Why is automation dependency encouraged in modern aviation ?

[KayPam]

Hello,

The title is voluntarily a bit provoking and I will explain my point of view in more details. Note that I fly the 320 so all that follows is applicable to this aircraft, not necessarily all others.
As I was saying in the other topic, aware that manual flying skills erode, airbus and airlines reckoned that pilots need to train regularly in real conditions, not just twice a year in the sim.
We even received, at our airline, a few weeks ago an e-mail reminding that, particularly with the low level of activity that we have with the covid crisis, it is recommended to practise manual flying as much as possible.

No problem at all at my airline, since most pilots I've seen commonly fly with no automation (AP, FD, ATHR, even the bird off).

The point of this topic is rather to point out the fact that modern aircraft tend to encourage automation dependency.
The point that best illustrates the problem is RNAV navigation and the way that it is managed.
With conventional navigation, pilots had to maintain a very good situational awareness at all times during the approach. Basic IFR training has pilots constantly think about wind, drift correction angle, timing corrections, anticipation angles,...
The conceptual workload peaked when I was flying single engine NDB's on the DA42. Correcting the wind, the drift angle due to n-1, while following the descent with altitudes to pass every 30s, readjusting power to correct height resulting in a requirement to correct the asymmetry... This is lightyears away from flying a normal ILS with ATHR and FDs ON.

But the way airbus manages lateral navigation is to rely completely on the FDs.
Yes, there is still a way to perform conventional navigation, using the VOR mode of the ND, but it is not trained and the aircraft is not really designed to be flown that way. A VOR approach is meant to be flown in NAV mode, following the FD, and then in FINAL APP mode with a minimal workload. One could argue that "meant to" is subjective and only my interpretation, but the FCOM clearly assumes in the "non precision approach" procedure that the FDs are used, and for RNAV approaches it is objective : they are mandatory.
Which is completely logical since there is no way to properly fly an RNAV approach in raw data. The MEL states that without FDs, the aircraft is not even RNAV1 nor RNAV2.
So for any departure or arrival that is RNAV, you are dependent on the FD, there simply is no other way available on this airbus.
But, it would be completely feasible to allow rnav approaches without FDs : just display an HSI : horizontal situation indicator, which would indicate the desired RNAV track, and a lateral deviation bar in nautical miles (instead of degrees on a VOR), and eventually a timer that indicates when to start the turn (like Garmin does). That's it.

Furthermore, the standard takeoff procedure also asks to follow the FDs : "after liftoff, follow the SRS pitch command bar". Are we deemed uncapable of pre-setting a target pitch (15°) then adjust it to maintain a given speed ? Anyway, many departure procedures are RNAV so it would also require the FDs.

The same type of reasoning can be applied to all phases of flight. Correct me if I'm wrong, I've heard that ATHR OFF at easyjet is forbidden, and that FD use is strongly encouraged at Ryanair for example. As Jacques Rosay says in the following article, flying with FDs is not manually flying, it is following the orders given by the FDs, that would otherwise have been given directly to the flight controls actuators.
https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/app/themes/mh_newsdesk/pdf.php?p=25849

The almost constant use of FD (that is required by design for many situations) can lead to decrease in basic IFR navigation and basic handling skills.


With this type of design, how can we still maintain a high standard of basic handling and IFR navigation competency ?
How can we say on one hand that pilots need to be able to fly without automation, and on the other hand not even give them the means to do it ?

There is still one time when it is feasible to fly manually : radar vectors to an ILS, no automation. The only difficulty is to know when to intercept the localizer, because most of the time the turn towards final should be initiated before the loc indicator is alive. Fortunately there are one or two ways (at least 3) to manage this.

Do you generally agree with the opinion that pilots should be able to consistently fly with no automation ?
How does this match with some airlines policy of forbidding to disconnect them ?

Many people will encourage manual flying "when conditions permit" : what are precisely the conditions that would encourage, allow, or discourage or even forbid manual flying ?
In my perception of things, clouds should not discourage FD OFF (except if they are just above the minimas), neither should a little turbulence.
The only conditions where I would find very adapted to use the FDs would be either a very turbulent approach (ATHR OFF, FDs on and AP OFF, all working together in order to reduce the amplitude and frequency of variations, to smooth the trajectory), or high crew fatigue, but I haven't thought out every possible combination of conditions, so your inputs are more than welcome.

Thanks

[EI_DVM]

I am in complete agreement with your post. Far too much lip service given to the importance of maintaining manual flying skills while having a culture of "I'm not sure that's appropriate right now" or "Best not incase it goes wrong". Airlines should be open to these minor deviations in the knowledge that they'll come back to benefit them on a stormy night some day in the future. A lot I think comes down to culture within an airline, while the manuals can all say one thing the practice can often differ in a more conservative way towards not wanting to be found out to be lacking in manual flight skills.

99.9% of times minor deviations, overshooting the loc, flying 6/7 knots fast for a couple of seconds etc will have zero effect on the safe outcome of the flight and I think we need to realise that and hold ourselves to appropriate standards, not that of a computer.

I agree cloud doesn't serve as a reasonable excuse not to handfly unless at minimums though I will throw in one further area I feel automation is appropriate, and that is close tight parallel approaches ala SFO etc, where using at least FDs to join the LOC is appropriate given the fact you'll roll out only meters off the side of another aircraft.

I'd also like to see as you said, OEMs include the equivalent of CDI's for RNAV approaches to enable them to be handflown raw data as well.

I also think it's important that we don't get drawn into an "The automation can do it better" debate. I'm fully aware that it can most of the time, there are few things I can do better than an autopilot, save for perhaps thrust control on a stormy night where certainly the Airbus' A/T lets itself down frequently, but for the most part I know I am at an absolute best, as good as the autopilot, and in most cases not so. The importance comes in being good enough, being able to fly within the tolerances, being able to correct deviations before they develop etc.

Just because one can not totally nail a VOR or ILS approach bang on the needles the whole way down does not make it any less safe; a 1/4 dot high or low, left or right quickly corrected is not an issue, and while the AP may not have done it, that doesn't mean we should abandon the maintenance of our handflying skills just because of that.

[Checkboard]

Correct me if I'm wrong, I've heard that ATHR OFF at easyjet is forbidden,
You're wrong. It's not forbidden - but it's unusual to see on the line.

And given the architecture of the airbus thrust lever quadrant, it's understandable. In the Boeing, for instance, the full arc of motion is available for manual thrust, so setting a particular thrust is relatively easy. In the airbus, the top third of the thrust lever arc is used for the Autothust setting detents - TOGA, FLEX/MCT and CLIMB - and the bottom third is used for reverse thrust (unlike the Boeing, there's no piggyback lever), so that just leaves the centre third for setting manual thrust which makes manual thrust lever movements "three" times more sensitive than in the Boeing.

[Check Airman]

I’ll agree that a wider range of movement would be ideal- but you get used to it. Better to sort it out on a normal day, than try to learn it when it’s not performing satisfactorily, or is broken.

[vilas]

In modern aircraft automation dependency is encouraged because that's the future of aviation. A350 ATTOL is an indication of that. A350 also automatically takes care of unreliable speed and loss of pressurization. The AP is also available with dual engine flameout. So in rare case of AP loss you are expected to keep your ability to fly a few type of approaches or ability to execute basic manoeuvres like climb, descent and visual circuits. You are not expected to handle everything and every situation manually. Besides no matter how proficient a human gets he can't get rid off human factors. Most accidents are due to human error and by experienced pilots at that. One Sully or Al Haynes don't make a summer. So technology will, if it can't replace(eventually that will happen) want to restrict humans to do limited tasks. So make the best of that is there and have fun while it lasts.

[Check Airman]

How is one expected to keep basic skills that are never utilised? It’s not like riding a bicycle.

[vilas]

How is one expected to keep basic skills that are never utilised? It’s not like riding a bicycle.
Well at the moment manufacturers are putting you in a catch22 situation. While you are told to keep the skills of manual flying, the space where you can hand fly is being taken away. So in real life it amounts to doing a raw data approach or more simulator visits. I don't see anything else.

[KayPam]

In modern aircraft automation dependency is encouraged because that's the future of aviation. A350 ATTOL is an indication of that. A350 also automatically takes care of unreliable speed and loss of pressurization. The AP is also available with dual engine flameout. So in rare case of AP loss you are expected to keep your ability to fly a few type of approaches or ability to execute basic manoeuvres like climb, descent and visual circuits. You are not expected to handle everything and every situation manually. Besides no matter how proficient a human gets he can't get rid off human factors. Most accidents are due to human error and by experienced pilots at that. One Sully or Al Haynes don't make a summer. So technology will, if it can't replace(eventually that will happen) want to restrict humans to do limited tasks. So make the best of that is there and have fun while it lasts.
That's an interesting argument.
In the future, you can envision that aircraft will be able to manage every trajectory.
But, first, this does not guarantee at all that it will work. The MAX had a system that was so well designed to assist the crew that it sent two airplanes down in less than six months (with a fleet of 200 and a few aircraft).
Second, aircraft as of right now still need pilots, because LVPs which allow autolands seriously degrade aerodrome capacities.
Plus, even in the case of a perfectly functional aircraft, a car passing through the ILS critical area can send an airplane sideways.

And as of now and also in the future, we would still need pilots to monitor the aircraft in case it does wrong.
Since humans are better at doing than monitoring, and even more so when they practise frequently, some say that it would be more relevant to maximise the amount of manual flying, and assist the human with the machine, not the other way around.
Or, are you saying that in the future, pilots will "take over" in a different way ? Instead of going from AP ON to AP OFF, they would degrade the managed modes into selected modes ?
That could be a possibility, but if you have pilots that aren't trained for normal flight handling, in case the AP goes wrong (even in selected modes) than essentially anything can happen to your aircraft.

We are already seeing a new type of crash where an almost perfectly good aircraft goes down even in CAVOK conditions.
Turkish at EHAM, Asiana at KSFO... This fact is what pushes airlines into saying that basic stick and rudder skills should be worked on.
I’ll agree that a wider range of movement would be ideal- but you get used to it. Better to sort it out on a normal day, than try to learn it when it’s not performing satisfactorily, or is broken.
It looks like I agree with you once again.
At first I was a bit unprecise with these levers but it gets better the more I use it.
​​​​​​​I also think it's important that we don't get drawn into an "The automation can do it better" debate. I'm fully aware that it can most of the time, there are few things I can do better than an autopilot, save for perhaps thrust control on a stormy night where certainly the Airbus' A/T lets itself down frequently, but for the most part I know I am at an absolute best, as good as the autopilot, and in most cases not so. The importance comes in being good enough, being able to fly within the tolerances, being able to correct deviations before they develop etc.

It is obvious that automation can do better.
It has a far better processing power than the human pilot. Can you calculate with any given set of speed, heading, final course, and wind the anticipation distance or angle to start the final turn onto the ILS ? I can with the help of excel, sitting at my desk. In flight I can't. I try to (and could discuss some techniques here) but the computer will have much more precise results.
Can you look at all flight parameters at a fast refreshing rate ? The human pilot can only do so much, one refreshment of all parameters per second, or so, maximum. I don't know the figure for the computer but much more obviously. They also have the intelligence of many engineers encoded into them to know the ideal amount of correction related to an amount of deviation. Once again, I can try to have a method to calculate this sort of thing in flight, but in a much simplified version (I use : on final, 1° of pitch up or down = 3% variation in thrust. Speed trend at x kt per second : plus or minus x% thrust. It works quite well but it is a simplification of reality whereas the aircraft can use a model accounting for a wide variety of parameters, wind, mass, configuration, etc..)
But I can work without the radioaltimeter, and George can't.

And if George wants to capture a false glide with +22° positive pitch, it fortunately never happened to me but I hope I would refuse to pitch up (and to this extent) at a moment when I'm supposed to descend 3°.

[vilas]

The MAX had a system that was so well designed to assist the crew that it sent two airplanes down in less than six months (with a fleet of 200 and a few aircraft).
Wrong! Max had a very poorly designed system based on single AoA sensor that took over controls and was secretly installed. And once it went awry it drove you to death. Well designed systems don't get globally grounded. Now they have connected the second but EASA wants a third like the Airbus. Max has destroyed even the credibility of FAA.
Unmanned aircraft is an unending debate but tendancy towards automation is definitely there. Take TCAS now automatic.

[Centaurus]

I remember talking to a friend of mine who was a Boeing 737 flight simulator instructor at Boeing Seattle. He told me his story of talking to the then chief test pilot of the Boeing 787 who said "We designed the 787 knowing that it will be flown by incompetent pilots. For this reason we have all the automatics protections designed into the aircraft."

Doesn't that say it all?

[Uplinker]

To answer the OP's question, I would say the chief pilot who does not want any cock-ups, and the CEO who doesn't want any extra costs. But of course, banning manual flying compounds this issue.

The challenge is: how to keep our manual skills sharp while flying very automated aircraft. The OP is one who clearly likes to physically fly and control every aspect. Others like to manage and guide a flight in a large airliner rather than actually move the flight controls themselves, (until the last 7 miles before landing).

Most humans prefer a job made easier. Not many of us would prefer to drive the first cars which had manual ignition timing and mixture controls on the steering column, and no synchromesh in the (manual) gearbox. Even as late as the 1970's, you had to know what you were doing to get a (non garaged) car running on a cold icy morning, We are quite happy now for all that to be designed out - I can reach in the window on the coldest day and the engine will start and run reliably with a single key turn to get it warmed up while I scrape the ice off the windscreen. In many 70's cars you had to be seated and know how to operate the throttle and choke to get the bloody thing going.

So how to maintain our flying skills? A start would be to mandate a minimum of three fully manually flown raw data approaches every six months - in appropriate conditions - and log them. We used to have to do this with practice Autolands, and a similar protocol could help make manual flying a normal, regular thing.

[Roj approved]

we have all the automatics protections designed into the aircraft."

But did they?

It can still be stalled in the same way as a 172.

If their intention was to design "All" the protections in, they missed the mark.

I do believe "protections" are being designed in, but pilots will still find new and interesting ways to crash aircraft.

Also, Boeing has provide that their "Protections" can be the problem, not the solution.

[Rt Hon Jim Hacker MP]

I've literally just come out of my LPC sim a couple of hours ago. Done a bit of flying over the summer but only one PF sector in the last 7 weeks. Airbus A320.

After all the usual items, each pilot flies a short sector from A to B. Manual flight, manual thrust and no FD's. Climbs, turns and descents to a raw ILS. Very useful exercise in the old basics and a reminder that it can still be flown just like a simple piston twin.

Would I try the same into a busy TMA? No chance. But if it all fell over, I still have the old skills available.

[pineteam]

How is one expected to keep basic skills that are never utilised? It’s not like riding a bicycle.

Totally agree. I did not fly much this year lately so as much as possible I will do raw data take off and approach. It's so much more fun especially these days with very low traffic.
Yes by regulation you can't do raw data take off for RNAV SID but it's not an excuse. Just request conventional departure!:cool:

And I said that before but Airbus recommends to fly raw data in line. Not only in the sim!



So how to maintain our flying skills? A start would be to mandate a minimum of three fully manually flown raw data approaches every six months - in appropriate conditions - and log them. We used to have to do this with practice Autolands, and a similar protocol could help make manual flying a normal, regular thing.
I was thinking the same! It should be mandatory. Most pilots I know they never fly raw data except in the sim as it's part of the syllabus. People underestimate the skills required to fly raw data. I would like to see a pilot who only flies raw data in the sim flying a raw data in the real plane. Oh wait I saw it, it was terrible. :E

[vilas]

Let's view the situation realistically. More and more automation is not an issue of pilots, aeroplanes and Airlines alone. It's the industry's requirement. For optimum utilisation available aviation space is being created for automated Aircraft. You are simply not allowed to fly manually. That should put to rest any discussion who produces a consistent and reliable performance. Humans are there to take over if the present day machines fail to follow the desired flight path. In future machines that will happen less and less. The topic we are discussing is how do we acquire or maintain the skill to do when machine won't do. Obviously in simulator, and once in while in real life where permitted. The days of switching off everything and going from A to B are over. You don't even need it. Only thing is you need to train pilots to higher standards of raw data handling in sim. Also more frequent visits are required. Simulator practice is not as frivolous as thought. I know pilots who have retired with more than 15000hrs on Airbus(with another 5000 on other type) whose only experience of direct law was in simulator. When all major emergencies are only practiced in the Sim with the expectation of handling them in real life what's such a big deal about raw data flying with all engines operating? Modern aircraft are not made for pilot's pleasure or desire of handling. They fulfill industry requirement.

[Goldenrivett]

The topic we are discussing is how do we acquire or maintain the skill to do when machine won't do. Obviously in simulator, and once in while in real life where permitted.
Hi Villas. I agree. The simulators we used in 1970s were so poor, we had to practice simulated engine failure on take off in real life during Base Flying (with no passengers obviously). Occasionally there were accidents - see B707 crash at Prestwick (https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19770317-2) Thank's to improved simulator design and fidelity - we will never have to risk our own lives doing something similar again.

If you feel you need to "practice" your manual flying skills with passengers on board, then choose the correct time and place and be prepared to re-engage the automatics if work load demands it.

[Check Airman]

Let's view the situation realistically. More and more automation is not an issue of pilots, aeroplanes and Airlines alone. It's the industry's requirement. For optimum utilisation available aviation space is being created for automated Aircraft. You are simply not allowed to fly manually. That should put to rest any discussion who produces a consistent and reliable performance. Humans are there to take over if the present day machines fail to follow the desired flight path. In future machines that will happen less and less. The topic we are discussing is how do we acquire or maintain the skill to do when machine won't do. Obviously in simulator, and once in while in real life where permitted. The days of switching off everything and going from A to B are over. You don't even need it. Only thing is you need to train pilots to higher standards of raw data handling in sim. Also more frequent visits are required. Simulator practice is not as frivolous as thought. I know pilots who have retired with more than 15000hrs on Airbus(with another 5000 on other type) whose only experience of direct law was in simulator. When all major emergencies are only practiced in the Sim with the expectation of handling them in real life what's such a big deal about raw data flying with all engines operating? Modern aircraft are not made for pilot's pleasure or desire of handling. They fulfill industry requirement.

While I have the utmost respect for your knowledge about the A320, I have to respectfully disagree with your operational philosophy.

Perhaps you’re a better pilot than I. I just know that a few minutes in the sim every few months would leave me woefully unprepared should the lights start flashing on a stormy night. On top of that, I find immense satisfaction in turning off the magic and having fun.

[KayPam]

I remember talking to a friend of mine who was a Boeing 737 flight simulator instructor at Boeing Seattle. He told me his story of talking to the then chief test pilot of the Boeing 787 who said "We designed the 787 knowing that it will be flown by incompetent pilots. For this reason we have all the automatics protections designed into the aircraft."

Doesn't that say it all?
(Does boeing allow to fly a RNAV trajectory on raw data only?)
But didn't manufacturers (at least airbus) create incompetent pilots by depriving them of the means to fly 95% of the trajectories that they fly ?
The industry as a whole encourages to use automatics because they have a precision that pilots will never have. But this does not mean that pilots should not practise their skills to the best level that they can.

After all the usual items, each pilot flies a short sector from A to B. Manual flight, manual thrust and no FD's. Climbs, turns and descents to a raw ILS. Very useful exercise in the old basics and a reminder that it can still be flown just like a simple piston twin.

Would I try the same into a busy TMA? No chance. But if it all fell over, I still have the old skills available.
Why ?
You've seen that you can do it.
I've seen many pilots do it. The first captain that I flew with after my line check disconnected everything while in descent FL100. (He was able to do that because we not flying an RNAV trajectory obviously..)
And if you don't do it enough, your skills will erode.

The one thing that I learnt during basic IFR training is that manual flying takes less and less resources the more you do it.

I was thinking the same! It should be mandatory. Most pilots I know they never fly raw data except in the sim as it's part of the syllabus. People underestimate the skills required to fly raw data. I would like to see a pilot who only flies raw data in the sim flying a raw data in the real plane. Oh wait I saw it, it was terrible. :EIt should indeed be mandatory to know how to handle things manually, to be able to detect when the FG does sh*t and to handle the situation correctly when it goes wrong.
What if a pilot that never flies manually encounters a situation where the airplane reverts to direct law ? It happens, just any failure downgrading to alternate, then gear down will leave you in direct law.

However, I disagree about the sim part.
Flying raw data in the sim is good practise for real flying. The only problem is the amount of sim practise. Two line checks per year, the majority of which is spent managing failures (leaving only 2 hours of manual sim flying per pilot per year) is obviously not enough.
But if you work tens of hours in the sim (in combination to normal line flying), you will be a decent pilot in the aircraft.
When my colleagues and I did our base training, we had spent 16 hours each (or so) preparing for it in the sim. When we touched the real aircraft for the first time, the most surprising thing was the ground handling qualities (Airbus itself admits that they don't really study "ground handling qualities"), not the stick and rudder part. We were obviously not perfect, but we all had a decent level, at least given the fact that we never had touched a jet aircraft before.

[Check Airman]

Hi Villas. I agree. The simulators we used in 1970s were so poor, we had to practice simulated engine failure on take off in real life during Base Flying (with no passengers obviously). Occasionally there were accidents - see B707 crash at Prestwick (https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19770317-2) Thank's to improved simulator design and fidelity - we will never have to risk our own lives doing something similar again.

If you feel you need to "practice" your manual flying skills with passengers on board, then choose the correct time and place and be prepared to re-engage the automatics if work load demands it.

Devil’s advocate. When is the correct time and place? Is 37,000ft over the Atlantic at night appropriate? What about descending in a cloud layer at 5000ft over Texas? Maybe shortly after taking off into IMC in Madrid?

[Check Airman]

(Does boeing allow to fly a RNAV trajectory on raw data only?)
But didn't manufacturers (at least airbus) create incompetent pilots by depriving them of the means to fly 95% of the trajectories that they fly ?
The industry as a whole encourages to use automatics because they have a precision that pilots will never have. But this does not mean that pilots should not practise their skills to the best level that they can.

Why ?
You've seen that you can do it.
I've seen many pilots do it. The first captain that I flew with after my line check disconnected everything while in descent FL100. (He was able to do that because we not flying an RNAV trajectory obviously..)
And if you don't do it enough, your skills will erode.

The one thing that I learnt during basic IFR training is that manual flying takes less and less resources the more you do it.
It should indeed be mandatory to know how to handle things manually, to be able to detect when the FG does sh*t and to handle the situation correctly when it goes wrong.
What if a pilot that never flies manually encounters a situation where the airplane reverts to direct law ? It happens, just any failure downgrading to alternate, then gear down will leave you in direct law.

However, I disagree about the sim part.
Flying raw data in the sim is good practise for real flying. The only problem is the amount of sim practise. Two line checks per year, the majority of which is spent managing failures (leaving only 2 hours of manual sim flying per pilot per year) is obviously not enough.
But if you work tens of hours in the sim (in combination to normal line flying), you will be a decent pilot in the aircraft.
When my colleagues and I did our base training, we had spent 16 hours each (or so) preparing for it in the sim. When we touched the real aircraft for the first time, the most surprising thing was the ground handling qualities (Airbus itself admits that they don't really study "ground handling qualities"), not the stick and rudder part. We were obviously not perfect, but we all had a decent level, at least given the fact that we never had touched a jet aircraft before.

To your point on simulators, I actually don’t do much “flying” in the sim. AP on ASAP and off as late as possible. The sim doesn’t fly like the real plane. I’ll do the required manoeuvres manually in the sim, but otherwise, AP please.

[sonicbum]

I remember talking to a friend of mine who was a Boeing 737 flight simulator instructor at Boeing Seattle. He told me his story of talking to the then chief test pilot of the Boeing 787 who said "We designed the 787 knowing that it will be flown by incompetent pilots. For this reason we have all the automatics protections designed into the aircraft."

Doesn't that say it all?

Very unlikely he said that.
ICAO defines an incompetent pilot as someone who needs additional training to reach proficiency before resuming flight operations. I am quite sure the Boeing 787 chief test pilot is aware of that.

[Uplinker]

I think the general philosophy is to design for the average pilot on a fleet rather than the most competent?

An incompetent pilot* should not be allowed anywhere near a real aircraft in the first place.


*(which is an oxymoron anyway),

[sonicbum]

(Does boeing allow to fly a RNAV trajectory on raw data only?)
But didn't manufacturers (at least airbus) create incompetent pilots by depriving them of the means to fly 95% of the trajectories that they fly ?
The industry as a whole encourages to use automatics because they have a precision that pilots will never have. But this does not mean that pilots should not practise their skills to the best level that they can.

Why ?
You've seen that you can do it.
I've seen many pilots do it. The first captain that I flew with after my line check disconnected everything while in descent FL100. (He was able to do that because we not flying an RNAV trajectory obviously..)
And if you don't do it enough, your skills will erode.

The one thing that I learnt during basic IFR training is that manual flying takes less and less resources the more you do it.
It should indeed be mandatory to know how to handle things manually, to be able to detect when the FG does sh*t and to handle the situation correctly when it goes wrong.
What if a pilot that never flies manually encounters a situation where the airplane reverts to direct law ? It happens, just any failure downgrading to alternate, then gear down will leave you in direct law.

However, I disagree about the sim part.
Flying raw data in the sim is good practise for real flying. The only problem is the amount of sim practise. Two line checks per year, the majority of which is spent managing failures (leaving only 2 hours of manual sim flying per pilot per year) is obviously not enough.
But if you work tens of hours in the sim (in combination to normal line flying), you will be a decent pilot in the aircraft.
When my colleagues and I did our base training, we had spent 16 hours each (or so) preparing for it in the sim. When we touched the real aircraft for the first time, the most surprising thing was the ground handling qualities (Airbus itself admits that they don't really study "ground handling qualities"), not the stick and rudder part. We were obviously not perfect, but we all had a decent level, at least given the fact that we never had touched a jet aircraft before.

Few points :

1) manufacturers create safe and efficient airplanes by using the best combination of technology available at that time and upgrading it as time goes by. They also train pilots -if required- to be competent and proficient.

2) You can't practice ALTN or Direct Law on the line for obvious reasons ; hence flying manually during normal line ops will generally do more harm than good (increases workload, reduces spare capacity for other tasks, etc..). It is beneficial -generally speaking- only in the case of cadets to get a better feeling on the machine.

3) From a training and confidence point of view, is it a good idea to visit the SIM twice a year for a total of 3 or 4 days ? NO.
BUT governing bodies across the world prescribe it as an acceptable minimum, and since operators do not like to throw money out of the window, they generally comply with that.
Think about crosswind landings : you can hand-fly as much as you like on the line, but if you never encounter crosswind conditions, it is likely that your crosswind landing technique will need a brush-up. The only way to practice it would then be in the SIM, otherwise when You are out and face a max crosswind landing when the toughest thing you have done in the past 6/7/8 months is 10 kt cross you will be definitely sweating.

[vilas]

I just know that a few minutes in the sim every few months would leave me woefully unprepared should the lights start flashing on a stormy night
Check Airman you missed something from what I said. I said about raising the standard of pilots in raw handling before they come on board and more frequent visits to sim to retain that and not for few minutes, I didn't say that. Real aircraft raw data approach on two engine is easier that raw data with OEI and ATHR OFF in sim. Isn't it all about scan? If someone is terrible on two engines in real aircraft will be all over in the sim also. Those who are starting fresh will need more practice than those who are trying to just maintain it. Besides if opportunity presents practice by all means.
Centaurs, it all started with Bernard Ziegler who said "I am making an aircraft that will not allow pilots to make mistakes. Any one can fly it even my concierge can fly it".

[FlyingStone]

But, it would be completely feasible to allow rnav approaches without FDs : just display an HSI : horizontal situation indicator, which would indicate the desired RNAV track, and a lateral deviation bar in nautical miles (instead of degrees on a VOR), and eventually a timer that indicates when to start the turn (like Garmin does). That's it.

The old 737 EFIS classics had this (optionally, I believe). With the world going towards PBN and curved (RF) procedures, this wouldn't be particularly useful.

Yes by regulation you can't do raw data take off for RNAV SID but it's not an excuse. Just request conventional departure!
Simple, just don't fly into any of noise sensitive or busy airports, or airports without conventional SIDs. Easy peasy.

What if a pilot that never flies manually encounters a situation where the airplane reverts to direct law ? It happens, just any failure downgrading to alternate, then gear down will leave you in direct law.
You can do 10 go-arounds in normal law on the A320, yet the one in direct law will have to look significantly different when it comes to control inputs. Apples and oranges.

I'm a big fan of hand flying and raw data (latter prohibited by employer unfortunately), but the reality is that (before Covid) we operate in ever busier airspace and at the end of the day, people in the back or shippers of freight pay us to deliver them or their goods safely and efficiently from A to B, not to have fun or to prove to somebody that we still have "what it takes". Could I handle flying raw data in and out of London TMA during a busy morning period? Yes. Is it a smart thing to do in real life, assuming you've got AFDS serviceable? I hope we all agree what the answer should be here.

PBN is the way forward for noise/fuel/emissions/cost/safety (not necessarily in this order) reasons, whether we like it or not.

[vilas]

and at the end of the day, people in the back or shippers of freight pay us to deliver them or their goods safely and efficiently from A to B, not to have fun or to prove to somebody that we still have "what it takes"
Absolutely! I​​​​​​ keep saying this all the time. Line flying is not a training flight. Some training is inevitable but should be kept to minimum. We are there not for ourselves but for a purpose.

[pineteam]

Come on guys flying raw data is not training. It’s maintaining his flying skills. Just because the aircraft is full of automations does not mean you should use it all the time. In that case we should perform autoland all the time since the aircraft can do it beautifully. Of course trying to do raw data it in a busy airspace after 10hr of duty would not be smart to say the least. But on a good cavok day with a sharp set of crew I really don’t see any safety issue down there..

[Two's in]

Why is automation dependency encouraged in modern aviation ?

Because killing passengers is bad for business.

[Check Airman]

Because killing passengers is bad for business.

If raw data equates to killing passengers, that person shouldn’t occupy a seat in the cockpit.

[Check Airman]

Absolutely! I​​​​​​ keep saying this all the time. Line flying is not a training flight. Some training is inevitable but should be kept to minimum. We are there not for ourselves but for a purpose.

Stateside, we do a great deal of training on the line. The sim only goes so far. You start your line training with a training CA. Thereafter, the training continues with line captains / FO’s who teach you how it’s done. The “training” footprint would be enormous otherwise.

[Check Airman]

Check Airman you missed something from what I said. I said about raising the standard of pilots in raw handling before they come on board and more frequent visits to sim to retain that and not for few minutes, I didn't say that. Real aircraft raw data approach on two engine is easier that raw data with OEI and ATHR OFF in sim. Isn't it all about scan? If someone is terrible on two engines in real aircraft will be all over in the sim also. Those who are starting fresh will need more practice than those who are trying to just maintain it. Besides if opportunity presents practice by all means.
Centaurs, it all started with Bernard Ziegler who said "I am making an aircraft that will not allow pilots to make mistakes. Any one can fly it even my concierge can fly it".

We agree that more frequent sims would be good. My point is that it’s a perishable skill though, so let’s say we visited the sim twice as often, it’d still leave your skills lacking on that last flight the day prior to the sim.

In reality though, you can practice a lot of raw data flying on the line in normal operations. Why visit the sim for something that can safely be done on the line?

PS- I didn’t mean to imply that you said a few minutes a year was sufficient. Apologies. You’re of course correct that somebody who’s new needs more raw data flying. I’d submit that even somebody who’s experienced needs it as well. I’ve watched things fall apart (on the line and in the sim) when an experienced pilot loses the FD.

