EASA Resilience

[PEI_3721]

EASA has a requirement for ‘Resilience’ training within CRM;- ORO.FC.115 Crew resource management (CRM) training, with AMCs and guidance material.

However, where and how does EASA specifically define Resilience ?

Definitions are quoted in non EASA documentation, but without any link to a specific EASA document.

[Airgus]

I would recommend you to contact John at EASA, very attentive chap
at EASA web site under community/ga

[PEI_3721]

Airgus, thanks.

I assume that this is the ‘John’ forum:-
https://www.easa.europa.eu/community/airoperations

Unfortunately my quest started here with the latest edition of AirOps news:-
https://www.easa.europa.eu/community/system/files/2021-11/Air%20Ops%20News%20November%202021.pdf

This refers to an Airbus publication on ‘resilience’ training:-
https://mms-safetyfirst.s3.eu-west-3.amazonaws.com/pdf/safety+first/training-pilots-for-resilience.pdf

Which quotes -
‘Resilience is used to qualify and evaluate human performance when faced with unexpected disruptions in operation. EASA has defined flight crew resilience as, “the ability of a flight crew member to recognize, absorb and adapt to disruptions”.’
I an unable to find the EASA definition as used by Airbus, thus my Pprune question to breakout of the EASA loop.

In addition, the Airbus article and IATA ref does not align with the EASA ORO view of residence (or at least my interpretation); e.g. mental flexibility, performance adaption (AMC1), and ability, process, …(GM5), much of which is already in some CRM teachings.
Overall, EASA’s position is confusing in using a mixture of dictionary ‘resilience’ (can this be trained) and aspects of Resilience Engineering (which considers capacity to act from systems view.)

[Mike V1Software]

Hi there,
I see you were looking for definitions re: resilience. I am researching resilience at the moment for a project we are currently working on. Would be happy to chat regarding resilience ito EBT, CRM, etc.
Best regards
Mike

[BoeingDriver99]

Hi Mike,

I would be interested in the project too.

BD

[PEI_3721]

I found a definition in EASA operational documentation, but now have mislaid the location.
This is no great loss after considering the wider academic and practical views of Resilience, which indicate (my interpretation) that the introduction of resilience development within CRM is misplaced, misapplied.

Whilst many aspects of resilience can be viewed as an extension of CRM (resilience development), CRM for management, its application fails to appreciate resilience’s basis of a systems view.
Resilience involves a new way of thinking about safety.

CRM - team safety management; Resilience - ‘system’ safety management.

Resilience is a concept, which like ‘safety’ can be considered as something to have, or something which is done. Whereas safety is more often viewed as either-or (SMS vs CRM), resilience requires the combination of both views, especially activities (thinking, adapting); and critically within a system of man-machine-environment.
The activities should be founded on Safety-II (in combination with Safety-I), with systems thinking - having a holistic viewpoint.

Resilience does not require a definition. The need is to explain the Concept of Resilience as a necessary evolution of safety management in ever increasing complex operations; as a new way of thinking, managing uncertainty.

CRM would benefit from using a Safety-II viewpoint, with emphasis on awareness and understanding, which with systems thinking could aid safety management in complex, uncertain operations.
First, a change in mindset, a new way of thinking about safety; safety management. Thence acceptance that everything is uncertain, judgements opposed to decisions, guidance opposed to regulation.
It is very difficult to impose (change) behaviour, thinking, on individuals, teams, or the overall system.
Concepts cannot be regulated, they have to be understood and embraced.

[BoeingDriver99]

Hi Mike V1Software and PEI_3721 ,

Video worth a watch if you have a free moment: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e-or_D-qNqM

[PEI_3721]

‘… worth a watch if …’ ?
The video promotes a psychological view of resilience, often seen in ‘pink and fluffy’ versions of CRM; show a video - training complete.

The concept of resilience in aviation requires specific explanation.
Resilience behaviours involve thinking, a holistic approach within an ill defined complex system.

Thinking, and thence acting, involves tacit skills.
We would not expect to be able to land an aircraft, any aircraft, in all situations and conditions after watching a video. Such behaviour involves skills, these depend on understanding the objective, the mechanism of action (an aircraft - landing; an operation - resilience), which are acquired primarily by demonstration.
Learn by watching, understand by doing, again and again, in as many scenarios as can be encountered.

