Dowding Vs Leigh-Mallory

[3greensok]

Hi, newbie here. Very interested in your opinions on the Dowding Vs Leigh-Mallory (big wing) saga, especially how L-M supported by the arrogant Bader managed to get Dowding and Park effectively fired. The air ministry both in the run up to WW2 and the aftermath (Brabazon debacle etc) seems to have been incredibly badly run. What are your views? Are there any other skeletons in the closet? Has anyone documented this properly? Thank you!

[Asturias56]

"Has anyone documented this properly?"

No - not a single thing has been published on this in 80 years :ugh:

Try Google first..........................

[OUAQUKGF Ops]

Might I suggest Dowding and The Battle of Britain by Robert Wright. Published by Macdonald and Co London 1969 and a best-seller at that time?

[3greensok]

Ok let me clarify. Thanks for the emoji - not. I have read everything on this. What I am after is a revisionist and recent opinion. Not books written in the aftermath. So I thought this would be a good place to source some opinions.

[Cornish Jack]

If you have time to spare, try "The Right of the Line" by John Terraine ... good coverage of the politics involved but, like most such, has no explanation as to why Bader had so much influence ... strange ! :confused:

[Brewster Buffalo]

I'd recommend The Battle of Britain - New Perspectives by John Ray - 1994 - Arms and Armour Press - which covers this topic in detail.....

[Asturias56]

he was older, he'd known all the SO's when they started, he was CERTAIN and he promised large scale destruction of the Luftwaffe

And they knew he would never take NO for an answer

[FlightlessParrot]

I am neither an aviator, nor a historian, but this is my take.

The Big Wing strategy fitted into the offensive mindset which pervaded UK forces. Compare the response to submarine warfare in WW1: it took a long time before analysts persuaded the Admiralty that the best strategy was convoys, rather than aggressive attempts to sink German submarines.

In the "Battle of Britain" the disagreement was between those who wanted to destroy the maximum number of German aircraft, and those, mostly Dowding and Park, who thought that the objectives were to disrupt German bombing, and above all to keep an RAF force in being. From a very distanced point of view, it was all irrelevant, since even if the GAF had established air supremacy, an invasion could not have been successful.

One of the aspects of WW2 from the British side that is inadequately dealt with in the books I have read is the importance of personality. Dowding was obviously not one of the chaps, and despite having been remarkably clear sighted about the issues involved in the air defence of GB, the establishment was happy to get rid of him. OTOH, Harris was obviously insubordinate, but for some reason seems to have been untouchable.

I do not know, and I have had a bit of a look, how far this outcome was the result of policy. It is clear that Air Force thinking had been captured by the advocates of strategic bombing; that Dowding had to fight very hard to get any kind of interceptor fighter force; and that that force was limited by policy to short range interception, which is why the definitive escort fighter was produced in the USA. But I think the basic conflict was between the offensive mindset of the British military establishment, and the shrewd calculation of Dowding. Plus, Bader was a hero (truly), and heroes are given credibility in areas that are completely out of their competence; but I doubt if Bader's personal advocacy had much influence at the highest level.

[DHfan]

Bader had Leigh-Mallory's ear so there was only Dowding and Portal(?) any higher.

Park's main concern appears to have been that no matter however many aircraft the Big Wing shot down, if they'd already destroyed his airfields or a swathe of London it wasn't a good result.

[Asturias56]

"OTOH, Harris was obviously insubordinate, but for some reason seems to have been untouchable."

oddly enough in yesterdays Times Max Hastings was writing about Churchill and the memoirs of Anthony Montague Browne , the great man's last private secretary.

" On the wartime bombing offensive, which in the 1950s was becoming a focus of controversy, Churchill said of Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, C-in-C of RAF Bomber Command (https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/bomber-commands-air-crews-honoured-at-last-lm098x6cz8c): “I admired his determination and his technical ability . . . And the Prof [Lord Cherwell] backed him up. You must remember that for a long time we had no other means of hitting back. The public demanded action and rejoiced at our counter-blows at German cities. But it did go on too long, and I pointed it out to the chiefs of staff. Such destruction tends to acquire its own momentum . . . That worried me about nuclear. Of course Harris was under-recognised at the end and so were his gallant men.”

As for the airman’s personality: “A very considerable commander. I said so many times. But there was a certain coarseness about him.”

