Crash at SunShine coast.

[aroa]

Ticker message on ABC . No specific details but 2 fatalities.

[pbwhi0]

https://buderimonlinenews.com.au/two-men-dead-in-sunshine-coast-cessna-150-plane-crash/

[tail wheel]

VH-CYO Cessna 150M Aerobat, Sunshine Coast Aero Club.

Was originally in Cairns with Cape York Air (1995). Ex Port Moresby Aero Club.

It led a charmed life.............

[av8trflying]

RIP - thoughts to the families affected.

CYO was the plane I did my first solo in. Started my training in Cairns with Cape York Air just before they shut it down. I thought I recognised the rego.

[Cloudee]

Pilot named and more info here. https://www.9news.com.au/national/two-men-killed-after-queensland-light-plane-crash-in-sunshine-coast-hinterland/474a5f4c-936d-401a-9ea5-68a87bc091f9

The link at post #2 says search commenced at 5.30pm. The 9 news link says the aircraft took off at 11.03 am and crashed 18 minutes later. It was located at about 9 pm that evening.

If the reports are correct it took a very long time to commence a search.

[lucille]

Engine failure or weather issue?

[Flingwing47]

Structural failure ?

[mcoates]

It is an Aerobat, perhaps a manoeuvre went wrong.

I just love the way the reporter is walking through the bush, only metres from the wreckage, disturbing who knows what during that process, probably well before investigators have arrived..... I can just imagine, "let's drag this part of the wreckage over here for a background to give a better shot"

you would think the police would have more control of the accident site to keep these media people out.

Condolences to everyone that knew these pilots.

[LapSap]

What surprised me is that they had to send a Challenger (?!!) from Essendon (?!!!) to search for it? Serious?

[beer bong]

What surprised me is that they had to send a Challenger (?!!) from Essendon (?!!!) to search for it? Serious?

I am sure if it was one of your family members missing, you would want everything thrown into the search

[lucille]

What surprised me is that they had to send a Challenger (?!!) from Essendon (?!!!) to search for it? Serious?

A day at the beach, and a bit of warming respite from the Melbourne winter for the crew. Can't say I blame them for kicking the tires and lighting the fires and shooting up to the Sunny Coast.

But on a serious note, this is not a remote area. There are multiple SAR helicopters in the area. One really can't see the value of sending a jet up there.

[Ixixly]

I am sure if it was one of your family members missing, you would want everything thrown into the search

Not sure about the others but I'm surprised as well, not that a Challenger was put onto it but that it had to come from Melbourne, was there NOTHING else closer in the area that could respond sooner?

[0ttoL]

What surprised me is that they had to send a Challenger (?!!) from Essendon (?!!!) to search for it? Serious?

Wasn't there another search going on for a missing diver?
That would require helicopters, I'd think.

1.5hrs for the Challenger to get there. It seemed to go straight to the right spot according to the ADSB track.
Would that have been due to an ELT? I hope so.
https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/444x960/rscu550_d7f59d762d3175e2f5f76791071bb9bf9da892fb.jpeg

[PoppaJo]

The link at post #2 says search commenced at 5.30pm. The 9 news link says the aircraft took off at 11.03 am and crashed 18 minutes later. It was located at about 9 pm that evening.

If the reports are correct it took a very long time to commence a search.
Pretty disgraceful if you ask me.

[triadic]

Where did the 18 minutes come from??

[Squawk7700]

Where did the 18 minutes come from??

Most likely after reviewing the flight data from mode C or ADSB, or the 18 minutes came from the location where the aircraft was found compared to the departure point.

Next there will be questions asked about why it wasn’t noticed and the usual arguments will come out.

[av8trflying]

Pretty disgraceful if you ask me.

No SARTIME. They weren’t reported missing until after 3

[Stickshift3000]

Both persons on board were licensed pilots. I hope that the ATSB find a conclusive cause of this accident.

Condolences to the families and friends of both pilots.

[Lookleft]

Why is there a picture of a Jetstream 41 in the SAR snapshot?

[Kundry]

Could the huge time between crash to deploying SAR resources be avoided if they had left a company SAR letting someone know they would be out for an hour doing aeros (extremely unlikely to divert or change plans of the flight), and to start checking up on their safety within 10-20 minutes of the SAR expiring?

I'm guilty of setting useless SARTIMES (i.e. always at last light, thinking "I might divert or decide to go somewhere else, or walk into town for lunch without reception") but this accident has highlighted the importance of putting some serious thought behind when I set my SARTIME. I think company / responsible person is the way to go - not having to access clunky NAIPS, and not having that worry about sitting on the couch at home with your phone in your bag meanwhile the Challenger is gearing up.

p.s. QPS website said they identified location of the crash via phone triangulation. would hope it was an ELT though....

