Virgin Australia hard landings ATSB report

[CIC]

Training Inconsistency Flagged In Virgin Australia Hard Landings | Aviation Week Network (https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/safety-ops-regulation/training-inconsistency-flagged-virgin-australia-hard-landings)

[Lookleft]

It was said that the 737 was a better jet to train on as the TC was able to intervene on their controls in case the trainee didn't do what was required at the time it was required. This report suggests that is not the case. The real problem though is the sub-contracting out of the endorsement training. Its not that the 3rd party contractor doesn't have the required skills, they would prefer to teach to the operator's SOP's but the airlines just want the aircraft type on the pilot's license and they will sort out the rest during revenue operations. So any bad habits that might have developed may not be noted until events such as this happen. The other problem is that the manufacturers have a fly by numbers mindset with landings which simulator's can accommodate but real world conditions do not.

[noclue]

PIC had a CC hat on not a TC hat.
This event highlights the grey a CC must live, between intervention and a check fail outcome vs intervention for safety of flight reasons.
The difference in time is minuscule and certainly less than anyone’s reaction time when weighing up the two options.

[43Inches]

The take-over line should be the same for a Check Captain or Line Captain. Line training, is not learning how to fly, it's type and SOP's familiarization. The point at which control should be taken should be the same line regardless, and that is as soon as safety of flight becomes an issue. If the approach looks like it will end badly, make sure all the correct calls and procedures are followed, as expected of a normal line flight. If you want to see how far a candidate will go wrong, stick em in the sim again and play games, not in the aircraft.

[Lookleft]

PIC had a CC hat on not a TC hat.

F/O's don't do line checks at 29 hours into their training. CC are also TC, being a CC does not stop you being rostered for TC duties. Either way you don't let the student smash it onto the runway, the TC or CC if they are in a control seat, is always the PIC.

[chookcooker]

Assuming the approach was a bit wild.

a perfectly flown approach can go pear shaped in the last 30’ very easily. Very very very little time to react.

[Lead Balloon]

What a difference 10’ (apparently) makes. What is the process through which a third party training organisation would be delivering training different to Boeing’s recommendations and the client’s SOPs?

[Xhorst]

Anyone got a link to the actual ATSB report? From the article, it sounds to me like the ATSB is barking up the wrong tree.

[junior.VH-LFA]

https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/2023-12/AO-2023-010%20Final.pdf

[Ollie Onion]

What a load of crap, if a professional pilot is really saying they landed hard as they were told to flare at 20ft instead of 30ft regardless of the actual dynamics of the landing then we are in trouble. Yes the SOP technique may be to flare at a given height but clearly this relies on how the approach has shaped up, you don’t just leave the flare if your ROD is high and say ‘but the book tells me I can’t do it above 20ft.’

[junior.VH-LFA]

What a load of crap, if a professional pilot is really saying they landed hard as they were told to flare at 20ft instead of 30ft regardless of the actual dynamics of the landing then we are in trouble. Yes the SOP technique may be to flare at a given height but clearly this relies on how the approach has shaped up, you don’t just leave the flare if your ROD is high and say ‘but the book tells me I can’t do it above 20ft.’

I think you'll find the individual involved despite the hours listed on the ATSB report has spent very minimal time in the control seat of anything other than a DA40. Not that that matters, but just for context.

[Xhorst]

Thanks, LFA.

Not criticising the crew here, criticising the report.

From the report:
The training provider who trained the pilot of the occurrence landing stated that they used the Boeing 737 NG/MAX flight crew training manual (FCTM) when training pilots to land. However, they taught pilots to mentally prepare for the flare at 30 ft and to flare at 25 ft rather than 20 ft.

Anyone who has flown and/or conducted training on a B737 would know that if a newbie tries to flare at 20 ft, they will end up flaring at 10 ft, which is exactly what happened on the subject landing, and is exactly why landing is taught as per the above quote.

However, after the external type rating, the airline conducted their own simulator sessions and:

As part of their OCC, the operator conducted 8 simulator training sessions with FOs. During the last training session, the operator trained the pilots to begin flaring the aircraft at 20 ft and went through the steps for the recovery of bounced landings.