I suspect that the British built up Harris, like Montgomery , as a war winner in 1942/43 but by late '44 it was clear they should be replaced but the public would have gone ape.

[DHfan]

Post now irrelevant.

[jolihokistix]

Bader apologized to Dowding after the war.

[Herod]

Thanks to Dowding's foresight and planning, and Park's inspirational leadership of 11 Group, the RAF didn't lose the Battle of Britain. Not belittling the other participants, but they were relative sideshows.

[rolling20]

Arrogant Bader? Bader was Bader and that was that.
​​​​​​If the Air Ministry was so badly run, how did they manage to orchestrate the defeat of the most power air arm that the world had ever known?
As an aside, I've never understood why Sholto Douglas ( another Big Wing advocate ) got off so lightly with his disastrous 'Circus' operations.
During which the attrition of RAF pilots and aircraft, achieved absolutely nothing.

[megan]

which is why the definitive escort fighter was produced in the USAOff thread a little, that definitive escort fighter was designed and developed with British money. With the appearance of the FW 190 the RAF didn't have a suitable aircraft to counter it, in June 1942 the Air Ministry Air Chief Marshall Freeman considered the Mustang the best bet as he had doubts about the Spit IX being available in time. Consideration was given to assembling the Mustang in the UK, the US at the time had given the Mustang the lowest priority that could be granted.

Granted the RAF fighter command didn't have escort fighter as a concept, an argument between USAAC and RAF over the latters participation in Operation Pointblank being emblematic.

[Asturias56]

Lets not start another discussion of Bader - there have been at least two previous discussions on here in the last 18 months.

[DHfan]

...which is why the definitive escort fighter was produced in the USA.

That's a bit of a stretch and makes it sound like the Mustang was specified and designed from the outset to be an escort fighter when the requirement didn't even exist then.

It was designed as more modern alternative to the P.40 the British had asked North American to build.

[Asturias56]

and it was a bit of an underperforming dog - then they put a Merlin into it in the UK and it was transformed - the British then ordered the "new" model and the US followed

[Brewster Buffalo]

Arrogant Bader? Bader was Bader and that was that.
......As an aside, I've never understood why Sholto Douglas ( another Big Wing advocate ) got off so lightly with his disastrous 'Circus' operations.
During which the attrition of RAF pilots and aircraft, achieved absolutely nothing.

I've read that, initially, Douglas thought that RAF casualities in "Circus" operations would be too severe for any results achieved which turned out to be correct. Post war analysis estimated that 4 RAF aircraft were lost to 1 German.
But on the other hand could it be acceptable to have a large number of RAF home based day squadrons not engaging with the enemy especially after the June 1941 invasion of Russia.

[Chairborne 09.00hrs]

It would have been much more acceptable if they'd sent a Wing of Spits to Malta in 1941 rather than throwing them away over France.

[First_Principal]

As I understood it the OP was looking for a modern take on what occurred over 80 years ago?

It seems to me that, at this remove, a certain amount of nuance of the times will necessarily be lost. While there has been plenty written about these people most of what we know today is merely author's interpretation, indignation, or aggrandizement, interspersed with a few hard facts. To even begin to fully understand the undercurrents at work I think one would need to totally immerse oneself in the era for a good length of time, and be armed with a lot of original source data - not just latter day books.

That said, like many here the names of these men were familiar to even me a small child, and I am always keen to learn more from genuinely original views. FlightlessParrot's post is one that I gained something from, and while I may seem a little disparaging about contemporary historical accounts the book references are also useful, thank you.

For me, while I like to contribute where I can, I don't think there's a lot I can say here, except that in re-reading accounts of the four or five main protagonists last night I was taken by the similarity in ages between all but one. Park, Leigh-Mallory and Harris were born in 1892, Portal and [Sholto] Douglas in 1893. Dowding of course was ten years older. In itself this is minutiae, but I wonder if it could have had bearing on interaction between the individuals, and their appreciation by others involved?

Otherwise, and while this is no reliable measure of anything I was also interested to note that of the Wikipedia entries about them all Park's was the most detailed, followed by Harris, Dowding, Portal, Leigh-Mallory, and Douglas. Perhaps the word count says as much about the contributors to Wikipedia as anything else, but I wonder if it could also say just a little about the perception of these people and their input at the time, and all these years hence?

FP.

