TAP extra long landing [Archive]

Greta_Thunberg

2nd Jul 2023, 00:42

Wonderful comments from people that do not know how to fly ..Trial by youtube again .. Looking at the winsock in the end of the video that gives a clue as to what most probably hapenned. The A320 has good brakes but a go around would have most probably be better, but we do not know which fuel they had. and what the conditions were in Porto Santo. .Anyway they made it OK in the end , so good landing by the old definition.
And apparently some even more wonderful comments from people that don't remember how to fly either.

They floated WAY past the end of the TDZ, wind,brakes, aircraft type are entirely irrelevant. Float it beyond the TDZ, go around. There is no special circumstances other than a fire that would make it acceptable to do anything else. They would have never rocked up at Funchal with a plan to commit. If they couldn't have made the first approach without being forced to commit to FNC due to fuel, they made the wrong decision making the first approach.

'Old definitions' be dammed, we've learned better definitions. With all due respect, your thoughts on the matter are a little out of date.

stilton

2nd Jul 2023, 05:58

Forcing it on regardless how far down the runway makes you wonder how much fuel they had left

Newcomer2

2nd Jul 2023, 08:47

IFLYyouBREATH

2nd Jul 2023, 09:16

I assisted to a SIM for new CPT being trained for FNC, the first thing that said the TRI is : 'The only thing you must be capable, is to take the decision to go around"

Capn Bloggs

2nd Jul 2023, 10:12

Capt Fathom

2nd Jul 2023, 11:55

The windsock is horizontal. A sudden gutload of headwind and you’ve just gained 20kts as you were about to grease it on. :{

olster

2nd Jul 2023, 13:42

I am not an armchair expert as I actually did the job into this challenging airport. I was FNC qualified for many years on the B737. That approach and landing was firstly too long and secondly characterised by a lack of discipline. They were extremely fortunate to stop. Those with long memories will recall a horrendous run off the end by a B727 with many fatalities and by the same airline. Not much point having stabilisation criteria and a disciplined approach to landing in the tdz if you are not going to comply. I agree FNC can be challenging and I did my share of go arounds. Always take lots of fuel…

FUMR

2nd Jul 2023, 14:21

400guy2

2nd Jul 2023, 22:23

'Old definitions' be dammed, we've learned better definitions. With all due respect, your thoughts on the matter are a little out of date.

But even in the good old days, the 'old definitions' were not meant to be taken literally, no? And just to be pedantic, by the 'old definitions', this was a *great* landing.

maui

3rd Jul 2023, 04:18

Not all that familiar with the 320 configurations, however to my untrained eye, he doesn't seem to be carrying much in the way of flap.
Any comments from more experienced eyes appreciated.
Maui

Fursty Ferret

3rd Jul 2023, 06:25

Not all that familiar with the 320 configurations, however to my untrained eye, he doesn't seem to be carrying much in the way of flap.
Any comments from more experienced eyes appreciated.
Maui

There are only two flap configurations on the A320 series - 3 and full. It's difficult to float an A320 in config 3 unless you get a gust in the flare or have added a significant speed increment to Vapp.

I don't think configuration is relevant here since the tendency to float is totally different to the obviously flawed decision making that went on in this landing, to the extent, in fact, that I thought initially that this was a Microsoft Flight Simulator video posted as a troll.

olster

3rd Jul 2023, 07:48

Yes I agree FUMR, you are quite correct, the old runway was seriously short and I should have mentioned that when quoting the catastrophic overrun of the TAP B727. I flew in to the old short, FNC as a youthful (!) first officer on the Boeing 737-200 and it was a fairly buttock clenching exercise…

nomorecatering

3rd Jul 2023, 07:52

I honeslty can't fathom some of the comments, this board has certainly lost it's technical expertise in the 20 years I have been on here.

For me, this landing would definitely qualify for a "please see the Chief Pilot" message in that crews inbox. I would have ripped a new one in one of my student pilots on his first solo, let alone a jet crew.

olster

3rd Jul 2023, 08:10

I am not sure who you are aiming at nomorecatering but I have personally flown into Funchal on many occasions in challenging and other conditions. I even flew into the as mentioned short version of the airport which contributed significantly to the fear factor. I am not keen on Willy waving but with 25 years on the B737 and 20,000 hours plus associated training quals just how much technical expertise do you need? I really apologise for any perceived immodesty but I have done the day job into FNC as have many other contributors. I have looked over this thread and nobody appears to be condoning what is obviously a badly flown approach underpinned by serious indiscipline which should have resulted in a go around by any company standards. Nobody appears to be disagreeing…

Chesty Morgan

3rd Jul 2023, 08:30

No disagreement, but just for the record at the time of the B727 accident the runway was only 5200 feet long leaving even less margin for error than today. It is now 9100 feet long.
5200 feet is probably about what the TAP had left...

Gordomac

3rd Jul 2023, 09:03

Olster ; we might have gone in there together. "Make sure you take lots of fuel"- yes but remember, way back, we were probably LW restricted. We probably worked for a professional outfit but one cowboy outfit would have you in the office for taking 1kg more than FP fuel- anywhere.

Most of us took TFS alternate fuel. If weather was perfect, PortoSanto.. Bort, it sure was butt-clenching all the way, using either alternate.

Interesting read on the Wizzair thread into Madeira too.

As John posted;" glad it's all over".

dixi188

3rd Jul 2023, 09:49

5200 feet is probably about what the TAP had left...
Looking at the video it seems to have touched down about level with the 3000 ft to go marker, which means that's about 5000 ft past the threshold.

slast

3rd Jul 2023, 16:23

Can anyone point to a fix for the problem where the relevant links are just not showing in the post?

B888

3rd Jul 2023, 16:45

Never operated into this airport but the airplane took approximately 20 seconds from crossing over the threshold to touchdown ( should be 7-8 seconds normally).

Contact Approach

3rd Jul 2023, 18:36

That was textbook, great job!

Dct_Mopas

3rd Jul 2023, 21:20

That was textbook, great job!

I think this thread is living in a parallel universe.

Land within the touchdown zone or go-around. This landing was unacceptable for a commercial airline operation.

First_Principal

3rd Jul 2023, 23:01

Looking at the video it seems to have touched down about level with the 3000 ft to go marker, which means that's about 5000 ft past the threshold.

Having had a quick look via a GIS I concur.

No disagreement, but just for the record at the time of the B727 accident the runway was only 5200 feet long leaving even less margin for error than today. It is now 9100 feet long.

There were also heavy showers, poor vis with 7 Octa's, and they had nil effective braking due to aquaplaning. IIRC there may have been a tailwind component as well. Making no comment on this approach/landing whatsoever, but the conditions are quite different.

FP.

hans brinker

4th Jul 2023, 00:51

0:25 wings level (before correcting to the other side). 0:42 crossed the threshold. 0:59 touchdown.

17 seconds in stable condition on final (about 200' above the TDZE). That alone should have been a GA.

17 seconds form the threshold to touchdown (about 5000'). That alone should have been a GA.

Is there an echo in here?

And it does look like a ANU input between 0:48/0:50. Wind gust tend to lift the acft horizontally, here you see the nose come up.

Stuart Sutcliffe

4th Jul 2023, 08:45

That was textbook, great job!
Your comment is either:

- a wind-up
... or ...
- you don't have the remotest clue about airline operations.

🤣

FullWings

4th Jul 2023, 09:51

I think this thread is living in a parallel universe.

Land within the touchdown zone or go-around. This landing was unacceptable for a commercial airline operation.
Unfortunately I think you are correct. If I did this on a 4000m runway, I would get a phone call from a FOQA rep.

SAC are there for a reason and it would be interesting to know the flight deck dynamics that led them to continue to a very deep landing over half way down the runway, especially given what the overrun area looks like.

Less Hair

4th Jul 2023, 10:09

Their fuel or technical status would be interesting to know.

fdr

4th Jul 2023, 12:20

A stable approach and a landing in the TDZ are two not necessarily mutual things. The approach looked great to me, given it was a circle. Plenty of nose-up the whole way in, no drastic pitch or roll yugs.

The landing: had they gone down another 2 feet it would have been perfect, right on the big white squares. Unfortunately, they overflared just a tad and the rest is history.

If there's any doubt, there's no doubt. Go around!

They also picked up an increase in HWC by the looks of it, the wheel height increases from a slow reduction with no obvious attitude change, that suggests a good gust. At the eventual touchdown, that is the "2" thousand ft remaining marker in front of the nose, off the other side of the runway, they are not much less than 3K from the end... nice to have carbon brakes.... :}

ATC Watcher

4th Jul 2023, 13:53

'Old definitions' be dammed, we've learned better definitions. With all due respect, your thoughts on the matter are a little out of date.
Apologies I should have added a smiley in the end on my "old definition" it was meantt to be ironic As to my thoughts being out of date , indeed they are , my (propeller driven ) flying experience there was over 25 years ago and on the old runway .
One thing that has not changed much I think from my time though is fuel management. Most are filing LPPS as alternate, but .on some days weather conditions are very similar in both islands and landing on 01 in PXO with a strong gusty wind is not without its challenges. The next alternates are in the Canaries, ( Arrecife) so fuel might possibly have been a factor here. But I have no particilar info on the fuel status of that flight .

Greta_Thunberg

4th Jul 2023, 14:16

If they had expected the weather to be that challenging in both FNC and PXO then take enough fuel for a third alternate instead of putting themselves in the position where they are committing to FNC. Offload passengers as necessary to get the fuel load you want. That's nothing new in aviation, any captain afraid of doing that should hand over their fourth stripe.

