Cirrus down Gundaroo, 06/10/23

[KRviator]

From the ABC (https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-10-06/possible-plane-crash-gundaroo-north-of-canberra/102945326):
Emergency services responding to reported plane crash outside Gundaroo, north of Canberra
Emergency services have been called to a reported plane crash at Gundaroo, a small town north of Canberra.

NSW Police said they received a report that a plane had crashed and caught alight just before 3:00pm today.

Firefighters, police and the ambulance service are at the scene, which is close to the Federal Highway and Lake George.

It is unclear how many people were on board the plane.Both FA & FR24 show VH-MSF, a Cirrus planned YSCB-YARM in the area at the time, and in a rapid descent from ~9,000 in the vicinity, and failing to reappear. Whoever it was, hopefully they've been able to walk away from it, but it doesn't sound promising...:(

EDIT:Added photos from onthesceneACT. (https://www.onsceneact.com.au/index.php/645-plane-crashes-in-gundaroo-north-of-canberra)
https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1500x844/20231006_gundaroo_crash_001_87658df57a28e46e7d1c989d17b76821 356cb151.jpg

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1500x844/20231006_gundaroo_crash_004_a8bf306ad6b6bf47da47514ce79e94af b05b8f0f.jpg

[Desert Flower]

Channel 10 news is saying there are no survivors.

DF

[Magnetomick]

[[color=#333333]Looks like pancaked from vision I can see, could shute been deployed?
Or is there slide marks across the road?

[Dick Smith]

It's about 3 km from my strip. Deepest condolences.

[Squawk7700]

Very sad.

Last radio call to departures was ops normal.

FR suggests 12,000fpm descent rate at <120 knots.

It’s a G1 and they have a one piece wing.

It sounds catastrophic.

[Dr1sRule]

There's nothing left to investigate . It looks like the remains of an ancient campfire.

[Desert Flower]

There's nothing left to investigate . It looks like the remains of an ancient campfire.

Yes. If you weren't told it was the scene of an aircraft crash it would be hard to know what it was.

DF.

[TBM-Legend]

I thought they had a ballistic chute

[atakacs]

I thought they had a ballistic chute
They do.
Still need to deploy it in (relative) reasonable conditions.

[Jenna Talia]

Icing?

[KRviator]

I thought they had a ballistic chuteThey're supposed to! Which makes this one strange. Looking at FA and the recent flights, they've all been filed at set 1000's in altitudes, not Alt+500, indicative of routine operations under the IFR.

Latest news reports (https://www.news.com.au/national/at-least-one-dead-in-plane-crash-near-canberra/news-story/4499f771d7d7b8ae0ebe08567f2f00e5) are saying a pilot + 3 kids on board, too. :mad:

Icing?FZL per the 0500-1100Z GAF was listed as 8000'N / 5000'S for the area, with BKN CU/SC5000/10000. Possible...
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1120x563/pprune_42df0eb033765cb964fcbde7667f4480c55f53f5.jpg

[Hammerstan]

FR shows maintaining groundspeed in low fpm descent at time 20231006 03:47 UTC after reaching top of climb, then followed by slowing groundspeed with increasingly rapid descent. Explanations?

[physicus]

Looks like something catastrophic happened. KMZ and CSV from RealTraffic - Fly with real air traffic (http://www.flyrealtraffic.com) attached.

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1176x898/screenshot_2023_10_06_at_09_08_57_001a9ffafa18a1c5e2de67b588 1548895ce9f042.png

[outnabout]

Worse…..grandpa took three of the grandkids out for a School holiday blast.

https://www.news.com.au/national/at-least-one-dead-in-plane-crash-near-canberra/news-story/4499f771d7d7b8ae0ebe08567f2f00e5


the flight profile is heartbreaking…


https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/920x2000/img_3696_ad27efcdf27138bd1fc57528024d5a88adf11198.png

[Paul O'Rourke]

Some observations:

From flightaware - Flight out of Canberra shows straight tracking upto 7800’ (1013 datum) then tracking looks handflown.



On the way down, at 7300’ (1013 datum) the ROD is 9811 at around 80° angle of depression. 18 seconds later the ROD at 3550’ (1013 datum) is reduced 41% to 5714 fpm at an 83° angle of depression.

[TBM-Legend]

Maybe an evil thought…

[Capt Fathom]

No mayday and no chute. Quite unusual. Incapacitation?

[Mr Mossberg]

Maybe an evil thought…

Hate to think it right.

[NZFlyingKiwi]

It's a bit hard to imagine incapacitation leading to that sort of flight profile unless it was a seizure or something causing a total lockup on the controls. I'd think even with someone slumped over the stick (which doesn't seem very likely with a Cirrus sidestick anyway) the aerodynamic forces involved would eventually shallow the descent out a bit. You would assume he would have shown the kids how to operate the parachute too in case he suddenly keeled over.

[Checkboard]

Autopilot on VS climb. Heart attack or similar. Young children not understanding anything about the aircraft or 'chute. Stall. Descent to terrain. :(

[Squawk7700]

Autopilot on VS climb. Heart attack or similar. Young children not understanding anything about the aircraft or 'chute. Stall. Descent to terrain. :(

I was thinking the same and was also thinking that my 10 year old would know enough to try and pull the chute, I will admit though, that in the heat of the moment he wound likely forget and I’d be keen to know how hard you actually have to pull it which he may struggle with.

As I was saying earlier they are a one piece wing, I doubt something happened there, however this is a 2002 model, serial number 157, something could have happened with the tail of the aircraft… there looked to be some dirty clouds around at the time and it didn’t look overly smooth.

65 is not exactly the age you’d expect for a sudden incapacitation, but of course( it could happen to anyone I guess.

Terribly sad.

[megan]

The 65 year old man, who was an experienced pilot, was on board the four-seater Cirrus SR22 with his 11 year old grandson and his two granddaughters who were aged nine and sixA lot of tears being shed in a few homes, poor kids sitting there knowing nowt. :{:{:{65 is not exactly the age you’d expect for a sudden incapacitation, but of course( it could happen to anyone I guessCan happen at any age unfortunately.

[TBM-Legend]

Very sad indeed

[PoppaJo]

Autopilot on VS climb. Heart attack or similar. Young children not understanding anything about the aircraft or 'chute. Stall. Descent to terrain. :(
From what I recall, SR22 Autopilot will disconnect in severe turbulence.

Certainly seems like it was in use, then disconnected for whatever reason looking at that profile.

Unknown why the chute wasn’t deployed however. Has been a few Cirrus IMC events however still successfully deployed the chute and lives saved. However it could have been deployed, we don’t know.

Truly tragic event. No words.

[43Inches]

It's a bit hard to imagine incapacitation leading to that sort of flight profile unless it was a seizure or something causing a total lockup on the controls. I'd think even with someone slumped over the stick (which doesn't seem very likely with a Cirrus sidestick anyway) the aerodynamic forces involved would eventually shallow the descent out a bit. You would assume he would have shown the kids how to operate the parachute too in case he suddenly keeled over.

I've been thinking the same. The profile looks almost like a bomb dropped from level flight and hard to fathom that something with wings would sustain that on its own. However the rate of descent only reaches 120 or so mph, so some sort of drag is stopping it from going faster. Is it possible the chute partially deployed and fouled the controls? As someone else has hinted at the other option for that sort of profile is not something we want to hear.

[Lead Balloon]

Perhaps severe icing, stall and spin, tangling the chute and damaging comms antennas.

Please everyone: Don’t feed the beast with speculation about sudden incapacitation and ‘evil thought’, especially when it’s a nonsensical explanation just on the cockpit ergonomics of a Cirrus and what actually happens if you point most any ‘light’ aircraft straight at the ground. It’s an awful enough outcome without the AvMeds of the world milking it before the smoke’s dissipated. The pilot’s medical history and domestic circumstances will be revealed, eventually.

[Squawk7700]

Descent rate under chute is less than 2,000 fpm, forward speed less than 20 knots and time to deploy down to near zero forward speed is less than 10 seconds.

There are only a very limited number of ways that an aircraft can lose that much altitude in that short space of time and pushing the nose forward does not result in the profile shown above.

If it was in a spin for whatever reason it entered, the chute was the only practical solution available. Build date 2002, so in theory it would have just had it’s second 10 year chute re-pack completed, so presumably it was in good operating condition.

[FullMetalJackass]

Autopilot on VS climb. Heart attack or similar. Young children not understanding anything about the aircraft or 'chute. Stall. Descent to terrain. :(
Assuming his Cirrus was fitted with (eg) an STEC 55 - the pilot would have had to have engaged a roll mode first - heading, nav or similar; however looking at Flightaware track log, either it was extremely bumpy at the altitude he was flying, with heading fluctuations left and right or, more likely, the pilot was hand flying - compare the track log with the previous flight where you can see the pilot was definitely using his autopilot - hardly any fluctuation in heading at all.

Ice certainly a possibility but if the plane had iced up, was descending uncontrollably, I would have expected the pilot to pull the chute - assuming he was capable of doing so. I don't believe that the pilot would have "forgotten" the chute because when I owned a Cirrus, we always brought CAPS into our decision making process, even when practicing emergencies. And if you're transporting your grandchildren, you'll be even less inclined to take risks, so I believe the pilot was incapacitated, the plane simply stalled whilst iced up.

Unfortunately if the pilot is incapacitated, this meant that most likely a small boy aged 11 was sitting in the front seat, I'm not so sure he could have reached, certainly not have pulled with the force required, the parachute, especially if the aircraft was spinning.....

My thoughts go out to the families.....

[43Inches]

Descent rate under chute is less than 2,000 fpm, forward speed less than 20 knots and time to deploy down to near zero forward speed is less than 10 seconds.

There are only a very limited number of ways that an aircraft can lose that much altitude in that short space of time.

My comment about the chute was more in regards to some sort of chute malfunction, of course fully deployed RoD would be well less. But what if somehow it was activated and fouled in the tail surface, or only opened enough to basically turn the aircraft into an unguided retarded bomb.

On spins or spiral dives, the profile and heading seems to be a turn to the right as it descends, but not in the pattern of a spiral dive for sure and the heading stability would suggest not a spin. And speed wise it looked like it was accelerating to cruise when it suddenly just dived, so it doesn't look like a stall spin scenario, at least at the onset.

[Squawk7700]

Oh I wasn’t disagreeing with you 43, I was just quoting some rough numbers on the chute operation.

[aroa]

Diabolical. Even more so when kids are involved. Will be very interested to hear what the investigation has to say when done. And I hope ATSB do a very through job on it.
RIP those 4. Tragic in the extreme.

[Capt Fathom]

Not much wreckage left for the ATSB to investigate. Some accidents can remain a mystery.

[BronteExperimental]

Very early days. There could well be more than one debris field. It’s pretty hard to envisage scenarios for that kind of ROD for an intact airframe.

[Lead Balloon]

Build date 2002, so in theory it would have just had it’s second 10 year chute re-pack completed, so presumably it was in good operating condition.Hopefully that will be confirmed as part of the ATSB's investigation into the maintenance history of the aircraft.

[runway16]

Four seats not five. Refer to TCDS. Later serials had five seats. Media jumped onto five seats too early.
R

[triathlon]

Was the pilot a student perhaps, fresh gfpt on a fun flight, could be trying to have fun around clouds for the kids?

[Lead Balloon]

CAPS Event database here (https://www.cirruspilots.org/Safety/CAPS-Event-History).

[PoppaJo]

Was the pilot a student perhaps , fresh gfpt on a fun flight , could be trying to have fun around clouds for the kids ?
According to the Aero Club, PPL holder 20+ years, IFR rated.

[Squawk7700]

Was the pilot a student perhaps, fresh gfpt on a fun flight, could be trying to have fun around clouds for the kids?

Have you read any of the articles yet? Clearly not well!

[43Inches]

This is the only accident I could find that is remotely similar;

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/310048

However it seems once the parachute failed and detached the aircraft then accelerated to very high speed as you would expect from such nose down attitude.

Was the pilot a student perhaps , fresh gfpt on a fun flight , could be trying to have fun around clouds for the kids?

​​​​​​​Experienced pilot with hundreds of hours is what is quoted by the media.

[triathlon]

This is the only accident I could find that is remotely similar;

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/310048

However it seems once the parachute failed and detached the aircraft then accelerated to very high speed as you would expect from such nose down attitude.



Experienced pilot with hundreds of hours is what is quoted by the media.

I have learnt over the years that the media is not into facts , one report said the kids were his, so I could be correct about being a student pilot

[triathlon]

Have you read any of the articles yet? Clearly not well!
articles written by media are often lacking credible facts, look at the gaslighting during covid with lies, so I could be right , a studen pilot , older man fulfilling a childhood dream late in life

[KRviator]

articles written by media are often lacking credible facts, look at the gaslighting during covid with lies, so I could be right , a studen pilot , older man fulfilling a childhood dream late in lifeOr you could have read what I posted earlier about filed altitudes being at IFR levels. Student pilots A-typically do not file a plan at all and B- when they do, they don't file IFR...

[43Inches]

articles written by media are often lacking credible facts, look at the gaslighting during covid with lies, so I could be right , a studen pilot , older man fulfilling a childhood dream late in life

Definitely not a student, IFR planned, Canberra to Armidale is what is listed. They know who was flying, and with who, so I'm fairly confident the media is not making it up.

[BronteExperimental]

There’s a very low probability of anything you read about this incident in the press being accurate at this early stage. We all know they have NFI when it comes to aviation (but it’s ok, everything else is reliable…)
How this for quality journalism:


“Referred to as Mike Sierra Foxtrot, the plane is heard replying "copy" as he is cleared for takeoff.

Later in the flight, air traffic controllers tell the pilot to "resume navigation and track direct to Cullen", referring to a small town in NSW.

"Direct, Cullen, Mike Sierra Foxtrot," the pilot is heard replying.”

[VH-MLE]

I tend to agree with BronteExperimental on the potential of more than one debris field. I cannot call too many accidents where such a total obliteration has occurred without some bits of metal (part of a wing etc) being present.

[Cloudee]

I tend to agree with BronteExperimental on the potential of more than one debris field. I cannot call too many accidents where such a total obliteration has occurred without some bits of metal (part of a wing etc) being present.
There’s not much metal in a Cirrus wing.

[Lead Balloon]

Yes, there's not much left after a post-crash fire in a Cirrus. 'Plastic' plus Avgas = big fire and not much left. The POB this one survived, albeit one had serious injuries.

*** NOTE: THIS IS NOT - REPEAT NOT - A PHOTO OF THE AFTERMATH OF THE TRAGEDY THE SUBJECT OF THIS THREAD. IT IS A PHOTO OF THE AFTERMATH OF A DIFFERENT INCIDENT WHICH THE PERSONS ON BOARD SURVIVED. THE POINT OF THE PHOTO IS TO SHOW THE EFFECTS OF A POST-IMPACT FIRE ON A CIRRUS TYPE AIRCRAFT AFTER A 'NORMAL' CAPS DESCENT. ***
https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1515/burnt_out_cirrus_82c1ca1a1a7790fd0173ee6bff5f0fb082338bec.jp g

[SOPS]

articles written by media are often lacking credible facts, look at the gaslighting during covid with lies, so I could be right , a studen pilot , older man fulfilling a childhood dream late in life
We are talking about a crash here that killed four people. Can you please give your Covid conspiracy theories a rest.

[Lead Balloon]

This is the only accident I could find that is remotely similar;

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/310048What about this one (https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/44566).

[43Inches]

My experience with icing is that it does not stack on so quickly that you can't tell someone about it, even in severe ice you have time to ask for a change of level, descent etc. The flight profile does not really fit sudden icing, and a stall. What I do see in those two failed chute deployments is that once the chute detaches the aircraft does nose dive very rapidly at high descent rate and speed. This event seems to start from climb speed, not particularly slow, there is still some altitude gain indicated after speed washes off rapidly, and then a brick like descent, but not accelerating to what you would expect for such a vertical descent profile. That's why I was thinking maybe some sort of chute malfunction, it deploys badly, the drag link pitches the nose up while forward speed reduces rapidly, then it arcs over into a semi drag arrested descent. In any case it's a tragedy and I hope those with the expertise and more information can put together something we all can learn from. The whole thing happened very quickly, so I don't put much weight on no 'mayday' being a significant marker.

[Clare Prop]

Was the pilot a student perhaps, fresh gfpt on a fun flight, could be trying to have fun around clouds for the kids?

Quite apart from anything else, The GFPT was abolished nearly ten years ago.

I'm thinking maybe structural failure of the tailplane as a reason for a descent like this. Horrific whatever it was. RIP

[Squawk7700]

I'm thinking maybe structural failure of the tailplane as a reason for a descent like this. Horrific whatever it was. RIP

I’ve been thinking the same thing. It’s one of the older examples out there. Turbulence can cause all of sorts of stresses. The Gen 1 cirrus does not have detachable wings, which is the reason why until later on that they were all flown to Australia from the USA, so it sounds unlikely that a wing fell off. The tail section (elevator?) is a different story, but this would surely be the first ever based on previous readings. Short of a spin or missing tail section, there aren’t that many ways to get a 1.5t aircraft from that altitude to the ground in such a short space of time.

[ozbiggles]

It is ironic that so many people here are saying the media is full of speculation and inaccuracies….

[Squawk7700]

It is ironic that so many people here are saying the media is full of speculation and inaccuracies….

Best to discuss it whilst it’s fresh, because in 2 years when the report comes out it will be long since forgotten.

It’s good to discuss it. Since yesterday, 2 pilots have mentioned to me that they will better brief their children on the use of CAPS as they are a similar age. Even for my own learning I didn’t know it would take 2 hands of a 10 year old and a “chin up” on the handle to get it to deploy,

[BronteExperimental]

It is ironic that so many people here are saying the media is full of speculation and inaccuracies….

Most posters here would consider the discussion informed speculation. nothing more.
the press does not consider themselves a rumor network and charges the reader for content that when it comes to aviation matters, is rarely better than (mis)informed speculation and supposition - with a scattering of “facts”.
there’s your irony.

[Clare Prop]

I’ve been thinking the same thing. It’s one of the older examples out there. Turbulence can cause all of sorts of stresses. The Gen 1 cirrus does not have detachable wings, which is the reason why until later on that they were all flown to Australia from the USA, so it sounds unlikely that a wing fell off. The tail section (elevator?) is a different story, but this would surely be the first ever based on previous readings. Short of a spin or missing tail section, there aren’t that many ways to get a 1.5t aircraft from that altitude to the ground in such a short space of time.
Hmm, when I was flying meat bombers one big danger was if a chute got tangled in the tailplane. That's why we had to wear parachutes as well. Just a thought.
Could a chute deploy in normal flight and get tangled in the tail?

[ACMS]

Is it possible someone pulled the chute when the Pilot wasn’t ready or watching?
What happens in a Cirrus when you pull the chute at cruise speed? It wouldn’t be too good at high speed would it?

[Lead Balloon]

No, it wouldn’t.

In this event (https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/44566) the BRS folks determined that the system was deployed above 133kts IAS.

In this event (https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/310048), this year, a witness reported that nearly 6 minutes after the impact of the aircraft, an empty parachute could be seen descending through the clouds.

The event database includes a couple of ‘on ground’ deployments attributable to nearby storms and static electricity.

[TBM-Legend]

Peter Nally has been identified as the pilot.

A very good guy who founded the Brisbane Flying Group over 30 years ago. A very keen and knowledgeable pilot who I’ve known since the ‘90’s

RIP Peter and your loving grandchildren

[VHOED191006]

The Daily Telegraph is reporting that CAPS 'failed' to deploy. Are they just stating that it didn't deploy or that something went wrong with the system? Either way, how horrible. RIP <3

[Lead Balloon]

Angus Mitchell seems to be keeping a low profile on this one.

ABC news said the investigation could take up to a few weeks. I'm assuming they meant the on-site part of the investigation.

[I spy]

The Daily Telegraph is reporting that CAPS 'failed' to deploy. Are they just stating that it didn't deploy or that something went wrong with the system? Either way, how horrible. RIP <3
Yeah, I just read that too.
Still think it was sudden pilot incapacitation. What else really could it be. No Mayday at all??My thoughts are with all affected obviously........but especially the parents who lost 3 out of their 5 children, and the daughter, who also lost her own father in the crash

[Lead Balloon]

How does sudden pilot incapacitation result in an aircraft plummeting to the ground?

[PoppaJo]

Yeah, I just read that too.
Still think it was sudden pilot incapacitation. What else really could it be. No Mayday at all??
Well we need to know if it was VMC or IMC.

I am reading many mixed messages. Some say the turbulence was significant in the area. Others are saying they noted lenticular clouds in the area during the morning. Others are saying the wind was quite volatile around that time and shifted dramatically. One media outlet noted it was perfect conditions.

Can anyone comment on turbulence they have experienced from the ranges to the West of Lake George?

[KRviator]

Well we need to know if it was VMC or IMC.

I am reading many mixed messages. Some say the turbulence was significant in the area. Others are saying they noted lenticular clouds in the area during the morning. Others are saying the wind was quite volatile around that time and shifted dramatically. One media outlet noted it was perfect conditions.