[rolling20]

I've read that, initially, Douglas thought that RAF casualities in "Circus" operations would be too severe for any results achieved which turned out to be correct. Post war analysis estimated that 4 RAF aircraft were lost to 1 German.
But on the other hand could it be acceptable to have a large number of RAF home based day squadrons not engaging with the enemy especially after the June 1941 invasion of Russia.
There are several ways of looking at this.
Regardless of what Douglas thought about casualties, he persisted with the operations, which began in January 1941.
It was assumed that the Wehrmacht would roll up Russia in a few weeks, hence keeping large numbers of squadrons at home, rather than send them to the M/E or SE Asia.
Had the Luftwaffe not been affected by Barbarossa, then the RAF may have come off even worse.
I think it was Johnson who said, he didn't mind being shot down in a dog fight, but didn't want to have his career ended by a chap with a rifle.

[megan]

and it was a bit of an underperforming dogNot at all, it was originally built for the low level role replacing the P-40 as noted above. It was a superb performer and those doing "Rhubarb" raids loved the Allison as it was more bullet proof than the Merlin and had a lower fuel consumption, hence greater range. So loved was the Allison version that when the Merlin was introduced certain folk wanted to keep the Allison version in production as well. The two engines excelled, but at different altitudes, one low level, the other high.

[Asturias56]

I think that was making a virtue out of a necessity TBH - they were originally planned as fighters

[Asturias56]

"But on the other hand could it be acceptable to have a large number of RAF home based day squadrons not engaging with the enemy especially after the June 1941 invasion of Russia"

That was clearly the reason - there was relatively little german activity over the UK and we had built up a large fighter arm - it was taking time to build up a heavy bomber force so it was all we could do really. The Army were being rebuilt (or shipped to N Africa) and the navy was stretched

[longer ron]

Not at all, it was originally built for the low level role replacing the P-40 as noted above. It was a superb performer and those doing "Rhubarb" raids loved the Allison as it was more bullet proof than the Merlin

The Mustang Achilles Heel though of course was the cooling system - one little bullet or shrapnel in the Rad or cooling pipery would eventually ruin your day ;)

[DHfan]

As with every other liquid-cooled aircraft.

[longer ron]

As with every other liquid-cooled aircraft.

For low level work though - the mustang was particularly vulnerable with its cooling system design/layout.

[megan]

For low level work though -the mustang was particularly vulnerable with its cooling system design/layoutNo more so than any other aircraft. All the liquid cooled aircraft were used for low level work at some stage, chap I worked with as an electrician had his brother, Ian McRitchie, shot down by flak in a Mosquito during Operation Jericho. Radial engines were not immune, a single round through the oil tank/cooler could occur as easily as a round in a liquid cooling system. The first time I was shot down was by a single AK-47 round in the engine oil cooler, engine (T53) ran for about two minutes following loss of oil pressure, which was instantaneous with the round hitting.

[FlightlessParrot]

On the P-51 as an escort fighter: the story I know is that the British purchasing people wanted P-40s, because they were in production; it was suggested that North American had the spare manufacturing capacity, but when they were approached said they could do something better than the P-40, and did so. I know it wasn't specified or designed as a long-range escort fighter, and I understand that it took quite a bit of modification, including a somewhat marginal rear fuel tank, to make it one. My point was that rather that, since once critical factor was the Merlin supercharger, an escort fighter might have been designed in the UK, but wasn't because it wasn't in the doctrine; and the P-51 was developed into an escort fighter on an American initiative.

[DHfan]

We wouldn't develop an escort fighter as we didn't need one. Well, I suppose we did but Bomber Command switched to night flying instead.

The Americans didn't need one either until they realised that their conviction that B.17s could defend themselves in daylight didn't work.

[Asturias56]

Originally the idea was that the bomber would fight its way to the target protected by guns on board (as with the Flying Fortress) - a few very nasty sets of losses showed that was effectively murdering the aircrew

So they HAD to fly by night - (oddly to my mind they kept the gun turrets ) but there was no need or possibility of long range escort at night. By the time the USAAF turned up the Luftwaffe was spread pretty thin and even then day time operations in bombers was very high risk affair over W Europe well into 1944

[pax britanica]

By the time Lancasters were in service the RAF had pretty well accepted that daylight bombing Germany with what was available was bringing Kamikaze forward to 1942 . As to the turrets well the tail gunner had a unique view and on clear nights (quite lot in N Euroepan winter at higher levels ) this was very valuable so why not keep the guns as well .

