734 hard landing @ Exeter

[readywhenreaching]

Happened this morning

https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/800x400/1611077526_f2d2b62fd16a436bb87636d8019bb036a239a527.jpeg
https://twitter.com/ryankirkpatric4/status/1351578094231019521/photo/1

[Webby737]

That looks nasty !
I'd guess given the age of the aircraft it could well be written off.
At least it wasn't one of their new shiny -800s !

[OldLurker]

More photos on AvHerald:
Accident: West Atlantic B734 at Exeter on Jan 19th 2021, hard touchdown (http://www.avherald.com/h?article=4e1e21a4&opt=0)

[tubby linton]

A photo of the airframe post the accident here shows that the structure is no longer equally supported by the undercarriage. The cargo is still aboard as it is currently too dangerous to remove it.
https://samchui.com/2021/01/19/west-atlantic-boeing-737-suffers-hard-landing-at-exeter-2/?utm_source=BoardingArea&utm_medium=BoardingArea#.YAdUty3fWfB

[DaveReidUK]

At first glance, the photos appear to show that the LH inboard flap has dropped.

But look closer and it can be seen that it's not the flap that has moved, but the upper surface of the wing root that has been pushed up by the MLG trunnion trying to break through.

[tubby linton]

The fuselage damage on the port side looks as though it has been caused by the leg or its support structure breaking through the upper surface of the wing.

[TheEdge]

I am curios to know how many Gs are we talking about here

[flyfan]

Would be interesting...Hard landing checks are carried out for any landing above (I think) 2,1 Gs, but a technician once mentioned to me that even a 3-4G landing (!) probably wouldn't cause major damage on the 737, longer versions being more critical than shorter ones. Would also be interesting as to what happened - weather doesn't look to bad / gusty... [EGTE 190220Z 23010KT 9000 -RA SCT012 BKN040 12/10 Q1009=] - source avherald.

[TeeGeeZee]

We're a few miles south-west of Exeter and I can remember hearing the wind hitting the house during Monday night/Tuesday morning so 10 knots seems like a surprisingly low forecast. Looking at FR24 the ground speed on approach was varying fairly rapidly between 111 and 133 knots, so I'm guessing they were dealing with some reasonable gusts. Data also shows a VS of -1,024 FPM over the threshold, but the aircraft was apparently still airborne as it reached the intersection with the old RWY13/31.

[Uplinker]

That's a nasty thing to happen to anybody. Hope the crew are OK.

[anxiao]

TGZ let us assume that the FR24 data does not give an accurate touch down point. I do not know if it does or not. But if it was accurate and they were still airborne at the intersection of the old RW31 then that was not the place to be in a 737. Let us see what more data provides...

[TeeGeeZee]

Good point. I'm not familiar enough with either the inner workings of ADS-B or what internal processing FR24 do to their data to speculate on how accurate it might be. Thankfully whatever happened there was a safe outcome for the crew, if not the airframe.

Had to take the car to the garage this morning and could see CY on the apron as we drove past the airport - I swear the aircraft is actually tilting several degrees to the left.

[DaveReidUK]

TGZ let us assume that the FR24 data does not give an accurate touch down point. I do not know if it does or not.

It doesn't.

But if it was accurate and they were still airborne at the intersection of the old RW31 then that was not the place to be in a 737.

On closer examination of the data, that seems unlikely. Height over the piano keys (after adjusting for QNH and elevation) was about 40' AAL. There are two subsequent plot points after that, approaching the cross runway, but those indicate 100 feet lower, which is clearly impossible.

It wouldn't be altogether surprising if hitting the runway with enough force to drive the gear up through the wing had also done strange things to the Mode S air/ground logic.

[Nightstop]

Human factors, rather than bad weather, is my theory as to the main cause of this accident. The Circadian Rhythm at 02:00 in most humans demands deepest sleep, with lowest body temperature occurring at 04:30. This accident occurred close to the lowest point in the average person’s alertness cycle.

[Pistonprop]

Nightstop, is this also valid when flying regularly on nights (as many of these crews do)? This is not a challenge but just a question.

[Nightstop]

Pistonprop:

This safety issue has been highlighted ad infinitum. Here is a FSF article on the subject. I’ve no connection with this Company or anyone involved whatsoever.

https://flightsafety.org/hf/hf_mar_apr99.pdf

[Dark Stanley]

This happened on the first night of what would be 5 nights of duty.
First night into the WOCL is the toughest. Incredibly difficult to rest for, weekend off with all the normal home triggers to get you up and going. And if you’ve got kids they’re not even at school at the moment if you’re trying to rest on a Monday. So I’d say human factors would be a very relevant area of mitigation.

[Stick Flying]

I think it very much depends on the individual. To me, if properly rested previously (i.e. having had enough sleep during normal patterns), the first night is alright. But the second and third nights for me hurt more until the body clock at least adapts slightly.