[601]

Why is there a picture of a Jetstream 41 in the SAR snapshot?
Probably the same reason one gets a photo of a 737 when tracking a Robbie

[tascats]

Why is there a picture of a Jetstream 41 in the SAR snapshot?
Flight Radar glitch maybe. Both planes have same reg - the J41 has sat in Humberside for years though, for spares I think.

[FullOppositeRudder]

My guess (in the best tradition of PPRuNe) is that any initial visual search - if there was one - failed because it looks from the footage seen on the news reports, that the 150 went in almost vertically into a substantial batch of trees. That being the case it probably would not have been readily visible unless the search a/c flew right over the top of the impact site, and the observers were looking straight down - an usual probability. The Challenger probably has specialist equipment to detect either the beacon (if it was operational and active), or some other means of honing in on the site. The track for the Challenger suggests a methodical search with multiple passes over the signal source - whatever it was - and eventually where all the lines intersect - that will probably be the location of what you are looking for. Whatever the speculation here, the tragic event leaves us all with a heavy heart and a deep sadness for the loss of two fellow aviators, and the implications for their families and friends. Profound sympathy to all affected.

[Chronic Snoozer]

What surprised me is that they had to send a Challenger (?!!) from Essendon (?!!!) to search for it? Serious?

You will find everything you need to know here. National Search and Rescue Manual (https://natsar.amsa.gov.au/natsar-manual.asp)

[MagnumPI]

Report is out - link here (https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5781807/ao-2021-025-final.pdf).

Interestingly a Safety Advisory Notice (https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/5781792/ao-2021-025-san.pdf) has also been posted.

Report makes for sobering reading. Very sad.

[PoppaJo]

The report leans toward the MB method being used first, which seems probable when looking at the instructors history with the method, lack of experience with the 150. I do recall the 150/152 however won’t self recover with the MB. Valuable time likely lost.

I’ve read a report a while back, similar situation, however a poorly performed PARE technique as they didn’t apply forward pressure, something which would actually delay the recover in other aircraft the pilots normally flew, so they actually didn’t do that until the ground was getting closer. Naturally the recovery came when they did that, as it should, well it’s in the POH after all. They didn’t know the aircraft. Aircraft was a 150.

Really shows how important it is to know your aircraft, the aircraft of the day you are flying not something else from yesterday.

[43Inches]

A very good reminder that when practicing non normal items near the edge of the envelope that every aircraft is slightly different. We can generalise on normal operations when flying from A to B in light aircraft and apply techniques for normal control that fit across the board. However when dealing with non normal/advanced scenarios it's extremely important to know that aircraft type and its characteristics. The C150 explicitly states to move the control column briskly forward to break the stall, and even then it can take a rotation to come out so needs patience. Then there's issues if you do these things outside the W&B envelope, which both scenarios described in the report are above MTOW, you are into test pilot territory then. This then comes down to how important is spin recovery for the average pilot, the recovery techniques taught are only for the aircraft that it's practiced in. It's much better to teach avoidance of the zone where these problems occur as once you get close to these edges each aircraft will behave differently, even to the point that weight and balance, power, config, rain, ice, insects, damage, etc can all make the aircraft behave differently around the stall.

[BigPapi]

I'm guessing this incident also influenced the decision to change sections of the Part 61 MOS Sched 2, previously section A5.2 was something to the effect of "recover from incipient spin", now A5.2 just states "Avoid Spin".

[43Inches]

Always was silly to require spin recovery techniques when 99% of the GA fleet are not approved to intentionally spin. Better to just practice stalling in various configs and power settings, attitudes and ensure the student is quite competent in controlling the aircraft in a way that does not promote spinning or loss of control.

[Vag277]

But what does one do when a spin is entered despite what the POH says?

[43Inches]

Can't say I've ever entered an unintentional spin, and I'm no Chuck Yeager, if I can fly 10k+ hours and never accidentally enter a spin I'm pretty sure most pilots can achieve the same feat. Most GA types are designed to resist entry to a spin if you fly them well away from the edges. If you are flying something that readily enters a spin for random reasons, no doubt, get some training in spins. None of the 100s of students I've trained have crashed or died from spinning either, maybe they are all just very lucky like me. Keep the focus on real problems, like don't push VFR into IFR, or push into any conditions that outmatch your abilities etc etc.

[MagnumPI]

It’s worth keeping in mind that as per the report the pilot under instruction (and his fellow aero club member who was waiting on the ground) were both licenced pilots who were doing an aerobatic endorsement with a contracted pilot who had no aerobatic time logged in an A150.

It’s likely only thanks to this other aerobatic endorsement student that we have an idea of what is likely to have happened. Both had written down 1. MB 2. PARE and the instructor had said on the ground that they’d be trying both methods.