There are plans for wars and there are real wars and they dont work out quite the same . Often concepts and practices work backwards, brish equipment was often not very good standard-better than the Russians but worse than the germsn but if what your are building is going to get shot down after ten trips why over build it . The Manchester Bommber wqas crap but wartime meant it could be converted quickly to 4 engines and suddenly its brillaint. T34 taks left the factoy virtually unfinsihed but there were lots of them and theyalso turned out to be pretty damne dgood and a nightmare for ehte Wehrmachts precison engineered but wont work when its cld panzers.

I think one of the fascinating aspects of WW2 is how complciated things could be made quickly (and often crudelly) or how projects bult with one idea in mind helped a probelm ina different area. Mosquitos were built from wood because we had wood and people who could use it . The fact that it gave them an element of Stealth wasnt even heard of let alone considered., DC3 s builkt as the luxury liners for US domestic airlines became one of the great logistical vehicles of all time.
With all the time and comexity of projects today i ljust think the engineers and designers of WW2 on all sides were amazing people

[DHfan]

Gun turrets were also an Air Ministry fixation. Remember they wanted one fitted to Mosquitos, despite the whole ethos of the Mossie being that it was unarmed.

[Herod]

Turrets on night bombers? Yes. Don't forget that Germany had night fighters.

[Asturias56]

How many German fighters were actually shot down by Air gunners? Not the claimed numbers but the actual ones? few is my understanding. And you added several crew and several tones of weight (and cost and complexity) to the aircraft. A Stirling without turrets might have actually been quite a useful aircraft

And of course most British bombers had no turret underneath - which is where most night fighters attacked

The turrets were really to give the crew the idea they could shoot back - but in reality it didn't work out

[POBJOY]

The 'powers to be' had tried to retire Dowding before the BoB but realised he had devised a system that needed him to 'see it through'.
The whole battle of France scenario was no doubt a shock to those in charge, and indeed even as Dunkirk was happening there was no clear understanding that we would actually fight on. Once Churchill had made his May 28th plea to cabinet (and the Government) then the die was cast and Dowdings 'no more fighters to France' message at least kept us with enough machines to offer a defence. This was the important factor, in that although under strength the output of Hurricanes alone meant we were never short of fighters, but of course 'our system' had yet to be put under test in that it had to operate well above its design factor with the enemy being so close. Dowding never flinched because he knew we had a unique ace up our sleeve in not having to rely on standing patrols to intercept raids, and the effect on the enemy actually getting intercepted must have been a considerable shock after such an easy ride on the continent. Battles are won by making fewer mistakes than your opponent and Dowding with Park made the best of what they had and with Quinton Brand (WWI Zeppelin killer) giving support from 10 group they were a fine team. Dowding stood up to the Ministry and Churchill when required and then 'enabled' what we had to be used to the best effect to preserve our forces, and prevail. They were still prevailing when the enemy made even bigger mistakes and lost its best chance of success. No credit is due to others who sought to replace Dowding and Park at the very time they should have been supporting them to the hilt.

[Herod]

Pobjoy; my thoughts exactly, and you put it better than I could have.

[jolihokistix]

Pobjoy and Herod, hear hear!

[rolling20]

How many German fighters were actually shot down by Air gunners? Not the claimed numbers but the actual ones? few is my understanding. And you added several crew and several tones of weight (and cost and complexity) to the aircraft. A Stirling without turrets might have actually been quite a useful aircraft

And of course most British bombers had no turret underneath - which is where most night fighters attacked

The turrets were really to give the crew the idea they could shoot back - but in reality it didn't work out
It isn't that simple to say most British bombers had no turret underneath.
Whitleys, Wellingtons, Manchesters, Halifaxes and Lancs all had at some stage dorsal turrets. It was considered however impractical to use them , due to sighting and performance issues.
Schrage Musik wasn't used operationally until the last 20 or so months of the war, from August 43.
Losses from these attacks were of course severe.
Freeman Dyson who was working with Bomber Command Operational Research, blamed himself for not spotting what was causing these losses sooner.
The RAF did know about these attacks, as some aircraft did return with damage clearly caused by upward firing guns, yet they seem to have chosen to keep the information from squadrons.
Gunnery leaders before the advent of Schrage Musik did advise pilots to dip a wing, so gunners could scan below.
6 Group RCAF did persist with dorsal turrets.
As one gunner said however, the intention was not to 'shoot it out with a nightfighter', but to see them first and evade.
As for claims, during the war many exaggerated claims from both sides were made, just one of those things.

