Boeing could cancel the 737 MAX 10

[LandIT]

There would be a lot of people who would say to Boeing and the regulators, why isn't this latest aircraft built to the latest standards? What is all this about "grandfathering rights"?

In light of Boeing admitting its a big expensive job to put the latest certification requirements into the "-10" then my view is then there must be something inherently wrong with using the old designs to try and market a new airliner using them. The "-10" will be heavier, larger, longer range and carry more passengers. Surely this deserves the best technology that can reasonably be provided?

I understand the desire to keep product compatibility in the MAX range for pilot flexibility, however its clear Boeing didn't have the foresight to design the MAX fully with that in mind. In fact as we all know it was apparently designed specifically with Southwest in mind for no or minimum extra pilot training over the "-700 and -800". Are Boeing willing to rule out there will ever be a "-11" or an "XLR" or more variants? No, I didn't think so. In that case the old 737 issues incorporated into the MAX-10 and subsequent would go forward for many decades if we let Boeing get away with continuing the grandfathering. What an abomination Mr Calhoun. Then please do not build the "-10", for the sake of all our lives, great grandfathers, grandfathers, fathers, sons and babies to come. Pilots included - I'm sure they would enjoy the very latest glass cockpit too.

If its too hard for Boeing to meet the current regulations with the "-10", then just lets indeed scrap it move on to the next generation aircraft as rapidly as possible please.

https://worldofaviation.com/2022/07/boeing-says-max-10-variant-could-be-scrapped/

[WHBM]

Yes, this subject has just been rolling round among aviation geeks, but now Boeing seem to be starting to soften up the investment community, etc, for this to happen.

To the general public, who the politicians represent, they will indeed not understand how some new safety requirement, known to be coming for years, can't be complied with for the 737-10 without an exception, for a type which is not just coming to the end of production, or already built, but hasn't even been made yet, will be built for many years to come, and then operated for years beyond that.

If the (few) carriers who have placed orders/options for the type are not careful they will start to get questions themselves from the general media about why they have ordered an aircraft not compliant with safety regulations, instead of one of a number which is.

It would be useful if someone could give a succinct technical explanation of what the matter entails.

[PEI_3721]

If significant reputation has already been lost then its contribution in the economic equation reduces.
The continuing lack of recovery, reflected by low share price, ( increasing certification risk ), then the timescale of ‘short term’ investment and the longer term new aircraft, is more balanced.
A short term hit on an already low reputation vs a viable longer term commercial industry.
The US cannot afford to loose Boeing commercial, thus short term support from the military pacifying investors in the event of bad news.
Also, a new commercial project enables opportunity for new technology to leapfrog the competition - think 20 yrs.

[Uplinker]

I don't know the full background, but if all is as the OP reports, then I agree with the OP.

It seems that Boeing got bored with making aircraft some years ago, and concentrated on making money instead. They became blind to what they were doing and thought that a few extra bits and bobs bolted into a 707 fuselage would result in a product to compete with Airbus. (Does the 737 still have the girt bars that have to be manually placed into the brackets on the floor by the CC ?)

Not only that, but then trying to twist and bend the certification rules........ A very sad chapter in a once respected World beating company and products. Was it Boeing's will or did they bow to shareholders?

Come on Boeing; Don't keep flogging a dead horse; Get a blank sheet of paper and design the real next generation short-haul aircraft. Probably cheaper in the long run, and far more satisfactory.

[Busbuoy]

Was it Boeing's will or did they bow to shareholders?

Stop thinking "Boeing - Boeing Style" and start thinking "Boeing - McDonnell Douglas Style" and you might find the enlightenment you seek. They didn't bow to the shareholders, they led the shareholder charge!

[Denti]

Yes, this subject has just been rolling round among aviation geeks, but now Boeing seem to be starting to soften up the investment community, etc, for this to happen.

Well, one could see it that way. I would rather see it as putting pressure on congress to get a special approval to certify the MAX 10 to the old rules (without an EICAS). Apparently Boeing has been putting pressure in that area already for some while and is now upping it by doing it more publicly. And of course it has the added side bonus of informing the stock market so nobody can be "surprised".

[BFSGrad]

Well, one could see it that way. I would rather see it as putting pressure on congress to get a special approval to certify the MAX 10 to the old rules (without an EICAS).Agreed. That is the better explanation.

Regarding the question, why can’t Boeing meet current certification standards with the -10 MAX (and -7 MAX)? The answer is that Boeing can, but not at the price point for the -10 MAX as currently designed.

Perfect is the enemy of good enough.

[Less Hair]

What would a possible end of the MAX 10 mean for the MAX family and 737 program?

[Jonty]

The 737 has nowhere to go now. It’s the end of the line for it.
Boeing need a “clean sheet” design, but I’m not sure they can deliver or afford to deliver one.

[DaveReidUK]

I haven't been following this particularly closely, but I would guess that the part of the 2020 Aircraft Safety and Certification Reform Act that's giving Boeing sleepless nights is the bit that requires the FAA to

review and reassess assumptions related to Human Factors when certifying aircraft, particularly those situations involving multiple cockpit alerts and automation

If the Max 10 misses the end-of-2022 deadline, and the lawmakers refuse to extend it, then fleet commonality with the rest of the Max family goes out of the window.

[Less Hair]

Wasn't the MAX 10 supposed to contribute most of the technical updates for the rest of the family?

[PAXboy]

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1205/boeing_fail_9f931cf77cd23a1759acfd462a07cdeb019fdd02.jpg

[tdracer]

What would a possible end of the MAX 10 mean for the MAX family and 737 program?
Not much. The MAX 8 and 9 are the mass market aircraft, which Boeing expects to sell in the thousands. The MAX 10 is expected to sell in the hundreds - it's intended to take market from the A321 NEO, but mainly for those who already have 737s.
It's pretty simple math really - it'll cost well north of a $Billion to implement an EICAS system into the 737, plus recurring costs. If Boeing sells 500 MAX 10s, then they need to make an extra $2 million plus per aircraft just to pay for EICAS. Given Boeing might make a total profit on a 737 MAX sale of between $1 million and $2 million per aircraft, it simply doesn't make economic sense to produce the MAX 10 with EICAS. Better to save the money and devote it to a proper 737 replacement somewhere down the line.

Given that the 737 NG is statistically just as safe as an A320 with ECAM (that over hundreds of millions of flight hours), and given that the MAX 8 and 9 are considered "safe enough" with the same basic flight deck as the NG, it's difficult to argue a case for spending an extra couple $billion to make it 'safer'.

[Less Hair]

I had seen the MAX 8 and MAX 10 as the most promising. Especially to counter the A321neo on shorter distances.

[WHBM]

As I understand it, the A320 had this kit when it first flew in 1987. Boeing had the chance, when they completely re-engineered the 737, in (I'm approximating) around 1997 for the 737NG, and again around 2015 for the 737Max. They didn't. A drop dead date was then set for 2023 for this to finally be there, and that is only for type certification, not for service or withdrawal date. They haven't meet any of that either. Talk about bending over backwards to help Boeing. But they just don't help themselves.

[tdracer]

As I understand it, the A320 had this kit when it first flew in 1987. Boeing had the chance, when they completely re-engineered the 737, in (I'm approximating) around 1997 for the 737NG, and again around 2015 for the 737Max. They didn't. A drop dead date was then set for 2023 for this to finally be there, and that is only for type certification, not for service or withdrawal date. They haven't meet any of that either. Talk about bending over backwards to help Boeing. But they just don't help themselves.
When Boeing did their original EICAS (757/767, certified 1982), they had to get an Alternate Method of Compliance (AMOC) since the regulations at the time didn't allow such a system. That was still true in 1989 when Boeing certified the 747-400 with EICAS. So no first hand knowledge, but I assume Airbus had to also get an AMOC to certify the A320.
If the regulations technically did not allow an EICAS type solution, then the regulators obviously didn't feel there was a big safety advantage to going to the EICAS style glass flight deck. I don't recall when the regulations were changed to allow an EICAS/ECAM type system without an AMOC, but it's not exactly bending over backwards to allow Boeing to certify a new aircraft type that follows the regulations as they are currently written in instead of forcing them to spend big bucks to implement a system that doesn't technically meet the regulations.

[GlobalNav]

Well, one could see it that way. I would rather see it as putting pressure on congress to get a special approval to certify the MAX 10 to the old rules (without an EICAS). Apparently Boeing has been putting pressure in that area already for some while and is now upping it by doing it more publicly. And of course it has the added side bonus of informing the stock market so nobody can be "surprised".
Boeing tried the same argument, successfully if you can call it that, with the original MAX certification. Whenever regulators, mostly FAA, debated the need to comply with current amendments Boeing repeatedly countered with the cost and relatively safety enhancement. FAA relented then, at the insistence of the highest executive level, and is having its arm twisted with the same argument. FAA should have held its ground then, as hindsight so tragically revealed, and must, finally, hold its ground now.

To hell with the MAX 10, if Boeing does not accept an improved certification basis. It’s their choice to establish this ultimatum, let them live by it. 14 CFR 21.101, The Changed Product Rule, needs substantial revision, simplification and a harder-nosed safety philosophy. The cost of human life proves it.

[PEI_3721]

“… putting pressure on congress to get a special approval to certify the MAX 10 to the old rules (without an EICAS)”

But that might not help with other authorities, who have already indicated their independence by re-examining the Max return to service.

[WillowRun 6-3]

At the time Congress passed the 2020 Aircraft Safety and Certification Reform Act it was evident the legislation was only a partial answer to the several different issues which had accumulated, were plaguing FAA in fulfillment of its basic statutory roles and responsibilities, and which the 737 MAX debacles had revealed. The legislation was a good beginning but I recall little if any informed commentary suggesting that the set of problems had been addressed fully.

What exactly the second component of a legislative response to these issues should contain . . . this SLF/atty isn't claiming capability to define that, at this time. But it does seem sensible to say first, that extending the applicable timelines for the MAX-10 would be a big step in the wrong direction (following on the explanations offered in several posts upthread). And second, I'm trying to keep an open mind on whether significant aviation experience actually is, or should be, a prerequisite for service as FAA Administrator. The nominee, by all accounts, has been an excellent public or administrative-type servant. Still, with what needs to change at FAA, one must wonder how much straight-up experience with and knowledge of various subject matter areas of aviation will be needed for high-performing leadership at FAA..

A possible indicator: consider the many and varied published materials on the 737 MAX accidents, found on all types of media and in many formats. Compare the written outputs of aviation professionals with outputs of people professional in other fields (let alone the many wannabes, amateurs, publicity seekers, and so on).

It's not that I'm advocating for a Senate confirmation battle. Yet a cynical observer would note, with an ironic or wry tone, the coincidental timing of the very recent announcement of about a billion dollars (U.S.) in federal airport project grant funds.

[WideScreen]

When Boeing did their original EICAS (757/767, certified 1982), they had to get an Alternate Method of Compliance (AMOC) since the regulations at the time didn't allow such a system. That was still true in 1989 when Boeing certified the 747-400 with EICAS. So no first hand knowledge, but I assume Airbus had to also get an AMOC to certify the A320.
If the regulations technically did not allow an EICAS type solution, then the regulators obviously didn't feel there was a big safety advantage to going to the EICAS style glass flight deck. I don't recall when the regulations were changed to allow an EICAS/ECAM type system without an AMOC, but it's not exactly bending over backwards to allow Boeing to certify a new aircraft type that follows the regulations as they are currently written in instead of forcing them to spend big bucks to implement a system that doesn't technically meet the regulations.
I think, the difference is, in 1982/1989, the "new" EICAS was seen as "the future", whereas Boeing now tries to keep a dino on oxygen alive with the attempts to certify the MAX 10 without EICAS. The only ones wanting that, are the stock-holders (Boeing as well as some US airlines).

