MAX 737 American Flight 2555 from Miami to Newark Engine Shutdown

[568]

Possible engine oil pressure switch/low oil pressure.

[Anti Skid On]

Any idea of the aircraft rego? Did it divert? Was it one of the aircraft that has been parked up for sometime?

[Dave Therhino]

N327SK according to avherald

Appears to have been stored for over a year based on planespotters info. Was delivered to AA last December. Couldn’t see how recently it returned to service.

The inflight shutdown rate of the Max was already higher than the ETOPS target before this failure.

[DaveReidUK]

568

Of course had it not been a Max, an in-flight shutdown due low oil pressure would not be remotely newsworthy.

[Pistonprop]

Flew Boeing Field to Tulsa 30 Dec 2020. Positioned Tulsa Miami 30 Jan 2021. Began regular operations 01 Feb 2021 based out of Miami. 80 plus sectors since.

[568]

David,
Yes I agree, and the standard of journalism really needs to be improved.

[ATC Watcher]

Give the guys a break it is news for the general public . We in the business , know that engine and airframe are 2 different things , not the average pax for which an aircraft is is a vehicle, a whole entity just like a train or a bus. No-one makes the difference between different parts..

[568]

But....
I can remember headlines such as "terror in the sky" and other such eloquent quotes from the media when a mishap occurs. It is also worth remembering that people believe what they read and see relating to the news.
That said, I agree that us peeps in the aviation sector better understand these events.

[aterpster]

DaveReidUK

Perhaps, perhaps not. ETOPS itself is under scrutiny, and SWA uses (or plans to use) the MAX to Hawaii.

[hoistop]

I flew on 737 (I believe it was MAX) from Hawaii to LAX 3 years ago. And before that, flew on 737 NG from Christchuch to Fiji, then Samoa, then Hawaii - crossed entire Pacific diagonally on 737. I wondered then how this was possible, but it seems it will become a norm.

[Derfred]

The CFM56 is pretty well proven now despite some early issues. It’s probably the most mature engine on the planet, so I wouldn’t have a problem with ETOPS on the 737NG.

The Leap on the Max is based on it, although it has a fair bit of new tech in it.

[old,not bold]

aterpster

Another opportunity to remind ourselves that the driving force behind ETOPS is the bottom line, and requires suspension of scepticism about the notion that catastrophic equipment failures can be precisely predicted and therefore prevented, 100% of the time, by removal "just before they fail".

The fundamental premise of ETOPS is that you maintain an ETOPS aircraft to a higher standard of safety than a non-ETOPS aircraft. I have always been, and remain, astounded that otherwise sensible people look the other way to avoid seeing the fatal flaw in that.

To regard ETOPS as a 100% safe concept, you also need to suspend belief in Murphy's Law. Can the industry afford to do that? No, is the short answer. Murphy is alive and well, as we see every week somewhere in the world.

Now, going back to Boeing's problems, it's quite easy to see that they are the product of the same thought processes as those driving ETOPS.

I retired recently, and so am not up to date. But the notion of a 7-hour allowable single-engine diversion time (across the Southern Ocean, I think it was) is truly terrifying. Did it get approval? I don't know, but I found it amazing that it could be seriously proposed and considered, let alone approved.

[Timmy Tomkins]

Well said Old Not Bold. I have felt similarly ever since the concept was introduced. The rationale was a little more valid back then but we see the trimming of limits, the drive for self regulation and last cent of savings still increasing and there are limits to everything; we just don't want to find it mid ocean with a few hndred people on board.

[DaveReidUK]

To regard ETOPS as a 100% safe concept, you also need to suspend belief in Murphy's Law. Can the industry afford to do that? No, is the short answer. Murphy is alive and well, as we see every week somewhere in the world.

Substitute "aviation" for "ETOPS" in the above, and you have a statement that has held true since the dawn of commercial air transport.

[Pistonprop]

A flight from Auckland to Honolulu with the mentioned stops Fiji and Samoa is (for me) not an issue. If I have my maths correct, the longest stretch is the last one which is approximately 2242 nm. However, in between lies Kiribati (6900ft runway) and Kona (11000ft runway). The longest overwater stretch between possible diversion airports is Kiribati -Kona which is approximately 1678nm. Whether it's a B777 or a B737 makes no difference to me.