[Wycombe]

I swear the aircraft is actually tilting several degrees to the left

The pics on AvHerald clearly show the aircraft is listing left, mainly due to the fact that the port main undercarriage has been pushed-up through the wing.

Local reports that the airframe is bent to the point that the ULD's could not be pushed off.

[DaveReidUK]

Other reports indicate that loaders were not allowed to board the aircraft with one of the main gears in an unstable state, for obvious reasons.

[eagle21]

Not a good thing for West Atlantic loosing this hull after transferring so many aircraft to the spanish registry.

[Alrosa]

Along with being one of the very few cargo airlines to make pilots redundant late last year citing “Brexit “ ...

[DaveReidUK]

FDR traces from today's Final Report (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/627ce6e5d3bf7f05216d7e04/Boeing_737-4Q8_G-JMCY_07-22.pdf):

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1701x1793/g_jmcy_ed1b8d9800bf56dc75d5c0bab8fbbb1138d13a68.jpg

[diginagain]

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-61521046

[tubby linton]

The report states the touchdown G was 3.5 which seems quite low for the damage that was caused.

[DaveReidUK]

The report states the touchdown G was 3.5 which seems quite low for the damage that was caused.

From the report: "The maximum vertical acceleration recorded by the FDR on touchdown was 3.8g, at this point there was 3° of left roll. However, FDR sample rates and sensor locations are not ideally placed to determine peak forces on touch down."

The fact that the touchdown was sufficiently hard to deform the LH MLG beam would appear to support this.

[tubby linton]

I have read the report but a lot of other aeroplanes have touched down with a greater G with less damage.The report is a bit vague, perhaps the fdr data was poor, but it does mention a vertical rate in fpm on the wing box that exceeded the design tolerance Surely Boeing must have been able to work this into a G .It seems strange that it was not included. Reading the report it didn’t seem as factual or as well written as what we have come to expect from the AAIB and I have read a lot of them.

[fdr]

FDR traces from today's Final Report (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/627ce6e5d3bf7f05216d7e04/Boeing_737-4Q8_G-JMCY_07-22.pdf):

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1701x1793/g_jmcy_ed1b8d9800bf56dc75d5c0bab8fbbb1138d13a68.jpg

Thanks Dave for the info from the report. That was a fairly steady rate of shear throughout at a mild rate. Aircraft performance follows the attitude the pilots have placed the plane at... There is no obvious vertical flow occurring from a quick comparison of speed/attitude and derived VS. Crew would like to have those 30 seconds over again I guess. The cognitive load on a turbulent approach can get quite high, which is why the rules on stable conditions and the response to GPWS alerts is such an important input to the safe outcome of a busy little approach. A "pull up" in the flare is pretty much a good suggestion to the drivers. The 3.5 slope kind of sucks, that is going to always need a good stable finals to remain within reasonable limits for a heavy landing wieght, <900FPM or more for the stable slope....

stuff happens

p3:
"The commander recalled that as the aircraft crossed the threshold, at about 100 ft, the PF retarded the throttles, pitched the aircraft nose down, from about 5° nose up to 4° nose down, and then applied some power in the last few feet. During these final moments before the landing, there was another “SINK RATE” alert. The result was a hard landing. A “PULL UP” warning was also triggered by the GPWS, but it was not audible on the CVR."

Golly. Did he catch the #1 wire on the tailhook?

p9:
"There was no stated requirement in the OM for both pilots to monitor that the stable approach criteria were maintained below 500 ft, with the aim of delivering the aircraft to the point in space above the runway from which a flare manoeuvre will result in touchdown at the right speed and attitude, and within the touchdown zone. This is something other operators are known to have in their OM, with a requirement to conduct a GA if the stable approach criteria are not maintained to the landing".

An amendment to the FOM coming soon?

The OEM's FCTM for every type they make states a need to maintain stable flight path for the rest of the approach, an item that the report does note as well. If we are stable at 500' and inverted at 200' it is hard to justify the approach as being "stable" and consistent with the desired outcome of being able to reuse the plane and crew without rework or scrapping.

p16:
"The commander also stated that he felt it was too late for him to take control or call “go around” from about 100 ft RA."
That is pretty sad to see in writing coming from an experienced crew. Is there a magical figure where the plane suddenly doesn't do what it is supposed to? To save tire wear, we would routinely do a G/A at the start of a flare, in the flare (and at any point up to the selection of TRs) Years ago, the wisemen comment to the new 747 drivers is when all else fails, go wings level, 5 degrees nose up and all thrust that you can get... it may not be pretty but it is hard to hurt the plane in that condition, and it works for every Boeing other than maybe the 717 and 727. If we believe there is a latest point that we can do a go-around, then that needs to be dispelled. Presumably, the alternative is that at 100-RA we just give up as the outcome is preordained?