Actually, I don't think, it's a matter of "certification along the rules as they are currently written", since that is no longer applicable, once it has becomes 2023 and the MAX 10 certification isn't finished. There was a timely announcement of these changes. And Boeing is just late, due to delays, which are 100% on the Boeing plate, having to spend their engineering time on the MAX revive and the ongoing 787 disaster, not to say, the ostrich approach to deny Boeing should be an engineering company, vs. just stocks.

Not to say, there are very legit safety reasons to just drop the currently existing 737 (body), since it does give little break-up protection, on more than a "hard-landing". A B737 Hudson bay landing could have easily ended up as a Transair 810, sinking within minutes, instead of keeping afloat -permanently- like the A320 did, probably costing many lifes. It is even pretty likely, the Turkish at AMS would have happened at all with an A320, not to say, the overhead cockpit goodies landing on the pilots and killing them all, was/is a typical B737 item. Historic certification does have its end, somewhere.

[WideScreen]

Wasn't the MAX 10 supposed to contribute most of the technical updates for the rest of the family?
This is something, floating around my brain, too. IIRC, the dino MAX versions got their certification reinstated, because of the promise to upgrade these versions to the additional security features intended for the MAX 10, within a timely time-frame. Maybe, this got "forgotten" ?

[WHBM]

One wonders just why Boeing chief David Calhoun has come out with this comment that the Max 10 will be scrapped if things don't get changed, just days before Farnborough, when various possible orders for it are (were) already being trailed for being placed there. What a turn-off for potential customers, any resulting positive PR in the media would immediately in paragraph two have a comment that Boeing has just said it could be scrapped.

[Uplinker]

......- it'll cost well north of a $Billion to implement an EICAS system into the 737, plus recurring costs. If Boeing sells 500 MAX 10s, then they need to make an extra $2 million plus per aircraft just to pay for EICAS. Given Boeing might make a total profit on a 737 MAX sale of between $1 million and $2 million per aircraft, it simply doesn't make economic sense to produce the MAX 10 with EICAS. Better to save the money and devote it to a proper 737 replacement somewhere down the line......

Is EICAS essential, and is that cost for its certification, or the whole package?
Because one imagines they can use the EICAS equipment already developed for other Boeings - reprogrammed for the '73. Or is it not that simple - would all the cabled hydro-mechanical flight control system need to be changed as well?

Ultimately though, the 737 airframe is a design cul-de-sac: old mechanical technology, small and cramped. Short main gear legs etc etc. It's had its day.

Time for a blank sheet of paper and start a new design. Or: could the 787 design be shrinked down to 737 size and economics?

[vilas]

It all started with Boeing giving new lease of life to the 737 with NG series instead of the 757 which led to Max and subsequent disasters. B757 could have been shortened to make smaller version equivalent of 737 800/900 or Max 8/9/10, fitted with any engine they want. It would have been better aircraft than lengthened airbuses. Any customer loss would have been recovered in next 10 years. If they abandon the Max10 it's not something that will be missed. It brings with it extendable undercarriage which will have another NNC "In case the gear doesn't extend then:
1. xxxxx
2. xxxxx
Or like the MCAS find it out yourself.

[WideScreen]

It all started with Boeing giving new lease of life to the 737 with NG series instead of the 757 which led to Max and subsequent disasters. B757 could have been shortened to make smaller version equivalent of 737 800/900 or Max 8/9/10, fitted with any engine they want.........
Unfortunately, the 757 was scaled down from and did share with the 767, and as such far too heavy to scale down again, without effectively creating a new design. Forget the 757, there are real reasons, it was stopped.

[DaveReidUK]

This is something, floating around my brain, too. IIRC, the dino MAX versions got their certification reinstated, because of the promise to upgrade these versions to the additional security features intended for the MAX 10, within a timely time-frame.

Was the MAX 10 trailed as having a "better/fixed" MCAS ? I don't remember hearing that.

[tdracer]

Is EICAS essential, and is that cost for its certification, or the whole package?
Because one imagines they can use the EICAS equipment already developed for other Boeings - reprogrammed for the '73. Or is it not that simple - would all the cabled hydro-mechanical flight control system need to be changed as well?

Ultimately though, the 737 airframe is a design cul-de-sac: old mechanical technology, small and cramped. Short main gear legs etc etc. It's had its day.

Time for a blank sheet of paper and start a new design. Or: could the 787 design be shrinked down to 737 size and economics?

Short answer is "it's not that simple". The original EICAS (757/767) was certified essential (that's why the flight deck of the 757/767 had all those indicator lights - to back up EICAS if it failed). However to meet the current requirement, EICAS has to certified critical. Hence everything has to be redundant and the s/w "Level A" - that's expensive - real expensive. While they could use some of the basic architecture of an existing EICAS, it has to be customized for all the various I/O (both hardware and software) - which are quite a bit different on the 737 relative to anything else currently in production. A billion dollars would be on the low end - I'd expect it to be closer to two billion just for the development costs.

As for shrinking the 787 - that's a non-starter for the airframe, although they could use much of the avionics architecture. But any 737 replacement airframe would have to be all new (it might end up with a composite wing, but Boeing has already determined that for a smaller, shorter range aircraft the higher production costs of a composite fuselage simply don't justify it over more conventional aluminum. Given the oceans of red ink Boeing has experienced in the last several years, there simply is no cash available for a new aircraft development - that cupboard is bare and will stay that way for many years.
So, unless you like the idea of Airbus having a complete monopoly on the single aisle market for the next decade, you'd better hope Boeing get's its act together (and soon).

[Dannyboy39]

If the MAX 10 was cancelled, could that make room for the “new mid range aircraft” the informal ‘57 replacement? Although Airbus have that market locked up with the A321LR XLR.

[PAXboy]

Is there a chance that Embraer will expand their range? I appreciate that it would not be a trivial exercise.

[Big Pistons Forever]

The 737 family is really down to only one viable model the dash 8. The A220 will take over all 737-7 orders and the 321 series virtually all the dash 9 and 10 future orders

The only way Boeing can sell the airplane is at a steep discount and they will never come close to recouping the 18 Billion they had to spend to deal with the fallout from the MAX crashes

[Uplinker]

Short answer is "it's not that simple"...............Given the oceans of red ink Boeing has experienced in the last several years, there simply is no cash available for a new aircraft development - that cupboard is bare and will stay that way for many years.
So, unless you like the idea of Airbus having a complete monopoly on the single aisle market for the next decade, you'd better hope Boeing get's its act together (and soon).

Thank you for the background info :ok:.

I don't know how big finance works; Presumably a company cannot take out the equivalent of a mortgage to fund development of a new airliner that will lead to strong sales? They would have already done this if they could, I guess.

Personally, (having flown a range of turbo-props and conventional jets, including the 737 Classic), I am more than happy with Airbus FBW, which, economics aside, is an order of magnitude improvement over the '73 - not only the airframe and systems but even things like the size and space of the cockpit, and the big windshields. The only thing I would have changed would be to link the side-sticks, with a mechanical inter-link, easily disconnect-able, so PM on either side can see PF's inputs more easily.

But ultimately, having no competition is not healthy in the long run. I wonder if Mr Musk might be interested in re-vamping Boeing, and designing a real contender airliner, combining Boeings know-how and Space X's abilities? He has the money to fund development - especially if he doesn't buy Twitter.

[WideScreen]

...... Given the oceans of red ink Boeing has experienced in the last several years, there simply is no cash available for a new aircraft development - that cupboard is bare and will stay that way for many years.......
Actually, there are piles of cash: The money Boeing used for their shares buy back actions, just reintroduce these shares. It'll dilute on the currently outstanding shares, though alas, there aren't many options, if Boeing wants to survive in the commercial airplane industry (I am not sure about that, though, everything shows, Boeing just wants to cash in on the current sales/production, without new developments).

[WideScreen]

...... I wonder if Mr Musk might be interested in re-vamping Boeing, and designing a real contender airliner, combining Boeings know-how and Space X's abilities? He has the money to fund development - especially if he doesn't buy Twitter.
Hmmm, I am not sure, whether Musk's boundless and baseless opportunistic behavior would be better than the current (and recent past) Boeing board/managements.

[excrab]

I think I must have a somewhat simplistic view compared with everyone else on this forum. I’ve been flying the 737 for sixteen years, first the 500, then 300 then 800 then the Max8. If something goes wrong a light comes on in front of us, we look up, see what’s happening, then either carry out the memory drills, or action the QRH, or both. If that’s safe with 178 passengers why isn’t it safe with 204. Or if it’s not safe with 204 why aren’t the 737 variants already flying being grounded ?

[WideScreen]

I think I must have a somewhat simplistic view compared with everyone else on this forum. I’ve been flying the 737 for sixteen years, first the 500, then 300 then 800 then the Max8. If something goes wrong a light comes on in front of us, we look up, see what’s happening, then either carry out the memory drills, or action the QRH, or both. If that’s safe with 178 passengers why isn’t it safe with 204. Or if it’s not safe with 204 why aren’t the 737 variants already flying being grounded ?
That's the same kind of reasoning, why you could perfectly fly without (E)GPWS, or drive cars without seatbelts, etc. It's called progress, and with progress you need to set deadlines, otherwise, everybody will find reasons, a feature is not needed for them, despite the feature bottom line giving advantages. And, this stuff should have been there, a long time ago, though Boeing managed to get away with it, because of the history certification, etc.

And, there are many more reasons, a 737 should be just outright history (the fuselage breakup tendency with accidents, the cockpit overhead panels falling down on the pilots, to give some examples). A classic car is a beauty, though from a safety POV a nightmare.

[Una Due Tfc]

Previous to MCAS, Congress waiving anything for Boeing was a given. Would you put your signature on this waiver knowing what the culture and quality control standards are like in Boeing right now?

[Australopithecus]

Excrab you would have to fly something newer to understand how really primitive the 737 is. A friend described it as an ergonomic slum 33 years ago, and it hasn’t improved much. The overhead panel is a 60’s throwback, the instrument panel mid 80’s.

The basic fuselage is a 50’s design with 50’s doors and escape slides (NOT slide rafts). The cabin, galleys and toilets are all cramped as is the flight deck. It's too low, baggage has to be loaded by hand instead of containerised. It is loud. Really loud.

The 737 is a tarted up 60’s plane built with 50’s know-how and design thinking. Someone compared old to new cars. You can still drive around in a ‘63 Impala but I wouldn’t let my kids drive one. Same thing applies here.

I have flown aeroplanes made in the 30’s, 40’s and 50’s. All good in their day, but their day has passed.

[meleagertoo]

Austro whatever you are, I simply do not recognise your description of the 737 as any recent variant that I have flown, and neither will anyone else. You seem to be fulminating about it simply because you don't regard it as the latest trendy piffle on the block.
Your car comparison is simply childish and utterly absurd.
What comparable airbus is containerised? Why would anyone want it to be? What's the difference between Airbus and boeing overhead switchgear? Looks? Who wants or needs slide/rafts?
Loud? By what measure?

A ridiculously lightweight, facile and fact-free condemnation.

[WHBM]

Who wants or needs slide/rafts?

For a start, all the 738 pax whose aircraft has gone off the end of the runway into the water.

I'll start a list ...

[Bleve]

Who wants or needs slide/rafts?
These pax found them useful:

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/640x320/0eac5a5f_2dd7_4364_ae71_dd43afc5fd6b_64ab8d0abe3203b6d8553dc 226e1ce07ce8d93b5.jpeg

For some strange reason when I read your post, the phrase ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ came to mind.

[Australopithecus]

Austro whatever you are, I simply do not recognise your description of the 737 as any recent variant that I have flown, and neither will anyone else. You seem to be fulminating about it simply because you don't regard it as the latest trendy piffle on the block.
Your car comparison is simply childish and utterly absurd.
What comparable airbus is containerised? Why would anyone want it to be? What's the difference between Airbus and boeing overhead switchgear? Looks? Who wants or needs slide/rafts?
Loud? By what measure?

A ridiculously lightweight, facile and fact-free condemnation.