[tdracer]

old,not bold

You're making the classic mistake of assuming more engines makes the aircraft safer. That's not a valid assumption.
Statistically (and every part of aviation design and operation is based on probability and statistics - e.g. "no single failure or likely combination of failures"), after you have two engines, adding more doesn't help safety.
Yes, there is a small but finite probability that a twin engine aircraft will suffer a dual engine shutdown or loss of thrust that turns catastrophic - and the probability gets smaller if you add more engines. However, there is also a small but finite probability that a single engine failure can be catastrophic - e.g. an uncontained rotor burst or engine fire - and that probability gets larger if you add more engines.
The basis of ETOPS is that - given a minimum standard of engine reliability (e.g. In-Flight Shutdown rates and Loss of Thrust Control rates) - the probability of a catastrophic accident is the same or less with a twin than with a tri or quad.
It's worth remembering that the closest we've come to a catastrophic accident due to single or multiple engine failures in the last 15 years was Qantas 32 - and that was a four engine A380.

[568]

Indeed TD.
But also noteworthy is this;

4th October 1992

El Al Flight 1862 - Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Al_Flight_1862)

[NWA SLF]

TD Racer - until a few weeks ago I would have agreed with you, but then I listened to Captain Behnam talking to Juan Browne about his FBO on UA1175. Captain Behnam said that the failure happened at 200 nautical miles from Honolulu - if it was 300 the 777 would have landed in the ocean because with all the drag due to the missing parts, he was not able to maintain ANY altitude. He was able, with full power on the left engine, to reduce his rate of descent so he could make it to Honolulu. He talked of 5 stars aligning making it possible for the flight to finish like it did. One was distance - 200 miles - if it was 300 he wouldn't have made it. He had taken a lavatory break 3 minutes prior to the incident in preparation for the descent and had just got seated and lap belt secured. They had a qualified FO jump seater as the plane was full - the extra person able to handle tasks so the crew could struggle to keep the plane in the air was kind of a miracle. There was a dent in the fuselage with materials identified as coming from a fan blade - a few inches difference and it could have taken out a window with resultant decompression. And I can't remember the 5th. Listening to his nearly 1 hour narrative with Juan Browne was enlightening, and frightening.

[tdracer]

First off, that failure wasn't supposed to happen - the nacelle should not fail due to a FBO (reportedly Boeing had a fix in the works for the nacelle coming apart - which apparently was delayed because of the FAA paperwork - which should have prevented the nacelle failure in the similar UAL event in Denver).
But more to the point - FBO is a rare event - something like 10-7 per flight (which, BTW, is the same probability number used for an uncontained rotor burst failure). And FBO at cruise is extremely rare - nearly all FBO events are during TO or initial climb. So you're talking an event probability that is way out there - the same sort of probability that an uncontained engine failure will cause catastrophic damage. Yes, it happened - but so do many improbable failures that endanger continued safe flight and landing. The statistics are solid - adding engines doesn't improve safety. Quite simply there are better places to spend money if the goal is to improve flight safety.

[old,not bold]

tdracer many of the arguments I have listened to about ETOPS could equally be applied to a case for saying that 1 engine is as safe, or safer than 2. And there are many cases where additional engines don't help, eg running out of fuel, to name the most obvious.

But you contradict yourself by asserting that "after you have two engines, adding more doesn't help safety," and then saying "there is a small but finite probability that a twin engine aircraft will suffer a dual engine shutdown or loss of thrust that turns catastrophic - and the probability gets smaller if you add more engines". Exactly.

It is a fallacy that you increase the chance of a catastrophic failure by having more engines. Apart from related failures (ie fuel starvation, volcanic ash etc) each failure is a random event. The probability of the first failure is the same whether your are flying with 2, 4 or 8 engines, as is the probability of a second unrelated failure which is, as you say, small but finite. I do believe that the small probability of a genuinely random second failure is increased by the fact that one engine has failed, due to a number of factors that are hard to quantify. For example; if the failure is the result of a maintenance error because the mechanic was tired, cross and under pressure, did that mechanic also work on the other engine on the same shift, and sign off both tasks?

