems. Clearly MoD did not stock a vast amount of AAR-47 wiring harnesses, LRUs, lighting systems or whatever and the only place the MoD could go to was Boeing. The MoD logistics desk officers for the upgrade found themselves fishing for LRUs, looms, sensors, connectors etc out of various bins as Boeing could not source new replacements.

You would think Boeing would know how to look after simple parts, such as transparencies, rotor blades and alike, by not just stacking them on concrete floors in a big heap. Run out of trestles - no problem. Just carry on and order new parts from the MoD at the end when you find the originals trashed.

[tucumseh]

Yet it became a MoD Commercial 'crisis' as so few of the basics were set before individual aircraft hit the Mk2 programme. For example, the build standard of the aircraft going into the programme was not set, nor were they set for the final output. This was particularly critical for items or systems that the MoD expected to remain undisturbed or returned with the aircraft on completion.

It may sound like trivia to some but during the strip-down phase of the build anything that was not recognised or thought to be part of the Mk2 output was removed by Boeing personnel. By removed, I mean brutally, with looms being cut to save time rather than using the LRU connectors as one would normally expect. A clause in the contract had the MoD being responsible for such systems marked as GFE and the scale of the problem only became apparent when Boeing started to order new looms from the MoD to make good all the damage to the 'undisturbed' systems. Clearly MoD did not stock a vast amount of AAR-47 wiring harnesses, LRUs, lighting systems or whatever and the only place the MoD could go to was Boeing. The MoD logistics desk officers for the upgrade found themselves fishing for LRUs, looms, sensors, connectors etc out of various bins as Boeing could not source new replacements.

You would think Boeing would know how to look after simple parts, such as transparencies, rotor blades and alike, by not just stacking them on concrete floors in a big heap. Run out of trestles - no problem. Just carry on and order new parts from the MoD at the end when you find the originals trashed.


Quite right, and all of the above is mentioned and explained in the books.

It boils down to Induction Build Standard. That is for the Service to determine, and agree with the project office, and they Boeing. Commercial's input is to ensure it's typed correctly in the contract by the typing pool; and the Service sponsor checks it, usually delegating it to the Engineering Authority.

The basic problem, and it's always a problem, is the plethora of Service Engineered Mods and Special Trials Fits in the aircraft, especially those that have not been appraised by Boeing or approved by the project office; and so don't appear in the Safety Case. Especially STFs. The Mk1 had 39 STFs. It's easier to cut and paste an extract from The Inconvenient Truth:


The technical procedures are mandated in two Defence Standards. Briefly in 05-123, with the full version in 05-125/2, Specification PDS/8. This partial duplication is confusing to the untrained user. The essential problem is that 123 was written by staff who would seldom have to implement it; whereas 125/2 was written by experienced, current practitioners. That is, the Technical Agencies. One can always tell which was implemented.
However, and correctly, neither mentioned STFs. Therefore, they could have no contractual status and Aircraft Design Authorities (ADA) were permitted to ignore them. It is not uncommon for an ADA to refuse an MoD aircraft permission to land on its property with certain SEMs or STFs fitted (because they have never been proven safe). If they do allow them, and they interfere with their subsequent work, they are removed and discarded unless otherwise agreed in the contract. Often, when the Service later tries to refit them, the real estate is taken up. By definition, these contracts are drawn up by the Aircraft Project Office, whose involvement the STFs are intended to bypass in the first place. So, they often have no knowledge of them.


In other words, we agree!

Edited to add that the book under discussion, The Concealed Evidence, lists each STF and discusses its status (or otherwise) in the Mk2. It's usually 'otherwise!

[falcon900]

Tecumseh,
we may be at crossed purposes in relation to it being a commercial matter. I am not meaning to determine which part of MOD should have been dealing with the matter, rather suggesting that it was a contractual / financial matter for resolution between the parties, if necessary in court. Notwithstanding the myriad preceding issues which you touch on here, and catalogue so comprehensively in your books, one part of the process which seemed to have worked was Boscombe Down identifying that the aircraft was at that time unflyable, and notifying RAF to that effect.
Despite this, someone felt it appropriate to sign off the RTS, and it is their motivation I am interested in. Were they simply over zealous, or are there any fingerprints from above? One way or another, it seems to me that the consequences of it becoming known that the RAF had flown an aircraft in peacetime which they had been told in the strongest terms not to, with such a catastrophic outcome might well have seemed to some as justification for a cover up.

[tucumseh]

Tecumseh,
we may be at crossed purposes in relation to it being a commercial matter. I am not meaning to determine which part of MOD should have been dealing with the matter, rather suggesting that it was a contractual / financial matter for resolution between the parties, if necessary in court. Notwithstanding the myriad preceding issues which you touch on here, and catalogue so comprehensively in your books, one part of the process which seemed to have worked was Boscombe Down identifying that the aircraft was at that time unflyable, and notifying RAF to that effect.
Despite this, someone felt it appropriate to sign off the RTS, and it is their motivation I am interested in. Were they simply over zealous, or are there any fingerprints from above? One way or another, it seems to me that the consequences of it becoming known that the RAF had flown an aircraft in peacetime which they had been told in the strongest terms not to, with such a catastrophic outcome might well have seemed to some as justification for a cover up.


Thanks Falcon,

Commercial's involvement (they were called 'Contracts' then) would have been limited to escalating it to Director General Contracts, a 2-Star. I can't recall precisely who had the job in June 1994, but for a few years before, until at least November 1993, I knew him well, because he was VERY aware that MoD didn't have a leg to stand on in any claim about quality of product in Air Systems. I was asked to brief him more than once, and he quickly understood that AMSO(RAF)'s policy to run down airworthiness, make savings at the expense of safety, and chop direct airworthiness funding by ~28% per year for the 3 years before the accident, handed any legal case to Boeing, or any company, on a plate. That is why his staff were told not to get involved. There's a thread running on another book 'Citadel of Waste' that explains this in detail, relating how AMSO's own Contracts people turned against their Supplier 'colleagues' for the same reason.

It is well-known that MoD sued for damages caused by FADEC, but that contract was let before the policy changes. Nevertheless, it is a crucial event, because this was hidden from Rifkind.

The illegal RTS was issued under Air Vice Marshal Antony Bagnall's name, but there was no formal letter of promulgation. At least, MoD claims there wasn't. The first legal authority to fly the Mk2 was issued by his successor in January 1996; even then the Mk2 was still immature although certain problems had become better understood.

Bagnall's motivation? He actually covered his arse very cleverly, by seeking a Switch-On Only clearance, which means 'not to be relied upon in any way'. Given the mandate not to fly, that meant ground training and famliarisation only. This was due to be renewed on 10 June 1994, a week after the accident. That is, Bagnall had accepted BEFORE the accident that the aircraft would remain unairworthy from 10 June for an indeterminate time. He KNEW he was prohibited from flying it. Obviously, AOC-in-C and Group chose to interpret this RTS (it was a Boscombe progress report, reporting no progress) as an excuse to fly; but as I said, AOC also knew he wasn't permitted. MoD has always waltzed round this aspect of the case, saying AOC and Group had no input to the decision to enter service. But they did - either they chose to ignore an illegal RTS, or escalated it to CAS and were told to get on with it.

Would a 'mere' 2-Star take this decision himself, given 4-Stars were moaning and groaning, and the Army was applying pressure to get the Mk2? I think not. My belief, and it is only that, is he was told to push out the RTS, and obeyed but in a manner which kept his own nose clean in a strictly legal sense. Although not morally. That is not to excuse him. It is telling he has never spoken, whereas his superior, CAS, has serially lied for over 27 years. Misguided loyalty? Or is there something in the files that proves more?

Your final sentence nails it.

[falcon900]

Tecumseh,
I am sorry to be droning on about this particular point, but this is where it seems to me that this saga turns from being yet another biblically scandalous procurement debacle into something else. Ok, they screwed up procuring Mk2, so what? I have bought but not yet read Citadels of waste, but am all too familiar with the plot; so much so that I am deferring reading it all until I am in a suitable mental state!
I have no sense that any of the dramatis personae in relation to the crash had any personal culpability in relation to the procurement.
And yet Bagnall felt inclined to sign the RTS, attempting to cover his bases as he did so, and two even more senior officers chose to protect him when the proverbial hit the fan in the most dramatic fashion. Odd.
It would be too cynical to speculate about whether any of them went on to post service employment with any of the contractors involved, so I won’t.

[BEagle]

Large G&T thanks, falcon900! There is a code when it comes to talking about The Scottish Officer!

[tucumseh]

Tecumseh,
I am sorry to be droning on about this particular point, but this is where it seems to me that this saga turns from being yet another biblically scandalous procurement debacle into something else. Ok, they screwed up procuring Mk2, so what? I have bought but not yet read Citadels of waste, but am all too familiar with the plot; so much so that I am deferring reading it all until I am in a suitable mental state!
I have no sense that any of the dramatis personae in relation to the crash had any personal culpability in relation to the procurement.
And yet Bagnall felt inclined to sign the RTS, attempting to cover his bases as he did so, and two even more senior officers chose to protect him when the proverbial hit the fan in the most dramatic fashion. Odd.
It would be too cynical to speculate about whether any of them went on to post service employment with any of the contractors involved, so I won’t.


