Eight B787 pulled from service over structural issues

[fgrieu]

According to this article (https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/boeing-pulls-eight-787s-from-service-over-structural-issue/) , Boeing identified manufacturing defects in eight B787 and asked the companies to stop using them.
Any better source?

[Copenhagen]

The Air Current is a reputable source, and has Boeing quotes.

Eight aircraft affected with both issues.... wonder how many aircraft with one issue.

[macdo]

Outsourcing?
Not training up the next gen of engineers?
Cost Accountants?
Greedy shareholders?

Take your pick

[lomapaseo]

I resent that, take your pick

[Sallyann1234]

If Boeing are like most other large engineering companies these days it will be a combination of most of the above.

[TURIN]

From what I remember weren't the early production section 48 assemblies made in Italy. Boeing pulled the contract due to 'tolerance' issues.
I think that particular problem related to the stab cut out area. Shimming was the answer to that problem too I think.

[Big Pistons Forever]

I bet they were all built in Charleston.....

edit. The first article I read about this issue did not specify where the assembly was built but I now see in the article embedded in the link in the first post specifies that the offending structures were indeed built in Charleston. This is what happens when Boeing execs decide union busting is more important than production quality. Yet another example of a once proud company renown for engineering and production excellence driven into the ground by MBA bean counters who know the price of everything and the value of nothing......

[Check Airman]

What’s so special about CHS?

[DaveReidUK]

Big Pistons Forever

Nobody who has bothered to read the article will take your bet ...

[Lordflasheart]

...
So Boeing have 'acted' on the double assembly error problem - making a combo of shims and roughness unsafe, sufficient to justify immediate grounding of a small number of 787s.

Who's to decide whether one or other of these issues alone, can be safely discounted ?

I mean, its not as if the backend is going to fall off, or is it ?

Are we waiting for an FAA AD ?
...

[tdracer]

Lordflasheart

Apparently it can adversely affect the fatigue life - so it needs to be fixed to avoid longer term issues.
Boeing technically doesn't have enforceable authority to ground those aircraft - so this is really just a recommendation. I'm sure an FAA AD will be coming shortly - which does have enforceable authority.

[Dave Therhino]

According to the article, it's not a fatigue issue - it's an inability to withstand limit loads issue (so yes, at least a theoretical back end falling off issue). Due to improper shim thicknesses installed during joining of the sections, installation of the fasteners for the joint causes localized pull-up loads and stress to be introduced in the composite material at the highly stressed areas of the joint. The surface discontinuities then apparently add stress concentrations. The joint strength with these conditions is apparently insufficient to withstand one or more of the applicable design limit loads. I don't know what flight conditions set the most critical limit loads for the section 47/48 joint, but gust loads, engine failure on takeoff, and hard landing touchdown are likely candidates.

[SamYeager]

Courtesy of another website I believe that all of these particular structures are built at CHS regardless of where subsequent final assembly of any individual 787 takes place.

[WillowRun 6-3]

I'd be curious to learn how the defects were discovered and isolated to eight aircraft. Did Boeing look at all manufacturing inspection data for this joint for all aircraft?

Interesting that TAC (J Ostrower) doesn't note how it was detected. Maybe his Twitter stream will say something about this, if and when it emerges.

Assuming (always risky on a forum where speculation is frowned upon . . . ) that the two issues were uncovered by review of inspection data, hmmm, what is the nominal time lag between generating of the data sufficient to review for such issues, and these inspections? Is that time lag (if it exists) subject to particular engineering discipline standards (prompted by "tolerance" issue re: Italian production earlier)? Were any of the certification Special Conditions - some were pertinent to this first very extensive use of composite materials in the airframe, weren't they? - pertinent to time lags between completion of inspection data sets and review of this data?

I'm not going to say anything specific about No Highway in the Sky.

[Klimax]

What has happened to what used to be the best aircraft manufacturer?

Bean counters took it down! Aviation and cheap - is a bad cocktail and very short sighted - the dudes counting the dudes don´t understand and don´t care. They´ll just move onto another industry and use there skills there. Really simple.

[infrequentflyer789]

According to the article, it's not a fatigue issue - it's an inability to withstand limit loads issue

The article isn't entirely clear, but my reading is that there is (at least potentially) both a fatigue issue and a limit loads issue.