The limiting factor on allowable diversion times was, if I recall correctly, the longest time that a hold fire could be suppressed, nothing to do with engine failure probabilities, and maybe that's still the case. I often wondered if that figure has ever been really tested in all conceivable types of hold fire. Maybe it has, maybe it hasn't. That's a problem with quads also, of course!

By the way; "First off, that failure wasn't supposed to happen". There you go, Murphy strikes again. It wasn't supposed to happen, but it did because it could.

[tdracer]

If's not a fallacy. When you go from 2 to 4 engines and double the number of engines, you double the chance that there will be a catastrophic engine failure (actually its a little worse than that because engines on quads often don't get as good of maintenance attention). That increase is greater than the decrease you get in the probability that you'll have multiple engine thrust loss that turns catastrophic. No contradiction - just basic statistics.
That's not the case when you go from 1 engine to 2, but it is when you go more than 2...
Or to put it a little differently - the 767 and 747-400 were designed with roughly the same level of technology and safety, but the 767 (and 757) are statistically safer than the 747-400 (by roughly a factor of 2).

[CargoOne]

Our world is conducting ETOPS operations for about 40 years now and there was no single accident caused by this so far. It may happen one day but if you take into account how many flight hours were logged in during those 40 years, it leaves no space to doubt regarding safety angle. One of US majors did even overshoot the max diversion time due to the headwinds over mid Pacific many years ago, flying over 3 hours on one engine before landing on Hawaii. What else is need to be discussed here?

ps and no, Air Transat Azores glider does not count in here, with the same circumstances applied, it would be the same outcome with 747 or 340

[hunbet]

Not sure you are debating ETOPS. This was caused by a maintenance error when an AMT incorrectly installed a lube unit scavenge screen.

It does not count against ETOPS and It's why 2 AMT'S are required when working on both engines or only one engine is done during a layover and the other is scheduled on a different date.

[FlightDetent]

Or to put it a little differently - the 767 and 747-400 were designed with roughly the same level of technology and safety, but the 767 (and 757) are statistically safer than the 747-400 (by roughly a factor of 2). Apologies, I understand the wording may have been simplifed. It seem to depend on what is meant by (shown to be) _statistically safer_ in this context. Is it that
- the number of IFSD over (say 10 k) departures was less on the 75&6 compared to the 747?

There are other metrics to view an IFSD.
- the number of events where 50% thrust loss resulted from an IFSD / (10k departures) (menitoned already)
and
- the number of events of IFSD where the resulting configuration was 1 (single) engine away from total loss of propulsion / (10k departures)

Okay, now the last one is clearly tailored to drive a certain point which had been already disproven by the decades of catastrophy-free twin jet operation. It's recognizable spin doctoring. Saying "the 767/757 ended up statiscically 2x safer than the 747 of equivalent technical design" - - that is equally awful. I remain convinced the bolded metric is a reasonable measure. It takes more bullets to hit more hares, and more luck to take down 4 in sequence than 2. P(n) = p^n.

The disagreement extends against arguments proposed at post #16, all of them to some extent are wagging the dog. To paraphrase, the classical mistake of supporting a good cause with weak examples and hollow logic.

For instance, #16 mentions finite probability of engine fire turning catastrophic (and the suggestions 4 installed increases exposure to the risk). Over the decades while ETOPS / LROPS existed, there was not any. See the lucid post number #21 saying _that (other discussed) failure was not supposed to happen_ and that's agreed. Same needs to apply to an uncontained rotor failure used to create a (not so) convincing probability calculation at # 16.

Nicely demonstrated with the AUA in-flight reverser deployment. Freak (uncontained by design at the time - absolutely love your insights!) failure mode where a fault on one engine takes down the whole ship. With that it certainly applies - having 3, 4, 8 increases the probabilty. That is mathematically valid but no longer relevant as it wouldn not happen again.

A conspiracy theorist would say this all reaks of groupthink and cherrypicking / modelling the probability equations for a pre-determined result. Perhaps in an era when launch of the T7 in twin configuration needed quasi-scientific support? I'm glad they did!