Falcon, I'll leave the book to speak for itself, although when discussing Chinook it concentrates on Mk3. What prompted it was a recent Defence Committee report that, much like any mention of 'procurement cock-ups' on pprune, conflated procurement and requirements setting. (Two ongoing threads are full of it). It complained of procurement failures, and its case studies were requirements failures.

To have personal culpability one must assess proximity to events. No, none of the VSOs were in the project office or Operational Requirements. But one of the officers who reviewed the findings and allegedly agreed with them was Controller Aircraft, Air Marshal Roger Austin. (Source - CAS, ACM Graydon). When discussing Controller Aircraft, MoD always talks of Sir Donald Spiers. He left in April 1994.

Others are Wratten and Day of course, but also Richard Johns and Peter Squire. Michael Graydon (CAS) wrote that they were 'off course by some miles'. Why would he say that to a Marshal of the RAF? Michael Alcock was Chief Engineer from 91-96, in the period airworthiness management was being run down. He became double-hatted as Air Member Logistics in April 1994. One of two recipients of CHART, he knew the Mk2 wasn't airworthy. What did he do about it? Oversaw another ~28% cut in funding, a renewed directive not to undertake safety tasks, and staff threatened with dismissal if they complained or met legal obligations.

You must take these names and then read the Nimrod Review. Ask why Haddon-Cave named and praised (e.g.) Alcock, while crucifying General Sam Cowan for 4% per annum cuts over 5 years, as a result of a political directive. Five x 4% cuts, vs 3 x 28%, the latter directly targeting safety management. And why did he claim the savings at the expense of safety policy of 1987 was issued in 1998? Who benefitted? The same officers.

Yes, as you say, a lot to conceal. Those named, with the exception of Austin (who has never spoken), were drawn out of their hole by CHART in early 2011. They wrote to the media, but their letters were systematically refuted using known facts.

[oldmansquipper]

Programs were very good and stirred the heart strings! Although, I would have liked to have it had more-openly discussed exactly what 'new evidence' (previously undisclosed by MoD) eventually swayed Lord Philip and the panel. I would imagine that the whole CHART report detailing so many airworthiness issues was key and the previously well-hidden BD signal about the ac automatics not doing what was required after a long while in a S&L transit (i.e. turning right instead of left) would have been right up there.

Interestingly, I had not previously heard the lighthouse keeper quite so clearly describing that the ac 'turned inland'.... for me, that says "UFCM" and tallies with Rob B and Tony C's reading of the odd rudder and flight control positions on impact - but guess we'll never know exactly.

But ultimately, Day and Wrotten were never, ever justified in making their adjudication of gross negligence - I think that is now an accepted fact by anyone with a modicum of nous. The legal advice was equally poor - any barrack room lawyer could have seen that 'absolutely no doubt whatsoever' was an impossible burden of proof (it was meant to be) and D&W could not meet it.

However, if we are to be fair (a concept denied to Jon, Rick and their families for far too long), then whilst D &W come across as 'oily' in the extreme, they too, are only human and prone to errors. Whilst they seem reluctant to admit that, they must have had some reason for abandoning any grasp of logic and understanding - no-one could be that stupid without some exceptional 'motivation' to find against those could not answer back. I doubt it was money that was motivating them, or a sense of wider duty (both far too self-centred for that), so it was likely to be external and/or peer pressure - warning of possible loss of face/kudos if they didn't be good little boys and toe the party line. Wonder who it was who applied the pressure ? I doubt it was the PM or senior MoD politicians because they came out in favour of clearing the pilots eventually. Rifkind especially seemed aggrieved that he'd been played for a fool by senior officers. So, who got the ear-worms into D&W - was it CAS? or ACAS? Or Controller Aircraft and his side-kicks DGA2/1, or some faceless civil servant from the MoD/Foreign Office/T&I possibly driven by business execs from across the pond? Perhaps D&W will be fall-guys yet - unless they come clean before they go (doubtful)? There is a good book in there somewhere for conspiracy theorists.....

Hmmm. They would appear to be Humans.

So perhaps Bill and Happy suffered from that transient condition known as ‘cognitive impairment’ whilst reviewing the BOIs? They were both pilots after all.

just sayin.

[cliver029]

Could somebody please tell us what the role “ controller of aircraft “ in context of Mr Austins title implied?

[tucumseh]

Could somebody please tell us what the role “ controller of aircraft “ in context of Mr Austins title implied?

Controller Aircraft is a 3-Star civilian or Service appointment in (at the time) MoD(PE), in charge of the Air Systems Controllerate. As distinct from Land and Sea.

He received his airworthiness delegation from the Chief of Defence Procurement, not via the RAF.

He issued Controller Aircraft Instructions, mandated upon all his staff.

In this context, his role was to provide the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (ACAS) with a Controller Aircraft Release, which is a statement by him that the aircraft is airworthy, at a stated Build Standard, and (e.g.) there is a full system of support in place to be able to Maintain Airworthiness of the Mk2 design (his staff) and for the RAF to ensure Continuing Airworthiness of individual aircraft. There must be a valid Safety Case reflecting that Build Standard.

CAIs mandate that CA must offer ACAS an advance notification of his proposed CA Release, and that ACAS must accept this. Only then does CA issue his CAR. ACAS is strictly prohibited from changing it, only allowed to remove the cover sheet and replace it with his own, and the document forms Part 1 of the Release to Service. His letter of promulgation, not the Release itself, is the authority for the RAF to fly the aircraft. If he wants to add anything, he issues a Part 2, normally in the form of Service Deviations. Those of a technical nature must be written by CA's staff.


On Chinook Mk2, it is easier to say what of the above was complied with.

CA stated it was not airworthy. (Source: a report in the form of an INTERIM CA Release, and Boscombe Down reports. All mandated upon ACAS, confirmed by the Mull of Kintyre Review).

ACAS knew this as he asked for a Switch-On Only clearance, which is what he got. (Source: MoD correspondence and minutes of meetings).

There was no valid Safety Case. (Primarily because there was no Certificate of Design for the FADEC Safety Critical Software, which had to be signed by both Boscombe and RSRE Malvern. But the Mk1 Safety Case was also invalid anyway. FADEC was not allowed within a country mile of an RAF Mk2, and there was no legal authority to enter production, based on the criteria set by the Chief Scientific Advisor and issued by Secy of State).

There was no Statement of Operating Intent and Usage at all, when the Mk2 contract was let, without which one wouldn't know where to start on the rest. (Source: Director Flight Safety).

ACAS issued an RTS in November 1993, without articulating the mandate that it be read in conjunction with specific Boscombe reports saying it was not airworthy, and why. The big question is why did he do this? It's not a case of misunderstanding 'INTERIM' or Switch-On Only' (same thing) because Boscombe had written to everyone spelling it out.

ACM Graydon's introduction of AM Austin's role is interesting, which is perhaps why you ask. What formal role has a MoD(PE) 3-Star in an RAF Board of Inquiry? Apart from his junior staff providing briefings or statements to the Board, none. They made one, alluding to what was mentioned above, SEM and STFs not being appraised. But the circumstances, Austin's predecessor Donald Spiers knowing that ACAS had breached a mandate but apparently saying nothing, meant he was sucked in.

However, during the campaign neither Spiers nor Austin were mentioned, until the Air Staff lied to Dr Susan Phoenix, telling her that there was no such thing as an RTS in November 1993, and the only authority to fly was issued by Spiers. That Spiers continued to support the RAF VSOs, means there is something else that made him ignore the VSOs had lied and pointed the finger at him.

It was not an inadvertent error, because at the same time a Defence Minister had written to various MPs mentioning the RTS. It was a deliberate attempt to deceive a family. Who benefitted? When the facts were put to MoD by Dr Phoenix, MoD repeated the lie. This is not rocket science. If your view is challenged, turn round, pull the drawer marked 'RTSs', and look at the date of the previous ones issued by your boss. Lord Philip was not amused, wrote to Minister, and an abject apology was eventually issued. But various committees were misled in the same way, and their official reports repeat the same lie.

Hope this helps.

[oldmansquipper]

IMHO, an excellent program. But I can hardly describe it as ‘enjoyable’.

I wonder….perhaps the film company concerned could produce similar ones dealing with the two contentious Red Arrows tragedies?

[Shaft109]

Is there anyway to view these programs online? I'm away so not able to get them on normal TV

Sorted it's on iplayer now

[Wwyvern]

Timelord's post no.39 interested me. It was not the first time a VSO has offered his interpretation of what constitutes an accident.

In the period Jun 1968 - Dec 1970 I was HQ22 Group Flight Safety Officer. The CAS, whose name escapes me, decreed that there was no such thing as an accident. Fortunately, our aircraft pool consisted of Chipmunks on 18 University Air Squadrons and some Vampire T11s and Meteor T7s on two Civilian Anti-Aircraft Co-operation Units (CAACUs). They caused little upset.

[Chugalug2]

ACM Sir John Grandy CAS Apr 1967 - Apr 1971 :-

Chief of the Air Staff (United Kingdom) - Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chief_of_the_Air_Staff_(United_Kingdom))

Interesting comment, Wwyvern, thank you. It was MRAF Grandy that was told by the then CAS that the Mull pilots were "off course" by some miles!

[212man]

Timelord's post no.39 interested me. It was not the first time a VSO has offered his interpretation of what constitutes an accident.

