Boeing pilot involved in Max testing is indicted in Texas

[WideScreen]

But then I would assume you also would need a competently different flight control computer architecture. On B737 each AoA sensor is afaik connected to each own FCC, if a FCC in one side fails, then the FCC in the other side can't access AoA data from the failed side. If an AoA sensor fails, then it need algorithms for identifying the faulted sensor, isolate it, and and likely also an EICAS display to convey this information to the pilots.
Ehhh, yes, it is not without reason, many people here write that the MAX should never have been designed and a clean-sheet restart should have been taken by Boeing. But, alas, that takes retraining, time, money and a loss of market share, due to being far too late with new developments at Boeing (in favor of shareholder pay-outs).

[GlobalNav]

The short answer is that some level of redundancy would probably have been required to meet the 10-7 requirement - there is sometimes a case for a single thread "Hazardous" system, but you need reems of historical data to back up the reliability claims - the AoA sensor simply doesn't have the level of reliability. Catastrophic must have redundancy - both the FAA and EASA are on record as not accepting probability arguments for single failures for systems with catastrophic consequences.
In addition, if the system had been judged to be Hazardous or Catastrophic, it would have received far more scrutiny from the feds - since 'Major' is considered to be a big deal, they don't tend to look at them very closely.

Precisely!

[tdracer]

But then I would assume you also would need a competently different flight control computer architecture. On B737 each AoA sensor is afaik connected to each own FCC, if a FCC in one side fails, then the FCC in the other side can't access AoA data from the failed side. If an AoA sensor fails, then it need algorithms for identifying the faulted sensor, isolate it, and and likely also an EICAS display to convey this information to the pilots.
Why? The revised MCAS logic uses both AoA inputs (and IIRC, will be updated with a synthetic AoA calculation at some future point) and they didn't need change the basic architecture for the update.

[WideScreen]

Why? The revised MCAS logic uses both AoA inputs (and IIRC, will be updated with a synthetic AoA calculation at some future point) and they didn't need change the basic architecture for the update.
Actually, my understanding is, MCAS-1 were 2 independent systems L/R, which did not communicate, but with only some kind of logic to switch-over on airplane boot-up. With MCAS-2, these systems now communicate with each-other to interact about (at least) the presumed health of the AoA input values. With one AoA input out of action, the AoA issue handling is returned to the pilot, according Boeing philosophy.

Regarding the synthetic AoA, this has been "agreed", though also tied to the MAX -10 (maybe also the -7) appearance. No -10 and the synthetic AoA might end up with a premature death. The FAA will be having weak knees, due to Congressional pressure, though It has to be seen, what EASA and China think about this. It was EASA, which was firmly after the 3rd AoA sensor, with the degrade compromise, it might be synthetic.

[Uplinker]

I will stop after this but I’m not having it.

Requirements always come from somewhere else. That’s not special.

You don’t take a stupid requirement.

You don’t expect a civil engineer to take a stupid design from an architect. Seldom the same company.

You don’t expect the engine manufacturer to take a dangerous design from the airframe manufacturer. Not the same company.

The fact that it comes from a different place does not relieve your responsibility to understand and interpret it.

There is no universe, regardless ALL the things you said, in which commanding AND indefinitely forever makes sense. It’s fundamentally stupid.

No.

In other areas of industry, there are arms manufacturers, who make machines and devices specifically designed to kill people. With your logic, nobody would manufacture arms, because that would be "stupid", but sadly, here we are.

Architects have also made mistakes, and civil engineers have built them; Quite a few bridge and building collapses in history show that. And most recently in my recollection; the Grenfell Tower fire in London UK, where the insulation used in the construction of that tower-block was highly flammable. One day, a fire broke out and because of the flammable insulation, it rapidly spread and there was significant loss of life.

A software programmer might not have any idea about how aircraft fly, or what a pilot might or might not do with an aircraft. They might just be given a brief that, (in very simple terms); in situation X; if Y happens, the result needs to be Z.

A staff programmer with aviation experience and knowledge of aircraft failure modes etc, might possibly raise concerns or even objections, but they would be told by their bosses that this is what we want. Or maybe they were convinced by the competent pilot argument. But even then; they would not necessarily know that MCAS was not going to be even mentioned in the FCOM.

[WideScreen]

In other areas of industry, there are arms manufacturers, who make machines and devices specifically designed to kill people. With your logic, nobody would manufacture arms, because that would be "stupid", but sadly, here we are.
Actually, arms serve a "higher" goal, even for the dictators, who want to expand their territory (Hitler, Putin, Xi).

.....
A software programmer might not have any idea about how aircraft fly, or what a pilot might or might not do with an aircraft. They might just be given a brief that, (in very simple terms); in situation X; if Y happens, the result needs to be Z.
That's not really how it works with software development. A proper software development gradually goes in steps from application experts to the factual coders. All guided/driven by a huge amount of documents in stepwise refinement/detailing, with continuous backtracking to correct on errors at the more abstract levels.

A staff programmer with aviation experience and knowledge of aircraft failure modes etc, might possibly raise concerns or even objections, but they would be told by their bosses that this is what we want. Or maybe they were convinced by the competent pilot argument. But even then; they would not necessarily know that MCAS was not going to be even mentioned in the FCOM.
What Boeing did was compartmentalize the whole MAX development, where the software got spec'd and subcontracted to India, implemented (probably some "easy" updates on the original version) by engineers without suitable aviation knowledge, "just a programming job", black box programming, paid the absolute minimum, etc. The less interaction there is in the whole development chain, the cheaper it is, though also the fewer chances there are, fundamental functional issues are detected along the way. Which happened.

[tdracer]

Actually, my understanding is, MCAS-1 were 2 independent systems L/R, which did not communicate, but with only some kind of logic to switch-over on airplane boot-up. With MCAS-2, these systems now communicate with each-other to interact about (at least) the presumed health of the AoA input values. With one AoA input out of action, the AoA issue handling is returned to the pilot, according Boeing philosophy.

Regarding the synthetic AoA, this has been "agreed", though also tied to the MAX -10 (maybe also the -7) appearance. No -10 and the synthetic AoA might end up with a premature death. The FAA will be having weak knees, due to Congressional pressure, though It has to be seen, what EASA and China think about this. It was EASA, which was firmly after the 3rd AoA sensor, with the degrade compromise, it might be synthetic.
But my point is they did all that without a major change to the avionic architecture - had the MCAS hazard category been properly identified during the original development, they could have fixed it within the existing avionic architecture.
My understanding is that the third AoA is a hard agreement with EASA - so Boeing needs to come up with something if they expect to keep delivering MAX aircraft in the EASA world. Congress has already approved an extension for the MAX-10, so I'm pretty sure that program will stay intact. As for China, with the current state of relations between the US and China, I think Boeing has pretty much given up on future China deliveries of the MAX (my understanding is that China still hasn't approved the MCAS fix and lifted the MAX grounding).