[43Inches]

There's also no evidence to state they didn't try the POH recovery first either. So it's pure speculation that the accident is the result of MB or PARE technique. That is key to remember its just a possibility that instructor used MB first as some form of demonstration. The ATSB is just highlighting the issues with one size fits all emergency procedures as opposed to POH procedure and also the dangers inherent in spin training. I've had the pleasure of spinning C152As, Airtourers and a few others there's always some quirk you have to be careful of, from min/max fuel levels to recovery technique to CoG limits. I've heard a few myths like 'all aircraft can be spun and recovered', well there's a few dead test pilots out there that might say otherwise, I think most wear personal chutes or the aircraft has some form of recovery chute fitted these days during spin testing.

[KRviator]

The ATSB is just highlighting the issues with one size fits all emergency procedures as opposed to POH procedure and also the dangers inherent in spin trainingA very salient point that is often forgotten. Several years ago a B1900 got very out-of-sorts (https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/24342/aair200000492_001.pdf) practicing EFATO's out of Williamtown. The Instructor decided to ignore both CAsA-approved instructions and the POH that both said "To simulate an engine failure, set Zero Thrust". Said PIC goes to Flight Idle and wonders why they are now 30* off runway heading and descending through 110RA.

"But...But...We've always done it that way."

Says Beechcraft:
The manufacturer reported that the data was consistent with expected airplane response when power on one engine is reduced to idle with takeoff power on the other engine, a bank is not immediately established toward the operating engine, a significant sideslip is allowed to develop, and the airspeed is allowed to decay below about 120 KIAS

The key takeaway from this is to know what is to be done for the aircraft you're flying on the day. If you're going to be practicing non-normals, look at the books yourself - you cannot always trust an instructor to know what to do, or to do the right thing. Trust - but verify...

[aroa]

And once again it is demonstrated that people die because for this type of activity, when all sorts of things can… and do go wrong, nobody is wearing a parachute. Even very experienced aerobatic pilots have come fatally undone for this very reason.

[MagnumPI]

There's also no evidence to state they didn't try the POH recovery first either. So it's pure speculation that the accident is the result of MB or PARE technique. That is key to remember its just a possibility that instructor used MB first as some form of demonstration. The ATSB is just highlighting the issues with one size fits all emergency procedures as opposed to POH procedure and also the dangers inherent in spin training. I've had the pleasure of spinning C152As, Airtourers and a few others there's always some quirk you have to be careful of, from min/max fuel levels to recovery technique to CoG limits. I've heard a few myths like 'all aircraft can be spun and recovered', well there's a few dead test pilots out there that might say otherwise, I think most wear personal chutes or the aircraft has some form of recovery chute fitted these days during spin testing.

Agree with what you’ve said, although would point out that the evidence from the other student in the same endorsement ‘course’ on the same day showed that they were to learn/demonstrate MB first, then PARE…backed up by notes that were taken by both students. This would suggest that it is likely that the reason for being unable to recover initially is because they were using MB, although sadly we will never really know. The report suggests that they may have been effecting a recover given the type of impact but ran out of height to get there.

[MagnumPI]

And once again it is demonstrated that people die because for this type of activity, when all sorts of things can… and do go wrong, nobody is wearing a parachute. Even very experienced aerobatic pilots have come fatally undone for this very reason.

Serious question, please don’t shoot me down. I’ve been considering doing an aerobatics endo, does anyone use parachutes? Is it common or practically unheard of except in competitions and the like…?

[Aussie Bob]

In short Magnum, no. Aerobatics take hours and hours of practice and this means years for most people. An aerobatics endorsement, at least in my book is to teach you the basics so you can recover safely when you loose control. There are only 4 aerobatic manoeuvres, (some say 5), everything else is a combination of these 4. Like most stuff taught to beginners in aviation, it is often the inexperienced doing the basic teaching.

In order for a parachute to work in most aircraft there needs to be a method of jettisoning the doors. I think the 150 Aerobat has this. An awesome little aeroplane, but rather limited by weight. Parachutes are heavy, need repacking and checking regularly and would substantially add to the cost of basic aerobatics training. A great idea, yes indeed! Provided by basic aerobatics instructors, no.

Once you have the basic endorsement you need to practice, practice practice, then get a really experienced aerobatics pilot for personal tuition. there are several offering this, Matt Hall springs to mind. Then you most definitely will be wearing a parachute! You will also be flying something far more advanced than a 150 :-)

If I was into aerobatics I would buy my own parachute and keep it up to spec.