Speaking of fact free piffle, go ahead and refute it, whoever you are. The A320, of which you may be aware, has containerised baggage.
The 737 is loud on an absolute decibel scale compared to modern aircraft. The 737 is the only aircraft in our fleet that requires noise cancelling headsets for OHS reasons. Overhead switchgear with switch lights is leagues ahead of toggle switches.

It is apparent that you are a rabid 737 fan. I am not and neither do I wholesale admire Airbus. But they do make a better short haul aircraft. Like it/don’t like it: don’t care.

By the way I do have over 25 years on the 737, off and on, 200 through to 800.

[Uplinker]

Austro whatever you are, I simply do not recognise your description of the 737 as any recent variant that I have flown, and neither will anyone else. You seem to be fulminating about it simply because you don't regard it as the latest trendy piffle on the block.
Your car comparison is simply childish and utterly absurd.
What comparable airbus is containerised? Why would anyone want it to be? What's the difference between Airbus and boeing overhead switchgear? Looks? Who wants or needs slide/rafts?
Loud? By what measure?

A ridiculously lightweight, facile and fact-free condemnation.

When you do your 737 walk-around and stand in the main wheel bay, don't you shudder at all the mechanical levers and brackets, and the control cables running in pulleys, going off to the various flight control surfaces? Doesn't having to reach down and unclip the girt bar from the main doors and fix it into the brackets on the floor to arm the doors point towards its mechanical crudeness? Do you not wonder if technology could make the F/O's extensive operation of the overhead panel mostly automatic? Does it not bother you that the 737 cockpit layout and the overhead panel layout is asymmetric - designed for a captain and an assistant, rather than two pilots.

The 737 was good for its day, and no disrespect to it, but have a close detailed look at an A320 family aircraft and all its systems, and its autopilot, auto-thrust and FBW capability, and see how Airbus took the airliner to the next level.

[tdracer]

Facts:
Hull loss rate (through 2019) for the 737NG series: 0.18/million departures. For the A320 series: 0.18/million departures.
Fatal hull loss rate (again through 2019) for the 737NG series: 0.08/million departures. For the A320 series: 0.08/million departures.

Now explain to me how the 737 is an unsafe design compared to the A320 series...

[chuboy]

Facts:
Hull loss rate (through 2019) for the 737NG series: 0.18/million departures. For the A320 series: 0.18/million departures.
Fatal hull loss rate (again through 2019) for the 737NG series: 0.08/million departures. For the A320 series: 0.08/million departures.

Now explain to me how the 737 is an unsafe design compared to the A320 series...

Are you going to compare the 737MAX to the A320 NEO as well? :rolleyes:

[Australopithecus]

Facts:
Hull loss rate (through 2019) for the 737NG series: 0.18/million departures. For the A320 series: 0.18/million departures.
Fatal hull loss rate (again through 2019) for the 737NG series: 0.08/million departures. For the A320 series: 0.08/million departures.

Now explain to me how the 737 is an unsafe design compared to the A320 series...

I didn’t say that it was less safe, just less refined. Perhaps if it had been a 737 in the Hudson things wouldn’t have gone quite so well. I was almost going to write “quite so swimmingly”, but you get the gist. Your stats also don’t reflect the body of incidents complicated by pilots trying to nut out non-normals using a six-pack, oddly written QRH and sometimes ambiguous dial design on the overhead.

How about the continued use of one horn for both take-off configuration warning and high cabin altitude? That one feature alone caused the loss of at least one aircraft.

Anyway, I think most of us are comparing the 737 that currently exists to the hypothetical aircraft that Boeing could have built if it hadn’t messed up every recent program to the point of being unable to launch a new plane. Since that ship has sailed the reality is that the only choice for the market is the 320-321 NEO and the MAX. Airlines will weigh a myriad of factors in choosing, and none of them will be what the pilots think.

[WideScreen]

Facts:
Hull loss rate (through 2019) for the 737NG series: 0.18/million departures. For the A320 series: 0.18/million departures.
Fatal hull loss rate (again through 2019) for the 737NG series: 0.08/million departures. For the A320 series: 0.08/million departures.

Now explain to me how the 737 is an unsafe design compared to the A320 series...
We live in a world, where we continuously "improve" (sometime outright stupid, like coins). There is little place to stick to old-mechanisms, when suitable new technologies exist, which make life easier and less complicated and in the same time, improve the productivity. Just fly the A350 and the B777 as a passenger, and you will notice the difference. Both will bring you to your destination, though the difference in comfort level and wearing out a significant. By limiting the "wearing-out", you in general improve safety.

I like classic stuff, cars, the traditional six-pack, but in modern times, applied at a large scale, there is no longer a place for that stuff, other than to dream about and use for nostalgic reasons.

Comparing the same generation B737/A320 you get comparable figures. From there, the A320 could be improved, since the infrastructure to do so is available, whereas the B737 MAX just did stick to its roots (with unfortunate MCAS lipstick).

And, TBH, I think, the stats for the A320 somewhat deteriorated due to the "somewhat less direct connection with flying" using a lot of automation vs. basic hand flying skills, resulting in somewhat deteriorated basic (IMC) flying skills. For example, the QZ8501, where, after a not-allowed-in-the-air computer reset, the co-pilot was not able to fly just basic glass-sixpack in IMC for only a few minutes (until the computers would be back online).

As chuboy wrote, compare the MAX and NEO and you get the answer. Lipstick can be very dangerous.

[blue up]

Day 1 of my 757-to-737 training course the instructor stood at the front of the class and said "..this aeroplane WILL try to kill you...". Kinda set the scene for the next 5 years. Hated it.

[fdr]

I didn’t say that it was less safe, just less refined. Perhaps if it had been a 737 in the Hudson things wouldn’t have gone quite so well. I was almost going to write “quite so swimmingly”, but you get the gist. Your stats also don’t reflect the body of incidents complicated by pilots trying to nut out non-normals using a six-pack, oddly written QRH and sometimes ambiguous dial design on the overhead.

How about the continued use of one horn for both take-off configuration warning and high cabin altitude? That one feature alone caused the loss of at least one aircraft.

Anyway, I think most of us are comparing the 737 that currently exists to the hypothetical aircraft that Boeing could have built if it hadn’t messed up every recent program to the point of being unable to launch a new plane. Since that ship has sailed the reality is that the only choice for the market is the 320-321 NEO and the MAX. Airlines will weigh a myriad of factors in choosing, and none of them will be what the pilots think.

USAir 1549, Hudson swim outcome was independent of the airframe type AFAICS. The alpha floor was in play at the final few seconds, but that led to a high sink rate. USAir was out of energy when they got to the final few seconds, and that is understandable, they had a lot of NYC to avoid on the way down.


Uplinker: When you do your 737 walk-around and stand in the main wheel bay, don't you shudder at all the mechanical levers and brackets, and the control cables running in pulleys, going off to the various flight control surfaces? Doesn't having to reach down and unclip the girt bar from the main doors and fix it into the brackets on the floor to arm the doors point towards its mechanical crudeness? Do you not wonder if technology could make the F/O's extensive operation of the overhead panel mostly automatic? Does it not bother you that the 737 cockpit layout and the overhead panel layout is asymmetric - designed for a captain and an assistant, rather than two pilots.

To get really messed up takes a computer. Having cables is pretty reliable system wise. It is harder to reverse a mechanical system than the A320 of Lufthansa's that got airborne with the Cats SSC wired backwards in roll.

The B737 flight controls... they are, so so, the ailerons suck, but are legal, just a bid odd. The rudder, well the single shuttle, dual acting servo had a few philosophical issues, and did cause some mayhem, (UAL 585 was not certainly the rudder..., USAir 427 was in autorotation with full backstick, which will ruin a day in most planes, not a surprise, it was a nasty start to the event) The elevators, well, lets not mention the stabiliser... apart from that, the plane is... cost effective. Boeing's replacement that is well overdue will be more like a baby 777 than a 737... and that is not a bad thing, but the B737 is a workhorse.

[vilas]

USAir 1549, Hudson swim outcome was independent of the airframe type AFAICS. The alpha floor was in play at the final few seconds, but that led to a high sink rate. USAir was out of energy when they got to the final few seconds, and that is understandable, they had a lot of NYC to avoid on the way down.
Alpha floor didn't/couldn't have(damaged engines)but alpha protection came into play which tends to pitch the nose down. That was because the speed was dropped 19kts below Vapp. The resultant high ROD during flare would happen in any aircraft with different reasons. In 737 it would cause a stall warning and pilot would have pushed the stick forward resulting in increase of ROD or continue to stall into Hudson. I think that would have been disastrous. So protections didn't create the problem. It worked as designed.

[FlyingStone]

Do you not wonder if technology could make the F/O's extensive operation of the overhead panel mostly automatic? Does it not bother you that the 737 cockpit layout and the overhead panel layout is asymmetric - designed for a captain and an assistant, rather than two pilots.

I have flown the 737 from both seats and have had no problem operating or monitoring the overhead panel from either seat. With a more streamlined SOP, it's only a handful of switches that require moving during a normal turnaround, backed up by a checklist.

but have a close detailed look at an A320 family aircraft and all its systems, and its autopilot, auto-thrust and FBW capability, and see how Airbus took the airliner to the next level.

Can you continue to your destination in RVSM to a Cat 3 autoland with both FMGCs failed in an A320? Or dare I say, select different range on NDs with one operative FMGC?

[Australopithecus]

My point about the Hudson was the slide rafts, which the 737 ain’t got. What it does have are ceiling stowed heavy mofo rafts which the crew have to manually launch and faf around before evac starts. I time the drills we do in the cabin mock-ups. It takes too long. And it’s a stupid nod to the Constellation era.

[JEH22]

I think the main issue here is that Boeing clearly hasn’t changed its attitude. Despite the MAX debacle, 787 QC, 777 X, KC46 etc it still thinks it should call the shots on safety critical points and regulatory matters. If this company was an individual candidate for flight crew in an airline they would fail an attitude/personality test.

[WideScreen]

My point about the Hudson was the slide rafts, which the 737 ain’t got. What it does have are ceiling stowed heavy mofo rafts which the crew have to manually launch and faf around before evac starts. I time the drills we do in the cabin mock-ups. It takes too long. And it’s a stupid nod to the Constellation era.
My issue with the Hudson landing with a B737, is the fuselage breaks up in 3 parts, making it an imploded submarine, immediately going to the bottom, with people trapped inside. Not to speak about all those seated around the break-up areas, who get wounded/immobilized. As we've seen with several A32x water landings, the fuselage doesn't break up and stays afloat. It's all "legal" with the B737, though, would not withstand current certification criteria. Think about driving a Beetle, a nice car, 50 years ago, but no longer acceptable for its task, nowadays. It's just an outright dangerous car, with the petrol tank in the crumble zone.

The dinghies: Each time I see the hatches, I get the impression, the whole comes down with a landing where the fuselage breaks up, hurting the people in those areas.

[WideScreen]

..... To get really messed up takes a computer. Having cables is pretty reliable system wise.
Yep, reliable, though also limited. To have some "combined-control surfaces", it needs a kind of "mechanical" computer, using levers, non-linear mechanics, etc. Can be done, though difficult and difficult to get this reliable.

It is harder to reverse a mechanical system.....
There are many reports about reversed mechanical cabling (though maybe more in small aircraft GA).

[Big Pistons Forever]

Boeing's near to medium term future is totally dependent on what happens to world air travel. I would suggest that one of the major drivers of recent new MAX orders is the fact that it will be several years before an airline will be able to take delivery of a Airbus 320/321 aircraft ordered now, given how far out the production slots are sold out. If there is another economic contraction then the reality is Airbus could meet nearly all the narrow body demand and Boeing will only be able to move product at an uneconomic price point. In any case I don't think the MAX 10 will ever fly and Boeing has effectively already ceded the 757 size market to Airbus with the A321XLR given the failure to launch the NMA

The wide body market is equally fraught with airlines giving up on the 787 in favor of he A330NEO and the A350 after all the 787 production woes. The future of the 777X program is also looking increasingly uncertain.

If there is a rapid and sustained rebound in world air travel, then I think Boeing may have a chance to dig itself out of the hole it made.