[Olympia463]

I'm a glider pilot, a very old glider pilot in fact. I have 2200 sorties in my log book, on most of which I was hands on 100%, except when my pupil was doing the flying. Lest you think I never did long flights, I did stay up for 5 hours once in thermals (a Silver badge requirement), and made many many other flights in excess of three hours.. I retired from gliding over forty years ago, but in 2007, after a 30 year break, I went back to a local gliding club for a weeks flying to see if flying was like roller skating - something you never forget how to do. And it IS like roller skating - I re-soloed in the early part of that week and spent the rest of it cruising around the beautiful hills of Scotland. My point is that manual skills are never forgotten once you have them. But, and is is a big but. you have to acquire these skills. I would suggest that airline pilots should join a gliding club and either fly the gliders or tow them. I'd favour doing both actually. That way you will keep your manual skills in good trim. It is very significant that Sully was a glider pilot at one time, and the 'Gimli glider' was also conveyed to the ground in one piece by two ex-glider pilots. You could say that every flight in a glider is a controlled crash, but that isn't strictly true. Gliding is real flying - you become part of the plane - something you will never be if the plane does all the flying for you. Lest you think I flew only in good weather in the summer, I flew in every month in the year in the UK and in every kind of weather and had no accidents.

I hear the cry of you modern pilots missing the handling of the controls. The idea that automation will ever totally replace human pilots is rubbish, but you guys have got to make an effort to maintain your raw flying skills at all costs for the day or night when something you were not expecting happens.



I

[KayPam]

Check Airman you missed something from what I said. I said about raising the standard of pilots in raw handling before they come on board and more frequent visits to sim to retain that and not for few minutes, I didn't say that. Real aircraft raw data approach on two engine is easier that raw data with OEI and ATHR OFF in sim. Isn't it all about scan? If someone is terrible on two engines in real aircraft will be all over in the sim also. Those who are starting fresh will need more practice than those who are trying to just maintain it. Besides if opportunity presents practice by all means.
Centaurs, it all started with Bernard Ziegler who said "I am making an aircraft that will not allow pilots to make mistakes. Any one can fly it even my concierge can fly it".
Did you know that Ziegler killed several people while flying recklessly close to a ski lift ?
AF447 proved that his goal was not reached. A few ice crystals and you need a competent pilot in the front seat.

You can do 10 go-arounds in normal law on the A320, yet the one in direct law will have to look significantly different when it comes to control inputs. Apples and oranges.

I'm a big fan of hand flying and raw data (latter prohibited by employer unfortunately), but the reality is that (before Covid) we operate in ever busier airspace and at the end of the day, people in the back or shippers of freight pay us to deliver them or their goods safely and efficiently from A to B, not to have fun or to prove to somebody that we still have "what it takes". Could I handle flying raw data in and out of London TMA during a busy morning period? Yes. Is it a smart thing to do in real life, assuming you've got AFDS serviceable? I hope we all agree what the answer should be here.

True, direct law will feel very different. But if you're used to setting a pitch/power couple, and monitoring all flight parameters with an efficent scanning, then it shouldn't be too difficult to manage.

At my airline we clearly have two types of airports. Large capital airports like Paris, London, Amsterdam, etc.. and also smaller regional airports in our home country or elsewhere, like Porto, Nice, Bucarest..

It is important to underline that I don't want to hand fly just for fun. It is important to practise hand flying for safety reasons.
There were several incidents where pilots put the aircraft in severely complicated positions, due to them following the flight guidance system at a time where it malfunctioned. The capture of a false glide is a very common example.

So I'm not talking about hand flying raw data a VOR approach into London. But any unconstrained airport should be seen as an opportunity to sharpen our skills.
Because killing passengers is bad for business.
On the contrary automation dependency is starting to kill passengers. Turkish at amsterdam, asiana at SFO..

[Vessbot]

Absolutely! I​​​​​​ keep saying this all the time. Line flying is not a training flight. Some training is inevitable but should be kept to minimum. We are there not for ourselves but for a purpose.I disagree with this, and strongly. Line flying is where the real training happens: every day, continuously. It’s where the habits are ingrained, skills developed, and the automatic reactions (mental and physical) set up for success or failure.

Actual training in the sim is just an initial scaffold to hold together a flight from beginning to end while following the SOP and profiles, and learning how to handle a few chosen non-normals, without everything falling apart. And then you do a few flights with a check pilot in the real plane to do your first few with a heightened level of safety backstop.

But imagine yourself having come fresh off training in your first airline operation, compared to say, a few thousand hours later. And think about the difference in how much you’re able to contribute then vs. now, in terms of situational awareness, predicting routine minor things going wrong, how overwhelmed you were, etc. For an even more stark comparison, imagine your then-self in command of the airplane!

What’s the difference between then and now? Of course, all of our cumulative experiences every day on the line. I’m sure you’ll agree that as far as SA, SOP, weather, traffic, ATC, and all that stuff we add about a thousand times more worth to the crew now vs. then, as a consequence of all that gathered experience.


But in what area do we not gather experience? Flying the airplane! If all the flying we ever do after getting signed off is below 1000 feet, configured, trimmed, thrust already set, and already delivered onto the loc and GS, then where do we gather this experience from? We don’t.

——

General reply to the thread:

Why is automation dependency encouraged, and hand flying proficiency paid lip service to? I know that everyone has the concept of proficiency in their brain, but it’s just an abstraction with no easy way to address. Put a few sentence preamble in front of every document to encourage hand flying? Sure. But what does that really do? It’s like knowing it’s bad to eat too much sugar. You know to keep it down overall, but how does that calculate on a particular day when you feel like a snack? You have the snack, on the this-day basis, with no contradiction between the this-day principle and the overall principle, because what you do on this day is a drop in the bucket that can’t possibly affect the overall amount in a meaningful way. But when the this-day urge happens every day, the calculus shifts without you realizing, and the overall principle is ultimately violated.

Just the same, every time on “this day” a reason (many times, actually an excuse) can be found why automation is the appropriate way to go. Every time, until after a while it turns out that an overall amount to maintain hand flying proficiency is never reached. This day, a specific reason - or 10 specific reasons - can be found to address the factors and decide to use the automation. But overall, by the nature of overallness, no specific reason can be called on to say that it’s the day to fly the plane. Always it can be pushed off to some vague next time, but the next time never comes.

To put it another way, it’s a problem with two competing opposite demands. On one hand, the safety, precision, and consistency of automation usage, and on the other hand, the safety of the pilot being proficient and comfortable flying the plane. But the triggers to specifically address those opposte demands aren’t symmetrical. The specificty of all the reasons to all upon automation usage ensure that it’s called upon virtually every time, while the triggers to call upon hand flying practice are too vage - really, non-existent. So, the situation is what it is.

[Check Airman]

I disagree with this, and strongly. Line flying is where the real training happens: every day, continuously. It’s where the habits are ingrained, skills developed, and the automatic reactions (mental and physical) set up for success or failure.

Actual training in the sim is just an initial scaffold to hold together a flight from beginning to end while following the SOP and profiles, and learning how to handle a few chosen non-normals, without everything falling apart. And then you do a few flights with a check pilot in the real plane to do your first few with a heightened level of safety backstop.


Thank you for putting this more eloquently than I could. Perhaps there's a cultural component to the difference in philosophies. Stateside, a lot of CA's will conclude the initial briefing with "let's keep it safe, and have fun". That's not an invitation to fly under the golden gate bridge, but if i haven't done a localizer approach in a while, we may request one even though there's an ILS available. Whether you'd consider that practise or training, the point is that it hones the skills for the day when you need to fly a localiser approach.

[Check Airman]

I'm a big fan of hand flying and raw data (latter prohibited by employer unfortunately), but the reality is that (before Covid) we operate in ever busier airspace and at the end of the day, people in the back or shippers of freight pay us to deliver them or their goods safely and efficiently from A to B, not to have fun or to prove to somebody that we still have "what it takes". Could I handle flying raw data in and out of London TMA during a busy morning period? Yes. Is it a smart thing to do in real life, assuming you've got AFDS serviceable? I hope we all agree what the answer should be here.

I've never flown to or from LHR, but assuming it's similar to busy airports here in the US, why not? There are times when JFK or ORD are busier than others- if you feel the need to use automation at that point- have at it. But I disagree with a blanket statement that we don't hand fly at certain airports.

By way of example, going to LAX from the east can be challenging, with multiple speed and altitude constraints on the approach. It's sometimes easier to just press the red buttons than twisting, pushing, pulling, selecting and managing. On top of that, it's heaps of fun!

[Check Airman]

The old 737 EFIS classics had this (optionally, I believe). With the world going towards PBN and curved (RF) procedures, this wouldn't be particularly useful.


I've flown curved legs without a FD. The aircraft had a CDI. It was a complete non-event. As pineteam said earlier, had Boeing and Airbus installed a CDI on the nav display, we could easily do "raw data" RNAV procedures.

[theFirstDave]

I am a (retired) Controls Electrical Engineer (Sr. Controls and Instrumentation). I designed and implement mega-million dollar systems. But I also know how to wire panels, bend conduit and solder breadboards. My job didn't need me to do it, but as I came up through the ranks (starting as an electrician) I kept my skills up. Others never acquired the manual skills as they jumped from college to design.

I am also a Private Pilot. All my flying is manual. I use VOR's, no ATH, no AP, no FD. Yes, at sometimes I am near overload. I won't fly into some places without a second set of hands / eyes with me. The most amount of automation I have is a Garmin GPS that also will warn me of terrane.

So, how to get the ATP guy some experience other than engaging AP at 400' and just twirling dials until you're on short final? Get yourself in a a piston plane (SE or light twin) and haul VFR around the LAX area. That'll get your PIC skills a workout and give you a boat load of situation awareness, energy management experience and more.

At the very least, it'll be fun again.

[KeepItStraight]

Aircraft are designed by engineers and flown by pilots.

I know I'm generalising but with no disrespect to either profession both professions can have quite a different perspective on how an aircraft should be operated or how valuable (or useless and distracting) certain whiz bang equipment can be in differing circumstances.

[FlightDetent]

I've flown curved legs without a FD. The aircraft had a CDI. It was a complete non-event. As pineteam said earlier, had Boeing and Airbus installed a CDI on the nav display, we could easily do "raw data" RNAV procedures. Correction: You could easily fly the "raw data" curved RNAV - on a good day. Us, the global pool of average pilots having weak days now and then, could not without adversely affecting some of the statistics.

Either case, such an exercise would be worthwhile to the pilot and unnecessary burden to the flight operations at the same time.

Think of your best talented A-10 pilot. Is he an expert aviator or a Senior Ordonance Delivery Executive? Both in my opinion and one skill set would not suffice if the other was deficient. Understandably the hangar talk is mostly who can best fly the ship tail first. As you go higher up the chain of command and responsibility, the pendulum swings to the other side of relevant. The mission requires both and don't despise the people on the top for caring almost solely about the overall production efficiency.

Is automation dependency encouraged? What a beautiful statement, clear and strong, showing where the line in the sand is. If we (had) reach(ed) the point where perceived automation over-use causes less trouble [(killed customers)^3 / cash / emissions] than the incumbent option - the future of air transport will see the piloting element dissolved.

No, it's not my operational philosophy; but yes it is what I see when reading the landscape of our much-beloved industry. Systems and engineering designs can be improved asymptotically to perfection, whereas reliability and performance level of humans - as a group - have their upper limit, distinctly below of what is achievable with technology. Habsheim and MAX do not enter the debate, those were both rapist acts.

Loved and will long for Skiathos and Santorini, quite happy to stay not qualified for Madeira, or Innsbruck. Mostly for the fuel decisions when approaching the IAF hold.;)

[Check Airman]

Correction: You could easily fly the "raw data" curved RNAV - on a good day. Us, the global pool of average pilots having weak days now and then, could not without adversely affecting some of the statistics.

Either case, such an exercise would be worthwhile to the pilot and unnecessary burden to the flight operations at the same time.


Despite what I sometimes like to imagine, I assure you that my skill set is somewhere between average and the median. I assure you, if I could manage it, anyone else here would be capable of doing it as well.

[jmmoric]

Some of the restriction may come from Performance Based Navigation - RNAV and RNP - require the aircraft to stay within a certain margin for separation purpose, both to terrain and other traffic?

Cause then ATC can work.... shall we say.... hands off :)

[alf5071h]

KeepItStraight, #39, even with generalisation, you perpetuate a myth.

Increasingly the 'lead' time in designing and producing a new aircraft is tens of years; requiring foresight of operations, traffic, density, economics, and system technologies.

A wide ranging view as a pilot, 'in research', 'in design', development and certification, in sales, customer support - flying down the line, and finally safety, there is no single view of todays so-called automation dependancy.
Viewpoints are according to experience; we 'pilots' are a major contributor to the perception of modern problems - is automation dependency a problem, or is our perception a problem. Humans are poor at foreseeing the future, also judging the current status against what many years ago was / was not 'foreseen'; we forget, we don't wish to remember.

A defining technological 'milestone' was the Advance Flight Deck research simulation; 45 years ago, its excellence recognised by the Smithsonian. Revolutionary use of CRTs, highly automated for economic operation in high density, noise abate, low vis operations. World wide pilot assessment fell into two groups. The old school, P1only, hand-fly anything. And those aware of future context, situation management, automated systems, and workload. These groups were geographically divided, divisions which can still be identified, where manufactures still have to satisfy both.

Beware of generalisations; what we look for is often what we find. And when considering the situation today, question the history; is this what we asked for, foresaw, if not why not. Also consider inherent bias of what we believe to be the future - something which we should have now, or should be doing now.

[Hot 'n' High]

Aircraft are designed by engineers and flown by pilots.

I know I'm generalising but with no disrespect to either profession both professions can have quite a different perspective on how an aircraft should be operated or how valuable (or useless and distracting) certain whiz bang equipment can be in differing circumstances.

Totally agreed KeepItStraight - and that’s why Aircrew are ……. or should be ……. deeply involved in design work from the very start of a new Programme or even a very simple Mod. However, it's a bit of a nightmare for even a small Mod.

Worked on Mil programmes where aircrew were involved right from Day 1, as were, for e.g., Maintenance Engineers …. who are a very different breed to Design Engineers (who differ again to Production Engineers) – as anyone who has done Aircraft Maintenance will testify!! “What idiot put that Hydraulic Acc charging point there???!!”. Weapons Teams were another area usually well represented.

Sadly, "availability" of SQEP input was sometimes an issue at key moments. And I (as Customer) even found absolute blinders on the early Production Line where the Production Teams have been doing something because "that's what the Drawing said to do" despite it being blindingly wrong! Drawing been up-issued but not disseminated? Ah, that'll be why!!! Cue H 'n' H being chucked off the site so that his Host could go and murder a few people for not spotting (and/or not doing anything about) the obvious!

Other times the issue was to make those Pilots involved aware of how vital their early input was. A good Test Pilot lead was vital so that they could “encourage” their peers along the way (ie drag them to yet another Design Review meeting and demand their respective views!). In fairness, it generally worked well from my limited dealings - but, even then, things got missed. And you really need Line Pilots involved to QA what the Test Pilots have proposed as, even there, expectations differ! The list of "stakeholders" is quite staggering - even on a relatively small Mod!

What really doesn’t help is when arbitrary “pressure” comes in from Commercial – such as we had with Southwest(?) and the MAX and a “no training” clause. Safety Reviews are ripe areas for “This is a Safety Issue! Oh no it isn’t! Oh yes it is!”-type arguments as it is! Very heated those can be!!!!

.... The MAX had a system that was so well designed to assist the crew that it sent two airplanes down in less than six months (with a fleet of 200 and a few aircraft).........

I guess, in the full automation case, unlike the MAX debacle, they won't be able to blame the Pilots for a dubious design failure and so will ground the fleet to find out what caused it! Or is that H 'n' H being a cynic? In all a fascinating Thread so TY to the OP! :ok:

[vilas]

Aircraft are designed by engineers and flown by pilots.
Airbus FBW was designed by Bernard Ziegler who was an engineer, fighter pilot and test pilot.

[Hot 'n' High]

KeepItStraight, #39, even with generalisation, you perpetuate a myth.

Increasingly the 'lead' time in designing and producing a new aircraft is tens of years; requiring foresight of operations, traffic, density, economics, and system technologies.

Beware of generalisations; what we look for is often what we find. And when considering the situation today, question the history; is this what we asked for, foresaw, if not why not. Also consider inherent bias of what we believe to be the future - something which we should have now, or should be doing now.

I think that what KeepItStraight says is correct within the context being used - as my Post above expands on but citing differences even in the Engineering fraternity!

Now, I believe that you bring up a further very valid issue in that, for any development, the technological complexity and rate of change (both of technology and the environment it needs to operate in - in all it's aspects as you clearly identify in your Para 2) makes it even more complex. To an extent, technology will lead capability. Who foresaw the explosion in consumer electronics? Until the chip was designed, the capabilities were impossible to achieve on the scale we have today. A key change I think is, more and more, civil R&D is starting to lead mil R&D.

I do like your last para as that hits the nail on the head - in many ways, the ability to manage/control change is limited by human capacity to process all the factors and rationalise them to an optimum conclusion. That's where AI is leading I guess, realising that, even controlling the advancement of technology is becoming beyond human capacity!

Interesting debate! I'll let others have their say as that's just my view! :ok:

[Vessbot]

Get yourself in a a piston plane (SE or light twin) and haul VFR around the LAX area. That'll get your PIC skills a workout and give you a boat load of situation awareness, energy management experience and more.

At the very least, it'll be fun again.

Also, earlier it was suggested that you can get into a glider to keep up your manual skills. And while I'm a supporter of both, it would be an onerous demand for most people's lives. But luckily, you can still go a very long way very much easier, by flying the jet at work! (And by that I mean at some altitudes above 1000, to include some level-offs, level turns, speed changes, flap changes, localizer and GS intercepts... even in IMC!)

[Vessbot]

Why? Because it means less go arounds and more situational awareness and less workload. If you engage at 1000ft and disconnect at 500ft every time chances are there will be a lot less mistakes than flying manually.

This is true, but it only considers the set of flights where the automation is available and working correctly. Is that the only set of flights that should be considered?

[Check Airman]

Why? Because it means less go arounds and more situational awareness and less workload. If you engage at 1000ft and disconnect at 500ft every time chances are there will be a lot less mistakes than flying manually. I personally enjoy doing manual sids and approaches with FD on but still anyone can follow a FD and do well.
Also a lot higher chance that your skills will deteriorate to the point that they can no longer be relied upon. Would you rather have another go-around, or fill out paperwork after the incident/accident?

What's wrong with a go-around anyway?

[dr dre]

I am a (retired) Controls Electrical Engineer (Sr. Controls and Instrumentation). I designed and implement mega-million dollar systems. But I also know how to wire panels, bend conduit and solder breadboards. My job didn't need me to do it, but as I came up through the ranks (starting as an electrician) I kept my skills up. Others never acquired the manual skills as they jumped from college to design.

I am also a Private Pilot. All my flying is manual. I use VOR's, no ATH, no AP, no FD. Yes, at sometimes I am near overload. I won't fly into some places without a second set of hands / eyes with me. The most amount of automation I have is a Garmin GPS that also will warn me of terrane.

So, how to get the ATP guy some experience other than engaging AP at 400' and just twirling dials until you're on short final? Get yourself in a a piston plane (SE or light twin) and haul VFR around the LAX area. That'll get your PIC skills a workout and give you a boat load of situation awareness, energy management experience and more.

At the very least, it'll be fun again.

Why do I get the feeling the real purpose of this thread is for non-airline and non-commercial pilots to boast they are “real pilots” and airline pilots are nothing more than children of magenta? To sneer down and smugly educate your airline brethren as if they cannot fly anymore? Are you guys jealous on missing out on the big leagues?

As far as lack of hand flying goes, I say it’s not a problem. There is little hand flying value to be gained anyway when the aircraft is in a stable climb or descent. The real value of manual manipulation skills are shown on an approach onto a short runway in gusty, wind shear or variable wind conditions. Hit the main gear on the markers and then exit first available taxiway as there’s another aircraft close up your backside. Won’t be able to do that unless you have good manual skills, yet airline pilots do it everyday all over the world without applause, even the so called “children of magenta”. I’d say less than 0.5% of landings are Autoland, and a auto land is pretty useless in all but the calmest wind conditions anyway.

In my opinion the biggest problems encountered on the flight deck are non technical factors, pilots with bad attitudes and poor teamwork skills, they totally dwarf any bad issues that exist with manual flying.

I think there’s too much bashing of airline pilots nowadays, primarily motivated by jealousy or maybe an older generation who just can’t let go of their glory days.

[Centaurus]

Interesting debate! I'll let others have their say as that's just my view! https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

Simulator instructors in the job full time could write a book on what they occasionally witness in the horror box. But the risk of hurt feelings and subsequent danger of litigation are always there. There was one event I saw however, that will forever stick in my mind. The automation was perfect but it was the flight crew handling of an unexpected slight technical defect that was the worry. This event convinced me not only of the pressing need for airline pilots to maintain raw data manual flying competency but of the ever present insidious effect in some countries of ethnic culture when it comes to flight safety mores.

I was briefed to give experienced military trained crews of a large Asian country two hours of general handling on the Boeing 737 Classic simulator. An interpreter was provided who sat on the jump seat while I occupied the instructor panel position. Part of the exercise was a standard ILS procedurally flown. The first thing I noticed after takeoff was both pilots flew with their hands firmly on their knees from the time the captain engaged the autopilot to the end of the session. After any autopilot mod selection their hands went straight back to the knees.

During the autopilot flying via a DME arc to intercept the localiser, I asked the interpreter to tell the captain (PF) it might be wise to have one hand on the thrust levers during the ILS rather than both hands on his knees. This advice was obviously rejected by the captain who was chief pilot of the company. As the aircraft was descending during the DME arc the autothrottle had commanded the thrust levers to idle. Speed was initially 210 knots clean. IMC conditions prevailed. Nil wind. On the instructor panel I actuated failure of the No 1 engine throttle clutch motor. There is no QRH item for this type of fault as it would be considered normal good airmanship to pick up any split between the two thrust levers when it occurred.

At the appropriate time in the ILS, the PF requested flap and gear extension and the PM made the selections and placed his hands back on his knees. As airspeed was reduced and drag increased, the autothrottle system increased power to maintain correct approach speed. However only the No 2 thrust lever moved. The No 1 thrust lever remained at idle because its clutch motor was inoperative. The autopilot now coupled to the ILS, applied significant aileron to stop the increasing asymmetric roll due to one engine at idle thrust and the other engine at 75% N1 trying to maintain selected speed. Rudder pedals were central as they were not part of the autopilot. Both pilots had their hands still on their knees and not a word passed between them despite the obvious indications of something drastically wrong.

Midway down the ILS I tapped the interpreter on the shoulder and in English told her to tell the captain to look at the throttles which had a large split, as well has the control wheel showing 45 degrees of roll application. Hardly had the interpreter done so when the autopilot decided enough was enough and disengaged itself. The aircraft began a rapid roll to the left and the nose dropped. Despite this, both pilots kept their hands on their knees and said nothing. The captain seeing the closed left throttle then announced "Engine Failure - checklist" in his native language but made no attempt to manually correct the increasing roll and spiral dive. He kept his hands on his knees and his feet on the rudders but without applying any correction.

The PF groped around to locate the QRH which was on the floor next to him. He frantically flipped the pages of the QRH while seemingly oblivious to the flight instruments indication of 60 degrees angle of bank, a high rate of dsecent, a GPWS warning and the closed throttle of No 1 engine and the high power indication of No 2 engine. All the while, the captain who seemed frozen in indecision kept his own hands on his knees shouting in his own language "Checklist - Checklist - Hurry up - hurry up!"

It was now clear to me that crew coordination had completely broken down and the aircraft would crash within seconds. I "froze" the simulator, lowered the drawbridge and told the interpreter to have the crew meet me in the coffee room for a chat. Frankly, I was at loss for words. These two pilots included the chief pilot and if he couldn't fly a 737 then what of the rest of the ten pilots who had come a long way to use my company's full flight simulator. The interpreter who spoke perfect English was equally dismayed; after all he was going to be the bearer of bad news to the captain. The interpreter was in an invidious position. I envisaged him being shot or worse, as a witness to a calamity in the simulator.

I decided it would be better for all concerned to run a completely neutral de-briefing and carefully avoid any criticism of either pilot. Loss of face in their culture was important to avoid. I did say, however, it was probably a good idea for the PF to retain one hand on the throttles during an instrument approach. The captain briefly nodded his head after the interpreter had passed on this advice. while the PM sipped his coffee with one hand and kept the other hand on his knee. In some parts of the world, cultural mores win over flight safety every time..

[Vessbot]

As far as lack of hand flying goes, I say it’s not a problem. There is little hand flying value to be gained anyway when the aircraft is in a stable climb or descent. The real value of manual manipulation skills are shown on an approach onto a short runway in gusty, wind shear or variable wind conditions. Hit the main gear on the markers and then exit first available taxiway as there’s another aircraft close up your backside. Won’t be able to do that unless you have good manual skills, yet airline pilots do it everyday all over the world without applause, even the so called “children of magenta”. I’d say less than 0.5% of landings are Autoland, and a auto land is pretty useless in all but the calmest wind conditions anyway.
That’s why it’s skills, plural. Yes many airline pilots are skilled at landing reasonably accurate in a gusty crosswind (which is itself a combination of a few sub-skills) but isn’t there more to flying than that? Does flying begin when you’re delivered onto a 3 mile final on the GS, configured and trimmed with the thrust set?

Earlier you only looked for hand flying value in a stable climb or descent, and I’d agree that some pitch slop there, where the only consequence may be 10 or 20 knots, is probably not consequential, and the correction to that can be so slow as to not be felt in the back. But how about level flight, where an altitude error of 1 or 2 hundred feet is much more glaring? And where ham-handed corrections lead to a jerky ride? How about flap changes, where separate slat and flap movements can require a carefully timed sequence of anticipated corrections, and corresponding thrust? Or, even better, in a turn where you also have to maintain altitude? Or intercepting the localizer where you want to do it ideally without five S-turns? Shouldn’t one be proficient at of all those things?

I would hope.

But we have crashes like Indian 605 where in a perfect plane on a clear day, they fell into mode confusion on the approach and couldn’t bring themselves to just fly the airplane, instead trying to untangle the modes all the way into the crash. Or, Flash 604 where in IMC the AP failed to engage on departure, and instead of flying the plane they maintained a panicked and sustained effort to engage it, again all the way into the crash. Or, Asiana 214, with again a perfect plane on a perfect day where, unlike the other 2 examples and to their credit, they clicked the red button and decided to fly the airplane. But in doing so, they were so overwhelmed by suddenly being thrown into the pilot’s seat that they didn’t didn’t have the task capacity to make a single trim change over two flap changes and 30 pounds of added stick force! Etc. etc.

So I think that the maintenance of a level of comfort and willingness to fly the airplane when required, including at sudden provocation, is not too much to ask for. And, living every day in a world where it’s as rare as hen’s teeth to see someone fly it above 1000 feet, and seeing example after bewildering example of accidents like these, I don’t feel this general comfort level around me. I have to disagree with your evaluation that “it’s not a problem.”

[Vessbot]

while the PM sipped his coffee with one hand and the other hand on his knee.
Best possible punchline to this story, I literally LOL’ed. (after, and before, crying)

[vilas]

Centaurs, it must have been long time ago at a time when aviation was new in the country you're referring to. Well things have definitely changed for the better. In the last ten years I have conducted type rating for pilots of ten Asian countries and I didn't find find any cultural traits that overruled or interfered with aircraft procedures. Yes! some of them are sensitive and physical touch even friendly etc is discomforting to them. As Instructors it can become problematic if the ethnic groups are switched. But then it's occupational Hazzard.

[Check Airman]

Simulator instructors in the job full time could write a book on what they occasionally witness in the horror box. But the risk of hurt feelings and subsequent danger of litigation are always there. There was one event I saw however, that will forever stick in my mind. The automation was perfect but it was the flight crew handling of an unexpected slight technical defect that was the worry. This event convinced me not only of the pressing need for airline pilots to maintain raw data manual flying competency but of the ever present insidious effect in some countries of ethnic culture when it comes to flight safety mores.

I was briefed to give experienced military trained crews of a large Asian country two hours of general handling on the Boeing 737 Classic simulator. An interpreter was provided who sat on the jump seat while I occupied the instructor panel position. Part of the exercise was a standard ILS procedurally flown. The first thing I noticed after takeoff was both pilots flew with their hands firmly on their knees from the time the captain engaged the autopilot to the end of the session. After any autopilot mod selection their hands went straight back to the knees.

During the autopilot flying via a DME arc to intercept the localiser, I asked the interpreter to tell the captain (PF) it might be wise to have one hand on the thrust levers during the ILS rather than both hands on his knees. This advice was obviously rejected by the captain who was chief pilot of the company. As the aircraft was descending during the DME arc the autothrottle had commanded the thrust levers to idle. Speed was initially 210 knots clean. IMC conditions prevailed. Nil wind. On the instructor panel I actuated failure of the No 1 engine throttle clutch motor. There is no QRH item for this type of fault as it would be considered normal good airmanship to pick up any split between the two thrust levers when it occurred.

At the appropriate time in the ILS, the PF requested flap and gear extension and the PM made the selections and placed his hands back on his knees. As airspeed was reduced and drag increased, the autothrottle system increased power to maintain correct approach speed. However only the No 2 thrust lever moved. The No 1 thrust lever remained at idle because its clutch motor was inoperative. The autopilot now coupled to the ILS, applied significant aileron to stop the increasing asymmetric roll due to one engine at idle thrust and the other engine at 75% N1 trying to maintain selected speed. Rudder pedals were central as they were not part of the autopilot. Both pilots had their hands still on their knees and not a word passed between them despite the obvious indications of something drastically wrong.

Midway down the ILS I tapped the interpreter on the shoulder and in English told her to tell the captain to look at the throttles which had a large split, as well has the control wheel showing 45 degrees of roll application. Hardly had the interpreter done so when the autopilot decided enough was enough and disengaged itself. The aircraft began a rapid roll to the left and the nose dropped. Despite this, both pilots kept their hands on their knees and said nothing. The captain seeing the closed left throttle then announced "Engine Failure - checklist" in his native language but made no attempt to manually correct the increasing roll and spiral dive. He kept his hands on his knees and his feet on the rudders but without applying any correction.

The PF groped around to locate the QRH which was on the floor next to him. He frantically flipped the pages of the QRH while seemingly oblivious to the flight instruments indication of 60 degrees angle of bank, a high rate of dsecent, a GPWS warning and the closed throttle of No 1 engine and the high power indication of No 2 engine. All the while, the captain who seemed frozen in indecision kept his own hands on his knees shouting in his own language "Checklist - Checklist - Hurry up - hurry up!"

It was now clear to me that crew coordination had completely broken down and the aircraft would crash within seconds. I "froze" the simulator, lowered the drawbridge and told the interpreter to have the crew meet me in the coffee room for a chat. Frankly, I was at loss for words. These two pilots included the chief pilot and if he couldn't fly a 737 then what of the rest of the ten pilots who had come a long way to use my company's full flight simulator. The interpreter who spoke perfect English was equally dismayed; after all he was going to be the bearer of bad news to the captain. The interpreter was in an invidious position. I envisaged him being shot or worse, as a witness to a calamity in the simulator.

I decided it would be better for all concerned to run a completely neutral de-briefing and carefully avoid any criticism of either pilot. Loss of face in their culture was important to avoid. I did say, however, it was probably a good idea for the PF to retain one hand on the throttles during an instrument approach. The captain briefly nodded his head after the interpreter had passed on this advice. while the PM sipped his coffee with one hand and the other hand on his knee. In some parts of the world, cultural mores win over flight safety every time..