“An improvement program must be directed at what you want, not what you don’t want. When you get rid of something you don’t want, you don’t necessarily get what you do want.” Ackoff.

Re previous opinion #6, misapplication of resilience;

http://www.ep.liu.se/ecp/023/002/ecp2307002.pdf
and
https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=9061001&fileOId=9061089

[Mike V1Software]

Thanks for posting those two documents which I have read. Both informative and both suggest that there is a somewhat of a disconnect between the regulatory authorities, operators and the individual actually performing the tasks (pilots in this instance).

Resilience, in my mind, can be both systems resilience (operator resilience) and individual resilience (pilot). Operator resilience is about the organizations ability to absorb disruptions and is more systems dependent, albeit combined with individuals performing the required tasks who are no doubt influenced by their own individual resilience. A pilot's resilience is dependent on the individual. Personally, I am researching resilience regarding pilots as both IATA/ICAO and EASA suggest that resilience is an output of Evidence Based Training (EBT) ie: a pilot signed out as proficient in an approved EBT training program should be resilient - that's the theory at least. We have developed an EBT system for an operator (going into final user test 1 July 2020) and in our research of EBT we discovered resilience. Therefore, if a resilient pilot is a product of an EBT operator how do you measure resilience, or do you even need to measure it? The easy answer is just not to measure it, but is that right?

Interestingly, Airbus (Safety First, Training Pilots for Resilience, October 2021) suggest that pilot resilience is dependent on their competency and their confidence. NASA (Wing, et al, 2020) assert that the attributes required for resilience include Anticipate, Monitor, Respond and Learn. A little more detail on these attributes:- Anticipate future events or situations,
- Monitor both its own performance and environmental factors,
- Respond to expected and unexpected events, and to
- Learn from experience

Furthermore, a lot of the research around pilot resilience revolves around the 'startle' effect. This is appropriate and required in the context of aviation. However, I would suggest that pilot resilience is also affected by operational challenges encountered on the day eg: pax late boarding, additional cargo requiring weight-and-balance re-calcs, adverse weather, ATC challenges, etc., etc. On top of that how does fatigue affect pilot resilience?

The big question in my mind can resilience be measured?

Best regards
Mike

[Mike V1Software]

BoeingDriver99 you are welcome to contact me to discuss your thesis on resilience. Sent you a mail with my email address

[PEI_3721]

Mike, ‘a disconnect in regulation’, I agree, but what to do about it.

Your ‘definitions’, constrain resilience; a problem with this is the loss the systems viewpoint, and a tendency to revert to old views of safety management.
The view of the individual (pilot), could be visualised as a system with analogy using the SHELL model. The simple human centred radial connections (HF CRM), would be joined up to form a system of all of elements interacting with each other, - a ‘system’ spiders web. In addition, a systems view is required for all of the factors within each element. Perhaps the concept maps (page 27 -) in the ‘Reliance on Resilience’ ref attempts to consider this - but these are not systems maps
A crew view (CRM) would consist of two or more interconnected and interacting SHELL diagrams with increasing complexity.

Using the same analogy, an operator or regulator ‘system’ would have to encompass every aspect of every diagram, every element, etc, etc. Hence Hollnagel’s intractable system, uncertainty in everything.
From this the need is to manage uncertainty in operations. This would involve the attributes which you identify, but they could be better considered as capacities, potential for managing uncertainty, before, during, and after the fact.

The behaviour associated with these (tacit) capacities is difficult to impart in training; and should not be, (cannot be), measured. This questions the use of ‘Evidence’ based training, opposed to a need for ‘Experience’, improved knowledge and judgement in uncertainty, adding to the way we think. These critically start with awareness - situational understanding.
Outward behaviour might be observed, but this requires simulation of an uncertain situation. Although potentials cannot be seen directly they might be discussed via questioning and debriefing.
Even if instructors believe that they have created realistic (uncertain) situation, their views cannot be related to the trainees’ because there is no correct answer in uncertain situations, no predefined outcome, no SOP. It is these aspects which the industry has to appreciate in their revised thinking about safety.

It is interesting to see the differing approaches to the word ‘resilience’. Academic vs practical, the latter invariably involving compromise, which inappropriately remains under the ‘resilience’ title because that is what the regulator specified.
Thus after the search for a definition, it might better not to have one, neither to use the word resilience at all. The need for change is in safety viewpoint, thinking, how to manage uncertainty, enhance the skills of awareness, judgement, in unforeseeable situations.