[BoeingDriver99]

Is there a statement in their OM for both pilots not to crash? Or to keep their eyes open during landing? Or to keep breathing continuously? FML

[Furniture Saver]

Fascinating that an 18-page report contains no explanation of why the co-pilot could not land the aircraft. This was the ‘cause’ of the accident (AAIB purpose: ‘…to improve aviation safety by determining the circumstances and causes of air accidents and serious incidents, and promoting action to prevent reoccurrence’) and deserved exploration.

[WideScreen]

FDR traces from today's Final Report (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/627ce6e5d3bf7f05216d7e04/Boeing_737-4Q8_G-JMCY_07-22.pdf):

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1701x1793/g_jmcy_ed1b8d9800bf56dc75d5c0bab8fbbb1138d13a68.jpg
Especially from (4), I'd say, the pitch input is lagging behind what is needed to get a stable descent rate. Not completely anti-cyclic, but the corrections are sufficiently delayed and being too big, making it impossible to dampen the inherent GS deviations. Which in turn suggests a lagging brain, which in turn might suggest fatigue.

A Go-Around and next landing may have suffered from the same problem, fatigue doesn't go away.

[DaveReidUK]

Fascinating that an 18-page report contains no explanation of why the co-pilot could not land the aircraft. This was the ‘cause’ of the accident (AAIB purpose: ‘…to improve aviation safety by determining the circumstances and causes of air accidents and serious incidents, and promoting action to prevent reoccurrence’) and deserved exploration.

That's a tad unfair on the AAIB. While it doesn't specifically use what the NTSB terms "probable cause" and "contributory factors", the section in the report labelled "Conclusions" is pretty unambiguous:

"The aircraft suffered a hard landing as a result of the approach being continued after it became unstable after the aircraft had past the point where the crew had declared the approach stable and continued.

Despite high rates of descent being observed beyond the stable point, together with associated alerts the crew elected to continue to land.

Had the approach been discontinued and a GA flown, even at a low height, while the aircraft may have touched down the damage sustained may have been lessened.

While the OM did not specifically state that an approach was to remain stable beyond the gate on the approach, the FCTM was specific that, if it did not remain stable, a GA should be initiated.

The commander may have given the co-pilot the benefit of doubt and believed she had the ability to correct an approach that became unstable in the final few hundred feet of the approach.

However, had there been any doubt, a GA should be executed."

Without the ability to get inside the heads of the crew, what more would you like to have seen?

[fdr]

In recent years I've encountered new pilots who have extraordinary perceptions, which they say they were taught during training - about how to salvage a landing which is going a bit pear shaped.
One is to add a surge of thrust just prior to touchdown; normally that's just makes for a very fast and long touchdown, and sometimes PIO in the past couple of feet trying to force the gear to touch.
And the worst - to actually push on the yoke when coming down too fast!!! Now this lead to the only hard landing I've ever been the crew for. And a sudden push at 20' is almost impossible for the captain to catch! He swore blind a trainer taught him this; of course it's crazy. (I think it comes from the theory in long wide bodies, where I tiniest relaxation of the back pressure at about 2' was the way to get a super smooth touch (it does), and he claimed he was told increasing pitch slightly pushes the gear towards the runway making it worse - nonsense of course - the mains are close to the pitch axis, and that effect is dwarfed by the massively increased touchdown descent rate by pushing) - No!; faced with excessive sink rate crossing the threshold - flying 101 ... PULL to moderate the descent rate (if the speed is adequate) ... or go around.
Anyway, both elements seem to be in this incident.

It is a nasty little technique.... it has remained around from the MD80 and B727 which could benefit from an initial flare and then a slight de-flare. The risks on the method are enormous, Doing an analysis of what the wheels sink rate does in a de-flare gives zero comfort as a procedure to avoid a hard landing. forward stick may help a P51 or T6 wheel landing to plant the gear, but otherwise is high risk.

[Furniture Saver]

Dave, some exploration at least as to why an experienced but possibly borderline-competent pilot was not able to land an aircraft. Fatigue? Insufficient cues? Distraction? Fundamentally unsound technique? There’s simply no effort to explain it. The AAIB costs somewhere around £8M a year, and really should be doing a lot better than that.

[lederhosen]

Text book example of why you should go around when an approach becomes unstable. Interesting how many hours the co-pilot had; 19,000 with 5,000 on the 737. The captain had 15,000 with 9,000 on the aircraft. I also wonder why the co-pilot did both landings, particularly in somewhat challenging conditions at an airfield the company later designated captain‘s only for landing. The captain had only flown 25 hours in the last 3 months so presumably could have used the practice. Middle of the night, Covid impact on currency, company disruption potentially also distracting the crew, made for a number of holes in the Swiss cheese.