It was likely planned using the following set of METARS/TAFs, Porto Santo looks sensible but if experience dictates otherwise, nominate Fuerteventura.METAR LPPS 291500Z 06013KT 020V090 9999 FEW013 24/18 Q1023=METAR LPPS 291530Z 06014KT 030V090 9999 FEW013 24/19 Q1023=

TAF LPMA 291100Z 2912/3012 04017KT 9999 FEW013
TEMPO 2912/2918 03020G32KT
BECMG 2918/2920 01015KT SCT015
TEMPO 2920/3012 01018G30KT BKN015=
TAF LPPS 291100Z 2912/3018 05012KT 9999 FEW012
PROB30 TEMPO 2912/2918 06015G25KT
BECMG 2918/2920 SCT015
TEMPO 2920/3018 SCT015 BKN030=

TAF GCRR 290800Z 2909/3009 01017KT CAVOK
TX31/2914Z TN22/3006Z
PROB30 TEMPO 2909/2916 01016G26KT
TEMPO 2916/3009 01023G33KT=
TAF GCFV 290800Z 2909/3009 05015KT CAVOK TX32/2914Z TN21/3006Z BECMG 2917/2919 35013KT PROB30 TEMPO 3007/3009 36018G28KT=

sonicbum

4th Jul 2023, 14:36

Guys, it’s a landing beyond the touchdown zone, which is a mandatory go around but please stop speculating about the stability of the approach and how it was flown; we know nothing about it.
Looks like they (wrongly) wanted to grease the landing by keeping some thrust in during the flare and in addition they probably hit a gust which increased lift and they ended up floating. Classic no-no stuff but that’s about it. I am 150% sure that, unless the flight data monitoring shows that something else was cocked up (like showing up way faster than the stabilized approach limits) they have learnt the lesson and after a tea and biscuits style debrief they’ll be good to go and you can bet your money they will never do it again.

rog747

4th Jul 2023, 14:56

That's Quite some float there -

Sadly got me thinking of the TAP425 727-200 CS-TBR 1977 crash at FNC (long landing and flare, on the very short 5000' runway, overran down onto the beach in poor weather/heavy rain)
An awful bad weather night, and making an Approach on his 3rd attempt with fuel now down in minimums, or less.
The alternates were PXO and LPA.
After the accident occurred, TAP stopped flying the Boeing 727-200 to Madeira, and started flying only the 727-100.
The crash prompted officials to explore ways of extending the short runway. Because of the height of the runway relative to the beach below, an extension was very difficult and too expensive to perform. Between 1983 and 1986, a 200-meter extension was built;

FNC Santa Catarina Airport located about 13 km from the city of Funchal.
Its single runway, in 1977, oriented in the directions 049º and 229º true (06—24) and was just 1,600 meters long and 45 meters wide (a usable length of 1,540 meters due to the threshold shifted by 60 meters, with no zones (STOPWAY) beyond the runway).
The elevation is 58 meters at 24, and 42 meters at the head of 06.
The runway ends at drops at both ends practically on the coast.
At the beginning of 06 there is only one widening for the turning circle; at the beginning 24, is a similar widening, and neither at the extreme runway ends are there any aircraft restraint devices.

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/960x766/75943_452273511475693_1874653468_n_40c893090d8bf21f8e77e5f5b 3ed32747618cd89.jpg

FNC Funchal, in the early days with the very short runway, 5,249 ft. The airport had a single terminal, which opened in 1973.
The first types to use the Runway in 1964 were TAP's Super Constellations. TAP began 727-82 flights to FNC in 1968.
The first charter Jets to fly there were 737-200's, Caravelle, BAC 1-11, and the 727-100.
Flights returning back to the UK or Germany usually had to fully refuel at PXO Porto Santo.
Or at Oporto, or Santiago de Compostela.
TAP's LHR 727-82 and 727-282 flights stopped at Lisbon going back.

You can make out the stone bridge that the TAP 727 ended up on and below on the beach and in the sea.

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1024x573/tap_portugal_boeing_727_282adv_cs_tbr_977f45752c80a8d2ad9211 e9792537bddf37a5f6.jpg

TAP 727 CS-TBR Sacadura Cabral lost at FNC 1977

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/700x357/fnc_tap_8d346da0401c25f9e77bb4bf49528e2b88dc6fd2.jpg

The 1970's Terminal at FNC

A friend who was a Sterling Airways Super Caravelle and 727-200 skipper says -
When the runway was only 1800 meters it was sloping downwards from threshold RWY 24 (now 23).
So we landed very hard there. We called it an arrival, not a landing.
On RWY 24 one had to make sure to come down firmly to get maximum use of ground spoilers and brakes as the downslope made the runway feel even shorter.
On RWY 06 there was a steep approach angle to the runway.
From both directions there was often turbulence close to the threshold.
Landings were limited to 15 knots of X-wind.
Haven´t been there since runway extension. I understand it is almost 1000 m longer now, have they done anything about the sloping runway?

Hapag Lloyd flew the first A310-304 into Funchal Madeira in the 1990's on the short 1800m runway.

JW411

4th Jul 2023, 16:59

I always wanted to fly into Madeira in a Short Solent flying boat of Aquila Airways. They had no trouble whatsoever with LDA or TORA!

Sailvi767

4th Jul 2023, 17:17

There has to be another factor in this landing. The approach actually looks fine. The aircraft is properly positioned and at the correct speed based on AOA in the video. The actual touchdown is not that far before the 2000 foot remaining sign. There is no way that aircraft floated 5000-6000 feet from the initial flare with the power at idle. For some reason the thrust was not retarded in the flare as commanded on the Airbus. If you watch the AOA on the aircraft it actually accelerates in ground effect.

Fly-by-Wife

4th Jul 2023, 17:48

For some reason the thrust was not retarded in the flare as commanded on the Airbus
So "Retard, Retard" was a description as well as a command in this case?

JanetFlight

4th Jul 2023, 18:44

Bahhhh...the Finnair 757 about one decade ago touched much more ahead than this one, and with successfully braking action ;)

JanetFlight

4th Jul 2023, 18:50

The first charter Jets to fly there were 737-200's, Caravelle, BAC 1-11, and the 727-100.

Hapag Lloyd flew the first A310-304 into Funchal Madeira in the 1990's on the short 1800m runway.

The Bac 1-11 was never used in Madeira.
HF 310 as well the Boeing 767-200 of Braathens SAFE...the very first two wide bodies used at FNC.

https://www.flickr.com/photos/spotterdudenor/51023472721

Sailvi767

4th Jul 2023, 23:03

Bahhhh...the Finnair 757 about one decade ago touched much more ahead than this one, and with successfully braking action ;)

The 757 is a beast and has 4 wheel trucks. Delta had a 757 abort after rotation at SNA going to ATL. Despite being well past V1 they stopped on the runway. Not bad for a 5700 foot runway with a full load on a 1700 mile flight.

Raduga-Burya

5th Jul 2023, 00:56

Greta_Thunberg

5th Jul 2023, 01:02

Nightstop

5th Jul 2023, 06:11

Delaying (or forgetting) to retard the A320 family thrust levers during flare increases the landing distance because the autothrust will target Vapp (or the selected speed) until it is disconnected by moving the levers to the IDLE detent. That is, the thrust increases as the speed bleeds off.

rog747

5th Jul 2023, 06:48

The Bac 1-11 was never used in Madeira.

HF 310 as well the Boeing 767-200 of Braathens SAFE...the very first two wide bodies used at FNC.

https://www.flickr.com/photos/spotterdudenor/51023472721

Wow, a splendid photo of the BU 767-200 at the Santa Catarina Airport FNC in 1986.

Thanks!, I never knew of them ever visiting FNC.
Their 767's were quite a stunning sight, and I often saw the 2 of them on the ground together at Palma.
They were sold on after summer 1986 as they were deemed too big for the airline.
Britannia Airways did not go for them at the time, as the BU 767's had PW engines.

In the photo one can see the large old Atlantis Hotel which was demolished to make way for the FNC Runway extension works in 2000.
The TAP crews often stayed there on nightstops.

Re the BAC 1-11 flying to FNC,
I am aware of Cabin Crews noting that Laker, BIA, and Dan Air 1-11's all going to Funchal,and possibly Cambrian Airways too.
One young lady I know was due to take a DA 727 there, but as it went Tech, so Dan Air laid on two 1-11's.

Certainly some of the German Charter airlines flew their 1-11's to FNC;
In early 1977 one of the Bavaria Flug Series 528FLs was modified with additional fuel tanks and a more spacious 95 seat cabin enabling the aircraft to operate non-stop services from Munich to the Canaries and Madeira. The company then merged with Germanair to become Bavaria Germanair Fluggesellschaft.
It is to be noted that Paninternational sent theirs to many far flung places, such as to Tenerife in the Canary Islands via Madrid or Seville, and to Funchal in Madeira via Lisbon. The airline also flew as far south as Mombasa in Kenya from Munich on regular charters via Athens, Cairo and Djibouti but occasionally used other way points where necessary.

Re: The Air Finland/Finnair 757 about a decade ago that touched much more ahead than this one, and with successful braking action ;)
It has to be said that both the 757 and the A320/A321 have rather good brakes...The 757 truly is a beast with its 4 wheel trucks.

FYI
The Funchal Runway Extension.
The existing 1800m runway was again extended in 2000, this time to 2,781 m (9,124 ft).
As landfill was not a realistic option, the extension was built on a platform, partly over the ocean, supported by 180 columns, each about 70 m (230 ft) tall.

rog747

5th Jul 2023, 07:53

I always wanted to fly into Madeira in a Short Solent flying boat of Aquila Airways. They had no trouble whatsoever with LDA or TORA!

If you get the chance when you visit Funchal, there is a small Museum on the town's promenade where they have an Aquila Airways display, and opposite on the prom is the preserved Tender Launch that was used to take the passengers out to the Flying Boats moored in the bay. I have attached some photos of my visit a few years ago.

Many notable persons such as Sir Winston Churchill would take their winter holidays in Madeira, flying down on Aquila, and stay at the famous Reid's Hotel (do go for Afternoon Tea on their terrace).