“… with popularity has come noise and confusion as the label (resilience) continues to be used in multiple, diverse and, sometimes, incompatible ways.’

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David-Woods-19/publication/330116587_4_Essentials_of_resilience_revisited/links/5c2e448ba6fdccd6b58f871e/4-Essentials-of-resilience-revisited.pdf?origin=publication_detail

[BoeingDriver99]

I would say that these concepts are very much on the academic side of things and heading towards abstract to the point of not being usable in any form. "The behaviour associated with these (tacit) capacities is difficult to impart in training; and should not be, (cannot be), measured." This is great to note in academia but of no practical use in training and flight safety. I detect a hint of post-modernism in that direction.

The system of commercial aviation as we know it is constrained by it's own environment, regulations and the people involved and any attempts to reduce risk/improve safety/proactively get ahead of the black swan event have to be thought of, created and implemented within such a framework. Straying outside of that framework is great for thought experiments but unless it can be broken down into implementable ideas then it is of no practical use.

However at the same time; as we reach a point were the engineering side of things means that the failures are more and more likely to be human-led there is a need for aviation safety systems and regulatory authorities to update their thinking and drag themselves into the 21st century - EBT being a prime example of that.

Also I think that a lot of safety discussions in an abstract and practical sense focus on the 'system' being update and applied to the 'user/pilot' and does not take into account the variability in the 'user'. Pilots are not all the same, with the same skills, motivations, intelligence and resilience. Training and recruitment needs to start taking these factors into consideration.

[PEI_3721]

Boeing, significant agreement with your views, however:

- given the extent and speed of change, and increasing complexity in operation, the industry must do more than just note academia, not dismiss it without thought. Academics provide many theories, industry holds the responsibility to translate these into practical activity.

- we should not expect to have a neat, practical solution when considering complex situations.*
Improved understanding is required to help think about issues in different way, to learn, monitor, etc.

- “… failures are more and more likely to be human-led”. A significant aspect of changing our thinking about safety is to consider joint activity; the human-machine as an entity, or with wider interaction, as a system; view the human as a help within the overall system.

- a system focus should include the variability in operations, also the ambiguities and assumptions, but not to seek a human focussed solution.
What if pilot selection, training, operational performance have reached an ill defined limit due to the complexity of modern operational situations, systematic interactions.
We should not expect to ‘improve’ the human, instead understand, adapt the system to the human. (James Reason)

The EASA implementation of Resilience in CRM appears to have mis-judged these points. Inappropriate focus on the human.

- “… safety systems and regulatory authorities to update their thinking” :ok:
They themselves, and then all of us must adopt the concept of Resilience, use holistic (systems) thinking, embrace safety-II, before expecting any meaningful change within the industry.

Resilience is a process looking for viewpoints from which to aid safety.

Is current safety management activity hindering the view by considering resiliences as a solution opposed to activity with a new perspective ?

http://scpsystem.weebly.com/uploads/2/1/3/3/21333498/jake_chapman_-_introduction_to_systems_thinking.pdf
Are current systems of safety management and regulation contributing to the problem - the ‘mess’.

* http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Connecting_the_dots_-_web-2.pdf
We should be gardeners, not architects; tend to what we have, avoid partially effective, costly destabilising interventions.

[alf5071h]

The recordings from the EASA Safety Week 2022, which included SMS / Resilience, are now available online:
https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLYhk72r7SyLJYRwD-J-yCeA5MJHZ3cXUY

There did not appear to be very much content directly relating to resilience, none for CRM.

The SMS aspect of resilience focused on the recovery from covid, etc, which by implication those operators who are still in business must have been resilient. However, there was no indication of how that was achieved nor what might be learnt about the concept of resilience.

[PEI_3721]

The document below is a view of (or around) the subject.
It identifies the need to change our view of safety in complex adaptive systems - all operations. There are indictions of a Safety-II mindset and holistic thinking which relate to ‘resilience’ (defined but not used).

https://flightsafety.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/LAO-safety-in-an-uncertain-world_rev1.pdf

[safetypee]

The roots of the ‘How Operators Can Create Safety in an Uncertain World’ are in a previous “Defining Resilience’ article:-
https://flightsafety.org/asw-article/defining-resilience/

Th Aero Safety article retains the old view of safety opposed to a new view, Safety-II, and also divides resilience amongst individual/teams and the organisation, overlooking the important ‘system’, combined view.
Resilience is defined from a dictionary, organisational management view without correlation to aviation. (The subsequent article corrects that).
Many training aspects are already within CRM or EBT. The focus is on ‘safety events’ - risk, old safety, opposed to the adaptation required to continue to manage normal operations; thus a drift towards failure in examples.