[djpil]

Serious question, please don’t shoot me down. I’ve been considering doing an aerobatics endo, does anyone use parachutes? Is it common or practically unheard of except in competitions and the like…?
Depends on what aircraft you do the spin/aerobatic endorsements in and where. I guess that the majority do not use parachutes in basic spin/aerobatic endorsement training.
If you are going to wear a parachute you need adequate training in its use plus the discipline of using it as briefed. Egress procedures must be rehearsed every flight.
To avoid jumping out of a perfectly good aeroplane then you would need to do the training exercises high enough above your hard deck. Hard deck consideration needs to consider the type of aircraft and the time required for two people to get out.
Read the article on page 7 here https://www.iac.org/files/magazines/SA_2011_05.pdf
In a Decathlon the instructor has to get the student to eject the door, student to get out first and then the instructor - that can use up a lot of altitude. I am aware of two fatal acccidents where parachutes have been used - in both cases only one person got out and the other did not.
In something like a Pitts my briefing is something like: I will say "bail out" three times and on the third time I won't be there. I am aware of fatal accidents where there had been sufficient height but the pilot left the decision too late.
Another consideration is weight and CG. Most aerobatic aircraft are fairly tight for useful load and some can be tight for loading within the allowable CG range.
Pay your money and take your pick.
https://www.airshows.aero/GetDoc/1470

[Lead Balloon]

You’re special, 43”: There's also no evidence to state they didn't try the POH recovery first either. So it's pure speculation that the accident is the result of MB or PARE technique.So you interpret evidence of what people were briefed as being the 2 techniques that would be tried during a flight as being completely irrelevant to the question as to whether a 3rd technique was tried first?

In your vast experience of intentional spinning, on how many occasions did you take out the POH during flight to brief yourself on what it said about recovery, as your first preparation for the event?

[43Inches]

I think your the special one here leadie. Theres no hard evidence what technique was employed. You are just making yourself look argumentative and trolling with such an attack, I do pity your feeble existance that you try to belittle those you disagree with. Or were you present or have a copy of the CVR fron this incident? Or do you want to continue with the line that its absolutely certain what happened here? Iam truely interested in how you are so certain that the loss of control is difinitively because of the recovery technique, or do you agree that its just a likely scenario?

[Lead Balloon]

I think your the special one here leadie. Theres no hard evidence what technique was employed. You are just making yourself look argumentative and trolling with such an attack, I do pity your feeble existance that you try to belittle those you disagree with. Or were you present or have a copy of the CVR fron this incident? Or do you want to continue with the line that its absolutely certain what happened here? Iam truely interested in how you are so certain that the loss of control is difinitively because of the recovery technique, or do you agree that its just a likely scenario?
Quoted just to make sure there’s evidence of what you originally posted.

QED.

[43Inches]

My original post was stating that we have no firm idea what actually happened here. The statement that they could have even tried the poh technique, that was not my determination of what happened, just a slight possibility. We have no idea what the instructor knew, he may well have read the POH technique, we dont know. It may have been employed too late to effect recovery. There is no hard evidence at all apart from the flight path indicating a descent path consistant with the spin sequence and a failure to recover.

[43Inches]

You do realise that this is a statement from the ATSB report;

The ATSB was unable to ascertain which of the recovery technique(s) was being utilised at the various stages of the spin recovery preceding the accident. For this reason, the ATSB was unable conclude if the use of an inappropriate recovery technique contributed to the accident.

and

Although the reason for the accident could not be fully established, the investigation identified that one of the spin recovery methods that was to be practiced on the day of the accident would most likely not recover the Cessna A150M Aerobat from a spin

Which is important to recognise that we have no conclusive evidence of what exactly caused this accident. The ATSB report is written to highlight the issues withe MB techniques when applied to the A150 and that pilots should seek guidance on a particular type prior to conducting spinning exercises.

I'm not sure what tangent you two are going off on but the important issue here is that spinning an A150 is not straight forward, and even with POH recovery technique the recovery can take time and seem futile until it works. So therefore it is plausible that the instructor may have tried the A150 technique too late in the piece to have recovered or possibly something else complicated the recovery, we just don't know. The briefing is just what the instructor expected to happen, as they were exploring the two generalised spin recoveries, that does not mean he was unaware of the A150 recovery technique, however it is also highly possible he was not etc etc....

Now it is most likely that what was briefed was practiced, that is the MB recovery was demonstrated, didn't work, then the extra time taken to recover led to insufficient height to pull out. But it is just the most plausible scenario, not an actual statement of fact.

On the previous event reported in CYO the correct POH recovery was attempted and the sequence almost ended in the same result, so while its easy to say the MB and PARE did not work, it also seems previously the pilots were almost killed when using the POH recovery. Why is that important? so that anyone who intends to spin A150s should be very cautious about it, and not just feel safe that they are not using the MB technique, lest we end up having the same conversation again when another spin exercise goes wrong. It might be found one day that a particular fuel quantity stabilising in the spin at a specific weight and CoG even within limits might have a nasty bite, who knows.

I was never questioning the ATSB report or its findings.

[Squawk7700]

Sounds like a law suit in the making.

[Lead Balloon]

We should be thankful to 43” for his masterclass in what constitutes evidence and the different standards of proof that apparently apply here:

There's “no evidence”.