I think what is going on is that there are two issues, bad shimming (cut too small leaving gaps) and ridges on the internal surface of the composite.

The bad shimming on it's own might cause fatigue issues - gaps mean more movement thus more potential for fatigue. It isn't clear that they know that this is definitely a problem, yet, and if it is it may just reduce the fatigue life - more frequent inspections may be the only remedial action.

On the other hand if you have both the bad shimming and the rough internal surface it seems there is an immediate problem that the structure might not handle limit loads. This might be because of poor load transfer - ridge pushes shim away from composite and all the localised load goes through the ridge - or maybe the ridge means that any gap is guaranteed to be between composite and shim giving the composite space to delaminate and fail, or something else.

My guess on how this has been found is that they have found the poor shimming (and maybe some earlier-than-expected fatigue) in routine inspections and that the second issue with the rough composite may be theoretical. Since, apparently, they cut the shims custom for each airframe from scans they may well have kept the scanning data which would make identifying the affected airframes straightforward. Suspect the shimming issue is more widespread, I can't see them ending up with eight airframes affected by both issues if it was just one bad batch of shims.

[megan]

From Boeing patent.Aerodynamic, also known as “wetted”, exterior surfaces of aircraft can experience significant manufacturing tolerance variations during component fit-up. If gaps at faying edges (i.e. fastening joints) are fixed and/or locked in place with contoured fillers or shims, resulting variations can create turbulent air flows which may create erosion of aft joint surfaces. When the components are formed of composite materials, the erosion may actually produce delamination. As a result, special care must be taken in the manufacture of faying edges of wetted aircraft components at risk for erosion damage.https://patents.justia.com/patent/20200271016

[Gove N.T.]

macdo

Unions seem to be missing from your list. They can be just as cynical and greedy as shareholders

[fgrieu]

A relevant aviationweek article (https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/safety-ops-regulation/new-787-problems-spotlight-boeings-quality-issues?elq2=adc91fbbf2fa453c988dcedb9065e3aa).

[Niallo]

I have not found a clear explanation of the shims. Are the two imperfect mating surfaces scanned and then individual shims made for each mechanical fastener, leaving possible gaps between the fasteners?
Or is one continuous annular shim made in order to mate the two surfaces perfectly?

[Zeffy]

New article in the Seattle Times (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-admits-a-new-quality-issue-on-the-787-and-tallies-more-737-max-cancellations/).

“Analysis is underway to determine if action is required on the in-service fleet,” she added. “Following an assessment of the manufacturing process, a total of 893 airplanes are believed to be affected.”
That’s the vast majority of the 982 Dreamliners Boeing has delivered.

[Ddraig Goch]

Who remembers of the whistle blowers at Charleston being ignored when they spoke of the 787s lash ups being produced there.

[Airbus_A350]

Just SOP for Boeing. Deny, deny, deny.
Another update today from The Air Current: "Best case the surface quality on these eight airplanes is good and then Boeing can put together a defendable argument that taking the things apart [across the fleet] isn’t needed."
Oh dear.

[The Banjo]

So Boeing is coming to the realisation that recruiting workers from fast food chains with no trade or industry experience to build airliners may not be a very clever idea.
If it's Boeing then I'm not going.

[Less Hair]

So who had checked those parts and processes when the sections were built? It was only left to be discovered now by some heavy check staff years later? And to internal IT to find out about the more unpleasant combinations of errors? Early fatigue?

[esscee]

What else might be "hidden" away in the B787 and may cause problems at a later date?

[dastocks]

Structural weaknesses and design defects in large commercial aircraft are nothing new, and are generally identified long before they cause an accident through a system of manufacturer testing, heavy maintenance checks and other in-service monitoring programs as has happened here. Also, this is nothing unique to Boeing, you will find similar issues cropping up from other makes and models of aircraft.

As an example, it took over 20 years for this issue to become apparent on the 737-classic
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues

it then took over 4 years of investigation to nail down the cause beyond reasonable doubt and for the FAA to order replacement of the offending parts.