‘How Operators Can Create Safety in an Uncertain World’ lacks emphasis on the need and extent of change, quoting “… a move to support safety management”, “… not a wholesale change”; whereas other ‘Resilience’ and ‘Safety-II’ texts emphasise ‘a change from … to’, proposing a new way of thinking about safety management.

The text misrepresents the concept of a complex adaptive system; ‘expected events are not necessarily just ordered (complicated), nor all unexpected events complex - they are just unexpected.
Accepting uncertainty is important, but the emphasis on understanding complexity (can it ever be understood) detracts from the need support the human in adjusting to the uncertainties in normal operations, by understanding why normal operations succeed; the awareness, knowledge, choice of action. Seeking to achieve more of what goes right.

This document has value, if only as another view of the concept of Resilience which is difficult to comprehend and apply, but don't expect to be able to ‘create safety’ based on this, if ever.

However as a ‘foundational support document’, it appears to be misplaced by locating it within the ‘Learning from all operations’ initiative - more on that later.

[safetypee]

An recent interesting view from EuroControl

‘Building a Basis for Resilient Performance’

Note the revised ‘working’ definition of Resilience, page 8, and the emphasis on activity.
and that Resilience is “an investment to facilitate that things go well,” which is closely associated with Safety-II

https://safetysynthesis.com/onewebmedia/SPM%20%28ECT%29%20Web.pdf

[PEI_3721]

Perhaps it isn't so surprising that the working industry has difficulties with these concepts, where apparently the academics also have problems in understanding / implementation;-

In particular:-
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/3kdztka0jke1g6r/AADD4ci14wGVnIIJxtqrOASpa?dl=0&preview=Shorrock+2.pdf

All presentations:-
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/3kdztka0jke1g6r/AADD4ci14wGVnIIJxtqrOASpa?dl=0

From the meeting;-
https://humanisticsystems.com/5th-international-workshop-on-safety-ii-in-practice-towards-a-unified-approach-to-all-operations/

[alf5071h]

Resilience Engineering news letter March 2023; aviation content.

https://www.resilience-engineering-association.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/REA_Newsletter14_March2023.pdf

Note:
Gitte Furdal Damm; many of our adaptations have become normal.
Where is EASA Safety II, do they still believe in it; need to adapt SMS.

Laura Maguire; continuous contextual learning.
… learning becomes knowledge about how the system functions under different conditions.

Tom Laursen; Two views of procedures, the need for change.
EuroControl leading aviation again.

Burnell and Waites; a difficult read, but some valuable ideas … an approach to learning grounded in the belief that context is the most important element of any data collected.

[safetypee]

A compact and readable introduction and explanation for Safety-I and Safety-II, and Resilient Engineering in safety management. FRAM is briefly discussed; perhaps better suited to the professional analysts, but many similarities with systems thinking.

"Safety-II and Resilience Engineering in a Nutshell: An Introductory Guide to Their Concepts and Methods"
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2093791120303619?ref=pdf_download&fr=RR-2&rr=7e0d73f0cfd5067a
(view pdf)


Also a good range of references;
e.g. 'The imperfections of accident analysis'. https://www.icheme.org/media/12669/lpb270_pg02.pdf

,

[john_tullamarine]

Once again, good sir, thank you for your citations.

[safetypee]

A short video presentation (with transcript) including Resilience via Simple / Complex Systems.
In https://thenewview.com.au - select Resources

This is a gentle guide arriving at Resilience towards the end, but importantly arguing the need for a change in thinking about safety management - regulators take note.

Copy of transcript - Simple vs Complex Thinking: Safety Science Essentials 1 – Introduction

https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/ms41m7smzg94oo23w8rje/Simple-vs-Complex-Thinking-Safety-Science-Essentials-1-Introduction.pdf?rlkey=vvpl3ecmlkiavdjtwcsu5a3v6&dl=0

To revisit the referenced Rasmussen’s model - which again identifies the need to adjust to modern views of safety management (at least sections 1 and 2), see:

http://rib.msb.se/filer/pdf/16252.pdf

[PEI_3721]

Although the title of the paper includes Resilience, it relates more to conventional deffinitions.
Yet there is value by presenting Resilience from a risk based view.