It's “pure speculation” that the accident is “the result” of the MB or PARE technique.

It’s “just a possibility”.

There’s “no hard evidence”.

Do you want to continue with the line that its “absolutely certain”.

How are you “so certain” that the loss of control is “difinitively because of” the recovery technique.

We have “no conclusive evidence” of “what exactly caused” this accident.

It is “plausible” that the instructor “may have” tried the A150 technique too late in the piece to have recovered or “possibly something else” complicated the recovery.

It is also “highly possible”.

It is “most likely” that “what was briefed was practiced”.

It is just “the most plausible scenario”.Only a formidable mind could reconcile the simultaneous assertions that:

- It is most likely that what was briefed was practised, that being the most plausible scenario, and

- Any suggestion that what was briefed was practised is pure speculation supported by no evidence.

There is actually evidence, admissible in civil proceedings at least, as to what happened. There is a human being who can give first-hand evidence of what was briefed. There are written notes taken by both 'students'. Where do you think the ATSB got this from: One of the students indicated that, during the pre-flight briefing, they were not instructed on what recovery method was recommended in the Aerobat Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH), or that it closely aligned with the PARE method. Further, they were instructed on the advantages of the Mueller/Beggs method, but not on its limitations; namely, if the Mueller/Beggs method was utilised on an Aerobat, the aircraft would not recover from a spin to the left (see Aerodynamic spins).

Both students were instructed to write down the 2 spin recovery methods on a piece of paper for reference in flight when the practical component of the spin recovery was to be undertaken. One of the students indicated that they believed they were going to utilise both methods of spin recovery during their flight instruction. The first method written down on both students’ spin recovery notes was the Mueller/Beggs method.And the applicable standard of proof is not “certainty”. If a civil court finds, as you have found 43", that it is most likely that what was briefed was practised, that’s what the court will find happened in fact. That’s how standards of proof work. Your “most likely” far exceeds the “balance of probabilities” threshold.

The ATSB used the word “ascertain” for a reason. Of course it could not find out what happened “with certainty”. (Then there’s the “fully established” nonsense, which was ATSB’s attempt to say “ascertain” again…) ATSB does not investigate by reference to standards of proof. It leaves that to courts. You should, too, 43".

[43Inches]

Leadie, thanks on that drivel you have written but it holds zero relevance to this thread and just makes you look like a legalistic pedant when I'm trying to promote a safety message here... If you want to belittle me PM me all you want, but dont waste the readers time with your ****e personal attacks.

[Lead Balloon]

Your "safety message" seems to me to be that the most likely cause of this accident - supported by the available evidence - is just pure speculation. I disagree. And plenty of us have already written in our Big Book Of Aviation Wisdom that it's very important to understand the specific characteristics, systems, procedures and limitations (and 'odd quirks') of the specific aircraft we're flying from time to time.

[43Inches]

Your "safety message" seems to me to be that the most likely cause of this accident - supported by the available evidence - is just pure speculation. I disagree. And plenty of us have already written in our Big Book Of Aviation Wisdom that it's very important to understand the specific characteristics, systems, procedures and limitations (and 'odd quirks') of the specific aircraft we're flying from time to time.

Actually its to highlight that in addition to the MB and PARE techniques the A150 is still difficult to recover using POH technique and is unusual in this way. Therefore anyone considering spinning this type should be careful about a number of factors, not the least weight and CG position.

Hence why I harped on the fact that this might not be related to MB technique, although on balance of surrounding circumstance it most likely started with a MB demo. Why they didn't recover is more likely not understanding how long the aircraft takes to recover using any technique.

BTW I've know students who have spun training aircraft on purpose during area solo, one even filming themselves and posting it on youtube. So education on the dangers of spinning is not just for advanced aerobatic pilots reading this.

[Lead Balloon]

Those are important and valid points. It would be helpful if you could always express them that succinctly.

[djpil]

Actually its to highlight that in addition to the MB and PARE techniques the A150 is still difficult to recover using POH technique and is unusual in this way.In some spin modes it demands the correct application of the POH method. It is not difficult https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iQkk0JLjEJY&t=3s

Cessna especially emphasises even slight aileron deflection, leaving some power on, moving elevator before rudder, slow rather than brisk movement of the elevator.

There are other types which also demand, in some spin modes, correct application of the method in the POH. I had a scare in a Pitts S-2A (in the days before we knew about Beggs-Mueller) when it wouldn't recover from a spin after I'd delayed my normal control actions finishing a lomcevak. The S-2A in a power off spin to the right where outspin aileron is held to flatten the spin will not recover when aileron is neutralised using "normal spin recovery technique" according to the factory. They discovered this in 1980 and added an extra cockpit placard: "For flat spins use aileron with the spin for recovery". That placard hadn't long been in the aeroplane when I needed to know about it. I quickly considered what was going on and then fixed it.