Sadly Aquila Airways did suffer a couple of accidents on their Madeira services, the most notable crash was in 1957 on the Isle of Wight, which basically finished the Company off,
being then at the time, the worst ever air disaster to occur on English soil.
The aircraft, a Short Solent 3 flying boat named the City of Sydney, registered G-AKNU, departed Southampton Water at 22:46 on a night flight to Las Palmas and Madeira via Lisbon.
At 22:54 the crew radioed to report that the #4 propeller had been feathered, ''Coming back in a hurry''.
#3 engine would also fail.
During an attempt to return, the Solent crashed into a disused chalk pit adjacent to heavily forested downland.
The crash site is on a steep eastern slope of Shalcombe Down, above the small villages of Chessell and Shalcombe.

An Aquila Sunderland G-AGJN was lost at Madeira in a landing accident, and another Sunderland G-AGKY was lost at Calshot on the take off for Madeira.
Both accidents happened within a week of each other in January 1953.

Such are the early days of the pioneering of commercial Aviation.

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1124/14352439_1840411636190881_7205236451476700290_o_594c3c1bf848 8baf86272698da19f8c4abfe1cdd.jpg
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1124/14352529_1840411472857564_6929533218501140496_o_5483fb51a79e b60e0c840d3c857c8bb29e76aa9b.jpg
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1124/14425493_1840411792857532_3025810360503418997_o_d3714558fa1b 3c12b78e29c2a9aa90f6e88403fc.jpg
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1120x2000/14444708_1840411872857524_1704389451492263182_o_4ecdae8c15ce 9fe40cef27e3b352f60e45ae1610.jpg

PoppaJo

5th Jul 2023, 08:17

To be honest, too much hot air (and BS) here in the comments.
It was a bit of long float, get over it.
Having flown into FNC for over 20 years, things like this (and worse) happen and it is part of the process of flying into a Cat C airport with very specific conditions.
You should see how it is flying into Vágar in the Faroe Islands :bored:

Which part of the ops manual? Can’t see it in mine, can’t see it in my previous employers, can’t see it in my previous previous employers.

I guess we are all doing it wrong then. I’ll have a chat to my training department when I see them next week and remind them about the need to land half way down the runway. I’ll take my resignation letter with me at the same time.

JW411

5th Jul 2023, 16:52

Thank you for that; much appreciated.

JanetFlight

5th Jul 2023, 17:46

Re the BAC 1-11 flying to FNC,
I am aware of Cabin Crews noting that Laker, BIA, and Dan Air 1-11's all going to Funchal,and possibly Cambrian Airways too.
One young lady I know was due to take a DA 727 there, but as it went Tech, so Dan Air laid on two 1-11's.

Certainly some of the German Charter airlines flew their 1-11's to FNC;
In early 1977 one of the Bavaria Flug Series 528FLs was modified with additional fuel tanks and a more spacious 95 seat cabin enabling the aircraft to operate non-stop services from Munich to the Canaries and Madeira. The company then merged with Germanair to become Bavaria Germanair Fluggesellschaft.
It is to be noted that Paninternational sent theirs to many far flung places, such as to Tenerife in the Canary Islands via Madrid or Seville, and to Funchal in Madeira via Lisbon. The airline also flew as far south as Mombasa in Kenya from Munich on regular charters via Athens, Cairo and Djibouti but occasionally used other way points where necessary.

Hi Dear Rog747 :)

First of all many tanx for your kind attention with me and my apologies to the other members here because we all have in mind this is a very thread regarding a specific TAP landing at Madeira island...so sorry for the lil off topic.

You my friend really opened a Pandoras Box, because since yesterday evening im in contact with several aviation colleagues from Funchal and none of them has memories from the One Eleven at Funchal on their own airport.

Me also as a regular poster regarding Faro airport history (my working place for decades) for blogs, sites and Facebook groups cannot recall or remind at all any refuel ops here at Faro onroute to/from FNC with the 1-11.

Remember tons of Boeings, Caravelles, even the F28, but sadly no one here at Faro or Lisbon has memories from such 1-11's on route to/from Madeira.

However i fully respect what you've said, im not the owner of truth, but i will be extremely happy and grateful if you could show some pics or docs regarding the 1-11 ops at FNC, please.

Regarding FNC i remember the first 310 there (the Hapag as u said), the first 767 (BRA Safe) and iirc the very first 757 was the blue german LTS....all the rest back in the days resumed to the classic 737, 727 as well the mighty Caravelle.

By the way and as matter of curiosity here at Faro i remember seeing a BA L1011 Tristar doing refuel ops on a very special ops at Gibraltar (big boy, tiny rwy) on the beginning of 80's for some cruise ships on the Med Sea...yes, BA managed to opr the giant 1011 at small GIB back in those days.

Also back in that day, on another portuguese island, Sao Miguel, Azores, the Ponta Delgada (PDL) airport with also a small rwy such as FNC, aprox 1800mts, (but not so difficult app), started to receive some USA charter DC8s...the inaugural one was Airlift Intl of Miami.
TAP Air Postugal also did a 707 test flight in the small 1800 mts at PDL

All the best,,,JF

First_Principal

5th Jul 2023, 22:21

If you get the chance when you visit Funchal...

I specifically logged in to 'like' your post, but see now that facility is not available on this sub-forum.

It was interesting and informative, and made a change to the general berating (1) of pilot's unknown (2) without possession of full facts (3) despite the successful landing...

FP.

Greta_Thunberg

6th Jul 2023, 02:01

It was interesting and informative, and made a change to the general berating (1) of pilot's unknown (2) without possession of full facts (3) despite the successful landing...

Someone else said it earlier, but it's like this thread is in playing out in a parallel universe. None of that matters, unless perhaps they were on fire, there is simply no excuse for that dangerous approach.

I was taught there are are soft SOPs (>250kts below FL100, securing the cabin slightly below 10,000 due holding, sterile cockpit rule <FL100 for especially funny anecdotes etc). Then there are hard SOPs: stabilising the approach, reacting to a TCAS, a stall or a GPWS, and assuring the landing is made inside down zone! Deciding which of those soft and grey areas can be tweaked on a given day is part of why a captain is paid to be a captain. Knowingly ignoring the hard and golden rules; simply no defence.

Thought experiment for those that think this is a storm in a teacup... Which crystal clear/absolute rules/SOPs that your airline PAYS you to respect... do you feel emboldened to disregard at say a CAT C airport as someone above suggested?

FlightDetent

6th Jul 2023, 02:38

The skilled guys:
Fighting on the radio about wind components overhead Funchal

Me, sitting on the ramp at PXO, having tankered fuel for the whole return trip to LIS, alternate OPO, and all reserves:
"Skip, did you get the stamps for Madeira? I never got qualified..."

Him: "Ain't stupid."

#sweetmemories

rog747

6th Jul 2023, 08:47

I specifically logged in to 'like' your post, but see now that facility is not available on this sub-forum.

It was interesting and informative, and made a change to the general berating (1) of pilot's unknown (2) without possession of full facts (3) despite the successful landing...

FP.

Many thanks indeed for yours, and also for JW411's most kind words.

Landings at FNC will always be an emotive and rather lively topic - Just like most of the Touchdowns LOL!

rog747

6th Jul 2023, 09:18

Hi Dear Rog747 :)

First of all many thanks for your kind attention with me and my apologies to the other members here because we all have in mind this is a very thread regarding a specific TAP landing at Madeira island...so sorry for the lil off topic.

You my friend really opened a Pandora's Box, because since yesterday evening im in contact with several aviation colleagues from Funchal and none of them has memories from the One Eleven at Funchal on their own airport.
Me also as a regular poster regarding Faro airport history (my working place for decades) for blogs, sites and Facebook groups cannot recall or remind at all any refuel ops here at Faro onroute to/from FNC with the 1-11.
Sadly no one here at Faro or Lisbon has memories from such 1-11's on route to/from Madeira.
However i fully respect what you've said, and will be extremely happy and grateful if you could show some pics or docs regarding the 1-11 ops at FNC, please.

Regarding FNC i remember the first A310 there (the Hapag as u said), the first 767 (BRA Safe) and iirc the very first 757 was the blue german LTS....all the rest back in the days resumed to the classic 737, 727 as well the mighty Caravelle.
Yes, I have just seen the LTS 757 photo at FNC, and a Condor 757 too - both there in the later 1980's !

All the best,,,JF

Hi there JF,
many thanks indeed for your most kind and detailed responses to my (sorry) slightly O/T stories of the very interesting landings at FNC over the years, and my apologies for opening a Pandora's Box!

I have indeed some BAC 1-11 at Madeira FNC stories for you - sadly no photos (we did not take that many back in the 1970's and 1980's)

Funchal BAC 1-11 operations - Dan Air

A Passenger recalls flying on Dan Air BAC 1-11 517 G-BCWA from Birmingham BHX to Funchal, via a refuelling stop at SCQ Santiago de Compostela in February 1978.
It was replacing a scheduled Dan-Air Boeing 727-100, several of which were stuck at Porto Santo waiting for an improvement in the weather at nearby Madeira.

July 01 1974
Dan Air BAC 1-11 414 G-AZED LGW-LIS-FNC-LIS-LGW noted in Skipper's logbook.
He quotes ‘’We used to go with the 1-11, I remember the landing roll coming very close to the end!
No great barrier... just a bloody sheer drop; Like landing on an aircraft carrier!
The late great Bob Andrews outbound, and Frank Buxton inbound.
I don't know why 2 Captains, probably a Fam trip into Funchal for Bob.

Quote from a Dan Air Stewardess,
‘’I flew into Funchal on the 1-11 many times. A very exciting approach with one wing pointing down at the waves and the other wing pointing up at the sky!
One time we went through that approach only to have to overshoot and go through it all again as a truck drove across the runway!