"The pursuit of resilience involves risk management."

Judgement
… 'uncertainty is qualified by probability'
… 'on judgments that cannot be objectively validated'

"Resilience is a skill acquired through experience"

"Resilience is not calculable. Unquantifiable, disputable, and disputed judgment will remain central to its pursuit."

http://john-adams.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/The-pursuit-of-resilience.pdf

[safetypee]

Part 1 of the ref below considers resilience from a more conventional definition. However, when read in combination with Risk, Uncertainty, and Decision Making, it provides a practical overview of safety activity.
See page 13, but the overall document has significant safety value.

" Resilience is in some ways the counter to vulnerability. It is defined as being shock-ready, and having the ability to resist, survive, adapt and/or even thrive … "

" This requires knowledge of the hazards, and having the skills needed to anticipate and cope with the demands and changing circumstances they may encounter. "

" There are risks we take (choosing an action in the view that the benefit outweighs possible harm), and there are risks we face (those we don’t choose but have to deal with). When facing risks we try to protect ourselves; when taking risks we look for advantage, but also need to prepare for possible failure … "

Whilst SMS is more about the protection from risk, Resilience is aligned with preparedness and managing the limitations of SMS, the unforeseen hazards and surprises, and incomprehensible events ( Shock - a sudden, disruptive event with an important and often negative impact on a system/s and its assets. Page 11, note systems view )

" risk - the effect of uncertainty on objectives. "

This view of Resilience aligns more with safety management (organisational and individual) than with the CRM training required by EASA.
Yet the second document covers the subjects in more depth it also has greater relevance to CRM. In particular: perceptions, heuristics and biases, judgement, and the influence of media on science or web based information, and of course forums like this one.

" A worldview is a particular philosophy, or collection of beliefs, about life and the universe that is held by an individual or a group. We use the term to indicate the overall perspective from which one sees and interprets the world. "

Ref: 'Making decisions in the face of uncertainty: Understanding risk'

https://www.apothecaries.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Ethics-and-Risk_Part-1.pdf

https://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2021-10/pmcsa-Risk-paper-2-Nov-2016-.pdf

Part 3 of the series may not have been published - yet ?

[PEI_3721]

The thesis -
How is anticipation, as part of system resilience, operationalised on the flight deck, and to what extent does the regulation facilitate it? answers the questions in this thread.

It has practical value throughout - Introduction, Findings, Discussion and Conclusion; then Resilience, CRM, Training. There might not be agreement about everything, but that is part of the issue.

This is 'the' document which should be sent to EASA - the problems with current regulation, work as imagined vs work as done.

https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=9140012&fileOId=9140014

[safetypee]

'Thinking in Systems', (https://wtf.tw/ref/meadows.pdf from 'websites'), has a section on Resilience - page 76 onwards.

This relates key resilient aspects to feedback loops in systems.
It identifies the need to manage resilience, implying there is intrinsic resilience to start with, although we may not have identified the factors as such.

Part one provides the foundations for systems thinking.

Part two relates aspects of human behaviour, e.g rationality page 105.

A bullet-point summary for 'systems' - page 188 onwards.

[safetypee]

This post might be better presented as a poll; if so, mods (JT) please help.

The document (33 slides) - https://speakerdeck.com/stevenshorrock/so-what-should-we-do-challenges-and-opportunities-for-resilience-engineering-and-safety-ii-in-practice asks, …

“What are your experiences of the key challenges and opportunities for Resilience Engineering and Safety-II as a practitioner?”

The collated views of the 'practitioners' (slide11) are listed below:-

Given the discussion in this thread, how do front line operators agree or otherwise with these findings ?
Any differences between regulatory authorities; EASA, FAA, Other ?
-

The term ‘resilience’ is often seen as an individual trait
There is limited understanding of the concepts of RE and S-II
Theoretical writings aren’t always helpful
Resilience Engineering and Safety-II
The practical application of RE and S-II is opaque or difficult
There is a lack of evidence of effectiveness
The dominant paradigm, collective mindset or common focus is a barrier
There are entrenched and conflicting legacy approaches
The need is not evident or the value is unclear
There is a lack of resources (competency, time, money)
RE and S-II ideas are understood, appreciated and talked about
RE and S-II offer a better explanation of the world
Practical opportunities to learn and move toward a better understanding of work
(Few) Opportunities for usable and practical methods
(Few) Opportunities to develop expertise in RE and S-II

Note general observations and what might be done (31/32), is this being done ?