Can anyone comment on turbulence they have experienced from the ranges to the West of Lake George?He's planned the flight at 10,000 (Why not 9, for an easterly flight though?), suggestive of under the IFR. To me at least, that says it was immaterial whether he was IMC or VMC, he'd have been flying by reference to his instruments and by all reports, was quite adept at doing so. The only way IMC/VMC would play a part is, in the event of pilot incapacitation, would the passenger would know [how] to take control. I know my regular Coey (Mini-Me MkII at 11YO) can fly to a "safe enough" landing in VMC, but that's as far as I can connect the dots in that scenario.

Going by the below photo taken the afternoon of the accident, there's blue sky above the cloud base, but I cant pick the bases or tops from behind a keyboard...
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1500x844/20231006_gundaroo_crash_005_c647760fba1646a3f25173fc2c83d65c 4a47b64d.jpg

[VHOED191006]

If I remember correctly, Canberra's METAR was showing broken at 8000ft.

[cncpc]

Icing?
More likely pilot incapacitation

[cncpc]

I have learnt over the years that the media is not into facts , one report said the kids were his, so I could be correct about being a student pilot
No you're not. You are dead wrong.

[cncpc]

Perhaps severe icing, stall and spin, tangling the chute and damaging comms antennas.

Please everyone: Don’t feed the beast with speculation about sudden incapacitation and ‘evil thought’, especially when it’s a nonsensical explanation just on the cockpit ergonomics of a Cirrus and what actually happens if you point most any ‘light’ aircraft straight at the ground. It’s an awful enough outcome without the AvMeds of the world milking it before the smoke’s dissipated. The pilot’s medical history and domestic circumstances will be revealed, eventually.

Incapacitation is not a nonsensical explanation. You post was.

[cncpc]

How does sudden pilot incapacitation result in an aircraft plummeting to the ground?
Are you familiar with the function of a pilot?

[cncpc]

Not much wreckage left for the ATSB to investigate. Some accidents can remain a mystery.

Nor likely for the coroner, as far as pilot incapacitation goes.

[Lead Balloon]

Yes I am a pilot, cncpc. And, nearly four decades in, I'm getting very tired of the mixture of amateurs, accident ghouls, media trolls and - worst of all - self-interested aircraft manufacturers and maintainers who are so keen to blame the pilot for accidents. And pilot incapacitation feeds straight into Avmed's justification.

You, of course, are just a disinterested observer, with no direct or indirect financial interest in Cirrus or BRS, or in Avmed issues, who's just appeared for purely altruistic reasons to nudge pilot incapacitation as the cause. Aren't you.

[Ivasrus]

Wonder if the kids had packed any lithium-ion battery powered toys? A few hard bumps, inflight cargo fire, fast incapacitation and structural failure.

[Squawk7700]

More likely pilot incapacitation

Icing probability is easy to work out as the freezing level is in the forecast!

[Lead Balloon]

For anyone related to those who've died in this terrible tragedy: Beware. There are many, many people out there whose interests lie in attributing blame for this accident to the pilot alone. Sudden incapacitation or some other event solely attributable to the pilot is a neat way of turning something very, very complex into something very simple, so as to absolve everyone else from any liability.

I've seen this many times before: PPruNers with very few posts over years who magically turn up to run interference on any suggestion that the pilot may not have been the only, or even a, cause of an accident.

Naturally you, cncpc, will be happy to explain where you come from in Canada and what you fly. As it turns out, I have some cousins who live over there and a sister who happens to be visiting there for a few weeks. What's your location, so that I can organise a chat?

[Squawk7700]

He's planned the flight at 10,000

It was mentioned to me third hand that 10k was his preferred operating level. The ADSB feed suggests that he was heading there as quickly as he could.

[Lead Balloon]

And which fact, if true, tells us what?

[Squawk7700]

And which fact, if true, tells us what?

Probably nothing…. It was in reference to the comments above.

[Lookleft]

How does sudden pilot incapacitation result in an aircraft plummeting to the ground?

Not as impossible as you might think:

​​​​​​​On the morning of 24 September 2005, a Raytheon Aircraft Company Beechcraft A-36 Bonanza, registered VH-BKM, was being flown by the
owner pilot on a private flight from Murwillumbah, NSW, to Coonabarabran, NSW, with one passenger. The pilot had not submitted
a flight plan or nominated a SARTIME and there was no requirement to do so.

The aircraft was reported to be missing on 28 September 2005 and a search was then commenced. The wreckage of the aircraft was
located on 29 September 2005. The aircraft had impacted a heavily timbered hill on a private property 'Millera', located
approximately 35 km east of Tenterfield. The aircraft had been destroyed by impact forces and a post-impact fire and both
occupants were fatally injured. Witnesses reported clear weather in the vicinity of the accident site.

The recorded radar data indicated that the aircraft was maintaining a stable heading and altitude which was consistent with
the autopilot having been engaged. The aircraft then descended from a cruising altitude of 6,500 ft above mean sea level (AMSL) to a
final recorded altitude of 3,800 ft AMSL, at a rate of approximately 5000 ft/min.

The pilot was 71 years old and held both commercial and private pilot licenses for aeroplanes with a valid Class 2 medical. The
maintenance records indicated that the aircraft had a valid maintenance release which was issued on 27 January 2005.

Weight and balance calculations showed that the aircraft was within centre of gravity limits for the final flight.
Discolouration of tree foliage at the accident site and the extent of the post-impact fire indicated that fuel was present when the
accident occurred.

The accident is consistent with the pilot becoming incapacitated, the aircraft departing controlled flight and
subsequently impacting terrain. The possible reasons for any incapacitation could not be determined.

[FullMetalJackass]

Perhaps severe icing, stall and spin, tangling the chute and damaging comms antennas.

Please everyone: Don’t feed the beast with speculation about sudden incapacitation and ‘evil thought’, especially when it’s a nonsensical explanation just on the cockpit ergonomics of a Cirrus and what actually happens if you point most any ‘light’ aircraft straight at the ground. It’s an awful enough outcome without the AvMeds of the world milking it before the smoke’s dissipated. The pilot’s medical history and domestic circumstances will be revealed, eventually.

I can concur with severe icing, I can also concur with a stall but deploying the 'chute and damaging comms antennas? Sorry, let's stick to the realm of reality. What surprised me was the fact that is was descending at more than 3600fpm whilst still showing a diminishing airspeed - from that alone, we can deduce that the aircraft wasn't "pointed at the ground". Therefore the question why would an aircraft be in a climb then suddenly start descending with no calls from the pilot? Occam's Razor says the most likely reason for him not responding was because he was unable to.

I have known fit and able people suffer a medical emergency and die, totally unexpected. One was mid 40s, training for the Tour de Flanders bicycle course, supremely fit. Went out one evening to ride his bike to his parents, got there, dismounted - collapsed, dead. We pilots aren't immune to such issues, I'm afraid.

How does sudden pilot incapacitation result in an aircraft plummeting to the ground?

It doesn't, unless the aircraft is seriously out of trim OR the pilot slumps across the controls, locking them. Looking at the flight record, this pilot typically climbed at a cruise climb setting of around 120KIAS. His groundspeeds are indicative of fluctuating winds from the front, so to be in a fully established stall at 90 knots ground speed, wings level, he'd need to have had a substantial tail wind, which I don't believe he had.

Yes I am a pilot, cncpc. And, nearly four decades in, I'm getting very tired of the mixture of amateurs, accident ghouls, media trolls and - worst of all - self-interested aircraft manufacturers and maintainers who are so keen to blame the pilot for accidents. And pilot incapacitation feeds straight into Avmed's justification.

You, of course, are just a disinterested observer, with no direct or indirect financial interest in Cirrus or BRS, or in Avmed issues, who's just appeared for purely altruistic reasons to nudge pilot incapacitation as the cause. Aren't you.

Not cncpc, but I did previously own a Cirrus - SR20, not SR22, have around 300 hours in one. My current steed also has a BRS system fitted - specifically for the eventuality that something could happen to me because I am in no doubt that it could happen and I would want any passengers to have a fighting chance.

have no financial interests in any of the above things you mentioned but I still believe the issue was due in part to pilot incapacitation which led to a stall during icing - let's face it, he had climbed to 9500 feet on his way to 10.000 ft - which appeared to be his preferred level - the freezing level was already forecast for between 5000 and 8000feet; the forecast also described broken SC & CU clouds between 5000 and 10000 feet.

He wasn't flying on autopilot, of that we can be sure because of the heading variations and autopilots fitted to the Cirrus require a roll mode to be activated for pitch mode to be used. Therefore the plane had been trimmed for a cruise climb. My belief is he had a medical issue, the aircraft climbed through heavy clouds, picked up ice; because the pilot didn't respond, the aircraft stalled.

Having owned a Cirrus, I know how strong they are, I've not heard of an SR20 / SR22 aircraft coming apart whilst flying below Vne. His issues started whilst at low speed. Sufficient CAPS systems have been deployed, if they could have mis-deployed. tangled with the Comms antennas, we would have heard about it. Let's say his tail broke off, that wouldn't stop his ability to pull the chute, nor to communicate.

As indicated, my current aircraft is also equipped with BRS and if I was at 9500 feet and had a structural failure, I would pull the lever and then contact ATC to let them know where I am heading. If I had a mechanical failure - engine failure, for example, I have enough time from 9500 feet to trouble shoot the issue whilst checking I keep the airspeed below Vpd and above my self imposed deployment hard-deck.

Occam's Razor tells us that to resolve a conundrum, look for the solution of a problem with the minimum number of conditions.

So, to conclude: Aircraft was climbing without an autopilot active. The plane's airspeed started to decrease. The aircraft had already started to drop like a stone before reaching stall speed. The pilot did not respond to any of the issues, didn't make any calls. Didn't pull the chute.

Why? because he couldn't..... Just my 2c worth.....

[Race200]

FMJ, Surely the speed was diminishing because they were going near vertically downwards. The speed shown is ground speed, not airspeed.

[43Inches]

FMJ, Surely the speed was diminishing because they were going near vertically downwards. The speed shown is ground speed, not airspeed.

That's the strange part, the vertical speed does not exceed about 130mph, so does not reflect an aircraft pointed at the ground, that would result in speeds well above 200mph. However that rate of descent seems too high for a stalled aircraft, and the profile looks like it flew straight ahead with a relatively gentle turn to the right. As I said earlier, the duration of the event is more likely the reason for no mayday call than anything else, why focus on radio when you are trying to save the aircraft.

I'm with LB on the issue of blaming pilots when there is no evidence of it. The A36 example above makes little sense to say it was on autopilot, but then descended at 5000fpm. When quite a few known cases of pilot incapacitation tend to have the aircraft continue to fly until fuel exhaustion or the pilot wakes up and regains control. Not enter a sudden plunge to doom.

[Squawk7700]

The stec autopilot in the early Cirrus doesn’t have a IAS hold as it uses vertical speed. Speed could decay away as the altitude increases, which it doesn’t really, so it’s performing well with 315 hp.

So with the ADSB feed being ground speed, I’m assuming the speed “blip” early on of close to 20 knots is a 20 know westerly as he turns briefly onto “crosswind” on the departure track.

The profile appears to be a consistent climb to max altitude at what is probably the best rate you could get out it is, on the way to the pilots alleged preferred 10,000ft. The airspeed is low though… it’s a lowish speed with a high climbing angle into thinning air. If there was in fact ice building up, it’s building up on the underside of the wing, MU2 style. Add this to the laminar flow Cirrus wing at high angle of attack and when the wing drops, it will drop hard, potentially inverted.

We all know that a Cirrus isn’t getting out of a spin with no chute and I wouldn’t be at all surprised if nobody was able to pull it.

Of course this would all be pending icing levels and cloud at the time….

On the flip side an incapacitated pilot scenario with 10k in the STEC in non-icing conditions doesn’t immediately result in this scenario either. For a passenger to turn off the auto pilot they need to press any hold the button on the controls for a couple of seconds and hear the loud beeps first. Seems somewhat unlikely.

The main standout for me is that the speed seems a little low from the start which reduces margins, especially when up high and if icing was present, or any other scenario that could cause a wing drop.

[43Inches]

The stec autopilot in the early Cirrus doesn’t have a IAS hold as it uses vertical speed. Speed could decay away as the altitude increases, which it doesn’t really, so it’s performing well with 315 hp.

So with the ADSB feed being ground speed, I’m assuming the speed “blip” early on of close to 20 knots is a 20 know westerly as he turns briefly onto “crosswind” on the departure track.

The profile appears to be a consistent climb to max altitude at what is probably the best rate you could get out it is, on the way to the pilots alleged preferred 10,000ft. The airspeed is low though… it’s a lowish speed with a high climbing angle into thinning air. If there was in fact ice building up, it’s building up on the underside of the wing, MU2 style. Add this to the laminar flow Cirrus wing at high angle of attack and when the wing drops, it will drop hard, potentially inverted.

We all know that a Cirrus isn’t getting out of a spin with no chute and I wouldn’t be at all surprised if nobody was able to pull it.

Of course this would all be pending icing levels and cloud at the time….

It would be very unlikely that a scenario like that would have the aircraft continue relatively straight ahead. Wing drop to inverted, I'd expect expect much larger heading variations.

[Squawk7700]

It would be very unlikely that a scenario like that would have the aircraft continue relatively straight ahead. Wing drop to inverted, I'd expect expect much larger heading variations.

Ok… so 43inches, you are the pilot of a Cirrus SR22. Physically, how could you get said SR22 from 9,000 ft to 3,000ft in one minute?

Just thinking out loud..

(Keeping in mind that the wings and tail plane appeared to be intact in the aftermath and assuming the elevator controls are still firmly attached)

[43Inches]

Ok… so how could you, 43inches, physically get a Cirrus SR22 from 9,000 ft to 3000ft in one minute?

Just thinking out loud..

That's why I was theorising some chute system failure, the profile looks like a drag assissted bomb. Stall/spin is still a possibility though, but the profile confuses me on that.

[Capt Fathom]

The aircraft was also cleared direct to CULIN, which initially it appeared to do. Then the lateral tracking started to ‘wander.’ Like HDG mode was engaged or being hand flown.

[Squawk7700]

I know we all know what a spin looks like, but thinking about ADSB data feeds and update times… hard to know what it would pick up in terms of heading during such an event. The graphs draw mean lines. You need to see the data in dot form.

https://youtu.be/2_8qCTAjsDg?si=CIW59jSSGbPH4Efv

[physicus]

There remained an appreciable horizontal velocity component up until the highest descent rate. Both the speeds from my attachments and the other post with FR24 data is GPS derived ground speed. Lack of forward movement simply indicates the velocity vector might be pointing more downward than forward, corroborated by the peak geometric descent rate at 03:48:49 UTC of over -17,000fpm (~167 kts) and 84 kts forward speed at the same time, for a total velocity vector of (84^2 + 167^2)^0.5 = 187 kts. After that point the forward velocity reduced abruptly to around 18 kts on average until end of transmission. The vertical rate reduced to about -12,000 fpm (~118kts) for the last 15 seconds.

There's a change in geometric rate fluctuations from about 5 minutes before the event, perhaps that's when they climbed into a turbulent layer/cloud or that's where some difficulties started to evolve (pretty much from after where the data gap is in the plots). The data gap itself is from an interruption in the data feed, not from ceased transmissions by the aircraft.

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1208x806/screenshot_2023_10_07_at_23_39_42_1cc609363af6111929ee06f62a 8ddb79058bbd13.png
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1204x806/screenshot_2023_10_07_at_23_39_58_9ef733ba55af00ebdb733764ce 754801838f74f5.png

[Squawk7700]

Thank you so much. I didn’t know how to extract the dots from the feed. Much easier to read that now!

[43Inches]

I'm now thinking stall spin is definitely an option. I just looked at the recent Seminole accident in the US, which was most definitely a spin as it was caught on camera. The flight aware profile is very similar. The chute failure option is still there as well as structural failure. The fluctuations in speed look like passing through the clouds that are apparent in the background of the photos, smallish broken cumulus, will kick a light plane around a little bit as you enter and leave, it will also cause the vertical speed to fluctuate with the up/down drafts. The heading variations may have been the pilot picking small holes close to track initially, then punching in as it thickened. Unless there's some eyewitness accounts pop up, I'm sure this will go down as multiple possibilities as I doubt there will be much information gained from the wreckage, that is unless parts are found away from the main site.

PS, even though I'm opening up to the stall/spin, the speeds involved are still making me think otherwise.

[Jenna Talia]

Forecast at the time was BKN CU/SC 5000' to 10000', Freezing layer 5000' and SNSH (snow showers) above 5000'. I know there can be difference between forecast and actual, but I still think it was icing.

[Lead Balloon]

And enter, stage left, Lookleft whose pathological obsession with disagreeing with everything I post – whatever the subject - is such that, not only has she searched far and wide to find an example, she disagrees with something I did not say:Not as impossible as you might think.I did not say it is “impossible” for sudden pilot incapacitation to result in an aircraft plummeting to the ground.

It is “possible” that a meteorite struck the aircraft, resulting in it plummeting to the ground.

As 43” observed:[Q]uite a few known cases of pilot incapacitation tend to have the aircraft continue to fly until fuel exhaustion or the pilot wakes up and regains control. Not enter a sudden plunge to doom.Here’s an example where an aircraft ‘landed itself’ with the pilot unconscious, and the pilot survived: https://youtu.be/MfzfP5CZBj8?si=Ew2Lag-ElRyCfYRM

So no doubt there are examples of aircraft plummeting to the ground due to pilot incapacitation, but there are many more examples where that doesn't happen. And there is a particular characteristic of the Cirrus that is relevant here.

Thank you for your very considered and informed post, FMJ.

Rest assured: I understand that all sorts of ostensibly healthy people collapse and die, unexpectedly, of some undetected affliction. The only pilots I know who’ve died unexpectedly at the controls were the holders of Class 1 medical certificates (thus exposing the expensive Avmed façade for what it is).

With your first-hand experience in the ergonomics of a Cirrus cockpit, could you please expand on how a pilot of a Cirrus "slumps across the controls, locking them"? Exactly what bits of the pilot’s body end up where, and how does that happen despite the shoulder harness?

Have you had a look at the CAPS Event database to which I posted a link earlier in the thread? There are numerous events – and of course numerous events not involving Cirrus aircraft – where no mayday is transmitted by a conscious pilot who’s busy on higher priorities. Did you note the events of ‘unilateral’ deployment attributed to static electricity?

I do think you might have misinterpreted what some of the reported parameters mean as to airspeed versus rate of climb/descent. My theory is based on discussions I’ve had with people who understand the numbers and the Cirrus – and some comments made here – which suggest a near-vertical descent but with some kind of unusual drag … like an aircraft with parachute lines tangled around the fuselage and tailplane and the parachute barely able to inflate. My comment about the comms antenna was the result of the physical characteristics of the Comm 1 antenna compared to other antennae in that scenario. But of course we don’t know if the pilot even tried to transmit a mayday.

Earlier in this thread reference was made – correctly - to the probability that the aircraft “would have just had it’s second 10 year chute re-pack completed”. As soon I read that, I consider the risk of maintenance induced failure. The flight I fear most is the first one after my aircraft has been the subject of mandated meddling. There have been many creative attempts made on my life by LAMEs over the years – not deliberate I hope. But the fact is: people make mistakes. It will therefore be important for the ATSB to investigate the maintenance history of the CAPS in particular.

Hopefully the ATSB folk will be able to ascertain at least whether the CAPS was deployed or not. Given the location, I would be surprised if there were no eye witnesses of even a couple of seconds of the descent. You will see, from the events database, that in one tragedy arising from icing the empty parachute was seen descending minutes after the aircraft impacted the ground. If this aircraft’s parachute is found intact some distance from the impact site, that would be a ‘lay down misère’ on a number issues.

[cncpc]

Yes I am a pilot, cncpc. And, nearly four decades in, I'm getting very tired of the mixture of amateurs, accident ghouls, media trolls and - worst of all - self-interested aircraft manufacturers and maintainers who are so keen to blame the pilot for accidents. And pilot incapacitation feeds straight into Avmed's justification.

You, of course, are just a disinterested observer, with no direct or indirect financial interest in Cirrus or BRS, or in Avmed issues, who's just appeared for purely altruistic reasons to nudge pilot incapacitation as the cause. Aren't you.
No, i'm not. But I get it, you've had your chain yanked and you had to splutter out something. And you'll keep on doing that.

[Mr Mossberg]

Lead, the grip is getting a bit tight there mate. Don't cut the blood supply to it :ok:

[Obidiah]

Truly a miserable accident, 3 kids.

Odd to see some pprune commentators here that appear to have locked in a cause, I like people with conviction, generally, but from the grainy photos and basic telemetry on your computer screen is likely the wrong place to form such a conviction. If you wish to excel in aviation the quicker you drop the locked in assumption proclivity the better.

Makes me think we need to keep moving forward with retrievable data loggers in GA types, particularly the composite aircraft as they are typically newer designs able to incorporate at manufacture and if there is a post crash fire there is not much left to work with from composite aircraft.

Nothing much fits as to the cause, pilot incapacitation, possible, but unlikely profile for such an event, I sort of imagine the kid in the front seat would not likely dive the aircraft against the trim forces and if grandpa was incapacitated you would think the kid in the front seat could keep it level-ish. Structural failure or control failure, possible, but pretty unlikely, icing possible but doesn't match the profile that well either. All of these move up toward probable if it can be shown that the CAPS deployment had been attempted. But no CAPS and no radio call???

I haven't read every post but I wondered why in flight electrical fire hasn't been raised.