[Airbus_A350]

The difference here is Boeing South Carolina is "so hellbent on making rate, sometimes engineering and production aren't aligned," in an engineer's words. The plant has a record of "undue pressure" on workers to make schedule over quality, unfortunately. The TAC, WSJ and NYT reports aren't flattering, at least. Neither is the number of fired whistleblowers.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Airbus A350 -
Interesting that in a situation of manufacturing and QC problems which appears to involve internal controls as well as tolerances, the assertions made about the root causes allow no role for either internal controls or tolerances.

The term whistleblower has obvious roots in the image of a ref calling a foul on, say, the basketball court or the gridiron type of football field. With the advent of instant replay, especially in the NFL, hasn't it become accepted that not every whistled call was correct? And even when "indisputable visual evidence" is said to have been discerned controversy often continues (and some of it can be honest). So why do press reports which use the magic whistle-word deserve unquestioned credence?

Regarding internal controls the full picture of what has gone wrong in the production process and what needs to be done about it has not yet emerged - certainly not within the confines of news reports. If a prior post is correct similar kinds of manufacturing anomalies, identified and resolved, have been part of a fair number of other aircraft programs.

The question whether Boeing management was over-eager in trying to correct what it perceived as a power imbalance in favor of organized labor in its Washington State workforce is a lot more complex than pointing to journalistic reports about employees, disgruntled, aggrieved or otherwise, identified as whistleblowers.

[Airbus_A350]

Collectively, the evidence looks poor for Boeing. Ostrower's article yesterday indicated Boeing's Quality Management System (QMS) failed to catch the defects in question. Boeing created QMS to make the case to the FAA that the company no longer required 900 quality inspectors. Not a good look for Boeing. Everybody I have spoken with agrees Boeing managers shifted away from a quality-first engineering culture to a cost-cutting business culture after the merger with McDonnell-Douglas. You can reasonably trace back most, if not all, of Boeing's problems to this culture clash, including the anti-union push by management.

The company needs an overhaul for the culture to return to its pre-merger days, which unfortunately looks unlikely. At best, you could argue Boeing's voluntary grounding and notice to the FAA marks a step in the right direction.

[Superpilot]

Joe Sutter, the Lead Engineer of the first ever Jumbo was asked to cut 1000 engineers from Boeing so they could have enough funds to market and build the aircraft. He walked into the meeting room and said "not happening" then walked out knowing full well he was probably now earmarked for the sack himself. Had he caved into board pressure, and Boeing hired brand new, lower paid, unskilled engineers, the 747 would've probably been a monumental failure owing to unreliability and poor manufacturing. Especially so when you consider the lack of advancement in materials and technology at the time. Seems Boeing needs to go back to valuing human experience once again.

[NutLoose]

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/scarce-data-on-787-quality-as-faa-peels-back-onion-on-boeing/

[fgrieu]

And now several (https://theprint.in/economy/almost-entire-boeing-787-dreamliner-fleet-under-scrutiny-now-for-defect-in-tail-wing/498720/) reports (https://samchui.com/2020/09/09/boeing-finds-manufacturing-flaws-with-787-dreamliner/) of a third manufacturing defect / quality control issue in a different section of the B787 (the horizontal stabilizer), potentially affecting 893 aircrafts.

PS: that's also in the article (https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-safety/scarce-data-on-787-quality-as-faa-peels-back-onion-on-boeing/) pointed by NutLoose above, perhaps the best of the three.

[Chas2019]

What has happened to what used to be the best aircraft manufacturer?
it no longer exists.

[etudiant]

Rather sad.
Bill Boeing founded the company with the maxim 'Let no advance in aviation pass us by'. His successors kept that course until Phil Condit stood by while Harry Stonecipher destroyed the company.
It should have been a warning to all when Frank Shrontz resigned from all his Boeing positions after quitting the chairmanship in 1997. However, there was so much good in Boeing that it took 20 years to bring the company down.

[FlightlessParrot]

The question whether Boeing management was over-eager in trying to correct what it perceived as a power imbalance in favor of organized labor in its Washington State workforce is a lot more complex than pointing to journalistic reports about employees, disgruntled, aggrieved or otherwise, identified as whistleblowers.

Ah yes, so complex now. A century ago, American employers corrected such power imbalances with Pinkerton men and rifles. Kill a few unionists, and the natural order is restored. Or not.