[safetypee]

A short article which argues that resilience is natural; at least for the human contribution (sharp and blunt ends), to system resilience.

'It’s pretty evident that safety thinking has to evolve and cope with an ever more complex environment. But survival in challenging environments is what humans evolved to do best.'

'So let’s stop arguing. Resilience is natural, it’s essential. We’ve always had it – let’s use it intelligently.'

The missing aspect is how; the 'how-to' use resilience involving thinking, using our brain, improving the way we think about safety in operations, but this might assume that we are allowed to think in a controlling, SOP dominated safety culture.

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David-Slater/publication/341977017_Resilience_is_Natural/links/5edb90d7299bf1c67d477850/Resilience-is-Natural.pdf?origin=publication_detail

Slides from a related presentation ('Think', slide 19):-

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/David-Slater/publication/361373379_Safety_II_The_mindset_of_tomorrow_What_is_it_Learn ing_from_normal_operations_Building_operational_Resilience_G uided_Adaptability/links/62ac9cff938bee3e3f3c1d8e/Safety-II-The-mindset-of-tomorrow-What-is-it-Learning-from-normal-operations-Building-operational-Resilience-Guided-Adaptability.pdf?origin=publication_detail

[safetypee]

'Rethinking The Fifth Discipline'; R. L. Flood
A book about 'Resilience', but doesn't uses the word.
About individual and organisational safety, but not like any other.
A book about Systems Thinking, where the sub title better describes it value;

'Learning within the unknowable'

Download from: https://epdf.tips/rethinking-the-fifth-discipline-learning-within-the-unknowable.html
- or
https://epdf.tips/search/Rethinking+The+Fifth+Discipline%3A+learning+within+the+unkno wable%2FRobert+Louis+Flood

Part 1 reviews Senge's book 'The Fifth Discipline', and briefly introduces eminent historical views of Systems (Systemic) Thinking - complexity, but with sufficient explanation to more than satisfy a cursory view.

Part 2 provides comprehensive presentation of many human related safety issues. Aspects of Resilience, HF, Airmanship, are embedded in the book without identification, thus provide a satisfying challenge to collate the components, which irrespective of individual viewpoint are all there.
An opportunity to change our thinking, to learn within the 'unknowable'.

Author's reflections:
"I was taught that concluding a book on ‘management and organisation’ normally is not very difficult. The task is to tie up, round off, and crystallise the argument. The book is reduced in this way to an island of thought on which the reader, if convinced, may build their future.
With systemic thinking, conversely, comes an ocean of ideas that is a medium for many currents of thought that give rise to endless tides of appreciation. It is a way of thinking that sets out to erode islands of thought and certainly cannot be reduced to one. So, I am unable to offer you a conclusion as such. Instead, I urge you to see the image on the front cover of this book. And I urge you to listen to the echoes and re-echoes passing between the covers of this book. Then you will see and hear, again and again, that:

We will not struggle to manage over things – we will manage within the unmanageable.
We will not battle to organise the totality – we will organise within the unorganisable
We will not simply know things – but we will know of the unknowable.

I find these three paradoxes of systemic thinking mightily thought provoking. If they were embraced by human kind, then surely we would witness profound changes in the way we conceive ourselves as a species on planet Earth and the way we handle ourselves in everyday life. And the amazing thing is that the kind of transformation I am talking about has no need for or call to a ‘religious conversion’, just a humble awakening to the realisation that really we don’t know very much about anything and actually never will."

[PEI_3721]

" In terms of resilience, the current EASA regulation on Crew Resource Management (CRM) appears somewhat vague and has a flavour of a compromise and reductionism.
While it outlines the "what," it falls short in explaining the "how."
It presents resilience as an individual's property, without receiving support from human factors and system safety research.
The airline training manager's perspective is heavily influenced by compliance with the regulation, shaping how instructors in the organization perceive resilience.
As a result, there is no clear and consistent definition of resilience among the individual instructors."