Well, as long as the captain used standard phraseology in calling for the chcecklist, it wasn't too bad now was it?:ugh:

[Centaurus]

J
Centaurs, it must have been long time ago at a time when aviation was new in the country you're referring to. Well things have definitely changed for the better.

Nice try. "Things have changed for the better" Good to know that. but depends on what part of the world you are referring to. The event took place in the last ten years. Military pilots operating a squadron of military 737's using a civilian airline name. The pilots all wore corporate type business suits, and spoke no English. Hence the interpreter.

[Check Airman]

So I think that the maintenance of a level of comfort and willingness to fly the airplane when required, including at sudden provocation, is not too much to ask for. And, living every day in a world where it’s as rare as hen’s teeth to see someone fly it above 1000 feet, and seeing example after bewildering example of accidents like these, I don’t feel this general comfort level around me. I have to disagree with your evaluation that “it’s not a problem.”

I think a competent pilot should be able to slip effortlessly between flying with full automation, and no automation. Turning off the AP shouldn't require a briefing, or lengthy assessment of the conditions, or paperwork after the fact. Automated systems can and do fail.

If you find yourself rapidly changing modes and trying to think of what potential trap your previous or next mode selection will have, ask yourself if the AP is there to help you, or if you're there to help the AP.

[Check Airman]

I'll concede that it does sound tiring, and having the AP to help is great. But it also sounds like a pretty typical regional trip (or a bad trip at a major) here in the US. My point is that the degradation of skill in insidious. We each have to make a conscious effort to guard against it so that when the day comes that the situation requires a pilot, and not a manager, we can still fly.

[vilas]

J


Nice try. "Things have changed for the better" Good to know that. but depends on what part of the world you are referring to. The event took place in the last ten years. Military pilots operating a squadron of military 737's using a civilian airline name. The pilots all wore corporate type business suits, and spoke no English. Hence the interpreter.
Large Asian country and non English speaking is the clue then it can't be south of China because they all speak English and can't be called large country. Ten years back could be some remote part of China or Mangolia perhaps. I have first hand experience of Indians, Myanmarians, Thais, Malaysians, Singaporeans, Vietnamese, Indonesians, Philippinoes, Hongkong and Japanese. Have seen Chinese being trained some issue with English but nothing deadly cultural.

[RetiredBA/BY]

I think a competent pilot should be able to slip effortlessly between flying with full automation, and no automation. Turning off the AP shouldn't require a briefing, or lengthy assessment of the conditions, or paperwork after the fact. Automated systems can and do fail.


Absolutely agree.I would also add that any and all competent captains should be well able to decide when the operational environment is suitable to allow hand flying.

Perhaps I was v lucky but I do remember flying ACR 7 approaches on limited panel for my Jet Provost instrument rating.We coped.

Reading some of the earlier posts really dismays me !

[Checkboard]

Have seen Chinese being trained some issue with English but nothing deadly cultural.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asiana_Airlines_Flight_214

[Uplinker]

I remember you telling that story before, Centaurus, and it still amazes me. It is absolutely unacceptable, (the crew's inaction was unacceptable - not your story!).

I also remember flying BAe 146s out of Heathrow. Our aircraft had no auto-thrust, no auto trim and only basic Ap's, and we had to capture the VOR radials manually. So the SIDs and noise abatements were basically flown raw data on the HDG bug. When we were inbound to Heathrow, we manually joined and flew the Ockham hold on raw data with the heading bug - making the drift compensation ourselves, there being no automatics for holding. It all worked and we were pretty good at it through constant practice.

Many years later, if ATC vectored us in too tight and above the glide-slope in an A320, I found it much easier to drop out the AP and manually fly the aircraft down to the G/S than fiddle about with the ALT and V/S. On very turbulent approaches, I take the AP out earlier rather than later, to get into the groove of the weather conditions, so that by around 4 nm, my responses are nicely up to speed and in control of the aircraft. (I normally leave the A/THR in on A320/321 though - it usually does a fine job).

So why do we get pilots such as those Centaurus observed, and of the recent gear-up and overrun accidents? It has to be down to poor checking, and letting pilots through who should be failed and retrained. I am also not sure about company TREs examining their own pilots - it must be very difficult to remain objective consistent and fair, and to fail a senior manager or a chief pilot?

Automation dependancy is to some degree caused by pilots who have very low experience of hand flying and raw data - maybe none in commercial line flying. Automation in an Airbus FBW is so good that a poor or inexperienced pilot can "get away with it" 95% of the time - like car drivers who have a licence to drive only an automatic and would not be able to cope with a manual car. This is not the fault of the Airbus but of the old training and checking regime. Chief pilots need to bring in protocols to strongly encourage or even mandate manual flying on the line. I believe that Airbus more recently trained new pilots without the automatics to start with, and only bring those in once the basic hand flying has been grasped?

[Consol]

I hand fly much more than usual in my company which is very good about manual flying. I keep my SEP current too. Most of the F.O.s are very good, well trained individuals who like to fly but most are still expecting an 'AP1 on' call after gear up and I often hear 'I'll put the autopilot in right after departure' in their briefings (CAVOK or near it). There's a bit of varience of course and the auto thrust is almost always left in. Point is they have picked this up from nervous Nellies in the training department and then the line and assume it's the norm. Add to that the P1s who have memorised all the FDR flags and have evolved theories of 'If anything happens they'll have my licence and I'll be thrown in jail' and you are not going to have a situation where the F.O. is going to do much hand flying lest the most minor correction be necessary or a trivial amber FDR flag be raised.
Point is the example has to be set from the left seat for the day when they are sitting there and something breaks and I am sitting back in 4A with a well preserved widowed heiress intending to enjoy retirement.

[alf5071h]

'Is the use of automation encouraged.' Autos = AP, AT, FD, HUD; any technology which can replace or supplement manual or cognitive task.

Industry depends on automation; without it, normal operation, traffic density, challenge the economics of aviation.

Historically, tedious long-haul cruise was automated - monitoring, evolving from checking system operation, to now overseeing the 'big picture' managed by highly reliable systems with auto alerting; but humans are poor monitors, we don't monitor - monitoring is a flawed concept.
The other area of automation was for operations beyond human capability. Initially low vis approaches, now RNAV, RVSM, etc, this is the dependancy, which in a not too distant future, sees manual flight as the reversionary mode, the skills set for recovery after autos fail.

Workload has changed, not necessarily less, its different in time and situation; similarly for error, new forms of error, could be easier seen due to clearer alerting and more information. Thus we might mistakenly relate auto use with improved safety and low workload, but often without adequate understanding of context, training content, experience; this is the encouragement, we wish to be safe.

Differences in operator perception might be seen as differences in encouraging use of autos or not.
The industry is safer (as measured after the fact), but risks still exist - we have to manage the uncertainty in future operations (before the fact). Whilst accidents have decreased, the proportion of aircraft with autos has increased thus we may create false associations.

Reconsider the dominant contributions of auto accidents; not lack of manual flight in normal operation as often reported - the industry is much safer than that. More likely degraded mental skills in managing situations - more surprise because of unfamiliarity due to highly reliable systems.
The level of experience required in abnormal situations is now inadequate. Operations and expectations must be matched to actual experience, not that imagined from training or manual flight in benign situations.

[KayPam]

Why do I get the feeling the real purpose of this thread is for non-airline and non-commercial pilots to boast they are “real pilots” and airline pilots are nothing more than children of magenta? To sneer down and smugly educate your airline brethren as if they cannot fly anymore? Are you guys jealous on missing out on the big leagues?

As far as lack of hand flying goes, I say it’s not a problem. There is little hand flying value to be gained anyway when the aircraft is in a stable climb or descent. The real value of manual manipulation skills are shown on an approach onto a short runway in gusty, wind shear or variable wind conditions. Hit the main gear on the markers and then exit first available taxiway as there’s another aircraft close up your backside. Won’t be able to do that unless you have good manual skills, yet airline pilots do it everyday all over the world without applause, even the so called “children of magenta”. I’d say less than 0.5% of landings are Autoland, and a auto land is pretty useless in all but the calmest wind conditions anyway.

This thread has nothing to do with jealousy or anything else like that.

About your perfect crosswind landing : it is only feasible if the pilot managed to bring the aircraft on the runway axis, at 50 above the threshold, with a slope as close as possible to -3°.
If you're high, you'll land long or hard (or at least risk it). If you're low, you could land short. If you're not on the axis at the threshold, it is a bad start..
So some credit goes to short final management (from 500ft to 50ft). And being able to manage it consistently without FDs is not the easiest thing.

To speak for myself, recently line checked, I usually fly manually at least up to slats retraction and usually to about FL80.
In descent, if my fatigue is at low enough level (which is not the case after 3-4-5 earlies), I usually disconnect everything while on the last descent before loc interception.
Nothing wrong with a go around but if you have 4 sectors and a 25 minute turn around to make each time and 5 days of that in a row you're probably going to be less inclined to fly manually and let the AP do most of the work. It's the reality of the situation.
If you're unstable and have to go around one in a hundred times, is it really a problem ?
Plus, chances are you will progress and decrease drastically this figure !
Absolutely agree.I would also add that any and all competent captains should be well able to decide when the operational environment is suitable to allow hand flying.

What is an appropriate or inappropriate time, then ?

I only see crew fatigue as a factor, and maybe very turbulent conditions which would ask for keeping FDs on.
'Is the use of automation encouraged.' Autos = AP, AT, FD, HUD; any technology which can replace or supplement manual or cognitive task.

Industry depends on automation; without it, normal operation, traffic density, challenge the economics of aviation.

Historically, tedious long-haul cruise was automated - monitoring, evolving from checking system operation, to now overseeing the 'big picture' managed by highly reliable systems with auto alerting; but humans are poor monitors, we don't monitor - monitoring is a flawed concept.
The other area of automation was for operations beyond human capability. Initially low vis approaches, now RNAV, RVSM, etc, this is the dependancy, which in a not too distant future, sees manual flight as the reversionary mode, the skills set for recovery after autos fail.
How do you safely revert if you never practise ?

Some of your sentences seem contradictory. Pilots (humans) are bad at monitoring. Pilots should monitor the automatic flying of the aircraft. Which should it be ?

[vilas]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asiana_Airlines_Flight_214
What Koreans have to do with Chinese?

[Uplinker]

Hi dr dre, I originally missed your post #51, but well said :ok:

[FlyingStone]

To speak for myself, recently line checked
...
What is an appropriate or inappropriate time, then ?

I only see crew fatigue as a factor, and maybe very turbulent conditions which would ask for keeping FDs on.

I hate to be the one to ask, but if you don't mind me asking, what's your total airline experience?
​​​​​​
There are plenty of good reasons to keep the automation, outside of turbulence and fatigue, e.g. flying to a procedural airport with two languages spoken on the frequency, ton of VFR traffic around and high terrain in the vicinity. Am I going to be flying raw data? No. Am I going to keep the autopilot in and encourage my colleague that we both keep an extremely good look out and listen out to avoid other traffic? You betcha.

[Check Airman]

I hate to be the one to ask, but if you don't mind me asking, what's your total airline experience?
​​​​​​
There are plenty of good reasons to keep the automation, outside of turbulence and fatigue, e.g. flying to a procedural airport with two languages spoken on the frequency, ton of VFR traffic around and high terrain in the vicinity. Am I going to be flying raw data? No. Am I going to keep the autopilot in and encourage my colleague that we both keep an extremely good look out and listen out to avoid other traffic? You betcha.

I do just that sort of flying with some regularity. I agree that that’s a good time to keep automation on, until on final. On the way back to base though (busy major airport with tons of VFR traffic, but no terrain or language in the way), click click.

[Centaurus]

A few of us still around would have read Handling the Big Jets by Captain D.B. Davies. For those that haven't, allow me to cut and paste blurbs from the fly leaf. Read what you will into these comments.

From IFALPA New Bulletin: " this book can be truly described as the best of its kind in the world and not only for the fact that there is no other book on modern aircraft handling characteristics .....we can recall no book which bears so directly on the pilot's problem as does 'Handling the Big Jets." Written by a test pilot for airline pilots, the book is likely to become a standard text book.....I would strongly recommend the book to all airline pilots who fly jets, or who will be flying jets in the future.

From Flight International.'..."this is no dry text book..It is a tremendous, but notably readable, vade-mecum of jet tranport flying qualities and design characteristics intended primarily for pilots who have yet to make the transition to jets, but which is packed with information of value to he most experienced of jet captains.'

This leads me to the author's advice to airline pilots which, in my opinion is the crux of the wide ranging differences of opinion between Pprune readers on the subject of automation versus the perceived need to maintain manual handling skills. Bear with me when I again cut and paste.

"Do not become lazy in your professional lives. The autopilot is a great comfort, so are the flight director and approach coupler. But do not get into the position where you need these devices to complete the flight. Keep in practice at raw ILS particularly in crosswinds. Keep in practice in hand-flying the aeroplane at altitude and in making purely visual approaches.

Airline flying really is money for old rope most of the time; but when things get hairy then you earn your pay. As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired - and this is a bit of a trap. The demand of jet transport flying can be best met by enthusiasm. Personal enthusiasm for the job is beyond value because it is a built-in productive force, and those who have it do not have to be pushed into practice and the search for knowledge. Enthusiasm thus generates its own protection. This is the frame of mind which needs to be developed for the best execution of the airline pilots's task"

The author mentions a known fact and that is "As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired." This can show up when the opportunity arises for a spot of hand flying and an enthusiastic first officer asks his captain "Do you mind if I hand fly this ILS raw data all the way down?" The captain demurs - if only because he either doesn't trust his first officer to fly a smooth approach or he perceives trouble if a FOQA pings the fact the FD is off on the copilot's side. An invite to tea and bikkies looms. So the captain knocks back the first officer's request with "its best to leave the autopilot in until DH."

Davies states "The demand of jet transport flying can be best met with enthusiasm." The problem nowadays, is that rules and tolerances are far tighter than when Davies wrote his book. With Big Brother FOQA monitoring every flick of a switch, it becomes all too onerous for the captain to risk straying from the magenta line of SOP. The first officer then becomes a captive audience to the captain's caution. In time, the same first officer becomes a captain and the problem is perpetuated

Regrettably, all this leads to the conclusion that in todays sophisicated electronic aviation environment it maybe safer in terms of pilot job security to leave hand flying a crosswind raw data ILS and its ilk to simulator practice only. . And that becomes another story.

[sonicbum]

A few of us still around would have read Handling the Big Jets by Captain D.B. Davies. For those that haven't, allow me to cut and paste blurbs from the fly leaf. Read what you will into these comments.

From IFALPA New Bulletin: " this book can be truly described as the best of its kind in the world and not only for the fact that there is no other book on modern aircraft handling characteristics .....we can recall no book which bears so directly on the pilot's problem as does 'Handling the Big Jets." Written by a test pilot for airline pilots, the book is likely to become a standard text book.....I would strongly recommend the book to all airline pilots who fly jets, or who will be flying jets in the future.

From Flight International.'..."this is no dry text book..It is a tremendous, but notably readable, vade-mecum of jet tranport flying qualities and design characteristics intended primarily for pilots who have yet to make the transition to jets, but which is packed with information of value to he most experienced of jet captains.'

This leads me to the author's advice to airline pilots which, in my opinion is the crux of the wide ranging differences of opinion between Pprune readers on the subject of automation versus the perceived need to maintain manual handling skills. Bear with me when I again cut and paste.

"Do not become lazy in your professional lives. The autopilot is a great comfort, so are the flight director and approach coupler. But do not get into the position where you need these devices to complete the flight. Keep in practice at raw ILS particularly in crosswinds. Keep in practice in hand-flying the aeroplane at altitude and in making purely visual approaches.

Airline flying really is money for old rope most of the time; but when things get hairy then you earn your pay. As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired - and this is a bit of a trap. The demand of jet transport flying can be best met by enthusiasm. Personal enthusiasm for the job is beyond value because it is a built-in productive force, and those who have it do not have to be pushed into practice and the search for knowledge. Enthusiasm thus generates its own protection. This is the frame of mind which needs to be developed for the best execution of the airline pilots's task"

The author mentions a known fact and that is "As we get older we all become slightly more lazy, slightly more tired." This can show up when the opportunity arises for a spot of hand flying and an enthusiastic first officer asks his captain "Do you mind if I hand fly this ILS raw data all the way down?" The captain demurs - if only because he either doesn't trust his first officer to fly a smooth approach or he perceives trouble if a FOQA pings the fact the FD is off on the copilot's side. An invite to tea and bikkies looms. So the captain knocks back the first officer's request with "its best to leave the autopilot in until DH."

Davies states "The demand of jet transport flying can be best met with enthusiasm." The problem nowadays, is that rules and tolerances are far tighter than when Davies wrote his book. With Big Brother FOQA monitoring every flick of a switch, it becomes all too onerous for the captain to risk straying from the magenta line of SOP. The first officer then becomes a captive audience to the captain's caution. In time, the same first officer becomes a captain and the problem is perpetuated

Regrettably, all this leads to the conclusion that in todays sophisicated electronic aviation environment it maybe safer in terms of pilot job security to leave hand flying a crosswind raw data ILS and its ilk to simulator practice only. . And that becomes another story.

Loads of valuable inputs and personally love the book.
The problem is that aviation nowadays (or at least the past 10/15 years) is "cheap". That means having low hours low experienced pilots in both seats in the cockpit who will not create much troubles to the airlines in terms of demands and complaints. On the other hand airlines also need experienced crews to balance the fleet, and then everything gets quite mixed up. The answer becomes super-rigid sops with very little margins for anything that can potentially "distract" the crew form a textbook sop flight from A to B.

[Centaurus]

The problem is that aviation nowadays (or at least the past 10/15 years) is "cheap". That means having low hours low experienced pilots in both seats in the cockpit who will not create much troubles to the airlines in terms of demands and complaints
Hence the propensity for hours cheating in some airlines where corruption is a national pastime.
Extract from a recently published incident report.
One unusual item contained in the report was the logged flying hours claimed by the captain as well as that of the first officer.

The captain claimed a total of 6094 hours. His time on type was 5608 of which the whole lot was claimed as in command. In other words the casual reader could take it the captain had received no dual and no copilot time on type. It appears he had 496 total hours when starting on the 737 and thereafter logged everything as pilot in command.

The first officer had 252 hours total of which 175 hours was on the 737. On the face of it he would have flown only 77 flying hours total before joining the airline to eventually become second in command of the 737 at 252 hours or less.

[DaveJ75]

Why is automation dependency encouraged in modern aviation?

Because automation is (sadly) apparently more reliable than 'uman pilots in most flight phases most of the time. As has been eloquently pointed out, there's a flip side.

[DaveJ75]

It is very significant that Sully was a glider pilot at one time, and the 'Gimli glider' was also conveyed to the ground in one piece by two ex-glider pilots. You could say that every flight in a glider is a controlled crash, but that isn't strictly true. Gliding is real flying - you become part of the plane - something you will never be if the plane does all the flying for you.

Oh no, not again. I'm pleased you enjoy your gliding but please don't do this. I do wish glider pilots would stop these tedious and naïve assertions every time the manual handling discussion comes up. The Unintentional Flight Into IMC thread elsewhere in this forum suggests the gliding fraternity would do well to learn from the professionals. For example, Cathay Flt 780 was a heroic save by a non-glider pilot crew. There are good pilots and bad pilots, the end.

[HPSOV L]

The complicating factor is this:

Few, if any of the major automation related accidents have been caused by a lack of "stick and rudder" skills. It is more nuanced than that. The major factor they have in common has been a failure to perceive an indirect mode change or understand a confusing system failure in time to prevent an accident. Being able to manually fly a decent raw data ILS, or fly an arc within half a mile is not really that relevant. In fact it is presumptuous to suggest that the incident pilots weren't as skilled at manual flight as any of us.
Some will argue that constantly practicing manual skills gives you a better ability to detect anomalies sooner. There may be some truth in this but you'd need to do it far more than is realistically practical and it introduces it's own set of risks which may outweigh the (debatable) rewards.

[Judd]

The major factor they have in common has been a failure to perceive an indirect mode change or understand a confusing system failure in time to prevent an accident. Being able to manually fly a decent raw data ILS, or fly an arc within half a mile is not really that relevant. In fact it is presumptuous to suggest that the incident pilots weren't as skilled at manual flight as any of us.

But it is relevant. There have been numerous accidents and probably thousands of unreported incidents where mode confusion and consequent furrowing of brows have led to an "undesired state' in terms of WTF is happening now? What is alarming in these cases is the reluctance of the pilot to go Click-Click and manually correct the situation. In fact, wasn't this the whole point of the film featuring Captain Warren Vandenburg when he gave his briefing to American Airlines crews in 1997 through Children of the Magenta Line? He was concerned the industry has made pilots too dependent on monitoring the magenta lines on the machines that are really flying the plane.

Even to the most biased aficionado of automation, the need for pilots to have a modicum of flying skill is acknowledged. All pilots should have the ability to seamlessly switch from automatics to manual instrument flying without being concerned about lack of confidence in their own ability to handle a situation where manual skills are instantly needed. The Egyptian Flash Air Boeing 737 accident in January 2004 was only one example of many, where mode confusion led to a low altitude jet upset and the captain lacked the confidence and manual instrument flying ability to recover the situation. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flash_Airlines_Flight_604

[Vessbot]

The complicating factor is this:

Few, if any of the major automation related accidents have been caused by a lack of "stick and rudder" skills. It is more nuanced than that. The major factor they have in common has been a failure to perceive an indirect mode change or understand a confusing system failure in time to prevent an accident. Being able to manually fly a decent raw data ILS, or fly an arc within half a mile is not really that relevant. In fact it is presumptuous to suggest that the incident pilots weren't as skilled at manual flight as any of us.
Some will argue that constantly practicing manual skills gives you a better ability to detect anomalies sooner. There may be some truth in this but you'd need to do it far more than is realistically practical and it introduces it's own set of risks which may outweigh the (debatable) rewards.

Well I was typing this out as Judd made his post above saying essentially the same thing but in fewer words. Anyway,

Do you have any examples of the crashes you're talking about, and how this applies? Because when too general, it's too easy for people to be talking past each other, with one meaning one thing and the other interpreting that as another, and ultimately addressing different things. And though I disagree with you, I think this is a good discussion to have and want it to be clear.

I listed in post 53 some crashes, and don't know if this is a reply to that or not.

The part where we agree, is that 2 out of those 3 started with cascading mode confusion, or the pilot's situation view being different than the autopilot's. (But this was the precipitating event that started the chain, and I don't see it as a "complicating factor" on the skills required as a response.)

The part where I hope we agree (but don't know if we do, and would like to find out) is that this situation should force a manual take over. In one of those 2, this happened.

The part where it seems we disagree, is that what follows after this manual takeover should be included as the baseline "stick and rudder," or manual handling skills, or whatever you want to call it. Basic flying of the plane, as you would a Cessna 172.

You dismissively list a few maneuvers as kind of a sideshow curiosity that one can brag about but "are not really that relevant." But what would have saved those airplanes is more than being able to fly some maneuvers after mentally preparing oneself and mustering up all of one's concentration after picking an easy time, shedding all nonessential tasks, etc. Yeah you can demonstrate the "skill" that way and check the box, but it's not enough. What's required is far more than that, it's a casual ease of something done (not "practiced," but simply done as a matter of course) every day like parking your car or doing a take off on a clear and calm day. And while doing so, have spare mental capacity to handle the other elements of a normal or emergency flight. It's only with that baseline that once the cascading mode confusion starts and it becomes apparent that that the airplane is headed toward crashing, the path toward not-crashing (click-click, level the wings, N1 to 60% and VSI to -800, or whatever rough intial actions apply to the particular scenario) can be embarked on without deadly reluctance.

I don't know if you were ever an instructor, but if you were, and the student ever took the situation far outside the error you allowed for him and headed toward a crash, would you say "my plane" (the equivalent of click-click) or start talking to him faster in hopes of him fixing it himself? The pilots in these crashes very much knew they were headed for trouble, but had a reluctance to say "my plane" and fly it to safety, that could have only come from a lack of the necessary skill, in the useful/meaningful sense. (If they had the skill, why didn't they use it? Having it but being too afraid to use it when suddenly called upon, is the same as not having it.)

Plus, if we're only to be ready to fly the plane in the "let's crack-our knuckles and take a deep breath, all right let's give it a go, but only because it's VFR and we're at a quiet outstation" sense, that puts lie to the whole fig leaf of our role in the cockpit being there "to take over if the automation fails." When it fails it's gonna be the "I'm suddenly thrust from a sleeplike slumber into this cockpit with a yoke/stick in one hand, a pair of rudder pedals, a pair of throttles in the other hand, and a multitude of information sources in front of my eyes to quickly make sense of" way. And the only part of your brain that's gonna be able to meaningfully handle all of that, is the part that treats it as instinct, because it's been baked in as such via everyday routine.

[alf5071h]

KP, 'How do you safely revert if you never practise ?'
My implication may not have been clear enough. By all means revert to manual as is widely done, but don't expect that to change workload and safety. What ever crews do in normal conditions is unlikely to improve everyones performance in unusual conditions.

'Pilots should monitor the automatic flying of the aircraft.'
The task is to monitor the aircraft, not monitoring autos, not looking at the FMA and expecting to deduce flight path from annunciators alone. Use instruments, compare the aircraft actual situation with auto selections; i.e. what you planned, selected, expected, vs the reality.
Don't ask "whats it doing now", but "what did I ask the system to do.

Re humans - poor monitors - check standard HF and human perf texts.

'Do you generally agree with the opinion that pilots should be able to consistently fly with no automation ?'
This is not a yes / no question. Consider what drives the need for manual flight, what task, accuracy, proficiency, when, then how.
If 'consistently' refers to accuracy, then where the need for hand flying is to fly the aircraft after automation fails; accuracy ~ safe enough, but not necessarily to the higher standards required pre automation.
Professional pride should aim for the higher standard, but training and opportunity restrict skill development.

[Check Airman]

'Do you generally agree with the opinion that pilots should be able to consistently fly with no automation ?'
This is not a yes / no question. Consider what drives the need for manual flight, what task, accuracy, proficiency, when, then how.
If 'consistently' refers to accuracy, then where the need for hand flying is to fly the aircraft after automation fails; accuracy ~ safe enough, but not necessarily to the higher standards required pre automation.
Professional pride should aim for the higher standard, but training and opportunity restrict skill development.

Actually, it is a yes/no question, in my mind.

If your training is restricting skill development, you need to oust whoever runs your training department.

Threads like this make me worry about sitting in the back of planes in some parts of the world. The last thing I want as I go off on holiday is a crew that’s going to “manage the operation” right into the ground.

[pineteam]

Of course pilots should be able to hand fly in any conditions. I don’t expect my colleagues to fly as accurately as the AP but he should feel confortable at any time to disconnect the AP If required and fly within acceptable limits. But sadly many aren’t. Once a friend of mine was observing my flight; that’s part of the upgrade process. That day I was flying with a very weak first officer; one of the weakest actually: one of those guys who never ever hand fly. That day I was doing a raw data approach ( no A/THR, no bird) and to show my friend how nervous this guy was even in a perfect CAVOK day. I asked the FO to take control pretending I needed to adjust my seat. He had nothing to do really, only keep the same pitch and leave the leavers on Idle. We were still passing 6000 feet descending to 3000. As soon as he took control, I looked at him he was completely overwhelmed, nervous as hell and shaking. Not even 20 seconds later he told me very nervously: “Let me know when you ready to take control!” I then took control and told him that he needs to relax and at anytime he could practice raw data with me. He is a nice guy actually tho; I actually feel sad for him; but yeah you get the idea and this kind of weak pilots is not an isolated case. Some are even on the left seat and I bet you in your outfit too. Those guys are a timing bomb for the next air disaster but let’s keep denying it... SMH

[FullWings]

I remember doing a brief for an approach to somewhere - can’t remember exactly where but it was a decent 1st World airport. Started talking about the offset VOR and how we were going to fly it and the guy in the RHS said “I don’t do NPAs”. “Hahaha!” went I, then I realised he was being serious. I asked him how we were going to get in, given the ILS was U/S in the AIS and the weather was definitely not good enough for a visual. OK, I’ll do it in RNAV he said; fine, I replied, but as it’s not in the database and offset, how are you going to do that using our SOPs? Cue look of horror and confusion.

Look, I said, let’s rewind back to the beginning and forget you said you didn’t do VOR approaches. We went through the entire process: FMC set up, expected modes and FMAs, contingencies, visual segment, blah blah. Didn’t take that long and he flew a perfectly acceptable raw data VOR that I was able to land off, which seemed to amaze him. A few beers later, he confessed that he had become very under confident with raw data, A/P in or out, and had been dreading the next sim where, by all accounts, you ended up having to do something like the above. Not an issue, I said, it happens to us all but the way back is practice, not avoidance. Ask and ye shall receive...

[Judd]

Those guys are a timing bomb for the next air disaster but let’s keep denying it.

I can well believe it. Friend of mine flying in the Asia region crewed with a local cadet just out of flight school and who had just completed his type rating. They were flying in Cirrus cloud, calm conditions, when the cadet first officer nervously said to the captain "I don't like flying in cloud..." This from the legal second in command of a jet transport. Image the chaos that would occur if the captain became suddenly incapacitated. In fact it does't even bear thinking about.

[safetypee]

Recent posts, HPSOV L, Vessbot, Judd, #77-79, consider the same problem from different aspects - situation awareness.
Perception, change, understanding, time, are critical components of awareness - how we make sense of things.
Reluctance to 'click click', 'my plane'; the difficulty is in identifying the need to act, that some situations require a change of action.
Pilots must consider the 'AP's perception', requires working knowledge, limitations, awareness.

Viewing accidents from human viewpoint usually concludes human error - more training. Alternatively, considering a joint human - automation system, what might be concluded as a perfectly serviceable aircraft, becomes an inadequate combination of man and machine in a particular situation (Man Machine Situation).
Not more training, but improved system alerting that auto-thrust is not available in some circumstances, that attempting to engage AP outside limits gives a 'uh uh' alert, cueing a change in awareness, an awareness which is assumed by others to include every circumstance, but circumstances are rarely as assumed.

First check assumptions, reconsider circumstances - avoid.
Improve the machine to aid the pilot - joint system.
Last, reluctantly consider the very difficult task of changing human behaviour which can never be assured or as assumed - not all situations are foreseeable.

Slowly deteriorating situations are difficult to identify, cf 'Boiling Frog'. There is a natural reluctance to act because action is already in hand, except that as situations change so must actions, which requires understanding, awareness, mental skills - which degrade faster than manual skills.

The industry requires a combination of improvements for man and machine, but the myth that human aspects are more effective come from management thinking. The issue is not about manual flight, its knowing when to fly manually, and adapting normal skills for abnormal situations.

https://nescacademy.nasa.gov/video/a0eabadac9a24630a2e2118f7585baa81d 'Man-Machine' >'Slides', 'Download'

http://hfs.sagepub.com/content/56/8/1506.full.pdf 'Manual flight skills'.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boiling_frog

[PilotLZ]

The airline policies which tend to take the most heavy-handed approach against manual flying are mostly concentrated in a certain part of the globe where there are lots and lots of expats who often complain about the locals' level of training being substandard. That's where you can expect to be told to consider autoland as the normal way of landing day in and day out. For whatever weird reason, many of said countries don't even bother teaching their local pilots the basics of flying. Many are never taught what they should be looking for during landing, many don't even look outside. All they have been taught is "at X feet set Y degrees of pitch, pull the thrust levers all the way to idle and wait". To make matters even worse, FOs hardly get any PF time. The Captain is PF by default. Many companies even explicitly forbid the FOs to handle the aircraft unless there's a TRI in the left-hand seat. What sort of Captain can such a FO become, I fear to think. By the time they get into the LHS, they likely still have less sectors as PF than a junior FO fresh out of line training in other parts of the world.