[MechEngr]

Had the AoA subsystem been identified as unacceptably producing the incorrect information 30+ years ago MCAS would have not been the discussion point it is today. But everyone thought that passing along false data and even creating false stall warnings was OK. Every pundit has said that the cacophony from the false stall warning distracted the pilots from noticing the MCAS activity - however if the false AoA data was properly identified then that data would have been marked invalid and not passed to MCAS to work with.

No one in India worked on flight software for Boeing. That was subcontracted to an American company.

China is apparently building their own copies of the 737. No need to buy them anymore.

[WideScreen]

But my point is they did all that without a major change to the avionic architecture - had the MCAS hazard category been properly identified during the original development, they could have fixed it within the existing avionic architecture.
Yes, I think, you are 100% right about that.

The issue is, why did this happen ? Were the engineers "just dumb", or were the engineers creating the spec just not allow to "discuss" these items with the ones asking for the spec ? Given the way Boeing did compartmentalize the engineers into their own small area of attention, all communication between the areas going through "management", it just kills the human ingenuity to find out "something is missing". In this case, the implicit transition to a higher hazard category was missed / prevented to spread out further.

We do have the Forkner chat messages, which in itself not only give factual information, though also reveal a huge amount of personal frustration. Frustration, that, to my judgement, is highly related to the lack of opportunities he has to "report" issues and when reported, nothing is done with it, he is ignored (and sent on a mission towards customers to lie further about these items).
My understanding is that the third AoA is a hard agreement with EASA - so Boeing needs to come up with something if they expect to keep delivering MAX aircraft in the EASA world. Congress has already approved an extension for the MAX-10, so I'm pretty sure that program will stay intact.
Yep, the MAX-10 certification period extension is active and then "officially" the synthetic AoA is to be implemented.

However, whenever possible, Boeing will quite likely try to wiggle out of that. It costs money to create, they don't consider it necessary (try raising a teenager), etc. with their revised mission, finding the (US) airlines on their side, since the third/synthetic AoA will change the cockpit GUI and as such, will require training across the board (with the additional risk, the B737 family commonality might be degraded/influenced).

As for China, with the current state of relations between the US and China, I think Boeing has pretty much given up on future China deliveries of the MAX (my understanding is that China still hasn't approved the MCAS fix and lifted the MAX grounding).
The resurrection of the B737 MAX in China seems to have started, just a few days ago:

Reuters: Boeing says 11 Chinese airlines have resumed operating B737 MAX (https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-says-11-chinese-airlines-have-resumed-operating-737-max-2023-04-11/).

Though one Taiwan "mishap" and China may miraculously find something else to ground the B737 MAX again. In the end, it's a dictatorial state, where these instruments are being used to steer their international geopolitics. (Anybody did read the ridiculous Lula statements around Ukraine ? Guess how he would proclaim, when Argentina would capture just one square mile of the Brazilian territory, with an argument like "it would be better for the local population" .....).

[WillowRun 6-3]

WideScreen, it's very heartening to read that there are others who saw the facts of Forkner's situation, or at least some major elements of those facts (as you've noted), as not deserving prosecution, let alone conviction.

Especially after the unseemly - and unlawful (imho) - manipulation of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement process to exclude the crash victims' families in the Texas criminal case against Boeing, the efforts to hoist Mr. Forkner to twist in the wind look even more outrageous. As if the deliberate deceit after Lion Air wasn't bad enough....(and all the other things on all the other levels in which the company acted wrongly).

[WideScreen]

WideScreen, it's very heartening to read that there are others who saw the facts of Forkner's situation, or at least some major elements of those facts (as you've noted), as not deserving prosecution, let alone conviction.
This was clear to me, right from the beginning. People don't communicate in a way Forkner did, when they happily agree with the way they need to operate, on the contrary. Around the time, the Forkner case came up on PP, I did have little time to follow/write, otherwise, I would have done so.

Especially after the unseemly - and unlawful (imho) - manipulation of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement process to exclude the crash victims' families in the Texas criminal case against Boeing, the efforts to hoist Mr. Forkner to twist in the wind look even more outrageous. As if the deliberate deceit after Lion Air wasn't bad enough....(and all the other things on all the other levels in which the company acted wrongly).
TBH, I would not be surprised, there might be more, though less publicly (known), (former) Boeing employees, which have been pushed under the train, by Boeing, just to move the blame away from the company. Fired for dubious reasons.

Even Dennis Muilenburg didn't give me the impression of being happy with the take it or get fired targets he got from the shareholders and the financial stakeholders around them. Knowing, very well, that Boeing financial road would be disastrous for Boeing's long-term future. But hey, it's a good salary, good social standing, and if they want it, I'll do so.

[MechEngr]

"just to move the blame away from the company"

The company accepted full blame. What Boeing doesn't want is to have 20,000 relatives of relatives of relatives coming up with reasons they should have been considered and dragging the proceeding out for a decade.

"the deliberate deceit after Lion Air"

Source for that?

How does it compare with "They followed the procedure exactly" a year before issuing a report that showed they did not follow even a single step (because steps are order dependent) correctly?

This is what runaway stabilizer presents as on the Classic - prior to the NG - prior to the MAX - that's how old this procedure is and how training is supposed to be. Note the startling warning horn.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pPRuFHR1co

[WillowRun 6-3]

Source? for Boeing shafting the public after Lion Air? I'll assume the question is not meant as just sarcasm. . . . although I'm only citing one of several reports or court filings listing and documenting the misdeeds between Crash 1 and Crash 2.

See the court filing, "Statement by Naoise Connolly Ryan, et al., Regarding Court-Imposed Conditions of Release of Boeing Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142, filed in the criminal case in federal court in Texas. On Pacer.gov, it's easily found, case 4:21-cr-00005-O, Doc. 170, filed Jan. 25, 2023, especially pages of the filing 11-14. The court filing cites sources for substantially if not literally all the statements attributed to Boeing or its corporate officers. Though the context is advocacy to right the wrong caused by exclusion of the crash victims' families from consideration of the DPA, the filing does a neat job of collecting facts and sources. Check it out.

(Just quite briefly, I'm not trying here to dispute assertions about wrong-doing by the Ethiopian entities involved - but even if all true, none of it excuses the way the company dealt with the Lion AIir crash. Perhaps that's not your view, or perhaps it is but the logic is beyond my understanding.)