[Mr Mac]

rolling 20
I think as the aircraft that were shot down by German night fighter’s and the claims were very accurate. However I would agree that the majority of allied night bomber losses were largely caused by some very experienced and exceptionally gifted airmen.

A large number of German night fighter pilots were just relieved to get back on the ground, never mind hit anything.

Allied claimed kills as we all are aware, and in particular those of the USAF were quite wide of the mark post war research indicated.

Cheers
Mr Mac

[longer ron]

No more so than any other aircraft. All the liquid cooled aircraft were used for low level work at some stage, chap I worked with as an electrician had his brother, Ian McRitchie, shot down by flak in a Mosquito during Operation Jericho. Radial engines were not immune, a single round through the oil tank/cooler could occur as easily as a round in a liquid cooling system. The first time I was shot down was by a single AK-47 round in the engine oil cooler, engine (T53) ran for about two minutes following loss of oil pressure, which was instantaneous with the round hitting.

m - glad you survived the 'lucky' shot from that AK - 47 - presumably in a Huey ?
There was always the occasional 'lucky' shot with any aircraft.
Possibly Dennis 'Fiji' McCaig ( RAF Mustang pilot) might disagree with you about the vulnerability of the P51 cooling system.

[rolling20]

rolling 20
I think as the aircraft that were shot down by German night fighter’s and the claims were very accurate. However I would agree that the majority of allied night bomber losses were largely caused by some very experienced and exceptionally gifted airmen.

A large number of German night fighter pilots were just relieved to get back on the ground, never mind hit anything.

Allied claimed kills as we all are aware, and in particular those of the USAF were quite wide of the mark post war research indicated.

Cheers
Mr Mac
Yes I would agree with you there.
Many Luftwaffe night-fighter pilots were shooting 3 or 5 bombers in quick succession once they had 'infiltrated' the stream.

[WideSpectrum]

Interesting thread on RAF inter-war/SWW personalities. Although retiring in 1929, Trenchard was ever present of course and helped to push his doctrine of 'strategic bombing.' There were also the politicians such as Sir Thomas Inskip who altered the country's emphasis on the bomber to that of the fighter during the expansion programmes during 1934-39. A couple of good books on the question of RAF senior officer personalities are: Churchill and His Airmen and Dowding of Fighter Command - Victor of the Battle of Britain. Both are by the academic, Vincent Orange and are well worth a gander.

[Herod]

Many Luftwaffe night-fighter pilots were shooting 3 or 5 bombers in quick succession once they had 'infiltrated' the stream.

Yes, but the stream was effectively overloading the fighters in that field. The other fields in the Kammhuber Line were basically fighters going round looking for targets that weren't there.

[Mr Mac]

Herod
But as you know the line was superseded by the Wild Boar method of feeding night fighters into the bomber stream which came more into being post Koln and Battle of the Ruhr.

This method of fighting caused Bomber Command to move away from German skies post Nuremberg until the June Normandy invasion and the resulting contraction of German radar and hence early warning. If the invasion had not occurred, or indeed failed, it would be interesting to see what would have happened in the short term. Ultimately the push from the East and resources from the West would have done for Germany but probably not until later in 1945/6 .

Cheers
Mr Mac

[Herod]

Agreed, Mr Mac. As you say, if the invasion hadn't been so successful, or even failed, the war would have dragged on longer. It would also probably have meant a much wider Soviet presence in Europe.

[rolling20]

Herod
But as you know the line was superseded by the Wild Boar method of feeding night fighters into the bomber stream which came more into being post Koln and Battle of the Ruhr.

This method of fighting caused Bomber Command to move away from German skies post Nuremberg until the June Normandy invasion and the resulting contraction of German radar and hence early warning. If the invasion had not occurred, or indeed failed, it would be interesting to see what would have happened in the short term. Ultimately the push from the East and resources from the West would have done for Germany but probably not until later in 1945/6 .

Cheers
Mr Mac
It's misleading to say that BC moved away from German skies post Nuremberg.
Indeed in April and May BC attacked Aachen, Brunswick, Munich, Schweinfurt and Duisburg . Then two weeks after DDay, they attacked Wesseling.
It wasn't until Autumn 44 as the Allies pushed across the Low Countries that the Luftwaffe started to lose their early warning advantage.
Regardless of whether DDay had failed, the growing strength of the 8th Airforce with it's P51 escorts would ultimately have brought about the Luftwaffe's destruction.