[etudiant]

The separation of the management from the actual manufacturing is surely a major factor. A corporate headquarters is not well equipped for finding problems and branch managers are not eager to report them.

[Airbus_A350]

KOMO radio just reported another defect today, this time with the vertical tail fin.

[WillowRun 6-3]

FlightlessParrot I don't believe you're inclined much, if at all, to commit thread drift by getting into the law applicable to the scope of mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. If it is preferred to adhere to a point of view by which a decision to build a plant in a right-to-work state was taken because of that legal status (of South Carolina) and it was just that simple, then there isn't much to discuss anyway.

Evidence . . . well, neither Ostrower reporting nor descriptions by Airbus_A350 of what people he's talked with have said, are evidence. And while I'm not questioning the veracity of either source the point was (in the post about whistleblowers) that caution should be exercised before taking at face value all reports of what they blew their whistles about.

The decline and fall of Boeing is not something especially in dispute. Nevertheless that set of facts and inferences is not the same thing as grappling directly with the facts about the manufacturing tolerances, inspection or other related processes, internal controls, and reporting to FAA. Or the same thing as the context noted by dastocks.

[Airbus_A350]

On the contrary, the reports from Ostrower et al. provide an increasingly clear picture regarding a number of questionable manufacturing processes for the 787. Specifically, automated quality systems failing and Boeing's justifications for cutting quality staff align very well with consistent complaints of undue pressure over making rate, whistleblower or not. Instead of quickly discounting quality complaints from workers and airlines, a healthy skepticism of Boeing PR will likely prove more objective. If nothing else, Boeing and the FAA's bungled response to MCAS justifies such skepticism. Had the FAA seriously investigated whistleblower claims preceding MCAS, the crash for Ethiopian, if not Lion Air, may have never happened.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Perhaps too much respect attributed to the objective reporting (inquiry, and assessment) by the Dep't of Transportation I.G. about the MAX can lead to exposure to assertions of "quick discounting" or lack of "healthy skepticism" in this nascent situation. An earlier post (#15 - before broad accusatory generalizations surfaced in the thread) didn't claim it was expressing healthy skepticism, but that would be a fair description, looking back.

Still not questioning the overall indictment of how Boeing declined and fell, although that indictment does not make it inadvisable or unnecessary to parse press reports. It could be the case that an inquiry and assessment on a par with the I.G. report (so far) on the MAX debacle would credit the sources and employee reports at face value, but that would be a departure from that method to date. (Of course if it were a choice between needing another I.G. report in another tragic aftermath, or taking those sources at face value, that's an obvious choice.).

[etudiant]

Willow Run, you are the voice of reason in many respects on this issue, but honestly, the various testimonies regarding the Max certification as well as the actual evidence of the 737 and 787 assembly deficiencies indicate a truly diseased corporate culture at Boeing. Aerodynamics don't meet spec, time for a 'Jedi mind trick' on the FAA. Stuff does not fit, just make it so. Where did the Boeing integrity go?
There is a great line from the early jet age when CR Smith, the chair of American, asked Donald Douglas for some substantial performance improvement before placing an order. Douglas's response was that 'I can't promise that', to which CR replied, 'I know that, I was just checking to see if you were still honest'.
Boeing too used to be honest, now we are not so sure.

[FlightlessParrot]

I don't believe it is strictly thread drift. Although US trades unionism (like so much in the USA) has had more than its fair share of criminality, corruption, and protection of vested interests, the desire to move to a non-union workforce is of a piece with the downgrading of the role of engineers, and the general tendency to treat Boeing as a machine for making money for a few, rather than an organisation for making machines, and making a profit by doing it well. And part of the complexity comes from the use euphemisms, such as "imbalance of power" and "right to work states."

[Airbus_A350]

The problem with heavily relying on I.G. reports and the like is that safety regulations are almost always written in blood. Everything is fine until it isn't, and the MCAS saga proves whistleblowers and journalists deserve more credit. The entire point of whistleblower programs is to check otherwise overlooked improprieties.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Time for an airport-callsign SLF to enter a plea.