Read Brian Lecomber's magazine article and his delayed spin recovery in an Extra 230. Read Dave Mond's article about his delayed spin recovery in a Pitts S-2B. Read the ATSB's accident report on VH-UPB for the Chipmunk spin saga 60+ years ago. Over the years I've had a number of spin instructors tell me about delayed recoveries in a Decathlon and I ask about their recovery technique - invariably I respond with "you were lucky that you didn't die" and refresh them on the correct recovery method amply described in the manuals.

... should be careful about a number of factors, not the least weight and CG position ...Inertia is related to those parameters but is a separate parameter. Cessna has noted "Distribution of the weight of the airplane can have a significant effect on spin behaviour. The addition of weight at any distance from the center of gravity of the airplane will increase its moment of inertia about two axes. This increased inertia independent of the center of gravity location or weight will tend to promote a less steep spin attitude and more sluggish recoveries." e.g. extra fuel will increase both roll and yaw moments of inertia. They are second moments (the moment arm squared) so there is a bigger change to the moments of inertia than CG for changes along the fuselage centre-line, even more so with tanks in the wing.

It is worth recalling this text from the FAA's Flight Instructor Bulletin #18: "The subject of airplane spinning is a complex one, which is often over-simplified during hangar-flying sessions. ….. This has resulted in some confusion and misunderstanding over the behaviour of airplanes in spinning flight, and it appears this lack of understanding may have contributed to some serious accidents. …" from 40+ years ago.

[By George]

Shame the post descends into a slanging match as it is not only a interesting subject but one where there is a strong safety message. Lead Balloon and Djpil have hit the nail on the head. ‘Know your aeroplane, the POH and any peculiarities to spin recovery for the type’ one size does not fit all.

I have spun half a dozen different types, the only classic one is the DH82, textbook spin recovery. The Chipmunk, after opposite rudder, requires the stick full forward to the stop and some even speed up one more turn before recovery. They also will go flat with an aft C of G , for example a light weight in the front and a NRL player in the backseat. The Victa Airtourer will stop spinning with central rudder. All are slightly different in some way.

I know of one instructor killed in a Grumman AA1 where the fuel contained in a tubular spar runs to the wingtips and stabilises the spin. Then you have some of these RAA machines with very dubious spin qualities.

I think it was a mistake to remove spinning from the syllabus. I understand the theory was, it is dangerous. This accident I guess proves that point.

What is dangerous is not knowing your aeroplanes capabilities.

[43Inches]

As far as I know these peculiarities were limited to the A150, does it still apply to the C152A? I recall most of the recovery 'horror' stories being in the 150.

[djpil]

As far as I know these peculiarities were limited to the A150, does it still apply to the C152A? I recall most of the recovery 'horror' stories being in the 150.
Perhaps because the FAA and Cessna took action with their publications and flight instructor seminar summarized in magazine articles - so a lot of publicity about it in the mid-late '70s. The NTSB commented: “Detailed investigation by the FAA, however, disclosed that problems were related to operational vagaries or anomalies, inadequate knowledge regarding the precise spin recovery procedures for the aeroplane, improper application or misapplication of recovery controls, apprehension, and confusion." The Cessna document is readily available free online. The 152 is very similar but a more forward CG and heavier so higher moments of inertia in pitch - more difficult to positively enter a spin. Kershner confirmed that the 152 Aerobat responds to Beggs-Mueller technique exactly the same as the 150. Kershner has two books which have detailed information about spinning (especially) the Cessna, it should be a reference for all who instruct on the type.
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/472x658/cessnaspin1a_11848c5b3f5f57cb3815a2dcef23b3a22e372dff.jpg
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/471x684/cessnaspin2a_808b1b744d43d9ed70ef52bfc259037930cf7e50.jpg
Note that demo of a hands off recovery after 2 turns - Kershner also demonstrates that once it gets to 2 1/4 it will not however when it gets to 4 turns it may do so - just those two points in the spin for that one particular example. People hear that comment about a hands off recovery being demonstrated so the misinformation spreads.

[MagnumPI]

From your username, I'm wondering if you're David Pilkington? Much respect for your contributions in this thread and patient explanations. Might have to come down to MMB and do my endorsement with you!

[43Inches]

It does sound like a lot of this well documented knowledge on type has been lost in history with it being past down haphazardly by knowledgeable aerobatic instructors. I never taught aerobatics and spin training was part of my instructor rating and can not remember at any point having these discussions. Which is why I'm trying to prolong this discussion so others can share more information like djpil has provided.

I'm in 100% agreement with the 'know your type' mantra, but this is beyond what I consider normally available knowledge for the type. The POH recovery technique does not go into details such as djpil has provided and it's clear there's a few little tricks that can be employed in addition to the POH list that can be thrown in.