I am waiting for any other anecdotes JF, from BIA British Island Airways, Laker staff/crews if they ever flew there.

Best R.

Edit - Cambrian Airways did not fly their 1-11's to FNC.
They did go to the Canary Islands.

ATC Watcher

6th Jul 2023, 09:22

........None of that matters, unless perhaps they were on fire, there is simply no excuse for that dangerous approach.

Common ! Do you have all the facts to pass this kind of judgement ? you ( and I ) were not in that cockpit , you are just reacting emotionally to a Youtube video.
As to SOPs, yes there is a bible , but have you ever flown in Africa ? I mean as PIC ? You will quickly learn there are SOPs and heir unwritten deviations called " local best practices" and then there are situations that fall outside those 2 categories in which either experience or luck are neceessary to succeeed. , Sometimes it is choosing between 2 evils. and you generally choose the least dangerous one.

FUNC is not in Africa, and TAP is not a Bush outfit I grant you that . I have no idea as to why this TAP PIC did decide to continue the landing well passed the touchdwn area instead of going around , but he or she has made a judgement that worked in the end, Whether that judgement was made using experinece , or was it luck , you and I do not know.
I am giving him or her the benefit of the doubt and I would not have liked to have been in this situation.

rog747

6th Jul 2023, 09:59

FAO JanetFlight

Quote from an old pal former MD, at Palmair/Bath Travel, and worked at Laker Airways -
''Amongst my memorabilia I have a number of bound Lord Brothers brochures (owned by Laker Airways) and the Summer 1974 edition suggests that Laker 1-11 300's operated LGW-FNC albeit with a tech stop in both directions.'' (Fuel Stop TBC but I think it was LIS)

Also from more Laker Airways Staff -
''Yes we did. Normally if I remember correctly it was a Wednesday weekly flight to Madeira.
Cannot remember if it was for Lord Bros, or for Wings Holidays, or both!''

Quote from a Laker Stewardess -
''Yes they did. It was one of my first flights in 1974!''

Also from a pal at BIA British Island Airways Gatwick Ops - and now confirmed by BIA's old Boss Peter Villa...
We sure did with the BAC 1-11 400 series - PXO Porto Santo was the stop for fuel.

Hope this helps JF!
Plenty for you to chat about with your old colleagues over a Coffee and a Pastel de Nata!

Best R.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/240x320/lords_gk_fnc_43bd1149876fabd4c5dd81ab2be79c00b1cfc3da.jpg
1974 package holidays
https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/240x320/358130591_10163030051207907_6963521556762682411_n_52a301a6e3 5c72674c64870c6ced1c8763307629.jpg
Lakers Jets - they owned Lord Bros Holidays

Airbanda

6th Jul 2023, 11:10

Interesting thread for those of us who watch the planes and have an insatiable curiosity about the technical stuff.

Landings that float a bit beyond the TD markers at FNC are pretty frequent. As already pointed out by others it's an effect of the wind changing and having added a few knots to the ref speed in case that change increases RoD.

This one was way beyond that category. Not just a bit of float but actually climbing, unless the runway drops away due downslope.

Almost as if a go around was started and then abandoned - surefire route to an overrun as any number of accident reports show...

JanetFlight

6th Jul 2023, 18:46

Dear Rog747...Many tanx for the kind words and attention with me.

It was a delight reading those quotes from your aviation colleagues, basically, "Our" aviation colleagues.

Its very curious and peculiar, and with such value, that no one at Funchal remembers that, however i fully believe your friends quotes and also your two interesting pics...tks for that.

As i told you before regarding Faro history im almost sure about 80%of the history things...regarding Funchal lets say around 60...lol :)

But now you really made me dig deeper and deeper towards my FNC friends and colleagues...for sure someone must have some 1-11 pics there back in the 70s, early 80's for sure if that was the case.

I remember here at Faro back in the day, the 1-11s from different operators at summer hot days, waiting for the sunset to fall down the external temperatute and could "reach the sky" even on a 2500 mts rwy.

To be honest i never heard about the 1-11 on such a small rwy as Funchal, but im aware that Faucett used it on such small and high rwys on the Peruvian Andes foothills....How? I really dont know ;)

But here in Faro on hot days the DanAirs, the BIAs, the Cymrus and even the old Bcals, and not to even mention Lakers...wow....they run, and run, and run, and run...till the very last inch of tar, and then....up to the sky....but slowwwwwwwwwwwww...and we were happy, bcause those were the days <3

Airbanda

6th Jul 2023, 20:18

To be honest i never heard about the 1-11 on such a small rwy as Funchal

Not directly comparable but Aer Lingus flew their 1-11 200s off the original 5400' 15/33 runway at Leeds/Bradford from the late sixties on.

Mainly on schedules to Dublin but occasionally further afield on charters albeit presumably with limited pax numbers.

FUMR

6th Jul 2023, 20:27

I flew into LBA on a BMA Bac 1-11 500 in March 1971. I think that by then it had been extended but not by much. Anyone know?

Airbanda

6th Jul 2023, 22:10

I flew into LBA on a BMA Bac 1-11 500 in March 1971. I think that by then it had been extended but not by much. Anyone know?

Once the SE/NW 15/33 runway was finished c1964/5 it was 5400 feet.

In 1984 the extension to 7380 feet was completed but displaced thresholds limit LDA from either end.

rog747

7th Jul 2023, 07:45

Dear Rog747...
Many thanks for the kind words and attention with me.
It was a delight reading those quotes from your aviation colleagues, basically, "Our" aviation colleagues.
It's very curious and peculiar, and with such value, that no one at Funchal remembers that, however i fully believe your friends quotes and also your two interesting pics...tks for that.
As i told you before regarding Faro history im almost sure about 80% of the history things...regarding Funchal let's say around 60%...lol :)
But now you really made me dig deeper and deeper towards my FNC friends and colleagues...
for sure someone must have some 1-11 pics there back in the 70s, early 80's for sure if that was the case.
I remember here at Faro back in the day, the 1-11s from different operators at summer hot days, waiting for the sunset to fall down the external temperature and could "reach the sky" even on a 2500 mts rwy.
To be honest i never heard about the 1-11 on such a small runway as Funchal.
But here in Faro on hot days the Dan Airs, the BIAs, the Cymrus and even the old Bcals, and not to even mention Lakers...wow....they run, and run, and run, and run...till the very last inch of tar, and then....up to the sky....but slow!...and we were happy, because those were the days <3

Dear JF,
Sadly despite searches and many requests it appears that no Funchal BAC 1-11 photos exist on the Web,
but for sure, some holiday makers would have taken plenty of snaps whilst boarding the plane at the FNC airport!

The BAC 1-11 500 used to go into LBA Leeds Bradford with British Midland back from 1970 onwards as mentioned in the Post by FUMR above, LBA was the same short runway length as FNC.

The 1-11's would normally always use Water Injection (De-Min water) to assist in extra power for take-offs in High Temps such as departures off very short runways and even at Faro Corfu, and at PXO.

Anecdotes from Laker Airways Crews who flew to Funchal are below:
We think Laker began holiday flights Gatwick to Madeira from around 1972 onwards -

1/
Yes, Laker Airways did fly into Funchal.
This was before the runway was extended and it was always a challenge as the wind from each end of the runway was always 180 deg opposite and the wind in the middle of the runway was always calm. As I remember it we used to position visually over a white building at 800 feet in a right turn onto the final approach. The limits for operating into FNC were quite high and only flight checked captains could do those trips.

2/
I flew on the jump seat as a Laker "Flying Spanner" to carry out the turnarounds to Funchal in April 1973. The Captain used to issue us with a Ticket for the trip to make things legal I suppose. Capt. Tom Smallman was my Captain to Funchal and Peter Dolosso was F/O. The landing at Funchal those days was more like landing on an aircraft carrier. I think we stopped at Lisbon for fuel on one, perhaps both of the sectors.

3/
A Laker Airways Hostess recalls,
''Yes they did. It was one of my first flights in 1974!''

A Dan Air skipper recalls -
I flew from Gatwick to Funchal on 24/06/80. The aircraft was G-BEKA (a BAC 1-11 520 series)
We had a full load of 119 passengers to take out of there and in those days the runway was only 1600 metres long.
When I calculated the performance, we could only take 3000 kgs of fuel out of there.
Needless to say, that meant a quick hop across to Porto Santo where we fully refuelled for Gatwick.
Had to uplift demineralised water to do a wet takeoff from Porto Santo and even then we used every inch of the runway!
I recorded in my logbook that we clocked up 12 hours 25 minutes on duty that day so had to file a discretionary report.
Happy days!

And another -
Ah, the old water injection system!
I remember one day in July 1989 the two of us at Faro pumping in 300 litres of the stuff in 30+ degrees with a hand pump.
The electric pump hadn’t been loaded on board and the only one available from Dan Air was this hand pump.
The flight deck didn’t smell too well on the way home!

Another reply -
''I remember doing the same at Funchal.
Sweating buckets by the end of it.
As if that wasn’t enough, halfway down the runway the demineralised water pump on the number one engine packed up so it went down to dry power.
This was before they extended the runway on stilts at Funchal so as you can imagine we used every bloody inch of it!
Had to tech stop in Faro on the way home and go through the whole process again using the hand pump.
I think I threw that uniform shirt away when I got home.
And we call them the ‘good old days?’'

I guess 737-800 and A321 Flight Crews ''these days'' have things a tad more easy now when down route lol.

BTW-
I also need to see if Airways International Cymru 1-11’s (and also Monarch) ever flew into Funchal too but I think not.

Best R.