[megan]

Possibly Dennis 'Fiji' McCaig ( RAF Mustang pilot) might disagree with you about the vulnerability of the P51 cooling systemI'm sure any number of losses were due to rounds in cooling systems, the P-51 was keeping very good company with the Whirlwind, Hurricane, Defiant, Spitfire, Lancaster, Mosquito, Halifax, some Beafighters, P-40, P-39, P-38, liquid cooling and its attendant failure modes were accepted, very few air cooled radial engines were fitted in allied fighters over Europe, P-47 and ?????

[Mr Mac]

Rolling20
But that is a large reduction from the qty of raids through the winter of 43/44. I know they were re directed partly due to operation Overlord and at first BC said the raids were only short range and arguably low risk so were downgraded so the number of missions increased in the numbers required to complete a tour.

That decision was reversed after another disastrous night for BC over Mailley -Le-Camp on 3/4th May with 42 A/C lost or written off.

Cheers
Mr Mac

[rolling20]

Rolling20
But that is a large reduction from the qty of raids through the winter of 43/44. I know they were re directed partly due to operation Overlord and at first BC said the raids were only short range and arguably low risk so were downgraded so the number of missions increased in the numbers required to complete a tour.

That decision was reversed after another disastrous night for BC over Mailley -Le-Camp on 3/4th May with 42 A/C lost or written off.

Cheers
Mr Mac
Harris would rather have not been distracted by Overlord, it was a sideshow to his main objective, Germany.
The Mailly loss was a combination of factors and showed what the Luftwaffe could do if it got into the stream.

[DHfan]

Harris had been told to take up tactical bombing in support of Overlord but since he didn't agree with it, he ignored the instruction. Finally, he had to be ordered to do as he was told.

[FlightlessParrot]

Harris had been told to take up tactical bombing in support of Overlord but since he didn't agree with it, he ignored the instruction. Finally, he had to be ordered to do as he was told.
This. And it wasn't the woke who wanted him to change, but fellow commanders, and his superiors. The puzzle for me is why he got away with what amounts to insubordination, and I will go off and read the book Churchill and His Airmen mentioned by WideSpectrum, to see if it gives any answers.

[Asturias56]

as we've already said - he was to visible and too much of a hero to the public to be dropped - same as Monty in mid/late '44

[3greensok]

I would like to thank everyone for replying. I have learned a lot. I posted this with my great-grandson’s help so my original post was a bit off. He is helping me to write this as I cannot. I was a trainee engineer at the time. I was very interested in the reply that says Bader apologized. If that person can elaborate I would appreciate it! Thank you all again for the very interesting thoughts.

[Asturias56]

it's through forums like this that some of the unwritten history make sit through to the next generation

[jolihokistix]

3Greensok, re Thank you. There is a book coming out soon which mentions the episode about Bader and the apology. I’ll see if I can get some details.

[Brewster Buffalo]

The controversy over Dowding's treatment came to head with the publication of Chris Wright's book in 1969 - Dowding and the Battle of Britain and the film release.. At the request of the under secretary of war at the time of the battle Bader provided his private thoughts on the book. Extracts from these can be found in the book I mentioned in post #6.

These thoughts are too long to reproduce here but Bader does comment on Dowding saying the pilots held him in high esteem and were disappointed he was not promoted to Marshal of the RAF.
He considered Wright's story as "unattractive" and it contributed nothing to history and damaged the reputations of Dowding and of Park.

I don't think the treatment of Dowding has anything to do with Bader.

Interestingly in 1970 an enquiry was undertaken with the RAF higher ranks as to whether Dowding should now be made a Marshal of the RAF or given some other award. Details of that enquiry are unknown but no such awards were made....

[POBJOY]

Ginger Lacy (known for being quite forthright with his views (and equally very successful in knocking down enemy aircraft) when asked in a post war conversation (prob during the making of the BoB film), about 12 Group leadership in the Battle, answered 'They were clots' , and judging by the evidence of the lack of cooperation plus political knifing he was spot on.

[jolihokistix]

3greensok
The tentative book title below. Publication ‘early next year’.

Per Ardua Ad Astra
Without Wings

The Genesis of Fighter Control and Tactical Air Battle Management

By Tim Willbond