The ATSB statement that pilots should seek additional instruction as per Cessnas' advice is very pertinent in regard to these aircraft, or any aircraft you should intend to spin, even if its a variation of a familiar type.

As an aside, is it required for the spin recovery technique to be placarded in such aircraft?

I think a lot of this is still around today from what I've heard over the years regarding recoveries in 150/152s...

“Detailed investigation by the FAA, however, disclosed that problems were related to operational vagaries or anomalies, inadequate knowledge regarding the precise spin recovery procedures for the aeroplane, improper application or misapplication of recovery controls, apprehension, and confusion."

As far as required spin training during a normal syllabus. I don't see much point unless the student intends to do aerobatics, instruct or possibly some other edge of envelope type flying. A lot of stall accidents occur at a height that spin recovery would be effected too late anyway, and avoidance of the situation is the best cure, rather than recovery. Practice of low speed flight and awareness of the dangers is the key, how to stop a spin from developing in the first place is the most important knowledge.

[djpil]

Thanks 43Inches, agreed. Yes, there is a placard in all certified to FAR 23 and CAR 3 for intentional spins. My old Cessna 150 Handling Notes (carved from the POH by the flight school) seems to provide adequate information although the essentials rather than the detail of the Cessna Spin Document. Remember when CASA required their own AFM to their template – I didn’t keep my copy for the Cessna nor Decathlon?

I'll be lobbying CASA to write an AC focussed on spin training, more on that later when I finish my notes.

By George would know about the Chipmunk spin saga of the ‘50s – the article from the Aviation Safety Digest back then is included in the ATSB’s report of VH-UPD’s spin accident. We know the instructor was teaching the incorrect spin recovery method. Incidentally, the ATSB noted that the old CASA AFM didn’t have any instructions for spin recovery of the Chipmunk?

Yes, MagnumPI and thanks. During the lockdowns I was using Facebook to login here and my real name was displayed but it seems that Facebook has been disabled for access here.

My Super Decathlon is currently in maintenance so between that and Melbourne’s weather I have plenty of time to sit in front of my computer and display my dinosaur attributes as explained by CASA https://www.flightsafetyaustralia.com/2017/12/the-unreachables-are-they-unteachable (https://www.flightsafetyaustralia.com/2017/12/the-unreachables-are-they-unteachable/)
It will be going again soon. I also have a Cessna 152 Aerobat and a share in a Pitts S-2C.

[Dora-9]

djpil

By George would know about the Chipmunk spin saga of the ‘50s – the article from the Aviation Safety Digest back then is included in the ATSB’s report of VH-UPD’s spin accident. We know the instructor was teaching the incorrect spin recovery method. Incidentally, the ATSB noted that the old CASA AFM didn’t have any instructions for spin recovery of the Chipmunk?

There were several factors with this one, e.g. a spin entry experienced with full power while inverted is VERY different from the usual "wings level. throttle closed, stick hard back at 50 kts and apply in-spin rudder" entry. Further, I believe this Chipmunk didn't even have an approved AFM (certainly the only source in the UK has no record of supplying one). This AFM not only discusses spin recovery but has a requirement for a cockpit placard stating "SPIN RECOVERY MAY NEED FULL FORWARD STICK..."

[43Inches]

Where I worked many years ago we had 5 152s, 3 of them aerobats. One of the Aerobats VH-RYI flew differently to the others, seemed to have slightly different attitudes and a bit more aggressive stall characteristics. We had the rigging checked numerous times, and found nothing different to the other two. Then there was VH-JBV that always felt under-powered, found out it had an alternate carburetor fitted that lost 2 or so HP, but apparently doesn't affect book figures enough for it to be documented. So even within a group of the same type there can be variation to be careful of. We did for a short time have two 150s on line, and whilst looking similar they had traps even for normal operations, like the extra stage of flap that turns it into a Stuka and less power, which doesn't go well with the speed brake hanging out. After a few students reported 'near death' experiences on selecting full flap we advised students not to use flap 40 unless familiar with its effects, especially if there's a chance of going around.

PS we were provided with the 150s in a pinch saying that there was little difference between them and 152s. In the days of CAA flight manuals and such, so pre having the POH on every flight or even available in a current copy, other than purchasing one yourself.

[43Inches]

This was the only real lead as far as the CFI check goes;

The CFI was not rated in aerobatics, and the check flight was limited to an assessment of the instructor’s general handling and area knowledge.

Really shows as to the limitations of hiring a contractor because you don't have the required approvals. The CFI possibly could have asked about spin recovery techniques, possibly not, its not in the notes. That being said the CFI was not aerobatic endorsed and the instructor showed a high level of general ability, which made them think he was competent across the board (I'm not saying he wasn't or was). I always thought that CFI/CPs had to hold all the endorsements and ratings conducted at the school, however the lack of ATSB mention about that makes me think its not a requirement at least anymore. I think it would have been more appropriate that the CFI possibly get the instructor to conduct one of the sequences for which he was contracted for, in hindsight you would think spinning being the obvious one that will be focused on from now.