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/644x608/357491360_6507455469312634_7521267345324772506_n_c22d9ed68b4 2b4fbabb5c915caf5e32cd9317e9e.jpg

Laker Flying Spanner duty travel tickets in 1973.

hans brinker

7th Jul 2023, 22:11

Common ! Do you have all the facts to pass this kind of judgement ? you ( and I ) were not in that cockpit , you are just reacting emotionally to a Youtube video.
As to SOPs, yes there is a bible , but have you ever flown in Africa ? I mean as PIC ? You will quickly learn there are SOPs and heir unwritten deviations called " local best practices" and then there are situations that fall outside those 2 categories in which either experience or luck are neceessary to succeeed. , Sometimes it is choosing between 2 evils. and you generally choose the least dangerous one.

FUNC is not in Africa, and TAP is not a Bush outfit I grant you that . I have no idea as to why this TAP PIC did decide to continue the landing well passed the touchdwn area instead of going around , but he or she has made a judgement that worked in the end, Whether that judgement was made using experinece , or was it luck , you and I do not know.
I am giving him or her the benefit of the doubt and I would not have liked to have been in this situation.

5 years PIC ACMI wet lease in the EU and north Africa. 6 years PIC corporate north & Central America. Now 8 years PIC FAA 121. 25+ years total. And not calling you out personally, more the post about it being " a successful landing" above I can't find.
"working in the end"/"successful" are not the measurements to be used to judge ourselves. I am pretty sure that on every GA I have done on an ILS in my career, we would have successfully landed, just like I am pretty sure, if I would have ignored every RA or GPWS warning, there is a good chance I would have survived.
And that is the problem. I have flown maybe 10000 flights total in all those years. There are 100000 flights per DAY. If all of us would take what we perceive as an acceptable risk once a year, and it goes wrong 1% of the time, it would still lead to an unacceptable raise in the number of crashes. And I am not saying I haven't done the same. But condoning it is not the right thing.

Doors to Automatic

8th Jul 2023, 06:56

Having watched the landing several times, by my calculations the aircraft landed more than halfway down the runway. Counting the number of centreline markings, the A321 landed on the ninth marking beyond the TDZ. After this point there was around 800 feet of runway before the opposite end TDZ, followed by 3000 feet of TDZ and finally around 500 feet beyond the displaced threshold before running out of runway. So a total of around 4300 feet. Enough to stop, but I wouldn’t have liked to try it given the sheer drop beyond the end.

Lookleft

8th Jul 2023, 07:18

So a total of around 4300 feet. Enough to stop, but I wouldn’t have liked to try it given the sheer drop beyond the end.

As many of the airline pilots who actually have posted have stated ITS NOT THE BLOODY POINT! You have a TDZ and a certain latitude either side of it. Its what the landing figures are predicated on. and its what any half decent airline pilot should be able to achieve. What this video shows is a crew who have put the fate of their lives and that of the passengers in the laws of physics as they have left SOPS, skill and any sense of professionalism way, way behind them. They have decided to become test pilots and have bought the pax along for the ride. Runway excursions continue to be a problem and the reluctance to go-around is a good reason why. The only point that you are committed to the landing is when the thrust reversers have deployed. The sad reality is, probably this crew were more concerned about doing a go-around than they were running off the end. They more than likely thought that there was enough room to stop but had no numbers, technique or SOPs on which to base that decision on. All they had were wide eyes and four feet on the brake pedals.

safetypee

8th Jul 2023, 09:29

There have been several references to TDZ, but AFAIR this relates to runway markings and not aircraft landing performance. Similarly 'margins'; what margin - distance, how is this established and how judged in actual operation. Landing performance is based on a calculated (assumed) touchdown position, together with an assumed spread of normal performance, but what is normal.

Overrun events are relatively rare, but how many near-miss are there, how are these judged.

Academic views discuss press-on-itis as a feeling of being in control, biased by prior experienced or the progress of this event - as understood by the crew - their point of view - of being in control.

Other academics note that we tend not to learn from near misses - the outcomes were 'safe', we lack ability to judge the margins of safety; we choose not to learn because 'we would not have done that', but how do we know.

The roles of monitoring (self and crew) and alerting, are issues of CRM; these are repeatedly cited in accident reports - more training. Yet does the industry consider, learn, and accept that these concepts are limited, and perhaps as in this incident the humans were 'max out'. We might never know.
Does this crew know; only by reflection, which is subject to hindsight bias, as are most posted comments and opinion in this thread (note to self).

brakedwell

8th Jul 2023, 10:11

I used to go into Funchal regularly with Air Europe in the Boeing 737/200 and then the Boeing 757. It didn't use the 757 for Funchals until November 1985, over 2 years after it's introduction. I was one of the first to be checked out into Funchal in November 27th 1985 and cannot remember any real frights on the short runway. The 757 had a better take off performance the the 737 and all our Manchester and Gatwick fiights were non stop. Landings were Captain only, but First Officers were allowed to do the take-offs, which were the most frightening part of the operation!

rog747

8th Jul 2023, 12:49

I used to go into Funchal regularly with Air Europe in the Boeing 737/200 and then the Boeing 757. It didn't use the 757 for Funchals until November 1985, over 2 years after its introduction. I was one of the first to be checked out into Funchal in November 27th 1985 and cannot remember any real frights on the short runway. The 757 had a better take off performance than the 737, and all our Manchester and Gatwick flights were non stop. Landings were Captain only, but First Officers were allowed to do the take-offs, which were the most frightening part of the operation!

Many thanks,
FNC was 1600m up until 1986, then 200m was added.

I have just had a spanner thrown in the works, that BIA British Island Airways may have taken their shiny new MD-83's in there from 1988 (1800m runway) ---->
More digging!

1southernman

8th Jul 2023, 15:50

As many of the airline pilots who actually have posted have stated ITS NOT THE BLOODY POINT! You have a TDZ and a certain latitude either side of it. Its what the landing figures are predicated on. and its what any half decent airline pilot should be able to achieve. What this video shows is a crew who have put the fate of their lives and that of the passengers in the laws of physics as they have left SOPS, skill and any sense of professionalism way, way behind them. They have decided to become test pilots and have bought the pax along for the ride. Runway excursions continue to be a problem and the reluctance to go-around is a good reason why. The only point that you are committed to the landing is when the thrust reversers have deployed. The sad reality is, probably this crew were more concerned about doing a go-around than they were running off the end. They more than likely thought that there was enough room to stop but had no numbers, technique or SOPs on which to base that decision on. All they had were wide eyes and four feet on the brake pedals.
To me the appr "looks" decent but without knowing speeds and alts it's impossible to say whether it meets the stable criteria...When the gain in alt in the "flair" occurred I thought ok they're GA but...oh well...I'd like to think somebody said in a quite moment on tax in or at the pub debrief "ya know we shoulda GA "...

ATC Watcher

8th Jul 2023, 19:33

And that is the problem. I have flown maybe 10000 flights total in all those years. There are 100000 flights per DAY. If all of us would take what we perceive as an acceptable risk once a year, and it goes wrong 1% of the time, it would still lead to an unacceptable raise in the number of crashes..
Totally agree . My point was more about attaking , even using strong words, someone decision based on a you tube video. Without the data it all basically speculation although yes, the video does not looks too good. My other point was about throwig the SOPs as the ultimate proof they were wrong. , We all have navigated outside from time to time on certain types of operations especially operating in funny places.
as 1sothernman just said I'd like to think somebody said in a quite moment on tax in or at the pub debrief "ya know we shoulda GA "... I think that would be a very good conclusion for this thread .

Doors to Automatic

8th Jul 2023, 20:15

As many of the airline pilots who actually have posted have stated ITS NOT THE BLOODY POINT! You have a TDZ and a certain latitude either side of it. Its what the landing figures are predicated on. and its what any half decent airline pilot should be able to achieve. What this video shows is a crew who have put the fate of their lives and that of the passengers in the laws of physics as they have left SOPS, skill and any sense of professionalism way, way behind them. They have decided to become test pilots and have bought the pax along for the ride. Runway excursions continue to be a problem and the reluctance to go-around is a good reason why. The only point that you are committed to the landing is when the thrust reversers have deployed. The sad reality is, probably this crew were more concerned about doing a go-around than they were running off the end. They more than likely thought that there was enough room to stop but had no numbers, technique or SOPs on which to base that decision on. All they had were wide eyes and four feet on the brake pedals.

I didn’t say it was. There is no way this landing should have continued whilst still in the air so far beyond the TDZ.

Greta_Thunberg

9th Jul 2023, 00:19

I'd like to think somebody said in a quite moment on tax in or at the pub debrief "ya know we shoulda GA "...

as 1sothernman just said I think that would be a very good conclusion for this thread .
That's not the reality of aviation in 2023. Flight Data Monitoring would have recorded PRECISELY where the aircraft touched down and flagged it to the company whereby even without the pilots filing a safety report. TAP would have been aware of this even before the video was uploaded. Them not filing a report and just having a chat in the pub will make matters worse for them.

Again, there is no 'data' one needs to see, the aircraft landed outside of the TDZ, the die is cast with regards to culpability, unless for some incredibly unusual set of circumstances which would be basically limited to the aircraft being on fire or having <600kgs of fuel remaining. This video (to this competent observer) can be little more than a video of a flight crew failing to safely execute their duties at a very risky and complex airport.

Lookleft

9th Jul 2023, 04:44

Without the data it all basically speculation although yes, the video does not looks too good.

You don't need FOQA to show what went wrong. Unless the video has been altered in this forum, the video is the data. If a formal investigation only looked at the video then you would have a valid point.

My other point was about throwig the SOPs as the ultimate proof they were wrong. , We all have navigated outside from time to time on certain types of operations especially operating in funny places.

And if we have then we deserve the same criticism..

I'd like to think somebody said in a quite moment on tax in or at the pub debrief "ya know we shoulda GA ".

That is what is being said on pprune. Its the starting point of the discussion not the end of it. Some are saying because they got away with it no damage done. The discussion should be around why the landing was persisted with in the first place. Why would a crew ignore all the red flags for a runway excursion and "press on" to an uncertain outcome. Is it training, standards or are there lots of pilots out there who would have done exactly the same thing in the same circumstances?