Personally I think there is no longer a future for Boeing commercial and the only question is how long it hangs on before being spun off into bankruptcy

[KrazyKraut]

Not much. The MAX 8 and 9 are the mass market aircraft, which Boeing expects to sell in the thousands. The MAX 10 is expected to sell in the hundreds - it's intended to take market from the A321 NEO, but mainly for those who already have 737s.
It's pretty simple math really - it'll cost well north of a $Billion to implement an EICAS system into the 737, plus recurring costs. If Boeing sells 500 MAX 10s, then they need to make an extra $2 million plus per aircraft just to pay for EICAS. Given Boeing might make a total profit on a 737 MAX sale of between $1 million and $2 million per aircraft, it simply doesn't make economic sense to produce the MAX 10 with EICAS. Better to save the money and devote it to a proper 737 replacement somewhere down the line.

Given that the 737 NG is statistically just as safe as an A320 with ECAM (that over hundreds of millions of flight hours), and given that the MAX 8 and 9 are considered "safe enough" with the same basic flight deck as the NG, it's difficult to argue a case for spending an extra couple $billion to make it 'safer'.

Well said, this sums it up. Let us stick to the facts: If you argue this point from a safety perspective, there would have to be data that supports the notion that an EICAS provides superior safety to the legacy system (master caution etc) in the 737 NG/MAX. Of course, EICAS is more pilot-friendly but there most likely isn't any data that supports the notion that it delivers significantly superior safety - especially when the -10 would be flown by the exact same pilots that are already highly familiar with the legacy warning system. I will also make the point here that the MAX accidents occurred - in part - because of a lack of commonality, not because of commonality.

Regulation is there to support, faciliate and enhance safety. If safety is not negatively affected, then there is nothing wrong with issuing an approval based on grandfather rights.

A note on scope: I am not arguing about "Boeing culture", the MAX crashes, whether a clean-sheet design would be better, or related topics here. I am simply making a point on the safety aspect of approving a legacy system, which has worked just fine for decades, for the -10.

[KAPAC]

The generation that flew the classic max created a similar safety record to its competitors . Let’s project forward and all of the 737 competitors have advanced systems ? I’m not saying future generations won’t be able to fly safely with no ECAS ?

[txl]

Just to check that I'm getting this right: The grace period for certifying aircraft according to old rules expires end of 2022. From 2023 on, new regulations require that a plane is being equipped with EICAS on order to get certified. Boeing could have done that easily, as they have known this to be coming for years. But apart from the cost factor, making those adjustments to the 737 would jeopardize the grandfathered certification and they would need to have a new certification – and airlines pilots would have to be type rated anew? Is that about it?

That said, on a personal note: I think the 737 has had its time, but now Boeing needs to move on. From a SLF perspective, Airbus offers the superior product by far. But I'm pretty certain Congress will grant Boeing their extension, the US won't shoot themselves in the foot by taking Airbus' biggest competitor in narrow-body aircraft off the market for a couple of years.

[WideScreen]

Just to check that I'm getting this right: The grace period for certifying aircraft according to old rules expires end of 2022. From 2023 on, new regulations require that a plane is being equipped with EICAS on order to get certified. Boeing could have done that easily, as they have known this to be coming for years. But apart from the cost factor, making those adjustments to the 737 would jeopardize the grandfathered certification and they would need to have a new certification – and airlines pilots would have to be type rated anew? Is that about it?

That said, on a personal note: I think the 737 has had its time, but now Boeing needs to move on. From a SLF perspective, Airbus offers the superior product by far. But I'm pretty certain Congress will grant Boeing their extension, the US won't shoot themselves in the foot by taking Airbus' biggest competitor in narrow-body aircraft off the market for a couple of years.
Yes, maybe.

The big question is, whether other XAA's/EASA will rubber stamp the MAX-10 type approval, or that the MAX-10 will become a sole-US orphaned flying airplane...... The latter would be a disgrace to the US its attempt to regain face, after the previous MAX regulatory humiliations, IE just confirming the MAX disaster wasn't an incident, though just ingrained in the US culture ......

[Less Hair]

Maybe Boeing gets another extension. But aren't they repeating the same mistake from before putting pressure on the government especially on the DOT and FAA? Boeing does not patiently wait. They just try to do it via Congress this time, sort of almost burning bridges. What will this mean for the 777-9 certification needing grandfathering as well? The FAA might be fed up finally?

[SMT Member]

What’s really astounding is Boeing on one hand saying they might cancel the -10, whilst at the same time selling that type by the bucket load - must recently at FAB where they racked up a couple hundred orders. Either Boeing are confident the certification will take place before December 20th, or that they can twist the arm of Congress to get an extension, or that they’re still arrogant enough to believe they’re “too big to fail” and that the FAA will be muscled into ensuring the aircraft is certified before the deadline.

Now if memory serves be right, EASA and other regulators were amongst those who agreed to certifying the -8 and -9, on the condition that the -10 would have EICAS and a 3rd AoA sensor, and that those enhancements would be back ported to all other models in the range. So what will happen if the -10 is certified without EICAS and any plans Boeing might have had to develop and implement the system are quietly scuttled?

[safetypee]

I suspect that all of the recent sales have a get-out caveat if the 10 is not certificated, or within reasonable timescale / cost.

Reading between the lines of F’boro reports, the third AoA source has been provided, probably by electronic means by integrating other sensors, leaving the EICAS to be negotiated separately.
This might just tip the balance with other certification authorities, particularly if the FAA were to threaten hard ball with future bilateral agreements, then Europe / Brazil might be more be more amenable to accept the 10. But China, etc?

Any compromise would not be in the best interests of aviation safety, nor FAAs image, but then safety is dominated by money and national interests.

[SMT Member]

Agreed, and the Boeing team must be applauded. Evidently they’re able to install enough confidence amongst customers that the -10 will be certified within reasonable time, but without EICAS, whilst simultaneously threatening Congress with a cancellation of the program.

[WHBM]

I think if the FAA threatened to play hard ball if Europe don't go along with an exemption to the 737Max, of all types, it would blow up right back in their faces. It would be good if someone would ask EASA right now in public what their attitude would be. I guess the FAA already have.

As another transport journalist once wrote "Statements that 'Safety is our First Priority' generally follow an event which shows that it isn't".

[WideScreen]

Agreed, and the Boeing team must be applauded. Evidently they’re able to install enough confidence amongst customers that the -10 will be certified within reasonable time, but without EICAS, whilst simultaneously threatening Congress with a cancellation of the program.
Given, how the Trump insurrection is being treated by roughly half the congress, we know, their knees are pretty weak......

[tdracer]

But China, etc?

China has high hopes for selling their upcoming commercial jetliners in large numbers in the US (and the rest of the world). If the CAAC is seen as not playing ball with the rest of the world it could come back to bite them big time.
Airbus has to tread carefully on this as well - while they are relatively clean on certification at the moment - stuff happens. It's not a matter of if but when Airbus will find the need for a receptive FAA - having EASA refuse to bilateral with the FAA on the MAX-10 could easily come back to haunt them.
It's a big industry - it's too everybody's benefit if they play nice together.

BTW, I see where Delta is already lobbying for the MAX-10 to retain a common flightdeck - pointing out that a unique flight deck configuration will add to costs and reduce fleet commonality (Delta currently flies a large number of 737NG aircraft).
I can see an argument that since many operators will use both the MAX-10 as well as the MAX-8 and -9, having a completely different flight deck on the -10 would increase confusion and could easily hurt overall safety - not improve it.

[txl]

Would you care to specify how the MAX 9 outperforms the A321 Neo "in every way"? I was under the impression that the MAX 10 was created because Boeing customers demanded something like the Airbus 321 Neo.

Edit: The post I'm referring to seems to have been deleted.

[FlightlessParrot]

As another transport journalist once wrote "Statements that 'Safety is our First Priority' generally follow an event which shows that it isn't".
I think it is possible that if the management of a US public company really did make safety their first priority, they would be acting illegally. Management seems to be legally required to put the interests of shareholders first. Of course, safety matters: there are legal obligations, though in some areas large companies treat fines for breach of regulations as part of the cost of doing business. Also, if a product gets a reputation as being unsafe, this could harm business, and so shareholders' interests, as has happened in the case of the Max 8. But to make safety the first priority would be the action of an engineering company, not a business.

[safetypee]

Re-reading the Boeing interview, with an alternative more speculative interpretation, is that the AoA sensing issue is fixed, and that the ‘European’ issue of multiple, consequential and coincident alerts for a single failure could be resolved with out resorting to EICAS.

EICAS is a neat (expensive and long timescale) solution with flexibility in display and computing logic, but requires differences training.

The much more difficult technical task is to use the existing (mainly analogue ?) alerting system with some fancy analogue to digital conversion, either embedded logic or an external ‘happy box’ - to provide a sufficient compromise of technical fix and dis-ambiguity, high workload.

The critical point will be if the ‘look alike’ fix will be sufficient to satisfy the tech, authority, and Congressional objections, and although this solution might not be in the stated timescale, can an waiver be granted - a timeline extension only.

If the alternative display-logic is acceptable to other authorities, then a time dispensation is much easier for Congress, particular if other authority's formal acceptance will be subsequent to - later than the FAA.

A lot of closed doors negotiation.

https://informamarkets.turtl.co/story/farnborough-airshow-issue-1/page/6/1

[Less Hair]

Does this mean they now shift the pressure towards EASA to green light the extension first and maybe okay more limited modifications? Finally making it a Europe vs. US political topic?

[safetypee]

Less Hair, a political issue.

I hope not, there is no need for European politics if a further EASA technical appraisal finds the compromise fix sufficient. The compromise may not have been on the table during the first discussions - previous thoughts influenced by the immediate aftermath of the accidents.

Q, does the compromise meet the agreed requirements (grandfather rights and special conditions for Max in general).

Q, will an EASA view be similarly acceptable to other regulators.

Political problems are within the USA: Boeing are hoping that congress has not said something previously which cannot be overturned - without political embarrassment.

Thus Boeing have to find both a tech solution acceptable to the world, and present it in a manner which Congress might use to their advantage so that a change of position is not embarrassing - political success.

[Check Airman]

Not much. The MAX 8 and 9 are the mass market aircraft, which Boeing expects to sell in the thousands. The MAX 10 is expected to sell in the hundreds - it's intended to take market from the A321 NEO, but mainly for those who already have 737s.
It's pretty simple math really - it'll cost well north of a $Billion to implement an EICAS system into the 737, plus recurring costs. If Boeing sells 500 MAX 10s, then they need to make an extra $2 million plus per aircraft just to pay for EICAS. Given Boeing might make a total profit on a 737 MAX sale of between $1 million and $2 million per aircraft, it simply doesn't make economic sense to produce the MAX 10 with EICAS. Better to save the money and devote it to a proper 737 replacement somewhere down the line.

Given that the 737 NG is statistically just as safe as an A320 with ECAM (that over hundreds of millions of flight hours), and given that the MAX 8 and 9 are considered "safe enough" with the same basic flight deck as the NG, it's difficult to argue a case for spending an extra couple $billion to make it 'safer'.

Why would it cost so much to put EICAS in the 737? It’s not like they don’t already know how to do it. The screen real-estate is there, so what’s the problem?

[Less Hair]

It would kill the common cockpits with the rest of the family. And starting now would take years for the software development and more years for certification. Still it is Boeing's job to stick to the rules and to not base everything on grandfathering extensions. How could they end up in a corner like this?

Maybe they just should forget the -10, double the -8-rate, halve the price and flood the market with it while Airbus is sold out on the A321neo? And start to design the next family from scratch.

[WideScreen]

Why would it cost so much to put EICAS in the 737? It’s not like they don’t already know how to do it. The screen real-estate is there, so what’s the problem?
Where most people think the "designing" or "manufacturing" is the cost item, essentially the "certification" is the expensive part.