[WideScreen]

"just to move the blame away from the company"
The company accepted full blame.
They entered a "political deal" with DoJ(?) very early in the process, before the scale of the intentional Boeing actions were clear to the general public (and probably DoJ), trying to get away with a fine as low as possible (effectively just a "tip") and cover itself for future claims. This is what is now being discussed to get the original deception dropped, the case reopened and Boeing getting the proper punishment for the damage they did to the society (and the US as a whole).
What Boeing doesn't want is to have 20,000 relatives of relatives of relatives coming up with reasons they should have been considered and dragging the proceeding out for a decade.....
Yep, that is what Boeing doesn't like (bad for stocks), though, this is what society wants, and what Boeing needs to get the real punishment for their deliberate actions and the consequences of that. And, not only Boeing, but large corporations in general, to take care, that (real, not only words) care for society gets a little higher on the agenda, than only corporate profits. A concept, that is significantly better developed in the EU.

[MechEngr]

Here it is, no paywall - https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/boeing-crash-victim-statement-usdc-fort-worth.pdf

To be fair, you must not have watched the video of how trim runaway is a #1 priority for control and how easily it is managed. Because of that you didn't see that pulling the plug on the autopilot and the autothrottle were nearly reflex actions, with both pilots ensuring the throttle was set correctly with actual hands on actual levers.

What you also didn't see in the Ethiopian reports was any hint Ethiopian took even one dollar and spent it on a refresher in the simulator in response to the emergency AD.

Win-win. If they crash they get a discount and Tigray is removed from the headlines. If they don't crash they saved a few training dollars.

How a fully documented event as occurred to the Lion Air 2nd crew can be considered a "cover-up" is beyond me. Every scrap of the necessary information was in the report and every response required was in the Emergency AD.

There are a lot of things in that section of the filing they hope are relevant, but hope does not evidence or truth create.

The reason for not concentrating on AoA sensor failure is that there could be other failures that produced the same symptoms. Deal with the symptom and let the maintainers determine the cause, don't give pilots a diagnostic chart for equipment they cannot repair. There was no control rendered inoperative by MCAS, except MCAS. In contrast, the failure of the AoA system disabled the autopilot and the autothrottle - the same as has happened to Airbus at least twice. They lucked into hero pilots somehow.

Boeing knew as much as everyone about it after the preliminary report - no airline took the planes out of service, no CAA questioned the Emergency AD or the FCOM update. It must be quite a shock that engineers looking at how the trim runaway is to be managed would not expect a crew doing every wrong action possible as the ET-302 crew did. A winding cliff-side road, a low tire - push the gas pedal to the floor and yank the wheel as hard towards the precipice as possible. Even Lion Air was going OK as long as the captain was in charge - he retrimmed 20 times before letting the FO have at it.

"Boeing’s internal Safety Review Board had identified an ongoing “airplane safety issue” " There is a reason the lawyers didn't mention in the complaint what that issue was. Is it because it had nothing to do with the two crash causes?

And here is the lawyer lie:


Mr. Forkner: [...] MCAS is now active down to M .2. It's running rampant in the sim on me
Mr. Gustavsson: Oh great, that means we have to update the speed trim description in vol 2
Mr. Forkner: so I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly) [...] granted, I suck at flying, but even this was egregious/

That exchange describes what happened in Lion Air and Ethiopian Air.
The men and women who are gathered here with the photos of your loved ones—
346 people are dead because [of] what these chief pilots described as ‘egregious'
and ‘crazy' - that's their language. That’s Boeing's internal language in this
exchange.

In fact what Forkner described is not what happened to Lion Air or Ethiopian Air. This is simply a false narrative. No question at all. Not even close. The lawyer, Ted Cruz, knows it or should know it. It fails due diligence by a mile. I missed where the "crazy" reference was plucked from; that may just be laziness to fail to include it.

Any mention of Cruz is marred as an unreliable narrator, but it helps to sway the judiciary to have a state senator on your side.

The fact is this lie was repeated as evidence in the complaint. Another failure of due diligence.

Before one claims it was a simple mistake - aren't lawyers supposed to be sure of their facts? Is Ted Cruz that incompetent in spite of being known as one of the best prepared lawyers in every setting it has come up? Nope - Ted isn't incompetent. He is hoping that J. Q. Public will believe what he said. Perhaps he was riding the wave of indignation or perhaps the Boeing lobbyists didn't produce a sufficient offering. But what of that slate of lawyers? Are all of them that incompetent or are they too hoping what they wrote will simply be accepted as fact?

The real reason that Boeing declined to answer the questions about MCAS is that truthful answers would have revealed that additional pilot training was required for pilots transitioning to the 737 MAX

So the evidence MCAS was hidden is based on unsubstantiated claims by attorneys who fail to perform due diligence before repeating a lie as evidence?

I get it - it's the impassioned speech one prepares when the facts are weak. After Lion Air the entire industry accepted the preliminary report explaining how it worked and the Emergency AD and FCOM updates were issued as the solution - the same solution that had already been used and proven the day before the Lion Air crash. It was acceptable to all parties: no CAAs demanded the plane be grounded, no airlines walked away, no pilots quit for safety concerns, no pilots apparently sweating like being ushered to the electric chair as they took their seats. And no one went into a simulator to prove it would or would not work.

No one was concerned about the information until Ethiopian crashed and an entirely fictitious story about how it was handled was fabricated.

Because - Win-Win.

The above-recounted facts
aren't all facts. Many are speculation, some are outright lies.

[MechEngr]

What precise punishments are suitable WideScreen? Others have been as vaguely adamant about that and refuse to comment on their desired outcome.

Care to take a swing at the effigy?

[WideScreen]

What precise punishments are suitable WideScreen? Others have been as vaguely adamant about that and refuse to comment on their desired outcome.

Care to take a swing at the effigy?
The current Dominion vs. Foxnews case is a good starting point. Dominion is obviously not interested in the money, but in pulling Fox-fake-news with all its lies over the table, in court. Getting the underlying information into the public domain, so both voters do get educated about the lies as well, the relevant information gets public, bringing the opportunity for criminal investigations into the lie driving individuals at Foxnews.

And a subgoal for the US society as a whole, it becomes clear, that these large scale lies are not covered by whatever amendment, and that even applies to Trump, the master himself, in this area.

The same for Boeing, get all the lying into the public domain, in court, up to a level, that it becomes clear, this whole setup at Boeing was intentionally. At which point you might get the evidence for manslaughter charges to the individual managers.

The moment that happens, the next generation managers at whatever company will become very careful to intentionally create an environment that can derail, like what has happened at Boeing. With such an approach, something useful is created for society.

[MELDreamer]

.......the next generation managers at whatever company will become very careful to intentionally create an environment that can derail, like what has happened at Boeing.......
"...to intentionally create an environment that can derail..." or did you mean "NOT to intentionally create an environment that can derail."
Maybe I'm misreading or misunderstanding your post.