In the period Jun 1968 - Dec 1970 I was HQ22 Group Flight Safety Officer. The CAS, whose name escapes me, decreed that there was no such thing as an accident. Fortunately, our aircraft pool consisted of Chipmunks on 18 University Air Squadrons and some Vampire T11s and Meteor T7s on two Civilian Anti-Aircraft Co-operation Units (CAACUs). They caused little upset.
Well, the US Military do not accept the word 'accident', as it has connotations of "s**t happens", or "it couldn't be helped". Instead the use the word 'Mishap', and all their investigation reports refer to 'MP' (Mishap Pilot), 'MA (Mishap Aircraft ) etc etc. My former employer is a major International Oil Company, and they had a similar viewpoint.

[Easy Street]

The neutral word prescribed by the MAA is "occurrence", encompassing what used to be called "incidents" and "accidents" plus also some of what used to be "hazard observations". Reports will sometimes refer to the "occurrence pilot", which gives an alternative spin on "OP".

[dervish]

The neutral word prescribed by the MAA is "occurrence", encompassing what used to be called "incidents" and "accidents" plus also some of what used to be "hazard observations". Reports will sometimes refer to the "occurrence pilot", which gives an alternative spin on "OP".

Please easy street tell us the MAA isn't employing serving officers to dream this stuff up. Or consultants on a few grand a day.

[SLXOwft]

Well, the US Military do not accept the word 'accident', as it has connotations of "s**t happens", or "it couldn't be helped". Instead the use the word 'Mishap', and all their investigation reports refer to 'MP' (Mishap Pilot), 'MA (Mishap Aircraft ) etc etc. My former employer is a major International Oil Company, and they had a similar viewpoint.

Clearly neither the DoD or the Oil Co possessed or at least consulted a dictionary.:E

Merriam-Webster gives two definitions for Mishap:

an unfortunate accident
bad luck

The Oxford Advanced American Dictionary defines it as:

a small accident or piece of bad luck that does not have serious results

[212man]

Clearly neither the DoD or the Oil Co possessed or at least consulted a dictionary.:E

Merriam-Webster gives two definitions for Mishap:

an unfortunate accident
bad luck

The Oxford Advanced American Dictionary defines it as:

a small accident or piece of bad luck that does not have serious results



Yes, it’s somewhat ironic. More so when you look at definitions of ‘accident’ such as:

an unfortunate (https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&sca_esv=23e333b9b80ac6d8&hl=en-gb&q=unfortunate&si=AKbGX_okpkrXRdHQwZu4Fe0iRe3u-pYtMHM0RbTzgGYpvsl3MOXtgbUZ6VHxJR9zYYrlB3DWhWNdewZyz6cM2zdZW lR4-DHW7VryRyHTVXYR5Quk2fXfBKY%3D&expnd=1) incident that happens unexpectedly (https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&sca_esv=23e333b9b80ac6d8&hl=en-gb&q=unexpectedly&si=AKbGX_rYYX5RSQWW4ITS1L-igAzufY5BOLT6lgbVJqehCXPyyc2-2PTlo9nlT-EIfs7Hf1WJjCh9wv__uIcX4kZFpS4Ymu_agHScyqrS7bG7BKsTJC4m7LU%3D&expnd=1) and unintentionally (https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&sca_esv=23e333b9b80ac6d8&hl=en-gb&q=unintentionally&si=AKbGX_qbffDhNJNmNuoQO9DPv_17wQnSxKx8E5c4gJOgoxuPzyuPm8q5s Km2Aq0JKsWQNSuWGqQXttOo9pOoDzxE6Ef_8ZKoW18o8v3lNOd8jzu3j2CxM og%3D&expnd=1), typically resulting in damage or injury.
"he had an accident at the factory"

​​​​​​​which actually fit the definition intended precisely!

[Eric T Cartman]

"Mishap" was already in use in British Railways reporting etc, when I joined in 1967.

[thefodfather]

Please easy street tell us the MAA isn't employing serving officers to dream this stuff up. Or consultants on a few grand a day.

I think it was possibly me who dreamt up the term "Occurrence" in the context the MAA uses it today when we named the D-FSOR and defined all the associated terminology. I was a serving officer at the time but it was still DASC at that point, although the reality was we didn't overthink it as ICAO Annex 13 had done the hard part for us.

[Jm1994]

It is pretty obvious, as we head to the 30th anniversary, 19 years after the MoD apologized to the Tapper and Cook families that something remains rotten with The State.
Not the peculiarities and specifics of the minutiae; rather the clue is in the sweep.
A team of more than a dozen full time civil servants (30 anyone?) in Bristol and London were employed to hold the line.
What line? That if there was new evidence presented by campaigners then the State would review the finding. Nothing was new to the State because they have all the evidence. Nothing to see here. Except each scintilla of information that emerged over the 16 years (1994-2011) when the pilots were finally cleared only helped the pilots' cause. There wasn't a single moment in all those years that set the campaign back.
Is it any wonder the State papers on the crash are closed until 2094. Why? And what other paperwork apart from Royalty enjoys such delay? Anyone?
The next phase of the campaign is to ensure the truth is revealed, not by another campaign but through the hand of the State itself, that currently remains hidden.
If there are good men and women out there, and there are, release the information while you are alive. Tell the stories that keep you awake at night. Join the subpostmasters in helping us find justice. Because we will all be dead in 2094 and I don't want the faceless bureaucrats of the State who have prevailed for so long, to win. Lying In State is not to be encouraged

[tucumseh]

I think it was possibly me who dreamt up the term "Occurrence" in the context the MAA uses it today when we named the D-FSOR and defined all the associated terminology. I was a serving officer at the time but it was still DASC at that point, although the reality was we didn't overthink it as ICAO Annex 13 had done the hard part for us.

Strange as it may seem, I'm with the MAA on this.

After all, half a dozen reports saying the Chinook Mk2 isn't airworthy, and a mandated directive not to fly it, can't be 'accidentally' ignored.

Likewise, Nimrod XV230......

[Flipster130]

Maybe we should all leave sealed instructions to our descendants (grand-children and hopefully great-grand-children) to seek the MoD papers in June 2094 and to use Tuc's excellent publications to discover who did/said what....and finally to discover who took any small part in this shameful episode?
In the meantime, and in the unlikely event of anyone on the long list of Senior Officers involved having a conscience, then approaching the 30th Anniversary of their wicked deeds would be a good time to unload.

"Justice Has No Expiry Date" John Cook.

[tucumseh]

Regarding the papers being held back for 100 years (or is it 50?), the obvious question is – what papers?

It must be remembered that Lord Philip had to resort to asking campaigners if they could provide the policy document setting out the standard of proof (‘absolutely no doubt whatsoever’), and that governing Safety Critical Software, as MoD claimed it could not.

At one point, MoD said the papers held by the ‘lead branch’ would be retained for 25 years. It would not say who the lead branch was.

The project office? It ceased to exist in March 1999, and if other aircraft offices in the same Directorate are anything to go by, 90% of their records had already vanished in the move to AbbeyWood in July 1996.

Perhaps they meant the Chinook IPT, stood up on 1 April 1999. Well, they didn’t inherit much, and had a clear-out of what they found.

Or the Air Staff files? The most benign of those were archived at the RAF HS a few years ago, and they happily release them under FoI, but in fact there’s so little of value it’s pointless.

Boscombe’s? Would QinetiQ be allowed to keep historical MoD files such as these, especially as they proved a series of very senior officers had lied?

For example, one important document MoD simply won’t answer questions about is the Certificate of Design for Safety Critical Software, for FADEC. Everyone knows it had to be signed by Boscombe Down, and they refused. But it’s seldom mentioned it also had to be signed by (what was) RSRE Malvern. No CoD? Not permitted in the aircraft.

And more fundamentally; no Controller Aircraft Release, no acceptance off-contract of production standard Mk2s. The status of the Mk2 when the CAR and RTS were issued? An unrepresentative ‘prototype’. First legal CAR? December 1995. Who issued a waiver against a mandate laid down by Controller Aircraft? It could only have been CA himself, or higher.

Given that in all probability only a fraction of the papers still exist, in 50, 100 years, whatever, the main evidence will still by that small part submitted to Lord Philip on a 482MB CD-ROM!

[1066]

Jm1994
If you are concerned with what remains rotten with The State may I recommend " An Inconvenient Death" by Miles Goslett.
It covers the death of Doctor David Kelly, a MOD civil servant and UN Weapons Inspector, on 17 July 2003 and the subsequent events including a suspended coroner's inquest. This was replaced by a Government Inquiry conducted by Northern Ireland High Court Judge, Lord Hutton.
Some may dismiss the book as supporting a conspiracy theory but it raises many legitimate points that were not and have not been answered. Not least why did Hutton impose a 70 year embargo on the release of all the evidence presented at his inquiry. To 'protect' Kelly's family was his published reason.
Another case to pass on to our offspring?
1066

[Watson1963]

1066,
along similar lines ... "Lying in State: How Whitehall Denies, Dissembles and Deceives - From the Chinook Crash to the Kelly Affair", by Tim Slessor, 2006

[Chugalug2]

I hope that those with the technical means have managed to save the two episodes of Chinook ZD576, whether to PVR or computer drives. Having watched both I am in awe of the families in their determination to find out why their loved ones were even allowed on board this knowingly grossly compromised aircraft, let alone flown to their deaths in it. I was struck also by the professionalism of the Odiham TP who had to be given a direct order not to reveal his knowledge of the type's technical vicissitudes and shortcomings to the BoI, and particularly not to the attached AAIB inspector who had specifically asked for his help. The second hint of the cover up; the first being from Day himself at the crash site, "People make mistakes". They do indeed Sir, and it seems that you were one of them!