So, yeah, designing: No problem. Additional equipment: It hurts, though manageable. Get the spider in the web, with all its sensory extensions and actions certified: Pfffffffff, this gets complicated with a huge amount of reciprocal influences, which all need to be verified, blabla. So, expensive.

[Sailvi767]

Boeing's near to medium term future is totally dependent on what happens to world air travel. I would suggest that one of the major drivers of recent new MAX orders is the fact that it will be several years before an airline will be able to take delivery of a Airbus 320/321 aircraft ordered now, given how far out the production slots are sold out. If there is another economic contraction then the reality is Airbus could meet nearly all the narrow body demand and Boeing will only be able to move product at an uneconomic price point. In any case I don't think the MAX 10 will ever fly and Boeing has effectively already ceded the 757 size market to Airbus with the A321XLR given the failure to launch the NMA

The wide body market is equally fraught with airlines giving up on the 787 in favor of he A330NEO and the A350 after all the 787 production woes. The future of the 777X program is also looking increasingly uncertain.

If there is a rapid and sustained rebound in world air travel, then I think Boeing may have a chance to dig itself out of the hole it made.

Personally I think there is no longer a future for Boeing commercial and the only question is how long it hangs on before being spun off into bankruptcy

The A330 NEO is pretty much a failure with Delta the only airline showing it real Love. Orders are terrible and it’s questionable how long Airbus will maintain the production line even at the fire sale prices they gave Delta.

[Check Airman]

Where most people think the "designing" or "manufacturing" is the cost item, essentially the "certification" is the expensive part.

So, yeah, designing: No problem. Additional equipment: It hurts, though manageable. Get the spider in the web, with all its sensory extensions and actions certified: Pfffffffff, this gets complicated with a huge amount of reciprocal influences, which all need to be verified, blabla. So, expensive.

Thanks for trying to explain, but my ignorance of the process makes it hard to understand why it’s difficult to certify. It’s not as if they’re reinventing the wheel.

[WHBM]

Just a general question and clarification, but are the issues preventing straightforward certification also an issue for the A320 series, which is living on grandfathering as well, or is that aircraft compliant with them ? If so, when did they put these features in ?

[WideScreen]

Thanks for trying to explain, but my ignorance of the process makes it hard to understand why it’s difficult to certify. It’s not as if they’re reinventing the wheel.
It's not difficult, it's just a lot of (paper)work and, as such, expensive.

The same reason, why adding a USD 25 camera "to monitor XXXXX" explodes in costs before it even can be installed as a useful device.
The same reason, why adding a nice device for whatever function in a private GA airplane, costs a multitude of the device costs itself, just to pay somebody to give its blessings, there will not be any additional risk, when adding that device.
The same reason why flying an N-reg GA airplane in Europe is cheaper than a locally registered airplane.
Maybe, even the same reason, why 'mericans hate a government.

Note: During design, a lot of extra effort is spent, preparing for the certification, so the exact cost allocation is somewhat diffuse.

[Less Hair]

No it's not just paperwork. It would open a can of worms to finally put in EICAS. This is why they avoided it through all those years.

[safetypee]

Design, engineer, certification, all cost in their own way … and in this instance, the cost of non commonality.

Although the flight deck displays appear spacious, its what goes on behind the scenes could be a problem, particularly the warning philosophy - integrated; new centralised warning display combining the critical alerts and logic (in this instance), or a distributed concept where alerts are still associated with the relevant system (existing aircraft ?).

See overhead panel. The 737 Overhead Panel (http://www.b737.org.uk/paneloverhead.htm)

Also not to forget that the original aircraft was analogue; how and where are the conversions to digital made or will have to change. What is the computing architecture, old new, processors, …

737 Centre Instrument Panel (http://www.b737.org.uk/panelcentreinst.htm#max)

This type of discussion would be ongoing throughout the aircraft’s development - when and where is there sufficient balance to change.

For the Max, previous balances might have been finely judged, but the 737 was ageing, Airbus had some surprises; and then there was the surprise of the extent of MCAS late in the testing. No dedicated MCAS alert, ‘failure’ had to be deduced, etc, … FAA will approve … etc …

Given this, it is more than likely that Boeing’s design was significantly influenced by operators; they wanted “faster, better, cheaper”, which aligned with Boeings requirement's, but then with hindsight how often is it concluded that this ideal is impossible, time and time again. We don't learn, or those that have, retire.

[WideScreen]

No it's not just paperwork. It would open a can of worms to finally put in EICAS. This is why they avoided it through all those years.

Yep, see my note:
Note: During design, a lot of extra effort is spent, preparing for the certification, so the exact cost allocation is somewhat diffuse.
It's not a matter of "some extra sensors" and "some extra wires", all this extra stuff does interact with the current systems, which all need to be (re-)certified. A lot of paperwork, and probably requiring a lot of extra "testing". And before you can dive into the paperwork creation, you'll need to work out all the tech (and GUI things), IE preparation of the certification. Because this whole needs to be (re-)certified, you can just tag-on some goodies, etc. I think, we agree on this.

Design, engineer, certification, all cost in their own way … and in this instance, the cost of non commonality.
The "making" itself is roughly linear with the amount of items, of course, only for this MAX-10, so little synergy with other aircraft.


Although the flight deck displays appear spacious, its what goes on behind the scenes could be a problem, particularly the warning philosophy - integrated; new centralised warning display combining the critical alerts and logic (in this instance), or a distributed concept where alerts are still associated with the relevant system (existing aircraft ?).
The moment you start messing with this stuff, you have to re-certify the individual components and the whole. $$$$$$

For the Max, previous balances might have been finely judged, but the 737 was ageing, Airbus had some surprises; and then there was the surprise of the extent of MCAS late in the testing. No dedicated MCAS alert, ‘failure’ had to be deduced, etc, … FAA will approve … etc …
Yep, when you start moving around things, things change, with the chance of late discovered items, etc. So, yeah, I really feel (technically) sorry for Boeing, they are in this position, but, hey, this is what they shareholders and major US airlines aimed for.

Given this, it is more than likely that Boeing’s design was significantly influenced by operators; they wanted “faster, better, cheaper”, which aligned with Boeing's requirement's, but then with hindsight how often is it concluded that this ideal is impossible, time and time again. We don't learn, or those that have, retire.
Yeah, there was already a huge order for the MAX (AA IIRC), even before a NG successor was announced (let alone Boeing had decided to design such a successor), go figure, so the US airlines do really bear part of the MAX disaster blame.

[WHBM]

it is more than likely that Boeing’s design was significantly influenced by operators; they wanted “faster, better, cheaper”,But where else were the US majors going to go ? Airbus ? Sold out for years ahead, and surely no discounts. Plus a training load that would dwarf what might be done on a properly-configured Max. The complete antithesis of "faster, better, cheaper". Boeing were in an envious duopoly position. Do you think Southwest were going to go for Airbus in these conditions, let alone at all ? If this was the operators' constant approach we'd all still be flying round in newly-built DC-6Bs.

[WideScreen]

But where else were the US majors going to go ? Airbus ? Sold out for years ahead, and surely no discounts. Plus a training load that would dwarf what might be done on a properly-configured Max. The complete antithesis of "faster, better, cheaper". Boeing were in an envious duopoly position. Do you think Southwest were going to go for Airbus in these conditions, let alone at all ? If this was the operators' constant approach we'd all still be flying round in newly-built DC-6Bs.
Maybe, the US airlines should have encouraged Boeing to NOT buy back shares, but invest the money in newly designed aircraft ? But, US airlines were predominantly focused on short-term low costs (no crew retraining, etc), so gave the wrong message themselves, too.

Not to say, US airlines should have opposed to the past-merger doctrine at Boeing, that a prosperous future would be without new technology developments, and plain old technology could be reapplied again and again. Ohhhh, we only buy US, to support our own industry ? Yep, bye bye to the leading position, the Boeing's long past history shows.

Nearly 30 years ago, I was leading a development group for medical equipment at a renown supplier of medical equipment, when the company message was brought to us: "We need to save on costs". "Ok, at what timescale ?". "Short-term !". "OK, then dissolve this whole development department (500 people or so), since our fruits will only become sold in 2-3 years from now". It all went silent and, etc.

[DaveReidUK]

Yeah, there was already a huge order for the MAX (AA IIRC), even before a NG successor was announced (let alone Boeing had decided to design such a successor),

go figure

I'm trying hard to figure how AA could place an order for a type/variant neither announced nor on the drawing board.

[WideScreen]

I'm trying hard to figure how AA could place an order for a type/variant neither announced nor on the drawing board.
Yep, strange, though it happened, see:

Commitment to order 100 737s with new engines and options for 60 more (https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2011-07-20-Boeing-and-American-Airlines-Agree-on-Order-for-up-to-300-Airplanes)
American, ..., said that it planned to acquire 260 of the Airbus A320 aircraft and 200 Boeing 737s — half of which will be equipped with a new, more fuel-efficient engine. (https://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/business/global/american-places-record-order-with-2-jet-makers.html)
The move is a clear commitment by Boeing to revamp its best-selling 737 with new engines rather than develop an all-new version of the plane — a strategy that until now it had said most of its customers preferred.

[tdracer]

Yep, strange, though it happened, see:
I've posted this several times previously, but the story goes something like this:
Boeing was working hard on an all new 737 replacement aircraft - with a planned introduction around 2020 (I knew people working on it). Then Airbus launched the A320 NEO and started collecting huge numbers of orders. This caught Boeing completely by surprise - had Boeing stayed the course, with the NEO entering service around 2015, it would have meant conceding nearly the entire narrow body market to Airbus for ~5 years. With the resources necessary to support the 787 and 747-8 introductions (remember, both the 787-8 and 747-8 were certified and entered service in late 2011), there simply were not the resources to bring the timeline for a new narrowbody forward. Worse, even after the new Boeing narrow body entered service, it would take several years to increase the production rate up to the ~50/month that the A320 and 737 were being produced. In short, no matter how good the new Boeing narrow body might be, it would mean conceding a roughly 5,000 unit advantage to the A320 NEO.
That was simply too bitter a pill for Boeing to swallow - they scrambled to find something they could get to market (relatively) quickly and minimize the damage from the NEO - and came up with the MAX.
Now, with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, staying the course with an all new aircraft may well have been a far superior solution, that was far from obvious 11 years ago.

[Less Hair]

Concerning Airbus Boeings move did not work it seems. Airbus owns the A321neo market now and for years with production running at record rates. Concerning Boeing they have nothing new in the pipeline and the MAX family is still not complete and not the cash cow it used to be. And the Triple Seven, the other traditional cash cow, looks like sharing this fate.
I miss a commitment by Boeing to launch a new family and some commercial airplanes roadmap. Boeing has income from the defence business. How about investing a bit in future commercial airplanes instead of this half hearted milking of legacy programs full of costly errors?

[WHBM]

Maybe, the US airlines should have encouraged Boeing to NOT buy back shares, but invest the money in newly designed aircraft ?
Good luck with that. Boeing's overarching problem is that it has got into the hands of Wall Street, who can only see share value and returns to the end of their spreadsheet short term. In two years time most hope to have moved on to a different employer, so it's only what happens short term which they can take credit for that matters. It's a real business problem for high-investment long term businesses, like pharmaceutical research - or aircraft manufacture. Notably throughout the Max grounding Boeing's top execs still could be seen to be principally bowing down to Wall Street analysts.

[ORAC]

Boeing has income from the defence business.


How much?

Losses on the KC-46 program are currently running at $5.4B and Boeing is writing off loses of $1.5B on the two new presidential VC-25Bs. Meanwhile the new T-7A has now attracted its first $367 million write-off charge, the DoD is planning to halve its F-15EX buy and the F-18 order book is reaching the end of the line.

CH-47 and AH-64 might be selling well, but they're not cash cows., nor is the V-22 and heavy investment is needed on FVL.

Bottom line, the civil side can't depend on the military to keep it afloat.

[WHBM]

Boeing is writing off loses of $1.5B on the two new presidential VC-25Bs.
How on earth can two 747s incur a loss of USD 1.5bn ? That's surely more than they were sold for.