[safetypee]

Punishment, attribution, cause; or understanding from which to learn.

If we start with a viewpoint of the first three, then a person can be identified. The old view of safety, a natural self satisfying human reaction, often the basis of litigious judgement. Has been useful in improving safety, but only so far.

Alternatively seeking understanding, particularly in complex systems can provide insight to improve the processes of design, certification, and operations. Need for more systems thinking in very safe operations.

The real world is never a clear cut one or other extreme, thus it is important to consider our viewpoints, where are we starting from, our assumptions, what do we wish to find, how we frame our thoughts.

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carl-Rollenhagen/publication/236597701_Human_and_organizational_biases_affecting_the_mana gement_of_safety/links/5a05a9e2458515eddb894e95/Human-and-organizational-biases-affecting-the-management-of-safety.pdf?origin=publication_detail

[WillowRun 6-3]

So, MechEngr, I'm laboring to stay concise, inasmuch as I feel like we've landed in "Cool Hand Luke" (1967): ["What we have here, is a failure to communicate.'"]

First, the court filing I referenced (and thank you for linking it) was prepared and filed by Paul Cassell, lead counsel for the crash victims' families in the federal court criminal case in Texas. Mr. Cassell is a law professor at the University of Utah in addition to his representation of clients. Other counsel are listed as well. There is no mention, none whatsover, anywhere in the filing, of the junior United States Senator from Texas, Senator Ted Cruz [edit: as an author of the court filing].. True, he filed a friend-of-the-court brief in the case, but to bring up his name in the particular context of the court filing I referenced .... I have to say, whatever substantive point sought to be communicated has not reached my comprehension.

Second, the training video. For openers, watching it is one thing, comprehending pilot reflexes (your term) is something not allowed for SLFs absent unique experience and qualifications, which I most certainly have not claimed to have (here, or anywhere else). As you note, the simulator is for a pre-737 MAX variant - would that not call into question its relevance for assessing anything about the MAX or MCAS, including but not limited to the two accidents? Also, one wonders what to think about the disclaimer on the video, "not for training purposes" - is it somehow below standards?
(So, yes, I had watched part of it before, and more of it now, but what exactly it is supposed to prove about the issues being discussed here .... not clear.)

Third, you wrote, "Every scrap of the required information was in the report and every response requested was in the emergency AD." You also wrote, "Boeing knew as much as everyone about it after the preliminary report - no airline took the planes out off service, no CAA questioned the emergency AD or the FCOM update."

After the NYT Magazine published an article written by William Langewiesche (Sept. 2019), this SLF/attorney asserted some similar notions about the evident mishandling, by the Ethiopian pilots, of the situation presented to them, on a twitter thread run by an independent aviation journalist and blogger (who doesn't deserve to have his name or publication dragged into this thread). Of course I only could parrot, or try to summarize, what the NYT article had claimed - not interpret things from a pilot's knowledge base. And did I ever get "ratio'd"!! Attacked for having "blamed the pilots", I kind of swore off making assertions of that nature a second time.

Which of course does not constrain anyone else. But what is the point sought to be established? Let it be assumed that the unfortunate souls who perished in the Ethiopian crash lost their lives due to the causes you have asserted. What does that prove about the 737 MAX debacle overall? So, all the information needed for that flight crew to save the day was available - how does that help Boeing out of the overall problem it created for itself? And if I didn't know better, I could miscontrue the second sentence quoted above, about the absence of airline and CAA actions and objections to the emergency AD, as a claim that the entire 737 MAX debacle has been nothing but an overreaction to the successful hoodwinking by Ethiopian entities to achieve what you call a "win-win." Surely you don't mean that, in other words that all the reports, in House of Representatives, by specially appointed panels at DOT, by the Inspector General, and more, really weren't about anythinig material, weren't necessary, because Ethiopia set out for a win-win. Yet that is how your advocacy, to be blunt, appears to play among the larger audience, as near as I can tell.

And speaking of that country and its motives - and leaving to one side the interesting question, what special insight or sourcing do you have for Ethiopia, or is it just keen powers of observation and logic being applied - you're asking the world (or the fraction of it that digs into threads here) to believe that the "discount" was a sufficiently concrete and material factor for the government to play air-crash roulette? I think, probably, something more definite in the way of proof (not merely what media types invoke as "evidence") would be needed. Perhaps there is a great deal of proof available (?)

Almost last, you wrote about thousands upon thousands of three levels of crash victims' relatives. Is there even a single case in any air crash disaster in which such levels of claimants have been before the court, let alone compensated? Maybe that was just colorful advocacy - but if there are examples, it would be nice to add to one's knowledge.

And finally, the point I raised was that after Lion AIr, the statements - for example, what the CEO told the Wall Street Journal - were purposefully deceitful. I've said it before and one more time, with lack of feeling: even if the "win-win" scheme, or call it a conspiracy or plot or calculation, happened as you assert, what "if anything" does that prove about: (a) false and misleading statements by Boeing after the Lion Air crash, and (b) the overall 737 MAX debacle?

[MechEngr]

I depend on the logic of the situation - what a coldly rational evaluation of the situation was. Ethiopia made a business calculation. Just like they did to invade the Tigray region. Boeing, et al, did not foresee that a mass casualty event would be acceptable to a typical airline, but underestimated what invulnerability allows an actor to consider.

If Ethiopia had halted all MAX flights to retrain all their pilots for that brand new centerpiece acquisition, that would make their political position weaker and cost them for the retraining and loss of ticket sales. Skipping training was a positive. They knew that if the plane crashed from mishandling due to MCAS inputs that would be a bargaining position. Those considering a war against civilians certainly aren't concerned with a handful of passengers.

Why not proceed -- you claim "roulette," but there was no gambling at all as they controlled the house or, in this case, the narrative.

That pilot who did quit Ethiopian related a case where an engine was thought to be leaking fuel - a ramp worker reported a far larger than normal amount of fuel pooled under an engine. The pilot called for someone to check the engine, which would delay the flight. He reported he was told that a leak was not his concern - if the engine caught fire the airline would seek compensation from the engine maker.

That's the sort of calculation they would have made about MCAS. I don't currently believe they looked forward to a crash, I would say they did not care if it happened because the outcome was a benefit. For certain the Chief Pilot wasn't on that plane.
---

Perhaps I misread this section then (my bolding):

Senator Ted Cruz has taken a leading role in exposing Boeing’s criminal behavior. During
investigative hearing on the two crashes, Senator Cruz exposed what Boeing had done through
pointed questions to CEO Muilenburg:

The testimony here today has been quite dismaying. I want to focus on the
text exchange that has been referred to and has been publicly reported on. There
was a text exchange between Mark Forkner, who was then Boeing’s technical
pilot for the MAX—chief technical pilot for the MAX—and Mr. Gustavsson, who
in 2018 was promoted to be Boeing's 737 chief technical pilot."