[excrab]

Looking at the experience levels I wonder if these were two Captains flying together perhaps, although not mentioned in the report. Seems strange that a pilot with that experience and time in the company would still be an f/o, when you consider that 3000 to 4000 hrs is a typical experience for 737 Captains at some low cost carriers.

[EcamSurprise]

Looking at the experience levels I wonder if these were two Captains flying together perhaps, although not mentioned in the report. Seems strange that a pilot with that experience and time in the company would still be an f/o, when you consider that 3000 to 4000 hrs is a typical experience for 737 Captains at some low cost carriers.

In my airline you get two shots at command and then you’re out of the process. Having many hours doesn’t automatically mean you are suitable to be a captain. If anything, having such high hours as an FO often tells a story in itself.

[Akrapovic]

Looking at the experience levels I wonder if these were two Captains flying together perhaps, although not mentioned in the report. Seems strange that a pilot with that experience and time in the company would still be an f/o, when you consider that 3000 to 4000 hrs is a typical experience for 737 Captains at some low cost carriers.

Perhaps the report in question goes a long way to explaining that. . . . . .

[Alrosa]

The bulk of the FO’s hours were most likely obtained elsewhere - accumulating those kinds of hours at an operator like WA is impossible. The norm I believe was 1 week on/1 week off with no more than 2-3 sectors a night.

[Fair_Weather_Flyer]

For me, the report did not really drill into the underlying reasons for the accident. Given that this report was 18 months in the making, I thought that it would be very detailed. The NTSB reports like to track the history of the pilots in their earlier career, through their recruitment into the airline and their detailed training history within the airline. Failed checks and commands etc are fair game.

My own unfortunate experience is that airlines have a dirty little secret of a group of poor pilots. How big this group is depends on sound recruitment, training and a plan of how to deal with those who are not able to meet standards. The slightly steep, Exeter, approach should not be a very challenging one, especially for a 19000 hour pilot. I'd bet that these pilots had a long history of poor performance dating over many years and various airlines. How they were recruited and why the airline did not act over the FO remains a mystery. What can we learn from such a mystery?

[RatherBeFlying]

What I see more than a destabilised approach is an oscillating approach with textbook like waveforms - or shall we say repeating cycles of divergence / overcorrection until the ground got in the way.

[Dropp the Pilot]

"Having many hours doesn’t automatically mean you are suitable to be a captain."

This is manifestly true. Unfortunately, add a pilot union into the mix which will protect and promote even it's most brain-dead progeny unto the barricades and watch the crash rate increase. cf. Air France

[Semreh]

That's a tad unfair on the AAIB. While it doesn't specifically use what the NTSB terms "probable cause" and "contributory factors", the section in the report labelled "Conclusions" is pretty unambiguous:



Without the ability to get inside the heads of the crew, what more would you like to have seen?

I've checked if your quotation of the report is accurate. It is.

The aircraft suffered a hard landing as a result of the approach being continued after it
became unstable after the aircraft had past the point where the crew had declared the
approach stable and continued. (from https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/627ce6e5d3bf7f05216d7e04/Boeing_737-4Q8_G-JMCY_07-22.pdf )

What I'd like to have seen is a report without grammatical mistakes (past/passed). This is in the 'Conclusion' section, which, presumably, has been read and approved by at least one other person than the writer, and who could be assumed to either have decent English, or access to a technical writer/copy editor.

"It's just a typo!", you may cry - and indeed, writing 'has passed' or 'was past' both parse correctly, even if the sentence structure is strained. However, the AAIB is meant to demonstrate competence, so readers of the report have confidence in the conclusions, and if a simple error like this gets though, it makes the reader wonder how many other errors in their work are not so noticeable. Presentation is important if you want to appear competent. Details matter, especially when your organisation is expected to routinely make painstaking investigations. If you can't get the basics right, what else is going wrong?

[WideScreen]

What I see more than a destabilised approach is an oscillating approach with textbook like waveforms - or shall we say repeating cycles of divergence / overcorrection until the ground got in the way.
Yep, when you start correcting the pitch, when you pass the intended glide slope, you can be sure to be oscillating. Just take care your pitch is roughly matching what is needed for the glideslope, when you get on the dots and your oscillation dampens out (fast).

The DRU figures clearly show the aircraft pitch only starts to change, when passing the glideslope, not before the glideslope is reached.

[Furniture Saver]

Semreh,

Written by an Inspector (or maybe Senior Inspector, which is usually an Inspector who’s managed to stay in the job for two years), looked at by at least two other Inspectors (or Senior Inspectors) probably in more than one meeting, messed about with by a Principal Inspector, probably in more than one meeting, then checked by the Deputy or Chief Inspector.

Yes, past/passed is poor. As was Stanstead not long ago. But I maintain that some effort to explain why an airline pilot couldn’t land, would have been a good thing to include.