It remains to be seen if BBC Central puts out these two episodes of Series 1 network wide. Given the national implications of this tragedy logic would suggest they should, and that it should then be followed by a Series 2 revealing the cover up since. Alas logic and politics, civil and military, are usually in direct opposition and you have to ask yourself what is the purpose of the BBC if it feels unable to confront the RAF/MOD with its lies and intimidation?

[dervish]

you have to ask yourself what is the purpose of the BBC if it feels unable to confront the RAF/MOD with its lies and intimidation?

Which makes the contributions of each and every active campaigner all the more impressive.

[ancientaviator62]

In next weeks copy of The Radio Times is a full page article on this very subject. I read it eagerly to see which major channel would be broadcasting it. However as far as I can see it will only be on BBC i player ! Given that this is usually only for 'catch up' I wonder what is going on. It will certainly not reach the wider audience that the PO scandal did.

[Rigga]

I think it was possibly me who dreamt up the term "Occurrence" in the context the MAA uses it today when we named the D-FSOR and defined all the associated terminology. I was a serving officer at the time but it was still DASC at that point, although the reality was we didn't overthink it as ICAO Annex 13 had done the hard part for us.

While you may have introduced the term ‘Occurrence’ to the MAA that very term had been in use in civil aviation (EASA/CAA/FAA, etc.) Safety Management Systems for some years (as in ‘Mandatory Occurrence Report’) well before the MAA formed after the Haden-Cave report. In later Safety Management System vocabulary, the term used is now Event or Safety Event - again to down-tone any emotive interpretation.
And when the MAA introduced such reporting i believe they were call DASORs - that I suggested should see the withdrawal of CONDORs - Still dont know if that happened?

[Cornish Jack]

Re. the programme... no problem accessing it via iPlayer - just requires payment of the licence fee !
As to content ? - an appeal to emotion rather than evidence and some rather odd claims and omissions just as misleading as the SO's ridiculous distortion of blame placing ... or, rather, the degree applied.
Emotion ? perfectly natural familial desire to protect the reputations of loved ones ... no disagreement there.
Making assumptions on in-flight activity with no hard evidence to support it . This may make for eye-catching TV 'entertainment', but it does nothing to advance the technical puzzle. Burke's input was posed as being that of a Test Pilot - a wholly different category than his actual post as Unit test pilot which gave him considerable experience operating on type but not the exploratory nature of A&AEE's and Handling Squadron's work. We were offered the latter's conclusions but nothing of substance as to how they were reached. On past (and present) records we are unlikely ever to be so informed !
From the very limited portions of the programme dealing with known crew activity, the absence of basic airmanship principles leaves inevitable unasked/unanswered questions, leaving us with a 'hearts and flowers' concoction.
Overall then, not hugely impressed and left with an itch to know more.
When I first heard the news of the crash, I immediately thought Mt Erebus and Air New Zealand.and, so far, subsequent (very limited) revelations haven't changed that. (I am, of course aware of the inertial input error which exacerbated that situation)
One final thought on the BOI's judgement - I seem to recall that it completely exonerated the Master Loadie from any blame, yet he was, apparently, operating from the jump seat ...perhaps CRM wasn't part of the SOPs ?

[Jm1994]

We all have that itch.
Don't be defeatist. The public record can be improved, if all documents are released.
Why did 30 staff sit in the West Country holding the line about pilot error if the evidence was so overwhelming. A junior typist could hold the line if the case had nothing to hide.
Bob Burke was indeed the unit test pilot and I think it fair to say he understood the exploratory nature of Boscombe Down. After all, he flew the Mark Two being tested in Wiltshire back to Odiham in Hants after the crash because the test pilots at BD refused. He also knew both Jon and Rick. Oh, and Rick increased his life insurance in the weeks before the crash because he didnt like what he was seeing with the Mark Two.
Of course the programme would have needed a third episode to highlight the MoD successfully sued the engine manufacturers yet this evidence was not presented to the BoI. Or the SoS.
And just to complete the circle, quick question. When was the Mark Three introduced and how many flew?

[dervish]

Cornish Jack
Where is the evidence of basic airmanship failures?

[waffler]

https://youtu.be/hkY4P_PDU6Y?si=ZO2wGvJJFRQDZcdD

For those who missed it.

[airsound]

Thanks waffler - what a good idea!

airsound

[tucumseh]

As to content ? - an appeal to emotion rather than evidence and some rather odd claims and omissions just as misleading as the SO's ridiculous distortion of blame placing ... or, rather, the degree applied.
Emotion ? perfectly natural familial desire to protect the reputations of loved ones ... no disagreement there.
Making assumptions on in-flight activity with no hard evidence to support it . This may make for eye-catching TV 'entertainment', but it does nothing to advance the technical puzzle. Burke's input was posed as being that of a Test Pilot - a wholly different category than his actual post as Unit test pilot which gave him considerable experience operating on type but not the exploratory nature of A&AEE's and Handling Squadron's work. We were offered the latter's conclusions but nothing of substance as to how they were reached. On past (and present) records we are unlikely ever to be so informed !
From the very limited portions of the programme dealing with known crew activity, the absence of basic airmanship principles leaves inevitable unasked/unanswered questions, leaving us with a 'hearts and flowers' concoction.
Overall then, not hugely impressed and left with an itch to know more.
When I first heard the news of the crash, I immediately thought Mt Erebus and Air New Zealand.and, so far, subsequent (very limited) revelations haven't changed that. (I am, of course aware of the inertial input error which exacerbated that situation)
One final thought on the BOI's judgement - I seem to recall that it completely exonerated the Master Loadie from any blame, yet he was, apparently, operating from the jump seat ...perhaps CRM wasn't part of the SOPs ?

There are some known facts that bear repeating:

Sqn Ldr Burke had previously flown the Mk2 in Philly. (While I say 'Mk2', to Boscombe it remained an unairworthy prototype for many months after the accident). He had been involved in a UFCM incident while co-pilot to the Boeing test pilot, the latter being injured. (MoD denied this, calling him a liar. His written report was found in Boeing's files some years later. As an aside, RAF witnesses spoke of the test pilot still being in plaster at their next jaunt to Philly). Burke had infinitely more experience of the Mk2 than almost anyone.

The programme was deliberately pitched as being from the families' point of view. Primarily, because a number of attempts to make it had failed at the BBC commissioning stage. It was thought this new approach would stand a better chance, given the BBC's ongoing support for MoD's behaviour. This mostly explains the lack of technical detail, although most of the important points were got across. If you want that detail, in detail, there's books on the subject...

It is correct to say Boscombe's views were not broadcast. But again, they are published. (Subject of this thread).

As dervish said above, there is no evidence whatsoever of airmanship failings. When most people talk of this, they are alluding to MoD's claim that they were too low and not at Safety Altitude. Once again, read the evidence. They were tasked with a flying an aircraft with an Icing clearance was below their Safety Altitude. (In fact, there was no Icing clearance at all, as the section had been removed from the RTS in March 1994. Probably inadvertently, but nevertheless removed). And, of course, it wasn't a legal RTS...

When given this tasking, they were not told that the Mk2 was not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever, and that this was mandated upon the RAF. (Lord Philip confirmed this. It was the only 'new' evidence in his report).

Links to Mt Erebus? I agree. The operator lied on both occasions.

A good point about the forward crewman. One of the known facts that MoD concealed was that his upper door was closed. Evidence from experienced operators said this might indicate he was content with progress and visibility. This was supported by the SuperTANS nav computer being in a mode commensurate with remaining in VMC.

[Cornish Jack]

Thank you tucumseh.
Just a clarification ... 'basic airmanship'? yes, the query was re. Safety Altitude both here and at Erebus. Re. the BOI's conclusions on the crew culpability, it seems the SOs considered that only the pilots had any responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight - an assumption both arrogant and dangerous.
While the Chinook was the one rotary of which I had no personal experience, I did have experience of the fatal results of failure on the part of 'authority' to deal with an aircraft 'discrepancy' . It is not an experience which should be allowed to pass unquestioned !

[tucumseh]

Thank you tucumseh.
Just a clarification ... 'basic airmanship'? yes, the query was re. Safety Altitude both here and at Erebus. Re. the BOI's conclusions on the crew culpability, it seems the SOs considered that only the pilots had any responsibility for the safe conduct of the flight - an assumption both arrogant and dangerous.
While the Chinook was the one rotary of which I had no personal experience, I did have experience of the fatal results of failure on the part of 'authority' to deal with an aircraft 'discrepancy' . It is not an experience which should be allowed to pass unquestioned !

Arrogant and dangerous? Definitely. They were found guilty of gross negligence for refusing to commit negligence.

There was a disagreement between the Board member and Reviewing Officers as to what the forward crewman was doing. And the rear man, according to MoD, had no time to carry out all the duties required of him, such as connector checks, etc. And the relative priority put on those checks made no sense.