(personally I fly a twin and used to be rated on an ETOPS-180 one too. The marketing campaign 4engines 4the long-haul from a certain manufacturer to battle the T7 seizing her rightful place was pure hypocrisy)

Arcing over towards the dramatic now: in case of a complex failure, is a 2 man-crew safer than a 3 man one because there is less humans to make mess of it? I know, I know ...engines don't correct each other. :) and a three-captain cockpit is a recipe for a disaster! :ouch: Ooops, not so much of light relief.

Stay healthy everyone.

[tdracer]

Sorry FlightDetent - I was simply referring to the hull loss and fatal hull loss accident rates. Nothing to do with engines specifically. Granted, a very simplistic argument - but if more engines made the aircraft safer, then one would expect that quads and tri's would have better accident rates than twins - and that's simply not the case.

Although shutdown and loss of control rates are tracked by operational hours and cycles, the fact remains that most engine failures occur early in the flight - takeoff and initial climb. Failures at cruise are but a small subset of the total numbers.
The loss of 50% thrust on a quad - particularly early in the flight - can be catastrophic - quads are not designed for that. In fact the most recent accident I can recall which was the result of multiple independent engine failures was a 747F. Specifically - roughly ten years ago - a Kalitta 747F suffered a major engine failure during takeoff (turbine failure) - the pilot apparently advanced the remaining engine throttles, which prompted a second engine to fail. They didn't make it.

[Dave Therhino]

The Kalitta accident was a good way to illustrate your point that the heavy quad can’t stand a second engine failure. Those weren’t independent failures, though. The first failure caused the pilot to increase the power above limits on the remaining tired engines as you said, causing the second failure. Strictly speaking that’s a cascading effect of the first failure. I recognize that wasn’t your main point in mentioning that accident.

I don’t think I’ve ever heard of any instance of two or more truly independent engine failures on the same flight in the last 40 years. I could be wrong though.

[old,not bold]

............................ engines on quads often don't get as good of maintenance attention.......What!? (as Oprah would say). Any evidence to back that one up? I don't think it's going off thread to ask the question; it's a factor in the discussion if true.

[hoistop]

For example; if the failure is the result of a maintenance error because the mechanic was tired, cross and under pressure, did that mechanic also work on the other engine on the same shift, and sign off both tasks?

Since quite some time it is prohibited that same mechanic performs same task on both engines or all 3 hyd. systems etc. (critical systems).It was introduced on ETOPS airplanes, but it is (should be) a norm now for all airplanes in Part-145 maintenance. This policy was followed in several maint. organizations I was dealing with in the past.

[tdracer]

What!? (as Oprah would say). Any evidence to back that one up? I don't think it's going off thread to ask the question; it's a factor in the discussion if true.
I don't have access to current information, but with the same engine on 747s and 767s, the 747 fleet usually had a marginally higher IFSD rate. Now, part of that is you're more likely to do a precautionary shutdown on a quad than a twin, but when you looked at the actual data, it went deeper than that. Also, ETOPS put restrictions on the same mechanic/team doing maintenance on both engines at the same time - rules that did not always carry over to quads (and a significant number of shutdowns are due to maintenance errors).
Also, some operators (note the disclaimer - I'm not saying this is universal) didn't pay as close of attention to things like EGT margin and vib limits on quads (hence the previously mentioned Kalitta event).

[old,not bold]

trdracer I'll buy most of that, and I'm already saying 10 Hail Mary's for forgetting the rule about having different teams work on each engine of an ETOPS aircraft.

It's a discussion that's going nowhere, you have your very valid views and I have my reservations. Like, for example, that specific rule (different maintenance teams). Why only ETOPS? If a potential cause of error is one team working on both engines, surely passengers and crew in non-ETOPS aircraft are entitled to having the risk eliminated on the aircraft they are sitting in? To widen the argument, the inference to be drawn from most of the regulations for ETOPS is that non-ETOPS aircraft have a lower standard of maintenance. That cannot be acceptable.