I am not Cirrus endorsed but I would imagine that in the event of detecting electrical smoke that turning off nearly everything electrical (including avionics) happens pretty quickly in the flow. It may not be that the aircraft itself had an electrical fire, with 3 kids on board for a 2 night stay away with family the likelihood of Lithium powered devices/toys is likely. A stowed item that thermal runaways may not be able to be differentiated from an aircraft electrical fire. What drill could have been adopted, instinct and likely the QRH reference might be...isolate/turn off master switch and adopt max RoD. Perhaps not a priority to talk to centre in SPIFR with an onboard electrical fire, nice if you can, but maybe you don't. (post edit, apparently the data output we are seeing is from the txpr so indicates avionics on if that's the case).

Then a clearing has to be found to put it down, how much smoke in the cockpit and how toxic is it. A witness (for what it's worth) reported (media report) the aircraft travelling at tree top height before spiraling into the ground followed by a large explosion. A fire could fit but pretty rare event too.

Certainly nothing clear cut about this from where we're sitting except for the miserableness of it all.

[43Inches]

It's the profile matched with the speed and rate of descent that leaves many questions. An emergency descent at around 10 degrees nose down will reach VMO/VNE at idle power relatively quickly without some form of drag device, you will then have to raise the attitude to prevent busting structural speeds. That will generally net you in the region of 3000fpm. To dive vertically, but keep the speed at most 180kts, and decreasing despite the attitude, well that's just odd. Granted there will be some errors in the ADSB plots based on what is received, but even then the descent had to be very steep.

[Mr Mossberg]

Does Cirrus have an internal investigation unit?
Could battery residue be found in the remains of that accident site ?

[Obidiah]

43" Yes likely right, it is a bit steep for an emergency descent. I have seen these profiles before a number of times. I hope for closure sake they are able to establish a cause.

[brokenagain]

If you listen to LiveATC and line it up with FR24, a Saab which departs Canberra about 15 mins after the Cirrus crashes asks for weather deviation in the same area.

[Lead Balloon]

On the specific issue of no radio call, there are plenty of emergencies during which a conscious pilot does not transmit a mayday. There is, after all, that ‘aviate, navigate, communicate’ list of priorities.

The aircraft involved in this tragedy was less the 20nms from YSCB, in CTA, on primary and secondary RADAR being monitored by ATC. What, precisely, would a mayday call have achieved? Do we think ATC would, absent a mayday or 7700, watch the aircraft suddenly descend, without clearance or any communications, and shrug and assume that there was no problem? The data indicate a descent from around 9,000’ to around 3,000’ – that’s nearly ground level around the area of impact – in about a minute. I doubt whether I’d spend that time transmitting information to ATC, when I know that they are seeing what’s happening anyway.

On the specific issue of "no CAPS", we don’t know that the pilot didn’t try to deploy the CAPS. Maybe the pilot tried but the system malfunctioned. Maybe the CAPS was deployed but at too high a speed. Maybe the CAPS was deployed while the aircraft was inverted or in some unusual attitude that resulted in the parachute lines being fouled by the airframe and the parachute not working properly or at all.
To dive vertically, but keep the speed at most 180kts, and decreasing despite the attitude, well that's just odd.Yep.

[43Inches]

If you listen to LiveATC and line it up with FR24, a Saab which departs Canberra about 15 mins after the Cirrus crashes asks for weather deviation in the same area.

SAAB pilots will deviate around any cloud near or above the freezing level in general. The engine anti ice sucks engine power, so if you can find a gap you will climb above the cloud layer faster. So unless there's more information it's hard to gauge whether the SAAB was avoiding significant bad weather, or just not wanting to use the anti-ice through a thin layer ahead, in both cases the crew will ask for deviations 'due weather'. If jets were deviating in the same area that would be more proof of significant build ups or weather RADAR returns. That being said if the SAAB crew did pass through the same area and did enter cloud, they might be able to answer if there was significant icing in the area, might be worth the ATSB contacting them if there is any questions relative to icing and turbulence.

[Lead Balloon]

<> I have seen these profiles before a number of times. <>What aircraft type/s were involved and was the cause identified in any of the cases?

[Squawk7700]

His groundspeeds are indicative of fluctuating winds from the front, so to be in a fully established stall at 90 knots ground speed, wings level, he'd need to have had a substantial tail wind, which I don't believe he had.

Except what happens to your stall speed when you have ice under your wing?

Agreed though, hard to know the wind without being there which makes theorising difficult,

[W.u.W]

[QUOTE=Lead Balloon;11516086]Yes I am a pilot, cncpc. And, nearly four decades in, I'm getting very tired of the mixture of amateurs, accident ghouls, media trolls and - worst of all - self-interested aircraft manufacturers and maintainers who are so keen to blame the pilot for accidents. And pilot incapacitation feeds straight into Avmed's justification.


This comment has nothing to do with this incident I have no idea what happened I am just trying to point out mechanical failures in aviation are very rare.

Are people not quick to point blame or look at what could of happened in the pointy front bit because statically speaking something around 70/80 percent of aviation incidents/accidents are down to human/pilot error?

[Lead Balloon]

I've read this statement in a thread about this tragedy in a different on-line forum:the chute is laying in the grass in good conditionI'm trying to ascertain the evidential basis for that statement.

[Lead Balloon]

This comment has nothing to do with this incident I have no idea what happened I am just trying to point out mechanical failures in aviation are very rare.

Are people not quick to point blame or look at what could of happened in the pointy front bit because statically speaking something around 70/80 percent of aviation incidents/accidents are down to human/pilot error?Assuming the "human" part of your "human/pilot error" term is confined to pilots, that's around 20/30 percent of aviation incident/accidents being down to other than pilot error. In my book, that percentage does not equal "very rare". Or do you include e.g. Air Traffic Controllers and aircraft maintainers in the "human error"?

But what is your definition of "mechanical failures"? It is "very rare" for e.g. an aircraft's wings to fall off an aircraft flown below Vne and within the G loading limits etc. That kind of "mechanical failure" is very rare.

But there are plenty of mechanical things that don't work properly or are unreliable and fail to work because of human error - in the case of aircraft, maintenance error. And not all manufacturing processes are perfect.

[Palmac67]

Nor likely for the coroner, as far as pilot incapacitation goes.
looking at the mostly ashes remaining I doubt the coroner will have anything to examine to determine the condition of the pilot or the occupants.

[Grey head]

Just registered here to clear up a few things:

I’ve spent many hours in cockpits with Peter, the deceased pilot. And many years on the ground with him also.

Not a “student” pilot. He had many hundreds of hours including much recent time in Cirrus aircraft.

He had completed many IFR renewals over the years including one in the last month.

I found him to be careful, thoughtful, competent and meticulous in his approach to flying.

In my experience, he always briefed his passengers - including the kids - on deploying CAPS, even when I/we had heard it all before.

Also we talked about the old ‘Aviate/Navigate/Communicate’ priorities quite a few times over the years.

I spoke with him on Wednesday morning for 5 minutes and he was in a very positive frame of mind, having just filed his flight plan.

We arranged to meet next week when he was back in town. I’ve also been informed that after the ARM to CB leg he advised another friend that the “plane was perfect”

I’m reliably informed that a “new” / repacked (?) chute was fitted to the aircraft in January.

I won’t be replying/ posting further.

Clearly atm none of us know what happened.

Just wanted to inject some facts into the discussion.

[physicus]

The departure from controlled flight appears to have been sudden based on the data I keep posting, followed by a very steep descent profile. That profile is NOT an emergency descent profile. The sinkrates involved are not achievable in normal, controlled flight (~167 kts vertical speed component alone, as posted above). There appears to be porpoising prior to the onset of the sudden departure, along with a significant speed decay. That could very well be indicative of a stall induced spin.

I'm adding another plot here, ground speed (GPS derived speed in the lat/lon reference frame), vs. the velocity vector (VV), or total velocity in X,Y,Z reference frame. It's interesting to see that the VV has a couple of very high excursions but otherwise remains at similar magnitude to cruise flight (conservation of energy) - it would seem plausible from this that the airframe remained largely intact but spent most of its energy on vertical speed (as in a spin), the two outlier data points probably being just that - momentary glitches from poor GPS geometry due to the unusual attitude. Note that the geometric vertical rate is also GPS derived. I didn't use the barometric altitude due to hysteresis. This particular aircraft did not report barometric vertical rate.

What's odd is that the speed already decayed to a similarly low level at time 03:44:38, ~4 minutes prior to the rapid descent.

I'm fairly certain the potential stall/spin is the result of events prior to that (icing and/or incapacitation) - it's a more complex sequence of events than many here speculate.


https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/600x401/screenshot_2023_10_08_at_08_31_39_d7de749d1ed76236a8322bae82 1a9c0740796591.png

[Lead Balloon]

Turns out that the statement I saw on the other forum, that "the chute is laying in the grass in good condition", was based upon the photo I posted at #48 and someone's assumption that it was of the aftermath of this tragedy.

In the original text above that photo I made clear that it was of a different incident which the POB survived. I posted it to show the effects of a post-impact fire on a Cirrus, even after a successful CAPS deployment. I've now added new bold and capitalised text above the photo, to assist the slow learners.

[FullMetalJackass]

The stec autopilot in the early Cirrus doesn’t have a IAS hold as it uses vertical speed. Speed could decay away as the altitude increases, which it doesn’t really, so it’s performing well with 315 hp.

The profile appears to be a consistent climb to max altitude at what is probably the best rate you could get out it is, on the way to the pilots alleged preferred 10,000ft. The airspeed is low though… it’s a lowish speed with a high climbing angle into thinning air. If there was in fact ice building up, it’s building up on the underside of the wing, MU2 style. Add this to the laminar flow Cirrus wing at high angle of attack and when the wing drops, it will drop hard, potentially inverted.

We all know that a Cirrus isn’t getting out of a spin with no chute and I wouldn’t be at all surprised if nobody was able to pull it.

Of course this would all be pending icing levels and cloud at the time….

On the flip side an incapacitated pilot scenario with 10k in the STEC in non-icing conditions doesn’t immediately result in this scenario either. For a passenger to turn off the auto pilot they need to press any hold the button on the controls for a couple of seconds and hear the loud beeps first. Seems somewhat unlikely.

.

Another couple of myths that needs busting. A Cirrus in a spin can be recovered from the spin using standard technique - throttle idle, ailerons level, stick forward, rudder against the direction of rotation until the spin stops. Then recover. When designing the SR series, the manufacturer offered the chute as an "alternative means of compliance" which is why it was never tested in US and the myth was born. However in EASA land, they refused to accept this AMOC and had the aircraft spin tested in various configurations - tail heavy, nose heavy etc - and recovery from a spin was normal.

Secondly, I did repeated stall exercises in the Cirrus which never dropped a wing. If you were flying straight and level and kept pulling back, the plane would violently shake but you still have aileron authority, you can keep the plane descending, stalled, wings level because of the cuffed wing profile which means that the outboard area of the wing where the ailerons is, remains unstalled. Only if you introduced yaw would it drop but was then easily recovered with rudder application.

As for the comment about needing to hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, that's also incorrect. A quick press of the button and the autopilot is off. In fact, depending on how it's been configured, if you hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, you can cause it to enter CWS mode - which means the aircraft will be commanded to hold it's current attitude - ie, nose angle, wing angles.

The fact remains that the aircraft wasn't flying on autopilot - too many variations in heading for it to have been active and, as previously said, for a pitch mode to be active, a roll mode needs to also be in use, which wasn't.


As 43” observed:Here’s an example where an aircraft ‘landed itself’ with the pilot unconscious, and the pilot survived: https://youtu.be/MfzfP5CZBj8?si=Ew2Lag-ElRyCfYRM

So no doubt there are examples of aircraft plummeting to the ground due to pilot incapacitation, but there are many more examples where that doesn't happen. And there is a particular characteristic of the Cirrus that is relevant here.

Thank you for your very considered and informed post, FMJ.

Rest assured: I understand that all sorts of ostensibly healthy people collapse and die, unexpectedly, of some undetected affliction. The only pilots I know who’ve died unexpectedly at the controls were the holders of Class 1 medical certificates (thus exposing the expensive Avmed façade for what it is).

With your first-hand experience in the ergonomics of a Cirrus cockpit, could you please expand on how a pilot of a Cirrus "slumps across the controls, locking them"? Exactly what bits of the pilot’s body end up where, and how does that happen despite the shoulder harness?

Have you had a look at the CAPS Event database to which I posted a link earlier in the thread? There are numerous events – and of course numerous events not involving Cirrus aircraft – where no mayday is transmitted by a conscious pilot who’s busy on higher priorities. Did you note the events of ‘unilateral’ deployment attributed to static electricity?

I do think you might have misinterpreted what some of the reported parameters mean as to airspeed versus rate of climb/descent. My theory is based on discussions I’ve had with people who understand the numbers and the Cirrus – and some comments made here – which suggest a near-vertical descent but with some kind of unusual drag … like an aircraft with parachute lines tangled around the fuselage and tailplane and the parachute barely able to inflate. My comment about the comms antenna was the result of the physical characteristics of the Comm 1 antenna compared to other antennae in that scenario. But of course we don’t know if the pilot even tried to transmit a mayday.

Earlier in this thread reference was made – correctly - to the probability that the aircraft “would have just had it’s second 10 year chute re-pack completed”. As soon I read that, I consider the risk of maintenance induced failure. The flight I fear most is the first one after my aircraft has been the subject of mandated meddling. There have been many creative attempts made on my life by LAMEs over the years – not deliberate I hope. But the fact is: people make mistakes. It will therefore be important for the ATSB to investigate the maintenance history of the CAPS in particular.

Hopefully the ATSB folk will be able to ascertain at least whether the CAPS was deployed or not. Given the location, I would be surprised if there were no eye witnesses of even a couple of seconds of the descent. You will see, from the events database, that in one tragedy arising from icing the empty parachute was seen descending minutes after the aircraft impacted the ground. If this aircraft’s parachute is found intact some distance from the impact site, that would be a ‘lay down misère’ on a number issues.

Firstly, when talking about a pilot slumped across the controls, I was referring to non-Cirrus aircraft. No way an incapacitated pilot can block controls on a Cirrus. Secondly, as an ex Cirrus owner and ex member of COPA, I would read everything I could about incidents in order to learn from them. The uncommanded initiation of CAPS was caused due to electrical interference which lead to a change in the systems - this was maybe 6 or 7 years ago so I very much doubt that could repeat itself, especially as this aircraft would have had CAPS refitted a year or so ago.

Whilst talking of the refitting, it's something that the maintenance operators have experience with, so no big deal. I also recall the SB to check the propellant because some got wet....

I also participated in CPPP trainings and let's take your example of an uncommanded parachute deployment - once the chute has been deployed, you are no longer in command of the aircraft, so what would you, as pilot at 9500feet do? Right. Call up and say what's what, let people know where you are in case you land in trees or something, just get the emergency services moving.

Let's now go with your thought that maybe the chute deployed erroneously, due to MIF, was incorrectly deployed wrapping itself around the aircraft - the aircraft became uncontrollable and the pilot was looking to regain control somehow hence he was more concerned with aviate than communicate. Reasonable assumption, but the reality is BRS systems are fitted in thousands of aircraft globally and for one to first self deploy and then mis-deploy is unheard of. As you can see, you need an erroneous deployment of the chute AND a misdeployment of the chute for that scenario to occur. That aircraft had been flying frequently after the repack so I'm pretty sure that a MIF can be ruled out.

Let's reduce this to a minimum - let's say he had commanded CAPS deployment and it mis-deployed. Why would he do that? First, there seems to be a myth that Cirrus pilots will, without hesitation, pull the chute at the first sign of trouble. That's not true. At 9500 feet you have a lot of time to trouble shoot, say, if you have engine issues; you will first check the usual suspects - fuel, air, spark - before looking for a suitable location and, if none available, then consider deploying CAPS. No Cirrus pilot would pull at 9500 feet unless he'd totally lost control, had structural failure and saw no way out which is why I'd rule both a commanded and uncommanded deployment of CAPS out.

On the specific issue of no radio call, there are plenty of emergencies during which a conscious pilot does not transmit a mayday. There is, after all, that ‘aviate, navigate, communicate’ list of priorities.

The aircraft involved in this tragedy was less the 20nms from YSCB, in CTA, on primary and secondary RADAR being monitored by ATC. What, precisely, would a mayday call have achieved? Do we think ATC would, absent a mayday or 7700, watch the aircraft suddenly descend, without clearance or any communications, and shrug and assume that there was no problem? The data indicate a descent from around 9,000’ to around 3,000’ – that’s nearly ground level around the area of impact – in about a minute. I doubt whether I’d spend that time transmitting information to ATC, when I know that they are seeing what’s happening anyway.

On the specific issue of "no CAPS", we don’t know that the pilot didn’t try to deploy the CAPS. Maybe the pilot tried but the system malfunctioned. Maybe the CAPS was deployed but at too high a speed. Maybe the CAPS was deployed while the aircraft was inverted or in some unusual attitude that resulted in the parachute lines being fouled by the airframe and the parachute not working properly or at all.
Yep.

Firstly, on the one hand you're hypothesising that the CAPS system deployed without command and then you're suggesting that the pilot tried to deploy it but it failed. If I was still a Cirrus owner, I'd be very worried about such theories because we buy the aircraft because of the additional safety offered by the BRS..... If BRS was so unreliable that it "might" ignite itself without command but then, when required, "might not" ignite, I doubt we would be paying so much for such a system, agree? BRS has a proven track record when operated within its parameters. And the data point before the upset showed a cruise climb of around 120KIAS, 15 seconds later they were dropping at 3700fpm at 90KIAS which means it wasn't deployed at too high a speed.

Secondly, a mayday call will always alert ATC as to what is going on, they can offer advise as to nearest airfield if necessary and raise awareness of ground units. Thirdly. how does a plane suddenly become inverted? Without external intervention? For me, his flight path is indicative of a pilot hand flying with the plane trimmed for cruise climb. If, as you hypothesise, he pulled the chute whilst inverted, how did he become inverted? I've flown through enough clouds to know that although they can be bumpy, they're not going to throw you on your back; the pilot was both experienced and current enough to know what he was doing. In order for that theory to be correct, something else had to have happened first, throwing the plane on its back. And knowing that the flight was in and out of some pretty heavy clouds with the freezing level in the clouds, I'd go with that. The plane iced up, stalled, descended like a brick. Nothing to do with CAPS.

But that doesn't explain why no recovery was initiated. Which can be answered by Occam's Razor. No recovery was initiated because the pilot was incapacitated. That's no negative inference on the pilot, it's just something which fits the story with the minimum number of external requirements....

[flopzone]

A light Aircraft has crashed south of Crystal Brook SA. The Jamestown Airshow was on 15 min away. 2 serious flown to RAH no further info apart from eyewitness "it plummeted into a field".

[Squawk7700]

As for the comment about needing to hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, that's also incorrect.

Definitely not the case in a G1 SR20/22.

If you press it quickly nothing happens other than a beep. Hold it a bit longer and you get a couple of loud beeps. Hold it even longer and it turns off after a few beeps.

It is specifically designed to not switched off with a quick accidental flick of the push bottom switch on the control stick.

I am aware that a test pilot who is expecting a spin to develop, has a solid chance of getting out of the spin. A “normal” pilot would severely struggle.

i highly doubt you would find anyone in this country that has successfully arrested a fully developed spin in a Cirrus.

[W.u.W]

Assuming the "human" part of your "human/pilot error" term is confined to pilots, that's around 20/30 percent of aviation incident/accidents being down to other than pilot error. In my book, that percentage does not equal "very rare". Or do you include e.g. Air Traffic Controllers and aircraft maintainers in the "human error"?

But what is your definition of "mechanical failures"? It is "very rare" for e.g. an aircraft's wings to fall off an aircraft flown below Vne and within the G loading limits etc. That kind of "mechanical failure" is very rare.

But there are plenty of mechanical things that don't work properly or are unreliable and fail to work because of human error - in the case of aircraft, maintenance error. And not all manufacturing processes are perfect.

I added human to cover all aspects not just pilot and could of worded better, mechanical failures that lead to loss of airframes are extremely rare.

Does your 20/30 percent include combination mechanical plus human error witch lead to loss of airframe? witch i believe usually is the case in accidents. ( swiss cheese)

Unsure how it's categorised but if 30 percent of accidents are pilot error alone that seems high to me and gets me back to the point of why people are quick to judge pilots in accidents before anything els.

Apart from publicly saying things like it looks intentional based on little data I can't see any harm coming out of discussions covering pilot errors in accidents only good, even to family's that have lost loved ones at the end of the day people's theories are usually proven right or wrong at some point.

WuW

[Lead Balloon]

Another couple of myths that needs busting. A Cirrus in a spin can be recovered from the spin using standard technique - throttle idle, ailerons level, stick forward, rudder against the direction of rotation until the spin stops. Then recover. When designing the SR series, the manufacturer offered the chute as an "alternative means of compliance" which is why it was never tested in US and the myth was born. However in EASA land, they refused to accept this AMOC and had the aircraft spin tested in various configurations - tail heavy, nose heavy etc - and recovery from a spin was normal.

Secondly, I did repeated stall exercises in the Cirrus which never dropped a wing. If you were flying straight and level and kept pulling back, the plane would violently shake but you still have aileron authority, you can keep the plane descending, stalled, wings level because of the cuffed wing profile which means that the outboard area of the wing where the ailerons is, remains unstalled. Only if you introduced yaw would it drop but was then easily recovered with rudder application.