The 'itch' I'd like scratched is an explanation of CAS's claim they were 'off course by some miles'.

Time marches on, and with Day having passed away, and Wratten, Graydon, Austin, Bagnall and the rest not saying anything, the whole truth is ever more difficult to uncover. Their silence speaks volumes.

[Cornish Jack]

Thank you, tucumseh - both for your replies and the efforts made by you, (and others), attempting to right a demonstrable wrong ! :ok:

[Chugalug2]

Thank you, tucumseh - both for your replies and the efforts made by you, (and others), attempting to right a demonstrable wrong ! :ok:
Just to be clear, the demonstrable wrong isn't the ROs' finding, that was set aside/quashed by SoS Liam Fox. If certain RAF VSOs still don't accept that it is a comment on them and their desire to maintain the cover up of the disastrous effects of illegal orders to subvert the mandatory Air Safety Regulations.

The demonstrable wrong is the still continuing cover up of those illegal orders that stands in the way of urgent reform of UK Military Air Regulation and Air Accident Investigation. Both must be entirely independent of the MOD and of each other. Only when that is achieved can airworthiness be slowly regained in the military air fleets and avoidable airworthiness related fatal military air accidents greatly reduced. Until then the cost in lives, treasure, and UK Air Power will continue.

[Geriaviator]

For anyone who cannot receive the BBC programmes, I can email them to you using a big file program if you send me PM with your email address. I'm pleased to have mastered this technology thanks to 12-year-old greatniece.:8

[JFZ90]

I watched both episodes yesterday, but I'm not sure viewers were left with a balanced picture, notably some of the key conclusions from the 2011 report.

Examples:

There is a clear "most probable cause" suggested:

1.4.2 The investigating Board found that there were several potential causes of the accident but, despite detailed analysis, were unable to determine a definite cause. They however, concluded that the most probable cause was the selection by the pilots of an inappropriate rate of climb which was insufficient to enable them safely to overfly the high ground of the Mull of Kintyre.

--

Whilst they can suggest what the most probably cause was, most I think would agree the high standard of proof for negligence was not necessarily established. This is what the criticism of the seniors rests upon - and it seems it was right that this aspect was corrected, albeit only years later, which is regrettable.

1.4.18 Applying the high standard of proof, the Board unanimously concluded that they were unable to make any finding of negligence or make any assessment of human failings because of the lack of evidence. After they had briefed Air Vice Marshal Day and his staff they reconsidered the question of human failings and concluded that, although it was likely that Flt Lt Tapper had made an error of judgment in the conduct of the attempted climb over the Mull of Kintyre, it would be incorrect to criticise him for human failings based on the available evidence.

--

However, it is not clear that the error in not having the supporting evidence to find the crew actions responsible necessarily translates into a witch hunt around wider airworthiness :

1.4.19 Criticism that insufficient attention was paid by the Board to the maintenance, engineering and airworthiness aspects of the Chinook, was not in our view, justified. They investigated the problems with the engines’ Full Authority Digital Electronic Control system and other technical malfunctions in the Chinook fleet, and the history of ZD576. They took these matters seriously, but did not expand on them in their report because there was no positive evidence that a malfunction had occurred before or during the accident. Their job was to determine the cause of this accident and make recommendations, not to investigate all aspects of Chinook operations. Moreover, these problems were well known and were being addressed by the Ministry of Defence.

--

If you were to write the story on balance of probabilities, and the report from 2011, you would draw certain conclusions on what probably happened. I'm not sure the BBC programme reflects a balanced view and heavily suggested the cause lay in airworthiness or other factors didn't it? That is not the most probable cause is it?

--

In the TV programme, what was the guy referring to when he said the chinook went right when you demanded a left turn?

[tucumseh]

JFZ90

I think the best way to summarise any reply to your points is to remind you that MoD admitted all the ‘claims’ made in the programme; and I think a statement to that effect should have been broadcast. It probably explains why MoD declined to take part.

The only slight error was I believe one of interpretation. The journalist you refer to, David Walmsley, who was the first one on the scene, implied the aircraft WOULD go right when a left turn a demanded. In fact, after the Review the Air Staff admitted that the evidence of Sqn Ldr Burke and Boscombe was true, that a control problem might only manifest after a straight run when the turn was attempted. Hitherto, Wratten and Day had denied this could happen. You also have to take this in the context of a Special Flying Instruction of March 1994, which was NOT shown to pilots, that;

‘The characteristic is manifested by very sharp uncommanded inputs to the yaw axis which result in a rapid 3-4 degree change in aircraft heading, in both the hover and when in forward flight when the aircraft is subject to high levels of vibration’.

Contrary to MoD’s claim, Boscombe had warned of high and unacceptable levels of vibration in the Mk2, and this had not been addressed by June 1994.

For the entire campaign the Government and MoD position was to demand ‘new evidence’. The ONLY new evidence set out in the Review by Lord Philip was confirmation that the aircraft was not airworthy, and not to be flown by the RAF. That, this was ’mandated’ upon the Air Staff. Again, MoD fully admitted this, in writing, after the Review. So, I’m not sure how that becomes a ‘witch hunt around wider airworthiness’. It’s simply a statement of known fact. The RAF’s Director of Flight Safety confirmed it for Mk1 in August 1992, and specifically warned of measures needed to ensure Mk2 would be airworthy. None were taken. Later, the RAF Chief Engineer denied this, but one need only compare DFS’s recommendations with the ZD576 BOI report, and the reports into subsequent accidents, such as Nimrod XV230, Tornado ZG710, Hawk XX177, etc. to see the common factors.

The Board did not, and could not, investigate the FADEC system in full, because so much was concealed from them. (And I include Wratten and Day in this). Once again, a simple known fact… There were no Certificates of Design, so it was strictly prohibited to accept it off-contract. Similarly, the whole Mk2 itself. If you study the evidence, and the regulations, FADEC was not even permitted to be in production. (There’s a reason why the Public Accounts and Defence Committees launched investigations into ‘Accepting Equipment Off-Contract’). With due respect to the Board members, not one of them would realise that, and those responsible weren’t about to tell them. The problems with FADEC were indeed well-known. But on the day of the accident they had become even greater, and the RAF was STILL not permitted to fly the Mk2. The actual concern was that Boscombe had underestimated the scale of the problems.

Balance of probabilities, given the known facts, the known problems with the Mk2, and specifically the known problems, faults and defects in ZD576? UFCM. (To which I’d add my own opinion, a cascading electrical failure; the various switch positions, and combinations thereof - which the BOI didn’t assess - pointing to them encountering a major problem). No-one can prove it, but this is a far more likely scenario than any other, and the supporting evidence is in MoD’s own hand. Many people THOUGHT this but regardless of their opinions and theories, it is trumped by MoD’s later admissions - not airworthy, not allowed not be flown, and UFCMs. I think that’s got to be the starting point for any comments.

[falcon900]

I continue to turn over the cock up versus conspiracy question in my head.
I have no quarrel with Tecumseh’s account, and as discussed earlier in the thread see the issuing of the RTS by The Scottish Officer as the key enabler for the ensuing tragedy. That said, he did seem to have the gumption to qualify the approval given, restricting it to start up only. Surely evidence in itself that he too knew it wasn’t airworthy, and was issuing the document on other than an entirely voluntary basis?
We surely need to consider how such a clear restriction to the use of the aircraft was ignored, and who ignored it, to the extent of overruling the Pilots request to use another aircraft.
Despite the shambles which preceded it, the system had actually worked. The aircraft was documented as not being fit to fly. How did it come to be flying?

[pulse1]

The question of what the crewman was doing was raised. Well, one of his duties at this time was to check the DECU connectors every 15 minutes. Apparently this was because of a history of the connectors working loose under the vibration. At some stage in my working life I was part of a team which probably knew as much as anyone about the technology of light duty contacts and I was horrified when that information came out. Now, we all live in an electronic age where very few of us will not have fiddled with a connection to make it work but back in the 90's not many sliding contacts, which I presume that these were, had been designed to switch an active current. You would be surprised at how much damage even a few milliamps can do to rhodium or hard gold contacts. But, for most of us, our lives do not depend on the outcome.

[Cornish Jack]

Relevant ?, irrelevant ?, or coincidental ?
https://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/657825-more-afcs-mayhem.html

[tucumseh]

I continue to turn over the cock up versus conspiracy question in my head.
I have no quarrel with Tecumseh’s account, and as discussed earlier in the thread see the issuing of the RTS by The Scottish Officer as the key enabler for the ensuing tragedy. That said, he did seem to have the gumption to qualify the approval given, restricting it to start up only. Surely evidence in itself that he too knew it wasn’t airworthy, and was issuing the document on other than an entirely voluntary basis?
We surely need to consider how such a clear restriction to the use of the aircraft was ignored, and who ignored it, to the extent of overruling the Pilots request to use another aircraft.
Despite the shambles which preceded it, the system had actually worked. The aircraft was documented as not being fit to fly. How did it come to be flying?

Precisely.

My opinion, and again I base it on known facts and my agreement with DFS, is that the Army was applying intolerable pressure to fly the Mk2 with it's intended enhancements. Ironic, then, that the reason eight pax were booted off the list was the AUW of ZD576 was insufficient due to FADEC concerns. One unfortunate was reinstated, at the behest of his boss, who 'required' ZD576 be allotted instead of 2 Pumas. He was also on the flight.