It appears that this last simulator session may have introduced confusion (as inferred by the ATSB), followed by check-captain-itis:

After the occurrence, the FO reported that although the operator’s training manuals and the OCC training required pilots to flare the aircraft at 20 ft, they were more comfortable flaring at 30 ft as originally trained. They advised that during all landings conducted prior to the occurrence flight, flare was initiated at 30 ft. The FO recalled that on the day of the occurrence, due to flying with a check captain, they made a last-minute decision to follow the operator’s procedures to initiate flaring the aircraft at a height of 20 ft.

The ATSB is pointing the finger at the training technique of thinking "flare" at 30 ft. Barking up the wrong tree. That is an entirely appropriate flaring technique for a B737, particularly for new pilots. I suspect that none of the authors of this report have ever flown a B737.

Regardless, the late flare was not the root cause of the hard landing*. The initial touch down was not recorded as hard, it resulted in a 3 ft bounce. This needs to then become a bounce recovery. The hard landing* (if it even was one) was actually the result of bounce recovery technique, which is not addressed by the findings of the report at all.

*Boeing provides information (not addressed in the ATSB report) that a QAR report of a hard landing and associated G-loadings are not accurate. The most accurate assessment of a hard landing comes from the crew, and the report states that neither crew regarded it as a hard landing. So this report could actually be all about nothing other than a bounce which was recovered.

[Icarus2001]

Regardless, the late flare was not the root cause of the hard landing*. The initial touch down was not recorded as hard, it resulted in a 3 ft bounce. This needs to then become a bounce recovery. The hard landing* (if it even was one) was actually the result of bounce recovery technique, which is not addressed by the findings of the report at all.


​​​​​​​I think you nailed it.

[KBNA]

I am surprised that no other issues have been mentioned with the trends in hiring now and this individual. This individual has pushed the #xxxxxxpilot card for their whole career.

What a load of crap, if a professional pilot is really saying they landed hard as they were told to flare at 20ft instead of 30ft regardless of the actual dynamics of the landing then we are in trouble. Yes the SOP technique may be to flare at a given height but clearly this relies on how the approach has shaped up, you don’t just leave the flare if your ROD is high and say ‘but the book tells me I can’t do it above 20ft.’

[Pinky the pilot]

A question from someone who in his career never got anywhere near heavies, but someone once told me that the 737 was one of the easiest to fly, compared to 'others.'

Any truth to that? Just asking.

[esreverlluf]

A question from someone who in his career never got anywhere near heavies, but someone once told me that the 737 was one of the easiest to fly, compared to 'others.'

Any truth to that? Just asking.
In my experience of 3 x Boeing and 2 x Airbus types, the 737-800 was the far more difficult and quirky to fly - probably as a result of over 50 years of stretches, redesigns, upgrades and various bandaid fixes or legacy "features" dictated by their largest customer rather than by any other measure. Having said that - fun to fly and a really versatile machine.

[Mr Mossberg]

I am surprised that no other issues have been mentioned with the trends in hiring now and this individual. This individual has pushed the #xxxxxxpilot card for their whole career.

You reckon anyone is going to bring that up as a factor? You'd have to be a brave person, or very close to retirement.

I just love all the social media takeoffs and landings. If it's a bloke pilot, the cameras are pointed on the throttle quadrant and outside, if it's a female pilot the cameras are pointed on the......female, no outside views.

[SHSS]

Training Inconsistency Flagged In Virgin Australia Hard Landings | Aviation Week Network (https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/safety-ops-regulation/training-inconsistency-flagged-virgin-australia-hard-landings)
Standby for more hard landings if VA pilots commence the flare at 20ft. Absolute dribble.

[BraceBrace]

Absolute dribble.

Same can be said about the 30ft and mental preparation blabla. Reduce thrust too quickly and a hard landing is on it's way... (and in my training experience this is the most common source of hard landings, especially with 0hrs previous experience on "jets").

The FCTM gives a pretty accurate description and I don't think it's necessary to explain it any differently to the trainee. Shifting eyesight to the end of the runway to asses descent rate and pitch attitude, "approaching 20ft" start the pitch up 2-3° (not more) and only then reducing the throttles to idle smoothly. Pitch control then allows to control slightly the rate of descent with some back pressure on the CC. You fly it on the runway.

Some "classic veterans" might prefer to keep some knots extra which is fine as wind corrections allow for the same corrections. If so, it is easier to control rate of descent but you have to be careful not to overcorrect the pitch to avoid floating.

[KRUSTY 34]

THEY!