[tdracer]

To widen the argument, the inference to be drawn from most of the regulations for ETOPS is that non-ETOPS aircraft have a lower standard of maintenance. That cannot be acceptable.

I think an unappreciated aspect of ETOPS (or at least underappreciated) is that is caused most of the industry to raise their game - resulting in improved safety across the board. There is the more obvious stuff like aircraft designed for ETOPS with improved systems and redundancy (777 being the first), and operators that conducted a significant numbers of ETOPS flights began maintaining their entire fleet to ETOPS standards - rather than maintaining separate ETOPS and non-ETOPS fleets.
But it goes deeper. For example, in the ramp-up to initial ETOPS (EROPS back then), Boeing started looking at the overall shutdown statistics and discovered that a many of those shutdowns were due to known causes with identified fixes. Many operators simply didn't bother to incorporate known fixes - figuring it was cheaper to simply accept the occasional shutdown. Boeing put together a presentation that pointed out just how much each in-flight shutdown cost the operators - not just the direct costs of a broken engine, but all the indirect costs of fleet disruptions, loss of use, remote engine replacements, etc. In short, a shutdown could easily cost the operator over a million dollars (and that in 1980's money) - it was cheaper to prevent the shutdown than to deal with it. After the operators got the message, shutdown rates started dropping dramatically such that now days shutdowns due to known causes with readily available fixes are fairly rare.

[FlyingRoland]

2 engines nowadays are just as reliable as 4 engines in the past. Statistically that is.
But who cares about statistics?

[Chris2303]

NWA SLF

I find it interesting? (alarming?) that this is the third flight that my tiny brain can remember where the rostered crew were overwhelmed and had to use the assistance of jump seat riders or passengering crew to keep ahead of the airplane. UA232, UA1175, QF32

[ImbracableCrunk]

I don't think asking your pilot Jumpseater to go assess the condition of the engine is a sign of being overwhelmed.

[exeng]

Chris 2303,

It is a case of using all resources available to you in a sensible manner. If a qualified crew member is sitting on the jump seat you would use his/her eyes and ears rather than taking the F/O (or Capt) out of seat - after all such a jumpseater could have been the person rostered to fly with you but happened not to be on that particular day.

[Check Airman]

ImbracableCrunk

Agreed. Using another crewmember is excellent CRM in my opinion.

[Chris2303]

exeng

My point was more what if there was no additional assistance available. Would Al Haynes have got the airplane down relatively safely if it was just him, the FO and the FE

[GlobalNav]

Check Airman

No question that using available competent resources is good. The real quest is whether the jump seater was a critical resource. Would the captain and FO alone been able to handle the non normal situation successfully? I realize professional pilots are reluctant to admit they could not. But there are some examples to the contrary.

The issue though is not pilot competence, but aircraft design and whether it is good enough, safe enough for two pilots to handle the potential nonnormals.

[NWA SLF]

I've been retired for 12 years - I don't know what today's processes are. Nacelle failing - would not Boeing doe a DFMEA on nacelle if they found deterioration from years of use, then go to the FAA explaining the urgency? Or is the FAA a roadblock to fast response? I have difficulty listening to experts say the FAA should have caught issues. Being an engineer for 47 years going through design process developments over 5 decades, I cannot fathom how inspectors are supposed to know more about the design and function than the crew designing. My second cousin once removed, who began his career with Boeing in the 1940's and retired after doing finite element analysis on the B-2 in the 1990s, reminisced about how our 2 industries - aviation vs automotive - weren't all that different although his team needed to do a lot more explaining to the people overseeing the project about what they should be looking for. Automotive a lot more reactive. In the nacelle failure incidents, I would foresee a process like finding and analyzing a problem, producing the documentation to the FAA recommending prompt repair. Yet the need to avoid statements or even inferences that if we don't make this change, people are going to die (Applegate memorandum). Living outside Senlis, France, I visited the DC-10 crash site many times to refresh the lesson of how engineers can screw up, assembly and maintenance can multiply the screw up, and even when a pilot like Bryce McCormick tells you that you have a big problem you fail to respond. And even worse sitting on a witness stand reviewing accident pictures when you've been trying to twist arms to implement a change and due to bureaucracy, being forced to defend.