That Bagnall has remained quiet speaks volumes. But AOC-inC SC knew, because immediately after the accident he drafted a letter to Bagnall, in response to a letter from Boscombe which had outlined (yet again) the reasons why the aircraft was as not to be flown. Whether or not Bagnall understood any of this can not be known, but it is surely revealing that MoD cannot find the correspondence from Controller Aircraft, yet Ministers have cited the documents either side of it in the file.

If I may add to my comment above about the Committees and 'Accepting Equipment Off-Contract'. When CDP (Sir Robert Walmsley) gave his evidence in March 1999, he admitted Chinook was STILL not airworthy. However, like all Inquiries and reports, he didn't actually use the 'A' word; but he agreed with the Committee that major pre-requisites were simply not yet in place - 5 years after ZD576. Please think about that. If he admitted this, what was omitted? Answer - the Mk2 wasn't allowed to be accepted off-contract. In addition to Chinook, two of my own programmes were case studies, and I submitted my own briefing to Sir Robert. It was immediately torn up by my intermediate line management, a draft brief prepared by a non-technical official, and someone outwith MoD(PE) who had nothing whatsoever to do with the programmes told to sign it. Asked why, the reply was 'We can't have anyone in Directorate of Helicopter Projects telling the truth'. Sir Robert was given complete bollix to tell the Committee. While my brief was not on Chinook, it was clear that the failings were systemic and applied to all aircraft. At the same time, the Chinook Project Director asked me how I'd circumvented the RAF policy denying funding to maintain airworthiness (the subject of the brief). I told him how FAA aircraft were managed and he replied 'We don't do that on Chinook'. No, because you're actively prevented from doing so. The Committee was lied to. There's far more to this than just one or two officers in the Air Staff and at Strike.

[dervish]

The question of what the crewman was doing was raised. Well, one of his duties at this time was to check the DECU connectors every 15 minutes. Apparently this was because of a history of the connectors working loose under the vibration. At some stage in my working life I was part of a team which probably knew as much as anyone about the technology of light duty contacts and I was horrified when that information came out. Now, we all live in an electronic age where very few of us will not have fiddled with a connection to make it work but back in the 90's not many sliding contacts, which I presume that these were, had been designed to switch an active current. You would be surprised at how much damage even a few milliamps can do to rhodium or hard gold contacts. But, for most of us, our lives do not depend on the outcome.I remember you posting about this and it’s the one thing you’d think the average person would understand. If a connector’s prone to working loose on a fuel computer at some point it’s going to fail. One of David Hill’s books points out that the Board said that no Servicing Instructions had been carried out. How did they know the crewman hadn’t checked the connectors? Any suggestion that the investigation was adequate is completely wrong.

Tuc I don’t know how you can remain so polite. Guys, this isn’t 2004. So much has been uncovered and put in the public domain. If you’re going to ignore or contradict it then offer a reason. Otherwise it’s trolling.

[Chugalug2]

Well said, dervish. The BoI was compromised from the start. Denied witnesses, eg the Odiham Test Pilot (who knew more about the 'idiosyncrasies' of the Mk2 than most, having suffered them all on repeated occasions), denied evidence, eg the 'switch on only status' of the aircraft, and most importantly the independence needed by any accident investigator to do its job. That still needs to happen. Mull was the key airworthiness related fatal air accident in the tragic series that preceded and followed it. It still awaits proper investigation and all the evidence ('new' or otherwise) properly considered. The scandal of RAF VSO interference in subverting Military Air Safety must finally be faced up to. Time to bite the bullet and enable reform. What is more important, the cover up or military airworthiness CAS?

[JFZ90]

It seems like many of you disagree with the 2011 report (that cleared the pilots) that I quoted.

Their take on most likely cause is quite clear.

I recall the programme mentioned some of the families did not disagree with that either.

[tucumseh]

It seems like many of you disagree with the 2011 report (that cleared the pilots) that I quoted.

Their take on most likely cause is quite clear.

I recall the programme mentioned some of the families did not disagree with that either.


JFZ90

The Review got its main point correct, because it was given irrefutable evidence. A 'mandate' was placed upon the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff - that being the RAF was forbidden from relying on the Mk2 in any way whatsoever.

But it was factually inaccurate on the point used by the Government - poor legal advice meaning the Reviewing Officers didn't fully understand standard of proof. MoD and the Government had, before the Review, stated many times, over a number of years, that they fully understood. As the Shadow Defence Minister said, what's not to understand about 'no doubt'. As ever, you have to take a step further and read their remarks in other reports from the same period. And the evidence from the officer who developed the legal test, saying very senior officers understood it straight away, and fought tooth and nail against its adoption as it would take away their power.

The Review did not have a take on cause, as it was not within its remit. It simply noted the RAF's position.

The programme omitted that it was the Air Staff who, later, admitted the UFCM scenario was plausible, having spent nearly 20 years denying this. That admission was brought about by the discovery, in December 2010 during the Review, of the UFCM Special Flying Instruction mentioned above. Sqn Ldr Burke promptly gave evidence to Lord Philip that he'd never seen it before, even after the accident, but that it described perfectly what he'd experienced, and reported, a number of times in 1993/4.

And it was DE&S who later admitted that the Mk2 was 'not to be relied upon in any way whatsoever' on 2 June 1994. This was a rare occasion when MoD admitted the existence of documents that it has previously denied the existence of, so kudos to the DE&S Helicopter Secretariat for breaking ranks at a time when retired and serving VSOs were serially lying to the media. It is very clear they conducted an internal investigation into the evidence presented to Lord Philip, and a decision made to accept it unconditionally.

In fact, a brief extract of their analysis of the 1992 CHART report was released, when they fact-checked a key piece of evidence to the Review, that CHART had mentioned the Mk2 284 times. The retired VSOs had claimed it didn't mention it at all, and this had been repeated in the House by Liam Fox. Fox promptly wrote to an MP admitting he was misled.

Neither admission proves cause. But both confirm acceptance of considerable, even overwhelming doubt. And that was the argument all along.

Yes, the programme mentioned that some families wished to move on. But that is not the same as accepting the original findings. It would appear the producers couldn't find anyone to say the SROs were right. No-one in their right mind who has read the evidence would think that.

[Chugalug2]

It seems like many of you disagree with the 2011 report (that cleared the pilots) that I quoted.

Their take on most likely cause is quite clear.

I recall the programme mentioned some of the families did not disagree with that either.

And it seems that some of you still cling to the notion of "My VSO, right or wrong". In their name lies have been told to families, QCs, Coroners, SoSs, Ministers, MPs, HoC, HoL, BoIs, SIs, FAIs, and many others, often under oath. Their comes a time when you have to look yourself in the mirror and think, "Will this be my legacy?". Just as with the disreputable acts of the Post Office, by its leadership and its 'enforcers', all this will be taken up eventually in its entirety by the media. It's only a matter of time. Even the BBC, ever aware of its unique dependency on a hypothecated tax, has broadcast this attempt to raise the issues that Mull presents, albeit from the families' perspective. The next series could concentrate on the Airworthiness Scandal itself, front and centre.

If you have children, even grandchildren, how will you answer them when they ask, "I thought you always said that the pilots were at fault, even if they couldn't be proved to have been Grossly Negligent"? How will you reply if they discover that you were part of the machinery that found them Grossly Negligent, or worse that you were part of the cover up? "He defended the RAF leadership to the very end" is all very well, until it is proved to have dissembled, subverted, and bullied in order to supress the truth.

[Chugalug2]

A clear indication that the desire here to uncover the cover up is shared with those who lost loved ones at Mull as we approach the 30th anniversary this year. Herewith yesterday's story from the Campbeltown Courier. In particular the stalwart determination by Dr Susan Phoenix , whose husband Ian was one of the 29 victims of the tragedy, is indeed a noble inspiration to all who are determined that the truth be revealed and Air Safety reform enacted :-EXCLUSIVE: ‘We can’t let it rest’ – families refuse to give up fight for Chinook crash truthCAMPBELTOWN COURIER (https://www.westcoasttoday.co.uk/all-content/campbeltown-courier)News (https://www.westcoasttoday.co.uk/news/news)Mar 1, 2024by Hannah O’HanlonCampaigners are refusing to back down in their bid for the truth about what caused a Chinook helicopter to crash at the Mull of Kintyre.

. (https://d2zr548cf6pkkj.cloudfront.net/AcuCustom/Sitename/DAM/295/NO_C05mullofkintyrechinookcrash01_24_anne-cousin.jpg)Chinook ZD576 crashed into the steep hillside in thick foggy conditions on June 2 1994, killing all 25 passengers – almost all the UK’s senior Northern Ireland intelligence experts – and the four Royal Air Force (RAF) crew on board.



The group, which included members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, MI5 and the British Army, had been travelling from RAF Aldergrove near Belfast to a security conference in Inverness two months before the 1994 IRA ceasefire.



Controversy surrounds investigations into the crash, with the RAF’s board of inquiry initially blaming the crash on “gross negligence” by the helicopter’s pilots, Flight Lieutenant Jonathan Tapper and Flight Lieutenant Richard Cook.



After an almost 20-year campaign to clear their names, the men were exonerated in 2011, but the actual cause of the tragedy has never been established.