Sorry, I know it isn't particularly relevant, but the use of this term to describe an individual really does my head in. A product no doubt of appeasing the sensitive, insecure, and woke minority.

Notwithstanding the absolute destruction of basic grammar in an official document!

[framer]

The FCTM gives a pretty accurate description and I don't think it's necessary to explain it any differently to the trainee.
I agree 100%.
At the end of the day this bit of the flight is different to most other parts of the flight in that it is 100% visual. It’s nothing but flying a plane. I suspect that many people who have difficulty landing consistently are weaving in some other form of perception, ie rad alt call outs or rad alt heights or something, and that will only work in relatively benign conditions. The FCTM uses the runway end as a cue because there will always be a runway end on each landing, there may not be a rad alt call or there may be no time to check a rad alt read out. The cue to initiate the flare should come from visual peripheral perceptions and it might be at 30 ft or it might be at 15tt. If new FO’s can sneak through training with a rote technique based on something other than visual perceptions outside the aircraft then when they get to a more challenging landing condition ( gusty crosswinds etc) they won’t have the habit of looking out the window to the far end sufficiently embedded to do a nice job of it.

[C441]

The FCTM uses the runway end as a cue because there will always be a runway end on each landing,
Not on an 800m+ runway in 800m vis.

[No Idea Either]

It’s just………the vibe (apologies Dennis)

[43Inches]

The ATSB is pointing the finger at the training technique of thinking "flare" at 30 ft. Barking up the wrong tree. That is an entirely appropriate flaring technique for a B737, particularly for new pilots. I suspect that none of the authors of this report have ever flown a B737.

The report points the finger at the difference in expected technique and the PFs decision to use a different technique on one flight after being taught another technique. If Boeing says that higher flare heights will result in hard or bounced landings you are pretty much stuffed if a bounce or hard landing occurs, legally, if you vary from that technique. So the ATSB analysis is correct even if in practice you might have easing procedures that work in 99% of occasions. If you vary from a manufacturers procedure you better hope that they agree with you when it goes wrong, which they won't as their documents are written to cover their own arse. If you wish to vary the procedure you need to have it approved by the manufacturer.

Regardless, the late flare was not the root cause of the hard landing*. The initial touch down was not recorded as hard, it resulted in a 3 ft bounce. This needs to then become a bounce recovery. The hard landing* (if it even was one) was actually the result of bounce recovery technique, which is not addressed by the findings of the report at all.

That is addressed in the report, the fact being the bounce resulted from the initial landing, so the initial landing technique was the root cause. Bounces and such in aircraft like this are far more an issue than simple aircraft bounces due to the unknown factor of what the drag systems will do, such as whether the spoilers activate or not.

*Boeing provides information (not addressed in the ATSB report) that a QAR report of a hard landing and associated G-loadings are not accurate. The most accurate assessment of a hard landing comes from the crew, and the report states that neither crew regarded it as a hard landing. So this report could actually be all about nothing other than a bounce which was recovered.

The FDR recorded the second touchdown at over the 2.2g limit that constitutes a hard landing. I'm not sure there is any aircraft maintenance manual that will conduct inspections on crew advice only, the crew advice will result in a FDR analysis that will determine what maintenance action is required. Considering the cost involved in inspections of this nature and the downtime I would suggest the FDR data is paramount in deciding what is done. I Understand that QARs can be less accurate than the FDR, however I would suggest the Boeing advice is more to counter any understatement of G loadings from the QAR, ie the crew feel it was a hard landing but the QAR says it's not. Imagine the report on a 737 that had a landing gear structural failure within 10 cycles of a QAR reported 3 g landing and the crew stated it was not hard so no inspection carried out. We all know what almost happened to the VA ATR that had an improper inspection following a turbulence and poor control input event.

[BraceBrace]

Not on an 800m+ runway in 800m vis.

It is true that it is much harder using simply a shorter section of centerline lights but the basic principle is the same. On the other hand, good training could also be to decide on an autoland in limited visibility... after all we train to be safe (and I hope you didn't mean 800m landing runway in training...)

To quote the FCTM it says "far end of the runway". The rate of descent assesment is done using peripheral vision. The far vision is a "locking" point for your vision, but the assesment is done by assessing how fast the shoulders (the runway sides just in front of the flightdeck) are rising in relation to that far end. Anyway, that's how I explain that part at least.