FullWings

9th Jul 2023, 08:35

Some are saying because they got away with it no damage done. The discussion should be around why the landing was persisted with in the first place. Why would a crew ignore all the red flags for a runway excursion and "press on" to an uncertain outcome. Is it training, standards or are there lots of pilots out there who would have done exactly the same thing in the same circumstances?
I think that is the nub of the issue. There are many things you can get away with, but in doing so you are operating in high-risk areas which experience has shown are not appropriate for commercial passenger flights. That’s why we have SAC and rules for a touchdown in the right place giving an assured stop, otherwise it is a GA or rejected landing. FNC is one of those airports where there is less margin for error and I assume most pilots operating there pay more attention to setting and achieving gates and have thoroughly briefed their actions in the event they are not complied with. Which makes the event in the video a bit of an outlier and worthy of comment.

172_driver

9th Jul 2023, 12:07

I am not saying this landing was well executed, far from it, but those who advocate TDZ or else.... There is really only one touch down point which for which you have valid performance, and under certain runway conditions that performance is a best guess. If I remember correctly, runways > 2400 meters has TDZ markings for 900 meters without account for the length of the actual stripes. Is landing at the end of the TDZ more okay on a (relatively) short and slippery runway, than landing outside of the touchdown zone on a long dry runway, irresepective of aircraft type or weight? Somewhere you have to draw the line and the TDZ markings are good help to make that decision. I just have a gut feeling that those who don't recognize the above mentioned variables are also those that advocate 2 white 2 red or else....

rog747

9th Jul 2023, 15:59

Originally Posted by Lookleft
''Some are saying because they got away with it no damage done. The discussion should be around why the landing was persisted with in the first place.
Why would a crew ignore all the red flags for a runway excursion and "press on" to an uncertain outcome.
Is it training, standards or are there lots of pilots out there who would have done exactly the same thing in the same circumstances?''

The reading of the CVR readout of the TAP 425 B727-282 CS-TBR accident (overrun) in Nov 1977 is a sobering and sad document, and that 'We Must Get it in' mode cost the lives of 125 passengers and 6 crew members.

Shortly before 10pm on that Saturday evening, after 13 hours and 15 minutes of crew hours duty time, the very tired crew was trying to land their 727 on the difficult Madeira airport runway, which at the time was just 1,600 m (5,250 ft) long.
The first attempt to approach the runway had to be aborted because the crew was unable to establish visual contact with the runway. A second attempt was made, but again, had to be discontinued due to the poor visibility.
The Captain João Lontrão and Co-pilot Miguel Guimarães Leal decided to make one last try to land the plane before they would have to make the decision to divert to the Gando Gran Canaria Airport in the Canary Islands (Seems the nearer airport on the island of Porto Santo was not the Alternate)

While descending now to runway 24 on an NDB approach, the crew still encountered poor weather conditions with limited visibility to 3 km, clouds down to 1,500 feet with heavy rain showers.
A few minutes later, on the third attempt to land at a speed of Vref + 19 knots, the crew landed with too long a flare, and touched down too far down on runway 24, about 2,060 feet past the runway threshold (Runway 24 is 5,000 feet long) at a speed of 148 knots.
Immediately after touchdown, the crew activated the thrust reversers and deployed the spoilers but were unable to stop on the wet runway, and the 727 overran at 48 knots. It went down a steep embankment, collided with a stone bridge, broke into several pieces and eventually came to rest in flames on the beach located about 40 meters below airfield elevation.
The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.
Six crew members and 125 passengers were killed while 33 other occupants were seriously injured.

The investigation found lacking at Madeira Airport and had insufficient lights, making it difficult to perform an Approach.
Apart from the severe weather conditions at the time of landing, investigators looked at the crew’s Approach procedure. The accident report concluded that the crew touched down 1,060 feet (320 m) farther down the runway than they were meant to, at a speed that was 19.2 knots greater than recommended.
This, paired with the wet runway conditions that led to aquaplaning, sent TAP Flight 425 to its ultimate end.

In the wake of the accident, TAP replaced using its Boeing 727-28s with 727-82s on the route to Madeira.
This shorter variant, carried 60 fewer passengers – and was more suitable for landing on the short FNC runway, on which it had previously been operating from 1967, prior to the bigger 727-282 version delivered to TAP in 1975.

The airfield, originally known as Santa Catarina, had the 1600m runway, but the rest of the airport facilities were initially rather basic.
The first aircraft to arrive at the newly completed airport on Madeira was a TAP - Transportes Aéreos Portugueses Lockheed L-1049 Super Constellation, carrying 80 passengers on July 18, 1964.
A new passenger Terminal capable of handling 500,000 travellers per year opened in 1972 but local geography limited the length of the airstrip and growth was sluggish.
Funchal (FNC) soon gained a reputation as one of the most hazardous airfields in the world – due in part to its short runway but also because winds came off the sea and up the mountainside on which the airfield was constructed, as well as down nearby valleys.

The TAP 727 crash also spurred officials to look at extending the runway.
Construction for a (200-metre) extension began in 1983.
It took almost ten years, but in 1986 a 656ft (200m) extension was completed on the only remaining piece of flat land at the end of the airfield.
But it was still rather short for the then upcoming generation of new jets, and research set out to establish whether further lengthening might be possible and how it could be done.

The main alternate for Funchal is Porto Santo Airport (PXO), 60 miles (100km) and just a few minutes’ flying time across the archipelago. It has a 9,843ft (3,000m) runway but only six parking positions for airliners – 19 is the maximum that FNC can accommodate today, so PXO can get full quickly during periods of adverse weather.
If a diversion to PXO is not possible the Canary Islands are around 250 miles (400km) to the south,
Agadir and Casablanca, Morocco are both around 500 miles (800 km) to the east, and Lisbon 600 miles (965 km) to the northwest.
Each airline has its own procedures and nominates its own alternates.

Jeppesen chart for Madeira --- NOT up to date (https://atsci.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/lpma.pdf)

Wind is not the only ‘gotcha’ though.
Poor visibility can be a problem, especially when the cloud base is low or easterly winds drag sand dust off the Sahara.

rog747

13th Jul 2023, 06:12

I have just had a spanner thrown in the works, that BIA British Island Airways may have taken their shiny new MD-83's in there from 1988 (1800m runway) ---->
More digging!

For those of you, both Pilots and others, that take an operational interest of the past and rather challenging aspects of the operations at Funchal, such as those that have most kindly been mentioned here, such as from Brakedwell;
An ex BIA British Island Airways skipper just sent me this - >>>

''We were unable to take the MD-83 there. The Vmcg was too high. For the non-drivers (airframe), that was the minimum speed you could control the a/c on the ground following an engine failure. In other words, approaching that speed you could neither stop or go on Funchal’s short runway following said engine failure - enough to spoil your whole day 😧😧😧
I took a 1-11 there twice. A very interesting exercise!
As Peter (Villa) said, we had to hop into Porto Santo for fuel''

Best R.

Willie Nelson

14th Jul 2023, 01:55

My two cents.

Some have mentioned that if you miss the TDZ, then that is a mandatory balked landing. That is in some airlines, not necessarily true. Nevertheless at a minimum you must at least know what the margin of distance is in the event that you miss the TDZ.

For example, on FLYSMART as part of the briefing, you are well served to make note that we have 285 metre of margin should we miss the touchdown zone.

At least then you know roughly what’s a stake.

FlightDetent

14th Jul 2023, 22:45

FlySmart, paved to hell is the road with good intentions.

The biggest challenge is learning to overcome the tunnel vision so that you have the capacity to push the levers forward and pull the nose up again.

For various scientific reasons, floating over the last TDZ markers can be your very last straw to refocus on what is the only good option.

Who dares to think otherwise, please remind me what is the punishment for going missed?

safetypee

15th Jul 2023, 06:46

Willie, "… you must at least know what the margin of distance is in the event that you miss the TDZ."
You appear to misunderstand or incorrectly define TDZ.

The 'TDZ' (fixed distance runway markings) is not related to actual runway length, thus there is no relationship with the aircraft landing performance, which is based on the LDA and local conditions (LDR).
The TDZ should not be confused with, or replace the expected touchdown position.

The distance safety margin is applied to counter many unknowns or variables in the computation; it is not for the crew to 'use'.

Because there is no relationship between TDZ and the stop end of the runway, it is not possible to be assured that the remaining runway distance will be sufficient to stop the aircraft.

FD :ok:

Capn Bloggs

15th Jul 2023, 07:33

The 'TDZ' (fixed distance runway markings) is not related to actual runway length, thus there is no relationship with the aircraft landing performance, which is based on the LDA and local conditions (LDR).
The TDZ should not be confused with, or replace the expected touchdown position.
I don't agree. With respect to landing distance, My Boeing FCOM says/said:

Air Run Distance from threshold to touchdown is associated with a flare time of 7 seconds.

Therefore, it is quite easy to work out what the distance to touchdown the data is based on. 7sec at 200fps (120kts) equates to about 1400ft, or the roughly 450m markers. This applies in all cases, short or long runway.

Provided your runway is marked IAW ICAO, you will, beforehand, know where the 7sec point is WRT the markings. It is therefore easy to ascertain if you will/have touched down in the "TDZ".

For example, on FLYSMART as part of the briefing, you are well served to make note that we have 285 metre of margin should we miss the touchdown zone.
Since the performance touchdown point is predefined by the regs (7sec), it does seem to me to be valid to acknowledge the extra 285 and use judgement as to whether you GA or not. Why would you GA on a long landing on a 3500mm runway? Because you know that the performance book says you'll need 1800m based on touchdown point of 7sec/1400ft, and if you float another 500m, you still have room up your sleeve (3500-1800-500). Not that I condone regularly landing 500m past the performance TDP!