Why did I bother writing that? Because, very sadly, "policies" like that make automation dependency a status quo in many carriers. A pilot with such a company is trained that way from day one, right until he/she becomes a Captain or a TRI and begins hammering the same way of doing things into the heads of those joining after him/her.

What can be done about it? Tightening the regulatory requirements for manual flying proficiency sounds tempting right until you realise that it can also backfire. For example, if you require a pilot to perform a raw-data approach every X days, how can you be certain that, during a period of low flying activity, his/her only flight won't be in conditions where flying raw-data is not appropriate? Hence, I don't think that hard-and-fast rules are the best way forward. The best strategy would be involvement of the authority, the aircraft manufacturer and national and international safety bodies into stimulating airlines to rethink their training programmes and objectives. Airbus are already making some steps towards this. Let's hope that others will follow suit.

[vilas]

​But we have crashes like Indian 605 where in a perfect plane on a clear day, they fell into mode confusion on the approach and couldn’t bring themselves to just fly the airplane, instead trying to untangle the modes all the way into the crash. Or, Flash 604 where in IMC the AP failed to engage on departure, and instead of flying the plane they maintained a panicked and sustained effort to engage it, again all the way into the crash. Or, Asiana 214, with again a perfect plane on a perfect day where, unlike the other 2 examples and to their credit, they clicked the red button and decided to fly the airplane. ​​​​​​
Vessbot I disagree on 2 of the three accidents you quoted. Indian airlines and Asiana both were visual approaches manually flown. There was no mode confusion because even to get confused you need to know what's going wrong. They were flying an approach without ever looking at the speed or ROD. The IAS in Indian case was 26kts below Vapp and in Asiana case was 31 kts below Vapp. They would have crashed even in a Dakota(actually more easily). The tragedy is both were under command check and not copilot release check.

[Check Airman]

Of course pilots should be able to hand fly in any conditions. I don’t expect my colleagues to fly as accurately as the AP but he should feel confortable at any time to disconnect the AP If required and fly within acceptable limits. But sadly many aren’t. Once a friend of mine was observing my flight; that’s part of the upgrade process. That day I was flying with a very weak first officer; one of the weakest actually: one of those guys who never ever hand fly. That day I was doing a raw data approach ( no A/THR, no bird) and to show my friend how nervous this guy was even in a perfect CAVOK day. I asked the FO to take control pretending I needed to adjust my seat. He had nothing to do really, only keep the same pitch and leave the leavers on Idle. We were still passing 6000 feet descending to 3000. As soon as he took control, I looked at him he was completely overwhelmed, nervous as hell and shaking. Not even 20 seconds later he told me very nervously: “Let me know when you ready to take control!” I then took control and told him that he needs to relax and at anytime he could practice raw data with me. He is a nice guy actually tho; I actually feel sad for him; but yeah you get the idea and this kind of weak pilots is not an isolated case. Some are even on the left seat and I bet you in your outfit too. Those guys are a timing bomb for the next air disaster but let’s keep denying it... SMH

Interesting story. My inner instructor would’ve come out, and I’d have let him hand fly for a bit to build confidence. Still, very sad that we’re discussing this though.

[Check Airman]

Vessbot I disagree on 2 of the three accidents you quoted. Indian airlines and Asiana both were visual approaches manually flown. There was no mode confusion because even to get confused you need to know what's going wrong. They were flying an approach without ever looking at the speed or ROD. The IAS in Indian case was 26kts below Vapp and in Asiana case was 31 kts below Vapp. They would have crashed even in a Dakota(actually more easily). The tragedy is both were under command check and not copilot release check.

That makes it all the worse. They were in VMC. Their scans and skills had deteriorated to the point where a visual approach could not be executed, let alone an approach in IMC.

[Check Airman]

Not an issue, I said, it happens to us all but the way back is practice, not avoidance. Ask and ye shall receive...

Thank you for being a Captain (uppercase C).

[KayPam]

The airline policies which tend to take the most heavy-handed approach against manual flying are mostly concentrated in a certain part of the globe where there are lots and lots of expats who often complain about the locals' level of training being substandard. That's where you can expect to be told to consider autoland as the normal way of landing day in and day out. For whatever weird reason, many of said countries don't even bother teaching their local pilots the basics of flying. Many are never taught what they should be looking for during landing, many don't even look outside. All they have been taught is "at X feet set Y degrees of pitch, pull the thrust levers all the way to idle and wait". To make matters even worse, FOs hardly get any PF time. The Captain is PF by default. Many companies even explicitly forbid the FOs to handle the aircraft unless there's a TRI in the left-hand seat. What sort of Captain can such a FO become, I fear to think. By the time they get into the LHS, they likely still have less sectors as PF than a junior FO fresh out of line training in other parts of the world.

Why did I bother writing that? Because, very sadly, "policies" like that make automation dependency a status quo in many carriers. A pilot with such a company is trained that way from day one, right until he/she becomes a Captain or a TRI and begins hammering the same way of doing things into the heads of those joining after him/her.

What can be done about it? Tightening the regulatory requirements for manual flying proficiency sounds tempting right until you realise that it can also backfire. For example, if you require a pilot to perform a raw-data approach every X days, how can you be certain that, during a period of low flying activity, his/her only flight won't be in conditions where flying raw-data is not appropriate? Hence, I don't think that hard-and-fast rules are the best way forward. The best strategy would be involvement of the authority, the aircraft manufacturer and national and international safety bodies into stimulating airlines to rethink their training programmes and objectives. Airbus are already making some steps towards this. Let's hope that others will follow suit.
This is completely incredible.
My airline is lightyears away from this and I still think they don't encourage raw data enough.

The most efficient solution for this type of airline could be simulator requirement, couldn't it ?
Requirement to be able to fly a complete raw data 2D approach of the TRE's choice. It does sound completely reasonnable to be able to do this, right ?
Plus, there are clear boundaries for what is acceptable. Did the pilot go below the safety altitude ? Did he descend at more than the authorized VOR/ADF deviation ? Did he go further than 0.5nm away from the DME arc ? All of this "without a go around or immediate correction".

Then each airline will decide how to reach that goal.

[FlightDetent]

This is completely incredible. Also mostly made up to suit the narrative.

[Vessbot]

Vessbot I disagree on 2 of the three accidents you quoted. Indian airlines and Asiana both were visual approaches manually flown. There was no mode confusion because even to get confused you need to know what's going wrong. They were flying an approach without ever looking at the speed or ROD. The IAS in Indian case was 26kts below Vapp and in Asiana case was 31 kts below Vapp. They would have crashed even in a Dakota(actually more easily). The tragedy is both were under command check and not copilot release check.
I don't follow. If you know what's wrong, then you're not confused, you're the opposite: you accurately know the situation. Confusion is if you think the automation setup will result in something different than what it's actually resulting in. And it can come in 2 flavors: first, not even knowing anything is wrong and merrily blundering toward CFIT; and second, knowing something is wrong but not understanding exactly what or why, and usually accompanied by an attempt to fix by frantically pushing buttons and twisting knobs.

Unless you think that the Asiana pilots intended to be 31 knots slow, or the Indian pilots intended to be 26 knots slow, (and intended to level at a selected altitude 2300 feet underground) then how can you say that they were not confused about the modes, or what the modes should have resulted in?

Their failure to monitor their airspeed didn't come from a generic laziness toward monitoring (although it was part of it), it came very specifically from a conditioned expectation that the automation mode (AT only, yes AP was off) would have it taken care of. I don't see how this would happen in a Dakota.

---

Actually we disagree with all 3 and not 2, because by process of elimination, it appears that you think the 3rd one (Flash 604) was mode confusion, while I think it's not. They accurately understood that the AP wouldn't engage (or would quickly disengage after trying), but they did not accept that this was forcing them to fly the plane, and instead placed all their mental energies into continuing to try to engage it as it completed a wingover into the ocean.

[Vessbot]

Reluctance to 'click click', 'my plane'; the difficulty is in identifying the need to act, that some situations require a change of action.Pilots must consider the 'AP's perception', requires working knowledge, limitations, awareness.

There are two things, and I’m not catching on if we agree or disagree. First, the identification of a need to act, and second, the ready base of skill to fly the plane, if the need happens to be for that. And I think the reluctance comes from an interplay of both. The skills have to be there, hard-baked to a point of casual ease; as I said in another post, if you’re unwilling to use the skills, it’s kind of the same as not having them. So the yearly sim (or maybe several-times-per-yearly, easy VMC into the quiet outstation) does not count. I think of it as an analogy of two “channels” of mental habit/action. In most automation cases, the starting point is with it engaged and in the automation channel, and for all of us, that is the easier way, and the place you spend most of the flight.

Then if something creates a need to fix a situation, it may be of low intensity, and the most appropriate action would be to probably stay in the automation. Let’s say you accidentally double-push a button instead of single push, so it goes in the wrong mode, and you realize it immediately. Just push it again, verify the right mode is up, done. No need for AP off.

Or the case may be severe. Like Flash 604, We’re low to the ground, the AP won’t engage, and after say 2 or 3 tries and bank angle going through 45 degrees, it’s time to fly the plane. It’s an obvious need to shift to the manual mental channel. And to overcome “the reluctance” to climb the ridge from one to the other.

But, (and I think this is an important part) the realization doesn’t come in a single shocking unambiguous announcement (like a FIRE warning), rather it builds up gradually. At the first failed try (and maybe wings are still level) is there a need to shift channels? Probably not, like my double-push example above. Just try again. OK second try, and it’s banking through 20 degrees? Maybe, maybe not, “you’d have to be there to really know.” 3rd try, and banking through 45 degrees? Hopefully all of us are going click-click “my plane” by now. 5th try? People are writing about us on forums decades later. But it’s a sliding scale of time-increasing realization, or the boiling frog like you said. And, when the automation mental channel is worn far deeper and more comfortable, with this sliding increase in need, the light bulb may never go off, as we emotionally grasp harder and harder at doing anything we can within the automation channel, and the panicked tunnel vision narrows down only on that view. The sliding-scale nature of the development allows us to be in denial and reinterpret the severity as a lower level until it’s too late.

So the only way to help that (and this is where the analogy kind of fails) is to have the manual channel also worn as deep and comfortable as we can get it, which would lower the barrier between the two and make the jump feasible at an earlier stage of the development.

Not more training, but improved system alerting that auto-thrust is not available in some circumstances, that attempting to engage AP outside limits gives a 'uh uh' alert, cueing a change in awareness, an awareness which is assumed by others to include every circumstance, but circumstances are rarely as assumed.

Well they already had alerting of what mode was active at the top of the PFD. Sure, even better alerting could be designed after careful study of the exact sequence of cascading events of the accident in question, and programming the plane to recognize that the pilot’s intent may be mismatching their inputs, but that only addresses this accident. (Though it should still be done).

What about all the future ways that pilots will dream up to fall into other compound cascading confusions that weren’t thought of? It’s just patching one hole in a dynamic pilot-aircraft-environment system where countless others might spring new leaks. It’s just adding more automation patchwork, and misses the fundamental failure that is outside the automation itself, but rather is in the pilot. The failure to recognize the difference between the intended state and the actual state (of the raw data, physical results), and if such exists (more than obviously a quick transient) click-click/ “my plane.” This must never stop being our job until the stick has been replaced by a mouse and we no longer have an interface with the control surfaces.

[HPSOV L]

A good discussion. I think Safetypee made some thoughtful observations and had some interesting links. The Dekker report is also good reading:


https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/nl/media/inline/2020/1/21/human_factors_report_s_dekker.pdf

[safetypee]

Vessbot, how do you recognise the need to disconnect ?
Are you able to describe the process which you use, which will always apply in every situation. If this starts with understanding the situation, then how do you understand.
To you it might be obvious, to others no so depending on the situation, experience, training - even of this can be trained at all.

How can we be sure that the situation as we understand it is correct, and even if correct that we will choose an appropriate course of action; errors in understanding or errors in acting (not acting).
http://www.pacdeff.com/pdfs/Errors%20in%20Decision%20Making.pdf

http://perigeantechnologies.com/publications/MakingSenseofSensemaking1-AlternativePerspectives.pdf
Note the myths:
Not just joining up the dots, but knowing what forms a dot in the first instance, where the meaning of a dot varies with context.

[Judd]

What can be done about it? Tightening the regulatory requirements for manual flying proficiency sounds tempting right until you realise that it can also backfire

The only problem with tightening the regulatory requirements is that the regulatory chiefs themselves are mostly retired airline pilots who are former children of the magenta line. For them it is easier to look the other way. Unfortunately it looks like we are stuck with the fact there will always be occasional crashes caused by incompetents in the left hand seat who simply can't fly. The cost of doing business?

[Chris Wheeler]

I wouldn’t worry too much about exact wording. You understand the company wants you to be proficient in automation as well as manual flying. Try to follow your companies FOM, as far as when you can manually fly an approach. After that, only you know what you need to work on. Then do what’s necessary to be proficient.
I also think a lot of what a company prints has to do with covering their butts.

[Vessbot]

Vessbot, how do you recognise the need to disconnect ?
Are you able to describe the process which you use, which will always apply in every situation.

Yes. You compare what you would like the airplane to be doing with what it is actually doing, and if those 2 things mismatch (and especially if you feel behind in any way in recognition, or proposed solution), you disconnect. (The old cutesy chestnut, "What's it doing now?")

An exception would be if the result is a common sequence of events in type, that you recognize immediately as well as the automation solution, (you never felt mentally behind) then it's OK to just do the automations solution. ("It's doing that thing again"). Such as in the R&N thread about the 777 stall warning out of JFK, people are talking about a common speed loss due to too-early altitude capture, and a double-push of the altitude button to deal with that)

If you're not sure which one you're in, you're in the first one.

If this starts with understanding the situation, then how do you understand.
To you it might be obvious, to others no so depending on the situation, experience, training - even of this can be trained at all.

How can we be sure that the situation as we understand it is correct, and even if correct that we will choose an appropriate course of action; errors in understanding or errors in acting (not acting).


This doesn't sound to me like a question about comparison of the understanding in your mind vs. the understanding in the airplane's computers, but just a question about the understanding in your mind. How do you understand? You take all your mental habits and abilities you've built up since flight lesson 1, and bring them to bear on all of the information you're receiving about the current situation. Could that be faulty? Yes. Could the airplane have a more accurate SA than the pilot, therefore the automation should be trusted? Yes, and there have been accidents due to that, like the Sukhoi business jet on a sales flight with a customer and a test pilot or something like that, where everything was functioning correctly and they got a GPWS but they blew it off and CFIT'ed.

We spend a lifetime/career assembling all of our experiences into the ability to build accurate SA and judgement... from mentors, hangar stories, accident reports, ground school, books by old sages, official manuals, etc. And hopefully become better at it than this crew. But at the end of the day in the cockpit, we're still the final arbiter of which SA picture is the most accurate, and must act on that; there's no logical way around that. If the computer has a better picture than you, then you still must decide that, and by virtue of that, that has become your own picture as well, to replace your previous one . There's no second version of you, outside of the situation, that judges which picture is better, and decides which one to pick. No, it's only the first you (until they make automation that can override you. So far it can make strong suggestions, but it doesn't override you.)

Evaluating that you're too confused for now, and making the willful choice to trust the automation for the time being, may also be valid, but in the end it's still an example of the same thing. Once you've made that evaluation then you, as the final arbiter, are making the choice (good or bad, result not known yet) which way to go.

---

I haven't had time to look at the links, but hopefully I will tomorrow.

[FullWings]

Vessbot,

That’s a couple of very cogent posts, dense with some really good observations.

For me, having had a fairly long career in aviation but coming from an engineering/science background, one of the (many) issues that gets me is the user interface that a modern commercial transport presents to its operator. In a word: suboptimal. They are an unholy mix of a century’s worth of ideas and technology, keeping the bad as well as the good for some kind of continuity. IMO many EFIS+FMC presentations are actually worse for SA in some areas than an equivalent steam-driven setup: un-annunciated hidden modes, weird logic and a plethora of known but too-expensive-to-fix bugs in prehistoric firmware/hardware.

As far as manual flying goes, I am mostly with those who say that it’s worthless to just follow the FD as you’re just inserting a monkey between the AFDS and the control surfaces. No need for any kind of instrument scan, just keep those needles crossed in the box (or whatever your aircraft requires) and you’re golden. I’m a little bit of a bully in that respect as if someone asks if they can fly manually, I say sure, but the FDs are going off with the AP! Make ‘em sweat. ;)

The idea of giving airline pilots a few hours every now-and-then in a light aircraft to get the old scan and handling ability up again often comes around and is generally pooh-poohed as being impractical, expensive, etc. Considering the cost of most FFS at £thousands a session and the limited exposure in the real thing to situations where you don’t have to compromise safety and regulations too much (non-RVSM, not at the end of a 12hr sector into bad weather, definitely not 3am on your body after a dodgy curry the night before, etc.) it would actually be more cost effective and 100% of it would be manual flying, IF and/or VFR. An explanation that sort of holds water is that this kind of activity looks suspiciously like “fun” and therefore what right-minded company would encourage such a thing, even if it led to increased safety and reduced wear-and-tear on airframes. Or, even pilots who were confident enough to do a visual circuit instead of an 12-mile ILS, saving £££ and getting there quicker?

[vilas]

I don't follow. If you know what's wrong, then you're not confused, you're the opposite: you accurately know the situation. Confusion is if you think the automation setup will result in something different than what it's actually resulting in. And it can come in 2 flavors: first, not even knowing anything is wrong and merrily blundering toward CFIT; and second, knowing something is wrong but not understanding exactly what or why, and usually accompanied by an attempt to fix by frantically pushing buttons and twisting knobs.
Again no! I have said it before with AP on or off pilot's scan remains same only difference is with AP on, the AP makes changes and in manual pilot makes changes. With or without AP It's the loss of scan that causes the problem. Mode or no mode, right or wrong mode, you simply cannot make an approch without a periodic glance at the speed. In the cases we are discussing the crew never even expressed a surprise or utter a word regarding falling speed because they never looked at the speed and worse not even the mode. They assumed a mode that wasn't there, they assumed a speed that wasn't being maintained. In both the cases even the go around was not because they noticed speed or the ROD but because they were not reaching the runway otherwise they would have executed a 3 or 4G Landing. In case of Indian airlines they lost their lives because they were nine seconds too late. The engines were spooling up. Somebody needs maintain the parameters either the AP does it, the mode does it or the pilot does it. Nobody is not acceptable.

[FullWings]

I have said it before with AP on or off pilot's scan remains same only difference is with AP on, the AP makes changes and in manual pilot makes changes.
I’m not too sure the scans are the same, as with AP in the aircraft is being controlled through the MCP/FMC, which necessarily takes attention away from instrument monitoring. Most SOPs are when the PF is hand-flying, the PM will look after all the selections so the PF can concentrate on the instruments?

With or without AP It's the loss of scan that causes the problem. Mode or no mode, right or wrong mode, you simply cannot make an approch without a periodic glance at the speed.
Agree with that.

Maybe there’s a third type of confusion: unconscious, where you don’t even know you don’t know what you’re doing? (Going Rumsfeldian here...)

[Uplinker]

+1 vilas. The pilot must maintain their scan of basic parameters even with the autos in.

Like when driving a car, where one should check the rearview mirrors every 10 seconds or so; pilots should regularly glance at the instruments. Even on auto at FL410 at 30W with nobody else in the sky, one should glance at the PFD and ED regularly - looking at pitch, roll, speed and V/S, and the engine parameters.

The problem of pilots unable to hand fly seems much worse than I imagined. The F/O who trembled when given control for 20 secs in the descent, the F/O who was scared to fly into IMC - they should not have been in the cockpit in the first place - how the hell were they allowed in there? How did they pas their captain's incapacitation detail and raw data hand flown approaches in the SIM?

PilotLZ
Tightening the regulatory requirements for manual flying proficiency sounds tempting right until you realise that it can also backfire. For example, if you require a pilot to perform a raw-data approach every X days, how can you be certain that, during a period of low flying activity, his/her only flight won't be in conditions where flying raw-data is not appropriate? Hence, I don't think that hard-and-fast rules are the best way forward.

You don't specify every x days, you require x approaches within every 6 month period, exactly like we did with practise autolands.

That way, on the very busy approach, on the bad weather day, on the long tiring multi sector day, you don't do it. But on the nice day when things are quiet-ish and both crew are feeling fine, then go for it. As pilots see that the Chief pilot is encouraging them to practise hand-flying, personal confidence will build; flying skills won't go so rusty and the fleet will improve its competence.

Only a tiny minority of pilots will regularly voluntarily practise their raw data flying - it's human nature. There has to be some sort of mandate from the CP to push us all into doing this.
.

[Check Airman]

+1 vilas. The pilot must maintain their scan of basic parameters even with the autos in.

I agree with vilas in theory. AP on or off, your scan shouldn't change.

Now let's take a step into reality. It does. I'll admit that I've flown approaches where I didn't know what my speed or N1 was, because the AT was on. Now imagine I'm the sort of person who never turns off the AT- it won't take much to overload me on the day that it fails.

I wonder how some of us ever got through an instrument rating checkride in a piston single where the only automation was a mode C transponder.

[KayPam]

Vessbot, how do you recognise the need to disconnect ?
Are you able to describe the process which you use, which will always apply in every situation. If this starts with understanding the situation, then how do you understand.
To you it might be obvious, to others no so depending on the situation, experience, training - even of this can be trained at all.

The criteria are very clear.
Aircraft trajectory deviated, deviating, or even about to deviate from the prescribed and safe track. The deviate, deviating or about to deviate depends on the pilot's capacity to detect the problem as soon as possible.
(For very minor deviations, the automation could be kept on. I heard of a case where the AP descended below the minimum altitude, but it was 2450ft instead of 2500ft. In clear blue sky it could be discussed that it is more interesting to observe the aircraft as long as it is doing something safe (once again : VMC) and be able to describe the problem in more details to the manufacturer, so that the system can be improved in the future)

One could even say that if there is even a mere potentiality that the system might misbehave : automation mode can be changed or even disconnected (if it is deemed safer to manually control the aircraft than to risk the aircraft doing something unexpected)

Some well know criteria are : descend below safety altitude, deviation of more than half a dot on loc or glide, or half deviation of the vor scale, 0.5nm for a dme arc, etc..
Other well know criteria are speed below Vls (airbus world) or alpha above alpha prot, there is no well-known figure for beta (sideslip), I think because the figure would be 0. Since aircraft are yaw-stable, any deviation is caused by a large external force (engine failure, aerodynamical problem..) which require immediate correction.
You could also put a limit at 33° of bank and debate of a figure for negative Vs. Some say "one minute before touchdown at all times"

The process that is used and trained is to monitor the aircraft. Speed, pitch, power, bank, altitude, radionavigation, all these are monitored constantly. The whole point of training is to know what to expect, how to achieve it, in a light aircraft. In a large aircraft it is exactly the same except it is more often achieved by the flight guidance system on the pilot's orders rather than manual inputs.
Vessbot,

That’s a couple of very cogent posts, dense with some really good observations.

For me, having had a fairly long career in aviation but coming from an engineering/science background, one of the (many) issues that gets me is the user interface that a modern commercial transport presents to its operator. In a word: suboptimal. They are an unholy mix of a century’s worth of ideas and technology, keeping the bad as well as the good for some kind of continuity. IMO many EFIS+FMC presentations are actually worse for SA in some areas than an equivalent steam-driven setup: un-annunciated hidden modes, weird logic and a plethora of known but too-expensive-to-fix bugs in prehistoric firmware/hardware.

Suboptimal : yes.
One very interesting aspect is flight at high altitude.
Yes, people are not supposed to be flying manually at high altitude. But many accidents have happened there. So pilots should still have an optimized interface.
Suppose your aircraft is on its way to cruise flight level 380. At flight level 372, AP disconnects. What are you going to do ? Suppose the best course of action at this time is to stabilize, first, at FL380.
Say you climb at 800ft/min, speed is about 450kt. You just have to push the nose and stabilize the aircraft. The pitch change required is about 1 degree.
But which instrument do you have to control this ?
https://lh3.googleusercontent.com/proxy/lxq06QM_j2Y5rlzLJubBgQSzovdK86X89Dtu5EfEdy2lSGQ8DtHnOpyyqbFZ XDg3AR-2eRc-VAjFUAe530Dzx6K4Hkrabg
From what I read, the center square on the PFD is about 1.6° large, and each pixels is about 0.2mm large
Between +10° and -10°, there are 4cm. That is 2mm per degree. And the center square is about 10x10 pixels. So the pitch change required to go from climb to cruise, or cruise to climb is about half the size of the center square and 1mm. Now look at a ruler with millimiter markings and ask yourself if it's easy to differentiate them.

It leads to something like this :
In climb, the top of the bottom segment of the center square is aligned with the top of the 2.5° line.
To go from climb to cruise, you have to put the bottom of the top segment and align it with the top of the 2.5° line.
This is a variation of about 0.8° so a realistic value for a heavy day.
It is absurd to think a normal human being can easily control something so tiny.

If Airbus really wanted to make possible manual flight at a high altitude (for cases of automation failure) they should implement a button that could be used only at high altitude which would switch the aircraft in "high precision mode".
- The PFD would be magnified at least 4 times. There is no point in seeing +/-20° in cruise as is the case on the above picture.
- The flight controls would also have a reduced efficacy (not sure about this one though, just a possibility, in my opinion the sidestick is too small even for low altitude flight so...).

There is the same kind of problem on the thrust levers.
When you want to begin taxi and apply breakaway thrust, let's say 30%, there are a few centimeters of dead area. So the thrust lever course, which was not very long to begin with, is even more reduced by this. On final approach, a variation of just 1% corresponds to almost 100ft/min.
I did not measure the distance to be traveled to change the thrust by just one percent... But my guess is it is about half a millimeter.

I don't get it. The aircraft is huge, there is plenty of space in the cockpit, but you have to move the thrust levers and the PFD target by distances similar to that of an ant's arse !

It seems that I completely agree with you overall.
The idea of giving airline pilots a few hours every now-and-then in a light aircraft to get the old scan and handling ability up again often comes around and is generally pooh-poohed as being impractical, expensive,
Which is exactly what I'm doing, at my own cost obviously. And if it is indeed pleasure, it surely helps.
At one point during the covid crisis I wasn't flying much on the airbus. To get myself going again, I booked a flight on a small aircraft. I did 15 short circuits followed by landings. All were full flaps and idle power. This gives a descent rate that is close to what you get on the A320, so it was good practise, my landings were definetely better that without this.

[vilas]

I’m not too sure the scans are the same, as with AP in the aircraft is being controlled through the MCP/FMC, which necessarily takes attention away from instrument monitoring. Most SOPs are when the PF is hand-flying, the PM will look after all the selections so the PF can concentrate on the instruments?
Every approach has a speed, flight path and ROD. When PF is hand flying how will he ensure this without scanning? On approch in Airbus the ATHR has to be in speed mode with hand on thrust levers. What's confusing about it? Yes it's possible to be distracted but not till 25/31kts below Vapp. And what happened to stabilized approach idea? This wasn't a check of 250hrs CPL. What happened to tactile feed back of Boeing throttles? They were stuck at idle throughout. In these two cases aircraft had no problems. In London B777 case the aircraft had a problem of fuel system ice crystal contamination case but the crew noticed everything, the throttles stuck, thrust not sufficient they even pushed them but were not in position to do anything. Scanning is essential.

[safetypee]

Vessbot, do find time to read the previous links in https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10937097

If they are too scientific then see the following :-

https://www.dropbox.com/s/c5otpsl20awxr35/Critical%20Thinking%20I.pdf?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/7f9h8qh8yhh9eh7/Gaining%20and%20Maintaining%20Situation%20Awareness%20II.pdf ?dl=0

https://www.dropbox.com/s/sk5agfbjbut9n8p/Making%20Better%20Decisions%20III.pdf?dl=0

P.S. re 777 example - you blame the crew and create a workaround for a weak aircraft system (double button press), but might the event be something to do with the aircraft:- https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10932069

[Vessbot]

Again no! I have said it before with AP on or off pilot's scan remains same only difference is with AP on, the AP makes changes and in manual pilot makes changes. With or without AP It's the loss of scan that causes the problem. Mode or no mode, right or wrong mode, you simply cannot make an approch without a periodic glance at the speed. In the cases we are discussing the crew never even expressed a surprise or utter a word regarding falling speed because they never looked at the speed and worse not even the mode. They assumed a mode that wasn't there, they assumed a speed that wasn't being maintained. In both the cases even the go around was not because they noticed speed or the ROD but because they were not reaching the runway otherwise they would have executed a 3 or 4G Landing. In case of Indian airlines they lost their lives because they were nine seconds too late. The engines were spooling up. Somebody needs maintain the parameters either the AP does it, the mode does it or the pilot does it. Nobody is not acceptable.“No” to what exactly? You say a few things in the rest of your post, all of which are mostly right depending on interpretation, but I don’t see how it relates to mine, in any contradictory way.

Regarding “interpretation,” here’s what I mean. You say that you have to keep up a good scan regardless of AP on vs. off, and “you simply cannot make an approach without a periodic glance at the airspeed.” Taken in the factual sense, that is of course laughably wrong. People can and do that all the time as a baseline default, and accidents like these 2 reveal the tip of the iceberg. But of course you didn’t mean in the factual sense, but rather in the prescriptive sense, or what should be done.

However, as it relates to the cause of these accidents, it is the factual, not prescriptive sense, that is relevant. What do these pilots do, not what should they do. And what they did actually do, is clearly rely on the autothrottles to maintain the airspeed without their brain being in the loop. And had the modes been what the pilots thought they were, (as you say, “they assumed a mode that wasn’t there”) the autothrottles would have done exactly that.

So where do we disagree? What part of my posts, if you can be more specific, do you take issue with?

[vilas]

. If you know what's wrong, then you're not confused, you're the opposite: you accurately know the situation. Confusion is if you think the automation setup will result in something different than what it's actually resulting in.
I said no to this. In the two cases if they would have seen the speed falling they could still be confused as to why it's falling if they don't check the mode/FMA. But the falling speed would have drawn their attention to the mode or FMA which they would have corrected. Alternately had they checked the mode first, as they must in Airbus then they would have corrected it then and there knowing that it (OP DES) won't maintain the speed. In Airbus you are not to assume anything as happening unless you confirm the FMA. If FMA was correct and yet speed starts falling that can be confusing. But that wasn't the case here. They committed first error of not getting into correct mode and checking it on the FMA, then committed the second, confirmatory error as it were to not monitor the parameter, the speed to cause the disaster.

[Check Airman]

I said no to this. In the two cases if they would have seen the speed falling they could still be confused as to why it's falling if they don't check the mode/FMA. But the falling speed would have drawn their attention to the mode or FMA which they would have corrected. Alternately had they checked the mode first, as they must in Airbus then they would have corrected it then and there knowing that it (OP DES) won't maintain the speed. In Airbus you are not to assume anything as happening unless you confirm the FMA. If FMA was correct and yet speed starts falling that can be confusing. But that wasn't the case here. They committed first error of not getting into correct mode and checking it on the FMA, then committed the second, confirmatory error as it were to not monitor the parameter, the speed to cause the disaster.

and the third error- not disconnecting the automation early enough when it wasn’t doing what it needed to be doing.