[Propjet88]

Jacobson Flare anyone? https://www.jacobsonflare.com/

[C441]

It is true that it is much harder using simply a shorter section of centerline lights but the basic principle is the same. On the other hand, good training could also be to decide on an autoland in limited visibility... after all we train to be safe (and I hope you didn't mean 800m landing runway in training...)

To quote the FCTM it says "far end of the runway". The rate of descent assesment is done using peripheral vision. The far vision is a "locking" point for your vision, but the assesment is done by assessing how fast the shoulders (the runway sides just in front of the flightdeck) are rising in relation to that far end. Anyway, that's how I explain that part at least.
Just pointing out that there's not always going to be a (visible) runway end as suggested in the quoted post - "The FCTM uses the runway end as a cue because there will always be a runway end on each landing,"

I agree too, that reasonable discretion would suggest that in reduced visibility an autoland, if available, would be a prudent choice - training or not.

[framer]

Sorry C441, I was lazy with my quote. What I meant was that the moment to shift your gaze to the far end of the runway, is when the threshold passes under the nose of the aircraft, and the threshold passing under the nose of the aircraft is always going to happen, on every landing. From the FCTM;
When​ the threshold passes out of​ sight under the airplane nose, shift the visual ​
sighting​ point to the far end of the runway
I also understand that once the basics of landing are squared away and consistent, there are other things to consider such as horizons lowering due to poor visibility.
Cheers

[nomorecatering]

Was there a committe of first officers landing the aircraft..............."they"

Honestly I can't read this **** any more.

[framer]

Was there a committe of first officers landing the aircraft..............."they"
I think one of the reasons the whole woke they/them stuff winds people up is because it’s like a marker, or a sign, that the people involved are removed from real work and consequence. We get organisations like Universities and Government departments and sections of large corporations pushing and utilising the they/them type of language and meanwhile, the folks who are on approach at 1am in poor weather trying to teach someone how to safely land an aircraft know that gender pronouns are not as important as a) landing a plane full of people safely and b) writing an accurate and useful report when learnings are to be had.
The ‘workers’ take full responsibility for ‘landing a plane full of people safely’ while the paper pushers wring their hands about pronouns and don’t actually understand what is important. It might even be because they don’t understand what it is like to take responsibility in a high consequence environment that they literally don’t understand what is important. Either way, I think they/them annoys people who do carry real responsibility day in day out whether that be in an aircraft, building a road, or delivering critical services because they see people fretting about something that doesn’t matter when much more important things are being neglected.

[neville_nobody]

I agree too, that reasonable discretion would suggest that in reduced visibility an autoland, if available, would be a prudent choice - training or not.



Assuming ATC want to turn on low viz procedures. I have had a couple of instances where auto land would have been prudent but it wasn’t an option.

[Capt Fathom]

You don’t need low viz procedures to be in force to carry out an autoland. ATC will just advise you the critical areas are not protected.

[neville_nobody]

You don’t need low viz procedures to be in force to carry out an autoland. ATC will just advise you the critical areas are not protected.

Yes I am well aware of that and if you wish to take that risk in deteriorating visibility that’s your choice but you will have a lot of difficulty explaining why you bent an aircraft and wound up on the front page of every newspaper in this country if you get unlucky.

Singapore’s runway excursion in Munich would be a good example of what can go wrong if you want to take the risk.

[By George]

So, in an effort to keep up, if the autopilot did the landing we would have to say, 'It' did it with them pilots watching?

Autopilots must have feelings too, especially if they are called George.

[BraceBrace]

Assuming ATC want to turn on low viz procedures. I have had a couple of instances where auto land would have been prudent but it wasn’t an option.

You are stretching reality. You can start by communicating. In this case nobody informed anybody. I had a couple of instances where with simple communication ATC was helpfull enough to keep others out of the sensitive area. There were also cases where it was unable to do so, so we simply were very go-around minded.

[Lookleft]

Yes I am well aware of that and if you wish to take that risk in deteriorating visibility that’s your choice but you will have a lot of difficulty explaining why you bent an aircraft and wound up on the front page of every newspaper in this country if you get unlucky.
The only time you are committed to the landing is when the thrust reversers are deployed. Even if low vis procedures are in force and the critical area is protected, at any time the ILS, rad alt or any other system could fail so you are always "at risk" of bending an aircraft if you don't follow the procedures.