I don't fly the A320 but I assume the certification requirements are similar (ie 7sec to touch). If the aeroplane isn't touching down by the 450m markers/point (~7sec), you're now eating into your predicted landing distance. This is all regardless of the LDA.

H. Hughes

15th Jul 2023, 13:14

Allthough I agree that it was poor airmanship and a goaround was in order, goal fixation combined with startle effect makes mistakes like this happend. I don`t think Tea and Bicuits are required if the company has a good Safety Management System with none punitive reporting. If pilots report their mistakes and show willingness to learn there should be no punitive actions, if not though might call them for a visit to the office.

Jwscud

15th Jul 2023, 20:32

If you look at this event using the FAiR system (used by many safety departments) and with the following assumption:

- TAP Policy is a go around shall be conducted if the aircraft does not touch down in the TDZ

it is very hard to assess this event as anything other than recklessness which places the event on the boundary between retraining/administrative action and disciplinary action. A proper Just Culture provides for both of the above. Filing an ASR after the event does not equate to a free pass from negligence on the day though it would clearly be seen as mitigation when flight ops are reviewing the event.

Doors to Automatic

16th Jul 2023, 09:11

It would be interesting to know how BA or EZY would deal with such an incident. Would it be tea and biscuits or just tea?

IcePack

16th Jul 2023, 10:46

Who dares to think otherwise, please remind me what is the punishment for going missed?

Happily retired but their was a time that some airlines had a fuel policy devised by some —- sitting at a desk or climbing the greasy pole.

I remember having to explain my fuel load. Said —- thought that even if Porto Santo parking was full. Just land & stay on the Runway. i.e No excuse for taking Canary diversion fuel.

Hopefully that type of pressure is long gone.

safetypee

16th Jul 2023, 14:36

The crux of the discussion involves differing definitions, and how theory is related to practice.
There are many regulatory and other guidance documents requiring update after the TALPA changes (operational landing distances).

"The 'TDZ' (fixed distance runway markings) is not related to actual runway length, thus there is no relationship with the aircraft landing performance, …."
In this sense TDZ is defined as a marked distance along the runway which can be identified but not related directly to expected performance.

Alternatively, 'Touchdown Zone' as an idealistic area in which the pilot aims to touchdown; the position is only identified after a landing, where aircraft actually touchdown. It involves air distance - a variable, and other variations including piloting techniques. The touchdown position is important in landing performance, but never fully assured as a fixed point. cf aerial photos of dispersion of rubber markings.

Landing performance is assessed using reported conditions; many factors are variable, e.g. reported wind (+-2), vs actual headwind (+-?) n.b Funchal, may need more than the minimum 15% safety margin.

The derivation of landing performance is in AMC CS 25.1592.
Para 3.0 lists 'standard assumptions' which contribute to variability. Note paras 5.0 and 6.0 … [page 28 …]

" … assessing the landing performance at the time of arrival using procedures for operation in service. These procedures should: — be able to be consistently executed in service by flight crews of average skill; — include safe and reliable methods or devices; and — allow for any time delays that may reasonably be expected in service.
The air distance that is used for any landing at any runway is a function of the following variables: — runway approach guidance; — runway slope; — use of any aeroplane features or equipment (e.g. heads-up guidance, auto-flight systems, etc.); — pilot technique; and — the inherent flare characteristics of the aeroplane.
… analytically determine the air distance that is used for operational assessments of the landing performance as ‘the distance that is traversed over a period of 7 sec at a speed of 98 % of the recommended speed above the landing threshold’.
The recommended ‘speed above the landing threshold’ may also be referred to as the ‘final-approach speed (VAPP)’. The above air distance represents a flare time of 7 sec and a touchdown speed (VTD) of 96 % of the VAPP. The VAPP should be consistent with the procedures recommended including any speed additives, e.g. those that may be used due to winds or icing conditions.
… also provide the effects of higher speeds, to account for variations that occur in operations or are caused by the operating procedures of individual operators."

The realty of operations is indicated in an FAA study of landing performance; note the range of values, section 4.3 onwards [page 28 …].
The key influencing factors are also in FAA AC 91-79 Mitigating the Risks of a Runway Overrun Landings.

Aircraft landing distance is not related to TDZ; it could with calculation dependant on specific conditions, but never assured due to the situational variabilities and pilot performance.
Beware SOPs based on TDZ runway markings - exceptions for specific runways with special markings e.g Vagar EKVG 'Touchdown in the yellow box, LCY before the fixed line \ lights'.

AMC CS 25.1592, page 26 … https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/downloads/134260/en

FAA A Study of Normal Operational Landing Performance on Subsonic, Civil, Narrow-Body Jet Aircraft; page 29 … https://www.tc.faa.gov/its/worldpac/techrpt/ar077.pdf 5 M/s ≈ 10kts

AC 91-79 Mitigating the Risks of a Runway Overrun Upon Landing https://skybrary.aero/sites/default/files/bookshelf/3606.pdf

ICAO Doc 10064 - Aeroplane Performance Manual, page 12 … and particularly the Appendices https://www.sapoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/10-ICAO-Friction-Task-Force-and-EASA-Rulemaking-Task-Force.pdf

FlightDetent

16th Jul 2023, 15:30

With respect to landing distance.....
if you float another 500m, you still have room up your sleeve (3500-1800-500). Not that I condone regularly landing 500m past the performance TDP!

Bloggs, respectfully. While you are correct with the geometry, there are couple of points missing once we shift focus from the math onto day-to-day recurring airline operations and quality assurance.

Firstly the terminology. Having calculated the exact same value of 450m independently before for my small Airbus, that is not the TDZ as the word is understood. Nominal distance-to-touchdown for sure, why not say 350-550 m is a 'valid touchdown range' where the landing performance figures are not invalidated. That is to say, the inherent margins from the calculation will cover ~100 m loss. (if the attempt was legally justified to begin with, unlike MK1602 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MK_Airlines_Flight_1602)).

TDZ is commonly understood as either
a) 900 m or 1/3 of the runway whichever comes shorter (various ALAR toolkits)
b) the first part that is painted with TDZ zone markings.

now, A) above is an utterly useless concept that is a repeated pain to unlearn on all the performance and landing safety courses we would attend, design, teach or audit.

but B) has good merit. Since there are rules (ugly exceptions such as Burbank 9 notwithstanding), if the touchdown is not happening before the markings end the pilots can read that and need to understand beyond those all of the performance margins could be long eaten up. Thus pushing or allowing one's self to complete the landing becomes a stunt, similar to flying on 4 red PAPIs. One cannot evaluate any more how bad it is and there is no protection or recognition pattern to judge if it is becoming suicidal. Not that there are many tools left once REVs get deployed anyhow-

Real men don't touch beyond the painted zone, no matter the runway length. It is a display of professionalism, resolve and upholding of standards expected from the PIC authority.

While you may have retired successfully and I still have only 15 yrs to go, there are bright colleagues starting their careers as we type. They will need to do better than both of us when 4th stripe arrives.

rog747

17th Jul 2023, 06:19

Happily retired but there was a time that some airlines had a fuel policy devised by some - sitting at a desk or climbing the greasy pole.
I remember having to explain my fuel load.
Said —- thought that even if Porto Santo parking was full.
Just land & stay on the Runway. i.e No excuse for taking Canary diversion fuel.
Hopefully that type of pressure is long gone.

That's awful to hear, was that a long time ago?

Absolutely !
If the alternate of PXO Porto Santo's parking ramp could already be full, and/or the weather there is also marginal, then one is looking at going to LPA or TFS - 250nm south.
Or, you have to go back north to Faro or Lisbon.
Flight planning for Madeira was/is crucial, with all 'areas' covered in the scenario.

As for Video posted on here of the TAP A321neo long flare and landing long,
perhaps one may muse that as the TAP Crew are 'locals', they maybe of the mindset as they have a 'local' confidence, they know/think they can do it.
(We could also call that complacency of course)
I am not excusing this landing at all for those opinions, but we do know that many accidents in the past (Including the TAP 727 at Madeira in 1977) was the cause in/or in part.

safetypee

17th Jul 2023, 06:45

FD, Re your point B),
This assumes that an 'acceptable' point of touchdown wrt the markings will provide sufficient runway remaining in which to stop.

Whilst in most normal operations the remaining distance is sufficient, the operation is still based on an assumption which might not hold in all circumstances because of the uncertainty about the remaining ground roll distance - depends where you touchdown. i.e you can land within a generalised zone (TDZ markings), but still be wrong.

Furthermore, 'inherent margins' are generally unknown, with wide variations according to conditions, accuracy of reporting, how the landing is flown - slightly high, slightly fast - most of the margin already used.
LDA constant; LDR variable.
We are slaves of our perception

safetypee

17th Jul 2023, 07:01

Rog, et al, for thought, debate.

Because we can see the flare - video, it is labeled after the fact as … (derogatory), yet this event apparently resulted in a 'safe' operation.
Safe - minimising the risk of harm, i.e. stop before the runway end using normal, predefined procedures, regulations.

What if another video was taken of a 'good' flare and touchdown, but unseen, late application of lift dump, reverse, brakes, resulted in the same outcome, the same stopping distance, the same margin of safety ?

We label only that which we see; a limitation of outcome-based safety management and hindsight.

PEI_3721

21st Jul 2023, 14:06

Many posts mention fixed distances as positional references, but landing performance involves so many variables it cannot be considered static.
The position where the wheels touch the ground will vary with each landing.
The distance required to stop varies with situational conditions; reported conditions may not be accurate.

Landing overruns still feature high in safety statistics; is the industry missing something.

LCY was mentioned an example of fixed distance markings (and lights); are these still in use after runway lengthening (by a small amount).