[First_Principal]

Moreover, the modern day company policy of openly "positive" discrimination towards applicants of a certain characteristic, and thereafter, a disinclination to remove substandard pilots of said characteristic from the line for fear of blowback, may be the cause of the confidential data I saw which showed they account for a vastly greater proportion of severe handling incidents, (notably, landings). Of course, woke PC will no doubt prevent such data from ever seeing the light of day.

It would greatly concern me if such information were held to be 'secret', given that it could have the potential to make a positive impact on risk assessment, training and so forth.

Unfiltered raw data on incidents/accidents correlated to age, hours, gender, position etc should be accessible so that *if* there's anything to this then trainers, regulators, employers, (and the public who get on a flying machine) may all be able to complete due diligence and reach conclusions on whether there are any statistically significant issues and, if so, how one might address them.

If, once thorough investigation has been carried out, there is something to be addressed then that detail must also be available to everyone without 'spin'. Should different groups then wish to exercise various opinions as to why it's 'better' to have statistically risky people in such positions that's up to them, but from a logic perspective there's be no excuse IMO. After all we'd not use components with a known low MTBF during overhaul when there are better ones available, would we?

In saying this I'm quite aware that there could be many reasons why one group might initially appear to have a greater number of incidents than another - it may in fact be nothing to do with biological factors - however without the necessary [unbiased] data it's extremely difficult to make any reasonable assessment. In the absence of traceable facts people are left to speculate, which can be quite corrosive.

Ultimately it's a complicated thing designing, building, and testing an aircraft, then getting it into the air, full of people, along to a destination and back without incident. Along that journey we try to use the highest quality components, the best people, the most proven systems, and we (hopefully thoroughly, scientifically without bias, and publically) regularly assess how that's going on so that any weaknesses or issues may be addressed. Factors relating to the drivers of these machines should not be exempted from such scrutiny, they are an important part of the process we presently utilise.

[Albert Hall]

West Atlantic safety record is good

Apart from this incident, the recent AAIB investigation into the load shift and that AAIB coverage of that horror story of an ATP crosswind landing at Birmingham, you mean?

[Nil further]

The AAIB in now sadly like the CAA.

In my personal opinion an organisation with zero credibility, a once formidable global reputation for probity, rigour and technical excellence is no more.

[punkalouver]

First principal - personally I think at the that female pilots are just as likely to make good or bad pilots as males at the outset, and gender aptitude is not the hypothesis anyway. It's the discrimination in favour of females at the recruitment, and training washout phases and the lower standard that logically follows. Yes, training departments will assert that minimum standards are maintained, and even accepting that to be true (debatable), but by narrowing the candidature based on gender, minimum standards could otherwise have been exceeded by a greater margin by not discriminating. Discrimination is bad, whatever it's form (eg gender percentages, quotas etc).


What instructor is going to wash out a female. A certain percentage of each gender that washes out will make false claims against an examiner. It could very well be the same percentage. But our society will immediately jump out in favour of the female pilot while ignoring the male pilot and examiner can kiss his training job goodbye. Perhaps he will have said Miss instead of Ms that got him suspended. Or perhaps it doesn't matter because ...."we have to believe".

The dangers of woke to aviation and so much else. Exaggeration? How did that 767 guy at Atlas end up flying the line.

[lederhosen]

Ageing pilots is another factor. Whilst a number maintain their skills to the end of their career, it is an inconvenient truth to a lot of us older posters that this can also be a factor. I don’t think any one of the holes in the swiss cheese can be singled out. But Covid disruption has definitely increased the number of holes.

[BoeingDriver99]

Time Traveller; I want to send you a private message but you’ve got the option turned off. Can you change that so I can send you a PM? Thanks

The data that would show gender differences in incident rate/report etc is there but is not accessible in the main. Which is interesting because I would hypothesise that if the data indicated female pilots had fewer incidents or reported more safety events thus demonstrating greater honesty/safety consciousness then any HR department/airline would be singing it from the rooftops so burnish their credentials. The fact is that none do and the female pilots pushing for greater gender balance don’t push for it either.

[DaveReidUK]

The data that would show gender differences in incident rate/report etc is there but is not accessible in the main. Which is interesting because I would hypothesise that if the data indicated female pilots had fewer incidents or reported more safety events thus demonstrating greater honesty/safety consciousness then any HR department/airline would be singing it from the rooftops so burnish their credentials. The fact is that none do and the female pilots pushing for greater gender balance don’t push for it either.

I suspect the reason is that women are too sensible to wave around a statistic like that which, even if true, would be a hostage to fortune.

[BoeingDriver99]

Well no because if the data was properly analysed using inferential statistics then one off events would not make any difference. Trends over time might make a difference eventually but for example; the data up to present day could result in interesting results - for example; no difference, small difference, large difference. They would be interesting results in their own way.