As for the comment about needing to hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, that's also incorrect. A quick press of the button and the autopilot is off. In fact, depending on how it's been configured, if you hold the autopilot button for a couple of seconds, you can cause it to enter CWS mode - which means the aircraft will be commanded to hold it's current attitude - ie, nose angle, wing angles.

The fact remains that the aircraft wasn't flying on autopilot - too many variations in heading for it to have been active and, as previously said, for a pitch mode to be active, a roll mode needs to also be in use, which wasn't.

Firstly, when talking about a pilot slumped across the controls, I was referring to non-Cirrus aircraft. No way an incapacitated pilot can block controls on a Cirrus. Secondly, as an ex Cirrus owner and ex member of COPA, I would read everything I could about incidents in order to learn from them. The uncommanded initiation of CAPS was caused due to electrical interference which lead to a change in the systems - this was maybe 6 or 7 years ago so I very much doubt that could repeat itself, especially as this aircraft would have had CAPS refitted a year or so ago.

Whilst talking of the refitting, it's something that the maintenance operators have experience with, so no big deal. I also recall the SB to check the propellant because some got wet....

I also participated in CPPP trainings and let's take your example of an uncommanded parachute deployment - once the chute has been deployed, you are no longer in command of the aircraft, so what would you, as pilot at 9500feet do? Right. Call up and say what's what, let people know where you are in case you land in trees or something, just get the emergency services moving.

Let's now go with your thought that maybe the chute deployed erroneously, due to MIF, was incorrectly deployed wrapping itself around the aircraft - the aircraft became uncontrollable and the pilot was looking to regain control somehow hence he was more concerned with aviate than communicate. Reasonable assumption, but the reality is BRS systems are fitted in thousands of aircraft globally and for one to first self deploy and then mis-deploy is unheard of. As you can see, you need an erroneous deployment of the chute AND a misdeployment of the chute for that scenario to occur. That aircraft had been flying frequently after the repack so I'm pretty sure that a MIF can be ruled out.

Let's reduce this to a minimum - let's say he had commanded CAPS deployment and it mis-deployed. Why would he do that? First, there seems to be a myth that Cirrus pilots will, without hesitation, pull the chute at the first sign of trouble. That's not true. At 9500 feet you have a lot of time to trouble shoot, say, if you have engine issues; you will first check the usual suspects - fuel, air, spark - before looking for a suitable location and, if none available, then consider deploying CAPS. No Cirrus pilot would pull at 9500 feet unless he'd totally lost control, had structural failure and saw no way out which is why I'd rule both a commanded and uncommanded deployment of CAPS out.

Firstly, on the one hand you're hypothesising that the CAPS system deployed without command and then you're suggesting that the pilot tried to deploy it but it failed. If I was still a Cirrus owner, I'd be very worried about such theories because we buy the aircraft because of the additional safety offered by the BRS..... If BRS was so unreliable that it "might" ignite itself without command but then, when required, "might not" ignite, I doubt we would be paying so much for such a system, agree? BRS has a proven track record when operated within its parameters. And the data point before the upset showed a cruise climb of around 120KIAS, 15 seconds later they were dropping at 3700fpm at 90KIAS which means it wasn't deployed at too high a speed.

Secondly, a mayday call will always alert ATC as to what is going on, they can offer advise as to nearest airfield if necessary and raise awareness of ground units. Thirdly. how does a plane suddenly become inverted? Without external intervention? For me, his flight path is indicative of a pilot hand flying with the plane trimmed for cruise climb. If, as you hypothesise, he pulled the chute whilst inverted, how did he become inverted? I've flown through enough clouds to know that although they can be bumpy, they're not going to throw you on your back; the pilot was both experienced and current enough to know what he was doing. In order for that theory to be correct, something else had to have happened first, throwing the plane on its back. And knowing that the flight was in and out of some pretty heavy clouds with the freezing level in the clouds, I'd go with that. The plane iced up, stalled, descended like a brick. Nothing to do with CAPS.

But that doesn't explain why no recovery was initiated. Which can be answered by Occam's Razor. No recovery was initiated because the pilot was incapacitated. That's no negative inference on the pilot, it's just something which fits the story with the minimum number of external requirements....That’s some very interesting stuff, FMJ.

Another couple of myths that needs busting. A Cirrus in a spin can be recovered from the spin using standard technique - throttle idle, ailerons level, stick forward, rudder against the direction of rotation until the spin stops. Then recover. When designing the SR series, the manufacturer offered the chute as an "alternative means of compliance" which is why it was never tested in US and the myth was born. However in EASA land, they refused to accept this AMOC and had the aircraft spin tested in various configurations - tail heavy, nose heavy etc - and recovery from a spin was normal.Yet a Cirrus salesman contributed to rather than busting that myth, as a consequence of this event (https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/166098) which resulted in this unwelcome garden ornament (https://www.avweb.com/news/watch-this-spin-results-in-chute-pull/).

This had me scratching my head: Firstly, when talking about a pilot slumped across the controls, I was referring to non-Cirrus aircraft. No way an incapacitated pilot can block controls on a Cirrus.Then why did you mention circumstances in which a pilot “slumps across the controls, locking them” – [b]your words[b] – in this thread? Surely you comprehended that the uninformed, hungry-for-facts people out there would take that as you suggesting that as an explanation for the tragedy. Surely.

This would be laughable, but for the enormity of the tragedy:That aircraft had been flying frequently after the repack so I'm pretty sure that a MIF can be ruled out.You say that because you want to focus on the least likely scenario: uncommanded in-flight deployment which I only mentioned because the CAPS Event data base includes two unilateral deployments, which I said were on the ground. But, in any event, that is meaningless to the question whether the system worked properly in the air if the pilot tried to use it. It’s like saying that an aircraft flew around for ages with an inbuilt ELT that didn’t do anything, so therefore we can rule out MIF if it continued not to do anything.

A breathtakingly broad statement: No Cirrus pilot would pull at 9500 feet unless he'd totally lost control, had structural failure and saw no way out which is why I'd rule both a commanded and uncommanded deployment of CAPS out.You know the skill levels and can predict the decisions, under pressure, of all Cirrus pilots. That’s a mighty big call. After all, the Cirrus salesman in the event I posted above seems to me to have made some decisions which I'd be surprised you'd support. Do you support those decisions?

As to the rest: I get it. I get it that someone needs to run interference to protect the interests of the aircraft manufacturer and distributors and maintainers, while there’s all the swirling publicity and emotion in the wake of an awful tragedy. I get it. And it may turn out that this tragedy is the consequence entirely of the pilot and not a serviceable aircraft.

My original post was in response to those who decided to leap to the keyboard and post that the cause of this tragedy was likely pilot incapacitation or – and it makes me sick to even contemplate it – to suggest some deliberate action by the pilot. Before the smoke had lifted on the site of the tragedy.

If you want to keep pressing for pilot incapacitation, that’s your choice, as is mine to continue suggesting different possibilities.

[cncpc]

Naturally you, cncpc, will be happy to explain where you come from in Canada and what you fly. As it turns out, I have some cousins who live over there and a sister who happens to be visiting there for a few weeks. What's your location, so that I can organise a chat?

Naturally? Happy? You've got cousins over here, and you're going to organize a chat? Gee,bit of code talk there. I'm an Irishman, Mr. Balloon, if indeed that is your name. I understand the pathetic veiled threat in the words "...organize a chat". But, send me their phone numbers, and I'll give them a call. That'll be a start, and I will keep this board posted on how that goes. Hopefully we'll have that out of the way by noon tomorrow, BC time. Tell them Padraig will be calling.

There are posters here who know who I am. I'm on the Canadian board under the same nick as here. I'm quite familiar with Pelmet and PilotDar and BigPistonsForever, and undoubtedly others who post here. I've never heard of you before this thread. But I've seen your kind on the other board, and very rarely, on here. It speaks volumes about you that one insightful poster has volunteered that you may be principally occupied with tearing the handle off yourself, as the priests ask in the confessional in Ireland, with one hand and typing utter ****e with the other.
.
I live in Vernon, British Columbia. I started flying in 1968 and flew my last flight in 2015. I am a British Columbia mountain pilot, who has also flown in the US, Ireland, England, and continental Europe. I have time on 45 different types of airplanes and helicopters while I was flying. I hold the Canadian Airline Transport License and the Commercial Helicopter pilot license, and the US Commercial pilot license. In my last bit of working life, I was flight operations manager at a commuter airline with up to 24 pilots and 14 aircraft, before taking on the GM role. I have been qualified as an expert witness in air crash investigation in the High Court in Ireland (Haughton v. Irish Aviation Authority) and as an expert in aviation careers and aviation business in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Adonis v. Athanasiou)

Looking forward to speaking to those cousins.

Padraig

[Cloudee]

That’s some very interesting stuff, FMJ.

Yet a Cirrus salesman contributed to rather than busting that myth, as a consequence of this event (https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/166098) which resulted in this unwelcome garden ornament (https://www.avweb.com/news/watch-this-spin-results-in-chute-pull/).

I wouldn’t pay too much attention to the actions of that Cirrus salesman. The accident report doesn’t show him in a good light. The pilot rated passenger said the salesman applied into spin rudder. No wonder it didn’t recover. https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/4920573/ao-2014-083_final.pdf

[43Inches]

No Cirrus pilot would pull at 9500 feet unless he'd totally lost control, had structural failure and saw no way out which is why I'd rule both a commanded and uncommanded deployment of CAPS out.

You just need to read the CAPS event webpage that LB posted earlier to know that statement is untrue. There's been a number of CAPS deployments in situations where they should have just landed, instead they panicked and pulled the chute. We are talking about bog standard PPLs here in most cases, not air force test pilots and ex NASA shuttle pilots. One fatal was at high speed and altitude over the rockies, with the predictable outcome that the chute separated and the aircraft speared in almost vertical. Another one had investigation results that talk about the operational limits of CAPS, maximum speeds, but, also maximum attitude, bank angle and pitching/rolling motions to prevent possible entanglement. The outcome was that the chutes effectiveness would be suspect outside of relatively slow, upright, level flight.

[Lead Balloon]

I wouldn’t pay too much attention to the actions of that Cirrus salesman. The accident report doesn’t show him in a good light. The pilot rated passenger said the salesman applied into spin rudder. No wonder it didn’t recover. https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/media/4920573/ao-2014-083_final.pdfBut he was a Cirrus pilot. FMJ presumed to assert what "all" Cirrus pilots would do.

[Lead Balloon]

Naturally? Happy? You've got cousins over here, and you're going to organize a chat? Gee,bit of code talk there. I'm an Irishman, Mr. Balloon, if indeed that is your name. I understand the pathetic veiled threat in the words "...organize a chat". But, send me their phone numbers, and I'll give them a call. That'll be a start, and I will keep this board posted on how that goes. Hopefully we'll have that out of the way by noon tomorrow, BC time. Tell them Padraig will be calling.

There are posters here who know who I am. I'm on the Canadian board under the same nick as here. I'm quite familiar with Pelmet and PilotDar and BigPistonsForever, and undoubtedly others who post here. I've never heard of you before this thread. But I've seen your kind on the other board, and very rarely, on here. It speaks volumes about you that one insightful poster has volunteered that you may be principally occupied with tearing the handle off yourself, as the priests ask in the confessional in Ireland, with one hand and typing utter ****e with the other.
.
I live in Vernon, British Columbia. I started flying in 1968 and flew my last flight in 2015. I am a British Columbia mountain pilot, who has also flown in the US, Ireland, England, and continental Europe. I have time on 45 different types of airplanes and helicopters while I was flying. I hold the Canadian Airline Transport License and the Commercial Helicopter pilot license, and the US Commercial pilot license. In my last bit of working life, I was flight operations manager at a commuter airline with up to 24 pilots and 14 aircraft, before taking on the GM role. I have been qualified as an expert witness in air crash investigation in the High Court in Ireland (Haughton v. Irish Aviation Authority) and as an expert in aviation careers and aviation business in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Adonis v. Athanasiou)

Looking forward to speaking to those cousins.

PadraigExcellent! We could be cousins! My father and his parents lived in Salmon Arm. The first name of one of my younger brothers is "Vernon". My first name is also that of a town in BC. My sister is in Salmon Arm now.

Are you able to get over the Salmon Arm? I only ask because my sister is visiting because of one of our cousins is sick, but she (my sister) doesn't have a car.

[Lookleft]

And enter, stage left, Lookleft whose pathological obsession with disagreeing with everything I post – whatever the subject - is such that, not only has she searched far and wide to find an example, she disagrees with something I did not say:

Good to see your paranoia is alive and well. Its no surprise that lawyers are at the bottom of the list of trusted professions. You asked how an incapacitation could bring down an aircraft, I gave you an example of just that scenario. Choose to accept it or not but once again you have to make a thread about yourself, who cares if you have cousins in Canada, this thread is about a tragic fatal accident. May I suggest that you spend less time on your word count and more time on your step count and get out and go for a walk. Your mental health will be much better for it.

[Lead Balloon]

I'm endeavouring to work out why I'm living in your head, rent free, Lookleft. I've thought about all the ex-girlfriends, but none of them went on to be pilots. I frequently post 'likes' when you post something with which I agree, but you've never been able to bring yourself to agree with anything I've posted. Never. And it's not like my posts never attract support from anyone.

So there's something else that drives you to be focussed on and presumptively negative to everything I post. A truly fascinating case study for those who care about this stuff.

My posts in this thread are an attempt to counter the oh-so-convenient and oh-so-common reflex to blame a deceased pilot, alone, for everything.

[cncpc]

I do accept that the cause may be something other than pilot incapacitation. However, I will relate this incident because it does involve a rare form of temporary incapacitation, and while that was miraculously resolved with a mostly intact airplane, had it not been, the very same type of thread would have been started, if they had forums in 1983.

I lived in Prince George at the time and I was Chief Pilot and Ops Manager there at a small charter company and flight school. I also owned, through a limited company, a Cessna 310Q. It was Christmas season and my wife and I had just returned from Zihuatenejo/Ixtapa and were in Salmon Arm, where our families were both from. A couple of days after, I had to go to PG on some matter and took a brother and a friend along for what was to be a day trip.

We took off and climbed to 8500. I noticed that I had flu symptoms, not unusual for me after a commercial airline flight. Bases were sometimes below the altitude and the trip did involve some maneuvering to stay VFR and avoid having to ask for a pop up to continue. I preferred to remain VFR given the stuffed head feeling I was having. However, about 25 miles short of PG, we encountered solid cloud and virga on most headings north. I called Center, got the pop up, along with a clearance for the approach in PG. The transition altitude was 7000 there, and prior to starting descent and completely in cloud, I closed my mouth and held me nose shut and forced my ears to pop. As soon as I did that, I experienced a fairly rapid closure of my field of view to a small circle, and then nothing. The last thing I saw was the artificial horizon start to move to a bank. Before I went black, I moved the yoke to correct. I think I moved it the wrong way. I went blind, and pulled back the throttles. I'm told that it was about 10 seconds and I heard a shout from one passenger, and my sight came back in reverse order to how it went. The first thing I saw was the back seat passenger up near the roof. I began to do partial panel stuff, with the airspeed indicator already well into the yellow. The guy came off the roof and down onto the seat. I could not rely on the AH, but I did manage to level the wings with the turn coordinator. I had started the technique of pulling back on the yoke till the airspeed stopped increasing, the make the thing back to level technique. Before that happened, we plunged out of the clouds, power off but engines running, wings level, and now about 70 degrees nose down. We had pulled some serious Gs. I was worried about the structural integrity of the aircraft. I called PG tower, said I had a medical emergency and had briefly lost my sight. As we were in bare VFR, and I wasn't going to lose sight of the ground again, I began discussing a highway landing option with ATC. As soon as we started that, I looked north and saw PG airport between virga to the ground. I told tower I could proceed VFR to the airport, but maintained the emergency as I had no idea if I was going to lose sight again, and I didn't know where we were structurally.

We landed and taxied to the Esso. I was shaken. I had barely spoken a word to the passengers as they could hear the situation in their headsets. I parked and went inside. I sat down, got a strange want to sneeze feeling in my nose, and then felt my chest get wet. I put my hand under my nose and the better part of a cup of water came out of my nasal cavity. Sea water.

About three days before, I and some friends, one of which went on to become Chief Pilot of Conair,,took scuba lessons there in the bay at Zihuateno. Part of that is to stand by the sea, take your mask, fill it with sea water, clamp it to your gob, and tilt your head back, and clear the mask by blowing. People were spluttering and puking all around. I called Transport Medical and told them all this. They figured it out. I had sea water trapped in my nasal cavity from the mask bs. It remained there right up to sitting down in the Esso. When I did the ear pop thing, that pressure transmitted through the water inside and affected the optic nerve, or nerves, not sure which. That led to the blindness, and that went away when the pressure stopped.

In the blind period, I do remember envisioning us splattered all over a mountainside, and people who knew me saying "Why in hell would Paddy do that?".But, the ones who knew me best would immediately presume pilot incapacitation. There are some types of incapacitation that can have you and your aircraft gone in seconds, and unlikely to come back.

I'm not just talking out of my arse when I express the opinion this Cirrus may have gone down as a result of pilot incapacitation. I never put out a Mayday through the whole thing until the airplane was back under control. Then I did.

For young pilots reading this, this is your lesson to take away...no matter that you may believe you are certain to die in the next few seconds, never stop being a pilot, never stop flying the machine.

[cncpc]

Excellent! We could be cousins! My father and his parents lived in Salmon Arm. The first name of one of my younger brothers is "Vernon". My first name is also that of a town in BC. My sister is in Salmon Arm now.

Are you able to get over the Salmon Arm? I only ask because my sister is visiting because of one of our cousins is sick, but she (my sister) doesn't have a car.

No, we're not cousins.

[Lead Balloon]

I do accept that the cause may be something other than pilot incapacitation.Good. Then we've nothing urgent to discuss, cncpc.

But I do hope to meet you next time I'm in BC, because you evidently have extensive experience and would be a font of aviation wisdom.

[Bones13]

I know the pilot, he was experienced and current for a private pilot. He was close to getting his CPL. Always flew IFR and was looking at moving onto twins. I can’t comprehend what has gone wrong here.

Has anyone yet worked out the wind/icing etc on the day? I think the lack of constant heading is coincident with a significant drop in groundspeed through about 8000ft. Perhaps something has begun to develop from then?

[FullMetalJackass]

That’s some very interesting stuff, FMJ.

Yet a Cirrus salesman contributed to rather than busting that myth, as a consequence of this event (https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/166098) which resulted in this unwelcome garden ornament (https://www.avweb.com/news/watch-this-spin-results-in-chute-pull/).

Firstly, I said that when stalling straight and level, the Cirrus will not drop a wing. That instance, the pilot was banking at 25°, performing the fabled base to final turn with associated stall / spin. Most planes would drop a wing and enter a spin if the plane is not co-ordinated. However it might interest you to note that EASA considers the SR 20 / 22 aircraft to be one of the few truly spin resistant aircraft to have been certified - not spin immune, but spin resistant.

However, let's go back to that incident with the salesman / pilot. Why did the Pilot fail to recover? Because, according to the passenger who was also a pilot. he applied pro spin rudder rather than anti. Had he acted correctly, he would have had no issue. However he did at least remember his hard deck and pulled before it became too late.


This had me scratching my head:Then why did you mention circumstances in which a pilot “slumps across the controls, locking them” – your words – in this thread? Surely you comprehended that the uninformed, hungry-for-facts people out there would take that as you suggesting that as an explanation for the tragedy. Surely.


You might recall your exact words were "How does sudden pilot incapacitation result in an aircraft plummeting to the ground?" You didn't refer to a Cirrus but to an aircraft hence I answered. Go check what you wrote and you will see you did NOT specify a Cirrus plummeting to the ground otherwise I would not have made such a suggestion. Please check your original post.


As to the rest: I get it. I get it that someone needs to run interference to protect the interests of the aircraft manufacturer and distributors and maintainers, while there’s all the swirling publicity and emotion in the wake of an awful tragedy. I get it. And it may turn out that this tragedy is the consequence entirely of the pilot and not a serviceable aircraft.

My original post was in response to those who decided to leap to the keyboard and post that the cause of this tragedy was likely pilot incapacitation or – and it makes me sick to even contemplate it – to suggest some deliberate action by the pilot. Before the smoke had lifted on the site of the tragedy.

If you want to keep pressing for pilot incapacitation, that’s your choice, as is mine to continue suggesting different possibilities.

Firstly,. I refuse to accept it was deliberate action, let me get that part out of the way. However history shows that Cirrus don't typically have wing spar issues like certain other brands therefore a catastrophic failure in the absence of CBs is unlikely. Their BRS system has been proven as reliable over the decades, the two issues you refer to were caused after the change to electronic ignition which was then rectified by an SB. This aircraft would have had its chute repacked last year so was not susceptible to spurious ignition. I therefore rule out any uncommanded activation or inability to pull - unless the owner flew with the safety pin still in the handle - some do, you know.....