Current operator comment ?

vilas

22nd Jul 2023, 11:47

I wish They design alarm which starts timing at crossing the threshold and rings a bell at 10seconds. The pilot just applies reverse or TOGA. No third option.
Generally the problem is initial flare. At correct flare altitude of 20 or 30 feet at ROD of 700 to 800ft the flare should cut the ROD by half which is to be judged looking outside. After that even if nothing is done acceptable landing results. Even overweight landing limit is 360ft/mt.

rog747

22nd Jul 2023, 11:55

I wish They design alarm which starts timing at crossing the threshold and rings a bell at 10seconds. The pilot just applies reverse or TOGA. No third option.

Airbus DO have such a system --- Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS)
The Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) is made up of two sub-functions: runway overrun warning (ROW) and runway overrun protection (ROP). The ROW function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to perform a Go-Around whereas the ROP function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to apply available deceleration means.

ROPS was certified for:
Airbus A380 in 2009
Airbus A320 Family in 2013
Airbus A350 in 2014
Airbus A330 in 2015

I am not sure if this a 'standard fit' piece of kit, or an optional extra.

Runway Overrun Prevention System (https://www.skybrary.aero/articles/runway-overrun-prevention-system-rops)

vilas

22nd Jul 2023, 12:01

Airbus DO have such a system --- Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS)
The Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) is made up of two sub-functions: runway overrun warning (ROW) and runway overrun protection (ROP). The ROW function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to perform a Go-Around whereas the ROP function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to apply available deceleration means.

ROPS was certified for:
Airbus A380 in 2009
Airbus A320 Family in 2013
Airbus A350 in 2014
Airbus A330 in 2015

I am not sure if this a 'standard fit' piece of kit, or an optional extra.

Runway Overrun Prevention System (https://www.skybrary.aero/articles/runway-overrun-prevention-system-rops)
I am aware of that but on A320 not a standard fit. Many are flying without that.

1southernman

22nd Jul 2023, 12:18

Airbus DO have such a system --- Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS)
The Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) is made up of two sub-functions: runway overrun warning (ROW) and runway overrun protection (ROP). The ROW function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to perform a Go-Around whereas the ROP function generates alerts which incite the flight crew to apply available deceleration means.

ROPS was certified for:
Airbus A380 in 2009
Airbus A320 Family in 2013
Airbus A350 in 2014
Airbus A330 in 2015

I am not sure if this a 'standard fit' piece of kit, or an optional extra.

Runway Overrun Prevention System (https://www.skybrary.aero/articles/runway-overrun-prevention-system-rops)
Flew the 320/319 for 9 yrs and don't remember ROP, etc. or any training for it...But then again my now adult kids wore name tags for me growing up so...Anyway I don't think more bells, etc. in this type of incident would help...Training and FOQA would and I can see this type of event as a great recurrent scenario...btw ROPS means something different for farm equipment :)...B

rog747

22nd Jul 2023, 12:23

Flew the 320/319 for 9 yrs and don't remember ROP, etc. or any training for it...But then again my adult kids wore name tags for me growing up so...Anyway I don't think more bells, etc. in this type of incident would help...Training and FOQA would and I can see this type of event as a great recurrent scenario...B

Thanks - I would guess it is a ''Customer Option'' ?

I gather the 2016 EK 777-300 crash-land at DXB also had a ''long land'' call out feature enabled and IIRC was heard on the CVR. Still did not save the plane.

Doors to Automatic

22nd Jul 2023, 15:08

Thanks - I would guess it is a ''Customer Option'' ?

I gather the 2016 EK 777-300 crash-land at DXB also had a ''long land'' call out feature enabled and IIRC was heard on the CVR. Still did not save the plane.

If memory serves it caused the decision to go around which was then poorly executed causing the crash. Had they ignored the call the landing would have been completed without incident.

rog747

22nd Jul 2023, 16:38

If memory serves it caused the decision to go around which was then poorly executed causing the crash. Had they ignored the call the landing would have been completed without incident.

Ah thanks, so I recall, yes.
However I heard that if one is ignoring the ''call out'' this was against/verboten of the EK FCOM/SOPs, and thus would have meant up in the Office with the CP, with no tea, and def no biccies.
I guess this one was possibly neither + the P45's ?

safetypee

22nd Jul 2023, 18:18

The alerting system in the EK accident differed significantly from ROPS, so too the procedures.

ROPS is predominantly predictive system which alerts the crew to possible limiting conditions for landing before touchdown; an amber level alert.
After touchdown it provides instructions for the crew to mitigate a potential overrun if the conditions are not as expected; a red level warning.
ROPS has knowledge of the runway length and some met conditions, aircraft config and selected autobrake level.
The runway condition is as entered by the crew, thus some uncertainty.
https://flightsafety.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Session-IX_FO_Dr-Logan-Jones.pdf

The EK system was purely advisory and based on a distance beyond the runway threshold, not proportional to the actual runway length. Also the operator mandated a GA with any alert (amber level).
Thus the system had a different meaning than normal on the very long runway (EK).
The SOP was less relevant for safe operation with potential for confusion and ambiguity, which might have contributed to the final outcome. Also the aircraft did not indicate to the crew the change of system state, mode of operation for GA at low altitude.

The EK system might have been of value at Funchal; an audio alert - a fixed distance marker, but not at all like the benefit the ROPS provides.

kap'n krunch

22nd Jul 2023, 18:49

I rarely post, choosing to respect the decisions made by the individuals involved because none of us speculators are at the controls at the time these events happen.

However…. when I watched the video it appeared to me that the PF was looking to grease it on. Then, as the distance markers flashed by, my opinion changed to the wind must have kicked in and things were going south quick. Nevertheless, unless there were extenuating circumstances that we don’t know about, a GA should have been called for.

400guy2

22nd Jul 2023, 21:52

appeared to me that the PF was looking to grease it on.

Pulling off a greaser is a real thrill. Sadly!

I take the old saying "any landing you walk away from is a good landing" as a warning against the quest for greasers: the important thing is that your landings be predictable and repeatable. The attempt to do better than that is a distraction.

My friends here shall kindly refrain from inquiring into my success at resisting that distraction, thankyouverymuch.

vilas

23rd Jul 2023, 04:56

Thanks - I would guess it is a ''Customer Option'' ?

I gather the 2016 EK 777-300 crash-land at DXB also had a ''long land'' call out feature enabled and IIRC was heard on the CVR. Still did not save the plane.
The feature did it's job to trigger a balked landing which the crew tried to execute without thrust and crashed .So not a fault of ROPS. Or rather had ROPs not been installed the crew would've landed with an innocuous overrun without destruction of the aircraft.

safetypee

23rd Jul 2023, 08:05

vilas,
EK was not fitted with ROPS; Boeing aircraft.
ROPS predominantly Airbus
See #113

vilas

23rd Jul 2023, 10:09

vilas,
EK was not fitted with ROPS; Boeing aircraft.
ROPS predominantly Airbus
See #113
It is not ROPS in Boeing but it is called the Runway Awareness Advisory System (RAAS) and an aural message "LONG LANDING, LONG LANDING" was annunciated to the pilots in the cockpit. So it's no different.

Capn Bloggs

23rd Jul 2023, 13:07

Or rather had ROPs not been installed the crew would've landed with an innocuous overrun
I very much doubt it. They touched down 1100m in, on an effective 3500m runway. They were 8t below MLW.

Doors to Automatic

24th Jul 2023, 07:34

Ah thanks, so I recall, yes.
However I heard that if one is ignoring the ''call out'' this was against/verboten of the EK FCOM/SOPs, and thus would have meant up in the Office with the CP, with no tea, and def no biccies.
I guess this one was possibly neither + the P45's ?

Yes indeed but aside from good practice, I am intrigued by the amount of weight that is put on landing before the last marker. Notwithstanding that the rejected landing should not have been anything other than routine, continuing with the landing would have been absolutely fine in this case. As others have pointed out the *long landing” call does not calculate the distance remaining on the Boeing system. On this runway there is around 9000ft still available beyond the last marker which is more than the entire runway length at places like Newcastle and Glasgow, which EK operates to without issue.

safetypee

24th Jul 2023, 08:22

vilas, re 'It is not ROPS in Boeing …'
'It' refers to technical systems, significantly different between Boeing and Airbus.

RAAS as fitted to EK was a reactive system, alerting to a specific distance gone, not that remaining - as per CB DtA above. RAAS is a reactive, advisory system which with ridged SOPS can be ambiguous because 'the correct decision' (after the event), changes with the situation.
RAAS has no specific situational knowledge

Alternatively, ROPS, both functionally and operationally supports the crew with less ambiguity. ROPS has predictive - anticipatory capacity originating from information available from the FMS and crew input. The calculations have the same basis as the crew's pre-landing distance assessment.
SOPs based on ROPS will be more consistent as they relate to the actual situation.

https://www.icao.int/SAM/Documents/2014-UNSTAPPCH/AIRBUS%20Preventing%20RE.pdf
ROPS page 46
Also see preceding sections on crosswind - a feature at Funchal, and TOGA logic and selection vs Boeing's 777 system which contributed to the EK acccident.

https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/hajf7m9wfrv1xzsxcjw5s/ROPS-Frank-Chapman.pdf?rlkey=e9f4lkalxqipek1wunix9qpr1&dl= (https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/hajf7m9wfrv1xzsxcjw5s/ROPS-Frank-Chapman.pdf?rlkey=e9f4lkalxqipek1wunix9qpr1&dl=0)
page 20
n.b. Alerting, call-outs, displays; and quick landing assessment for all runway conditions - situation awareness.

https://slideplayer.com/slide/10912942/
n.b. 'What the pilot sees - what ROPS sees', slide 15
'Small deviations can have a large impact.' slide 8
Need for understanding slide 17

https://aircraft.airbus.com/sites/g/files/jlcbta126/files/2022-04/Airbus-FAST55.pdf
page 12
.