Mr. Forkner: [...] MCAS is now active down to M .2. It's running rampant in the sim on me

I posted what Ted Cruz went on to say in the earlier post.
---
"not for training purposes"
is basic cover to prevent anyone half-remembering what was shown coming to sue them over some mishap. Very much like the YouTube lawyers who emphasize they are not to be taken as legal advice while they are pointing out laws and precedents that might apply to a case they are exploring. Even in engineering, particularly civil and structural (buildings and bridges,) engineers will emphasize that advice is as-is and must be compared to applicable regulations which can vary with locale.
---
I think this action is against the wrong party, but the correct party is invulnerable. Being "false and misleading" did not cause ET-302 to crash. Putting improperly trained people in control of an aircraft with a known, sometimes fatal but easily controllable, defect caused ET-302 to crash. Part of that improper training has been complacency over trim runaway containment training, but that was exactly what the communications from Boeing and the FAA stated was the problem.

[WillowRun 6-3]

I've never visited the country known as . . . .

(i) prior post seemed to argue Sen. Cruz was responsible for the court filing, as compared to arguing that Cruz's remarks as referenced in the filing, were incorrect. The misreading occurred on my end.

(ii) I anticipate your "wrong party" assertion would prompt lively discussion even from venerable defense counsel, not only the gun-slingers. That is, the manufacturer takes a given customer's host country's civil aviation sector as a whole as the manufacturer finds it.

(iii) it turns out, to some extent reading between lines, that your advocacy about "matters involving Ethiopia" (lacking a better phrase at this time) may not be intended to be read or interpreted as a broad exoneration of Boeing with regard to the entire set of 737 MAX debacles. As it happens, I detest the word "narrative" but I'll use it: ..... the part of the overall set of debacles with this aircraft which in your view must include and account for the narrative you relate about matters involving Ethiopia, that part of the overall debacles stands on its own. Not as a reason to minimize or even disengage from any other 737 MAX failing by Boeing that has come to light. (I hesitate to "buy" that narrative but I cannot refute it, either, so.....)

(Iv) nonetheless, having said all that, I think the record of Boeing's dishonesty after the Lion Air accident speaks adequately for itself. Boeing, which agreed to the DPA, wasn't charged with a crime relating to or involving its post-Lion Air acts and omissions. Perhaps your view is that corruption or similar malfeasance in the matters involving Ethiopia is so significant that the crash victims' families' legal offensive against the DPA should be thrown aside. But the statutory provisions in question, .... I'll just say, I would disagree.

Hey, thanks for waiving off snark and so on, & for tolerating some from my end.

[WideScreen]

"...to intentionally create an environment that can derail..." or did you mean "NOT to intentionally create an environment that can derail."
Maybe I'm misreading or misunderstanding your post.
Apologies for the misunderstanding.

Let me elaborate.

When one wants (at engineering) to create the best results, going "beyond" the current state of technology, one needs to take care, the engineers working on this, do cooperate together. Not only inside a (small) group of engineers, working on a specific topic, though also among the groups of engineers, relevant for that topic.

The disadvantage of such an approach is, that engineers tend to "keep working" on solutions, without ever reaching a result, they are "happy" with (the nature of engineers, to create the best of the best). The effect of that is, that the time and money spend on the items at place, will be "unlimited". So, you need measures in place to keep a tab on this happening.

What Boeing did was compartmentalize the engineers in their own groups and let the communication between those groups go through managers. Very effective to keep the time and costs low, that works at the micro-level. Unfortunately, at Boeing, it shows all signs in what is being reported, the "gatekeeper" managers, just chopped off the engineer group interaction, before suitable engineered solutions were developed. So, immature solutions were brought into production and the final products. (More companies struggle with that: Philips respirators, for example).

So, intentionally, Boeing did create an engineering environment, aiming to keep the development costs/lead-time low, at the expense of an inferior product. From the Forkner messages and a lot of other leaked messages, it is clear, the engineers involved with the development did not support these limitations. Not to say, when being a major engineering company, one is responsible to set up an engineering environment that can create mature products, this is a major item for the companies top management (IE, "security is our first priority"). This is where Boeing top management just failed and followed their own goal, "profit above everything else". This change of the organization into a profit over security model, was a deliberate action.

Make top managers personally/criminally responsible for the fall-out of their intentional actions, which will derail the development of suitable secure products, and this whole "security is our first priority" theater will finally become a reality. I hope, it's clear now.

[WideScreen]

Punishment, attribution, cause; or understanding from which to learn.

If we start with a viewpoint of the first three, then a person can be identified. The old view of safety, a natural self satisfying human reaction, often the basis of litigious judgement. Has been useful in improving safety, but only so far.

Alternatively seeking understanding, particularly in complex systems can provide insight to improve the processes of design, certification, and operations. Need for more systems thinking in very safe operations.

The real world is never a clear cut one or other extreme, thus it is important to consider our viewpoints, where are we starting from, our assumptions, what do we wish to find, how we frame our thoughts.

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carl-Rollenhagen/publication/236597701_Human_and_organizational_biases_affecting_the_mana gement_of_safety/links/5a05a9e2458515eddb894e95/Human-and-organizational-biases-affecting-the-management-of-safety.pdf?origin=publication_detail
Am I correct, you want to introduce a kind of "just-culture" around this subject ?

If so, in principle, this sounds a good idea, though looking a little further into the Boeing case, I don't think, this MAX saga could be handled from a just-culture perspective. The reason for this is, the mishap was a deliberate top-management action, in violation with the fundamental principle "Security is our first priority" (all signs are there, including the "hiding"/"lying" towards FAA and customers). The MAX MCAS failure was not an engineering accident, its happening was build into the organization of Boeing engineering, the compartmentalization. Once an action is deliberate and warnings have been issued that the action will fail, a just-culture approach is past its goals: "Learn from one's honest mistakes" and it becomes criminal.

[WideScreen]

I've never visited the country known as . . . .

(i) prior post seemed to argue Sen. Cruz was responsible for the court filing, as compared to arguing that Cruz's remarks as referenced in the filing, were incorrect. The misreading occurred on my end.

(ii) I anticipate your "wrong party" assertion would prompt lively discussion even from venerable defense counsel, not only the gun-slingers. That is, the manufacturer takes a given customer's host country's civil aviation sector as a whole as the manufacturer finds it.