I'm not "running interference for the manufacturer" because I know from first hand experience how good those aircraft are and what it takes to cause them to fail. I'm a fan of Cirrus aircraft - except, perhaps, for their pricing policy, especially of the costs for BRS repacking...You, on the other hand, appear to be searching for reasons which would require multiple issues happening at the same time, allowing the holes in the swiss cheese to line up whereas I am merely saying that the most likely cause is an aircraft being hand flown in moderate icing - the GAFOR said that clouds above freezing level inferred moderate icing - with an incapacitated pilot causing it to ice up and stall.

At the end of the day, the aircraft went from cruise climb to a rapid descent - within 15 seconds his vertical speed had changed from 800 feet upwards to 3700 feet downwards. The only way I have seen a light aircraft change that rapidly without a commensurate gain in airspeed is either structural failure - which has been ruled out so far - or for the plane to stall - and knowing how well these aircraft are built, I cannot believe a mechanical defect could force a plane into such a 90° nose down dive within 15 seconds. Perhaps you can think of such a failure mode - otherwise I remain by my belief that the aircraft stalled due to ice, that was the start of the incident.

The question remains: Why did the pilot not react? Why did he not recover or at least pull the chute? The most logical solution is - because he couldn't.... I find it amusing that you are opining that the plane could become inverted, that CAPS could be deployed which then became tangled with the aircraft..... Sure, this theoretically could happen but it begs the question: what caused the upset? How does an SR22, climbing along suddenly become inverted and, within 15 seconds, start descending at nearly 4000fpm??? If the accident aircraft had become inverted and wrapped up in its Chute, the pilot would have known that it's effectively game over, I would have expected him to make a call.

You just need to read the CAPS event webpage that LB posted earlier to know that statement is untrue. There's been a number of CAPS deployments in situations where they should have just landed, instead they panicked and pulled the chute. We are talking about bog standard PPLs here in most cases, not air force test pilots and ex NASA shuttle pilots. One fatal was at high speed and altitude over the rockies, with the predictable outcome that the chute separated and the aircraft speared in almost vertical. Another one had investigation results that talk about the operational limits of CAPS, maximum speeds, but, also maximum attitude, bank angle and pitching/rolling motions to prevent possible entanglement. The outcome was that the chutes effectiveness would be suspect outside of relatively slow, upright, level flight.

Historically speaking, Cirrus had a worse fatality rate than similar aircraft so COPA initiated a "pull early, pull often" mantra - which was basically to tell them: You have the chute, use it. Ridicule came because pilots were accused of pulling when they flew a tank ran empty rather than trouble shooting the issue within the time (altitude) available to them. However, typically the training at CPPPs is, if you have an issue in cruise at, say, 8000 feet, to first trim to maintain airspeed, point yourself towards the nearest airfield / suitable landing spot then trouble shoot the issue whilst remaining aware of the lowest deployment altitude. If a landing is not 100% assured when a few hundred feet above your hard deck, pull CAPS.

The fatal over the rockies was IIRC, a pilot caught in icing and he deployed CAPS after exceeding more than 180KTAS - here, the pilot was nowhere near this sort of airspeed. Concerning operational limits of CAPS, the question is: how does a plane flown by a competent and current IFR rated pilot suddenly experience an upset which, if CAPS was deployed, would cause entanglement around the aircraft? How does the plane invert itself?

[Lead Balloon]

I remain by my belief that the aircraft stalled due to ice, that was the start of the incident.Did anyone say that’s impossible? My first post started with the words: “Perhaps severe icing, stall and spin….” I usually say nothing about the cause of accidents, but in this case I couldn’t stay silent in the face of the immediate speculation which put the entire blame on the pilot. Before the smoke had dissipated from the site of the horrific death of four souls.

Why did the pilot not react?You don’t know that he didn’t. Why did he not recover or at least pull the chute? You don’t know that he didn’t.

I’ll now wait for the report of the poor bastards who have to sift through the aftermath of this tragedy to try work out what actually happened. I’ll standby for you to say: “Told you so” when their report backs your theory.

[43Inches]

Firstly, I said that when stalling straight and level, the Cirrus will not drop a wing. That instance, the pilot was banking at 25°, performing the fabled base to final turn with associated stall / spin. Most planes would drop a wing and enter a spin if the plane is not co-ordinated. However it might interest you to note that EASA considers the SR 20 / 22 aircraft to be one of the few truly spin resistant aircraft to have been certified - not spin immune, but spin resistant.

However, let's go back to that incident with the salesman / pilot. Why did the Pilot fail to recover? Because, according to the passenger who was also a pilot. he applied pro spin rudder rather than anti. Had he acted correctly, he would have had no issue. However he did at least remember his hard deck and pulled before it became too late.



You might recall your exact words were "How does sudden pilot incapacitation result in an aircraft plummeting to the ground?" You didn't refer to a Cirrus but to an aircraft hence I answered. Go check what you wrote and you will see you did NOT specify a Cirrus plummeting to the ground otherwise I would not have made such a suggestion. Please check your original post.



Firstly,. I refuse to accept it was deliberate action, let me get that part out of the way. However history shows that Cirrus don't typically have wing spar issues like certain other brands therefore a catastrophic failure in the absence of CBs is unlikely. Their BRS system has been proven as reliable over the decades, the two issues you refer to were caused after the change to electronic ignition which was then rectified by an SB. This aircraft would have had its chute repacked last year so was not susceptible to spurious ignition. I therefore rule out any uncommanded activation or inability to pull - unless the owner flew with the safety pin still in the handle - some do, you know.....

I'm not "running interference for the manufacturer" because I know from first hand experience how good those aircraft are and what it takes to cause them to fail. I'm a fan of Cirrus aircraft - except, perhaps, for their pricing policy, especially of the costs for BRS repacking...You, on the other hand, appear to be searching for reasons which would require multiple issues happening at the same time, allowing the holes in the swiss cheese to line up whereas I am merely saying that the most likely cause is an aircraft being hand flown in moderate icing - the GAFOR said that clouds above freezing level inferred moderate icing - with an incapacitated pilot causing it to ice up and stall.

At the end of the day, the aircraft went from cruise climb to a rapid descent - within 15 seconds his vertical speed had changed from 800 feet upwards to 3700 feet downwards. The only way I have seen a light aircraft change that rapidly without a commensurate gain in airspeed is either structural failure - which has been ruled out so far - or for the plane to stall - and knowing how well these aircraft are built, I cannot believe a mechanical defect could force a plane into such a 90° nose down dive within 15 seconds. Perhaps you can think of such a failure mode - otherwise I remain by my belief that the aircraft stalled due to ice, that was the start of the incident.

The question remains: Why did the pilot not react? Why did he not recover or at least pull the chute? The most logical solution is - because he couldn't.... I find it amusing that you are opining that the plane could become inverted, that CAPS could be deployed which then became tangled with the aircraft..... Sure, this theoretically could happen but it begs the question: what caused the upset? How does an SR22, climbing along suddenly become inverted and, within 15 seconds, start descending at nearly 4000fpm??? If the accident aircraft had become inverted and wrapped up in its Chute, the pilot would have known that it's effectively game over, I would have expected him to make a call.



Historically speaking, Cirrus had a worse fatality rate than similar aircraft so COPA initiated a "pull early, pull often" mantra - which was basically to tell them: You have the chute, use it. Ridicule came because pilots were accused of pulling when they flew a tank ran empty rather than trouble shooting the issue within the time (altitude) available to them. However, typically the training at CPPPs is, if you have an issue in cruise at, say, 8000 feet, to first trim to maintain airspeed, point yourself towards the nearest airfield / suitable landing spot then trouble shoot the issue whilst remaining aware of the lowest deployment altitude. If a landing is not 100% assured when a few hundred feet above your hard deck, pull CAPS.

The fatal over the rockies was IIRC, a pilot caught in icing and he deployed CAPS after exceeding more than 180KTAS - here, the pilot was nowhere near this sort of airspeed. Concerning operational limits of CAPS, the question is: how does a plane flown by a competent and current IFR rated pilot suddenly experience an upset which, if CAPS was deployed, would cause entanglement around the aircraft? How does the plane invert itself?

The difference between what LB and I are speculating is that we are not trying to attribute a cause or say it's one thing over another. Just debating if that theory has merit.

There is nothing ruling out mechanical failure at this point, just because the tail/wings are still attached does not rule out control failure, or structure deformation where it was all remains attached.

There is nothing ruling out chute malfinction.

There is nothing ruling out incapacitation.

There is nothing presently ruling out ice, stall, spin.

However as stated before the profile does not realy fit with stall/spin due the speeds involved as discussed eatlier, neither does it fit with an incapacitated pilot that well for similar reasoning. It could still be either as we just don't know anything except the profile.

We may get a definitive answer on the pilot incapacitation aspect though.

[Lookleft]

I frequently post 'likes' when you post something with which I agree, but you've never been able to bring yourself to agree with anything I've posted. Never. And it's not like my posts never attract support from anyone.

You sad little man. If you want adoration go on tik tok.

Pilot error is blaming the pilot, incapacitation is not and from personal experience it is easier for the family to accept that a medical event occurred rather than a piloting mistake was made.

[FullMetalJackass]

Quote:
I remain by my belief that the aircraft stalled due to ice, that was the start of the incident.

Did anyone say that’s impossible? My first post started with the words: “Perhaps severe icing, stall and spin….” I usually say nothing about the cause of accidents, but in this case I couldn’t stay silent in the face of the immediate speculation which put the entire blame on the pilot. Before the smoke had dissipated from the site of the horrific death of four souls.

Yes you did say that. However, you said that you couldn't accept speculation which put the entire blame on the pilot yet in my eyes, a stall and subsequent spin usually ARE typically caused by pilot error..... except with severe icing; here, any pilot aware of the danger would typically be looking for a way out - higher or lower - and whilst on an IFR flight plan, he's not going to depart from his assigned altitude without clearance. Maybe the pilot thought: at 10000 feet he would be on top and could get the ice burnt off but as soon as he's starting to descend due to icing, I can pretty much guarantee he'd be calling up the controllers - this has happened with multiple aircraft suffering icing, they didn't stay silent and accept their fates....

At the same time, I wouldn't blame a pilot who became incapacitated due to an unknown medical condition as being guilty of pilot error because, after all, none of us know when our time has come. It's not a crime to become involuntarily incapacitated, it's not as if the pilot said "yes please, I want a massive stroke / heart attack right now...." If it happens, it happens - why do you believe we mustn't consider such issues as most likely but rather want to suggest BRS malfunction or some other mechanical reason for the accident?

Quote:
Why did the pilot not react?

You don’t know that he didn’t.

The fact that the aircraft departed controlled flight so abruptly would indicate otherwise.... from 800fpm climb to 3700feet descent rate within 15 seconds is a pretty rapid change, wouldn't you say? The descent rate then only increased as the ground speed decreased. My first thoughts were that the plane was descending in a flat spin but that would mean the aircraft would have had to have stalled extremely tail heavy, beyond its aft CG limits - however with 3 small children aboard, I think we can safely rule that out....


Quote:
Why did he not recover or at least pull the chute?

You don’t know that he didn’t.

Again, the fact that the aircraft descended so rapidly and crashed whereas BRS are rightly proud of their records for deployments within the recommended flight envelope would indicate that he did neither.....the plane was already dropping like a stone, just 15 seconds after the last datapoint showing a cruise climb was transmitted. What "recovery actions" would cause a plane in a cruise climb suddenly descend at a terrifying rate, so quickly? If the Chute was the cause of the issue, why was it deployed in the first instance? If it deployed accidentally, they would have been within normal operating parameters, why would it have suddenly caused the plane to drop? Assuming it was pulled whilst inverted or whilst at an unusual attitude, what caused the upset in the first place?

I’ll now wait for the report of the poor bastards who have to sift through the aftermath of this tragedy to try work out what actually happened. I’ll standby for you to say: “Told you so” when their report backs your theory.

I'm pretty sure that based on the wreckage left that they have available to investigate, they won't be able to define a clear root cause for the accident because the plane was completely destroyed and burnt - unless, of course, they find parts of it which detached in flight which would point to an in flight breakup or perhaps a video capturing it's last moments of descent.... Also, I doubt a coroner would be able to carry out an autopsy on the remains of the pilot either to identify whether he had any unknown medical conditions which could have caused his sudden incapacitation.....

But again. let's look to Occam's Razor or, if you prefer, the Swiss cheese model. What scenario needs fewest number of slices of Swiss cheese to line up for the outcome we have seen? We know the plane wasn't flying on autopilot, we know that there was moderate freezing forecasted in clouds between 5000 and 10000 feet, we know he was climbing to 10000 when the incident started. Icing was therefore likely to have been present.

I'd love for it to be the result of poor maintenance or something like that - maybe he lost an aileron, the plane then rolled inverted, the pilot then triggered caps whilst inverted which led to the chute wrapping itself around the aircraft whilst ripping off his communication antenna - you know, something like that - but that requires multiple layers of cheese to line up. How likely do you believe that scenario is?

With my scenario, all I need is the icing to be a little more severe than forecasted with the pilot unable to react, for whatever reason.....

[43Inches]

But again. let's look to Occam's Razor or, if you prefer, the Swiss cheese model. What scenario needs fewest number of slices of Swiss cheese to line up for the outcome we have seen? We know the plane wasn't flying on autopilot, we know that there was moderate freezing forecasted in clouds between 5000 and 10000 feet, we know he was climbing to 10000 when the incident started. Icing was therefore likely to have been present.


We know nothing of what/who was flying at the time of departure. We don't know that the aircraft even entered cloud to gather ice. Wandering heading could be the pilot using heading mode to avoid small buildups, the fluctuations in speed and rate of climb could be mechanical turbulence outside cloud and the changes in ground speed can be attributed to wind changes aloft as the aircraft climbed, which would also cause turbulence at the shear layers. We just don't know. The lack of radio calls more suggests everything was normal until it was not, then they either could not or were too busy to make one. I know that ice does not suddenly turn an aircraft into a brick, I have hundreds of hours in icing, some severe events. At all times I had time to talk to center and exit the conditions.

At the same time, I wouldn't blame a pilot who became incapacitated due to an unknown medical condition as being guilty of pilot error because, after all, none of us know when our time has come. It's not a crime to become involuntarily incapacitated, it's not as if the pilot said "yes please, I want a massive stroke / heart attack right now...." If it happens, it happens - why do you believe we mustn't consider such issues as most likely but rather want to suggest BRS malfunction or some other mechanical reason for the accident?

Pilot incapacitation has more far reaching implications than just simple pilot error. The whole AvMed premise of restricting medicals is based on the rates of accidents attributed to incapacitation, so the higher the rate, the more justification to place more restrictions and tests on pilots, which don't make flying any safer as we all know underlying conditions that tend to kill you stone dead are very hard to detect, even heart attacks occur over time. A stroke is almost impossible to predict and could be the result of you sitting watching TV too long the night before in an awkward position. And personally I don't 'want' to find an answer, I want to know the answer, no matter what it is. Whatever the truth is here will add to the learning files for all who come after, so squeezing the accident into one cause that is what everyone wants to hear is not going to help stopping it again.

[Lookleft]

I want to know the answer, no matter what it is.

As FMJ stated, there may not be enough wreckage left to determine what the definitive cause was. Possibly there will be circuit boards or micro chips available to analyse but that won't provide a sequence of events, just a series of data points. They will probably be able to determine if the engine was producing power and if the aircraft was intact when it hit the ground. Whatever may have caused an incapacitation will never be determined but the pilots medical records may give the investigators some idea but those details will not be published.

I have flown in that area in conditions much worse than that indicated in aircraft much less capable than a Cirrus. Icing does not cause an alert pilot to fall out of the sky like this one did.

[PiperCameron]

Pilot incapacitation has more far reaching implications than just simple pilot error. The whole AvMed premise of restricting medicals is based on the rates of accidents attributed to incapacitation, so the higher the rate, the more justification to place more restrictions and tests on pilots, which don't make flying any safer as we all know underlying conditions that tend to kill you stone dead are very hard to detect, even heart attacks occur over time. A stroke is almost impossible to predict and could be the result of you sitting watching TV too long the night before in an awkward position. And personally I don't 'want' to find an answer, I want to know the answer, no matter what it is. Whatever the truth is here will add to the learning files for all who come after, so squeezing the accident into one cause that is what everyone wants to hear is not going to help stopping it again.

If it turns out it was "pilot incapacitation", frankly I don't see how the same thing happening in a car travelling at 100kmh on a typical country road wouldn't end with exactly the same outcome (apart from the typical negative press coverage and CASA overreaction, that is).

It'd just be another "family of four dies wrapped around a tree" on the nightly news, an increase in the road accident statistics for the month, and that'd be the end of it.

[Mr Mossberg]

Lead, is there any chance you are mixing alcohol with your medication? Happens to the best of us, sometimes we forget we've taken the medication.

[cncpc]

If it turns out it was "pilot incapacitation", frankly I don't see how the same thing happening in a car travelling at 100kmh on a typical country road wouldn't end with exactly the same outcome (apart from the typical negative press coverage and CASA overreaction, that is).

It'd just be another "family of four dies wrapped around a tree" on the nightly news, an increase in the road accident statistics for the month, and that'd be the end of it.
With respect, it is different on the ground. There is a period before incapacitation in which you know something isn't right and can pull over.

[KRviator]

With respect, it is different on the ground. There is a period before incapacitation in which you know something isn't right and can pull over.No, it's not.

In an ideal world, yes, that can happen, but life doesn't always afford you that opportunity. The big one is obviously fatigue, but sudden incapacitation is often given as a cause for accidents. "Blacked out", "Medical episode", even the Waterfall prang 20 years ago didn't give the Driver the opportunity to either apply the brakes, or even remove his foot from the deadman pedal and the train rolled over killing a bunch of passengers...

[PiperCameron]

With respect, it is different on the ground. There is a period before incapacitation in which you know something isn't right and can pull over.

Surely it takes a lot longer to slow down and pull over than it does to power back and pull the chute.. no?

[Capt Fathom]

Surely it takes a lot longer to slow down and pull over than it does to power back and pull the chute.. no?

No. Because you are not likely to just 'pop the chute' without having a good long think about it. In a car, there is nothing to lose by pulling over straight away. If it's a false alarm, you just drive off!

[IndianaOcean]

Just registered here to clear up a few things:

I’ve spent many hours in cockpits with Peter, the deceased pilot. And many years on the ground with him also.

Not a “student” pilot. He had many hundreds of hours including much recent time in Cirrus aircraft.

He had completed many IFR renewals over the years including one in the last month.

I found him to be careful, thoughtful, competent and meticulous in his approach to flying.

In my experience, he always briefed his passengers - including the kids - on deploying CAPS, even when I/we had heard it all before.

Also we talked about the old ‘Aviate/Navigate/Communicate’ priorities quite a few times over the years.

I spoke with him on Wednesday morning for 5 minutes and he was in a very positive frame of mind, having just filed his flight plan.

We arranged to meet next week when he was back in town. I’ve also been informed that after the ARM to CB leg he advised another friend that the “plane was perfect”

I’m reliably informed that a “new” / repacked (?) chute was fitted to the aircraft in January.

I won’t be replying/ posting further.

Clearly atm none of us know what happened.

Just wanted to inject some facts into the discussion.
Thank you Grey Head for posting and clarifying a few things. People can speculate all they like, but you had first hand experience with Peter. That goes a long way. Appreciate your time in posting. My first and last post too, as this thread seems to be a bunch of alleged pilots (perhaps some real ones), trying to outdo, outsmart and outfly eachother. May the family Rest in Peace and the actual investigation find the truth.

[Mr Mossberg]

IndianaOceans post appears pretty quick for a first post (thankfully).

And Grey head's post doesn't appear at all to me,

Let's hope that both these identities are in contact with ATSB and Cirrus.

[RickNRoll]

With respect, it is different on the ground. There is a period before incapacitation in which you know something isn't right and can pull over.
You can "pull over" a Cirrus, more or less.

Sometimes medical events happen that are fatal, even when the person is in otherwise good health.

[Squawk7700]

IndianaOceans post appears pretty quick for a first post (thankfully).

And Grey head's post doesn't appear at all to me,

Let's hope that both these identities are in contact with ATSB and Cirrus.

Grey Head's post appears to have been deleted; they obviously changed their mind, but not before someone quoted it.

All the comments in there are reflective of what's been said second hand about the pilot, so no surprises there and nothing of interest to the ATSB. Keep in mind that the pilot was not the owner of the aircraft, so any maintenance or relevant info is well known.

I do question people when I hear them say "just pull the chute" or "I briefed my 8 year old on how to pull the chute"... it would simply be a HUGE step for someone to mentally pull that handle, especially an adult with any life awareness, but expecting a child to is a huge ask and that's not even before they see if they actually physically try and pull it. For a young child to process a medical episode of the pilot, try to triage the situation, panic, attempt to make a radio call, attempt to level off and gain control, comfort the patient and decide to pull the chute in a short space of time seems incredibly unlikely. I know my 9 and 10 year old would probably discuss it for way too long, argue about something and not truly process that I wasn't going to be able to help them.

[cncpc]

Surely it takes a lot longer to slow down and pull over than it does to power back and pull the chute.. no?
No, it doesn't. And that isn't the test.

[Squawk7700]

Does anyone have the QNH from the day?

With the data based on 1013 it would be interesting to know what altitude actually is actually applying the delta.