[Less Hair]

The bigger surprise is that Boeing accepted some fixed price contract.

[etudiant]

How on earth can two 747s incur a loss of USD 1.5bn ? That's surely more than they were sold for.

These aircraft are stuffed with electronics and everything is custom made, but still has to be tested and qualified. Integrating the electronics is a software intensive task.
So the price of the hulls and engines are almost irrelevant, except that the engines are also modified to allow longer refueled flights.
Agree entirely that signing up to do this on a fixed price basis was foolish, but iirc, they were really determined to keep Boeing as the builder of Air Force 1.

[Less Hair]

Do they finally install AA-refueling in the new ones?

[WideScreen]

These aircraft are stuffed with electronics and everything is custom made, but still has to be tested and qualified. Integrating the electronics is a software intensive task.
So the price of the hulls and engines are almost irrelevant, except that the engines are also modified to allow longer refueled flights.
Agree entirely that signing up to do this on a fixed price basis was foolish, but iirc, they were really determined to keep Boeing as the builder of Air Force 1.
Yep, high-end one-offs are extremely expensive, especially, when the whole needs to be certified. 100 Years ago, one did buy a Rolls-Royce based on that one-off concept, fortunately no certifications in those days :ok:

Wasn't the one (ehhh, the president) pushing for this "low price", the president who wanted to make America great again ? Bad start, ruined the US and, he even might end up (for other reasons) in (deserved) prison .......

[WideScreen]

I've posted this several times previously, but the story goes something like this:
Boeing was working hard on an all new 737 replacement aircraft - with a planned introduction around 2020 (I knew people working on it). Then Airbus launched the A320 NEO and started collecting huge numbers of orders. This caught Boeing completely by surprise - had Boeing stayed the course, with the NEO entering service around 2015, it would have meant conceding nearly the entire narrow body market to Airbus for ~5 years. With the resources necessary to support the 787 and 747-8 introductions (remember, both the 787-8 and 747-8 were certified and entered service in late 2011), there simply were not the resources to bring the timeline for a new narrowbody forward. Worse, even after the new Boeing narrow body entered service, it would take several years to increase the production rate up to the ~50/month that the A320 and 737 were being produced. In short, no matter how good the new Boeing narrow body might be, it would mean conceding a roughly 5,000 unit advantage to the A320 NEO.
That was simply too bitter a pill for Boeing to swallow - they scrambled to find something they could get to market (relatively) quickly and minimize the damage from the NEO - and came up with the MAX.
Now, with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight, staying the course with an all new aircraft may well have been a far superior solution, that was far from obvious 11 years ago.
Yep, that was the "insider" story. You see, people carefully read (and remember) your contributions.

My general comment is, this whole derailed earlier. When you sell airplanes (or cars, or whatever), you know, the stuff you sell, does have a life-cycle. And a proper company (should) anticipate on these life-cycles and be ready to initiate a new design very early on. 45+ Years ago, I was working at a large copier firm and, they did their marketing for future generation machine-concepts with a time horizon of 5-10 years (The real marketing, not the "promotion side", but think/anticipate what the future will bring, etc).

[WideScreen]

How much?

Losses on the KC-46 program are currently running at $5.4B and Boeing is writing off loses of $1.5B on the two new presidential VC-25Bs. Meanwhile the new T-7A has now attracted its first $367 million write-off charge, the DoD is planning to halve its F-15EX buy and the F-18 order book is reaching the end of the line.

CH-47 and AH-64 might be selling well, but they're not cash cows., nor is the V-22 and heavy investment is needed on FVL.

Bottom line, the civil side can't depend on the military to keep it afloat.
Yep, I really think, there is a significant chance, the Boeing commercial side will be just siphoned off on sales of the current models (maybe a 777Z) and "that's it for new airplane models". And by the time, that becomes clear, the whole is sold off to an investment company, who may try to resurrect the mess.

[tdracer]

How on earth can two 747s incur a loss of USD 1.5bn ? That's surely more than they were sold for.
Boeing lost a boatload of money on the current AF1 aircraft - fixed price contract for less than $400 million (two aircraft), actual costs over a $Billion (in 1980's money).
Before I retired, I started getting phone calls asking me questions regarding the new AF1 747s - questions I couldn't answer because I didn't know what was going into the new aircraft. So a requested and received a confidential briefing on the new aircraft so I could accurately respond to the incoming queries.
The amount of gold plating going into those two aircraft was stunning - far above what went into the current AF1. I obviously can't go into details, but I honestly wondered if the USAF had a plan for a militarized 747 and was using the AF1 program to finance the development costs.
The militarized 747-8 obviously didn't happen, but I don't know if that's because my theory was wrong, or if it just didn't work out as planned...

[DaveReidUK]

Yep, strange, though it happened

OK, so unannounced notwithstanding being trailed in that Boeing press release, and not-yet-designed despite the reference to "pending final configuration".

Leaving aside such tricky concepts, what would be the effect of cancelling the Max 10 on its synthetic AoA that the regulators have accepted as an certifiable retrofit solution to the existing Max variants' deficiencies?

[oceancrosser]

Boeing lost a boatload of money on the current AF1 aircraft - fixed price contract for less than $400 million (two aircraft), actual costs over a $Billion (in 1980's money).
Before I retired, I started getting phone calls asking me questions regarding the new AF1 747s - questions I couldn't answer because I didn't know what was going into the new aircraft. So a requested and received a confidential briefing on the new aircraft so I could accurately respond to the incoming queries.
The amount of gold plating going into those two aircraft was stunning - far above what went into the current AF1. I obviously can't go into details, but I honestly wondered if the USAF had a plan for a militarized 747 and was using the AF1 program to finance the development costs.
The militarized 747-8 obviously didn't happen, but I don't know if that's because my theory was wrong, or if it just didn't work out as planned...

I wonder if #45 had anything to do with that…

[WideScreen]

I wonder if #45 had anything to do with that…
Neither #44 nor #46 would be into gold-plated from their nature, though I think tdracer does refer to something else with "gold-plated": The amount of newly developed superior tech involved with the "new" AF1. Though, maybe, he can elaborate.

[tdracer]

Neither #44 nor #46 would be into gold-plated from their nature, though I think tdracer does refer to something else with "gold-plated": The amount of newly developed superior tech involved with the "new" AF1. Though, maybe, he can elaborate.
The sort of 'gold plating' stuff I'm talking about on the new AF1 747s isn't the sort of thing The Donald (or any president I'm familiar with) would care or probably even know about. What I'm referring to is more associated with - shall we say - mission capability (and the sort of missions it added capability for have little to do with hauling the POTUS around). As for range, the 747-8 is already an 8,000 mile capable aircraft, and that's before they add the aerial refueling capability (which the current AF1 already has). That's why I wondered if the real desire was some new military platform based on the 747-8, but since the 747-8 will be out of production by the end of the year, either I was wrong or the 'plan' never made it to fruition.

BTW, the existing AF1 is very fancy and plush, but in a very businesslike way. Lots of nice leather and fine wood furniture. It's in no way lavish with the things like gold toilet fixtures that showed up on some of the VIP 747's bound for the Middle East. One of my special memories of working on the current AF1 was after an incredibly long two weeks (16-17 hour days for 12 days straight - the engines were a mess when I got there, and I had to cover both the day and evening shifts). Finally, we did engine runs on a Sunday (minimum disruption to the other activities) and the engines performed perfectly - I was done, but they had other engine running stuff to do (hydraulics/pneumatics/electrical generation) and they didn't want to shutdown to let me off. So I went down to the president's office and watched an NFL football game on the big screen TV with a couple of mechanics. :ok:
My briefing on the new AF1 didn't go into the interior furnishing, but I'd be surprised if they are much different than the current aircraft (oh, and I'm glad Trumps AF1 paint scheme is DOA)

[FullWings]

It would kill the common cockpits with the rest of the family. And starting now would take years for the software development and more years for certification.
Would it though? When I flew the 737, admittedly some time ago, I was rated on the -100 to the -500 and regularly swapped between the -200 (steam) and -400 (hybrid glass + FMC) on the same day. No regulator problems with that.

As far as software approval, they got it for the MAX with this program running off a single sensor:

10 IF AOA > LIMIT THEN TRIM = TRIM + 1
15 WAIT 5; *** ADDED THIS ***
20 GOTO 10

[Less Hair]

Boeing is said to have a contract with Southwest about the MAX. Claiming it would need to pay 1 million dollars per aircraft ordered if MAX pilots need more than CBT. Stuff like this. Not much might be known outside. EICAS would change procedures. The fact that they did not install it yet seems to indicate how tricky it is.

And the more Boeing changes the closer they come to the legal tipping point where authorities don't accept grandfathering anymore whenever "more than 50 percent" is considered to be new.

[tdracer]

Would it though? When I flew the 737, admittedly some time ago, I was rated on the -100 to the -500 and regularly swapped between the -200 (steam) and -400 (hybrid glass + FMC) on the same day. No regulator problems with that.

As far as software approval, they got it for the MAX with this program running off a single sensor:

10 IF AOA > LIMIT THEN TRIM = TRIM + 1
15 WAIT 5; *** ADDED THIS ***
20 GOTO 10
So you're honestly suggesting that Boeing should repeat the fiasco of MCAS on a 737 EICAS? :ugh:
At the risk of repeating myself (again), MCAS was certified "Essential" - that's DAL (Design Assurance Level) C. Essential systems are allowed single failures since it's assumed that crew can adequately detect and react to a malfunction (the entire MCAS fiasco goes back to that seriously flawed assumption). EICAS is "Critical" - DAL A. Going from a DAL C to a DAL A system increases the costs exponentially (both hardware and software) (which is probably why they wanted to make MCAS DAL C). Further, while all other Boeing commercial aircraft have EICAS, it's far from a 'cut and paste system'. It basically needs to be customized for each application, and the 737 is a very different animal than even the 767 and is a world away from the FBW 777 and 787.
Adding EICAS to the 737 would be a multi-year, multi-billion dollar exercise.

[FullWings]

So you're honestly suggesting that Boeing should repeat the fiasco of MCAS on a 737 EICAS?
No, of course not - that was part ironic, part humorous (maybe?) What it has exposed is that for Boeing, DAL C might as well be DAL K, for Kwality. What is even more ironic is that if EICAS (DAL A) failed completely, the aeroplane would carry on flying and most critical fault diagnosis and remedy would still be available; with an MCAS (DAL C) fault, the aeroplane can crash out-of-control almost immediately, as proven on two separate occasions. Just sayin’...

[tdracer]

No, of course not - that was part ironic, part humorous (maybe?) What it has exposed is that for Boeing, DAL C might as well be DAL K, for Kwality. What is even more ironic is that if EICAS (DAL A) failed completely, the aeroplane would carry on flying and most critical fault diagnosis and remedy would still be available; with an MCAS (DAL C) fault, the aeroplane can crash out-of-control almost immediately, as proven on two separate occasions. Just sayin’...

But you're missing the point. Another 'quick and dirty' MCAS style implementation of EICAS could easily turn into another disaster. Sure, the aircraft will continue to fly, but will a crew - given dangerously misleading engine indications, false or misleading warnings or lack or real warnings - be able to fly and land it? Remember one crew was able to diagnose and account for improper MCAS and land the aircraft at its intended destination - problem is not the good crews, it's the 'below average' pilots (especially those on the 2 or 3 sigma below average).
The current flight deck on the 737NG and MAX may not be perfect, but it's perfectly adequate (as demonstrated by the virtually identical hull loss rates between the NG and the A320 series).
You're basically arguing that a 737 EICAS doesn't have to be perfect, while at the same time arguing that the current flight deck - with hundreds of millions of hours of safe operation - is somehow unsafe.

[Less Hair]

The crew that saved it had a pre-briefed mechanic in the jumpseat. He was actively looking for the changed AoA-sensor's performance and supported the pilots early on.

[FullWings]

Would it be impolite to say “Whoosh”?