There isn't any question (I've agreed three or four times now (plus a lot of hammering on Boeing on other threads)) that the culture degraded. The point of looking for the niceties of courtroom evidence - since I am copping a plea - apparently doesn't matter in this instance. Maybe there isn't a single assertion in any of the reported deficiencies about these specific manufacturing issues which is inaccurate. I had thought that healthy skepticism works both ways - that to solve the problems Boeing is manifesting, turning the clock back isn't really an option, and so sorting out what's accurate from what may not be accurate actually does matter. But, I cop.

As for euphemisms, perhaps there is knowledge about the Board deliberations and the information upon which they acted in opting to build a plant in South Carolina which makes it clear that the move was thoroughly and exclusively, or nearly exclusively, about avoiding a union workforce. That was not the only factor I recall from decidedly non-inside knowledge of which I was aware. But the label applied to a class of legislation, right-to-work, isn't a euphemism. And by the phrase, imbalance of power, yeah I had hoped to evoke the disdain which a lot of observers have for contemporary progressive dogma. But if the plant relocation was only about avoiding a union and nothing else, then it was an ill-timed shot at sarcasm.

[I'll take: voice of reason. . . when and if I could find it. Thanks.]

[Bidule]

the various testimonies regarding the Max certification as well as the actual evidence of the 737 and 787 assembly deficiencies indicate a truly diseased corporate culture at Boeing.

And don't forget the 767KCs and rejection of some aircraft at delivery by USAF, for quality issues.

[etudiant]

It may be as simple as the logical consequence of manufacturing consolidation. When everyone's livelihood depends on one customer's operations, no one can dare tell that customer that this process is deficient. Anyone who does gets ostracized..
I'm totally certain that lots of people knew about the design weaknesses of the Max, just as they did about the QC failures in the 787. Some heroes tried to sound the alarm, no one wanted to hear it.
In a world where there is one US and one European jetliner manufacturer, who can dare to speak up?

[Volume]

The issue is not necessarily quality issues in production.
Whatever part you manufacture, you will have tolerances. It is unavoidable. Especially if you assemble a complex machine from thousands of parts you need to design for tolerances, you need to have provisions in your design to account for them. For example shims.
You need to design for that, you need clear (and workable!) shimming procedures for production. You need to plan for the time it needs to perform this.
The new generation of CAD designers which have never seen production tend to believe that if they specify the dimensions in their computer model to the third digit, it will fit. It won´t !

Composites generally means higher maunfacturing tolerances than metal, and of course in other locations. The wound fusealge barrels of the 787 do not allow any diameter adjustemt, you need to plan for it on the mating parts. If you need to join two non-adjustable parts, you have messed up the design. If you do not realize that from the very beginning and design for it, you will face the issues Boeing does just now. again...

There are reasons, why the A350 fuselage is made from large scale panels, not from seamlessly wound barrels.

[Joe_K]

The issue is not necessarily quality issues in production.


"The manufacturing process uses laser measurement to precisely align the barrel sections and to predict the size of any shims needed. Kowal said the flaw arose when “software notification designed to alert when a shim exceeded the maximum thickness per engineering specifications was not being used.”
From: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-finds-manufacturing-flaw-in-some-787-dreamliners/

In my book that's the very definition of a quality issue...

[Volume]

Well, obviously somebody in design did not expect that shims beyond a certain thickness may sometimes be required...
It clearly is a quality issue if (to get the job done...) workers in final assembly just force the parts together with shims that are too thin for the tolerances.
But it is a design issue, if you do not correctly predict manufacturing tolerances and don´t plan for them to happen and to be accounted for.

The seamlöessly wound barrel design does not allow to correct the inner diameter in production. It is a nice design with respect to strength, weight and fatigue performance, but a nightmare to deal with tolerances. And if you plan for thick shims, you lose the benefits again...
It was a wrong prediction of manufacturing tolerances that can be met with this type of production. It was lack of composites experience. Partly this is a natural learning curve (after all wound barrels are new), partly it is ignorance not to use the +40 years of experience from glider and small aircraft composites production (which does not exist in the U.S.)