[cncpc]

In discussions about incapacitation and the fact pattern of this accident, I want to add that it may confuse the analysis to presume that incapacitation and loss of control were simultaneous. If it was incapacitation, all we can know is that the state came on sometime between the last radio response from the pilot and the loss of control. Once it had, the only other person at the controls was a child. That might have been the situation for five seconds, or several minutes with an incapacitated or dead pilot in the left seat. In the second case, we may be seeing the best efforts of a child to do something. i.e. the heading changes, etc. ,

[Squawk7700]

Under the assumption that there's a consistent wind velocity, there's a lot going on in this red box.

A consistent climb followed by a sharp reduction in airspeed caused by occurrence X.
Presumably the autopilot cannot climb at the ~800fpm vertical climb speed which appears to be set on the autopilot VS dial.
A sharp decrease in airspeed follows.
The aircraft pitches forward and the speed increases by around 10 knots, at which point the climb rate increases again, back to normal levels.

What is interesting, is that the if the graph is correct, the climb rate continues at what it was, if not even a little higher, right to the point of stall, even as the airspeed decays dramatically, like the autopilot is pulling back hard for all it's worth, trying to climb the aircraft. Keeping in mind that as far as we are all advised, the stec autopilot doesn't run off IAS, but rather Vertical Speed.

Was the pilot potentially blissfully unaware that the aircraft was teetering on the edge of a stall for potentially a couple minutes, even after a seemingly similar occurrence barely a minute earlier?




https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1200x349/cirrus_568e76c1b37944504386a47cd8acadd401f79b8c.jpg

[BronteExperimental]

Caveat, FR data is heavily smoothed and obviously granular but….
The same behavior is also exhibited through 8000’ as well which could suggest close to the aircraft’s performance capacity. Especially if heavy.
I have no experience with that autopilot but I do with more modern setups in similarly capable aircraft and obv can’t just peg it at 1000fpm and close your eyes. You need to use IAS/FLCH or dial the VS down as you climb.
the thought of climbing through 8000’ in IMC with the FZL at 5000’ at pretty much Vy while potentially accumulating to me would have my pucker meter in the red. He could have been very keen to get on top quickly. Or not conscious.
that leg LSALT is 4600.

[skyrangerpro]

Quote:
I remain by my belief that the aircraft stalled due to ice, that was the start of the incident.



Yes you did say that. However, you said that you couldn't accept speculation which put the entire blame on the pilot yet in my eyes, a stall and subsequent spin usually ARE typically caused by pilot error..... except with severe icing; here, any pilot aware of the danger would typically be looking for a way out - higher or lower - and whilst on an IFR flight plan, he's not going to depart from his assigned altitude without clearance. Maybe the pilot thought: at 10000 feet he would be on top and could get the ice burnt off but as soon as he's starting to descend due to icing, I can pretty much guarantee he'd be calling up the controllers - this has happened with multiple aircraft suffering icing, they didn't stay silent and accept their fates....

At the same time, I wouldn't blame a pilot who became incapacitated due to an unknown medical condition as being guilty of pilot error because, after all, none of us know when our time has come. It's not a crime to become involuntarily incapacitated, it's not as if the pilot said "yes please, I want a massive stroke / heart attack right now...." If it happens, it happens - why do you believe we mustn't consider such issues as most likely but rather want to suggest BRS malfunction or some other mechanical reason for the accident?

Quote:
Why did the pilot not react?



The fact that the aircraft departed controlled flight so abruptly would indicate otherwise.... from 800fpm climb to 3700feet descent rate within 15 seconds is a pretty rapid change, wouldn't you say? The descent rate then only increased as the ground speed decreased. My first thoughts were that the plane was descending in a flat spin but that would mean the aircraft would have had to have stalled extremely tail heavy, beyond its aft CG limits - however with 3 small children aboard, I think we can safely rule that out....


Quote:
Why did he not recover or at least pull the chute?



Again, the fact that the aircraft descended so rapidly and crashed whereas BRS are rightly proud of their records for deployments within the recommended flight envelope would indicate that he did neither.....the plane was already dropping like a stone, just 15 seconds after the last datapoint showing a cruise climb was transmitted. What "recovery actions" would cause a plane in a cruise climb suddenly descend at a terrifying rate, so quickly? If the Chute was the cause of the issue, why was it deployed in the first instance? If it deployed accidentally, they would have been within normal operating parameters, why would it have suddenly caused the plane to drop? Assuming it was pulled whilst inverted or whilst at an unusual attitude, what caused the upset in the first place?



I'm pretty sure that based on the wreckage left that they have available to investigate, they won't be able to define a clear root cause for the accident because the plane was completely destroyed and burnt - unless, of course, they find parts of it which detached in flight which would point to an in flight breakup or perhaps a video capturing it's last moments of descent.... Also, I doubt a coroner would be able to carry out an autopsy on the remains of the pilot either to identify whether he had any unknown medical conditions which could have caused his sudden incapacitation.....

But again. let's look to Occam's Razor or, if you prefer, the Swiss cheese model. What scenario needs fewest number of slices of Swiss cheese to line up for the outcome we have seen? We know the plane wasn't flying on autopilot, we know that there was moderate freezing forecasted in clouds between 5000 and 10000 feet, we know he was climbing to 10000 when the incident started. Icing was therefore likely to have been present.

I'd love for it to be the result of poor maintenance or something like that - maybe he lost an aileron, the plane then rolled inverted, the pilot then triggered caps whilst inverted which led to the chute wrapping itself around the aircraft whilst ripping off his communication antenna - you know, something like that - but that requires multiple layers of cheese to line up. How likely do you believe that scenario is?

With my scenario, all I need is the icing to be a little more severe than forecasted with the pilot unable to react, for whatever reason.....

Coroner's don't perform autopsies, they may order them. Pathologists do.

[Obidiah]

"Wandering heading could be the pilot using heading mode to avoid small buildups, the fluctuations in speed and rate of climb could be mechanical turbulence"

Speed fluctuations may also mean very little other than using a little inertia energy to zoom climb over a few taller build ups on your way up, the kids probably would have enjoyed such a thing too.

.....(all types and yes)....

[FullMetalJackass]

With respect, it is different on the ground. There is a period before incapacitation in which you know something isn't right and can pull over.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/italy-authorities-probe-venice-bus-crash-that-killed-21-people-2023-10-04/

You were saying? Here the thoughts of the investigators are that the driver became incapacitated at the wheel. He had plenty of time to pull over, right..... oh wait......

[Mark__]

What about a Cirrus trim runaway (relay failure)? It has caused loss of control and fatalities before. Those it has happened to who managed to recover report that a full up trim event at circuit or climb speeds has them in a stall in just a few seconds if not immediately recognised and countered (overpowered until the circuit breaker can be identified and pulled).

[Mr Mossberg]

nothing of interest to the ATSB.

I would think the ATSB would like to know everything they can about the pilot for obvious reasons.

[Squawk7700]

I would think the ATSB would like to know everything they can about the pilot for obvious reasons.

They are already well across all this was more my point.

[Lead Balloon]

Analysis

The pilot reported that he lost airplane control during cruise flight in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and turbulence. He subsequently activated the airplane's parachute system, but the parachute failed to deploy. The pilot regained control of the airplane after exiting IMC and landed the airplane without further incident.

Certification tests were performed from level flight at speeds ranging from 62 to 137 knots indicated airspeed, and one test included deployment of the parachute system after a one-turn spin. The testing showed that to minimize the chances of parachute entanglement and reduce aircraft oscillations under the parachute, the parachute system should be activated from a wings-level, upright attitude if possible.

Postincident examination of the parachute system did not reveal any system component failure. Postincident testing showed that off-axis deployment of the parachute could exceed the forces required for a successful deployment of the parachute. If the airplane has a large pitch or bank angle or angular rates (or a combination of these) as the parachute rocket leaves the airplane, the airplane will rotate and cause the rocket tether to pull at an angle other than that intended, and the parachute will fail to deploy.

Radar data showed that the airplane was in a very dynamic flight pattern with extreme pitch and bank angles when the parachute system was activated. Thus, the parachute likely failed to deploy when activated due to the dynamic maneuvering of the airplane at the time of the activation, which exceeded the parachute system's certification requirements.

Probable Cause and Findings

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this incident to be:

The failure of the airplane's parachute to deploy when activated during a loss of control in cruise flight due to the dynamic maneuvering of the airplane at the time of the activation, which exceeded the parachute system's certification requirements.

A pdf copy of the whole NTSB investigation report is available here (https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/155963).

If the base of the IMC had been granite rather than clear air in that incident, the Monday Morning Quarterbacks would be asking why the pilot didn’t transmit a mayday and pull the chute.

[KRviator]

LB, The linked report does not align with the quoted text. Got the wrong URL?

From the linked report:
Analysis
The instrument rated pilot and passenger departed into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) and intended to practice some instrument approaches. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot reported a turn coordinator failure. The turn coordinator indicated a left bank regardless of control inputs and the pilot became disoriented. The airplane was equipped with a Cirrus Airplane Parachute System (CAPS). The pilot stated he pulled the CAPS activation handle repeatedly; however, the cable did not extend and "nothing seemed to happen."

​​​​​​​The airplane broke out of the cloud layer, and the pilot performed an emergency landing to a field. Witnesses near the accident site reported that the CAPS parachute deployed after ground contact. Post accident testing of the wreckage did not reveal any pre-impact instrumentation, or autopilot failures. The CAPS system also functioned normally; however, it was noted that the pull forces to activate the CAPS parachute varied significantly

[HarleyD2]

For me, there are few things about this tragic accident that I can take to heart.

The state of the residual wreckage is one which will likely not enable any definite conclusions to be drawn regarding the causal factors, unless there is other structure that exists outside the impact site yet to be found. No comms from the pilot cannot be pinned to a specific reason.

Whilst there are numerous possibilities, sifting through these to formulate probabilities requires some pretty speculative narrative constructs that some commentators seem to cling tenaciously to, without definitive evidence.

There are several 'facts', but I don't see the connections that some others do, we see nothing that really links these in a cogent manner that is supported with real evidence.

It is frustrating to many in this industry/recreation/field of interest that a clear explanation does not connect all of the dots. The aviators mind generally likes to create order from the chaos to complete the story and close the narrative, and to apply some confirmation bias. To accept that there are too many unknowns to complete and package the open ended is difficult to embrace, so we seek plausibility to make up for evidence or even proof that "this would not happen to me". I have a few thought of my own about what MAY have happened, but without evidence these are notional and I respect that others experiences (or inexperiences) will lead them to different theories of cause and outcome, some better informed than others but all speculative, including my own, and so I will refrain from commentary.

So what are the lessons to be learned:
- Always communicate during any/every emergency?
- Deploy Caps as soon as issue is recognized?
- Maintain control in severe turbulence?
- Be aware of icing potential?
- Recognize departure symptoms, and associated recovery inputs, for Spiral dive and incipient spin?
- Be competent at spin recovery technique applicable for type?
- Don't carry passengers when unpredictable/unforeseen medical conditions may manifest?!?
- Carry a safety pilot/flight competent passenger?

Most of us should be at least reasonably competent in all these aspects so that when flying a certified aircraft we remain in control and can safely complete the task. Does this mean that a similar fate cannot befall us skilled and experienced in these considerations? These are the knowns, and known unknowns. As Donald Rumsfeld once observed, "its the unknown unknowns that will get you" (paraphrased), Dunning and Kruger also had some thoughts about this.

My reflection is that the evidence indicates this was an experienced and capable pilot, with the added responsibility of his grandchildren on board, who departed on a well planned flight that went amiss in the most terrible way, telling me that the lesson I must take from this is that whilst all due care is exercised there may be interventions that can steal the care and skill in an instant from such a person in a manner that can be terminal and terrible.

Rather than attempting to solve the riddle, I contemplate more the outcome and aftermath in this case. Sad and tragic, currently unexplained, this accident serves to illustrates to me that observation and introspection, rather than supposition based explanation, may be a better approach to some resolution and acceptance of mortality could be the 'lesson learned' that may make us all a little bit better at aviation in our own way.

I do not expect that this will in any way dampen the the wild and varied posting of the to and fro by the proponents of the pet theories, I'm just throwing my own two cents worth into the pot FWIW.

HD2

[Lead Balloon]

LB, The linked report does not align with the quoted text. Got the wrong URL?

From the linked report:
Fixed. Thanks KR. Ironic that the incident I mistakenly linked to originally (https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/297505) also involved a CAPS malfunction.

[Squawk7700]

A pdf copy of the whole NTSB investigation report is available here (https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/155963).

If the base of the IMC had been granite rather than clear air in that incident, the Monday Morning Quarterbacks would be asking why the pilot didn’t transmit a mayday and pull the chute.


That's interesting LB, your linked accident had not had the below SB performed.

On February 25, 2002, Cirrus Design Corporation issued Service Bulletin (SB) 22-95-01. The SB was also the subject of FAA Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2002-05-05, which became effective on March 19, 2002. The service bulletin and subsequent AD, entailed the installation of a cable clamp external to the rocket cone adapter which would provide positive retention of the activation cable housing. On February 28, 2002, Cirrus Design Corporation issued SB 20-95-02, after it was discovered that some production airplanes may exhibit a condition where the pull force required to activate the CAPS system may by greater than desired. The SB entailed the installation of a clamp to positively restrain the cable housing at the CAPS Handle Adapter, loosen and straighten the activation cable above the headliner, and to remove an Adel clamp securing the activation cable adjacent to the rocket cone adapter.

The US crash was SR22 serial number 1140.
MSF was serial number 0153, so that SB would have presumably applied to MSF.

Both had the same year of manufacture I believe, being 2002.

I'm not suggesting that the SB wasn't performed on MSF, but it does show that this part of the aircraft build was clearly not foolproof from the start. Too bad when you tried to use it back in 2002.

[Desert Flower]

With respect, it is different on the ground. There is a period before incapacitation in which you know something isn't right and can pull over.

I disagree. My husband had a coronary in November last year & was gone in an instant. Had he been driving the car instead of sitting in his chair at the end of the table right in front of me you can guess what would have happened. And if anyone else was in the car with him then the chances are that they would have also died.

DF.

[Lead Balloon]

That's interesting LB, your linked accident had not had the below SB performed.



The US crash was SR22 serial number 1140.
MSF was serial number 0153, so that SB would have presumably applied to MSF.

Both had the same year of manufacture I believe, being 2002.

I'm not suggesting that the SB wasn't performed on MSF, but it does show that this part of the aircraft build was clearly not foolproof from the start. Too bad when you tried to use it back in 2002.There are a number of Service Bulletins for the Cirrus CAPS, some of which are not the subject of an Australian or FAA AD. Thus I'll be interested to read what the ATSB finds about the maintenance history of MSF's system.

[Mr Mossberg]

My husband had a coronary in November last year & was gone in an instant.

First of all DF, deepest sympathy for the loss of your husband.

The widow maker brand of heart attack is instant. There's no pulling over to the side of the road, there's no pulling of the CAPS.

[megan]

Originally Posted by cncpc
With respect, it is different on the ground. There is a period before incapacitation in which you know something isn't right and can pull over.Few months ago 50YO relative was on the highway 110kph cruise control engaged and had a stroke, collapsed, car speared off the highway into a tree at 110kph, wife received cracked vertebra, both survived. Different place could well have been fatal, head on for example, or over a cliff, no period before incapacitation.

[markis10]

First of all DF, deepest sympathy for the loss of your husband.

The widow maker brand of heart attack is instant. There's no pulling over to the side of the road, there's no pulling of the CAPS.

Indeed, be it plane or car sometimes life comes instantly to an end, another example was the death of Dean Mercer. I don’t want to think what happened in the plane after that if in fact it occurred…..

[FullMetalJackass]

A pdf copy of the whole NTSB investigation report is available here (https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/155963).

If the base of the IMC had been granite rather than clear air in that incident, the Monday Morning Quarterbacks would be asking why the pilot didn’t transmit a mayday and pull the chute.

I think you should reread that report. Page 18 is especially pertinent.....It appeared that the pilot's radio call about having deployed the parachute comes near the apex of a very steep climb

[Lead Balloon]

I did. As usual, you evade the key point.

[janrein]

From Rich Stowell's book Stall/Spin Awareness, chapter 18 (re Cirrus and similar)
The Cirrus is not approved for spins, and has not been tested or certified for spin recovery characteristics. The only approved and demonstrated method of spin recovery is activation of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). [..]
While the stall characteristics of the SR20 make accidental entry into a spin extremely unlikely, it is possible.


Paraphrasing further from that chapter 18: while standard certification requirements of single engine airplanes require spin certification and demonstrated spin recoverability from early stages of spin, these requirements were waved for the Cirrus and instead the Cirrus was certified based on the availability of the parachute system, allowing it an "Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS") rather than fulfilling the standard certification requirements.

From the information up-thread is appears a spin was entered (by whatever cause), the parachute was not pulled (for whatever cause or reason), and the resulting traces sadly appear consistant with a continued unrecovered spin.

Quoted information is from 2007 and new insights may have been gained since, if so it would be interesting to know of. Other than that probably little more to expect until the report comes out.

[FullMetalJackass]

I did. As usual, you evade the key point.

If you're referring to me, you should make that clear. However I will assume you are. You have made multiple claims - that the pilot pulled and it wrapped itself around the plane, tearing off the aerial. That he pulled and it failed to deploy. In both instances, you believed that "aviate, navigate and communicate" should happen in that order. Well, would it surprise you to know that once you've pulled that red handle, you can no longer do the first two so what exactly are you going to do, especially at 9500 feet with a long way to descend?

You also claimed in that incident that you posted about that, had there been cumulo-granite within the clouds, Monday Morning Quarterbacks would have been asking why didn't he communicate, why didn't he pull. Strange that, because he DID communicate.... he told the controller he had pulled his chute.... which was clearly stated in the report you linked.....

As for evading the key points, you have yet to tell me what could cause such a severe upset to cause a current and experienced IFR rated pilot to need to pull the chute whilst in an upset.... You seem to want to fantasise about scenarios which could, with maybe a one in a billion chance, occur. I prefer to look at reality, at what is most likely to have happened.

I must say that I am intrigued with the trim runaway idea, hadn't considered that scenario - because then without correct action, the pilot stalls not because of ice but because of an errant system, and then is too busy attempting to recover to communicate. That could easily cause him to be so focussed on resolving the issue, he doesn't communicate. I can see how that could occur, especially in IMC, further complicated by a child distracting the pilot. During my ownership of the Cirrus, my CSIP actually tried to simulate runaway trim by running the trim nose up - I don't know whether a runaway trim would run at the same speed as the CSIP dialling in nose up trim from his side yoke, but it was relatively benign, as long as you caught it quickly.

Obviously, it was a bit of a faff, applying nose down inputs whilst looking down to my right, looking to select the correct CB to pull. I can imagine in IMC, with the plane shaking, finding the correct one is going to be a little more difficult than me practicing on a CAVOK day.....especially as I was forewarned at the start of the flight that the CSIP "might" choose to dial in some trim to simulate runaway trim and see how I would cope.....

How fast a pilot would recognise a runaway trim also depends whether the pilot was in IMC or VMC but also if the pilot flew with the side yoke in his hand - I always had my left arm resting on the arm rest, my hand lightly gripping the yoke because the ergonomics allowed me to do so - the Cirrus is supremely comfortable to fly that way. I know when flying other aircraft such as C172, some pilots, in cruise, on autopilot, let go of the yoke. The advantage of holding the yoke lightly in the Cirrus is that if an uncommanded trim occurs, then you feel it acting against you - when nose up trim is applied, the yoke moves, powered by the motor, you feel the pressure, you can see the yoke moving.

So without finding parts of the aircraft elsewhere which departed in flight, I now see two possible scenarios - a trim runaway - and here I'm hoping that the remains of the aircraft will allow the investigators to determine the position of the elevator trim - or severe icing / stall with an unresponsive pilot. Obviously there could be others, I hope for the family's sake that they can find the reason.....

[FullMetalJackass]

From Rich Stowell's book Stall/Spin Awareness, chapter 18 (re Cirrus and similar)


Paraphrasing further from that chapter 18: while standard certification requirements of single engine airplanes require spin certification and demonstrated spin recoverability from early stages of spin, these requirements were waved for the Cirrus and instead the Cirrus was certified based on the availability of the parachute system, allowing it an "Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS") rather than fulfilling the standard certification requirements.

From the information up-thread is appears a spin was entered (by whatever cause), the parachute was not pulled (for whatever cause or reason), and the resulting traces sadly appear consistant with a continued unrecovered spin.

Quoted information is from 2007 and new insights may have been gained since, if so it would be interesting to know of. Other than that probably little more to expect until the report comes out.

FAA accepted the Chute as an alternative means of compliance, but EASA didn't. In total, the SR20 was stalled / spun 61 times before it was certified by EASA in 2004 - extract see below:

Spin Behavior

i. Test Matrix. A limited investigation of the SR20 spin behavior has been completed and results are contained in Cirrus Design reports 12419, title, and 15568, title. The incipient spin and recovery characteristics were examined during more than 60 total spin entries covering the following configurations.

Configuration(1)​​​​

Clean-Power Off ..........Takeoff-Power Off............. Landing-Power Off.............. Clean-Power On

Level Entry

1 Left & 1 Right.............. 1 Left & 1 Right................ 1 Left & 1 Right..................... 1 Left & 1 Right

C.G

Fwd(2), Mid, Aft................Fwd.................................... Fwd...................................... Fwd(2)

(1)All spins conducted at gross weight.