[BoeingDriver99]

Also I reckon women are just like men; some are too sensible, some aren’t and a whole bunch occupy them middle ground. So wouldn’t that mean a few less sensible folk (male or female) would be making that case by now if the data supported it?

[Uplinker]

It's interesting that when we discuss other accidents; involving only male pilots, I don't think we ever see, "well a female pilot in that situation would have been more cautious", or "a female pilot would have been able to multitask better" or whatever it may be.

In other words we only seem to see a gender debate when a woman pilot is involved?

[fdr]

Well no because if the data was properly analysed using inferential statistics then one off events would not make any difference. Trends over time might make a difference eventually but for example; the data up to present day could result in interesting results - for example; no difference, small difference, large difference. They would be interesting results in their own way.

The unfortunate truth is that trends usually don't give actionable intel towards stopping the next bingle. They look like they should mean something, but most times the next loss or embarrassment comes from outside of the focus at that time. In recent events, the only glaring example that really stands against that is the USS Connecticut's allision with the south china sea. The squadron command had highlighted deficiencies that seemed to be defied by the crew command, and either following being overridden by higher command or a change of heart, the event mirrored the concerns of the squadron command.

No trend picked up the 2 x B777 events in DXB, the take-off one or the GA one, they are system resonant events that come from what otherwise looks like a normal day at the office. The Exeter landing would not necessarily have been proceeded by actionable QAR alerting of stable approach criteria unless the screening looked at the full path of interest, rather than 2 snapshots. Even with screening triggering the unstable approach as an event, unless attributed to a common pilot, their problem doesn't get highlighted, it becomes a blip in the overall scheme of events. There are ways to get a meaningful understanding of the risks that the operation has, but it means a change of the manner by which we do business, and it is incompatible with pathological management teams, which are overrepresented in aviation.

[Stuka Child]

I have observed a code of silence on these fora for some time now, not wishing to be drawn into any debates.

However, I feel the need to speak up this time and ask the mods to clean up this disgusting thread or close it. You can not seriously be suggesting that we are now blaming "the woke" and "female pilots" for landing incidents. What is wrong with you? Step out into the real world for a minute. And most of all, take a good look in the mirror.

Landing incidents are either the result of sloppy flying, fixation or lack of confidence. If, as you say, women are overrepresented in these type of occurrences, I'm willing to bet it's due to lack of confidence. I can very well see why someone would lose faith in their own abilities if they flew with condescending, patronizing assholes like yourselves.

Women are not extraterrestrials. Just like any living being, if you treat them right, support them and show them you trust them, you will see their ability and confidence come out. If you employ the attitude shown in some of these posts, you will make whoever is sitting next to you uncomfortable, make them retreat inside themselves and prime them to make mistakes. Were you never taught this aspect of CRM or did you never have the common sense to learn it?

I would rather fly with amoeba than with some of you on here.

[parkfell]

Knowing the history of these unfortunate pilot(s) can be revealing…..the AAIB report of the A320 landing accident at KOS in July 2007 provided training details of the FO who was PF.
Reading it of course gave a remarkable feeling of hindsight.

[Equivocal]

On the topic of discrimination, I am generally supportive of some of the views expressed by Stuka Child, although I find the language and presentation of the post no better than that of those he/she condemns. More generally, the topic of discrimination, whether it seeks to deliver positive outcomes or not, should be open to discussion, particularly if it might possibly have some relevance - more on this in a moment. To prevent or delete that discussion is akin to pulling down statues and tossing them in the harbour.

I truly doubt whether female pilots are better or worse than male pilots - all other things being equal. And to know if all other things are equal, it is necessary to record and analyse data where there may be relevance. To me, those who seek to prevent such analysis and subsequent discussion are likely to be afraid of what the results might show.

And one final point on analysing data - and this relates mainly to fdr’s comments - when looking at accident, and to an extent, incident data (particularly when looking at a fairly narrow subset of that data), the sample size is very small. There is no real value in looking for trends because the data is already marginal and, quite possibly skewed - whether intentionally or otherwise - by the sample selection. The most useful approach is to search for common factors in the events and then to investigate whether these are coincidental or a hint of a trend. Of course, that investigation will be of little value if it is done with preconceptions of what the outcome will or should be.

[punkalouver]

I would rather fly with amoeba than with some of you on here.

I bet you would rather fly with this guy.

https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/legacy-of-a-lie-the-crash-of-atlas-air-flight-3591-519a3a7bd6ec

Unfortunately, people( I won't use the term amoeba) like you are willing to force us to.

Oh, and his family is suing the airline.

[BoeingDriver99]

I think most folk on here are attempting to look at the issue dispassionately and to first gather the data, then analyse and then draw conclusions. And as fdr says quite rightly; past history is no indication of future performance. Trends don't indicate single events.