[infrequentflyer789]

Joe_K

Not sure that's the right link for the quote, this one definitely has it: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/eight-grounded-boeing-787s-were-built-last-year-rework-on-more-jets-may-be-needed/

And yes, it is the very definition of a quality issue in my book. It isn't really a design issue if the designers had specified that this software should have been used, any more than it is a design issue if a part is not made to specified tolerance. This sort of thing may be a design issue (failure to design for production) if, say, tolerances are too tight to be produced with the machinery available or the operator skills available etc. but "was not being used" doesn't indicate that, rather it indicates failure to follow specified process. This is why having loads of "tried and tested processes" (see MAX threads) is no defence (or at least not a complete one) - processes and procedures are no good if they are not followed. Like, say, designing and specifying a component to be made to certain tolerances on a CNC machine, then not bothering with the CNC and just machining it by hand - not that anyone would ever do that in aircraft manufacturing of course.

The really big question is why the software / process "was not being used" - someone just forgot (at least eight times?), or someone wasn't trained properly, or someone was told (or pressured) not to use it in order to speed up production...

[GlobalNav]

Or the software was impractical in the production environment. Who knows?

[etudiant]

Very likely true.
Manufacturing by remote control from the HQ often generates this kind of disconnects. The testimony of the Boeing 737 Max executives underlines that. (
They are certain the design process worked splendidly, even after the casualties were in the hundreds and the costs in the billions.

[tdracer]

I had plenty of first hand experience dealing with various Boeing process software programs. To say they weren't user friendly would be a massive understatement.

[megan]

after all wound barrels are newThe first Beech Starship (1986) had a carbon fibre wound over a mandrel fuselage, as did the Premier IA (1998) and Hawker 4000 (2001), so the technology has been around for a while, if not to the scale of the 787. A bit of an article.

https://www.intechopen.com/books/aerospace-engineering/the-evolution-of-the-composite-fuselage-a-manufacturing-perspective

[SLF3]

If the issue is the flatness of the sealing face, and the tolerance is 0.005", how do you inspect without disassembling the joint?

[CW247]

Very well written article that stitches it (pardon the pun) altogether nicely:

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4374235-boeing-dreamliner-manufacturing-nightmare

[Running Ridges]

SLF3

Ultrasound NDT methods would probably pick up the gaps created by the waviness of the surface

[TLoraine]

Boeing are said to be closing their 787 production line at Everett so everything will be built in SC. Is that where Al Jazerra filmed their investigative documentary about alleged quality control issues on the 787?

[joe_bloggs]

That is correct.

[unmanned_droid]

Volume

Shims above a certain thickness cannot be used as there is a knock-down in joint static strength and fatigue strength. Above a certain thickness, capability falls off a cliff edge. You can also use wet shim up to a certain thickness. This appears to be a limitation of the manufacturing process (process variation). I expect that it was not a pop-up issue. Somebody would have authorised a design manual(s) for the product, and in that manual are a list of all the allowed tolerances for parts in design. The digital model is created as 'nominal' with appropriate spacing built in for positional tolerancing. Above and beyond that, tolerance studies are carried out for large scale assemblies to assess the assembly process. Some of those tolerances are well understood (i.e. machined aluminium), some of them come from new process data. All are as a result of some level of testing and measurement process. Then you get in to the production side of things. There are quality auditing processes on purpose, and some are more fit for purpose than others. That possibly a quality process was abandoned with no replacement or improvement, primarily in order to make rate is cause for concern over the whole assembly process within that particular function/building/company unit. I find it hard to believe that there wasn't a manufacturing engineering task to look in to this one way or another. This could have been because the process wasn't fit for purpose, or because the process would show parts to be out of spec, or because the part condition wouldn't allow the user to carry out the inspection. The worst case scenario is that these measurements were not taken and things that needed a concession carried out on them have not been found and checked. Usually these kinds of things show themselves as a fatigue issue rather than a static strength issue.

This is the problem with commercial aircraft sized composites - part tolerances are more like cheap car assembly or worse than what we're used to (and require for our strength data and analyses) with metallic aircraft, for joints anyway. To compound the issue, B and A want to build airliners like Toyota and Honda churn out cars. Of course they do - there are thousands of single aisle in the order list at A, for instance. Something has to give. You get to choose two of: On Time, On Cost & On Quality.

[Big Pistons Forever]

I find it hard to believe that there wasn't a manufacturing engineering task to look in to this one way or another.