(iii) it turns out, to some extent reading between lines, that your advocacy about "matters involving Ethiopia" (lacking a better phrase at this time) may not be intended to be read or interpreted as a broad exoneration of Boeing with regard to the entire set of 737 MAX debacles. As it happens, I detest the word "narrative" but I'll use it: ..... the part of the overall set of debacles with this aircraft which in your view must include and account for the narrative you relate about matters involving Ethiopia, that part of the overall debacles stands on its own. Not as a reason to minimize or even disengage from any other 737 MAX failing by Boeing that has come to light. (I hesitate to "buy" that narrative but I cannot refute it, either, so.....)

(Iv) nonetheless, having said all that, I think the record of Boeing's dishonesty after the Lion Air accident speaks adequately for itself. Boeing, which agreed to the DPA, wasn't charged with a crime relating to or involving its post-Lion Air acts and omissions. Perhaps your view is that corruption or similar malfeasance in the matters involving Ethiopia is so significant that the crash victims' families' legal offensive against the DPA should be thrown aside. But the statutory provisions in question, .... I'll just say, I would disagree.

Hey, thanks for waiving off snark and so on, & for tolerating some from my end.
It's difficult to argue with somebody, who considers the abnormally to be normal. Mech Eng does have the viewpoint, that the cacophony in a B737, once just a single item goes wrong, is normal and all and every pilot should be able to handle the situation as if the cause of the cacophony is "known" right away, as if a big light goes on with the exact failure indication. And, since such a light doesn't exist in the B737 cockpit, blame the countries circumstances, that the pilots don't understand the cause of the cacophony, within a couple of seconds (which is the time, one has with the MCAS type run-away). On top of that, that the official Boeing MCAS "resolution" simply doesn't cover the situation AND does not work, when not applied within a few seconds after the happening. Yeah.....

With the YT example of the trim-runaway: This is just a different situation. A trim-runaway "keeps running", as in the YT. The MCAS run-away just stops, whenever the pilot does do a manual trim, to sneaky restart again, after a couple of seconds. Looks a little similar, though completely different at the overall functional level.

As said, it's difficult discussing with Mech Eng, when non-relevant aspects are promoted to "the cause of the ....".

[soarbum]

Boeing knew as much as everyone about it after the preliminary report .

Even Fox news would have trouble keeping a straight face telling that porkie...

1) Boeing knew that a step to trim back to level before hitting the cutout was not in the emergency response checklist: did they modify it - NO

2) Boeing knew that MCAS would keep coming back for another bite 5s after the last trim input but a pilot could safely use the trim if they hit the cutout within 5s afterwards: they did share that - NO

3) Boeing knew that if there was an unreliable airspeed situation after take-off, leaving the flaps out would inhibit MCAS and allow a safe landing: did they share that - NO

4) Boeing knew that they had modified the trim architecture so that the pilots first response of pulling back on the column would no longer inhibit AND trim as it did in the NG and every other 737: did they share that - NO

[FlightDetent]

I was not aware of that last one, thanks for sharing. The clarity of your post is outstanding, BTW.

my attempt:
A) Boeing at that time did not know that
B) Boeing Commercial at that time had forgotten they were an aircraft manufacturer.
</end>

Being one, amongst many other consequences, carries the responsibility of not letting the A) above happen. That was violated.
[While it's a sin to lose marbles, inventory on how many went missing shall be maintained at all times]

Many may argue the top floor responsible for avoiding A) was hired and incentivized to feed the shareholders with cash but without the objective of building exquisite vehicles as an irrevocable and the only priority. While that is understood, in my book it's a zilch excuse for failing to govern.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Yes, soarbum, that "pilot stuff" was what I'd been trying to say in previous exchanges to/from MechEngr. . . . .

I doubt I'll ever be able to express sufficient gratitude and appreciation for being allowed to participate in this forum. There is zero chance I could have derived those four specific items from the parts of the subject of which I have some understanding. In other words thank you for that post.
WR 6-3

[MechEngr]

Even Fox news would have trouble keeping a straight face telling that porkie...

1) Boeing knew that a step to trim back to level before hitting the cutout was not in the emergency response checklist: did they modify it - NO

2) Boeing knew that MCAS would keep coming back for another bite 5s after the last trim input but a pilot could safely use the trim if they hit the cutout within 5s afterwards: they did share that - NO

3) Boeing knew that if there was an unreliable airspeed situation after take-off, leaving the flaps out would inhibit MCAS and allow a safe landing: did they share that - NO

4) Boeing knew that they had modified the trim architecture so that the pilots first response of pulling back on the column would no longer inhibit AND trim as it did in the NG and every other 737: did they share that - NO

Interesting points - answers to all those points were extractable from the Lion Air preliminary report. I knew all those things from the report before reading the AD and FCOM update.

In retrospect I would have made the Emergency AD one line: UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE DISABLE ELECTRIC TRIM.

What you meant was that Boeing and the FAA didn't repeat the contents of the Lion Air Preliminary report in the AD. Read Appendix D of the ET-302 final report of the Multi Operator Message which was issued on 10 NOV 2018 to see what Boeing did publish.

While it might have seemed to be a secret to those who don't own or operate 737 MAX aircraft - per Appendix H, Captain Seifu (Senior Vice President of Flight Operations at Ethiopian Airlines) got a reply on Dec 3, 2018 about his inquiry over the 5 second delay on Nov 28, 2018. which he understood from a conference call with Boeing. Curiously he remarked about following the UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED procedure, which the ET-302 crew also didn't follow.

It is a puzzle - what sense is there, when one has a stall warning, to retract the flaps?

The AD does mention to use the control column and main electric trim to manage the pitch attitude and it indicates that the electric trim can be used to neutralize control column pitch forces. Clearly failing to follow the stall warning procedure, doing the opposite of what is detailed there, would anyone expect that flight training 101 instructions about neutralizing trim forces would have helped?

In the FDR it is clear that the pilots did respond with electric counter trim, within 12 seconds the first time and about 6 seconds on the second MCAS increment, but left between 60 and 100 pounds of pull on the control column, even though the electric trim was reducing the control force at the time they gave that up.

Why would a pilot not continue to trim out the excessive force? Would that have been a reasonable prediction?

More important, the AD also says, quite clearly, "ensuring the STAB TRIM CUTOUT switches are set to CUTOUT and stay in the CUTOUT position for the remainder of the flight."

"and stay in the CUTOUT position" seems important.

Until the crew re-enabled the trim to apparently try to re-enable the autopilot (specifically an item to be disabled when a stall warning and stick shaker is running under the UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED procedure) the plane was gaining altitude, about 2000 Feet per Minute. After going against the AD they tried electric trim twice and the stabilizer moved both times, then autopilot warning was given which would have been only from pushing the enable button and then, 6 seconds after what they tried failed, MCAS ran for 4 seconds until the plane pitched down and the AoA sensor was likely in range. They did not attempt to retrim that increment as they apparently focused solely on pulling.