[Vessbot]

I said no to this. In the two cases if they would have seen the speed falling they could still be confused as to why it's falling if they don't check the mode/FMA. But the falling speed would have drawn their attention to the mode or FMA which they would have corrected. Alternately had they checked the mode first, as they must in Airbus then they would have corrected it then and there knowing that it (OP DES) won't maintain the speed. In Airbus you are not to assume anything as happening unless you confirm the FMA. If FMA was correct and yet speed starts falling that can be confusing. But that wasn't the case here. They committed first error of not getting into correct mode and checking it on the FMA, then committed the second, confirmatory error as it were to not monitor the parameter, the speed to cause the disaster.

You make a post where again I agree with every sentence, and again I can’t find what part of it disagrees with my text that you quoted.

If they saw saw the speed falling they could still be confused as to why - yes, and I said this (“knowing something is wrong but not understanding exactly what or why”). The falling speed should have drawn their attention to the FMA, also yes (but among other things, like drawing their hand to the thrust levers). Had they fixed the mode, after checking it as required, AT would have been active - of course.

The next sentence may be a disagreement? Not sure. “If FMA was correct and yet speed starts falling that can be confusing. But that wasn't the case here.” Yes of course that would have been confusing (and not only that, but not only that, an actual malfunction). And yes that wasn’t the case here, and I hope you’re not hinging an argument that they weren’t confused by this event that didn’t happen, since there are myriad other possible confusion scenarios, one of them being the actual case.

And yeah the first error was getting in the wrong mode (compounded by lack of checking the FMA) and the second, not monitoring the airspeed. I’ll add a third, not monitoring the picture outside the window. How many thousands of hours does it take to learn what an approximate 3 degree descent over flat terrain looks like? I guess actually too many thousands, when you never use that as a source of SA due to putting all your chips in the automation. And also a 4th (Check Airman’s 3rd) and IMO the most significant of all, not flying the airplane when required. 17 seconds from “You are descending on idle open descend ha, all this time” (at 400 feet) until TOGA, in the meanwhile playing with modes and questioning each other on what switches had been flipped.

[vilas]

I’ll add a third, not monitoring the picture outside the window. How many thousands of hours does it take to learn what an approximate 3 degree descent over flat terrain looks like?
vessbot, we aren't much in disagreement. But about the above sentence, perhaps the only thing the crew(in both the cases) was doing was keeping the aircraft on the correct descent path without the necessary thrust, manual or auto immaterial. That's why the speed was dropping. And when Airbus crew at 400ft realised the wrong mode the only solution was to try another time. It was early days on Airbus but thought that the crew which had come from basic B737 200/300 should have had manual skills because in many places they were doing visual approaches. In Boeing case they didn't realise at all. Boeing also had been asked to do something about the throttle hold as it can be confusing.

[vilas]

Check airman
I'll admit that I've flown approaches where I didn't know what my speed or N1 was, because the AT was on.

NTSB Chairman on Asiana SFO
Hersman has repeatedly emphasized it is the pilot’s responsibility to monitor and maintain correct approach speed

[vilas]

Coming back to the original question "Why is automation dependency encouraged in modern aviation?" Because:
1. Aircraft behave(mostly) as designed in the US, China or anywhere in the world.
2. Humans operate the machines differently in different countries, cultures and ethnicities.
3. No matter how well a pilot is trained or is experienced he does not become immune to all the ills human flesh is heir to(human factors).
4. Automation can perform repetatively to a given standard. There is no variation due to skill. If it doesn't just replace it.
5. A few failures of automation is not enough evidence against automation just as one Sully or Al Haynes doesn't make a summer. There are any number of fully serviceable Aircraft crashed through inadequate piloting.
6. Accidents will happen in manual or automation but the frequency and economics of the accidents will be the deciding factor.
Industry is moving towards automation. AF447 triggered some training but eventually alternate/backup speed in A350 and synthetic speed in B787. Final solution always end up in automation.

Actually the question should have been how to acquire/retain manual skill. That's what all the discussion is about.

[sonicbum]

Coming back to the original question "Why is automation dependency encouraged in modern aviation?" Because:
1. Aircraft behave(mostly) as designed in the US, China or anywhere in the world.
2. Humans operate the machines differently in different countries, cultures and ethnicities.
3. No matter how well a pilot is trained or is experienced he does not become immune to all the ills human flesh is heir to(human factors).
4. Automation can perform repetatively to a given standard. There is no variation due to skill. If it doesn't just replace it.
5. A few failures of automation is not enough evidence against automation just as one Sully or Al Haynes doesn't make a summer. There are any number of fully serviceable Aircraft crashed through inadequate piloting.
6. Accidents will happen in manual or automation but the frequency and economics of the accidents will be the deciding factor.
Industry is moving towards automation. AF447 triggered some training but eventually alternate/backup speed in A350 and synthetic speed in B787. Final solution always end up in automation.

Actually the question should have been how to acquire/retain manual skill. That's what all the discussion is about.

Fully agree on all the points.

Regarding the last bit on how to acquire/retain manual skill I believe we all know the answer is : training, and more specifically SIM training. But SIM training is expensive and, aside from from the mandatory annual sessions, unproductive from an entrepreneurship point of view. How to get the message across that some extra non jeopardy yearly sim sessions focused on FPM are beneficial to everybody in the long term ? I believe this is another question we should be able to answer as a pilots/trainers community.

[Uplinker]

Kaypam, from what you say about control movements, don't worry, you will get used to it.

The control movements can seem weirdly small until you get used to it. For taxiing, take the brakes off and you will normally start to move. If not you advance the thrust levers say a quarter of the available arc and as soon as you see the start of movement, you put them back to idle. Now you will taxi.
If you ever need to make fine adjustments to thrust levers, "walk" them against each other; twist your hand left and right to move each lever at a time by a small amount.

Reducing the pitch if the AP drops out 800' below the level. Gentle pressure on a conventional control column, not a push or even a movement, just gentle pressure.

On Airbus FBW on my initial type rating NOBODY could tell me how to use the side-stick. Even though I asked my TRE and several others, neither they or anybody could tell me. I eventually taught myself after seeing a film of a pilot operating the joystick in a Tornado (military fast jet):

On Airbus FBW, the attitude will stay where it was until a further input is received. So in your level-off scenario push the side-stick forwards against the centring spring one very brief forward push of about 20% of the full travel and immediately let the side-stick return to central. So just a small nudge or jab or bump against the spring, lasting half a second and then centre. So the action is nudge-release in half the time it takes to say that phrase. This will lower the nose a small amount and the FBW will hold the aircraft at this new attitude. If it was not enough, nudge-release again. Same applies in roll. That is how to make very small fine adjustments to the attitude of an Airbus FBW.

Re instruments, I agree, indications are too small for a given deviation or are badly designed, and this is why raw data flying is such a challenge. I remember finding NDB tracking in a PA28 to be very difficult because the NDB needle was on one dial and the heading bug was on another, and there was no bug for the NDB track - you had to remember what it was. One had to continually compare the needle with the heading instrument, and parallax and misreading could occur. Also, you were flying an aircraft that never stayed where you put it, so you were busy hand flying and continually correcting the aircraft and tracking a non bugged NDB needle, it was quite common for the NDB to drift more than 5 degrees out. When I later flew the Dash 8, you could overlay the NDB needle, the NDB track bug and the compass rose all on one instrument and suddenly NDB tracking was a piece of piss ! Instead of having to remember the NDB track and look at a different instrument to read what the heading was and then go back to the NDB instrument, all you had to do was glance at the one composite overlay. You did not even have to read any values, you could see at a glance if the NDB needle was under the track bug, and if it was just one degree out one side, you clicked the AP heading bug towards it by one degree. Really easy.

I have always found LOC and G/S displays to be too limited. By the time you can see a deviation, it is quite a large error. With my engineer's hat on, I would redesign the display so the markers were in two halves. One half would move as they currently do, the other half would move over its whole range of the display for say 1/4 of a degree LOC or 50' G/S - much more sensitive and a large movement for a small deviation - so you would be able to see a deviation before it became too big. The other half would display as it does now. A lot of the time the sensitive marker would be pegged on one extreme or the other, but when you had captured the LOC and G/S they would come off the stops, and a perfect ILS would see all the bugs centred.

(I should qualify that I am referring to the ILS markers on the PFD, not the navigation ILS beam bar display)

[KayPam]

5. A few failures of automation is not enough evidence against automation just as one Sully or Al Haynes doesn't make a summer. There are any number of fully serviceable Aircraft crashed through inadequate piloting.
I worked at airbus incident analysis and little system malfunction were commonplace.
Aircraft descending below minimum descent altitude, initiating the first sid turn on the wrong side, unable to switch to land then flare mode, etc...

Actually the question should have been how to acquire/retain manual skill. That's what all the discussion is about.
Disagree on that point.
Airbus could very well design a cockpit full of automation but that would still leave a possibility to fly raw data.
This is impossible, so the slow erosion of manual skills is almost unavoidable, even if we would all be well aware of the problem and willing to practise raw data flying, in most cases (RNAV) we just can't, due to a design choice.
Regarding the last bit on how to acquire/retain manual skill I believe we all know the answer is : training, and more specifically SIM training. But SIM training is expensive and, a
It is almost impossible. A correct amount of sim training would be one session per month. So multiply by about 5 or 6 the required sim capacity. Take that hangar that your airline uses to stuff a few sims into, and imagine building 5 others, recruiting tens of TRIs, etc.. Impossible.
Plus, a sim remains a sim. Since it represents the aircraft, you still can't fly raw data RNAVs in it. Since it does not match perfectly the aircraft, the training is not as realistic.

Flying raw data manual departures and approaches on a regular basis on the line, to me, is the only option to maintain a high standard of manual skill.
...
Re instruments, I agree, indications are too small for a given deviation or are badly designed, and this is why raw data flying is such a challenge. I remember finding NDB tracking in a PA28 to be very difficult because the NDB needle was on one dial and the heading bug was on another, and there was no bug for the NDB track - you had to remember what it was. One had to continually compare the needle with the heading instrument, and parallax and misreading could occur. Also, you were flying an aircraft that never stayed where you put it, so you were busy hand flying and continually correcting the aircraft and tracking a non bugged NDB needle, it was quite common for the NDB to drift more than 5 degrees out. When I later flew the Dash 8, you could overlay the NDB needle, the NDB track bug and the compass rose all on one instrument and suddenly NDB tracking was a piece of piss ! Instead of having to remember the NDB track and look at a different instrument to read what the heading was and then go back to the NDB instrument, all you had to do was glance at the one composite overlay. You did not even have to read any values, you could see at a glance if the NDB needle was under the track bug, and if it was just one degree out one side, you clicked the AP heading bug towards it by one degree. Really easy.

I have always found LOC and G/S displays to be too limited. By the time you can see a deviation, it is quite a large error. With my engineer's hat on, I would redesign the display so the markers were in two halves. One half would move as they currently do, the other half would move over its whole range of the display for say 1/4 of a degree LOC or 50' G/S - much more sensitive and a large movement for a small deviation - so you would be able to see a deviation before it became too big. The other half would display as it does now. A lot of the time the sensitive marker would be pegged on one extreme or the other, but when you had captured the LOC and G/S they would come off the stops, and a perfect ILS would see all the bugs centred.

Yes ! You explain very well how a simple design choice leads to an easier flying.
Two other examples :
When flying an DME arc with an old DME like this one :
https://s7d2.scene7.com/is/image/honeywell/BK-p-KDI574-detail-470x290
You have the DME distance, but also the very precise and precious indication of DME speed !
So to fly a DME during flight school, on an aircraft equipped with a DME, I used the TAS/200 to initiate the turn towards the DME, and then I did not worry about the wind, the angles, the calculations, all this, I just kept the DME speed around zero.
Let's say after the initial interception I was 0.1nm away. I would set 10kt convergence until it displayed the correct DME distance, at which time I set the DME speed to zero by diverging a little.
Then, the DME speed increased slowly, and when it reached a limit that I chose like 5kt, I converged until I read 5kt on the other side. At some point after several corrections like this one, the DME distance which was stuck on the correct DME distance could deviate by 0.1nm. I corrected this and continued.
This allowed me to make almost perfect DME arcs, remaining always within +/-0.1nm. And I would have been always within 0.05nm if I had an indication of the distance of that precision.
Whereas even the best other students struggled to remain within +/-0.3nm.
I could very well see when they would deviate, thanks to the DME speed. A DME speed deviation of about 30kt outwards would appear. At 0.1nm they would reduce the DME speed to 20kt. But by the time they reached 0.2nm deviation, their DME speed is now 25kt outwards.. They apply a larger correction and now have 10kt DME speed outwards, increasing. They reach 0.3nm deviation at 15kt outwards. They apply the same large correction and they are now at 0kt outwards, but increasing outwards. They can reach 0.4nm at 5kt outwards, and only then with another correction they can finally converge ! Now the risk is huge to overcorrect.

When I gave them the technique they aced the DME arcs, problems like above described never happened anymore and instructors were amazed.

Then, we changed airplanes, and I could no longer use this technique. Because DME speed was not given anymore !
So I had to find another technique. Add 90° to the bearing and that is my desired route.
Also works very well. I did an almost complete DME circle in a glider like this, around my home gliding airfield, with just my GPS watch.

A computer can analyse in real time the deviation, the derivative of the deviation, and it's derivative's derivative !
A human cannot derive a derivative from a needle, at least not as well as a computer.

Regarding the ILS, I practise them raw data on the airbus.
The difficulty is that the green diamond should give an indication of the LOC's derivative : right of course, deviate to the right, and so on.
But since there is a few degrees imprecision on the diamond, especially after a long flight, this does not work. The computer can compute the LOC's derivative, but I have no indication of it. So a deviation trend must start before I can detect it, and this still does not give me the heading at wich the derivative is zero.

Instead of your double indicator, I would rather think of a very sensible "LOC trend" or "glide trend", as is done with the speed trend, displayed on the side of the diamond.
Then you would just set the LOC trend to zero, and if there was a deviation, you could see much faster if it is growing or reducing, which would also help the PM's job.

[Uplinker]

Yes, a trend arrow might work really well. I like that idea.

Another thought is that the V/S indication has a logarithmic presentation, (or expanded centre scale), but the ILS is linear.

If we made the ILS markers logarithmic/expanded centre scale, it would be easier to notice deviation trends. So half the marker travel from centre could be, say 0.25° LOC deviation. The next 1/4 of scale would go up to say 1° LOC dev, the last quarter up to 2.5° dev.

But I think your idea is better.:ok:

[FlyingStone]

If we made the ILS markers logarithmic/expanded centre scale, it would be easier to notice deviation trends. So half the marker travel from centre could be, say 0.25° LOC deviation. The next 1/4 of scale would go up to say 1.5° LOC dev, the last quarter up to 2.5° dev.

Boeing aircraft have had expanded LOC scale on EADI/PFD for decades, I believe from the start of the EFIS with the 767.

[vilas]

Instead of your double indicator, I would rather think of a very sensible "LOC trend" or "glide trend", as is done with the speed trend, displayed on the side of the diamond.
Then you would just set the LOC trend to zero, and if there was a deviation, you could see much faster if it is growing or reducing, which would also help the PM's job. This is what the FD does. A raw data is raw data. You are suggesting a emergency or limited function FD. The technology may provide you an emergency FD using different inputs. As it is A350 gives you AP even with double engine flameout. It does auto TCAS, auto TCAP(TCAS prevention), auto EMER DES. They aren't going to develop anything to help you fly raw data. They will develop emergency AP. You don't need to practice everything raw. How many times FD are lost during RNAV departure and you have no alternative? A direct to or radar vector is always possible. As long as you can climb, descent execute an approach raw data within acceptable accuracy it is good enough.

[Judd]

If you ever need to make fine adjustments to thrust levers, "walk" them against each other; twist your hand left and right to move each lever at a time by a small amount.

Fascinating. "Walking the throttles" was a DC3 technique used if the the throttle friction nut was poorly maintained making the throttles stiff to operate causing a jerky operation. I have seen pilots who unconsciously walk the thrust levers of a 737. It becomes a gimmicky habit. The result can be a slight but annoying change of noise or engine synchronisation. Old habits die hard. In a similar habit, some Boeing 727/737 pilots always give a quick burst of power a fraction before the flare in anticipation of a runway level windshear. All that does is to extend the landing run and becomes a reflex movement at every landing.

[vilas]

​"Walking the throttles" ​​​​​​ not required in airbus, just look at the gauge and move the doughnuts to the requirement thrust will catch-up.

[safetypee]

vilas, interesting points, #114.
The revised question is challenging. It could be divided further; what standard of training is required to fly (operate) an aircraft in normal circumstances, and then in abnormal situations which generally involve manual flight, but not always in a normal aircraft.

This thread, like many others degrade to hardened extremes; fixed solutions without first reconsidering assumptions, alternatives - the essence of critical thinking. There may not be any one solution, only middle-ground compromise, small improvements in many areas; all requiring the skill of thinking.
Modern aviation suffers the worldly effects of modern education, instant access solutions, unverified web answers, even electronic training - yes no answers.
Pilots still need the skill of thinking, judgement of risk, managing uncertainty, all refreshed every flight. Yet we appear to be happy to let the autos do that (auto dependency), without realising that autos do not think.

KP, the latter part of your post #117 provides the answer to your original question. If you are unable to fly raw data without assistance - modified displays, then you are automation dependent, whether this is encouraged or not.

[Uplinker]

Hi vilas, and safetypee no not really; my suggestion of a logarithmic or expanded centre scale instrument - like the V/S - is simply a different presentation of raw data. It is not a FD - it will not tell you which way to point the aircraft, nor is it automation in the sense we are using it in this thread.
A machmeter for example does internal calculations and presents a reading, but we would not call a machmeter "automation". Our IAS readout arithmetically subtracts static pressure from pitot pressure but that is not what we mean here by "automation", it is still raw data.

In my example of a PA28, the instrumentation makes it a difficult job to track an NDB accurately and consistently. If all the information were superimposed onto one instrument, it becomes very easy. Still raw data, just presented better.

A flight director tells you which way to point the airplane to centre the raw data needles. With raw data alone you have to be able to work it out by yourself. The current ILS displays make it hard to notice initial deviations - especially if one is hand-flying as well. Kaypam suggests a trend arrow, which would require some computer processing, but even that is not a flight director. (Note: He is not suggesting the arrow points which way to roll to correct the deviation, it indicates the trend of the marker movement; the rate and direction of change of the marker and so makes the raw data easier for the pilot to see and assimilate).

The thrust levers - I am talking about a method to physically move thrust levers by small, precise amounts - in any aircraft - for example increasing N1 from 53% to 55%, or to 'null out' the speed trend arrow: just tiny increments. I think vilas is talking about matching the doughnuts to the present thrust setting before disconnecting the A/THR - a completely different subject.

[Vessbot]

vessbot, we aren't much in disagreement. But about the above sentence, perhaps the only thing the crew(in both the cases) was doing was keeping the aircraft on the correct descent path without the necessary thrust, manual or auto immaterial. That's why the speed was dropping.

Somewhat true for Asiana, who was within a fuselage length of pavement, but not even close for Indian, who was 2300 feet short (or 3300 from aimpoint, that’s over half a mile.) Dropping airspeed pays for some amount of flight path, but not necessarily all of it; Indian was low on both.

And when Airbus crew at 400ft realised the wrong mode the only solution was to try another time.
Fully agreed, a go around was the only sensible choice at that point. I meant “fly the plane” generically to include whatever the correct flight is, I didn’t mean it to press on (and I see how I could have come across that way, especially with previous examples)

[vilas]

I think vilas is talking about matching the doughnuts to the present thrust setting before disconnecting the A/THR - a completely different subject. No! Not at all. Airbus thrust levers have no friction, no back pressure. Whatever thrust you want just gently push both the levers to place the doughnuts there. That's all.

[FullWings]

Kaypam, from what you say about control movements, don't worry, you will get used to it.

The control movements can seem weirdly small until you get used to it. For taxiing, take the brakes off and you will normally start to move. If not you advance the thrust levers say a quarter of the available arc and as soon as you see the start of movement, you put them back to idle. Now you will taxi.
If you ever need to make fine adjustments to thrust levers, "walk" them against each other; twist your hand left and right to move each lever at a time by a small amount.

Reducing the pitch if the AP drops out 800' below the level. Gentle pressure on a conventional control column, not a push or even a movement, just gentle pressure.

On Airbus FBW on my initial type rating NOBODY could tell me how to use the side-stick. Even though I asked my TRE and several others, neither they or anybody could tell me. I eventually taught myself after seeing a film of a pilot operating the joystick in a Tornado (military fast jet):

On Airbus FBW, the attitude will stay where it was until a further input is received. So in your level-off scenario push the side-stick forwards against the centring spring one very brief forward push of about 20% of the full travel and immediately let the side-stick return to central. So just a small nudge or jab or bump against the spring, lasting half a second and then centre. So the action is nudge-release in half the time it takes to say that phrase. This will lower the nose a small amount and the FBW will hold the aircraft at this new attitude. If it was not enough, nudge-release again. Same applies in roll. That is how to make very small fine adjustments to the attitude of an Airbus FBW.

Re instruments, I agree, indications are too small for a given deviation or are badly designed, and this is why raw data flying is such a challenge. I remember finding NDB tracking in a PA28 to be very difficult because the NDB needle was on one dial and the heading bug was on another, and there was no bug for the NDB track - you had to remember what it was. One had to continually compare the needle with the heading instrument, and parallax and misreading could occur. Also, you were flying an aircraft that never stayed where you put it, so you were busy hand flying and continually correcting the aircraft and tracking a non bugged NDB needle, it was quite common for the NDB to drift more than 5 degrees out. When I later flew the Dash 8, you could overlay the NDB needle, the NDB track bug and the compass rose all on one instrument and suddenly NDB tracking was a piece of piss ! Instead of having to remember the NDB track and look at a different instrument to read what the heading was and then go back to the NDB instrument, all you had to do was glance at the one composite overlay. You did not even have to read any values, you could see at a glance if the NDB needle was under the track bug, and if it was just one degree out one side, you clicked the AP heading bug towards it by one degree. Really easy.

I have always found LOC and G/S displays to be too limited. By the time you can see a deviation, it is quite a large error. With my engineer's hat on, I would redesign the display so the markers were in two halves. One half would move as they currently do, the other half would move over its whole range of the display for say 1/4 of a degree LOC or 50' G/S - much more sensitive and a large movement for a small deviation - so you would be able to see a deviation before it became too big. The other half would display as it does now. A lot of the time the sensitive marker would be pegged on one extreme or the other, but when you had captured the LOC and G/S they would come off the stops, and a perfect ILS would see all the bugs centred.
And there I rest my case about User Interfaces (no insult to the author!)

It just seems to be the last thing on the minds of those who design this stuff that it might be used by humans. Flying is easy - it’s all the essential workarounds of other peoples’ bad ideas that are the problem...

[Vessbot]

not required in airbus, just look at the gauge and move the doughnuts to the requirement thrust will catch-up.

This doesn’t solve the problem that walking the throttles solves. The problem is of a physical nature, when you want to make a very small and precise movement but can’t due to a rough friction nut or what have you. The solution is to change the lever arm from originating at your shoulder, (a few feet) to originating at the non-moving throttle, which acts as an anchor. The much shorter lever arm allows for the precise input needed. (Just think, can you better manipulate a light switch with a yardstick, or your finger directly?) Make a tiny movement, then the moved throttle becomes the anchor for you to move the previously fixed one, repeat.

I do this all the time in a modern FADEC jet even with smooth throttle friction in cruise, to adjust the N1 by a few tenths of a %. And I think sometimes in taxi, to increase the thrust in very small amounts above my initial “yay much” if the plane isn’t moving enough.

[Vessbot]

No! Not at all. Airbus thrust levers have no friction, no back pressure. Whatever thrust you want just gently push both the levers to place the doughnuts there. That's all.

To an accuracy of 0.1%? It seems to me that airbus throttles, that are known to have a shorter travel arc (therefore more output change per movement distance) than most planes, would be even tougher to control these small amounts. (lack of necessity due to AT aside)

[Check Airman]

Check airman


NTSB Chairman on Asiana SFO

I know that it wasn’t my brightest moment. I was just pointing out how easy it is to slip into complacency, and the dangers that arise. What if the BA 777 crew had been complacent that morning going into LHR?

[vilas]

To an accuracy of 0.1%? It seems to me that airbus throttles, that are known to have a shorter travel arc (therefore more output change per movement distance) than most planes, would be even tougher to control these small amounts. (lack of necessity due to AT aside)
Yes! It's miniaturisation. But not an issue when done consciously. We all get used to it. May be it was easier for me because I came to A320 from B747 classic where everything was huge and four of them which were rarely aligned. But I flew other twins A300 and A310 never did walking. It helps when there is friction which could be unequal.

[Uplinker]

Apologies, vilas for my incorrect assumption.

However, All thrust levers have some friction, (otherwise they wouldn't stay where you put them!), and walking the thrust levers is a very useful technique for small adjustments - especially on Airbus FBW, where as has been noted, the lever travel and the levers are relatively short.


Like Vessbot, I use this technique to adjust taxi thrust and flying thrust if I want to make small changes, (and have done so on turbo-props and the BAe146 for example as well as Airbus). To adjust thrust from, say, 53% to 55% N1, I can easily over shoot if I do it 'freehand' , but if I walk the levers up I can get my target thrust very precisely.
Note: when I say walk, I am taking steps of a few millimetres at a time, no more.

[Check Airman]

The walking thing seems to be very much a leftover technique. It seemed to be more of a way to avoid inadvertent large power changes.

[vilas]

Since Airbus thrust levers do not move in auto mode there's no spring, any mechanism or cables that can cause any undue friction. They slide evenly when pushed and stay where left. And since it is FBW their position just signals the required thrust and their rate of movement selects an acceleration schedule. If you slam them it selects the fastest schedule. The problem is if coming from other aircraft you are used to large movements. It can happen even with the stick but since the arm is rested only the wrist comes in play. That's Why Airbus insists on proper adjustment of the active arm rest. Compared to yoke movements the stick moves an inch or so. Again takes getting used to.

[tubby linton]

The only time I have seen a problem with athr on the bus is when I used to fly an A320 with different mod engines. The problem was with a cfm-56 dac engine that accelerated much slower than the standard cfm. You really had to wait until they were both at 50% before advancing any further on the take off roll if you wanted to stay on the runway.

[Vessbot]

Vessbot, do find time to read the previous links in https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10937097


OK, I’ve read them both now. They’re very general, and I can’t immediately find a point that slots into this thread’s discussion. But if you’ve gleaned such a thing, I suppose I’m ready to talk about it now.

Except one sentence, that jumped out in a huge way: “Under stress, decision makers fall back on their most familiar responses, which may not be appropriate to the current situation.”

P.S. re 777 example - you blame the crew and create a workaround for a weak aircraft system (double button press), but might the event be something to do with the aircraft:- https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10932069

I’m not saying anything about this event - I have no clue what happened and blame no one. I’m only referring to the double-push technique, that came up in the off-shoot discussion, as an example of a common and immediately understood sequence (even with a catchy name) where I think it’s OK to use the automation solution. (To be clear I’ve never flown a Boeing, I’m just going off of that thread’s posts.) It’s a counterexample to my more general point where if you don’t immediately recognize the sequence and solution, it’s necessary to fly the plane, like all the other accidents we’ve been talking about.

[KayPam]

This is what the FD does. A raw data is raw data. You are suggesting a emergency or limited function FD. The technology may provide you an emergency FD using different inputs. As it is A350 gives you AP even with double engine flameout. It does auto TCAS, auto TCAP(TCAS prevention), auto EMER DES. They aren't going to develop anything to help you fly raw data. They will develop emergency AP. You don't need to practice everything raw. How many times FD are lost during RNAV departure and you have no alternative? A direct to or radar vector is always possible. As long as you can climb, descent execute an approach raw data within acceptable accuracy it is good enough.
Yes, the FD does that (or rather, uses that), and actually much more. It also uses a notion of distance to the runway to modify its own sensibility. It uses a computed geographical position and real time turning radius capacity to anticipate the LOC interception.. There are many features embedded in the airbus flight guidance system.
Are you suggesting that DME speed (if you recall my speech about DME arcs using the old system vs the new system) on old bendix king DME receivers is not raw data ?

I am not suggesting a limited function FD at all.
I am suggesting that the aircraft stops hiding useful data that it has, such as LOC trend, crosstrack deviation for RNAV departures and approaches..

It is not about mitigating the consequences of FD failure, you lost the global objective of this topic.
Mitigating the consequences of FD failure would just be a "collateral benefit".
The whole point of the discussion is to allow pilots to fly more comfortably raw data (by presenting useful information), or to merely allow them to do so (by presenting required information)

If pilots have the possibility to fly raw data, they will do it more than if they have no possibility of doing it. Sorry for saying this sentence, which was completely obvious, even tautological.
The whole point of this is to encourage raw data flying, not because it is better, more precise than automatic flying, on the contrary. But because it develops the basic skill that we need to do our job.

All of this is about ergonomics.
You could imagine a PFD displaying the entire possible range of angles of pitch (from -90° to +90°) and two or three times smaller than it is now.
Would that make controlling the pitch easier ?
You surely agree that it would make no sense to do such a modification, because it would make the flying very impractical ?
So why stop at not deteriorating the ergonomics ? The logical thing to do is to improve the ergonomics, each time that it's possible.


Fascinating. "Walking the throttles" was a DC3 technique used if the the throttle friction nut was poorly maintained making the throttles stiff to operate causing a jerky operation. I have seen pilots who unconsciously walk the thrust levers of a 737. It becomes a gimmicky habit. The result can be a slight but annoying change of noise or engine synchronisation. Old habits die hard. ...
I learnt very soon that this technique is very useful for fine adjustments.
As I said, because the useful distance traveled by the thrust levers is very very limited.
not required in airbus, just look at the gauge and move the doughnuts to the requirement thrust will catch-up.
Are you reading the conversation ? If you want to correct the thrust for 800fpm to 700fpm, you have to move the thrust levers by a distance as short as an ant's bottom.
It sounds like you're working for Airbus. "The aircraft is perfect as is."

[Vessbot]

Not related to anything to do in an airliner, but the discussion on potential examples of what I’ll call “expanded raw data,” especially the logarithmic localizer, reminded me of a very elegant solution to a problem, that I encountered in cropdusting school. In modern times, you’re guided down the swath by a GPS lightbar, which works the same as a localizer: you’ve got the center mark, and a light (horizontal column)that moves left or right, showing which way the swath is relative to you. And, it’s logarithmic! On the swath, one mark of deviation (it’s a row of LED’s) is something like a lateral foot, while if you’re significantly off (including 90 degrees away on the turnaround prior to going down for the swath) you still get a meaningful indication. (If it was 1 light per foot all the way, it would be begged if you’re anything but near-perfect already)

So, that’s beautiful guidance when you’re on the swath and not following a row crop, but how do you provide guidance in the turn-on? With what I’ve described so far, it’s still impossible to estimate your closure rate with the centerline, and you’d have to join it long prior to entering the field. Maybe 10, 20, 30 seconds to adjust? Who knows. This would be highly uneconomical when repeated hundreds or thousands of times, and could not match the historical solution of a guy with a flag that you visually roll in on.