I find it very easy to believe that Boeing cut corners. What is unbelievable to me was the fact that Boeing used the supposed automated control of the shim process as justification for reducing the number of QA personnel. The drip drip drip of examples of corporate malfeasance is truly scary.

Now if there is a crash of any newer Boing due to a significant design or manufacturing flaw, I have to think Boeing in its present iteration is finished.

[fgrieu]

It seems more defects in the same vein have surfaced. Quoting the Seatle Times (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/boeing-finds-more-787-quality-defects-broadens-inspections/)
(Boeing officially states) “some areas of the 787 circumferential fuselage join may not meet specified skin flatness tolerances,”
flaw arose when software failed to flag that shims exceeding the maximum thickness per engineering specifications were being used.
“As a result, we delivered no 787s in November and expect the process will continue to slow deliveries in December,”

[CAEBr]

Flight Global's report is here
https://www.flightglobal.com/airframers/boeings-787-inventory-hits-60-amid-broader-quality-issues/141620.article

Seems like they now have a stockpile of 60 undelivered 787s,

[Less Hair]

That is a lot of inventory waiting for delivery and payment.

[Case One]

I’ve had the dubious “pleasure” of being a 787 pilot for several years now, starting with the unedifying experience of a manufacturer’s conversion course. None of this surprises me. I recall picking up an airframe from BSC. They are very nice people. However I did ask several probing technical questions that were met with absolutely blank stares - of the “what do you mean”, rather than the “that’s commercially confidential” variety. I didn’t leave with a feeling of increased confidence. If you’ve been in aviation a long time, and done enough factory/ engineering visits, spent your time in hangars, you know what an “aviation culture” feels like. It wasn’t there at all.

Hey ho, sooner I’m out of this mugs game the better.

[tdracer]

CAEBr

That has much more to do with the pandemic than any additional inspections (although the inspections aren't helping). Only 15 787s delivered since April (and only two passenger 777s).

[airsound]

Posts like Case One's (#67) really give me pause for thought. A while ago, I asked a 787 driver of my acquaintance what he thought about the batteries, and he said "We don't".

And now, the later, current, tales of Boeing incompetence just reinforce the impression of a once-great engineering company that has sold its soul to commercial success at all costs. How very depressing.

And is Boeing the only one?

[DieselOx]

As a Li-Ion battery designer, this saddens me. From what I'd read about the mitigation installed, I'd happily fly on a 787 with a pre determined 100% chance of a battery fire. The risks are known, and the fix looked good from here in the cheap seats.

The rest of it though, yeah, no thanks. Never setting foot in most newer Boeings.

I've seen an erosion of rigor in engineering across industries in the last 10-15 years. My boss, the head of engineering, was fired a month ago for surfacing a few critical issues to upper management. Opposite of normal, which would be mobilization of a thorough containment effort. But shipments are still going out, so contracts are being met, payments being wired on time.

(looking for another job actually, could be criminal liability for some of the stuff I've seen leave production).

[Grunff]

And to top it off, there is FAA warning about software bug found in newly rolled Autothrottle uppdates. Affecting 787, 777 and 747. This was not found in testing but out in the wild.

"Several in-service reports have been received from operators that the auto-throttle remained engaged in the IDLE mode when the flight crew advanced the thrust levers to conduct a balked landing. Once airborne, the thrust levers moved back to idle."
I am not allowed to post links but just Google "AIR-20-19"

[DaveReidUK]

EASA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin AIR-20-19 (https://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/AIR-20-19.pdf).

No mention of applicability to 747, only 777/787.

[double-oscar]

I would think the reason that most pilots don't think about the batteries now is that it is no longer an issue. The fix has worked and I cannot think of any further incidents. Also Boeing South Carolina was purely set up as a manufacturing site with no history of aircraft production. I am sure most of the people there are grateful to have a job and would be just as happy building washing machines. However, I would hope they still take pride in their work. I am sure if you were to visit Boeing in Seattle there would be no shortage of people who have been involved in aviation all their life and would have a great deal of insight into the product.

[Grunff]

The fix has worked and I cannot think of any further incidents.

The sad part is that Li-Ion + metal box weights more than NiCd it was meant to replace.

[double-oscar]

Sadly that is true. But if the batteries continue to perform without issue then one day the metal boxs may be removed to save weight.