The vast, vast, vast, vast majority of accidents and incidents are caused by machines designed and flown in the most part by men. However enough females design and fly the machines for data to be gathered. The idea that there would zero statistical difference at all is highly unlikely but possible when accounting for gender ratio differences in the professions. I know in my own experience the most difficult and least competent pilots were/are guys. But that's anecdotal.

As for other poster(s) on here who use highly emotive language to shut down discussion and use shame to silence it; I think it says it all about your argument or lack thereof.

[fdr]

The pilot flying of this aircraft was a qualified and certified pilot. Happens to be a female. So what? Females have been high-scoring aces, have saved RPT jets in distress, and also been killed by male pilots who screwed up, biggly. There have been some notable crashes where the co-pilot was female, UAL585, Colgan, USBangla, and in none of those events would gender have made any difference to the outcome. Male co-pilots and Captains have been screwing up since Wilbur and Orville were working out how to make date night work, and that seems to be the direction we intend to continue with. The DXB departure was not dependent on the gender, nor was the arrival done by a group of male pilots.

A charge of bias towards females comes from a pretty interesting place, one has to ask why they were underrepresented in the first place; that is where the bias arose. Have just completed over 150hrs with one young lady, and she exhibited the exact same weaknesses in her competency as a male compatriot who had 10 times her experience. Whatever the issues are, gender didn't enter into the issues.

[parkfell]

….. Have just completed over 150hrs with one young lady, and she exhibited the exact same weaknesses in her competency as a male compatriot who had 10 times her experience. Whatever the issues are, gender didn't enter into the issues.

I agree with fdr, gender is irrelevant.

Go back to flight school. Examine the training records. Speak to the Flight Instructors, and the experienced ones will be able to say with a high degree of certainty as to who will turn out to be sound, and those who will always struggle post licence issue.

There will of course always be some late developers who will come good in the end.

Depending how the brain is wired up, the extremes of the spectrum will result in a natural ability or one where shear hard work is necessary to achieve the required basic skills. Ideally a “Steady Eddie” will emerge.

The Exeter report is rich material for students of CRM analysis. Learn from other peoples mistakes as you will not live long enough to make them all yourself.

[Pilot DAR]

The pilot flying of this aircraft was a qualified and certified pilot. Happens to be a female. So what?

Correct. The gender of the pilot is not a factor worthy of discussion here.

[punkalouver]

It is worthy of discussion though. If Easyjet is disqualifying 90% of the candidates who would apply if they could from their cadet scheme due to gender reasons only, it is impossible to avoid the average level of candidate talent decreasing significantly. A lot of people are scared to say this because of the politicization creeping into just about everything. Some right on this forum will disagree using their excuses but aviation safety comes first in my mind.

However, I am happy to get back on to the piloting issues of this thread.

[Jwscud]

I think gender concern especially over the easyJet scheme is just male protectionism. The problem with both of these pilots was basic decision making. It doesn’t need an OM A or B policy to make clear that multiple sink rate cautions and an approach that unstable should have led to the captain to either call go around or take control.

The elephant in the room is that some people are just below average pilots and as long as they scrape through LPCs after practicing in the sim on a known profile every year they will be fine. Those people need to be weeded out but it is very hard. Many end up as professional copilots who can be very pleasant colleagues but are a liability when the operation strays outside their rehearsed little box. Major airlines and unions however currently allow people who are marginally competent to stay in the flight deck and with the shortages of crew the problem isn’t going away.

[M.Mouse]

Many end up as professional copilots who can be very pleasant colleagues but are a liability when the operation strays outside their rehearsed little box.

For many years in my former company we had co-pilots who had failed command courses and were permanent co-pilots. After many years of some quite marginal people being allowed to continue their careers a program was put in place called Managing Operational Performance. Thse who find themselves in that program either meet the required standards after further training or they are eased out of the company. The days of the not very competent being allowed to continue have long gone as I understand it.

[lederhosen]

This occurred at two in the morning on the first night of a cargo rotation during the early stages of Covid when schedules were disrupted and people were flying less. The weather was not great at a regional airport with what I would consider a shorter than average wet runway and a gusty wind. The company was going through turbulent times post Brexit and the working atmosphere may have been affected. The conclusion of many posters seems to be that this accident is probably the result of the wrong people flying.

I don’t think there is any doubt that both pilots performed poorly on this occasion. But I think it is simplistic to put it down just to poor selection and training. In my company multiple GPWS warnings without a go around would have led to a rapid tea no biscuits interaction with the safety department. The concept that the operations manual did not cover what to do if an approach became unstable below minimum also seems very strange. I would allocate more than a little blame to management and supervision. The reduction in flying due to Covid has been followed by some interesting incidents. The Easyjet high speed reject way beyond V1 at Luton and the Aberdeen missed approach with TUI are two that immediately spring to mind and in very reputable airlines. Multiple factors in my opinion played a role in this accident.