Enter the second row of lights, under the first one. It shows the derivative of your lateral position, or the cross-track rate. It’s also logarithmic, and it’s calibrated so that on the ideal turn-on, the top bar (localizer) and bottom bar (cross rate) shrink together! So, you watch the ends, and play the bottom vs. top. If the bottom bar lags (is longer than) the top, your cross rate is too large for where you are along the turn, so you’re gonna blow past, so you increase (or slow the decrease of) your bank a bit. In the opposite situation, if you’re set to roll out too soon, the cross rate is too small (bottom bar shorter than the top) so you unbank a bit more to get your profile closer to the centerline. Of course, while flying it, you don’t think about the if-this-then-that like I just described, you just watch the end of the bottom bar and adjust your bank so as to manipulate it in the direction you want, using the end of the top bar as the reference.

I only went to school for this for a few weeks and never got a job, but to this day I’m tickled by the elegance of this setup, and how with some practice, it delivers you perfectly centered down the swath and going straight the instant you roll out.

(Of course this can all be done with a much simpler flight director, but there’s the obvious problem of looking intently at the instrument panel as you’re making sure you don’t hit the ground or the wires as you’re pulling out of a rolling dive a few feet AGL.. While this setup is on top of the nose, far away from you, not just in your field of view but also in focus, while you’re looking at the ground and obstacles.

Having said this, they could also design the bottom bar to just show a FD roll command, the goal being to keep it centered all the time. For all I know, this might even exist. Pretty sure the the regulations in that field pose a smaller obstacle to tech progress than those in the transport sector, combined with the lifecycle times of airliner development)

[blind pew]

https://www.flyingthings.org/flying-articles/bdam3vhmouk9ka89sgvqg9otljtgru

Mike Riley touches on the subject in this article in his blog on solo flying..

[pineteam]

Are you reading the conversation ? If you want to correct the thrust for 800fpm to 700fpm, you have to move the thrust levers by a distance as short as an ant's bottom."

On A320 during raw data approach approach you adjust the vertical speed with the pitch and the speed with the thrust levers.
I agree on the walking the levers technique . I do it all the time during approach for fine tuning. Quite difficult otherwise.

[Vessbot]

On A320 during raw data approach approach you adjust the vertical speed with the pitch and the speed with the thrust levers.

So just to make sure I haven’t lost the plot, if you change vertical speed you have to also change thrust right? :O

[pineteam]

Haha yes of course! But we first change the pitch to adjust the vertical speed then adjust the thrust as required to maintain the speed. We don’t adjust thrust to achieve a targeted vertical speed. Increasing or decreasing thrust on A320 will not affect or barely the vertical speed directly as it’s pitch stable.

[vilas]

Are you reading the conversation ? If you want to correct the thrust for 800fpm to 700fpm, you have to move the thrust levers by a distance as short as an ant's bottom.
It sounds like you're working for Airbus. "The aircraft is perfect as is."
KP as an AB pilot you off course know, informed as you are, that airbus is flight path stable and normal thrust and speed changes do not change the flight path. So you reduce the VS with pitch then keep the speed with ants bottom increase in thrust. How you measure the ants bottom is your call, walk, run, crawl or stand on your head if it suits you. It's not important otherwise FCTM would recommend it.
And no! I don't work for Airbus but since life is not a la carte in real life knowing what your machine does and doesn't and adjusting skills accordingly make your teeth last longer. There are two aspects to discussions, one share knowledge, individual techniques and experiences, the second is idle lament. When the industry is moving towards automated flights with least human presence I think better raw data flying tools is the last thing on their mind. There are more import things required but it's not on cards. B Max needed immediate fix they didn't do it till two crashes. B777 SFO FAA asked them to have look at the throttle hold function they aren't planning to do anything. They also have two different GA procedures one normal and another after touchdown (Emirates Dubai crash) they haven't any plans to change(personally I don't blame Boeing but hold pilots responsible for them). So wake me up when they design better raw data instrument.

[KayPam]

The fact that I omitted the pitch part does not change the length by which you have to move the thrust levers, which is my point : it is too short.
There are two aspects to discussions, one share knowledge, individual techniques and experiences, the second is idle lament. When the industry is moving towards automated flights with least human presence I think better raw data flying tools is the last thing on their mind. There are more import things required but it's not on cards. B Max needed immediate fix they didn't do it till two crashes. B777 SFO FAA asked them to have look at the throttle hold function they aren't planning to do anything. They also have two different GA procedures one normal and another after touchdown (Emirates Dubai crash) they haven't any plans to change(personally I don't blame Boeing but hold pilots responsible for them). So wake me up when they design better raw data instrument.
It can be lament, but if you start sending it to the engineers that work across the telephone or email, it becomes customer feedback.

The point of this discussion is to debate the topic and try to find out if it could be beneficial to change a few things here and there.
If you base your answers on the fact that airbus would probably say no to any modification, even if it was asked by several airlines all agreeing on one subject, then yes the discussion becomes useless.
But if you try to ignore this (plausible) possibility, you can have a very interesting discussion like we're all having since the start of this topic.

The customer feedback is to point out the discrepancy between two discourses : there are more and more crashes related to lack of manual flying skill, or reluctance to try and put them into practise, or lack of skill in monitoring the correct behavior of the automation controling the most basic aircraft trajectory... All these could be tackled with higher practise of manual flying, but the aircraft are designed to keep the pilot more and more out of the loop.
As long as automation will sometimes fail, and as long as pilots are needed, this seems counterproductive.

It is also not lament if you propose potential solutions.
For the above mentionned problem, I would suggest adding a thrust figure on the PFD, much closer to the pilot's usual visual circuit. One N1 figure per engine, or one average figure for both engines with abnormal colors to indicate a thrust asymmetry that should be corrected by looking at the EWD.

[Uplinker]

I am adding the phrase "ants bottom" to my lexicon of words meaning small distances. Brilliant ! :ok: :D - (the other of course being "a gnats cock").

[Vessbot]

Haha yes of course! But we first change the pitch to adjust the vertical speed then adjust the thrust as required to maintain the speed.

Yeah, I was just being cheeky since KayPam made a comment about the thrust response as a function of VS change, to which you seemed to make a correction of sorts with a very basic statement. So we’re on the same page.

However, wouldn’t it be better technique to make the adjustment at the same time? Why wait until speed decays and then correct it? Why not maintain the correct speed to begin with?

—

To the general discussion about raw data enhancements, yeah there have been some suggestions that are interesting thought experiments (like a cross rate indicator tacked onto the localizer, or zoomed in artificial horizon, etc.) but would probably get laughed out of the design room. If it’s not based on something that existed on steam gauge instruments, it’s probably pie in the sky fantasy. It’s like a steampunk alternate history where EFIS was never invented and mechanical instrument design continued. Never gonna happen in even the wildest possibility of real reality.

But OTOH, there have been some glaring omissions that I consider a near criminal link in the feedback loop of cutting the pilot out of flying because it’s too difficult to fly. Like my plane the CRJ, there are no tick marks on the N1 gauge! I’m not even asking about 10ths, I would settle for quarters or anything to give me a rough at-a-glance reference. So I’ve resorted to using the “N1” label at the bottom left of the right gauge, as the only tick mark. So my initial settings are on it, just a bit under it, or needle pointing down at a 45 degree angle, etc. Like FullWings says, inventing workarounds for designers’ failure to consider that humans might use it some day. Or maybe they thought the numerical readout would suffice, and have never experience the difference between quickly and fluidly setting an analog-style gauge compared to interpreting numbers, when you’re multitasking with 5 simultaneous things... especially when this numerical readout is 45 degrees away from everything else you’re looking at.

Of course it’s no problem when the autopilot’s flying it and all you have to do is set the thrust to work the speed tape...

And yes it should be on the PFD too, that’s a great suggestion (but I’m not holding my breath). It’s in every sense a primary flight control as is the artificial horizon. To anyone inclined to reply that the result (airspeed) is more important than the input (thrust) so should be looked at instead, consider that the same relationship exists between everything else and the attitude, so by the same logic the artificial horizon should be removed also.

[vilas]

However, wouldn’t it be better technique to make the adjustment at the same time? Why wait until speed decays and then correct it? Why not maintain the correct speed to begin with?
If the speed was correct then it's simultaneous. One hand pitches up the other adjusts the thrust. But in speed stable aircraft there's also pitch up with thrust which is not there in airbus. So if thrust is first or pitch up is late then it will speed up.

[pineteam]

Yeah ideally both at the same time, I agree. Quite difficult to estimate tho.I think instinctively I do it most of the time.Usually if my speed is VAPP and VAPP + 5 I don’t really touch the levers unless I feel like it will go below VAPP. Can’t be bothered too much unless it’s one of those days I try to be on the dot. LOL

[Vessbot]

If the speed was correct then it's simultaneous. One hand pitches up the other adjusts the thrust. But in speed stable aircraft there's also pitch up with thrust which is not there in airbus. So if thrust is first or pitch up is late then it will speed up.
Agreed on all. Except that my speed stable aircraft pitches down with thrust ;)

[vilas]

Agreed on all. Except that my speed stable aircraft pitches down with thrust ;)
Which one is that?

[Vessbot]

Which one is that?
It is the CRJ

[vilas]

It is the CRJ
Oh! Tail mounted engines. Never flew one.

[Check Airman]

Agreed on all. Except that my speed stable aircraft pitches down with thrust ;)

That’s mighty convenient.

[PEI_3721]

Several posts described the difficulties of flying with raw data, relating this with 'deficiencies' in modern instrument displays. These posts suggest novice-like behaviour and difficulties with situation awareness; projection, predictive ability. No aspersions on the ability of skill of the authors, but an observation relating to the wider industry; aviation operates with a lower level of expertise than previously, yet it is 'safer'.

Improved technology, relyability, etc, reduces the need for higher levels of expertise in both normal and abnormal operations. Pilot training is matched to operational need, generally scenarios which have reduced opportunity to develop expertise.
There are fewer 'surprises' requiring revised awareness and understanding; thus even moderately surprising situations have greater impact because of their rarity and lower expert ability to manage them.
In addition, older generations of crew are part of this evolution, there is reduced expertise in training and mentoring.

Automation dependency is a fact of modern operations.
The belief that more hand flying will improve the level and extent of expertise is not supported by science. Many texts identify the need to experience challenging situations to develop non-normal manual and mental flight skills, to achieve a higher level of expertise.
Developing expertise requires time and opportunity, neither being readily available in modern aviation. The current standard appears good enough when compared with safety data - the industry is safe; it could be safer, but beware false beliefs or generating negative training.

'Accelerated Proficiency and Facilitated Retention' - Accelerated Learning, Expertise, Learning Retention, Skill Acquisition, Skill Proficiency, Training. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a536308.pdf

Summary page 8 "It typically takes years of experience for professionals to master their domain. … domain complexity and the need for extended and continuing practice at rare and difficult cases."
Expertise and proficiency page 29 -
Levels of proficiency Table3 2.1 - 2.2 page 31 - 33.
Characteristics of effective scenario-based training Table 4.8 page 148

[Capn Bloggs]

The belief that more hand flying will improve the level and extent of expertise is not supported by science.
Apart from the one area where we must be able to hand-fly: landing. And so we continue to have all manner of prangs (overshoots, undershoots, sideways excursions and botched go-arounds) because the automation-dependent pilots can't hand-fly the aircraft to the required aim point at the correct speed and put it on the ground safely.

[pineteam]

Maybe it's not supported by science but it's recommended by Airbus and I think they know best.:cool:

[Uplinker]

Hi PEI 3721,

To take one example of instrumentation; in our modern big jets would we be happy raw data flying an NDB course with the NDB pointer on one small round instrument, the heading bug on another small round instrument; no means of bugging the required NDB course, and having to regularly sync the directional gyro with the E2 compass?

No. Yet, those of us of a certain vintage did it at flight school - within 5°, whilst also flying a non stable, non AP, non A/THR light aircraft.

So now that we can overlay the NDB required course bar and the raw data NDB needle onto the (automatically synced), ND compass display making NDB tracking 10 times easier and 10 times more accurate; does that make us bad pilots?

When cars were first developed the car radiator temperature gauge was on the top of the radiator, out on the front of the bonnet. Modern cars have the temperature gauge next to the speedo in front of the driver - much easier to see and monitor. Does that instrument improvement make us worse drivers?

Bad pilots are those who 'blindly' follow a FD and don't look through it at the raw data and the pitch, bank, speed and V/S readouts.

[KayPam]

Several posts described the difficulties of flying with raw data, relating this with 'deficiencies' in modern instrument displays. These posts suggest novice-like behaviour and difficulties with situation awareness; projection, predictive ability. No aspersions on the ability of skill of the authors, but an observation relating to the wider industry; aviation operates with a lower level of expertise than previously, yet it is 'safer'.
It makes absolutely no sense to correlate those two things.
Just because someone suggests a possible improvement about ergonomics, that says nothing about their skills.
Airline pilots should be competent, have all the skills that you list, yes.
Does that prevent an aircraft manufacturer from making their products easier to use ?

With your reasoning, we could very well accept that the aircraft manufacturer makes a very complicated aircraft and reject the blame on the pilots for not being competent enough.
For example, we could accept the overhead panel to be designed for minimum cost rather than for presenting a coherent view to the pilot. We would get an overhead with buttons put in a seemingly random or counterintuitive fashion. Would you blame a pilot for launching the wrong fire agent, if agent 1 from engine 1 was next to engine 2 fire button ? Or would you blame the manufacturer for an absurd design ?
You could also imagine reverted controls, all kinds of absurdity, you would still blame the pilots protesting about this as "not skillful enough" ?
It is absurd.

Aircraft manufacturers and pilots work hand in hand for safety.
Pilots have to be the most competent that they can and Airbus has to deliver an aircraft that is as easy to use as possible.
So yes, I still don't understand airbus' position. If manual flying is important, as they say, to maintain flying skills, why don't they give the pilot a crosstrack deviation, allowing them to practise RNAV in raw data ?

[pineteam]

So yes, I still don't understand airbus' position. If manual flying is important, as they say, to maintain flying skills, why don't they give the pilot a crosstrack deviation, allowing them to practise RNAV in raw data ?

Raw data departure using Nav or Arc mode is easier than raw data approach so as long as you can fly raw data approach you should be just fine for a raw data departure. Of course a raw data departure using solely Rose VOR would be challenging if not used to do so. I agree it would be nice to have cross track deviation but why not like I said in an earlier post fly a conventional departure instead? All the airports I'm flying have conventional SIDs. You can always request one. I do that sometimes in my own base.

[Checkboard]

You do have crosstrack deviation - it's on the moving map. Simple.

[pineteam]

You do have crosstrack deviation - it's on the moving map. Simple.
Unfortunately not good enough to fly RNAV SID without FD. I think the cross track deviation has to be on PFD.
By MEL, FD are mandatory on A320 family for RNAV departures.:(

[KayPam]

Raw data departure using Nav or Arc mode is easier than raw data approach so as long as you can fly raw data approach you should be just fine for a raw data departure. Of course a raw data departure using solely Rose VOR would be challenging if not used to do so. I agree it would be nice to have cross track deviation but why not like I said in an earlier post fly a conventional departure instead? All the airports I'm flying have conventional SIDs. You can always request one. I do that sometimes in my own base.
You can't comfortably go around busy, noise sensible airports requesting for non standard departures. For example, if the standard departure is an RNAV noise abatement, it isn't commendable to anoy ATC (more talking, probably more work) and the inhabitants (more noise) just because your aircraft doesn't allow raw data RNAV.

Rose VOR is completely manageable if anticipated correctly, it was considered basic during my MCC training.
It is quite fun to consider that the first time I flew the A320 sim, it was all raw data flying and navigating. It didn't seem to be a huge problem. But it is never done like this on the line.

[FlyingStone]

All the airports I'm flying have conventional SIDs. You can always request one. I do that sometimes in my own base.

Not all airport have them. RNAVs are usually also minimum noise routes, so have to stick to those at many noise-sensitive airports.

[pineteam]

You can't comfortably go around busy, noise sensible airports requesting for non standard departures. For example, if the standard departure is an RNAV noise abatement, it isn't commendable to anoy ATC (more talking, probably more work) and the inhabitants (more noise) just because your aircraft doesn't allow raw data RNAV.

Rose VOR is completely manageable if anticipated correctly, it was considered basic during my MCC training.
It is quite fun to consider that the first time I flew the A320 sim, it was all raw data flying and navigating. It didn't seem to be a huge problem. But it is never done like this on the line.


The conventional SIDs in my home base are almost identical tracks than the RNAV ones and no NADP required. That's the nice thing with airports built over the ocean I guess.:p

Of course it's manageable as long we remember how to fly the needles. xD

Not all airport have them. RNAVs are usually also minimum noise routes, so have to stick to those at many noise-sensitive airports.

Ok thank you. Did not know that.

[PEI_3721]

Capt Bloggs, pineteam, :ok:
The subject should not be seen as hand flying or not, pilots should hand fly; instead it questions why some views believe that more manual flight will improve expertise required to manage different situations.
Opportunistic flying in low workload conditions can improve confidence, self esteem, and refresh existing skills in that operation. However, this is unlikely to improve the expertise required in other flight areas or managing abnormal situations.
Although GA should be a normal operation, in reality it is abnormal due to low occurrence, not failure. Hand flying an approach and landing is unlikely to improve GA; hand flying a GA could, but also improved aircraft / systems.

A concern is if regulators or operators believe that the purpose of hand flying is to improve expertise, they risk complacency - they have responded to the perceived threat. Many safety 'interventions' are based on variable accident investigation and reporting, causal allocation, and misjudged recommendations.
Perhaps 'automation dependent' operators realise this and have other training methods to enhance expertise, particularly cognitive skill, situation awareness and decision making.

PK, yes inappropriate correlation, not cause or effect, but 'related' - associated; instruments and flying aircraft.
'… pilots have all of the skills … '. Accidents suggest otherwise, not weak manual skills, but inadequate situation assessment and choice of action.

An alternative view of manufacturing might be that modern aircraft have been designed for the primary task which is heavily automated - safer, but sufficient for manual flight, but not necessarily with the same accuracy depending on the situation; no AP, FD, RNAV could require a Pan call.

[KayPam]

KP, yes inappropriate correlation, not cause or effect, but 'related' - associated; instruments and flying aircraft.
'… pilots have all of the skills … '. Accidents suggest otherwise, not weak manual skills, but inadequate situation assessment and choice of action.

An alternative view of manufacturing might be that modern aircraft have been designed for the primary task which is heavily automated - safer, but sufficient for manual flight, but not necessarily with the same accuracy depending on the situation; no AP, FD, RNAV could require a Pan call.
I did not say pilots have all the skills, I said they should have them, which is a slight difference.
Many accidents reflect loss of awareness about automation, and reluctance to takeover swiftly.

Why design it for "sufficient" in manual flight, instead of "optimal" ?
They litteraly have thousands of engineers, for design and certification, and dozens of test pilots (cat 1 and 2) and maybe hundreds of airlines pilots (flight operations department)

With no crosstrack deviation in RNAV, you can't fly an RNAV approach in case of loss of FDs. So suppose you fly into an airport without conventional arrivals (which could happen in the near future due to the attrition of conventional means, or is even already the case at somes places?), with an FD failure you're now pan pan. But if the aircraft was designed differently, it would be a seamless reversion to manual flight.
The subject should not be seen as hand flying or not, pilots should hand fly; instead it questions why some views believe that more manual flight will improve expertise required to manage different situations.
Where does that come from ?
Opportunistic flying in low workload conditions can improve confidence, self esteem, and refresh existing skills in that operation. However, this is unlikely to improve the expertise required in other flight areas or managing abnormal situations.
I wonder how you got there. The point of practising manual flying is to improve manual flying.
The 9 competencies are, as you know if you use this model, manual flying, automated flying, procedures, knowledge, decision making, SA, communication, workload management, leadership and teamworking.
It is obvious that flying manually will not make you gain knowledge or help you remember the procedures.
However, it has to beneficial side effects, in my opinion : better workload management (because of a higher workload which will make you practise this competency) and situational awareness, for the precise case of awareness of the aircraft.
Someone who is used to flying manually knows very well how the different flight parameters should behave. If the automation starts to do something unwanted, they will very easily catch that there is something odd. It is basic flying skill, but some accidents demonstrated that they sometimes caused a problem. The most iconic one, in my opinion, is the Emirates go around without power.

[Check Airman]

There’s no conceivable drawback to regularly practicing without automation. My first jet didn’t have autothrust. I quickly had to learn power settings for different phases and configurations. Eventually you get to the point where you can set the approximate power setting without even looking at the engine instruments- your hand just knows where to go.

Likewise with pitch. If for some reason the attitude indicator doesn’t look just so, you know it’s not right and you fix it.

That sort of intimate knowledge of the aircraft comes in handy in an emergency. The flying part becomes subconscious. You’re using your mental capacity to handle the emergency. If that means I don’t fly the ILS as crisply as the AP in good weather, so be it.

[Centaurus]

It is basic flying skill, but some accidents demonstrated that they sometimes caused a problem. The most iconic one, in my opinion, is the Emirates go around without power.

Not forgetting the Flydubai Flight FDB 981 B737-800 on 19 June 2016. It was a straightforward go-around on instruments yet the pilot blindly tried to follow the HUD beyond its tolerances and dived into the ground. A terrible accident. There is no exemplary skill needed for a go-around in a 737. Properly trained, it is a basic manoeuvre after all. All the usual excuses can be made (fatigue etc) but it boils down to staggering incompetence in instrument flying ability.
See:

https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/report_a6-fdn_eng.pdf

[Vessbot]

Capt Bloggs, pineteam, https://lh5.googleusercontent.com/z_Vjt7-BExo-sSVLy7sOqEGa6RfqOTG90YBN_TXye03hj8g-g5vQHZyTdVEMYQGd8m5KLIe32NnpIFWUHFWIsdbs4ONcG-YrKE8nYSOLUefBWl6WK8DllY9chKk8QEA9JvRVXWTvThe subject should not be seen as hand flying or not, pilots should hand fly; instead it questions why some views believe that more manual flight will improve expertise required to manage different situations.

It depends on what you mean by “different situations.” Will handlfying improve expertise on doing a QRH procedure for a hydraulic problem with the AP remaining on… no. Will it improve performance/SA during any situation where handflying is (or should be) happening, including the non-handflying-related hydraulic QRH? Absolutely unqualified yes, through the simple virtue of being less task saturated, which is a direct result of regular practice of one of those tasks, to where it takes, say, 20% of your available attention rather than 120%.

Opportunistic flying in low workload conditions can improve confidence, self esteem, and refresh existing skills in that operation. However, this is unlikely to improve the expertise required in other flight areas or managing abnormal situations.

Not just low workload conditions, but medium workload conditions too. When some semi-routine situation happens where a bunch of tasks fall in your lap simultaneously, like you’ve got to answer a radio call, and do 2 things on the FCP, and make an FMS change, and you’re in the middle of a flow/checklist… and one guy is handflying - do you want to be riding in the back if that can derail the whole train for the crew? Quickly prioritizing and shedding is an essential mental skill, and semi-regular practice of it (and guess what, this can happen by an unpleasant coincidence even on the nice day at the quiet outstation) should be part of our repertoire.

Also, by “abnormal situations” of which you say the management is unlikely to be improved by hand flying proficiency, you seem to excluding basically every airline crash in recent history.

Although GA should be a normal operation, in reality it is abnormal due to low occurrence, not failure. Hand flying an approach and landing is unlikely to improve GA; hand flying a GA could, but also improved aircraft / systems.

Totally disagree. You’re looking for “flying an approach” to be a transferable skill to “flying a go around,” and correctly coming up dry. But you’re looking in the wrong place. It’s not “flying an approach,” it’s “flying.” Being comfortable simply in the situation of being in charge of the control surfaces and thrust, and VSI and altitude and airspeed tapes and heading/course and N1 gauges, including the impending leveloff coming in 500 feet, as well as the flap-related pitch disturbances - and feeling more like you’re in your car than like you’re in the Apollo Lunar Module with the commensurate attention to spare for SA and the rest - is what’s going to improve the hand flown go around.

Would go arounds be better if we could regularly practice them? Of course, but we have no choice but to accept that we can’t do that. But from that to conclude that proficiency in general flying of the airplane does not improve the situation, for a given maneuver, any more than no such proficiency? No.

A concern is if regulators or operators believe that the purpose of hand flying is to improve expertise, they risk complacency - they have responded to the perceived threat. Many safety 'interventions' are based on variable accident investigation and reporting, causal allocation, and misjudged recommendations.
Perhaps 'automation dependent' operators realise this and have other training methods to enhance expertise, particularly cognitive skill, situation awareness and decision making.

I don’t understand this paragraph, especially the first sentence. But I feel like there might be something key in there… would you mind explaining?

Accidents suggest otherwise, not weak manual skills

After the accidents discussed in this thread (and recurring on this forum in general), how can you come out with this conclusion? You consider it not weak manual skills to slow the airplane by 30 pounds of pull force, over 2 flap changes without a single trim input? And not weak manual skills to be watching the flight path set to intersect the ground 2300 feet short of the runway and think everything is OK? How about to allow the airplane to slowly fly a wingover into the ocean, fully aware of what is happening, without leveling the wings?

[Uplinker]

The more we hand fly and use raw data without the FD, the less rusty our hand-eye coordination will be and the better our instrument scan.

Incidences such as SFO 777, several over-pitches and other very very basic mistakes during go-arounds, and some other fatal crashes, could have all have been prevented had the pilots "looked through" the automatics at the basic pitch, bank and speed.

But we should chose suitable times to practise. Am I going to hand-fly down from FL410 to a busy Gatwick morning after crossing the Atlantic during the WOCL? No - I will probably only hand-fly the last 7 miles. But should I practise hand-flying and/or raw data when it is appropriate? Yes !

(For my BAe146 line check years ago, I had to fly holds in three different locations during a very busy Gatwick morning - no auto available on that jet - so all flown with AP on HDG, (no A/Thr), and raw data with me working out the joins and drift headings in my head. Why did it have to be a line check !)

[KayPam]

Not forgetting the Flydubai Flight FDB 981 B737-800 on 19 June 2016. It was a straightforward go-around on instruments yet the pilot blindly tried to follow the HUD beyond its tolerances and dived into the ground. A terrible accident. There is no exemplary skill needed for a go-around in a 737. Properly trained, it is a basic manoeuvre after all. All the usual excuses can be made (fatigue etc) but it boils down to staggering incompetence in instrument flying ability.
See:

https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/report_a6-fdn_eng.pdf
From what I understand, the PIC had to perform two go arounds and was emotionnally messed up. He had to push forcefully on the control column (he did not trim down at the first stage of the go around) and he looked like he went tired of this and eventually put way too much down trim.
To me, this is another illustration of the importance of ergonomics.
Surely, the captain failed to control his aircraft. But with an airbus, the captain would not have been disturbed by very large stick forces, even in alternate law and trim failure, because of the sidestick having a constant force feedback.
I forgot the exact word, but in the TEM model as well as in James Reason's model, safety comes from the addition of "safety layers".
So it is not contradictory to say that the pilot failed, but this does not prevent the manufacturer from trying to improve its product.

The whole subject is which improvement to make ? One strategy could be to keep the pilot out of the loop, as much as possible. Less pilot input required = less possible pilot error.
Another strategy would be to facilitate his task, offer him highly sophisticated automation, but also provide him with the means to keep sharp skills whenever he/she wants. And only then the regulator could ask for a certain point of manual flying proficiency.

[FlyingStone]

Surely, the captain failed to control his aircraft. But with an airbus, the captain would not have been disturbed by very large stick forces, even in alternate law and trim failure, because of the sidestick having a constant force feedback.

Airbus FBW sidestick has force feedback? Well, I learnt something new today, I thought it was just couple of springs that knew nothing about what was going on with the flight controls, airspeed or the atmosphere.

Airbus FBW handles very differently in normal and alternate law, particularly during a go-around. In normal law, one has to pull, whereas in direct law (which you will be in landing configuration) the same amount of pull will get you into big trouble very quickly, as with any aircraft with underslung engines.

[hec7or]

From what I understand, the PIC had to perform two go arounds and was emotionnally messed up. He had to push forcefully on the control column (he did not trim down at the first stage of the go around) and he looked like he went tired of this and eventually put way too much down trim.

If I understand your comment, the PF was over-reacting to the large amount of forward control force required to counter the power pitch couple by running far too much APND trim, however the report also mentions the somatogravic effect which can be mitigated by disciplined instrument flying. The HUD was originally intended to be a landing aid to allow visual acquisition of the environment while monitoring the instruments during the landing phase in Low Visibility Ops. It would appear that the HUD is now routinely used instead of the PFD for all flight modes, but looking at the clouds through the HUD may have increased the perception of a pitch up viewed through the HUD, particularly if the Landing Lights may have been illuminating the cloud layer as they flew through it.

[sonicbum]

But with an airbus, the captain would not have been disturbed by very large stick forces, even in alternate law and trim failure, because of the sidestick having a constant force feedback.
I forgot the exact word, but in the TEM model as well as in James Reason's model, safety comes from the addition of "safety layers".
So it is not contradictory to say that the pilot failed, but this does not prevent the manufacturer from trying to improve its product.


On an Airbus He would have performed the go around with AP ON, and that makes a huge difference in terms of safety, especially with crap weather at 2 am.

[Uplinker]

Airbus FBW sidestick has force feedback? Well, I learnt something new today, I thought it was just couple of springs that knew nothing about what was going on with the flight controls......


He said constant force feedback. i.e. springs. The point being that it is no effort to push or pull, unlike a mistrimmed Boeing type.


On an Airbus He would have performed the go around with AP ON, and that makes a huge difference in terms of safety, especially with crap weather at 2 am.

Even flying manually, though it is very easy - the pitch/power couple has been designed out :ok: (ooops, automation dependancy........:=)

[vilas]

From what I understand, the PIC had to perform two go arounds and was emotionnally messed up. He had to push forcefully on the control column (he did not trim down at the first stage of the go around) and he looked like he went tired of this and eventually put way too much down trim.
To me, this is another illustration of the importance of ergonomics.
Surely, the captain failed to control his aircraft. But with an airbus, the captain would not have been disturbed by very large stick forces, even in alternate law and trim failure, because of the sidestick having a constant force feedback
KP I can't believe what you said.There's no feedback constant or otherwise on the Airbus side stick. It's just the spring pressure to bring the stick to neutral. Airbus maintains 1g when stick free so for a GA if you don't pull up there's a small pitch up at TOGA rarely exceeds 7to8 degrees. You need to pull up to 15° otherwise she will accelerate. The B737 has a large pitch up from TOGA that's why in a GA the pull if any quickly changes to push to prevent excessive pitch up. This Fly Dubai accident could have happened simply because not understanding fully the stab trim functionality. Unlike conventional elevator trim stab trim doesn't change the neutral position of the yoke. You pull or push on the yoke, trim and let go for it to return to neutral. Here he was pushing on the yoke and trimmed, long one 12 secs at that and was still pushing on the stick so the aircraft went in steep dive. Airbus GA is no problem or for that matter even flying because aircraft trims itself. It even applies to alternate law I am talking about within the envelope (you aren't supposed to be outside) which is different only in roll. Besides in Airbus the windsheer and GA could have been done in auto itself, definitely not the time for manual practice.
Last question how do we practice manual handling when emotionally messed up? Because all those hours spent on raw data didn't seem to help.

[sonicbum]

He said constant force feedback. i.e. springs. The point being that it is no effort to push or pull, unlike a mistrimmed Boeing type.




Even flying manually, though it is very easy - the pitch/power couple has been designed out :ok: (ooops, automation dependancy........:=)

Yes, absolutely, my point was that if the NG had the capability to perform an AP coupled go around in normal ops (besides low vis) then the outcome could have been different.

[Uplinker]

Yes, the B737 really is the Mark 1 Landrover of the skies, (no disrespect to a Landrover mark 1 - it's just a basic machine). What a shame they didn't update the 737 properly.