The main reason they had trouble with control was failing to handle the stall warning / UNRELIABLE AIRSPEED by taking full control of the wheel, control column, and throttle.

They never performed in the simulator to demonstrate solid capacity to comply with an AD issued as a direct result of a crash.

More important, no discussion about what Captain Seifu (Senior Vice President of Flight Operations at Ethiopian Airlines) did following that conference with Boeing in regards to training, discussions with his company pilots, or any other factor, appears in the Final Report. He knew about the 5 second delay - there is no evidence he told any pilot at Ethiopian.

Now that it is clear that all relevant information was supplied to Ethiopian Airline by Boeing before the ET-302 crash, all those details supposedly withheld.

---

There was no requirement for Ethiopian to fly the MAX after the AD. That was a voluntary choice, to put an airplane with a latent defect into service knowing that their pilots had no follow-up training and were provided with only the AD, that the management had felt was inadequate. The lack of detail on how the unreliable airspeed training was insufficient such that two pilots with apparently recent training did every step incorrectly is troubling.

Instead of focusing on the runaway stabilizer in the AD, the crew would have been served better if training was provided about the effect of MCAS activation.

The previous sentence is from the Final report, not me, in case there was concern. The airline was responsible for providing that training.

22. While the autopilot was engaged, systems were supplied by the erroneous LH AOA values. The A/P failed to fly to the target altitude resulting in accelerated speed. After reaching a maximum altitude of around 9,100 ft (right baro corrected altitude) the Airplane started to descend;
23. The A/P disconnected automatically after remaining engaged for 32 seconds;
24. The activation of MCAS followed by GPWS aural alert with ongoing stick shaker, coupled with no failure flag or warning to indicate that the auto throttle has failed to transition to climb thrust at the critical phase of flight indicate that multiple happenings taking place simultaneously because of the overlapping effects of the erroneous AOA inputs;
25. The Stall Management Yaw Damper Computer -1 (SMYDC 1) computed a LH minimum operational speed and a LH stick shaker speed greater than VMO (340Kt) without any alert or invalidity detection;

All of this, including the autopilot and the SMYD, had traditionally been allowed to accept erroneous AoA data and caused problems the crew didn't notice. MCAS was at the end of a long line of accepting inaccurate AoA data - 30+ years of industry acceptance. AFAIK Airbus doesn't do sanity checks on the AoA sensors, depending instead on best 2 out of 3, which has also prompted at least one incident on par with what MCAS did. That hero pilot pulled the circuit breakers to the 2 lying computers to save the plane.

[1southernman]

"just to move the blame away from the company"

The company accepted full blame. What Boeing doesn't want is to have 20,000 relatives of relatives of relatives coming up with reasons they should have been considered and dragging the proceeding out for a decade.

"the deliberate deceit after Lion Air"

Source for that?

How does it compare with "They followed the procedure exactly" a year before issuing a report that showed they did not follow even a single step (because steps are order dependent) correctly?

This is what runaway stabilizer presents as on the Classic - prior to the NG - prior to the MAX - that's how old this procedure is and how training is supposed to be. Note the startling warning horn.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3pPRuFHR1co
Curious as to why the youtube guys didn't use the cranks...a little less leverage?

[AeroTech]

Mech Engr I depend on the logic of the situation - what a coldly rational evaluation of the situation was. Ethiopia made a business calculation. Just like they did to invade the Tigray region. Boeing, et al, did not foresee that a mass casualty event would be acceptable to a typical airline, but underestimated what invulnerability allows an actor to consider.

If Ethiopia had halted all MAX flights to retrain all their pilots for that brand new centerpiece acquisition, that would make their political position weaker and cost them for the retraining and loss of ticket sales. Skipping training was a positive. They knew that if the plane crashed from mishandling due to MCAS inputs that would be a bargaining position. Those considering a war against civilians certainly aren't concerned with a handful of passengers.

Why not proceed -- you claim "roulette," but there was no gambling at all as they controlled the house or, in this case, the narrative.

That pilot who did quit Ethiopian related a case where an engine was thought to be leaking fuel - a ramp worker reported a far larger than normal amount of fuel pooled under an engine. The pilot called for someone to check the engine, which would delay the flight. He reported he was told that a leak was not his concern - if the engine caught fire the airline would seek compensation from the engine maker.

That's the sort of calculation they would have made about MCAS. I don't currently believe they looked forward to a crash, I would say they did not care if it happened because the outcome was a benefit. For certain the Chief Pilot wasn't on that plane

Boeing had history of bad ethics after the merger with McDonnell Douglas. This merger was bad for Boeing. Certain persons tarnished Boeing reputation and they are still destroying Boeing legacy: 767 Tanker scandal, 2 Boeing managers charged over stealing and using Lockheed secrets, fake Boeing 787 roll out and 787 debacle ( delay, way over budget, outsourcing., several groundings/halted delivery), 767 tanker problems, and most importantly 2 737 MAX crashes that killed 346 persons, 20 billion loss. The final report of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure blasted Boeing and FAA and exposed them. Boeing had influence on FAA as mentioned in the final report of the House Committee.Since you mentioned in your post about fuel leak,I am including also a fuel leak as example. Some excerpts from new papers about bad ethics at Boeing where it shows falsified papers and sloppy works led FAA to fine Boeing (it was slap on the wrist):
"Leaking fuel around a hot engine is a fire hazard. An FAA investigation revealed that Boeing had noted the leak nine months earlier, before it delivered the plane, and had supposedly reworked the pylon at a Seattle-area plant in the city of Everett to fix the problem. A mechanic and a quality-control inspector signed off on the rework as completed. But as the FAA noted, this "did not represent work performed." In other words, the repair work hadn't been done.This is the link for the article of the news paper https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-boeing-fine-disclosure-20170213-story.htmlSince you mentioned pilots training in your post. It was Boeing that decided that the flight simulator training was not needed to lure airlines/customers under the pressure of 320 NEO (profit and greed over safety). Boeing decided that iPad course was enough for 737 MAX training. For example Lion Air requested from Boeing a sim training for the 737 MAX and Boeing said it is not needed. A Boeing employee even mocked Lion Air pilot after their requests and called them "idiots". It is Boeing that decided to put a critical automated system (MCAS) on the plane without even telling pilots about this critical system, let alone the really bad design of the MCAS.

Here another example of bad ethics in Boeing. It was Boeing that pressurized the Dutch Safety Board to downplay the role design errors in the Boeing 737 NG played in the crash of Turkish Airlines crash near Schiphol in 2009
According to the following article, U.S officials pressurized the Dutch Safety Board
https://nltimes.nl/2020/01/21/us-pressu ... ash-report (https://nltimes.nl/2020/01/21/us-pressured-dutch-safety-board-downplay-tech-faults-2009-turkish-airlines-crash-report)
"While investigating the Turkish Airlines plane crash near Schiphol in 2009, the Dutch Safety Board was pressured by Americans to downplay the role design errors in the Boeing 737 NG played in the crash, the New York Times reports based on its own research. According to the newspaper, there are many parallels between the 2009 crash and the recent crashes with Boeing 737 MAX planes, the successor of the Boeing 737 NG."