As for the instructor, you don't know what you don't know. Read that POH and ask questions from mentors and others with type experience even if the aircraft is very similar to previous ones you have operated. There are no stupid questions in aviation.

Even in the airline business I ask previous crews 'how's this thing going today' which is the casual way of asking what little menaces it threw at them for the morning so I can be prepared for it, and that's flying the same type over and over. Even between airplanes in a single type they all have their quirks and nuances.

[djpil]

As a C150 Aerobat owner, I didn't do any aero's or spins in The Bat until this report came out. As is the case when an accident of this sort happens, you chat to your aerobatic mates about possible causes. ....Yes, good to be cautious. Trouble with being an engineer if I have to sit flying S&L for too long I start wondering about particular bolts and attach fittings etc. I've learnt to avoid chatting to most aerobatic mates early on as they jump to conclusions and mislead me. The ATSB is pretty good at alerting us about defects fairly quickly.

Where I worked many years ago we had 5 152s, 3 of them aerobats. One of the Aerobats VH-RYI flew differently to the others, seemed to have slightly different attitudes and a bit more aggressive stall characteristics. We had the rigging checked numerous times, and found nothing different to the other two. ....BMB was my favourite A152. HEZ was at the bottom of my list but it has been improved and I like it now. UPS was my favourite A150 then suddenly it changed its behaviour in snap rolls and spin entry - rigging measurements within tolerance but it had a section of wing leading edge replaced - sometimes it doesn't take much.
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1632x1232/100_2085_bee47fea3d166110aefc5361c3e81e4dc795445d.jpg

[43Inches]

NKJ on the right was a "texas tail dragger" converted back to a nose wheel, still had the forward wheel mounts.

[jonkster]

Over the years I've had a number of spin instructors tell me about delayed recoveries in a Decathlon and I ask about their recovery technique - invariably I respond with "you were lucky that you didn't die" and refresh them on the correct recovery method amply described in the manuals.

I have always been curious about the Citabria and Decathlon POH's (at least the old ones I have). In the POH they state it should be placarded for the spin recovery technique and the placard technique is different in order from the emergency procedures section in the POH for spin recovery.

The placard has rudder application before neutralising elevator and the emergency section has elevator prior rudder.

I also would be curious to hear what technique was being used when the spin recovery was reported delayed in the Decathlon? MB?

[djpil]

I have always been curious .....
Yes, at MB. I've got this hypothesis that some-one looked at the Day VFR Syllabus many years ago and added what seems to be the appropriate control as I have done in upper case below.
"• Closes throttle
• Stops yaw RUDDER
• Unstalls wing" ELEVATOR
So text like that is in the briefing slides in the format of PARE. The presenter simply says the words on the slides so the briefing ends up something like full opposite rudder to stop the spin and then elevator to unstall the wing. This video demonstrates that nicely https://youtu.be/vETMS-QI_8I
It seems to me that very few bother to read the manuals (I must admit to only reading the manual for my car when I can't get something to work).

The NZ CAA uses PARES rather than PARE - good idea I think to remind pilots that S (to stop the spin) only comes after both the R and E.

Even current production Super Decathlons have the old-style manuals, not much has changed since it was certified in the '60s. That was before the FAA permitted unapproved data in the AFM - so there is no POH per the GAMA spec. There is the approved AFM which takes precedence and the manufacturer's Pilot's Operating Manual. The emergency section of the POM suggests that elevator is moved prior to the rudder, as you say. In the normal operating procedures section it has text identical to the AFM "Recover with positive movement of stick to neutral and full opposite rudder." Words are in the opposite order to the placard and my interpretation (not just mine) is that it means simultaneous application of rudder and elevator. I ignore anything in the POM which is contrary to the AFM.
Important thing is not to apply elevator before the rudder. With instructor trainees I make a point of doing the PARE actions in that order but so quickly that the trainee believes that they were simultaneous actions - then this discussion.

[john_tullamarine]

David makes reference to the GAMA style POH. The current revision of GAMA Spec 1 can be downloaded from the GAMA site GAMA Technical Publications - GAMA (https://gama.aero/facts-and-statistics/consensus-standards/publications/gama-and-industry-technical-publications-and-specifications/) and is worth a read for the younger set.

Prior to the original document in 1975, we had a dreadful mishmash of often not very useful manuals for light aircraft. Without digging into my really old and dusty filing cabinets to check, the first issue was very similar to an equivalent ICAO publication - can't recall at the moment which predated the other but that's probably not all that important. The document introduced a much needed change for pilot reference documents. My only hobby horse is that the weight and balance section is dreadful, but that is the prerogative of old chaps like Dave and me (I'm just slightly the more handsome but he still has his hair so I guess we're on a par).