Quote from -
https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=9140012&fileOId=9140014

How do these views, the discussion and findings, in this thesis correlate with Pprune operators experience; a wider international section of the industry ?



Also see: 'Safety, Leaders, and Learning. A Practical Guide to HOP'
How to Implement …

https://www.norskindustri.no/hms-og-ia/human-organisational-performance-hop/safety-leadership-and-learning--a-practical-guide-to-hop/

and Learning;
https://alwayssafe.no/en/

[PEI_3721]

Not classic 'Resilience' … , but the subject is embedded in the link; as is CRM, Systems Thinking, foresight, uncertainty, and much more.

"Knowing how to think empowers you far beyond those who know only what to think."

… this helps ensure that we are resilient, flexible and adaptable and that we can take advantage of new advances in time to make a difference.

"Our ability to prepare, to anticipate and to be agile in the face of rapid change means we can manage risk by mitigating the impact we have on each other and our environment. Ultimately, saving and improving lives."

… a willingness to embrace uncertainty, failure and the future through their culture and values are more likely to be resilient and adaptable. If we prepare well for the future, we improve and enhance the present too.

'Unfogging the Future'

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/615447e1e90e077a2cbdf420/Dstl_Unfogging_the_Future_v7_FINAL_RGB_ONLINE_VERSION.pdf

Don't miss the 'Extra Bites' references and tool kits

[PEI_3721]

The title of this paper might not be an eye-catching, attention grabbing headline requiring action, but this text could be one of the most valuable contributions to safety management in modern times.

Resilience emerges at the end, almost as it had to be mentioned; however in context, the paper seeks to enhance resilience. Similarly it relates to High Reliability, and the need to understand how work is done.

A very thoughtful and thought provoking paper, which should be read and reviewed more than once; complexity evolves, risk changes, thus continually revisit the views of risk, less we use fantasy planning.

'Fantasy Planning'; Hutchinson, Dekker, Rae
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ben-Hutchinson-4/publication/325395758_Fantasy_planning_the_gap_between_systems_of_safety _and_safety_of_systems/links/5b0b4cfc4585157f871ad571/Fantasy-planning-the-gap-between-systems-of-safety-and-safety-of-systems.pdf
(select join researchgate for free)

From some of the references:

'No Safety in Numbers: Persistence of Biases and Their Effects on Team Risk Perception and Team Decision Making.'

Because individuals can have cognitive biases that lower their perceptions of decision risk, some suggest that teams, not individuals, should make decisions. Prior research, however, has not explored whether a team’s risk perception is affected by information-processing biases that are similar to the cognitive biases that individuals exhibit. This study examines whether three biases—the law of small numbers bias, illusion of control, and overconfidence—influence perception of risk of a first move at the team and individual levels. It was found that the law of small numbers and illusion of control decreased the risk perception at both levels and that the law of small numbers had a significantly greater effect on team risk perception than on individual risk perception. In contrast, the effect of overconfidence was not significant at any level.

'Examining the asymptote in safety progress: A literature review'
https://safety177496371.wordpress.com/2021/07/05/examining-the-asymptote-in-safety-progress-a-literature-review (https://safety177496371.wordpress.com/2021/07/05/examining-the-asymptote-in-safety-progress-a-literature-review/)
Many industries are confronted by plateauing safety performance as measured by the absence of negative events, particularly lower-consequence incidents or injuries. At the same time, these industries are sometimes surprised by large fatal accidents that seem to have no connection with their understanding of the risks they faced; or with how they were measuring safety. This article reviews the safety literature to examine how both these surprises and the asymptote are linked to the very structures and practices organizations have in place to manage safety. The article finds that safety practices associated with compliance, control and quantification could be partly responsible. These can create a sense of invulnerability through safety performance close to zero; organizational resources can get deflected into unproductive or counterproductive initiatives; obsolete practices for keeping human performance within a pre-specified bandwidth are sustained; and accountability relationships can encourage suppression of the 'bad news' necessary to learn and improve.

http://sidneydekker.stackedsite.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/899/2016/02/DekkerPitzer2016.pdf

'Safety Management in a World Beyond Simplification'
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/safety-management-world-beyond-simplification-martijn-flinterman-6vvpe?utm_source=share&utm_medium=member_ios&utm_campaign=share_via

[olster]