[vilas]

Yes, absolutely, my point was that if the NG had the capability to perform an AP coupled go around in normal ops (besides low vis) then the outcome could have been different.
My post#114 3. No matter how well a pilot is trained or is experienced he does not become immune to all the ills human flesh is heir to(human factors).
4. Automation can perform repetatively to a given standard. There is no variation due to skill. If it doesn't just replace it.
5. A few failures of automation is not enough evidence against automation just as one Sully or Al Haynes doesn't make a summer. There are any number of fully serviceable Aircraft crashed through inadequate piloting.
Fly Dubai case:
Compare with my para no.3. Pilot was emotionally messed up. Human factor.
If it was Airbus they would have flown in Auto and result would have been different.
Compare my para no. 4 and 5.
Automation can perform repeatatively to a given standard.
The aircraft was fully serviceable crashed due to inadequate piloting.
Idea of practicing raw data is develop and maintain a scan pattern of monitoring attitude, speed, altitude, thrust and/or ROD or ROC. It doesn't help flying everything in raw data and it is not possible. You can't practice high altitude handling, GAs, Direct law landings or any abnormalities.

[vilas]

Forgot to mention next time you go to SIM practice double SFCC Fail. A few approaches can teach you a lot.

[Check Airman]

Last question how do we practice manual handling when emotionally messed up? Because all those hours spent on raw data didn't seem to help.

I strongly disagree with this. Reference what I said earlier about aircraft control being intuitive. You have to practice raw data regularly, so that when you have a distraction (emotionally messed up- as you put it), you’re not expending valuable cognitive ability just trying to fly the airplane.

Think about it- you can write your name and phone number while holding a conversation, because you’ve done it a thousand times before. I bet you couldn’t figure out the square root of pi quite as easily while still having that conversation.

[KayPam]

KP I can't believe what you said.There's no feedback constant or otherwise on the Airbus side stick.
Sorry if it's not clear or grammatically incorrect, but I said "constant force feedback". The spring in the sidestick does provide a constant force feedback, doesn't it ?
Or would it be more grammatically correct to say "constant force feel" ?

The interesting question behind this being : is it harder to push a few dozen kg with both arms on a yoke or a few kg (how much is it for the airbus?) with only one hand ?
If I have time, maybe I will measure it at work with a luggage scale, which will give an approximate answer.

[Check Airman]

I think you’ll find that you can do more work when using both arms.

[FlyingStone]

Sorry if it's not clear or grammatically incorrect, but I said "constant force feedback". The spring in the sidestick does provide a constant force feedback, doesn't it ?
Or would it be more grammatically correct to say "constant force feel" ?

Where’s the “feedback” coming from? Does the Airbus sidestick provide you with feedback so you can tell the difference in load on the flight control surfaces between 0kts and Vmo?

[Capewell]

there is no ' force feedback' at all on the Airbus sidestick. it is spring loaded so you need to apply progressively more force to it until it hits the stops

[Vessbot]

*sigh*. There's 2 parallel lines of discussion going on -

1) The terminology of "force feedback" - of which the usage is incorrect, since there's no information from the result feeding "back" to the input.

2) The actual intent of KP's post, despite the wrong word being used (so let's just forget it was used, and pretend it was "constant force"), the implications of the constant force ergonomics on cues to the pilot. Personally I think it's a double edged sword. It prevents overwhelming forces that can add stress and confusion to the pilot (this was KP's post) but at the same time (I think, based on pure speculation, not having flown such a system) it hides meaningful information, which can add its own source of confusion.

[Capn Bloggs]

Airbus GA is no problem or for that matter even flying because aircraft trims itself. It even applies to alternate law
That wasn't exactly advantageous in AF447. Had it been a normal aircraft, the crew would have had to consciously trimmed back into the stall. The A330 did it automatically, to full nose up, which is just what they didn't want or need. :{

[Vessbot]

That wasn't exactly advantageous in AF447. Had it been a normal aircraft, the crew would have had to consciously trimmed back into the stall. The A330 did it automatically, to full nose up, which is just what they didn't want or need. :{

That may be somewhat of a factor, but the opposite would not have been a slam dunk prevention. Cf. Asiana 214 which was a "normal aircraft" yet the pilot's consciousness did not extend to the elevator force provided to them by the system, and still drove it into a near stall. (Without the ground there to cue a reaction first, there's every reason to think they would have continued pulling back all the way to the stall warning/shaker/limiter/whatever. edit: they did get the shaker)

Any stupid thing that an Airbus airplane is able to do automatically, a pilot is able to do manually. Well, at least this stupid thing. Otherwise there would have been no stall accidents prior to the 1980's.

[Capn Bloggs]

(Without the ground there to cue a reaction first, there's every reason to think they would have continued pulling back all the way to the stall warning/shaker/limiter/whatever.)

I doubt it. They ONLY reason they kept puling back was to reach the runway which was in plain view straight ahead. The AF447 crew had no outside reference to entice them to pull back, they were simply climbing and slowing down, and as they did the jet trimmed back for them. In a normal aeroplane, the nose would have dropped if the pilots had done nothing.

[Vessbot]

I doubt it. They ONLY reason they kept puling back was to reach the runway which was in plain view straight ahead.
The AF447 crew had no outside reference to entice them to pull back, they were simply climbing and slowing down, and as they did the jet trimmed back for them. In a normal aeroplane, the nose would have dropped if the pilots had done nothing.

You're comparing the two different reasons for pulling back, and that difference doesn't really matter. The point is that they did, and the likeliness of that being mitigated by auto trimming vs. not. We can see that lack of auto trimming is far from a guarantee against the pilot applying obscene amounts of force manually. I grant that the stick force, though useless in the Asiana case, does give some chance of providing a cue. But how much chance? I dunno. (Overall I'm in favor of the speed stable feedback design, but that's cheap words since I've only ever flown that kind.) Also for AF447 speculating on what the nose would have done "if the pilots had done nothing" is moot, as they didn't do nothing, they pulled all the way back and the result would have been largely the same if it was in a conventional airplane. (Same for the less famous crash of Air Asia 8501, a virtual duplicate of AF447).

I think a likelier benefit to both of those (447, 8501) would have been if the controls were physically interlinked, and the tunnel visioned CA might have been clued in to what the FO was inputting. In both cases, the CA was making some half-hearted forward pushes, so he had the right idea. But there was no meaningful nose-down response due to the FO overpowering him hard against the aft stop. If the CA knew the reason, they could have yelled for the FO to stop and/or push forward, as he pushed harder forward himself.

[vilas]

That wasn't exactly advantageous in AF447. Had it been a normal aircraft, the crew would have had to consciously trimmed back into the stall. The A330 did it automatically, to full nose up, which is just what they didn't want or need. :{
Let's not get 447 into this. First in Airbus you never keep the stick out of neutral on permanent basis. Any Airbus pilot knows if you keep pulling back she will keep trimming up. It's not a secret. The way to stop is leave the stick once the desired pitch is reached. Unfortunately just like the SFO crew never checked their speed the 447 crew never looked at the PFD. Even a B757 which doesn't auto trim has crashed with UAS. The subject is developing/ maintaining raw data flying skill. No one says pilot shouldn't have it. The difference is on practicing how much to, what to and where to. Naturally every one has different views. But no point quoting accidents that have nothing to do with the subject.
​​​​​​

[Vessbot]

Let's not get 447 into this. First in Airbus you never keep the stick out of neutral on permanent basis. Any Airbus pilot knows if you keep pulling back she will keep trimming up. It's not a secret. The way to stop is leave the stick once the desired pitch is reached. Unfortunately just like the SFO crew never checked their speed the 447 crew never looked at the PFD. Even a B757 which doesn't auto trim has crashed with UAS. The subject is developing/ maintaining raw data flying skill. No one says pilot shouldn't have it. The difference is on practicing how much to, what to and where to. Naturally every one has different views. But no point quoting accidents that have nothing to do with the subject.
​​​​​​

I think it has much to do with the subject. In answering "how much to" fly raw data, doesn't it weigh in as a criterion, for the result to be a successful suppression of the urge to pull up 10 degrees and 6000 fpm (or, even more disturbingly in AirAsia 8501, 45 degrees and 11000 fpm) from cruise?

[Check Airman]

But no point quoting accidents that have nothing to do with the subject.​​​​​​
I'd say AF 447 has EVERYTHING to do with the subject. A pilot who never does any raw data flying is a slave to the FD/FMA. The instrument scan becomes a stare. On AF447, the FD commanded a nose up input, and the PF said something like "I've been pulling the whole time".

We'll never know for sure if he was trying to follow the FD, but regular raw data flying allows you to more easily look behind the FD, and also allows you to more readily realise when it's time to turn it off.

Over the ocean in essentially night IMC is when some people would probably say is not ideal to practice raw data flying. However it's exactly the situation encountered by AF447.

If you don't feel comfortable hand flying an approach in IMC, you should let your regulator know there needs to be a DAY VMC ONLY limitation on your ATPL.

[vilas]

I'd say AF 447 has EVERYTHING to do with the subject. A pilot who never does any raw data flying is a slave to the FD/FMA. The instrument scan becomes a stare. On AF447, the FD commanded a nose up input, and the PF said something like "I've been pulling the whole time".

We'll never know for sure if he was trying to follow the FD, but regular raw data flying allows you to more easily look behind the FD, and also allows you to more readily realise when it's time to turn it off.

Over the ocean in essentially night IMC is when some people would probably say is not ideal to practice raw data flying. However it's exactly the situation encountered by AF447.

If you don't feel comfortable hand flying an approach in IMC, you should let your regulator know there needs to be a DAY VMC ONLY limitation on your ATPL.
It's not that simple. UAS is one of the most challenging failured because it doesn't come in standard format like hydraulic or engine failures(Ask Uplinker. He will tell you)There is definite procedure for it and if you didn't know it then when it happens you are not likely to discover by accident(pun! May be). There were more than 22000 posts on 447 so I won't go over it. There's no evidence that 447 pilots didn't know how to fly raw data. OK! they followed the FD and stalled. Did they know stall recovery or they needed actual practice at 370? They had to know how to deal with UAS which they didn't. They didn't even know stall recovery procedure. They knew FDs don't recover you from stall or did they? So let's forget 447. Nobody is saying don't fly raw data approaches. But automation is there and installed for day to day use and not only as a standby to daily raw data practice flying. It's a commercial flight and not a training flight. Everything has to have a sense of proportion.

[Check Airman]

Why do commercial flights and training flights need to be mutually exclusive? When you go to the hospital, the doctors who see you may well be in training. Even after training, as consultant or attending physicians, don't you agree that they're honing their skills with each new patient?

Nobody's suggesting we go around pulling breaker to see what happens. I don't even consider flying around with 0 automation to be training, really- it's more about maintaining a firm grasp on an ablatable skill set- one which we may need to call upon without as much as a moment's notice.

[vilas]

Why do commercial flights and training flights need to be mutually exclusive? When you go to the hospital, the doctors who see you may well be in training. Even after training, as consultant or attending physicians, don't you agree that they're honing their skills with each new patient?

Nobody's suggesting we go around pulling breaker to see what happens. I don't even consider flying around with 0 automation to be training, really- it's more about maintaining a firm grasp on an ablatable skill set- one which we may need to call upon without as much as a moment's notice. I am sure you can give better example than Doctors. Sure! They practice their skills on sick patients but not on a healthy person making him sick just for practice. I understand what you are trying to say but I don't see it as that much of a problem to be so passionate about to suggest instruments to be redesigned to allow pilots to fly raw data. In Airbus it's very rare to do at moment's notice. AP off not a big deal it will hold it's flight path. In Airbus one is better off keeping one's hands off till you get your wits about. Again 447! in alternate law all they had to do was just keep wings level, ask for the Capt to return and gracefully exit the scene. QZ8501 is even more bizarre. They engineered a crash by trying to be engineers by fiddling with CBs (which is forbidden), they caused alternate law, instead of controlling the bank they caused the pitch up which on it's own the aircraft wouldn't, they stall the aircraft, they don't recover. There's a lot to learn from this but raw data has nothing to do. Let's leave the accidents. Absurd but someone may say had the 447 PF reported sick it would have prevented the accident. Isn't it true?

[vilas]

Kay Pam I say again practice double SFCC slat channel Fail approach and all the scan required will be there.

[Checkboard]

UAS = Unmanned Aerial System? Upper Air Stalls? University Air Squadron?

[hec7or]

UAS Unreliable Air Speed

[KayPam]

I'm not sure accidents have nothing to do with the subject..
They show that a problem exists.

Have you ever seen a general aviation accident where the aircraft stalled from a high cruise altitude and never recovered ?
This does not mean, obviously, that general aviation is exempt from piloting errors, but they have much less training (PPL vs CPL or ATPL + TR), much less practise (average of 12 hours vs 600 hours per year), and only pilot required.
So flying errors are much more suprising for commercial aviation. It looks like we don't make the most of our advantages (two pilots, and potentially far higher practise)

[PEI_3721]

To roundoff a few previous comments:-
KP, #166,'The 9 competencies are' - a model with neat definitions, but what exactly are these aspects in practice, how do we explain them, train them. '… better workload management (because of a higher workload which will make you practise this competency) and situational awareness'. Yet humans continually have difficulty with identifying high workload or when we have 'good' awareness' or even the correct awareness; or when will understanding be sufficient vs an 'optimum' ideal.
Our views are closer than might appear; not what they are, but how we get to them.

Vessbot, #169 re 'skills being transferable'. Ideally it would be convenient to acquire skills in one situation that would transfer to others. However, the research report indicates that some skills may not transfer; page 63 onwards.
Perceptual-motor skills, manual flight handling, feel of the aircraft, could transfer between approach and GA, but less so the mental skill of knowing when to GA, or knowing that the aircraft will 'intersect the ground 2300 feet short of the runway', knowing that the need is to 'level the wings', - the orientation (the understanding) part of OODA.
Note that the report relates advance proficiency with expertise, a deffiniton not alway used in aviation.
Also, and importantly, that task is considered in different ways; manual task includes both cognitive and motor skills - tactical, whereas flying involves manual tasks and higher order cognitive skills in awareness, understanding, and decision making - strategy. Higher order skills should transfer, but rarely do - we may not have them to begin with (training) or with the basics they are not practiced, improved, higher levels of expertise.
Re 'regulator beliefs', see refs - as we choose to interpret them.

A conclusion of sorts: the issue is less of 'know what' but more of 'know how', tacit knowledge, experience from being there, doing it, remembering that something has been achieved.

Like riding a bike; tell me, I fall off, but having fallen off and continuing to seek the skill, there comes success, but still being unable to explain how this was achieved.

Refs:- https://www.icao.int/Meetings/a40/Documents/WP/wp_296_en.pdf
https://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/SIB_201305_Manual_Flight_Training_and_Operations.pdf/SIB_2013-05_1
https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/airline_operators/airline_safety/safo/all_safos/media/2017/SAFO17007.pdf

[FlyingStone]

Have you ever seen a general aviation accident where the aircraft stalled from a high cruise altitude and never recovered ?
This does not mean, obviously, that general aviation is exempt from piloting errors, but they have much less training (PPL vs CPL or ATPL + TR), much less practise (average of 12 hours vs 600 hours per year), and only pilot required

GA aircraft flown by PPLs typically aren't complex, heavy multi engine swept-winged jets flying at FL400.
​​​

[vilas]

I'm not sure accidents have nothing to do with the subject..
They show that a problem exists.

Have you ever seen a general aviation accident where the aircraft stalled from a high cruise altitude and never recovered ?
This does not mean, obviously, that general aviation is exempt from piloting errors, but they have much less training (PPL vs CPL or ATPL + TR), much less practise (average of 12 hours vs 600 hours per year), and only pilot required.
So flying errors are much more suprising for commercial aviation. It looks like we don't make the most of our advantages (two pilots, and potentially far higher practise)
​​​​​​I beg to differ. In 2019 in GA there were 1220 accidents out of which 233 were fatal. While agree to less frequency of flying and training but general aviation accidents in last few years are also freightning. Both pilots not qualified, check lists given go by, IMC to VMC VMC to IMC at will. About stall at altitude a mere knowledge of the attitude the aircraft flies at and in alternate law no instinctive action on the side stick is enough. Without aerodynamic damping it's very easy to cause upset. You cannot practice because of RVSM. Once outside envelope fear factor will come in compromising cognitive ability.

[Vessbot]

There's a lot to learn from this but raw data has nothing to do. Let's leave the accidents.

Do you think that if they saw the VSI and altitude tapes (and in the QZ case, also the airspeed tape) and incorporated that information into a picture of the airplane's state, that could have had an effect on the outcome?


Vessbot, #169 re 'skills being transferable'. Ideally it would be convenient to acquire skills in one situation that would transfer to others. However, the research report indicates that some skills may not transfer; page 63 onwards.

I'm not sure you got what I was trying to say in response to your previous post. In short, we're not talking about "transfer," but assembly from basic elements. You looked for transfer of skill from flying one maneuver (approach) to another maneuver (go around) and decided it's not gonna happen, so you might as well not bother. (At least that's how I read it, please correct me if it's not what you meant).

What I meant in reply to that by saying "you're looking in the wrong place" is that what improves the performance (as well as minimizes the chance of falling off the rails due to deviations, distractions, multitasking, stress, etc.) of a maneuver is the constituent basic elements of flying: the inputs pitch, bank, and thrust; and the results altitude, VSI, airspeed, heading, and course; and all of their interplay. (And whether holding all that together simultaneously, takes part of your mental capacity or all of it... or even more than all of it.) In other words, general "flying" as opposed to "flying an approach" (another maneuver). General "flying" is what we should be looking at. Ability to handle those elements together comes from hand flying. And while we have no opportunity to practice the one particular assembly of them in question (the go around) we do have the opportunity to develop them otherwise, by general hand flying. And while that doesn't get us all of the way to full go around expertise (as daily go around practice would), it sure gets us a lot farther than doing nothing.

I read the 2.4 Transfer section of that document (https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a536308.pdf) and it had a lot of different definitions of what transfer might mean, and different situations under those definitions. But I didn't really find anything that matches what we're talking about closely. But I did find this in one of the early summarizing paragraphs:

"Unless there is continuous deliberate practice at difficult tasks, the only thing one can do “on the job” is forget and actually experience degradation of skill. "

Perceptual-motor skills, manual flight handling, feel of the aircraft, could transfer between approach and GA, but less so the mental skill of knowing when to GA, or knowing that the aircraft will 'intersect the ground 2300 feet short of the runway', knowing that the need is to 'level the wings', - the orientation (the understanding) part of OODA.

Well yeah, but we're not talking about deciding when to go around - at least I wasn't. I was talking about flying it. Making the decision to, is different, and I agree hand flying pretty much doesn't effect it. It's a fairly straightforward evaluation of the present state, regardless of if you were flying, the other guy was, or the autopilot was. Knowing if you're gonna hit the ground short of the runway comes from some experience descending toward runways - using the runway as guidance and not the FD. And knowing there is a need to level the wings, they very much had that knowledge. Where things went astray is in the downstream habitual response of how to make that happen.

The rest of your post is, to me, vague and somewhat rambling. It touches on many things, but I'm afraid I can't follow the path you've laid, through those things, to an overall point.

Note that the report relates advance proficiency with expertise, a deffiniton not alway used in aviation.
Also, and importantly, that task is considered in different ways; manual task includes both cognitive and motor skills - tactical, whereas flying involves manual tasks and higher order cognitive skills in awareness, understanding, and decision making - strategy. Higher order skills should transfer, but rarely do - we may not have them to begin with (training) or with the basics they are not practiced, improved, higher levels of expertise.
Re 'regulator beliefs', see refs - as we choose to interpret them.

A conclusion of sorts: the issue is less of 'know what' but more of 'know how', tacit knowledge, experience from being there, doing it, remembering that something has been achieved.

Like riding a bike; tell me, I fall off, but having fallen off and continuing to seek the skill, there comes success, but still being unable to explain how this was achieved.

[vilas]

Do you think that if they saw the VSI and altitude tapes (and in the QZ case, also the airspeed tape) and incorporated that information into a picture of the airplane's state, that could have had an effect on the outcome? As I said I don't like to discuss 447 because this topic will hijack the thread again. Since you asked
447 and 8501 although the result is same the situation is different. AF447 they hadn't undergone any training for UAS. In the ungodly hour of midnight over the Atlantic, in IMC, Airspeed gone they were not going to device a procedure. We are not birds so in the air we can act out of our training, learnt habits but if fear washes out the conscious layer there are no instincts to guide a human to safety. The speed was lost only for one minute. But the crew's cognitive ability was gone. They stopped seeing anything, they stopped hearing anything, they stopped feeling anything but just kept doing something with their hand that had nothing to do with present situation. The only chance they had was that they froze and didn't do anything. May be the Aircraft would have descended on its own and in warmer temperatures icing would have gone. If they could see altitude then why not they also feel the stall buffet, also hear the stall warning? There's no point 447 has been beaten to death.

[GICASI2]

While I have the utmost respect for your knowledge about the A320, I have to respectfully disagree with your operational philosophy.

Perhaps you’re a better pilot than I. I just know that a few minutes in the sim every few months would leave me woefully unprepared should the lights start flashing on a stormy night. On top of that, I find immense satisfaction in turning off the magic and having fun.

If I want ‘fun’ I climb into an Extra or a Pitts. When I go to work I operate the Company’s aircraft to the best of my ability to ensure a safe and efficient flight. That means using the equipment in the most professional way that I can. ‘Turning the magic off and having fun’ says it all.

[Checkboard]

It's perfectly normal to have fun at your job, you know. Without being unprofessional in any way.

[Check Airman]

As I said I don't like to discuss 447 because this topic will hijack the thread again. Since you asked
447 and 8501 although the result is same the situation is different. AF447 they hadn't undergone any training for UAS. In the ungodly hour of midnight over the Atlantic, in IMC, Airspeed gone they were not going to device a procedure. We are not birds so in the air we can act out of our training, learnt habits but if fear washes out the conscious layer there are no instincts to guide a human to safety. The speed was lost only for one minute. But the crew's cognitive ability was gone. They stopped seeing anything, they stopped hearing anything, they stopped feeling anything but just kept doing something with their hand that had nothing to do with present situation. The only chance they had was that they froze and didn't do anything. May be the Aircraft would have descended on its own and in warmer temperatures icing would have gone. If they could see altitude then why not they also feel the stall buffet, also hear the stall warning? There's no point 447 has been beaten to death.

I’ll start off by saying that AF faced a difficult situation, and we’ve all learned from their mistakes.

That said, the main point of this argument seems to be “they weren’t trained for that”. Please correct me if I’m wrong.

If not, we face things for which we were not specifically trained every day. We depend on our skill and experience to resolve them. The PF was ultimately unable to recognise and recover from a stall. There’s only one way to fix that, and using a ton of automation most of the time, and only disconnecting after a thorough briefing in day VMC isn’t it.

[Check Airman]

If I want ‘fun’ I climb into an Extra or a Pitts. When I go to work I operate the Company’s aircraft to the best of my ability to ensure a safe and efficient flight. That means using the equipment in the most professional way that I can. ‘Turning the magic off and having fun’ says it all.

I have fun in an Extra as well. I’ll repeat it without hesitation or reservation- I have loads of fun flying with no automation. It’s a great way to keep my skills sharp, and a smile on my face. If for whatever reason, you don’t think flying is fun, that sounds like something you should consider before putting on the uniform next time.

[megan]

If for whatever reason, you don’t think flying is fun, that sounds like something you should consider before putting on the uniform next timeCouldn't agree more, worked with a number to whom it was just a job with no interest in broadening their knowledge or understanding and took up secondary duties to remove themselves as much as possible from the roster, personally looked forward to every duty with relish, it was fun personified, though there were moments/events I could have done without.

[pineteam]

It’s pretty sad to see how many pilots when asking what they miss the most about not flying they will reply:” the extra money”. They don’t mind staying home doing nothing as long they get paid...:\

[vilas]

Why is automation dependency encouraged in modern aviation ? Basic topic. Dependency is rarely encouraged but use of automation is encouraged. If you are tired, in marginal weather you will use automation. That is the reason, consistent results. It's not impossible to land manually in Cat3 but not with any surety or safety. The Use of automation is not to hide inability to do it manually and use of manual flying should not be because of mistrust or dislike of automation. Both are integral part of a professional pilot. Accidents convey what happened but why it happened is many times a conjecture. Practice raw data where possible and prudent. But is Quixotic spirit really required? If someone is in the wrong job and doesn't enjoy what he is doing it can happens, you can't change him.

[flash8]

I can well believe it. Friend of mine flying in the Asia region crewed with a local cadet just out of flight school and who had just completed his type rating. They were flying in Cirrus cloud, calm conditions, when the cadet first officer nervously said to the captain "I don't like flying in cloud..." This from the legal second in command of a jet transport. Image the chaos that would occur if the captain became suddenly incapacitated. In fact it does't even bear thinking about.In the words immortalised by one SE Asian FO.... "Captain, if you go.. we all go!"

[PilotLZ]

It's perfectly normal to have fun at your job, you know. Without being unprofessional in any way.
Golden words. Enjoyable things absolutely don't have to be unsafe things. Or unprofessional ones.

There's nothing unsafe in reverting to manual flight wherever and whenever this is appropriate. Nobody on here has suggested that you should try departing from a close parallel runway with the flight directors off or that you should try landing manually in CAT III for the thrill of it. Anything like that is indeed stupid and irresponsible. But, whenever the situation permits, flying manually is just as much of a normal way of doing it as any level of automation. And, in some situations, it might be the safest or even the only certified way of flying. Think landing in strong winds. The maximum certified wind values for the autoland system are usually not even close to the maximum demonstrated wind values for manual flight. Also, an automatic approach to minimum in some abnormal configurations might not be certified. Let alone that plenty of equipment failures in themselves take out the AP and leave you with no alternative to flying manually - and you'd better rehearse that under normal conditions before you've been forced to do it out of necessity.

[Vessbot]

As I said I don't like to discuss 447 because this topic will hijack the thread again. Since you asked
447 and 8501 although the result is same the situation is different. AF447 they hadn't undergone any training for UAS. In the ungodly hour of midnight over the Atlantic, in IMC, Airspeed gone they were not going to device a procedure. We are not birds so in the air we can act out of our training, learnt habits but if fear washes out the conscious layer there are no instincts to guide a human to safety. The speed was lost only for one minute. But the crew's cognitive ability was gone. They stopped seeing anything, they stopped hearing anything, they stopped feeling anything but just kept doing something with their hand that had nothing to do with present situation. The only chance they had was that they froze and didn't do anything. May be the Aircraft would have descended on its own and in warmer temperatures icing would have gone. If they could see altitude then why not they also feel the stall buffet, also hear the stall warning? There's no point 447 has been beaten to death.So you’re saying their cognitive ability was gone, and they couldn’t take in the altitude/VSI information, much less process it. Completely agreed, they were overwhelmed past 100% task capacity, and essentially shut down.

Given that, the next question is that if they had an attention/task capacity to process that info, and did so, (i.e., they didn’t shut down) could that have effected the outcome? (This was in my last post, but you didn’t answer it.) This seems pretty obvious, so to save another tedious back and forth, I’m going to assume your answer is yes.

So the next question is, is there a possible way to tailor the situation (via regular habits and practice) so that they might not have been overwhelmed by the situation and been able to see and process the altitude and VSI into what they were doing on the artificial horizon? Or is it a futile proposition, and truth is that no matter what anyone’s level of practice and comfort with hand flying in IMC, they would be just as likely to be overwhelmed and freeze up if called to do so? In other words, there is no effect of regular practice, on how big a portion of your total attention the practised thing takes?

—

All this aside, I have to take exception to your characterizing the action to not pull up to 6000fpm from cruise for no reason, as “devising a procedure.”

Dependency is rarely encouraged but use of automation is encouraged.

Notionally true. But, if the areas where it’s not considered “prudent” (tired, marginal weather, there are too many legs per day, there are not enough legs per month, you’re increasing the other pilot’s workload, there is too much traffic, etc.) add up to leave the remaining area as essentially nothing, then dependency is de facto being encouraged. How many times can you not find something to point at? At some point, they stop being valid reasons and start being excuses.

[Check Airman]

For the people who prefer higher levels of automation on the line, when do yo work on raw data skills? Is it in the simulator every 6-12 months? And if so, do the instructors make allowances for the fact that you may not have done it since your last sim session?

[pineteam]

Golden words. Enjoyable things absolutely don't have to be unsafe things. Or unprofessional ones.

There's nothing unsafe in reverting to manual flight wherever and whenever this is appropriate. Nobody on here has suggested that you should try departing from a close parallel runway with the flight directors off or that you should try landing manually in CAT III for the thrill of it. Anything like that is indeed stupid and irresponsible. But, whenever the situation permits, flying manually is just as much of a normal way of doing it as any level of automation. And, in some situations, it might be the safest or even the only certified way of flying. Think landing in strong winds. The maximum certified wind values for the autoland system are usually not even close to the maximum demonstrated wind values for manual flight. Also, an automatic approach to minimum in some abnormal configurations might not be certified. Let alone that plenty of equipment failures in themselves take out the AP and leave you with no alternative to flying manually - and you'd better rehearse that under normal conditions before you've been forced to do it out of necessity.

Buy this guy a beer!! Totally agree with you.:ok:

[KayPam]

For the people who prefer higher levels of automation on the line, when do yo work on raw data skills? Is it in the simulator every 6-12 months? And if so, do the instructors make allowances for the fact that you may not have done it since your last sim session?
About that, I was really surprised in the sim.
There was one exercice on a test (ILS approach with one engine out I believe) where the instructor insisted I flew manually. I was very surprised that the FD was allowed !
As Jacques Rosay said, flying in this manner can in no way be considered as “flying manually”.
https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/high-altitude-manual-flying/
Personally, I have often heard during test, demonstration, acceptance or airline flights, colleagues, young or older, airline pilots or test pilots, proudly say that they would do such or such a part of the flight - in general a complete approach followed by a landing - “in manual control mode”. I would then observe how they performed and saw that all they did was actually disconnect the AP and servilely follow the Flight Director, leaving the Auto Thrust engaged. And this until start of the flare. This obviously allows an accurate trajectory to be followed, with correct captures, and good control of the speed. These functions are provided for this purpose.
However, within the scope of this article, which concerns manual flying, flying in this manner can in no way be considered as “flying manually”. Indeed, the orders given to the flight controls by the pilot consist in setting the Flight Director (FD) bars to zero, which corresponds to the orders generated by the guidance function. These stick inputs are actions done mechanically by the pilot but are in no way elaborated by him/her. These flight control orders are the same as those which the AP would give if it was engaged. Thus, the added value provided by the pilot is rather negative, as the cognitive resources that he/she uses to follow the FD bars are no longer available for the most elaborate flight monitoring and control functions. In other words, this exercise provides strictly nothing towards the manual flying training for the cases where the pilot would truly have to fly the aircraft manually.

[vinayak]

Testing automation and reliance will eventually prove that the pilot is not needed.

we are looking at 7-10 years before we see commercial flights taking off without pilots.

[pineteam]

Try 70-100 years then you might be credible. :E

[Momoe]

Excellent synopsis by PilotLZ of the benefits of automation and why manual skills still have their place. I'm not sure that SLF mindset is ready to accept effectively being the payload for a drone, although I'm aware the average flight has minimal manual intervention.

Cargo is the best starting place, it would build a metrics database quickly which can be used to hone the software.

[ScepticalOptomist]

Not even close... won’t be in my lifetime, and I doubt my kids lifetime either. Check with any critical systems software people - they will tell you some pretty scary stories that aren’t close to being solved...