As the 30th anniversary approaches, the incident has returned to the spotlight, with the BBC recently airing a two-part documentary, Chinook: Zulu Delta 576.READ MOREArgyll MP pleads for Chinook documents to be preserved (https://www.westcoasttoday.co.uk/news/news/argyll-mp-pleads-for-chinook-documents-to-be-preserved)
Chinook crash victim's daughter's heartfelt 'thank you' to Kintyre (https://www.westcoasttoday.co.uk/news/news/chinook-crash-victims-daughters-heartfelt-thank-you-to-kintyre)
https://d2zr548cf6pkkj.cloudfront.net/AcuCustom/Sitename/DAM/295/NO_C05mullofkintyrechinookcrash01_24_anne-cousin.jpg (https://www.westcoasttoday.co.uk/news/news/mull-of-kintyre-chinook-crash-in-the-spotlight-30-years-on)Mull of Kintyre Chinook crash in the spotlight 30 years on (https://www.westcoasttoday.co.uk/news/news/mull-of-kintyre-chinook-crash-in-the-spotlight-30-years-on)
Among the men killed that night was Detective Superintendent Ian Phoenix, whose wife Dr Susan Phoenix is one of those who is determined to keep fighting for the truth about what happened.



Speaking to West Coast Today, she said: “I remember sitting with some of the other campaigners and technical experts when the announcement was made that the pilots’ names had been cleared.



“I was overwhelmed with emotion but it was double-pronged – I was relieved, but then one of the reporters who had come to be with us whilst the verdict was announced said, ‘Right, that’s it, job done.’



“We all turned to him and said, ‘No – we need to find out what happened. This is only the beginning.’ Then the phone hacking scandal broke and all the attention turned to that.”



Phoenix: Policing the Shadows, a 1996 book co-written by Dr Phoenix, is based on her husband’s diaries and uncovers the workings of covert operations in Northern Ireland. It has recently been turned into an audiobook, narrated by the couple’s son Niven, who also took part in the BBC documentary.



Dr Phoenix said: “Even 30 years on, we can’t let it rest. It was a cover-up and we are pleading with the government for the truth.”

https://d2zr548cf6pkkj.cloudfront.net/AcuCustom/Sitename/Documents/Creative/09BF9057CE964AF59B4EECE412463A45.jpg?cdn=149 (https://www.westcoasttoday.co.uk/UserExperience.cfm?cr=76&ca=41&zoneCode=1&cc=874)

Susan Phoenix and her son Niven are refusing to give up the fight for the truth about the crash.One of the technical experts who Dr Phoenix thanks for supporting the ongoing campaign for justice is David Hill, the author of a book on the tragedy called The Inconvenient Truth.



Mr Hill, a retired aeronautical engineer who worked in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for more than 30 years primarily as an avionics/aircraft programme manager, contributed to the review which eventually cleared the pilots’ names.



He said: "“The government declared the case closed, but there is no legal basis for doing so. The original findings have not been replaced and the aim of the investigation, to prevent recurrence, has not been met.



“If one asks the MoD for the official record, it will supply the original report. Negligent to a gross degree. Manslaughter. The truth remains concealed.”



He added: “The families are seldom given the opportunity to present the truth and on the odd occasion they have, MoD has refused to debate the issue. Their voices must be heard.”



An MoD spokesperson told us the organisation is satisfied a proper probe was carried out.



They added: “The Mull of Kintyre was a tragic accident and our thoughts and sympathies remain with the families, friends and colleagues of all those who died.



“In 2010, the government established the Mull of Kintyre Review, the findings of which were unequivocally accepted.



“This review considered that criticism of the board of inquiry, on the grounds that insufficient attention was paid to airworthiness and maintenance aspects, was unjustified, likewise it did not find new evidence to suggest mechanical failure, and no safety issues with the Chinook mark 2 were raised in the report.”

Mr Hill is now calling for political intervention to help finally establish the cause of the crash.



He said: “The disposition of the case rests with the Lord Advocate in Edinburgh, the senior law officer in Scotland. Successive incumbents have refused to re-open the Fatal Accident Inquiry or instruct the police.



“That is bad enough, but they have, in the process, wilfully ignored the known facts, content in the certain knowledge their 1996 inquiry was lied to.



“However, the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal’s Service, which acts on behalf of the Lord Advocate, has considered the ‘new’ facts; albeit briefly.



“Their decision was that, despite the accident and deaths occurring in Scotland, this was a matter for the Metropolitan Police in London, as that is where the offences took place. The Met have not replied to formal complaints. This impasse needs resolving at a political level.”



Argyll and Bute MP Brendan O’Hara this week also joined the calls for clarity.



He said: “Following reports in 2019 that relevant files pertaining to the disaster could be destroyed, I sought confirmation and reassurance from the UK Government that all the files they hold relating to the RAF Chinook helicopter crash would be preserved.



“Although the pilots’ names were finally cleared, the circumstances in which 29 UK service personnel died has never been fully explained. I cannot fathom as to why the MoD would even consider destroying these files which remain the only pathway to establish the truth of what happened.



“As we approach the 30th anniversary, I will write once again to the Secretary of State for Defence seeking confirmation that these files have not, and will not, be destroyed.



“The bereaved families must have that hope of finding out what exactly led to their loved ones losing their lives on that awful night.”



West Coast Today has also contacted the Metropolitan Police for comment but has not yet received a response.

Mr Hill said that while the authorities drag their heels, the family’s heartache continues.



He added: "The bereaved families, all 29 of them, are in limbo. Who caused the death of their loved ones?



“It is clear some accepted the findings against the pilots and moved on as best they could. A small few have always taken a keen interest in the facts and sought to understand them, consumed by grief and the deceits perpetrated upon them.



"This case is not over. Not by a long way.”

West Coast Today - News - ‘We can’t let it rest’ – families refuse to give up fight for Chinook crash truth (https://www.westcoasttoday.co.uk/news/exclusive-we-cant-let-it-rest--families-refuse-to-give-up-fight-for-chinook-crash-truth)

[Flipster130]

“If one asks the MoD for the official record, it will supply the original report. Negligent to a gross degree. Manslaughter. The truth remains concealed.”

This is the nub of it......the 'official record' is in quite clearly in error and cannot be allowed to stand - either in Scotland or Westminster......but how to get it changed?
Perhaps this should be the focus leading up to the 30th Anniversary?

[NutLoose]

Further on from the link above, links to both episodes on iplayer

https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m001vxy6/chinook-zulu-delta-576-series-1-1-catastrophic-loss?at_mid=cqWp2LsuQ6&at_campaign=Chinook_Zulu_Delta_576&at_medium=display_ad&at_campaign_type=owned&at_link_origin=discovery_cards&at_link_id=gr03&at_product=iplayer&at_brand=m001vxy8&at_ptr_name=bbc&at_ptr_type=media&at_format=image&at_objective=consumption&at_link_title=Chinook_Zulu_Delta_576&at_bbc_team=BBC

[Top West 50]

This is the nub of it......the 'official record' is in quite clearly in error and cannot be allowed to stand - either in Scotland or Westminster......but how to get it changed?
Perhaps this should be the focus leading up to the 30th Anniversary?
A little while before I presided over an inquiry into an aircraft accident in which all on board perished. Since there were no eye witnesses and neither a CVR or ADR, evidence was necessarily incomplete. Determination of the cause relied upon some supposition but, as I observed at the time, "when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth." But Sherlock Holmes was wrong because truth is absolute and, since all our crew had died and could not give evidence, there had to be an element of doubt, however tiny, when apportioning blame. In accordance with the legal guidance at the time, I did not find any of the crew to have been negligent (despite a lot of compelling evidence). I should think, but I don't know, that the President of the Chinook Board came to his conclusions in a similar way? I am sure, however, that he and his members did their honest best with the information they had at the time to discharge their duty in accordance with the direction of the Convening Authority. I apologise if this is obvious to other readers but the Convening Authority need not accept the findings of the Board, either in whole or part. All that became a matter of public record and it must stand. Grievance, I suggest, should be a different process.

[Shaft109]

Hello Top West, could you elaborate are you agreeing with the Gross Negligence finding or that there was a bulk of evidence that the Chinhook wasn't remotely airworthy that day and it's very plausible that it suffered from an UFCM or control jam over which they had no control unfortunately about 500' away from a cliff to their right?

[Chugalug2]

. In accordance with the legal guidance at the time, I did not find any of the crew to have been negligent (despite a lot of compelling evidence). I should think, but I don't know, that the President of the Chinook Board came to his conclusions in a similar way? I am sure, however, that he and his members did their honest best with the information they had at the time to discharge their duty in accordance with the direction of the Convening Authority. I apologise if this is obvious to other readers but the Convening Authority need not accept the findings of the Board, either in whole or part. All that became a matter of public record and it must stand. Grievance, I suggest, should be a different process.

"With the information they had at the time", Well, we know that they didn't have access to the one Chinook pilot who had probably more experience of flying and engine control malfunctions than most, the Odiham Station Test Pilot. He wasn't called and was ordered by his Station Commander to not put himself forward. Nor were they informed that the CA clearance was for "switch on use only", ie the aircraft was not cleared to fly in RAF service.