I would be very interested to know how these seemingly abstract and predominantly academic concepts can be conveyed to the average airline pilot. I must hasten to add that the average airline pilot generally has an intelligent brain that has to hold quite a bit of technical and operational information on a routine basis. I speak as a current instructor active within EBT and after asking crews to define resilience there is unlikely to be consensus. Unfortunately we are human beings, not robots and it appears that this highly theoretical way of thinking is actually a condition that is built into humans naturally; ie we all have a certain amount of resilience in built that increases with experience (not just flying) and exposure to events, simulated or real. I am most certainly not a Luddite and as I am supposed to deliver EBT I have a vested interest in knowing definitions and how to deliver training effectively but I am not sure what we are trying to achieve. Resilience did not save AF447 but an understanding of aerodynamics and stall recovery procedures particularly at high altitude might have.

[john_tullamarine]

Perhaps you might follow Centaurus's path (among others). John has collected a voluminous quantity of useful reports etc., over the years. It is his practice to distribute copies to students for reading information. Obviously, not all students bother reading them but, for those who do, there be some benefits.

[alf5071h]

A major problem with resilience depends on how it is defined; this is where training discussion starts from - as questioned in post #1.

The EASA view, and other individual training initiatives consider Resilience as something the human will have, thus should be trained. As a continuing evolution of individual HF, team CRM, and thence resilient human performance for uncertain, complex situations.

Alternatively most of the academic views consider Resilience as a capacity of a system.

The distinction is identified by the term Resilience Engineering - how to construct a safety management system for a complex and uncertain future. This requires a change in safety thinking, revised views of safety management, new vs old view of safety, SI and SII, which as yet is not happening, and something where regulators have to lead - adapt their thoughts about safety management.

Arguably, individual and team training is approaching a limit of effectiveness; flatlining safety statistics, difficulty in measuring results based on failure in a safe industry - fewer accidents. Further training, if at all, has to evolve from how to avoid failing, to how to succeed in unforeseeable situations. This might focus on aspects of individual surprise and risk management, not seeking to change behaviour, but manage it; also consider how natural human resilence can complement a system as an adaptive component.

The need of a new paradigm for safety management (Resilience Engineering) is well represented in several papers, but again arguably, not yet adapted possible because of the current high level of safety, no need to change - but we should not have to wait for the surprising events - proactive safety management.

AF 447 discussions are a good example of the differing viewpoints.

- Errant human behaviour, old safety, SI, more training, … (a confusing view of personal resilience)

- A systems view; how-come the previous 20 or so events did not result in an accident, even with some similar human behaviour initially. What was learnt about human performance from these events?

The conclusion was that the ADS design in rare situations was not as assumed by certification, and thus required to be changed. The focus was technical.
Alternatively a joint tech, human, situational system view might have provided better interim safety intervention; crews did not respond as assumed by the checklist, but did recover, changed activity. e.g. simulator training for unreliable airspeed flight actions, vs the awareness of do nothing - read the checklist and reassess the situation (not economic use of a simulator).

[PEI_3721]

This thread has been and continues to be an education; adding knowledge and improving understanding.
Searching for definitions can distract from the need for action in a changing world.

Instead of separating the human from the system (# 35), consider concentric systems (Russian dolls).
Individuals as a system (HF), groups, teams, crews a larger system (CRM), then these within organisations (SMS), all within an industry - Resilience.

EASA has chosen to consider Resilience by starting with CRM, as an aspect of individual or team behaviour; this is of little value as CRM is already taught. Furthermore, Resilience at the HF/CRM level could be detrimental unless the higher levels have previously accepted the concept, i.e. an operator engages with Safety II (SI + SII), but the regulator retains a Safety I mindset.

There is need of Resilience in SMS because of increasing complexity; this should be applied at organisational level it would be better supported if regulators first adopted the concept in their activities.

It is not necessary for the individuals / teams ('inner dolls') within the larger system to apply the academic views, use them as supporting information.

The safety benefit from Resilience must be understood and applied in all safety management systems; without this, then much of what the lower levels do to improve safety has little benefit and adds confusion.
The need is for adaptive safety leadership suitable for the future world; EASA may have misunderstood the concept or misused it in starting with CRM; first look at safety regulation.

[john_tullamarine]

This thread has been and continues to be an education; adding knowledge and improving understanding.

Hear, hear !