[CessNah]

Little bit off topic from the present discussion, but I suppose this would be the right thread to ask!

For those of you who are confident with the raw data manual flying, do you have any rule of thumb forumlas for turn anticipations? For example, how many miles before flying overhead a VOR should I start turning to smoothly intercept the outbound radial? On top of that, are there any very rough factors that we can add to DME distance to compenstate for slant range?

Many thanks guys and girls, keep up the hard work as always :cool:

[Checkboard]

Turn radius - 200 divided by the time to station.

[alf5071h]

Pre 'automation' navigation procedure required beacon overflight before turning; airspace design and management allowed for this.

Post automation it is possible to use turn anticipation which enabled more efficient airspace use, increased traffic, etc.

Choosing to fly manually in modern 'automated' conditions requires the pilot to adapt to the norm, greater mental demand, increased workload, less attention on overall flight management, - why would we choose to do that.

Auto unavailability, system failures are rare; there is no need to practice for a rare event when alternatives are available - use alternative procedures, communicate, declare an emergency.
If there are no alternatives then ask why; now, before any failure, do not depend on automation.
Alternatives should not force change on limited capability humans; nor expect that being able to remember / calculate, divide, and multiply will improve flying in surprising situations when automation fails.

[Stuka Child]

Pre 'automation' navigation procedure required beacon overflight before turning; airspace design and management allowed for this.

Post automation it is possible to use turn anticipation which enabled more efficient airspace use, increased traffic, etc.

Choosing to fly manually in modern 'automated' conditions requires the pilot to adapt to the norm, greater mental demand, increased workload, less attention on overall flight management, - why would we choose to do that.

Auto unavailability, system failures are rare; there is no need to practice for a rare event when alternatives are available - use alternative procedures, communicate, declare an emergency.
If there are no alternatives then ask why; now, before any failure, do not depend on automation.
Alternatives should not force change on limited capability humans; nor expect that being able to remember / calculate, divide, and multiply will improve flying in surprising situations when automation fails.

Because the pursuit of excellence is a cornerstone of this demanding profession and it is what the passengers expect of us (for those who fly passengers) and it is what we should expect of ourselves. You don't hear Formula 1 pilots saying "oh well I'll just cruise around because I'm nervous about turning corners at a high speed" or bridge workers saying "oh I don't like heights and I'm trying to avoid the greater mental demand of working strapped in a harness, so I'll not punch in these rivets. I'll let my robot colleague deal with it." Don't like the job, there are others clawing to take your spot. By all means step aside if it's not your cup of tea.

Sure if this is your xth sector today and the fatigue is creeping in and you don't trust yourself *at that moment*, give yourself some mental rest and take advantage of the automation which is at your disposal. But if this becomes a habit - or worse, a *limitation*, it will lead to nowhere good. Imagine telling a load of nervous flyers that their crew of professional, paid pilots are nervous about manually controlling their aircraft while flying an approach and that two of them find the combined workload overwhelming. Come on! Even Gordon Ramsay would be disappointed by that attitude, and he doesn't even fly.

We all have deep fears, we all have insecurities, weaknesses, lack of skill in certain areas, lack of mental resources after reaching the point of exhaustion, but we owe it to the people whose lives depend on us and to our basic human decency to WORK ON IT. Whenever possible, however possible, pilots should always strive to improve their skills, their understanding, their confidence, their precision and themselves as persons. Reach out to colleagues, reach out to anyone you can, but you must make an active effort. Settling into a nice little routine and making excuses is not the correct attitude and it will bite you in the ass on that day that I hope you never get to experience. If you are not constantly striving to become better, you don't belong up there.

[shared reality]

Because the pursuit of excellence is a cornerstone of this demanding profession and it is what the passengers expect of us (for those who fly passengers) and it is what we should expect of ourselves. You don't hear Formula 1 pilots saying "oh well I'll just cruise around because I'm nervous about turning corners at a high speed" or bridge workers saying "oh I don't like heights and I'm trying to avoid the greater mental demand of working strapped in a harness, so I'll not punch in these rivets. I'll let my robot colleague deal with it." Don't like the job, there are others clawing to take your spot. By all means step aside if it's not your cup of tea.

Sure if this is your xth sector today and the fatigue is creeping in and you don't trust yourself *at that moment*, give yourself some mental rest and take advantage of the automation which is at your disposal. But if this becomes a habit - or worse, a *limitation*, it will lead to nowhere good. Imagine telling a load of nervous flyers that their crew of professional, paid pilots are nervous about manually controlling their aircraft while flying an approach and that two of them find the combined workload overwhelming. Come on! Even Gordon Ramsay would be disappointed by that attitude, and he doesn't even fly.

We all have deep fears, we all have insecurities, weaknesses, lack of skill in certain areas, lack of mental resources after reaching the point of exhaustion, but we owe it to the people whose lives depend on us and to our basic human decency to WORK ON IT. Whenever possible, however possible, pilots should always strive to improve their skills, their understanding, their confidence, their precision and themselves as persons. Reach out to colleagues, reach out to anyone you can, but you must make an active effort. Settling into a nice little routine and making excuses is not the correct attitude and it will bite you in the ass on that day that I hope you never get to experience. If you are not constantly striving to become better, you don't belong up there.

Well said! In my airline (European legacy), pilots must be equally proficient in all levels of automation, including basic manual, and we are encouraged to practice manual, raw data flying regularly, when conditions permit. As a trainer, I find this to be an excellent way to hone skills on a regular basis, which may save your life one day.
This regular practice (WHEN CONDITIONS PERMIT), clearly shows in the simulator, where most of my colleagues display very good handling skills on a regular basis.

Unfortunately, many airlines around do not adhere to this, and having been on quite a few voluntary leave of absence over the years with other operators, I have seen the effects of so called aviators, who were plainly scared of disconnecting the automatics anywhere but fully configured at a 1000 ft in visual conditions.... Some of them so out of touch with flying an airplane that I would not dare to visit the toilet in cruise.

Rgds,

[Uplinker]

I agree with most of those points, Stuka :ok:

The question of this thread is "Why is automation dependancy encouraged in modern aviation?"

It is human nature to do the easiest thing - we don't follow the footpath all the way to the end if we can cut the corner by walking across the grass. When we drive our cars, how many of us willingly use a paper map or our memory of a route ? No, obviously we use SatNav. How many drivers of automatic cars use their automatic gearboxes in manual mode?

If you are on a punishing airline roster or didn't sleep too well in the hotel, (but are not actually fatigued), then it is easier to fly using the automatics, and most pilots flying busy rosters in busy airspace will probably use the automatics. As soon as you start using good, well integrated automatics - and not all of them are - it is very hard to break away back to manual flying, because you know you are rusty and will look less than expert if you attempt it on the line. But of course this becomes a vicious circle.

How do pilots keep their skills sharp ? Since most pilots will use the easiest option and won't remember to manually fly - that is human nature - I believe it will have to be mandated in some way by chief pilots. A bit like paying taxes - you wouldn't do it unless there was some sort of pressure !

[Stuka Child]

I agree with most of those points, Stuka :ok:

The question of this thread is "Why is automation dependancy encouraged in modern aviation?"

It is human nature to do the easiest thing - we don't follow the footpath all the way to the end if we can cut the corner by walking across the grass. When we drive our cars, how many of us willingly use a paper map or our memory of a route ? No, obviously we use SatNav. How many drivers of automatic cars use their automatic gearboxes in manual mode?

If you are on a punishing airline roster or didn't sleep too well in the hotel, (but are not actually fatigued), then it is easier to fly using the automatics, and most pilots flying busy rosters in busy airspace will probably use the automatics. As soon as you start using good, well integrated automatics - and not all of them are - it is very hard to break away back to manual flying, because you know you are rusty and will look less than expert if you attempt it on the line. But of course this becomes a vicious circle.

How do pilots keep their skills sharp ? Since most pilots will use the easiest option and won't remember to manually fly - that is human nature - I believe it will have to be mandated in some way by chief pilots. A bit like paying taxes - you wouldn't do it unless there was some sort of pressure !

I understand your point :)
However, I disagree with some of the assumptions you're making. I don't believe it's human nature to do the easiest thing. I think it's human nature to search for meaning and to do meaningful things.
I love driving, and I'll seldom use navigation tech (unless using the car for deliveries or something). I memorize the route beforehand and, if I get lost, I try to figure it out, or stop and ask for directions or look at the (admittedly non-paper) map again. It's a beautiful thing, to be lost and to find your way again.
When taxiing in a C152/172 (or whatever I can see the ground in) in summer, I'll try to avoid squishing the grasshoppers that swarm the taxiways. Ground doesn't mind. I know I'm still going to kill a bunch of them on the runway and who-knows-how-many insects in flight, but the ones that I have a choice to avoid I will. Even though it's far from easy.

If one flies for a living, it is reasonable to assume that this person finds some meaning in flying. Otherwise why do it in the first place? Can't be for the money. There's much less stressful ways of making much more money.

For all the people saying "why would we choose the extra workload etc" I just want to ask "but don't you enjoy flying? Are you not addicted to your aircraft and the way it moves? And the way you make it move?"
If someone has to force pilots to hand-fly, I would question what they're doing there in the first place.

[Check Airman]

I understand your point :)
However, I disagree with some of the assumptions you're making. I don't believe it's human nature to do the easiest thing. I think it's human nature to search for meaning and to do meaningful things.
I love driving, and I'll seldom use navigation tech (unless using the car for deliveries or something). I memorize the route beforehand and, if I get lost, I try to figure it out, or stop and ask for directions or look at the (admittedly non-paper) map again. It's a beautiful thing, to be lost and to find your way again.
When taxiing in a C152/172 (or whatever I can see the ground in) in summer, I'll try to avoid squishing the grasshoppers that swarm the taxiways. Ground doesn't mind. I know I'm still going to kill a bunch of them on the runway and who-knows-how-many insects in flight, but the ones that I have a choice to avoid I will. Even though it's far from easy.

If one flies for a living, it is reasonable to assume that this person finds some meaning in flying. Otherwise why do it in the first place? Can't be for the money. There's much less stressful ways of making much more money.

For all the people saying "why would we choose the extra workload etc" I just want to ask "but don't you enjoy flying? Are you not addicted to your aircraft and the way it moves? And the way you make it move?"
If someone has to force pilots to hand-fly, I would question what they're doing there in the first place.

Seems having fun at work isn’t cool. I suppose I won’t be one of the cool kids then.

[Centaurus]

For all the people saying "why would we choose the extra workload etc" I just want to ask "but don't you enjoy flying? Are you not addicted to your aircraft and the way it moves? And the way you make it move?"
If someone has to force pilots to hand-fly, I would question what they're doing there in the first place.

In the 1980's and earlier I flew 737-200's around the Western, Central and South Pacific region. Most of the small airline (three 737-200 and two 727-100) 35 pilots were former Royal Australian Air Force. All the Boeings had FD 108 flight directors and there were no autothrottles and no EFIS. Manual flying in the climb to 10,000 ft and from 10,000 ft down was the norm and as far as I remember there was only one particular captain who swore by the FD and used it as much as he could. Navigation was by Omega in the early years followed by our first INS. All instrument let downs at the remote Pacific islands were NDB with the occasional VOR and ILS at the larger islands like Guam. In short, the standard of instrument flying was first class and there were no reports of pilots losing the plot in cloud or night IMC. And believe me there were some seriously black nights at these destinations.

Then in 1989 I went to England for a flying job also on the 737-200 and was given an instrument rating test in a 737-200 simulator at Gatwick as part of the British ATPL award, the IRE being a company man himself being tested for his IRE certification by a British CAA senior examiner occupying the 4th seat in the simulator. The senior examiner silently observed the two hour session. I found out later he was the Head Examiner of the CAA. In my opinion and being used to the outsoken and demanding Australian check captains in my former airline, he was a thorough English gentleman. The FD 108 left a lot to be desired and I elected to conduct the instrument approaches (ADF/VOR/ILS) manually flown raw data. After all I had been doing that sort of thing most of my flying career both military and civil.

The test was successful thank goodness as I felt a bit nervous knowing the top CAA gun was watching. The de-briefing finished and paper work signed, the CAA Examiner quietly said "That was OK, but you should try and use the flight director rather than fly raw data. I was tempted to say I found the Collins FD 108 a pain in the neck and that IMHO it added to my workload. But I listened to that tiny voice in my mind and thanked him politely assuring him I would use the FD more in the future. But the CAA man was a wise old bird and guessed I couldn't change my views at my relatively advnced years. We shook hands and went our separate ways. His to his big mahogany desk and me back to a real 737.

Later when flying EFIS 737's I could see the superb accuracy of the flight director system and used it but only to keep in practice at using it - not that I thought I needed it to complete a flight. That was in another era of course... .

[Bergerie1]

When I was a training captain in a big airline back in the 1980s, there was a move to 'streamline' simulator exercises. One of the items it was suggested we should remove was the NDB approach on three engines in a cross wind. Why, we were asked, should this be retained in the six-monthly refresher training cycle when all the airports to which we operated our 747s were equipped with ILS? We kept this exercise in for two reasons; (1) some alternate airfields were equipped with NDBs (no VORs or ILS) and in the event of a diversion to one of these it was likely the reason for the diversion might be some kind of technical problem. (2) Flying an NDB only approach with an outboard engine failed and in a cross wind was as good a test of handflying ability as you were likely to find.

So I am with you Centaurus.

[Uplinker]

..........If one flies for a living, it is reasonable to assume that this person finds some meaning in flying. Otherwise why do it in the first place?

For all the people saying "why would we choose the extra workload etc" I just want to ask "but don't you enjoy flying? Are you not addicted to your aircraft and the way it moves? And the way you make it move?"
If someone has to force pilots to hand-fly, I would question what they're doing there in the first place.

The conductor of an orchestra does not play the actual instruments, yet coordinates and produces an amazing piece of music.

Flying a large passenger jet is like conducting an orchestra and not the same as flying say, a Pitts special or a Tigermoth. In those smaller aircraft the very point of them is to hand fly. In the larger passenger jet the purpose is to get your passengers from A to B as smoothly, professionally and as efficiently as possible.

You say you use SatNav when making deliveries, which is similar to us using the FMGCS to conduct a passenger flight.

I started on very basic turbo props with no automatics at all which was fine, but nowadays my flying enjoyment (of large passenger jets) is more as a conductor. It is immensely satisfying to be up in the atmosphere in my shirt sleeves operating a large modern jet across continents through mostly key presses and knob twiddling. It's more about strategy and I don't feel the need to hand fly for hours on end.

BUT if ATC brings me in above the glide slope, I find the easiest thing is to drop the automatics and hand fly. And I still really enjoy hand flying a turbulent crosswind approach, flare and landing. It is great fun and gives me a strong sense of satisfaction.
.

[vilas]

If one flies for a living, it is reasonable to assume that this person finds some meaning in flying. Otherwise why do it in the first place? Can't be for the money. There's much less stressful ways of making much more money.
Life always doesn't give pleasant options. It will be very Utopian to imagine that most people earn a living doing what they like. Earning a living is not an option. A380 Capt doesn't enjoy driving a bus but they are doing it now. If you happen to earn a living doing what you like it's a bonus. Besides one likes flying is no guarantee of anyone's professional competence. There are pilots who love flying but are mediocre and there are pilots who were basically attracted to it because they had money to become one and considered the salary of airline pilot as a good investment. The basic education with which one becomes a pilot there is no other field to make much more money. The thread is about acquiring and maintaining unassisted skills so let's not add philosophy to it.

[Stuka Child]

Well said! In my airline (European legacy), pilots must be equally proficient in all levels of automation, including basic manual, and we are encouraged to practice manual, raw data flying regularly, when conditions permit. As a trainer, I find this to be an excellent way to hone skills on a regular basis, which may save your life one day.
This regular practice (WHEN CONDITIONS PERMIT), clearly shows in the simulator, where most of my colleagues display very good handling skills on a regular basis.

Unfortunately, many airlines around do not adhere to this, and having been on quite a few voluntary leave of absence over the years with other operators, I have seen the effects of so called aviators, who were plainly scared of disconnecting the automatics anywhere but fully configured at a 1000 ft in visual conditions.... Some of them so out of touch with flying an airplane that I would not dare to visit the toilet in cruise.

Rgds,

Seems having fun at work isn’t cool. I suppose I won’t be one of the cool kids then.

I think it's all because someone figured out that paying low-experience pilots low wages and imposing use of automation as company policy, is a viable and statistically safe business model. The industry is only now waking up to the idea that this is actually creating unsafe pilots who do not trust in their own abilities. If normal flying becomes a source of unease, what can be expected in an emergency? It's a fact that company culture must change at a lot of airlines, but what frightens me is how individual pilots can be okay with these minimal hand-flying policies and, worse, actually actively defend them.



In the 1980's and earlier I flew 737-200's around the Western, Central and South Pacific region. Most of the small airline (three 737-200 and two 727-100) 35 pilots were former Royal Australian Air Force. All the Boeings had FD 108 flight directors and there were no autothrottles and no EFIS. Manual flying in the climb to 10,000 ft and from 10,000 ft down was the norm and as far as I remember there was only one particular captain who swore by the FD and used it as much as he could. Navigation was by Omega in the early years followed by our first INS. All instrument let downs at the remote Pacific islands were NDB with the occasional VOR and ILS at the larger islands like Guam. In short, the standard of instrument flying was first class and there were no reports of pilots losing the plot in cloud or night IMC. And believe me there were some seriously black nights at these destinations.

Then in 1989 I went to England for a flying job also on the 737-200 and was given an instrument rating test in a 737-200 simulator at Gatwick as part of the British ATPL award, the IRE being a company man himself being tested for his IRE certification by a British CAA senior examiner occupying the 4th seat in the simulator. The senior examiner silently observed the two hour session. I found out later he was the Head Examiner of the CAA. In my opinion and being used to the outsoken and demanding Australian check captains in my former airline, he was a thorough English gentleman. The FD 108 left a lot to be desired and I elected to conduct the instrument approaches (ADF/VOR/ILS) manually flown raw data. After all I had been doing that sort of thing most of my flying career both military and civil.

The test was successful thank goodness as I felt a bit nervous knowing the top CAA gun was watching. The de-briefing finished and paper work signed, the CAA Examiner quietly said "That was OK, but you should try and use the flight director rather than fly raw data. I was tempted to say I found the Collins FD 108 a pain in the neck and that IMHO it added to my workload. But I listened to that tiny voice in my mind and thanked him politely assuring him I would use the FD more in the future. But the CAA man was a wise old bird and guessed I couldn't change my views at my relatively advnced years. We shook hands and went our separate ways. His to his big mahogany desk and me back to a real 737.

Later when flying EFIS 737's I could see the superb accuracy of the flight director system and used it but only to keep in practice at using it - not that I thought I needed it to complete a flight. That was in another era of course... .

When I was a training captain in a big airline back in the 1980s, there was a move to 'streamline' simulator exercises. One of the items it was suggested we should remove was the NDB approach on three engines in a cross wind. Why, we were asked, should this be retained in the six-monthly refresher training cycle when all the airports to which we operated our 747s were equipped with ILS? We kept this exercise in for two reasons; (1) some alternate airfields were equipped with NDBs (no VORs or ILS) and in the event of a diversion to one of these it was likely the reason for the diversion might be some kind of technical problem. (2) Flying an NDB only approach with an outboard engine failed and in a cross wind was as good a test of handflying ability as you were likely to find.

So I am with you Centaurus.

Wow! Thank you both for sharing :)

The conductor of an orchestra does not play the actual instruments, yet coordinates and produces an amazing piece of music.

Flying a large passenger jet is like conducting an orchestra and not the same as flying say, a Pitts special or a Tigermoth. In those smaller aircraft the very point of them is to hand fly. In the larger passenger jet the purpose is to get your passengers from A to B as smoothly, professionally and as efficiently as possible.

You say you use SatNav when making deliveries, which is similar to us using the FMGCS to conduct a passenger flight.

I started on very basic turbo props with no automatics at all which was fine, but nowadays my flying enjoyment (of large passenger jets) is more as a conductor. It is immensely satisfying to be up in the atmosphere in my shirt sleeves operating a large modern jet across continents through mostly key presses and knob twiddling. It's more about strategy and I don't feel the need to hand fly for hours on end.

BUT if ATC brings me in above the glide slope, I find the easiest thing is to drop the automatics and hand fly. And I still really enjoy hand flying a turbulent crosswind approach, flare and landing. It is great fun and gives me a strong sense of satisfaction.
.

Heheh nice try, but I think a better comparison to the GPS/No-GPS drive would be an RNAV approach vs. a VOR one. After all, SatNav tells you when/where to turn, it doesn't help drive your car.
That being said, I can't fault anyone for loving what they love. If somebody's heart is with the symphony of knobs, then that's where it is. But keep in mind that this conductor is expected to play, at a moment's notice, a flaming violin when the orchestra catches fire, while at the same time playing the cello with his other hand because the cellist just passed out. And sing.
I'm glad you agree that there are situations in which the most appropriate level of automation is none and that the *easiest* thing to do is to drop everything and hand fly. Unlike what some posters are saying, automation can actually mean MORE workload. There was a disappeared thread around here about how to fly a particular VOR approach on the A320 I believe, and all the posts were full of programming altitude constraints and programming this and programming that.

Life always doesn't give pleasant options. It will be very Utopian to imagine that most people earn a living doing what they like. Earning a living is not an option. A380 Capt doesn't enjoy driving a bus but they are doing it now. If you happen to earn a living doing what you like it's a bonus. Besides one likes flying is no guarantee of anyone's professional competence. There are pilots who love flying but are mediocre and there are pilots who were basically attracted to it because they had money to become one and considered the salary of airline pilot as a good investment. The basic education with which one becomes a pilot there is no other field to make much more money. The thread is about acquiring and maintaining unassisted skills so let's not add philosophy to it.

There most definitely are other fields in which you can make more money. In Canada, one can make more money driving a lorry or a limousine. Or selling drugs. I don't know what it's like in Europe anymore, but I'm sure there's options.
I don't buy the argument that people will just take that money and invest it in such a fickle profession. I'm not saying it's not possible, but it's terrible decision making. There must be some love, otherwise I really don't see why someone would bother. As someone who has gone to flight school, you know how much money it costs. That same money can get you 2 keys of cocaine, which you will see a quick return on, I promise you. Or you can open a small business and have cushion money left for your first months. In any case, you will definitely see a faster and more certain return on investment. All the money in the world could never have convinced me to go sailing in the sky if I didn't deeply love flying. The sacrifices, the uncertainty, the danger in some cases...Totally not worth it if your heart isn't in it.

[vilas]

That same money can get you 2 keys of cocaine, which you will see a quick return on, I promise you. in many countries it can get you a long drop at the end of a rope.

[Check Airman]

As someone who has gone to flight school, you know how much money it costs. That same money can get you 2 keys of cocaine, which you will see a quick return on, I promise you. Or you can open a small business and have cushion money left for your first months. In any case, you will definitely see a faster and more certain return on investment.

Never thought I'd be reading about keys of coke on PPRUNE :D

We're certainly starting 2021 off right! :)

2020 has been a rough year for us all. Let's hope that the vaccines will help us round the corner. Cheers!

[Centaurus]

Many thousands of years ago airline pilots in the UK renewed their instrument ratings (in the sim) under these conditions:

-raw data
-no autopilot
-no autothrottle
-no FMC
-IMC icing conditions
-all engines operating
-flight director available (PF asking PM to make the appropriate selections) \

A puzzling feature of the above list is "flight director available." Yet the first item is "Raw data." A contradictory statement I would have thought?

The following statement is from an earlier Pprune contributor. I don't know the date of the original post or even which forum or the author, but in my book it should be kept in every pilots navigation bag and shoved in the face of any pilot (first officer or captain) that baulks at a reasonable request to switch off the flight director and practice hand flying.

(Quote):

"Raw data as a competence demonstration is intended to check a fundamental ability to fly some procedure at the lowest level of instrument display required to be provided in the aircraft.
Thus, no flight suggester, no thrust management slave, no 'noughts and ones' translating input data and no stress-relieving flight control manipulator. Just that most elusive of skills, manual flight on basic instruments." (Unquote)

Perhaps the operative words being "a fundamental ability to fly."

[Checkboard]

Ah 4dogs. :)

https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/490194-interpretation-what-raw-data-approach.html#post7289008

[aterpster]

Where I worked 1964-90 we had to have either the FD or AP to use charted ILS CAT 1 minimums. Without either our DA became the LOC-only MDA and not less then 3/4 or RVR 4,000.

[Vessbot]

\

A puzzling feature of the above list is "flight director available." Yet the first item is "Raw data." A contradictory statement I would have thought?


I interpreted it to mean that they were tested both with and without.

That said, I have seen more than once, "raw data" used as meaning the display of a VOR signal instead of the overlaid RNAV approach.

[vilas]

I think all the discussion is only centred around short to medium haul flights. If someone needs to do a dozen approaches to practice raw data then spare some thought to long distance guys. They hardly get to do 8 to 10 landings total in a month some they got to share also.

[Check Airman]

I think all the discussion is only centred around short to medium haul flights. If someone needs to do a dozen approaches to practice raw data then spare some thought to long distance guys. They hardly get to do 8 to 10 landings total in a month some they got to share also.

That’s very true. That doesn’t mean they can afford to be any less vigilant. They’ll probably be more tired, and be going into less familiar airports, but they’re prone to the same mistakes narrowbody guys are. With fewer sectors per month, I’d argue they need to be more proactive in pushing the red buttons.

As an aside, if I fly a widebody and do 8-10 landings a month, something’s wrong. That’s more than I do on a narrowbody! :} Some of my more senior colleagues do 4.

[vilas]

As an aside, if I fly a widebody and do 8-10 landings a month, something’s wrong. That’s more than I do on a narrowbody! Some of my more senior colleagues do 4. That is more correct. I was being over generous.

[hans brinker]

About a decade ago, when I flew corporate, sat at the bar with a retired legacy US legacy carrier pilot. He had always been able to do long haul, but most not senior enough to be pilot flying. He estimated he had done around 2 landings per month in the last 20 years of flying part 121, so about 500 landings in that part of his career. I had just come of flying ACMI for a European regional, doing 10 days on 5 days off, 6 legs per day, and in 8 months had about 500 landings as PF that year. He also had 8000 hours "dozing for dollars" (sleeping in the crew rest quarters as PIC). While I was commuting from the us to the EU I definitely flew more miles as a passenger than as a pilot....

[vilas]

About a decade ago, when I flew corporate, sat at the bar with a retired legacy US legacy carrier pilot. He had always been able to do long haul, but most not senior enough to be pilot flying. He estimated he had done around 2 landings per month in the last 20 years of flying part 121, so about 500 landings in that part of his career. I had just come of flying ACMI for a European regional, doing 10 days on 5 days off, 6 legs per day, and in 8 months had about 500 landings as PF that year. He also had 8000 hours "dozing for dollars" (sleeping in the crew rest quarters as PIC). While I was commuting from the us to the EU I definitely flew more miles as a passenger than as a pilot....
So how do they maintain their skill? Everyone has to manage within what is available. Long haul guys have to make their simulator sessions count because online situation is not going to change. The only advantage they have is they land at international airports which are generally not critical infrastructure wise. Also doing more manual landings is the corporate sector safer than airlines? What does the record suggest?
https://www.google.com/amp/s/qz.com/work/1169517/executives-are-dying-in-private-planes-while-commercial-flights-have-never-been-safer/amp/

[Bueno Hombre]

https://futureairlinepilot.********.com/2013/01/what-is-dog-there-for.htm

[Uplinker]

(quote):
The following statement is from an earlier Pprune contributor. I don't know the date of the original post or even which forum or the author, but in my book it should be kept in every pilots navigation bag and shoved in the face of any pilot (first officer or captain) that baulks at a reasonable request to switch off the flight director and practice hand flying.

"Raw data as a competence demonstration is intended to check a fundamental ability to fly some procedure at the lowest level of instrument display required to be provided in the aircraft.
Thus, no flight suggester, no thrust management slave, no 'noughts and ones' translating input data and no stress-relieving flight control manipulator. Just that most elusive of skills, manual flight on basic instruments." (Unquote)

Perhaps the operative words being "a fundamental ability to fly."

The contributor you quote is saying that we should all be able to fly an aircraft with very basic controls - not even FBW, which is fair enough - yes we should, and when it all goes wrong that is what we have to do.

But do we drive our cars holding a paper map or remember the route like a taxi driver, or do we use Sat Nav? Do we go down to the local library to look up information, or do we Google it? Do we use a fully manual film camera and a hand held light meter, setting the shutter speed and f-stop, or do we use an automatic digital camera? Do we keep a little black book of all our contacts' phone numbers or do we use our smart phone?

Technology has moved on, and there are better, more reliable and more efficient ways of control, than there were in the 1950's. (Even cross-channel ferries use autopilots, and they are moving quite slowly!)

[alf5071h]

Uplinker, "… be able to fly an aircraft with very basic controls …"
An alternative view is that pilots should first be able to interpret the situation from basic (unaided) instrumentation, enabling awareness and understanding before acting through the controls.

http://understandingaf447.com/extras/Gillenstudy.pdf

[Centaurus]

Technology has moved on, and there are better, more reliable and more efficient ways of control, than there were in the 1950's
A true statement. However there is one big difference between the examples you quote and the ability of the pilot to fall back seamlessly on raw data manual flying. That is lack of basic instrument flying skill has the potential to kill you and your innocent trusting passengers. Using an obsolete camera or a road map without GPS won't.

[vilas]

In modern automated aircraft and the environment like RVSM, CAT II/III the opportunities to keep safe levels of raw data flying are limited. Here the Airbus flight path stable concept helps because it doesn't demand the same levels of skills as say a 737. You just make what ever pitch and bank changes you require and the aircraft stays there. It trims itself and doesn't deviate due to speed or thrust changes. It's just a question of not loosing the scan. Only degraded mode like direct law which shouldn't normally extend beyond 3 or four minutes before landing you need to fly like conventional aircraft. And that in any case is practiced only in the simulator. Even engine failure after takeoff is automatically partly assisted leaving the pilot to do very little. This cannot be removed even in the sim for practice nor is it required. So the raw skill requirements are much less than ancient times, it cannot be denied nor is anyone unhappy about it.

[Uplinker]

Yes, I think there are two elements to this.

One is being able to fly manually, the other is being able to navigate accurately using only raw data.

Being able to fly manually means having the proven ability to direct the attitude, path and speed of an aircraft in the air mass, by reference to the primary flight display - pitch, bank, speed, Alt and V/S - and no flight director. Then trim it to maintain attitude with hands and feet off the controls; and manually adjust thrust to set the required speed. Then do it again following config or speed changes. This is a most fundamental requirement and ALL pilots should be able to do this to keep their licence.

The second element is navigation with reference to raw data. This is more of a grey area in my mind. If you navigate with raw data on a daily basis, you become very accomplished and accurate - I am sure that many of us flew our first commercial contracts in raw data aircraft, so this became second nature to us. However, some raw data displays and presentations leave a lot to be desired. Tracking an NDB in a PA 28 can be hard work; doing the same in a Dash 8 - in which you can overlay the NDB course bug onto the magnetic heading rose, which is automatically synced to magnetic north - is much easier. But is that "cheating"? Having an FMGS do it and drive flight directors, is obviously much easier again, (and essential for some navigation protocols).

In modern flying, do we need pilots to be able to accurately track an NDB with raw data? If you have lost most of your Nav systems in a modern aircraft AND have to land only via a raw data NDB procedure - displayed on the tiny back-up instrument(s) - it is a very very bad day - normally systems can be reset, or there will be at least a VOR or a Cat l ILS approach or radar vectors available, or within easy reach.
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