Given the very public and very costly MCAS debacle, which may still propel Boeing Commercial into even direr straits, what are the options? They cannot afford to be anything other than diligent if they went down the EICAS route, or, as this thread title suggests, bite the bullet and set off for pastures new. The spotlight is on, the FAA are once bitten, twice shy and foreign regulators are not going to go along for the ride.

Having a similar level of hull losses is one thing, but knowing that at least two of them arose because of known issues and were the product of toxic corporate culture is quite another. What else is hiding in there, and has the culture actually changed? We all know the 737 would be uncertifiable under modern regulations, so “unsafe” as far as the rules are concerned; cars without seat belts had millions of hours of safe operation as well.

My original comment was about having EICAS making the aircraft so different that current 737 pilots couldn’t fly it, which I thought through historical precedent and personal experience wasn’t necessarily a foregone conclusion?

[GlobalNav]

How on earth can two 747s incur a loss of USD 1.5bn ? That's surely more than they were sold for.

This is how the “money saving” is presidentially (former President that is) accomplished.

[WideScreen]

But you're missing the point. Another 'quick and dirty' MCAS style implementation of EICAS could easily turn into another disaster. Sure, the aircraft will continue to fly, but will a crew - given dangerously misleading engine indications, false or misleading warnings or lack or real warnings - be able to fly and land it?
I think, that highly depends on their nerves. When a crew does realize, the indications are wrong and just keep flying the airplane, all will be well. IF the crew starts to panic and act on invalid indications, "everything" can happen.

Remember one crew was able to diagnose and account for improper MCAS
The issue with the MCAS was, that it actively screwed up the aircraft flyability.

and land the aircraft at its intended destination - problem is not the good crews, it's the 'below average' pilots (especially those on the 2 or 3 sigma below average).
Even when using 2 or 3 sigma, you still have -by definition- the situation that half of the crews are below average. Increase the crew capabilities and the average goes up, and still half will be below average.
The current flight deck on the 737NG and MAX may not be perfect, but it's perfectly adequate (as demonstrated by the virtually identical hull loss rates between the NG and the A320 series).
Personally, I think, the A320 series suffers much more from a "lower than average" crew performance, the aircraft is sold as "crew-proof", IE resilient against mistreatment and as such, more suitable for environments, where crews are acquired from a more primitive living environment. Which does seem to match the distribution of A320 series over the world, compared with basic wealth and overall quality of life / freedom in those areas.
You're basically arguing that a 737 EICAS doesn't have to be perfect, while at the same time arguing that the current flight deck - with hundreds of millions of hours of safe operation - is somehow unsafe.
I don't think, the B737 flight deck is that bad, provided you have sufficiently trained and on the dot crews, implying, the B737 is less suitable for those "below the average". Add to that, that improving the flight deck environment (also the noise levels) can improve the "quality of life" for those spending a lot of time there, at the same time decreasing the body wear&tear, IE, lowering the fatigue levels.
The issue with the B737 is more the ancient -no longer certifiable- mechanical and electrical constructions. Perfect according to historical standards, though it is no longer acceptable, that (for example) the fuselage does break up along its joints, or the cockpit overhead panels land on the crews heads, when more than a hard-landing is surprising the crew. Or the outright confusingly designed RA sensor - control units matching, which was the fundamental issue with the Turkish B737 before reaching AMS.

[WideScreen]

This is how the “money saving” is presidentially (former President that is) accomplished.
Yep, another indication, Boeing was effectively already far behind the presumed "leading" position in the market. When you are the considered "the best in the market", pricing becomes a less relevant item, the moment your customers want "the best" and customers are prepared to pay for that "the best".

[tdracer]

Would it be impolite to say “Whoosh”?
Apologies - I was referring to the posts suggesting implementing EICAS on the 737 would be cheap and easy - which is very much not the case. I'd (apparently erroneously) lumped you in with that crowd.

My original comment was about having EICAS making the aircraft so different that current 737 pilots couldn’t fly it, which I thought through historical precedent and personal experience wasn’t necessarily a foregone conclusion?
Common type rating - even with 'differences' training - is a very sensitive subject. Worse, it's largely subjective - there are few hard and fast rules - so it's very difficult to predict what the regulators will do. The 757 and 767 have shared a common type rating for 40 years (and actually share a common flight deck), but we spent a lot of time on pins and needles because no one wanted to be the one that implemented a change on one or the other that caused the regulators to decide they'd become too different and could no longer have a common type rating. We were working on implementing autostart on the 767 (mainly for the CF6-80C2 FADEC) in the early 1990's. Upper management killed it due mainly to the potential impact on the 757/767 common type rating, afraid it might be the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back (much to my relief as there were some nasty technical issues we'd need to deal with to implement it on the 767)

[WideScreen]

Would it be impolite to say “Whoosh”?

Given the very public and very costly MCAS debacle, which may still propel Boeing Commercial into even direr straits, what are the options? They cannot afford to be anything other than diligent if they went down the EICAS route, or, as this thread title suggests, bite the bullet and set off for pastures new. The spotlight is on, the FAA are once bitten, twice shy and foreign regulators are not going to go along for the ride.

Having a similar level of hull losses is one thing, but knowing that at least two of them arose because of known issues and were the product of toxic corporate culture is quite another. What else is hiding in there, and has the culture actually changed? We all know the 737 would be uncertifiable under modern regulations, so “unsafe” as far as the rules are concerned; cars without seat belts had millions of hours of safe operation as well.

My original comment was about having EICAS making the aircraft so different that current 737 pilots couldn’t fly it, which I thought through historical precedent and personal experience wasn’t necessarily a foregone conclusion?
Crews could still "fly" the airplane, though no longer properly and timely handle exceptions. I am not sure, if "just ignoring the EICAS" and revert to the old paper manuals would be OK, to overcome that issue, maybe not.

[hunbet]

In the meantime !

​​​​​​Delta buys 100 Boeing Max planes, its first major order with the manufacturer in more than a decade. The deal is for 100 737 Max 10 planes, with options for 30 more. Deliveries are slated to begin in 2025. It's Delta first fresh order for new Boeing planes in more than a decade.Jul 18, 2022

[WideScreen]

In the meantime !

​​​​​​Delta buys 100 Boeing Max planes, its first major order with the manufacturer in more than a decade. The deal is for 100 737 Max 10 planes, with options for 30 more. Deliveries are slated to begin in 2025. It's Delta first fresh order for new Boeing planes in more than a decade.Jul 18, 2022
To me, this sounds a bit like an opportunistic order (The MAX-10 is bigger as the airplanes it is going to replace, at such a qty scale). So, when the MAX-10 finds its grave before certification-birth, Delta has some negotiation cookies to get a good deal on a MAX-9 "downgrade". And, in the (unlikely ???) situation, the MAX-10 gets its certification, Delta could sell to Ryanair, who will be desperate for new, somewhat bigger airplanes, by then .....

[tdracer]

To me, this sounds a bit like an opportunistic order (The MAX-10 is bigger as the airplanes it is going to replace, at such a qty scale). So, when the MAX-10 finds its grave before certification-birth, Delta has some negotiation cookies to get a good deal on a MAX-9 "downgrade". And, in the (unlikely ???) situation, the MAX-10 gets its certification, Delta could sell to Ryanair, who will be desperate for new, somewhat bigger airplanes, by then .....
Delta has already been lobbying for Congress to extend the deadline for the MAX-10 cert (without EICAS).

[fdr]

So you're honestly suggesting that Boeing should repeat the fiasco of MCAS on a 737 EICAS? :ugh:

A patch job for adding an "EICAS" to the B737 would seem to be asking for embarrassment, and frankly, there is negligible display benefit to the crew that arises from the "EICAS". What off's in recent times would an EICAS have provided the vital input to stop the crew having a bad day? My 20,000 hours with various Boeing EICAS and Airbus's later ECAMs have never provided any information that actually altered the correct actioning of a QRH. The NNECL on the B777/787 is delightful but other than closed loop items, the iPad can do the same with a little less overhead in costing. The Synoptic is a nice touch to have, from a training point of view, as in stopping new drivers from balancing fuel tanks due to a bad sender, but otherwise, I am not sure that it ever changed the outcome of an issue. I would give parts of other peoples anatomies for real imaging of a cabin, as every smoke event I have had the misfortune to experience has been most entertaining, getting the information as to what is actually happening is interesting in a multi-lingual environment. The original lack of a cabin altitude alert separate to the T/O warning was probably not one of the better cost-saving exercises Boeing undertook, but even then, at X thousands of feet after takeoff, a "T/O warning horn" blaring in your ear may tend to make one look at the other logics that make it chatty.

Essential systems are allowed single failures since it's assumed that crew can adequately detect and react to a malfunction (the entire MCAS fiasco goes back to that seriously flawed assumption). EICAS is "Critical" - DAL A. Going from a DAL C to a DAL A system increases the costs exponentially (both hardware and software) (which is probably why they wanted to make MCAS DAL C)

An EICAS would not have made a difference in the MCAS shambles, the crew had the controls in front of them, hands on those, and had two lots of trim position indicators showing the action of the trim, and wheels spinning around to give a hint. Not sure that anything else was going to be a bigger hint, except, for a very modest sum, an audio output giving the problem would be possible to add to any of these "plains", maybe make them as good as a Lancair...

The Airbus ECAM has some insidious characteristics to it, where there is a compounded/cascading defect, there can be a continuous rolling series of alerts and actions that make it difficult for the drivers to stay on top of the problem. Boeing's EICAS and the ECL-NNML do handle that condition with much more grace and less frustration.

All in all, the most frustrating problem is not having a checklist on a screen, or on plastic or in a book, (or on a boat, or with a goat, or with green eggs and ham, Sam..) it is actually getting a crew to start actioning what they train to do in the simulator routinely, and then in the real world, the crews ad-lib for various reasons. The justifications are depressing to listen to when there is the subsequent washup, yet that is where we seem to have ended up as a group of operators.

[Australopithecus]

FDR, all true, including the expectation that a common horn sounding at 10,000’ wouldn’t get me to check the parking brake, but a licenced crew did in fact not recognise the horn was sounding “cabin altitude high” and a bunch of people died. Don’t forget just how far left the old bell curve stretches. By definition there are >50,000 flights a day operated by at least one below average crew member. That’s a lot of dice rolling.

Ultimately, a 737 Max will be flying on the 100th anniversary of the first flight. The perverse reality in that is there will be somewhere 100 years of systems development completely ignored in the service of expediency. Anyway, in competent hands the aeroplane is a money maker and currently enjoys an industry typical safety record. Its just a shame Boeing didn’t have the time, available talent or money to leapfrog the 320 and set the stage for the next 50 years.

[WideScreen]

Delta has already been lobbying for Congress to extend the deadline for the MAX-10 cert (without EICAS).
Yep, on the other side, Delta gets the critics: "What are you going to do with these airplanes, too many, too big for you" (I personally don't judge on this).

The trick with running (large) businesses is, to "play chess", always take care to have alternative options, when things don't go as planned. For this case: IF Delta indeed does not want the MAX-10 in these qty, and it gets certified, sell off to other parties. IF it doesn't get certified, go back to Boeing and demand the MAX-9, with discount, etc.

[ATC Watcher]

Its just a shame Boeing didn’t have the time, available talent or money to leapfrog the 320 and set the stage for the next 50 years.

In a former life I was invited to take delivery of a brand new 757 in Renton in the 1990s ,bought by a friendly airline that no longer exists. It was with the standard VIP treat and included a lenghthy visit of the facilty , and the 737 and KC135s..were also built there alongside. It was very noisy , lots of debris on the floor, lots of mechanics in blue overall pushing rivets into holes made with eletrric drills. A year later I was shown the A320 assembly line in Toulouse Blagnac , workshop complety clean on white painted floor, robots working in silence , laser beams to align the parts together and a few mechanics in white blouses walking around with iPads.. OK that was 30 years ago, probably the 737 assembly line looks different today , but to "leapfrog Airbus for the next 50 years" would have needed quite a cultural and technological change at the time.