"Convening Authority need not accept the findings of the Board, either in whole or part.". Indeed, and therein lies the Achilles Heel of the RAF/MOD Air Safety system, whereby the perpetrators, ie those operating an aircraft with an illegal RTS can override a BoI that does not produce the required result, ie finding the pilots to be Grossly Negligent! That is why Air Accident Investigation (and Air Safety Regulation) must be independent of the operator (the RAF/MOD).

"All that became a matter of public record and it must stand. Grievance, I suggest, should be a different process". No, it mustn't stand, it must be challenged and reform enacted! The cover up must end; it has cost lives, treasure, and UK Air Power. It will go on doing so unless it ends and Air Safety reform is commenced.

Not sure what the last sentence even means. Care to explain?

[Top West 50]

Hello Top West, could you elaborate are you agreeing with the Gross Negligence finding or that there was a bulk of evidence that the Chinhook wasn't remotely airworthy that day and it's very plausible that it suffered from an UFCM or control jam over which they had no control unfortunately about 500' away from a cliff to their right?
I have no opinion on the findings, since i was not involved. I was making a comparison with my case where, according to the guidance at the time, it was not possible to find find negligence (since the crew had died).

[ShyTorque]

Top West 50,

Was that the Shackleton CFIT accident?

[Hot 'n' High]

...... I apologise if this is obvious to other readers but the Convening Authority need not accept the findings of the Board, either in whole or part. .........

Hi TW50, your observation is quite true ..... but one would hope that those overturning any finding do so with integrity and that such changes are based on hard evidence. Sadly, in the case of ZD576, this appears not to be the case. Kudos to you for reaching your decision in what must be a dreadful experience picking though the lead-up to a fatal accident - whatever the cause. Nearest I got to such lofty matters was being on the Board of a lowly CM. Fortunately, the hard evidence of guilt was compelling ... erm, once I'd pointed it's relevance out to the Prosecution who, amazingly, had missed it completely :ooh: .... and the subsequent list of "previous" was eye-wateringly long!!! :E Cheers, H 'n' H

[72forever]

Sir John Days Obituary in The Telegraph quite glosses over this whole episode. As can be seen I served on 72 when he was the boss and one couldn't have wished for a more decent fellow. However, I cannot agree at all with the decisions made in this instance. I watched the documentary and, having flown on numerous air tests with Bobby Burke I was amazed to see that he has hardly changed over the decades. Nothing new really came to light in the BBC program, all those who know, know it was a whitewash but sadly mud sticks.

[Chugalug2]

Sir John Days Obituary in The Telegraph quite glosses over this whole episode. As can be seen I served on 72 when he was the boss and one couldn't have wished for a more decent fellow. However, I cannot agree at all with the decisions made in this instance. I watched the documentary and, having flown on numerous air tests with Bobby Burke I was amazed to see that he has hardly changed over the decades. Nothing new really came to light in the BBC program, all those who know, know it was a whitewash but sadly mud sticks.

When he was your Boss he was a commander. Ditto when he commanded a Station, but outside of that is a bureaucracy and managers with grandiose titles. So he became a manager and thus participated in office politics. He was not alone in this, but Mull pointed up the difference as no other. I see that one of our more illustrious members covered Sir John Day's infamous Finding in a letter to the Royal Air Force News, which to its credit published it. I would only add to John Nichol's necessarily brief points that the Finding was set aside by the SoS for Defence, so the 'wider RAF' would have questionable justification if it did indeed 'support the finding of Gross Negligence'. Rather it would suggest that the BoI should have been reconvened to find out just why ZD576 crashed, killing all 29 occupants. Lord Philip in his Review determined that the Interim CAR was mandated upon the RAF. In effect it forbade the RAF flying the Chinook Mk2. Instead an illegal RTS was issued by ACAS with tragic consequences.

[Thud_and_Blunder]

I had no idea that the "RAF News", aka Pravda in my years in the service, was still going. That it allowed those comments to be published in Day's obit was inexcusable, but kudos to both JN for his timely letter and to the editorial staff for publishing the letter. I'm saddened that such attempts to airbrush the record may, if unchallenged, affect the way the young folk currently crewing RAF aircraft view the tragedy and its true cause(s).

[dervish]

Chug

Are you mellowing in old age? Mr Hill's book, the subject of this thread, offers proof in the form of MoD papers that flying the Mark 2 was not 'in effect' forbidden, but absolutely forbidden. Lord Philips agreed.

[Chugalug2]

I'm banged to rights, dervish, and no mistake! An unfortunate choice of words by me, and you were right to bring me to book (I've just seen what I did there!). The old age tag is certainly true too, though probably unlawful these days.

T&B, yes I too remember it as Pravda though I never subscribed. There was sometimes the odd copy though in the Crew Room, which usually confirmed the justice of its sobriquet.

The star chamber still clings to the ROs' finding, for what else can it do? If Gross Pilot negligence isn't to blame for 29 deaths then what is? As you say, dervish, David Hill has provided what a decent accident investigator could have done years ago if it were independent of the operator. Sadly it wasn't and still isn't, and the cover up continues as do the lies. Their Greatest Disgrace, indeed.

[Flipster130]

Chug
In fairness to the accident investigator Tony Cable - who was an excellent chap indeed, who was adamant both then and now that there was not much evidence at the crash site to go on (so bad was the impact and ensuing fire). But he did say the "Absence of Evidence is no way the same as Evidence of Absence" (referring to failures and faults and what the BOI and ROs inferred to mean the ac was 'serviceable'). Its been shown that the ac may have been serviceable but definitely wasn't 'airworthy' as the RTS was a fabrication.
It was also TC (and Rob Burke) who identified similar airworthiness failings in a Chinook crash in the FI in 1987.
I am sure you don't mean to cast aspersions at TC individually - more that you point the finger at the whole BOI process, mostly at the totally ineffective and jaundiced oversight by SROs which was very badly flawed - I think we can all agree on that. (The 1980 Tench Report is clear on this).
Don't forget that Rob Burke was controversially DIRECTLY ORDERED (by OC Ops Odiham) not to assist TC and the BOI in any way in Jun 1994....I wonder if that man has ever stopped to ask why? Why would senior Air Officers want to interfere with an investigation? ...I cant think!
Furthermore, I have seen a copy of the original BOI where it is so obvious that the words of the Chair of the BOI and Stn Cdr Odiham have been altered. perhaps more than once (under duress?).....more outside interference?
At least now, the DAAIB has properly trained investigators embedded within team - which is also more separate from the CoC. However, there is still too close a link with that chain perhaps as many are serving officers with annual reports to be written by the self-same CoC? I'm sure there are other issues with DAAIB but its definitely a step ahead of 1994. Also we have a more Just Culture (or so we are told)...but I hear you nonetheless!
Having said all that.....What if the equivalent of ZD576 were to happen tomorrow (foreign design, integration problems, no FDR, no survivors etc)? I wonder whether the modern investigation process would find out what the MOKG and Dave Hill & Co have done since and leading up to the Philip Inquiry.....doubt it. I was asked this question by the ZD576 BOI President - I said as much and he didn't correct me.

[dervish]

Flipster and Chug. From memory, although I've read the books again recently, Mr Hill discusses these issues at length. He obviously knows Mr Cable and Squadron Leader Burke very well and points out that both were astonished at the concealed evidence that emerged, and very keen to discuss this with the Review. Particularly that physical evidence was removed from the crash site before Mr Cable arrived, meaning it could not be part of his report. He was told the MoD examined it separately, and so were the lords I think, but they now admit they didn't and won't say what happened to it. Talking of investigators, it seems the reports from the other AAIB investigators have never been released and were never mentioned by the BOI. I'm sure you know all this!

[Chugalug2]

Flipster, I absolutely do not cast aspersions whatsoever at Tony Cable, quite the opposite. He wasn't a member of the BoI though, merely there to assist it. As with all such assistance, it could be utilised to the full or not. Rather like the only eye witness interviewed of the a/c's short transit across the sea, the so called 'lone yachtsman' (who wasn't alone!). He could have given so much more information if only the board had asked him the right questions. It didn't, so he couldn't. It would have clashed with the VSO 'reconstruction' presentation to the HoC Committee. Whether the BoI was so feeble because that was its brief, or it simply wasn't professional enough, or evidence was deliberately withheld from it, or all of those things, is open to question. Whatever, it is a damning indictment of UK Military Air Accident Investigation. It, and Military Air Regulation, needs to be separate from the MOD and from each other.

UK Military Air Safety now depends on good intentions, that those with the power to intervene and subvert investigations, won't. That's probably all that kept my little pink body safe when I depended on the likes of tucumseh to ensure that my aircraft were airworthy. All that changed when RAF VSOs illegally raided ring fenced Air Safety budgets to cover the losses incurred by a disastrous and incompetent AMSO policy. Hence the loss of UK Military Airworthiness, hence Mull, and all the other airworthiness related fatal air accidents that litter this forum. Is that all over now and we can put it all behind us and move on? Not by a long shot in my view. The cover up has to end and admitted to, and Accident Investigation and Air Regulation made independent of the operator (the MOD). Otherwise it will simply be deja vu all over again.

[Shackman]

Shy Torque (and TW50) - do you mean the Benbecula or the Mull of Kintyre Shackleton crash?

[Flipster130]

Chug
I think we are in violent agreement!!
:ok: