Second cockpit barrier

[Pilot DAR]

The news is reporting that the FAA will require a second cockpit barrier on new aircraft by 2025. I'm presuming, though not stated, that would apply to new type designs, rather than present type certified models ( which would be retroactive to certification basis), but I will watch with interest to see which airliner models are captured by the new regulation:

https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/faa-cockpit-barriers-1.6876098

I'm imagining what that might entail, and thinking that the aisle to the cockpit is about to become very crowded....

[EEngr]

I could see an application for a second lockable door just aft of the forward lavatory and galley. The cabin crew closes the rear door, giving the flight deck crew access to the lav or galley without having a clear path to the flight deck even momentarily.

[CW247]

I'm glad. Seems to be the case over the last 50 years, whenever we have stretched an aircraft it's been to accommodate more passengers. It's time practicality and security had a chance at aircraft design and not pure commercial skullduggery.

[Less Hair]

How about changing the front lav opening 90 degrees to face the tail not the cockpit access aisle? Like right next to door 1L. Then a double door with a camera would be possible to better protect the cockpit aisle. However, door 1L would need to be secured from accidental opening or sinister fiddling with the handle.

[Rie]

Most narrow bodies will struggle with this change. Any manufacturer will have to revisit the whole entryway and how much of an effect that the galley will have on entry space to the cockpit with a barrier in the way.

[golfbananajam]

The news is reporting that the FAA will require a second cockpit barrier on new aircraft by 2025. I'm presuming, though not stated, that would apply to new type designs, rather than present type certified models ( which would be retroactive to certification basis), but I will watch with interest to see which airliner models are captured by the new regulation:

https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/faa-cockpit-barriers-1.6876098.


The very first sentence reads "Pilots' association welcomes move, which will go into effect for new planes in 2025" which to me suggests that it's ALL new planes, not just new designs.

I wonder when the requirement will be for a third door, or a fourth door? will this second door make any real difference?

[Less Hair]

You will have a clean and secured zone in front of the cockpit door.

[Luc Lion]

I wonder when the requirement will be for a third door, or a fourth door? will this second door make any real difference?
No.
I will be directly a mirador equipped with a machine gun.

[Speed_Trim_Fail]

I’d like to think that the net result would be a “crew only” loo on all new aircraft - wishful thinking I know!

[mustafagander]

To me this looks like a solution desperately seeking a problem.
Do we have any security problems with the current system? I mean real threats not possibilities.

[BoeingDriver99]

Well why not? Two separate compartments. One with FD and one CC with food, drinks, rest, bathroom and a separate entry door. And the rest in the back. Problem solved. Impossible to access the flight deck in flight unless you bring a bunch of oxy-acetylene torches onboard which might be noticed by someone hopefully.

[the_stranger]

Well why not? Two separate compartments. One with FD and one CC with food, drinks, rest, bathroom and a separate entry door. And the rest in the back. Problem solved. Impossible to access the flight deck in flight unless you bring a bunch of oxy-acetylene torches onboard which might be noticed by someone hopefully.
I have two colleagues who had an heart attack during cruise and were kept alive by reanimation from a cabin crew member. They would have been dead in your design.

[Dont Hang Up]

To me this looks like a solution desperately seeking a problem.
Do we have any security problems with the current system? I mean real threats not possibilities.

The underlying assumption must be there is some residual risk inherent in the single door solution. As, to my knowledge, there has never been a breach of the current solution, that risk is only a perceived risk and one may estimate that it is very low. The problem with designing any mechanism to remove very small residual risks is you have to be extremely sure you are not adding or increasing other risks because even a small increase in such risks - and in this case I mean blocking legitimate access to the flight deck as a real and demonstrated danger - would completely outweigh the risk you are trying to remove. Basic safety arguments based on the relative probabilities can demonstrate this very well and I would be intrigued to see the FAA's numbers in this regard.

If this second door is implemented, there would need to be some extremely strict operational rules in force to avoid the "unforeseen consequences". One of those rules would certainly be that, during flight, no member of the flight crew could, under any circumstance whatsoever, pass through or beyond that second door. So yes, loo access would need to be designed accordingly.

[Tango and Cash]

To me this looks like a solution desperately seeking a problem.
Do we have any security problems with the current system? I mean real threats not possibilities.

I would like to see a cost-benefits type analysis on this--and before the "you can't put a price on safety/security" crowd chimes in, I'd want a look at the safety/security impacts of adding another locking door in case emergency egress or access is needed to the cockpit. The design implications for lavatory and galley access, especially on narrowbodies will be... interesting.

[vegassun]

For long flights greater than five hours there should be a lounge up front for the crew to relax in.

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1536x859/o_justintimberlakefivetimers3_facebook_93701e83afa4a05b9172e 827496e3d131106f77b.jpg

[thnarg]

NITS briefings on Zoom? Ice inspections with wing mirrors? Or maybe just work from home.

[DaveReidUK]

The very first sentence reads "Pilots' association welcomes move, which will go into effect for new planes in 2025" which to me suggests that it's ALL new planes, not just new designs.

As does the statement later in the article:

"However, industry trade group Airlines for America and United Airlines argued that current security steps are effective. They asked that secondary barriers be required only on future types of planes — meaning that new copies of FAA-approved planes such as Boeing 737 Max and Airbus A320 jets would not need secondary barriers, even if they were built after mid-2025.

The FAA said Congress was clear that the requirement should apply to all new planes."

[IBMJunkman]

You mean putting a food cart across the aisle is not enough? :)

[EDLB]

With the Helios accident we have one example how restricted access can result in a preventable desaster. On normal flights you have sometimes deadheading crews which can be of great help in difficult situations. Wonder why the FAA thinks now, that the danger from the passengers are that much greater now.
I think to the contrary, that today nobody with a boxcutter will make it through the aisle, because passengers will intervene.

So what rationale is behind those changed regulations?

Solving a non existent problem by creating several new ones?

[HOVIS]

I'm sure Singapore Airlines did this sort of thing years ago on their 777 fleet. There was a crew bunk behind the flight deck on the left of the corridor. When the door was opened it latched against the opposite wall forming a secure area between galley and flight deck.

[MechEngr]

The major effective security change was the acknowledgement that no passengers would be allowed in the cockpit. This was realized, too late, by the 4th plane passengers on 9/11. The FAA should have realized it years before given the terrible outcomes where passengers had been allowed access to the controls by the crew and drunk people had caused trouble by forcing their way in.

Given the difficulty passengers had in breaching the existing door on 9/11, it is clear that the existing doors were sufficient. Add in that passengers also generally know the problems they will face if anyone with ill intent gains access to the cockpit and that would seem to eliminate the majority of the problems.

Concepts about shooting and killing the pilots are far fetched given that shooting out a window gives a clear shot at disabling an engine while providing a major distraction for the crew, which is nearly as effective and more obvious in result. Maybe add bullet resistance to cockpit seat backs?

I think the threat of converting a passenger aircraft into a suicide-guided cruise missile is over. Concentrate on fixing maintainer induced problems and crew upset training and the other, repeated sources of crashes.

If they want more security theater, maybe a curtain similarly retained the way cargo nets are, but opaque, so that no one can see the cockpit door and no one can simply rush the opening.

[FullWings]

I think the threat of converting a passenger aircraft into a suicide-guided cruise missile is over. Concentrate on fixing maintainer induced problems and crew upset training and the other, repeated sources of crashes.
IMO you’re right. If the industry spent 1% of what it does on pointless “security” on actual flight safety and training, we’d be in a much better place. Lubitz proved in an unfortunate way that current arrangements are pretty robust, even against those completely familiar with procedure.

Maybe for extra safety passengers should be towed behind in a totally separate aircraft, shackled to the floor, just in case?

[Dont Hang Up]

You mean putting a food cart across the aisle is not enough? :)
Said in jest but a highly salient question.

I understand the perceived risk with the single door is that opportunistic terrorists could, suitably seated, rush the door in the moments when it may be opened. I know placing the food trolley across the aisle at the galley seems awfully ad-hoc, but as a hindrance to the attack pushing it aside or climbing over it will create a lot of commotion, and it probably doubles or triples the reaction time available to get the secure door closed again. Maybe that is all that is needed?

A second locking door worries me. It just seems ripe for unforeseen consequences.

[Bergerie1]

MechEngr

I used to be involved in both pilot training and in anti-terrorist work. You are right. From a straight statistical basis, passengers are far more likely to be killed by the pilot rnaking a mistake than they ever are by any kind of onboard terrorist activity. Therefore the money and effort would be far better spent on improved pilot traning