[Twiglet1]

This occurred at two in the morning on the first night of a cargo rotation during the early stages of Covid when schedules were disrupted and people were flying less. The weather was not great at a regional airport with what I would consider a shorter than average wet runway and a gusty wind. The company was going through turbulent times post Brexit and the working atmosphere may have been affected. The conclusion of many posters seems to be that this accident is probably the result of the wrong people flying.

I don’t think there is any doubt that both pilots performed poorly on this occasion. But I think it is simplistic to put it down just to poor selection and training. In my company multiple GPWS warnings without a go around would have led to a rapid tea no biscuits interaction with the safety department. The concept that the operations manual did not cover what to do if an approach became unstable below minimum also seems very strange. I would allocate more than a little blame to management and supervision. The reduction in flying due to Covid has been followed by some interesting incidents. The Easyjet high speed reject way beyond V1 at Luton and the Aberdeen missed approach with TUI are two that immediately spring to mind and in very reputable airlines. Multiple factors in my opinion played a role in this accident.

Cargo Ops with Covid pretty much stayed the same / got busier.

[lederhosen]

Generally you are right that cargo has done well unless of course you work for a Russian aligned operation. The report says though that the captain had flown on average 8 hours a month over the last 90 days, which even in night freight is at the bottom end. We can speculate as to the reasons for the low hours, but I think we can agree you might not be super current particularly if you were giving away some of your landings. I find it interesting that the co-pilot did both landings that night.

[SaulGoodman]

Generally you are right that cargo has done well unless of course you work for a Russian aligned operation. The report says though that the captain had flown on average 8 hours a month over the last 90 days, which even in night freight is at the bottom end. We can speculate as to the reasons for the low hours, but I think we can agree you might not be super current particularly if you were giving away some of your landings. I find it interesting that the co-pilot did both landings that night.

that’ll equal to 8 sectors a month, or 4 landings. I don’t get more on long haul.

[SLF3]

Gender is irrelevant. Did they have a bad day, or was this one of many bad days? No consideration of training records or career history is a startling omission from the report. Pages and pages on what happened, nothing on why.

[Furniture Saver]

Gender is irrelevant. Did they have a bad day, or was this one of many bad days? No consideration of training records or career history is a startling omission from the report. Pages and pages on what happened, nothing on why.

Forgive me, it is only startling if you have a presupposition that the AAIB is competent.

[exeng]

The problem with both of these pilots was basic decision making. It doesn’t need an OM A or B policy to make clear that multiple sink rate cautions and an approach that unstable should have led to the captain to either call go around or take control.

I quite agree. Regardless of the gender of the F/O the Captain should have taken control amd flown a go-around if it was apparent the approach was not stable. That is a Captains resposibility.

It is not relevant in a single instance to denigrate the performance of a particular F/O as it is the Captain's resposibility at that time to ensure the safety of the flight. It is anothe discussio altogether on how or why certain pilots continue emplyment when their performance is sub optimal.




Kind regards
Exeng

[Uplinker]

This crew (should) have been asleep all day to prepare for their night duty.

I wish them no ill, but they clearly went unstable after they had declared "stable" during their approach. PF should have gone around but if they didn't, PM/PIC should have gone around. "Stable" needs to be stable all the way down to the runway !

One potential safety problem with freight operations is time penalties. Ever since I did night Royal Mail flights years ago (with another company), and was told to close up and get going instead of re-tying a badly secured loose load*, I thought time penalties where aircraft are involved is unsafe, since it puts pressure on pilots and ground staff to get going.


*I ignored the command and resecured the load first. Load shifts can be fatal.

[Bryan Kiing]

possibly previously stressed prior to last landing....feel bad for the crew..we all have had our share of screw ups...most nothing more than a bruised ego thankfully

[tubby linton]

Wasn’t it shortly after the accident in Exeter that West Atlantic binned all its UK based pilots? You have to wonder if there were any rumours doing the rounds that the crew would all be out of employment and this subconsciously caused stress and distraction

[Alrosa]

Wasn’t it shortly after the accident in Exeter that West Atlantic binned all its UK based pilots? You have to wonder if there were any rumours doing the rounds that the crew would all be out of employment and this subconsciously caused stress and distraction

It was certainly around that time. Quite a few U.K. pilots in both seats were made redundant, with some offered a transfer to an associated company headquartered in Spain that also operates 734s (I believe 5 WA aircraft were transferred over to Swiftair and re-registered EC-XXX.) Others were offered a transfer to WA Sweden on the NG aircraft.

I’m not suggesting the above contributed to the accident but morale was pretty low at WA at around that time.

[enzino]

Rumour has it the DFO of the Spanish company was PIC for this flight.