[Australopithecus]

That just reflects the broad differences between the two cultures. I have been in a few manufacturing facilities on both continents, and its always as you describe. Don’t ever subject yourself to an industrial factory tour in China.

The old Boeing had the technical expertise and imagination to make game changers. Back in the day the 747 was engineered by the “B” team while most of the talent was trying to get the SST off the drawing board. They were able, in about 15 years, to come up with the B-47, B-52, 707, KC135, 727, 737, 747. And do the SST engineering. And whatever other military/space projects I am forgetting.

That Boeing was more than capable of defining state of the art.

[swh]

The sort of 'gold plating' stuff I'm talking about on the new AF1 747s isn't the sort of thing The Donald (or any president I'm familiar with) would care or probably even know about. What I'm referring to is more associated with - shall we say - mission capability (and the sort of missions it added capability for have little to do with hauling the POTUS around). As for range, the 747-8 is already an 8,000 mile capable aircraft, and that's before they add the aerial refueling capability (which the current AF1 already has). That's why I wondered if the real desire was some new military platform based on the 747-8, but since the 747-8 will be out of production by the end of the year, either I was wrong or the 'plan' never made it to fruition.

BTW, the existing AF1 is very fancy and plush, but in a very businesslike way. Lots of nice leather and fine wood furniture. It's in no way lavish with the things like gold toilet fixtures that showed up on some of the VIP 747's bound for the Middle East. One of my special memories of working on the current AF1 was after an incredibly long two weeks (16-17 hour days for 12 days straight - the engines were a mess when I got there, and I had to cover both the day and evening shifts). Finally, we did engine runs on a Sunday (minimum disruption to the other activities) and the engines performed perfectly - I was done, but they had other engine running stuff to do (hydraulics/pneumatics/electrical generation) and they didn't want to shutdown to let me off. So I went down to the president's office and watched an NFL football game on the big screen TV with a couple of mechanics. :ok:
My briefing on the new AF1 didn't go into the interior furnishing, but I'd be surprised if they are much different than the current aircraft (oh, and I'm glad Trumps AF1 paint scheme is DOA)

a new flash aircraft does not bring a game changing level of efficiency, any 737 replacement would have similar engines to the A320neo, the economics just would not justify the change for many airlines who are already invested heavily into 737 and A320 fleets and parts.

then in reality Boeing would have failed to deliver what they promised, when they promised yet again, there has not been a single new program Boeing has been able to deliver on its promises, they are seen as being an unreliable supplier.

[WideScreen]

That just reflects the broad differences between the two cultures. I have been in a few manufacturing facilities on both continents, and its always as you describe. Don’t ever subject yourself to an industrial factory tour in China.

The old Boeing had the technical expertise and imagination to make game changers. Back in the day the 747 was engineered by the “B” team while most of the talent was trying to get the SST off the drawing board. They were able, in about 15 years, to come up with the B-47, B-52, 707, KC135, 727, 737, 747. And do the SST engineering. And whatever other military/space projects I am forgetting.

That Boeing was more than capable of defining state of the art.
Yep, and then, Boeing intentionally changed into a stock-exchange directed leech to please "the investors" and now, we effectively do have a company with a lot of orders to fulfil, but no perspective for the future, due to a lack of long-term investments. That's how big companies (start to) fail.

[WideScreen]

a new flash aircraft does not bring a game changing level of efficiency, any 737 replacement would have similar engines to the A320neo, the economics just would not justify the change for many airlines who are already invested heavily into 737 and A320 fleets and parts.

then in reality Boeing would have failed to deliver what they promised, when they promised yet again, there has not been a single new program Boeing has been able to deliver on its promises, they are seen as being an unreliable supplier.
Not only as an unreliable supplier, but also a supplier who is outright and intentionally (see the MAX-saga) lying to its customers as well all its stakeholders. Emperor and cloths, etc. But, hey, that's the Trump philosophy......

[WHBM]

a new flash aircraft does not bring a game changing level of efficiency, any 737 replacement would have similar engines to the A320neo, the economics just would not justify the change for many airlines who are already invested heavily into 737 and A320 fleets and parts.
No, the world moves on. The big change of the 737-300 was the new CFM engine. They didn't continue with the long established, heavily invested in skills and parts on the 727 and 737-200 (and competing DC9/MD80), JT8D engine, and this was well before the A320. And they took all their customer base along with them.

[Jwscud]

I assume everyone is holding off major new clean sheet work due to the uncertainty of the powerplant future. I am personally most interested in H2 burning engines as the most likely practical solution but it’s a long way away.

[Less Hair]

It feels like everybody will stay or return to kerosene that can be made "green", called SAF. Everything gets certified for 100 percent SAF and that will be it. I don't see any way to get enough H2 made from green energy at competitive costs for a long time. Improvements will be made but evolutionary not step changes. Batteries will NOT power the next generation of airliners.

[Nil by mouth]

Batteries will NOT power the next generation of airliners.

Agreed, you'll probably get drama queen quotes like in the other fuel related topic.
"We were over the Atlantic and ran out of electricity"

[WideScreen]

No, the world moves on. The big change of the 737-300 was the new CFM engine. They didn't continue with the long established, heavily invested in skills and parts on the 727 and 737-200 (and competing DC9/MD80), JT8D engine, and this was well before the A320. And they took all their customer base along with them.
Well, the change to a high (or at least higher in nowadays terms) bypass engine was a significant game changer for about nearly all relevant aspects (power, full consumption and noise). So it's understandable, the world accompanied the move, etc.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Reporting in The Wall Street Journal (Weekend July 30, 2022 ed.), indicates first delivery is expected within days.

"The [FAA] has approved Boeing's plan for dealing with problems and carrying out fixes for the planes, but would still need to clear each 787 delivery. The company still has to submit paperwork for the first planned delivery to the regulator" [attributed to person familiar with the matter].

(Posted here since the last active 787 thread is quite dormant, and resuming deliveries on an ongoing basis would be (obviously) good in general for the planemaker & thus relevant for thread here)

[WHBM]

Reporting in The Wall Street Journal (Weekend July 30, 2022 ed.), indicates first delivery is expected within days.
I'm afraid we have been reading "leaks" about the 787 deliveries about to restart, it seems every week for the last year. We'll wait until it actually happens. It's an associated issue with the Max 10, because it shows Boeing PR, if not the company, wholly concentrated on "gloss" rather than reality.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Well, no major dispute on just the factual level .... but consider, the reporting indicates the FAA gave some type of official approval to the go-forward plan - by implication at least, a formally documented plan. The WSJ isn't Fx-snooze, least of all their aviation coverage,

And if the Journal has been duped (or is complicit) and the news isn't anything but hype, and just puffing, what in blazes is going on, wherein such a situation exists that the United States Department of Transportation lacks senior-level authoritative leadership, at the Cabinet as well as FAA level, not to squelch such nonsense? Any decently competent junior partner in even a regional, mid-size U.S. law firm could issue a statement putting an end to such misstatements or misrepresentations (if that's what they are), in their sleep. ....Or at least before their second cup of coffee.

[Australopithecus]

I don’t think that the U.S. Department of Transportation is lacking cabinet leadership. And what business of theirs would it be to kibosh every stupid thing said in the Murdoch press?

[fdr]

That just reflects the broad differences between the two cultures. I have been in a few manufacturing facilities on both continents, and its always as you describe. Don’t ever subject yourself to an industrial factory tour in China.

The old Boeing had the technical expertise and imagination to make game changers. Back in the day the 747 was engineered by the “B” team while most of the talent was trying to get the SST off the drawing board. They were able, in about 15 years, to come up with the B-47, B-52, 707, KC135, 727, 737, 747. And do the SST engineering. And whatever other military/space projects I am forgetting.

That Boeing was more than capable of defining state of the art. "That Boeing" was indeed setting the bar. Curious to have Joe Sutters group considered to be the "B" team, the work on the B747-100/-200 series was groundbreaking in almost all areas. First versions were somewhat hampered by having -3 engines, they made TOD entertaining, and the first wing wasn't quite so pretty, but thereafter, the plane was a delight. Could have done with a bit more tin around the S41 stringers and frames... the first set of those to go ping in flight were quite a surprise. Systems-wise, the B747 was a logical system, and the flight controls made it a beautiful plane to fly anywhere. Boeing got the body gear right, needed a bit of work on the fuse pins, and hydraulic fuses a little earlier would have been a nice touch. The engineers panel was logical, and really just improved on the B-17-29-52 707 727 setup, some of the switches appeared to have come from Rosie the Riveters time zone. Placing the packs where they were looked good, until it didn't, but then, we have issues with other aircraft from later periods that seem to reinvent the wheel with CWT ignition...

Times change, perhaps the B787 will be considered as a great plane someday, but it has some big shoes to fill. The B777 may be more cost-effective, but it isn't a 747.

[Australopithecus]

Having flown the B-17 I can assure you the family roots are palpable in the later planes.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Various media outlets reporting, American Airlines did in fact take delivery of the first 787 aircraft following FAA overall approval of Boeing's plan as well inspection of the specific aircraft. Evidently the press report several days ago was accurate.

[WHBM]

Various media outlets reporting, American Airlines did in fact take delivery of the first 787 aircraft following FAA overall approval of Boeing's plan as well inspection of the specific aircraft. Evidently the press report several days ago was accurate.
It does however appear the aircraft left Charleston today, not for any American base like Dallas, or their maintenance centre at Tulsa, but for Victorville, where Boeing are to do further work on it, which really does not sound like it's been actually completed yet.

[tdracer]

It does however appear the aircraft left Charleston today, not for any American base like Dallas, or their maintenance centre at Tulsa, but for Victorville, where Boeing are to do further work on it, which really does not sound like it's been actually completed yet.

So you're better informed than this?
Boeing delivers its first 787 Dreamliner in more than a year | The Seattle Times (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-delivers-its-first-787-dreamliner-in-more-than-a-year/)Boeing on Wednesday delivered its first 787 Dreamliner since May 2021, ending a blockage that has starved the manufacturer of cash, added $5.5 billion in costs and led to a buildup of more than 120 jets in storage.

The delivery pipeline was formally cleared Monday when the Federal Aviation Administration announced that it was satisfied with the changes Boeing had made to its production system (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-to-resume-787-dreamliner-deliveries-following-faa-clearance/)to ensure that the 787s meet all certification standards.

The plane was delivered at Boeing’s North Charleston, South Carolina, plant. In an Instagram post, American Airlines CEO Robert Isom said the jet is the first of nine the airline expects to take this year.

[Pearly White]

These aircraft are stuffed with electronics and everything is custom made, but still has to be tested and qualified. Integrating the electronics is a software intensive task.
So the price of the hulls and engines are almost irrelevant, except that the engines are also modified to allow longer refueled flights.
Agree entirely that signing up to do this on a fixed price basis was foolish, but iirc, they were really determined to keep Boeing as the builder of Air Force 1.
Who else could possibly have been in contention of the AF1 replacement? It would never go to an overseas manufacturer, surely?

[WHBM]

So you're better informed than this?

Looks like it, doesn't it ?

You see, nobody trusts PR releases any more. American may have got the title documents and have even transferred the final funds. But if the aircraft is then flown, not to the customer's base, but to a location where Boeing have a facility, it does look like it needs some more work.

Boeing AOG Victorville :

Boeing AOG is an extension of the fabled aircraft manufacturer's larger facilities that performs specialized repairs, maintenance, and modifications on Boeing aircraft. Boeing AOG also serves as a completion center for newly built aircraft requiring customized improvements.

[DaveReidUK]

Looks like it, doesn't it ?

Boeing use "delivered" to mean what the man in the street would understand as "handed over". :O

The plane was delivered at Boeing’s North Charleston, South Carolina, plant.

It flew to Victorville with an AA flight number (https://www.flightradar24.com/data/aircraft/n880bj#2d0299c8), so I guess that satisfies the lawyers and beancounters.

[Less Hair]

It went to some Boeing facility to get satelite IFE installed.