(2)Also evaluated accelerated entries, 30 degree banked turn entries, and effects of ailerons against the spin direction.

Results. The aircraft recovered within one turn in all cases examined. Recovery controls were to reduce power, neutralize ailerons, apply full rudder opposite to spin, and to apply immediate full forward (nose down) pitch control. Altitude loss from spin entry to recovery ranged from 1,200 – 1,800 feet. Detail results can be found in the above referenced reports.

Comments. No spin matrix less than that prescribed in AC23-8A or AC23-15, can determine that all configurations are recoverable. It must be assumed that the SR20 has some unrecoverable characteristics. In the SR20 proper execution of recovery control movements is necessary to affect recovery, and aircraft may become unrecoverable with incorrect control inputs. These spins enabled Cirrus to gain additional understanding of both the stall departure characteristics of the airplane and the necessary spin recovery techniques.

[jonkster]

was that testing only incipient spin recovery or fully developed spins?

[Lead Balloon]

I will try to make it simpler for you, FMJ:

The absence of a deployed chute is not conclusive of an absence of attempts to deploy it. There are documented instances of pilots attempting to deploy the chute but it failing to deploy properly or at all.

(Equally, the presence of a deployed chute is not conclusive of the presence of attempts to deploy it. There are documented instances of the chute deploying without human intervention.)

[cncpc]

First of all DF, deepest sympathy for the loss of your husband.

The widow maker brand of heart attack is instant. There's no pulling over to the side of the road, there's no pulling of the CAPS.
The "widow maker" brand of heart attack is not the only type of heart attack, or the only type of incapacitation. Stroke is a higher risk as it does almost immediately reduce the effectiveness of thinking and motor activity.
I just came back to look at where this thread was going, and I see that now the argument has come from my rather innocuous statement that people in a vehicle who are experiencing an incapacitating event can simply pull over. It beggars belief that someone could launch a denial post about that obviously true statement. Behind that is the presumption that a heart attack is an off on switch for the body to end life instantly, rending all other systems inoperative in a split second. It isn't.

https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/17522-sudden-cardiac-death-sudden-cardiac-arrest

[janrein]

FAA accepted the Chute as an alternative means of compliance, but EASA didn't. In total, the SR20 was stalled / spun 61 times before it was certified by EASA in 2004 - extract see below:

Spin Behavior

i. Test Matrix. A limited investigation of the SR20 spin behavior has been completed and results are contained in Cirrus Design reports 12419, title, and 15568, title. The incipient spin and recovery characteristics were examined during more than 60 total spin entries covering the following configurations.

Configuration(1)​​​​

Clean-Power Off ..........Takeoff-Power Off............. Landing-Power Off.............. Clean-Power On

Level Entry

1 Left & 1 Right.............. 1 Left & 1 Right................ 1 Left & 1 Right..................... 1 Left & 1 Right

C.G

Fwd(2), Mid, Aft................Fwd.................................... Fwd...................................... Fwd(2)

(1)All spins conducted at gross weight.

(2)Also evaluated accelerated entries, 30 degree banked turn entries, and effects of ailerons against the spin direction.

Results. The aircraft recovered within one turn in all cases examined. Recovery controls were to reduce power, neutralize ailerons, apply full rudder opposite to spin, and to apply immediate full forward (nose down) pitch control. Altitude loss from spin entry to recovery ranged from 1,200 – 1,800 feet. Detail results can be found in the above referenced reports.

Comments. No spin matrix less than that prescribed in AC23-8A or AC23-15, can determine that all configurations are recoverable. It must be assumed that the SR20 has some unrecoverable characteristics. In the SR20 proper execution of recovery control movements is necessary to affect recovery, and aircraft may become unrecoverable with incorrect control inputs. These spins enabled Cirrus to gain additional understanding of both the stall departure characteristics of the airplane and the necessary spin recovery techniques.



I stand corrected, thank you FMJ. Apparently the 2004 certification by EASA had not made it to the 2007 edition of Stowell's book.

[Desert Flower]

The "widow maker" brand of heart attack is not the only type of heart attack, or the only type of incapacitation. Stroke is a higher risk as it does almost immediately reduce the effectiveness of thinking and motor activity.
I just came back to look at where this thread was going, and I see that now the argument has come from my rather innocuous statement that people in a vehicle who are experiencing an incapacitating event can simply pull over. It beggars belief that someone could launch a denial post about that obviously true statement. Behind that is the presumption that a heart attack is an off on switch for the body to end life instantly, rending all other systems inoperative in a split second. It isn't.

https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/17522-sudden-cardiac-death-sudden-cardiac-arrest

Excuse me? My husband was laughing & joking with me one second & dead the next! So what is that then if it isn't an on/off switch to end life instantly, rendering all other systems inoperative in a split second?

DF.

[Desert Flower]

First of all DF, deepest sympathy for the loss of your husband.

The widow maker brand of heart attack is instant. There's no pulling over to the side of the road, there's no pulling of the CAPS.

Thank you.

DF.

[Squawk7700]

Excuse me? My husband was laughing & joking with me one second & dead the next! So what is that then if it isn't an on/off switch to end life instantly, rendering all other systems inoperative in a split second?

DF.

Around 40-50% of heart attacks are fatal. In your husband's case it was sadly short and sharp, hence the widow-maker term. That must have been truly terrible for you.

[Nadsy]

Excuse me? My husband was laughing & joking with me one second & dead the next! So what is that then if it isn't an on/off switch to end life instantly, rendering all other systems inoperative in a split second?

DF.

I'm very sorry for your loss. That would have been (and must still be) awful. I had the dreaded 'widow maker' (LAD, Int and Cx triple infarction) a couple of years ago aged 46. Fortunately for me, the ambo station was 10 minutes away, and within an hour I was in the ward, and got away lightly with 3 stents. Although I still had my wits about me during it, I would not have liked to be in charge of any kind of machinery.... I don't think it would have ended well.

Anyway, I just wanted to respectfully add that there can evidently be varying degrees of effects from a heart attack, but it wouldn't take much to loose the ball in a plane, or car for that matter.

My condolences also to the family affected by this awful crash.

[43Inches]

The "widow maker" brand of heart attack is not the only type of heart attack, or the only type of incapacitation. Stroke is a higher risk as it does almost immediately reduce the effectiveness of thinking and motor activity.
I just came back to look at where this thread was going, and I see that now the argument has come from my rather innocuous statement that people in a vehicle who are experiencing an incapacitating event can simply pull over. It beggars belief that someone could launch a denial post about that obviously true statement. Behind that is the presumption that a heart attack is an off on switch for the body to end life instantly, rending all other systems inoperative in a split second. It isn't.

https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/17522-sudden-cardiac-death-sudden-cardiac-arrest

You just have to watch the multitude of dashcams of drivers who just spear off the road suddenly, most are sudden incapacitations. I can count at least 50 from this year I've watched, and thats the ones that have been caught on dashcams. The difference was not that they had time to stop, it was that most were at low speed and ran into things at a survivable speed.

This was a Truck driver who suffered a medical episode, I guess you can say he did pull over...

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l3mfJsaOsLA

Luck played a major part that no one was killed, imagine if anyone was in the bus shelter. Also pretty normal that during a road vehicle incapacitation the car/truck tends to go straight ahead more or less with little swerving. Which is the same for aircraft in most cases unless you are very poorly trimmed as in general most normal category aircraft are designed with positive stability to more or less keep it upright unless you give it reason not to be.

Around 40-50% of heart attacks are fatal. In your husband's case it was sadly short and sharp, hence the widow-maker term. That must have been truly terrible for you.

I think your stats are well out of date, that rate has fallen to less than 15%. I think you may be referring to the widow-maker variations survival rate, which just refers to blockage of the upper coronary arteries, which supply a more essential part of the heart. The amount of people I know personally that have suffered heart attacks in the last few years is in double digits, only one passed away, almost immediately the same as DFs husband.

[Capt Fathom]

So where are we at solving the Cirrus accident at Gundaroo?

[lucille]

So where are we at solving the Cirrus accident at Gundaroo?

Surely you have to marvel at the range of expertise displayed here. ADS data analysis, Cirrus flight controls and stability, CAPs, icing, stall / spin behaviour and now, advanced cardiology. All that’s missing here to make this the complete cockpit conversation is taxation and investment advice.

Looking at the photos of the site, the best anyone can hope for is that the investigators get lucky enough to find a vital clue or two.

[Mr Mossberg]

and now, advanced cardiology.

I'm hazarding a guess that some of the posters may have experienced coronary events, and do somewhat become experts, sadly after the fact.

[RickNRoll]

Surely you have to marvel at the range of expertise displayed here. ADS data analysis, Cirrus flight controls and stability, CAPs, icing, stall / spin behaviour and now, advanced cardiology. All that’s missing here to make this the complete cockpit conversation is taxation and investment advice.

Looking at the photos of the site, the best anyone can hope for is that the investigators get lucky enough to find a vital clue or two.
Can out be said it didn't go in nose down? Can I see an outline of the flattened plane in the debris.

[FullMetalJackass]

was that testing only incipient spin recovery or fully developed spins?

I'll see if I can find out the information however I would imagine that it is incipient spin recovery. By the way the comment:

It must be assumed that the SR20 has some unrecoverable characteristics

refers to the fact that to recover a Cirrus from a spin, the yoke must be pushed FULL forward and not just partially; indeed, pushing full nose down was viewed as an action can be daunting for a pilot who finds themselves looking down at the ground with it spinning around them.....

I will try to make it simpler for you, FMJ:

The absence of a deployed chute is not conclusive of an absence of attempts to deploy it. There are documented instances of pilots attempting to deploy the chute but it failing to deploy properly or at all.

(Equally, the presence of a deployed chute is not conclusive of the presence of attempts to deploy it. There are documented instances of the chute deploying without human intervention.)

And I will make it even simpler for you.

1) Let's assume you're high enough and have deployed / attempted to deploy the chute. You have a couple of minutes descent in front of you. What are you going to do. You can't aviate, nor can you navigate.

In your example where the chute misfired, you said he didn't communicate. This is what you wrote:

If the base of the IMC had been granite rather than clear air in that incident, the Monday Morning Quarterbacks would be asking why the pilot didn’t transmit a mayday and pull the chute.

Your words, not mine. But he did. The report clearly stated that he had declared pulling the chute. Indeed, most pilots who deploy at an altitude higher than circuit pattern typically DO communicate. So why didn't this pilot, if he popped the chute at 9000 feet, even if it misfired / misdeployed?

2) unwanted chute deployment was always an issue that happened on the ground and this itself led to an SB..... you know that....

[Lead Balloon]

The following statements are unassailably correct, FMJ:

The absence of a deployed chute is not conclusive of an absence of attempts to deploy it. There are documented instances of pilots attempting to deploy the chute but it failing to deploy properly or at all.

Equally, the presence of a deployed chute is not conclusive of the presence of attempts to deploy it. There are documented instances of the chute deploying without human intervention.

I’ll add another couple:

The absence of receipt by ATC of a mayday call is not conclusive of an absence of a pilot’s attempts to make one.

The existence of a Service Bulletin is not conclusive of the carrying out of the SB, competently or at all, in the case of a particular aircraft the subject of the SB.

You can of course keep expressing opinions about the probabilities of various circumstances, but if you want to argue the correctness of the above statements you’re merely reinforcing how biased your agenda is.

On the subject of SBs, you are of course aware that there is no regulatory requirement to comply with an SB unless it is made the subject of an AD by an NAA (in this case CASA or the FAA) or the particular aircraft has an approved system of maintenance which mandates compliance with SBs. Please identify the AD issued by CASA or the FAA mandating compliance with the SB to which you referred, or quote the provision of the approved system of maintenance for MSF which mandates compliance with SBs.

Even if there is an AD mandating compliance with the SB, or there is an approved system of maintenance mandating compliance with SBs or the aircraft owner chose to comply with all SBs, that is not conclusive of the carrying out of any SB, competently or at all, in the case of MSF. And that is an unassailably correct statement.

That is why accident investigators look into the actual maintenance history of an aircraft involved in an incident and in some cases speak to the people responsible for actually carrying out the maintenance.

[Squawk7700]

Surely you have to marvel at the range of expertise displayed here. ADS data analysis, Cirrus flight controls and stability, CAPs, icing, stall / spin behaviour and now, advanced cardiology. All that’s missing here to make this the complete cockpit conversation is taxation and investment advice.

Looking at the photos of the site, the best anyone can hope for is that the investigators get lucky enough to find a vital clue or two.

You may scoff over some of the comments, however there are a LOT of years of experience here. Pilots, engineers, lawyers and doctors to name a few (probably the odd accountant too). The younger gen Y's and Z's are generally on Facebook and the old-scool boomers tend to cling to forums like this one :-) In fact some of the posters may have more experience that those tasked to actually investigate the incident.

That aside, the availability of the ADSB data has completely changed the landscape, it's literally a game-changer, even to the point where a flight-sim pilot could find a probable cause before the wreckage has even been located.

[Nadsy]

pushing full nose down was viewed as an action can be daunting for a pilot who finds themselves looking down at the ground with it spinning around them.....


Highly recommend actual spin training (obviously in a rated A/C). Did some in a Citabria during my FIR. Only had to call on it once as an instructor, but, for me, having actually done/experienced it as opposed to reading the instructions on it gave me a lot of comfort.

[43Inches]

Highly recommend actual spin training (obviously in a rated A/C). Did some in a Citabria during my FIR. Only had to call on it once as an instructor, but, for me, having actually done/experienced it as opposed to reading the instructions on it gave me a lot of comfort.

An instructor rating should include actual spin recoveries, since it's highly likely that a student can put you in one.

You may scoff over some of the comments, however there are a LOT of years of experience here. Pilots, engineers, lawyers and doctors to name a few (probably the odd accountant too). The younger gen Y's and Z's are generally on Facebook and the old-scool boomers tend to cling to forums like this one :-) In fact some of the posters may have more experience that those tasked to actually investigate the incident.


Some may even have input into the investigation. And postulate on forums like this to thresh out ideas from the industry. The media definitely like to troll through industry forums and take tid-bits and print them as fact.

​​​​​​​That is why accident investigators look into the actual maintenance history of an aircraft involved in an incident and in some cases speak to the people responsible for actually carrying out the maintenance.

And hence several investigations led to maintenance actions and procedures or lack of there of that have caused the crash of numerous airliners. The DC-10 engine replacement issues, the Brasilia prop issue, the JAL 747 repair, are just a few of many accidents caused by maintenance performed, but not as it should. Even going back to certification, like the ATR saga, where certification results were not communicated, or hidden. Engineers knowing the aircraft had an icing issue, stating the boots were too small, EASA/DGAC regulations allowing blanket icing certification, but FAA assuming that meant for all conditions. It took a lot of digging to solve that one and ATR swore black and white it was a pilot error issue, until the NTSB got wind of a cover up by the DGAC.

[jonkster]

I'll see if I can find out the information however I would imagine that it is incipient spin recovery. By the way the comment:

It must be assumed that the SR20 has some unrecoverable characteristics

refers to the fact that to recover a Cirrus from a spin, the yoke must be pushed FULL forward and not just partially; indeed, pushing full nose down was viewed as an action can be daunting for a pilot who finds themselves looking down at the ground with it spinning around them.....


With full forward stick in a spin there may also be the possiblity of the spin crossing over to inverted (not saying it would just it would seem the full spin behaviour of the aircraft has never been explored - which is fair enough - most GA aircraft would fit that category).

[Dora-9]

Given that there's some conjecture about the aircraft being in a flat spin - while I've never even sat in a Cirrus, on most aircraft the spin will be flat if the engine remains at high power. Is it possible that, following a pilot incapacitation with no further control inputs, the aircraft stalled with cruise/climb power, departing controlled flight into a flat spin?

[Runaway Gun]

No. Without pilot input, especially full back stick, the aircraft is not even going to stall, let alone spin.

[Squawk7700]

No. Without pilot input, especially full back stick, the aircraft is not even going to stall, let alone spin.

How did you come to that conclusion? Looking at the graph where the altitude increases sharply and the airspeed washes off, are you saying that this could only be pilot induced? Also, do you know the cutoff limit on the Stec AP as fitted in the Gen 1 SR22? How many stalls have you conducted in an SR22 whilst using the autopilot, in a reduced power cruise climb at 10,000 ft with VS mode at 800fpm?

[FullMetalJackass]

Given that there's some conjecture about the aircraft being in a flat spin - while I've never even sat in a Cirrus, on most aircraft the spin will be flat if the engine remains at high power. Is it possible that, following a pilot incapacitation with no further control inputs, the aircraft stalled with cruise/climb power, departing controlled flight into a flat spin?

A flat spin would typically require a tail heavy centre of gravity outside of the normal operating envelope. I took an old SR22 W&B calculator, entered 80kg for the pilot, 50kg for the 11 year old and 35kg for each child on the rear seats, full tanks. In order to get the CoG just slightly outside of the envelope, rearwards, they would have had to have been carrying around 110kg of baggage in the boot....

No. Without pilot input, especially full back stick, the aircraft is not even going to stall, let alone spin.

Not true. If the aircraft was flying using a basic autopilot such as the STEC 55x, set on HDG & VS mode, climbing with, say, 700fpm, eventually the autopilot will pull the aircraft into a stall as the engine can no longer generate the power required to sustain the climb, the higher it climbs. In order to keep the commanded climb rate, the autopilot raises the nose in order to continue to climb....hey presto - stall. Depending on the VS set, depends how soon the aircraft will stall - with VS+1000 fpm commanded, it will stall much earlier than, say, VS +300fpm.

However for this to develop into a spin, yaw would have to be present in some form or other, otherwise the nose would just drop and the plane would mush downwards. Stalling a Cirrus with no yaw is relatively benign; because of the cuffed design of the wing, the inboard portion of it stalls first, allowing the outboard area to remain unstalled, meaning the ailerons are still effective; in a Cirrus, you can actually use the ailerons in a stall to keep the wings level.... yes, you're descending rapidly but without yaw, it won't spin - the Cirrus SR2x aircraft were considered the first spin resistant aircraft EASA certified.. External factors such as turbulence might create the yaw required to induce the spin, though....

Modern autopilots such as the Garmin GFC or Avidyne DFC have a safety feature which will trim the nose downwards before stalling the aircraft - unfortunately we don't know what A/P this aircraft had fitted. Other factors which can cause an aircraft to stall without pilot input would be icing, trim runaway...

[Mr Mossberg]

An instructor rating should include actual spin recoveries, since it's highly likely that a student can put you in one.

​​​​​​​It does

[Squawk7700]

Not true. If the aircraft was flying using a basic autopilot such as the STEC 55x, set on HDG & VS mode, climbing with, say, 700fpm, eventually the autopilot will pull the aircraft into a stall as the engine can no longer generate the power required to sustain the climb, the higher it climbs. In order to keep the commanded climb rate, the autopilot raises the nose in order to continue to climb....hey presto - stall. Depending on the VS set, depends how soon the aircraft will stall - with VS+1000 fpm commanded, it will stall much earlier than, say, VS +300fpm.

However for this to develop into a spin, yaw would have to be present in some form or other, otherwise the nose would just drop and the plane would mush downwards. Stalling a Cirrus with no yaw is relatively benign; because of the cuffed design of the wing, the inboard portion of it stalls first, allowing the outboard area to remain unstalled, meaning the ailerons are still effective; in a Cirrus, you can actually use the ailerons in a stall to keep the wings level.... yes, you're descending rapidly but without yaw, it won't spin - the Cirrus SR2x aircraft were considered the first spin resistant aircraft EASA certified.. External factors such as turbulence might create the yaw required to induce the spin, though....

Look at the graph with the green and yellow.

It looks like the autopilot tried hard once to stall unsuccessfully, then a minute or two later it tried again... successfully. Did it get away with a nose drop the first time, then nose drop and spin the second time? As you say, turbulence could cause that, however do you think that a full or cruise power stall with full back-stick may result in a wing drop into a stall with limited yaw input?

[BronteExperimental]

Does that STEC have a YD?
even if it did I’d say it would have made little difference.
A full power on stall in any 300hp single is not a benign nose drop event. Granted at 9000’ it’s not 300hp anymore but I can see a cirrus departing in quite a sporting manner at full power without a boot full of right rudder.
Won’t be the first time in a cirrus either. Plenty of lazy right foot cirrus prangs.

[Squawk7700]

Does that STEC have a YD?
even if it did I’d say it would have made little difference.
A full power on stall in any 300hp single is not a benign nose drop event. Granted at 9000’ it’s not 300hp anymore but I can see a cirrus departing in quite a sporting manner at full power without a boot full of right rudder.
Won’t be the first time in a cirrus either. Plenty of lazy right foot cirrus prangs.

The rudder input required is very manual with no rudder trim. If you are off the rudder, depending on the power setting, the balance will be off and it will drop the wing to compensate, making for an uncomfortable ride.

In this case I’m assuming a reduced power cruise climb as the speed doesn’t seem to be high enough for a full power climb.

[Clare Prop]

An instructor rating should include actual spin recoveries, since it's highly likely that a student can put you in one.




Yes it does and that's a skill that in nearly 15,000 hours instructing I have never had to use. Debatable if that makes me n=1 or n=15,000 but I'd be interested to see where you get the "highly likely" from?
The syllabus includes competency in "Avoid Spin".

[Mr Mossberg]

Agreed, a student hasn't come close to putting me in a spin, not even in the planes that want to spin.