According to the New York Times, comments from American parties - including Boeing and the American aviation authority FAA - resulted in the Dutch Safety Board largely omitting a study by professor Sidney Dekker from the official report. Dekker, a specialist in human actions in disasters and previously a part-time pilot on the Boeing 737, was asked by the Safety Board to investigate the human factors in the crash.

Dekker's study emphasized the design errors of the Boeing 737 NG and their catastrophic consequences. According to Dekker, the 2009 accident "represents such a sentinel event that was never taken seriously". In his study, Dekker accused Boeing of deflecting attention from its own "design shortcomings" and other mistakes with "hardly credible" statements that admonished pilots to be more vigilant, according to the newspaper. Only around one page of Dekker's 90-page long final report made it into the Dutch Safety Board's report.

In February 2020, it was reported that Boeing had refused to cooperate with a new Dutch review on the crash investigation and that the NTSB had also refused a request from Dutch lawmakers to participate.

The bottom line Boeing (FAA also by certifying the 737 MAX) made big mistakes (not honest mistakes) and didn't want to assume the responsibility because of the consequences of the liability. That's why Boeing are blaming pilots. There was a shared responsibility between Boeing and FAA and not pilots

Capt Sully (who landed safely a disabled A320t on Hudson river on 2009) said in Congress very truthful comments regarding the Boeing 737 Max crashes
Some quotes from Capt Sully during US house Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure hearing:
-" Max jetliner crashes should never have happened”—and possibly could have been avoided with better safety processes and pilot training"
-“These crashes are demonstrable evidence that our current system of aircraft design and certification has failed us".
So he mentioned clearly Boeing and FAA and not pilots.
-"Boeing have said that they didn't categorize a failure of the MCAS is more critical because they assumed the pilot action would be the safeguard. From my 52 years of flying experience and many decades of safety work I know we must consider all the humans factors of these accidents and how system design determines how many and what kind of errors will be made and how consequential there will be"
-" These 2 recent crashes happened in foreign countries, but if we don't address all the important issues and factors they can and will happen here".
Clearly Capt Sully is contradicting certain persons who were and still blaming pilots a lot. For example the actual Boeing CEO blamed the pilots on developing countries and said these crashes would not happened if US airline pilots were flying these 2 planes.
-"We owe it here to everyone who flies passengers alike to make sure that pilots will be able to handle an unexpected emergency and keep their passengers and crews safe. But first we should design aircraft for them to fly that do not have inadvertent trap set for them".
-" I am one of relatively small group of people who have experience such crisis and lived to share what we learn about it. I can tell you first hand that the startle factor is real and huge and is absolutely interferes with one's ability to analyses the crisis and take effective action. Withing seconds these crews would have been fighting with their lives in the fight for their lives. In both accidents the failure of a single of AOA sensor quickly caused multiple instruments indication anomalies and sudden loud, and in some case false warnings creating major distractions masking the cause and would make it ever harder to analyze the situation quickly and take effective and corrective actions. I recently experienced all these warnings in 737 MAX flight simulator during recreation of accident flights. Even knowing what was going to happen I could see how crews could run out of time before to resolve the problems. Prior to these accidents I think it is unluckily that any US pilot were confronted with this scenario in simulator training.

Here what the capt sully said exactly during a U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure hearing:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JaeZsSl9ZSY

Allied Pilots Association president Dan Carey (35 years as pilot when he said this on May 2019) talked about the MCAS and discussed tense meeting with Boeing about 737 MAX 8. He said Boeing already knew about the danger of the MCAS. Why Boeing didn't ground the MAX after the first crash? Why Boeing took the pilot out of the loop...since they expected the pilot to be the last resort. Basically they came out with a bad design (not honest mistake) and they wanted pilots to figure out a solution when the MCAS misfires. Here the video which I think it is a strong evidence that Boeing prioritized the profit over the safety and they knew the danger of the MCAS:
Here what he said exactly in this video: Allied Pilots Association's Dan Carey discusses tense meeting with Boeing about 737 MAX 8

It is inconceivable that Boeing designed such critical system (MCAS) with one AOA sensor...etc. The MCAS was a rushed design and it was not honest mistake. Boeing was under pressure by 320 NEO and the requests of certain airlines. So Boeing chose the profit over the safety. The Senate final report mentioned several evidence about this flawed design. Here few examples:
-“Are we vulnerable to single AOA sensor sensor failures with the MCAS implementation or is there some checking that occurs?” asked Boeing engineer in a December 2015 email
-A separate Boeing document about MCAS from June 2018, four months before Lion Air Flight 610 crashed in Indonesia, warned that slow reaction times to runaway trim, which can push the nose of the plane down, could be “catastrophic” if pilots take more than 10 seconds to react and said it found a typical reaction time was four second.

The real problem was in the airplane itself that's why it was grounded 20 months. If It was a problem of airlines and their training systems the 737 MAX would be grounded for short period of time. In addition after the 2 crashes the sim training was mandatory for all pilots including in the US. Which contradicted the actual CEO who said that these crashes would not happened in the US (for US airlines pilots), but it could happen only in developing countries. At the opposite of Boeing CEO, Capt Sully said in the hearing "These 2 recent crashes happened in foreign countries, but if we don't address all the important issues and factors they can and will happen here"
An exchange between 2 Boeing pilots about MCAS on the sim, please click on the link.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5UAcIh7jUsc

[WideScreen]

Good job. Unbelievable, there are still people out there (on a Pro-pilot rumour forum), denying what happened with the MAX and its whole saga at Boeing. :ugh:

[megan]

Report on AvwebSo-far-unnamed senior FAA officials overruled their own engineers who called for the immediate grounding of Boeing 737 MAX after the second fatal crash in five months in Ethiopia in March of 2019. The Transportation Department’s Office of Inspector General issued its report on the decision chain within the agency on Friday. It said the engineers immediately noticed the similarities between the Ethiopian Airlines crash and one in October of 2018 involving a Lion Air MAX off Indonesia and urged immediate grounding. “Yet agency officials at headquarters and the Seattle (Aircraft Certification Office) opted not to do so.”

[WillowRun 6-3]

Issued April 26, 2023, Report AV202325

"FAA Has Completed 737 MAX Return to Service Efforts, but Opportunities Exist to Improve the Agency's Risk Assessments and Certification Processes."

https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/39461