[NZFlyingKiwi]

Yes it does and that's a skill that in nearly 15,000 hours instructing I have never had to use. Debatable if that makes me n=1 or n=15,000 but I'd be interested to see where you get the "highly likely" from?
The syllabus includes competency in "Avoid Spin".

I would generally agree with that sentiment, when teaching spinning to new instructors I tend to approach it from the angle that if it's unintentionally got to this point you've already let the situation get out of hand but you might as well come back to the school with egg on your face rather than in a box. I would say aerobatics instructing is a slightly different kettle of fish but I would certainly expect anyone doing that to have practiced many many spins!

[Checkboard]

I used to instruct aeros - and never had an unintentional spin.

[43Inches]

Except that I know two instructors personally that are traumatized due to a student locking up during a stall and entering a spin. Just because you have never experienced it, does not mean it does not happen, and when it does, you really need to have some wits about you to know what to do. I could go on about several other situations that tend to send instructors to seek mental professionals, but we can focus on spins for now. BTW it will make you think twice about about instructing people that are physically stronger than you.

[NZFlyingKiwi]

Of course it goes without saying that having not had the experience myself doesn't rule it out of the realms of possibility, but I very much disagree it's a highly likely scenario.

[physicus]

I don't know why some of you keep suggesting a flat spin. That makes no sense, and the evidence is stacked against that theory.

The rate of descent (ROD) in a flat spin is much less than in a regular spin - perhaps 3,000 - 4,000 fpm. For a light aircraft, a normal spin ROD is between 5,000-8,000 fpm. MSY's final descent averaged a geometric (GPS derived) ROD of 9,932 fpm - or taking altitude and time data alone, it lost 7250 ft in 44 seconds which averages out to 9,886 fpm. That is a very high rate for a spin, and I don't think possible for a flat spin.

These numbers still make me suspect there will be a critical part of an airfoil found some distance away.

[43Inches]

I agree, flat spin is really not an option here, the numbers barely fit with a spin at all, or even a stalled condition. If the autopilot stalled it, or it was passing in and out of a stalled condition with an incapacitated pilot holding it back, it would show a much shallower porpoising profile. As has already been discussed it looks more like something catastrophic happened that also caused an amount of drag that put the aircraft into a very steep, but restrained dive. Something more like a Stuka dive bomber, which was the only dive bomber capable of a sustained completely vertical dive, it even had an automatic dive recovery mechanism as pilots could black out from the g load during pull out.

Of course it goes without saying that having not had the experience myself doesn't rule it out of the realms of possibility, but I very much disagree it's a highly likely scenario.

I meant highly likely over the career of an instructor, not on a day to day basis. It will also depend on what types you fly, some are more aggressive in spin entry than others.

[cncpc]

Excuse me? My husband was laughing & joking with me one second & dead the next! So what is that then if it isn't an on/off switch to end life instantly, rendering all other systems inoperative in a split second?

DF.
First of all, my sympathies on the loss of your husband.

I have no idea how this thread swerved off the road to the point where we discuss incapacitation in the narrow framework of it being only and instantly fatal heart attack. There are dozens of things which can incapacitate you in an airplane for which you can simply pull over in a car. We experienced it with a family member less than a year ago. He was driving in Kelowna, had previously had a heart attack, felt another one coming on, saw the other side of the road was clear with traffic at the oncoming light, swerved across, rolled up onto the curb, and died. A Mountie was at the light, saw it happen, was there almost out instantly, had him out of the car, saw he wasn't breathing, gave him CPR and brought him back.

I believe that the most likely cause of this crash was pilot incapacitation. That is far more deadly in an airplane than in a car. It may well be something else.

[43Inches]

No one that has been involved in accident investigation would have any 'belief' in what the 'cause' is at this stage. A key part to being an investigator is to not jump to conclusions until you have as much information as possible. Putting forward 'beliefs' can bias the investigation to 'fit' the outcome you want. You get all the data, witness statements, as much information as possible and then start ruling out what it's not from a list of possibilities that you have made up based on the scenario. The pilot may have had a heart attack after a wing fell off, so if the autopsy found he had died before impact, but you never bother to look for the wing, of course it goes down as an incapacitation instead of inflight break up. And further to that, several posts have indicated why this does not necessarily fit with an incapacitation, first and foremost that the aircraft basically plunged straight down, but not at VNE, even though it was near vertical.

[NZFlyingKiwi]

I meant highly likely over the career of an instructor, not on a day to day basis. It will also depend on what types you fly, some are more aggressive in spin entry than others.

I can agree with that, assuming we're talking long term career instructors. Many instructors 'careers' at the moment are only 200-300 hours!

[cncpc]

Except that I know two instructors personally that are traumatized due to a student locking up during a stall and entering a spin. Just because you have never experienced it, does not mean it does not happen, and when it does, you really need to have some wits about you to know what to do. I could go on about several other situations that tend to send instructors to seek mental professionals, but we can focus on spins for now. BTW it will make you think twice about about instructing people that are physically stronger than you.

I have about 500 hours of instruction time in the early 80s. We always did incipient spins. I usually stopped at 2 turns. I believe that was not only allowed back then, but mandatory. Not sure, but I think you can only teach to the point of wing drop now.

I and quite a few others had a plan for lockup at the controls. Anytime, but obviously spin training is the most likely situation for that. I kept an 18 inch long 1 inch diameter hardwood dowel in the map pocket on my side. The students knew what it was for, that it was coming across their hand or wrist if they didn't instantly give up control when commanded. Never had to use it.

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

Except that I know two instructors personally that are traumatized due to a student locking up during a stall and entering a spin. Just because you have never experienced it, does not mean it does not happen, and when it does, you really need to have some wits about you to know what to do. I could go on about several other situations that tend to send instructors to seek mental professionals, but we can focus on spins for now. BTW it will make you think twice about about instructing people that are physically stronger than you.

When I did my Instructor's Rating I was taught that is what the fire extinguisher is for - to bash the student with in order to regain control!

[megle2]

Forky your back

[Checkboard]

I was taught a simple, quick, light backhand slap to the face. The instantaneous reaction is for the student to put their hands up to their face, and that breaks the psychological lock they have on the controls.

The scenario was a small turbulence bump, the new student reacting by “bracing” themselves on the yoke, pushing it forward, with the sudden nose down resulting in further “bracing” - and a viscous circle panicked lockup on the controls the result.

Also never had to use it, but was it part of my instructor training from a very experienced 60 year old instructor.

[PiperCameron]

I was taught a simple, quick, light backhand slap to the face. The instantaneous reaction is for the student to put their hands up to their face, and that breaks the psychological lock they have on the controls.

I was taught something similar (but less violent) as part of ab-initio RPL training - for use with a panicked passenger in the right seat. Assuming I'm not the only one, it's either a normal part of the syllabus these days or my instructor enjoyed scaring the ****e out of her students!

[PiperCameron]

Back on topic, here's a link to the pending ATSB report:

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2023/report/ao-2023-045

[NZFlyingKiwi]

I was taught a simple, quick, light backhand slap to the face. The instantaneous reaction is for the student to put their hands up to their face, and that breaks the psychological lock they have on the controls.

The scenario was a small turbulence bump, the new student reacting by “bracing” themselves on the yoke, pushing it forward, with the sudden nose down resulting in further “bracing” - and a viscous circle panicked lockup on the controls the result.

Also never had to use it, but was it part of my instructor training from a very experienced 60 year old instructor.

Likewise, I have had to do that once to an introductory flight student who had a mild panic attack quite unexpectedly. Worked fine and they were very understanding about it afterwards. My 'last resort' option has always been either the fire extinguisher or crash axe (the blunt side...) or one of those fuel sample glasses with the screwdriver attachment. Would hope I'd never need to resort to that.

[Lead Balloon]

Back on topic, here's a link to the pending ATSB report:

https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2023/report/ao-2023-045
"Investigation level: Short"

Really?

[Lead Balloon]

It's ... breathtaking.

So many ATSB resources are expended on 'PR', but nobody spotted the 'PR' consequences of waving off 4 deaths as a "short" investigation?

It may be that everybody's already decided what happened - wouldn't be the first time; look at this thread - but I'd score 0/10 on 'look'.

[43Inches]

To be fair Airservices and the Airlines are keeping them rather tied up at the moment, GA is taking a back seat. I've heard phrases like "luck, rather than systems and skill will be the only thing stopping a serious accident in the next few years", too many low experienced personnel across the board in all areas of aviation, and no one willing to pay to fix it.

[gerry111]

It's ... breathtaking.

So many ATSB resources are expended on 'PR', but nobody spotted the 'PR' consequences of waving off 4 deaths as a "short" investigation?

It may be that everybody's already decided what happened - wouldn't be the first time; look at this thread - but I'd score 0/10 on 'look'.
Perhaps ATSB's "anticipating" an open finding?

[grizzled]

Perhaps ATSB's "anticipating" an open finding?

Or, despite the condition of the wreckage, they have found a significant clue (either at the site or elsewhere).

[PiperCameron]

To be fair Airservices and the Airlines are keeping them rather tied up at the moment, GA is taking a back seat. I've heard phrases like "luck, rather than systems and skill will be the only thing stopping a serious accident in the next few years", too many low experienced personnel across the board in all areas of aviation, and no one willing to pay to fix it.

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1000x1333/ostrich_illustration_head_in_the_sand_by_yuval_caspi_5367223 c633bb108e9e8c712d1136f3d4f537f9e.jpg

[Nadsy]

An instructor rating should include actual spin recoveries, since it's highly likely that a student can put you in one.
Soz… been away for a bit (and soz to go off topic again about spins). Yes, we were only allowed to teach incipient spin, but learned fully developed spins as instructors. Having read the responses to my experience, just confirming I totally own not responding in time. Full flap stall followed by spin due to incorrect rudder input happened pretty quick (especially very early in my instructing days) :uhoh:.

My actual point was for any pilot who hadn’t had the opportunity to experience a fully developed spin, to go and do the training.

[aroa]

Drat. Like I said they come in 3s. Another one down on the Southern Downs today. RIP

[megan]

My actual point was for any pilot who hadn’t had the opportunity to experience a fully developed spin, to go and do the trainingExercise 14.a back in the day, was it something ALL pilots did as part of their training, or just on those types that had the ability - 1960's when Chipmunks and Tigers were prolific club aircraft.

[cooperplace]

[QUOTE=43Inches;11520204 I could go on about several other situations that tend to send instructors to seek mental professionals,.[/QUOTE]
Sorry for the drift but I'd love to hear more...apart from students complaining about the costs..

[43Inches]

Sorry for the drift but I'd love to hear more...apart from students complaining about the costs..

Pushing the control column into the dash when 10 ft above the runway because they think they flared too high, applying full rudder towards the dead engine during assymmetrics, pulling the mixture back turning base because they didn't see what lever they were holding, trying to take gear/flaps 20 kts above a limit speed randomly for no reason, getting out a checklist in a memory item scenario whilst the aircraft keels over towards the ground, not having done any study prior to a lesson. The list can go into many pages. Then there is the excuses, "I was about to do that, but you took over", "I know you said I need more work, but, I have to do my test now because (insert inane reason, usually running out of money or visa expiring etc)", "Another student told me this was a better way".

PS I forgot about the students who have no idea about personal hygiene, like toothpaste or deodorant.

[NZFlyingKiwi]

...or the old 'my BFR is due tomorrow and I need it done because I'm taking the wife and kids on a trip around the mountains this weekend and I've only done 2 hours in the last 2 years but I've got hundreds of hours so I won't need more than a couple of circuits to be up to speed'.

[megan]

students who have no idea about personal hygiene, like toothpaste or deodorantYou expect them to be able to afford those and fly 43? Then there's roof over the head and food. :p

[43Inches]

I remember as a grade two many years ago a grade three came to me and asked if I could take over the training of one of their students. As they were not particularly busy I asked why. They told me the student was a heavy smoker, coffee drinker, and probably consumed a lot of wine and garlic for most dinners, they were progressing fine but the instructor could not stand being within 10 meters of him due to the smell. Having smoked in the past and enjoying a coffee myself, I thought it can't be that bad, just a non smoking younger instructor not liking the stale smoke odor. I was wrong. On first meeting this gentleman he appeared well groomed, then he opened his mouth to speak, several obviously rotten teeth and gnarly looking gums, and a smell emanating that could only be described as several dead things that had other things crawl inside them and die, mixed with some awful cheese, coffee and stale smoke. Just speaking to him in open air was nauseating, inside the aircraft I'm sure I was passing in and out of consciousness. Needless to say I avoided flying with this person ever again.

[megan]

We all have to learn 43, back in the days of R & R took the new spouse to the Bourbon & Beef Steak in the Cross, had a garlic steak did I, last ever as the better half was not amused for the following week, gee that stuff hangs about, good for your health though they say.

[cncpc]

My actual point was for any pilot who hadn’t had the opportunity to experience a fully developed spin, to go and do the training.
And that is a very good point.

[aroa]

Every pilot, trainee or otherwise should learn fully developed spins and recovery therefrom.
Get into a spin and never having been there will most likely be a fatal outcome.

[jonkster]

Every pilot, trainee or otherwise should learn fully developed spins and recovery therefrom.
Get into a spin and never having been there will most likely be a fatal outcome.
I may be wrong but strongly suspect that most inadvertant spin entries occur at low level where even if you know the correct spin recovery technique you are unlikely to recover before impacting the ground. Or if not trained in low level recoveries will not apply the correct technique because you will act out of instinct when you are very close to the ground rather than to what you have been trained at higher altitude. Better to have learnt spinning so you recognise what will happen if you continue to apply pro spin inputs and thus avoid inadvertant entry altogether. My 2c

[43Inches]

Thousands of pilots have been through entire careers without spin training and survived. Spin avoidance is far more important than recovery as some types will not recover, or recovery takes so much altitude that you just don't have. The point being, don't go anywhere near stall/spin entry conditions especially when low. The stats are just not there to back up that spin recovery training will make that much of a dent in accident statistics, in Australia anyway. If you then mandate spinning, inevitably aircraft will be lost practicing in 'failed to recover' scenarios. I've heard enough "there I was" stories where a C152 Aerobat or the like has not wanted to come out of a spin and recovery effected at tree top height, after using power, rocking and so on. It would not have taken much for those stories to become accidents and ATSB entries.

[Squawk7700]

I’ve heard similar Aerobat stories on multiple occasions. Also ones like, “the Aerobat poh said no more than 5? spins, so we tried 15” or similar. (Not personally sure what the max recommended number is)

[megan]

Thousands of pilots have been through entire careers without spin training and survived. Spin avoidance is far more important than recovery as some types will not recover, or recovery takes so much altitude that you just don't haveReading the US comics stall spin in the circuit seems to feature regularly, fatally of course due to lack of altitude, might spin training make the driver more aware of the dangers involved, speed, angle of bank, altitude necessary for recovery. Dangers of stall, spin on base was drilled into embryo naval aviators, with video available.

[blakemc]

Or, despite the condition of the wreckage, they have found a significant clue (either at the site or elsewhere).

The condition of the wreckage could also be the contributing factor. There could simply be such limited evidence available that any more than a short investigation isn’t possible.

[lucille]

12 pages of speculation and analysis for this accident. Yet the Jabiru at Stanthorpe on the 19th gets zero interest.

[megan]

Perhaps because there is nothing to discuss, a Jabiru bit the dust is all that is known thus far, nothing to conjecture upon, ran out of fuel, structural failure, engine failure, medical event? Don't know Merv nor ever heard of him, but RIP to a good man from what has been said..

[Clare Prop]

This study has been around since 1999 and is a properly researched paper rather than opinions.
StallSpinEvaluation.PDF (richstowell.com) (https://www.richstowell.com/documents/Transport_Canada_TP13748E.pdf)

One fact that emerges clearly in this study is this: “One feature that stands out in all except one of the 39 stall/spin accidents examined is that knowing how to recover from the stall or spin was of no benefit to the pilots in these circumstances. They stalled at altitudes so low that once the stall developed, a serious accident was in progress. Safety will be advanced therefore by preventing stalls and spins.”

It is well worth a read.

[Cloudee]

12 pages of speculation and analysis for this accident. Yet the Jabiru at Stanthorpe on the 19th gets zero interest.
We’ll, if you asked CASA or the ATSB they would say it isn’t a real VH registered aeroplane so therefore doesn’t count.

[Squawk7700]

Perhaps because there is nothing to discuss, a Jabiru bit the dust is all that is known thus far, nothing to conjecture upon, ran out of fuel, structural failure, engine failure, medical event? Don't know Merv nor ever heard of him, but RIP to a good man from what has been said..

There are sadly quite a few second hand comments being thrown around online that haven’t made their way here on that one that said witnesses saw the aircraft on fire before it crashed/landed. Completely unconfirmed and hearsay until it comes from a reliable source.

[Checkboard]

12 pages of speculation and analysis for this accident. Yet the Jabiru at Stanthorpe on the 19th gets zero interest.
Unusual post, when most posts are "Don't speculate! Wait for the report! Of course YOU'VE got the answers, we don't need an investigation now ..."

[josephfeatherweight]

This study has been around since 1999 and is a properly researched paper rather than opinions.
StallSpinEvaluation.PDF (richstowell.com) (https://www.richstowell.com/documents/Transport_Canada_TP13748E.pdf)

One fact that emerges clearly in this study is this: “One feature that stands out in all except one of the 39 stall/spin accidents examined is that knowing how to recover from the stall or spin was of no benefit to the pilots in these circumstances. They stalled at altitudes so low that once the stall developed, a serious accident was in progress. Safety will be advanced therefore by preventing stalls and spins.”

It is well worth a read.

Thanks for posting this!
Whilst I don't disagree with the stats in this post (and, in fact, find it a really interesting read), I can't help but think experiencing a spin and recovery is still a great experience to have in your bank of aviation know-how. Perhaps it'll make you even better at spin-avoidance.
I'm of the opinion that some aerobatic/spin exposure is important to lessen the "startle effect" of even relatively benign Unusual Attitudes/Aircraft Upsets. The more training and experience, the better.

[megan]

I can't help but think experiencing a spin and recovery is still a great experience to have in your bank of aviation know-how. Perhaps it'll make you even better at spin-avoidance.Exactly the point I was trying to make joseph, I've butt clenched a few times when riding along and seen what I considered largish angle of bank at lowish speeds, and I knew the pilots didn't have spin training, perhaps it's just my old age and spending a life time flying things you couldn't spin if you tried.

[Lead Balloon]

I did spins when I did my tailwheel endorsement, because the aircraft was coincidentally a Decathlon and the instructor had an aerobtics rating.

I immediately learned that there was no way I would have recovered from a spin merely through the explanation given during my PPL. Very glad I did the real thing.

[cncpc]

Thousands of pilots have been through entire careers without spin training and survived. Spin avoidance is far more important than recovery as some types will not recover, or recovery takes so much altitude that you just don't have. The point being, don't go anywhere near stall/spin entry conditions especially when low. The stats are just not there to back up that spin recovery training will make that much of a dent in accident statistics, in Australia anyway. If you then mandate spinning, inevitably aircraft will be lost practicing in 'failed to recover' scenarios. I've heard enough "there I was" stories where a C152 Aerobat or the like has not wanted to come out of a spin and recovery effected at tree top height, after using power, rocking and so on. It would not have taken much for those stories to become accidents and ATSB entries.
Spin recovery training by its very nature must demonstrate the lead in circumstances that are to be avoided.

Not all spins are base to final. If you're in a spin at 5000 agl despite having taken spin avoidance training,who you gonna call if you didn't have to take spin recovery training to get the license.

[43Inches]

My point was not that spin recovery was not useful, in fact I'd recommend it for instructors, however like any advanced training the more it happens the more likely crashes occur from miss handling. As the data suggests actual spin training has negligible effect on spin related accidents as they tend to occur too low to recover from and spin entry at altitude which results in ground impact is very rare. So you then have to think of the crossover in that if you mandate spin training for all candidates you will have less competent providers forced to do it, and training accidents will occur.

[cncpc]

My point was not that spin recovery was not useful, in fact I'd recommend it for instructors, however like any advanced training the more it happens the more likely crashes occur from miss handling. As the data suggests actual spin training has negligible effect on spin related accidents as they tend to occur too low to recover from and spin entry at altitude which results in ground impact is very rare. So you then have to think of the crossover in that if you mandate spin training for all candidates you will have less competent providers forced to do it, and training accidents will occur.

"...spin entry at altitude which results in ground impact is very rare." There are two ways to read this. The first is spin entry at altitude is very rare. That of course is accurate. The second read is that a spin has happened, rare as it is, and yet ground impact did not occur. Although it is said that some aircraft will recover from a spin if you just let go of the yoke, I don't think most will. If they didn't go to ground, then some spin recovery technique must have been applied, which means it must have been learned at some point.

"...if you mandate spin training for all candidates you will have less competent providers forced to do it, and training accidents will occur." Absolutely correct. I would suggest that can be remedied by a requirement of more competent instructors. And perhaps a recurring requirement for demonstrated spin recovery, although that may be an administrative goat shag. I've probably done about 300 spin recoveries, or supervised someone else both entering the incipient stage and recovering on command. I can't say I enjoyed any of them. At some point, I did become fairly competent in the process. But, no denying things can go south.

Until I saw this thread, I hadn't known that spin recovery was no longer required.
. . .