[turbidus]

"Several in-service reports have been received from operators that the auto-throttle remained engaged in the IDLE mode when the flight crew advanced the thrust levers to conduct a balked landing. Once airborne, the thrust levers moved back to idle."

Isnt this is what caused the 777 accident at Dubai...
once there is weight on wheels, the ac is in LAND mode, therefore the autothrottles will not advance thrust, even when pressing TOGA.

[sgs233a]

I read this as a slightly different issue - sounds like a bug introduced at a particular firmware update, rather than known design logic.

[horizon flyer]

double-oscar

If they had used the better Lithium chemistry LiFePO4 which can not catch fire, instead of Lithium Ion which if anything goes wrong goes into thermal running away.
So bad design and choices in both type of chemistry and not putting them into a fire safe box from the start.. The best would be redesign with LiFePO4s and dump the steel box.

The trend in vehicles and aircraft is for LiFePO4 batteries to replace all forms of batteries.

[tdracer]

The sad part is that Li-Ion + metal box weights more than NiCd it was meant to replace.
The problem was that NiCd didn't have the necessary energy density - in short a NiCd of the needed capacity wouldn't fit in the available space. So they redesigned the Li battery with enough isolation between the cells that if a cell shorted and ran away, it couldn't propagate to additional cells. Unfortunately, the damage to the failed batteries was such that they couldn't definitely determine the cause of the failure, so they couldn't prove they'd fixed the root cause - necessitating the steel box in a sort of belt and suspenders solution.

[Imagegear]

As SLF on this aircraft, I re-evaluate the risks of flying on it every time I am forced to book it. Perhaps it is the prerogative of a pilot to consign his awareness of this issue to the back of his mind, but I trust he understands exactly how he will react when it all goes pear shaped.

It is true that we have not heard much about 787 battery fires lately, is that because they are not happening or the containment is working as designed.

[tdracer]

It's because they are not happening. There was one case where a single cell overheated, but it didn't propagate to the adjacent cells (and hence was pretty much a non-event).
With nearly 1000 787s in-service, each averaging around 4,000 flight hours/year (pre-pandemic), I'd say it's a pretty good bet that the redesign solved the problem...
Do you honestly think - with all the attention that everyone has been paying to the 787 - that there is a chance in hell that battery fires would go unnoticed/unreported by the MSM?

[Imagegear]

TDRacer,

Thanks for the clarification.

Although the redesign appears to be successful, I am afraid that it will not slip from memory so quickly.

[vilas]

turbidus

Dubai cause was different. There the throttles didn't come back to idle but we're always at idle till three second before crash when they were advanced to thrust position and one second before they were out of idle. The autothrottle disablement on touchdown is not due to land mode because sometimes you need to go around even from land mode. The autothrottle is disabled on touchdown or some low RA to prevent inadvertent triggering of GA during Landing.

[Dave Therhino]

tdracer - Since the changes were made after the grounding, there have been several main or APU battery fires and overheats that resulted in venting from the containment system in flight or on the ground. The new containment/venting design seems to be working.

[tdracer]

Dave, were any of those events complete battery meltdowns, or were they all confined to a single cell? Granted, I'm not as well connected as I was before retirement, but my understanding was that while there were venting events, all the battery failures were confined to a single cell - not the chain reaction complete battery events that prompted the grounding.

[WillowRun 6-3]

SLF/atty venturing out into this discussion more tentatively than usual....I have just a question. I recall discovering, at the time of the battery fires in early 2013 and which led to the grounding, that the type certification by FAA had involved Special Conditions for the lithium-ion batteries. The incidents were covered in the Wall Street Journal and, for better or worse, rekindled a long-time (long, long time gone) interest I have held, until now pointlessly, in aviation law and policy, particularly in the U.S. and internationally as well. Maybe the articles by Andy Pasztor (and was Jon Ostrower still at the Journal then?, I'm not certain) mentioned the Special Conditions, or someplace else, but I looked them up, and found a topic of interest that appeared maybe capable of ejecting your loyal atty-poster from what was a legal life of drudgery.

The question I have is, knowing what is known now, and realizing that the Boeing engineering and design planning (and market assessment and technology-visionary-encouraging) capacities had weakened even then, would you (a) write different Special Conditions for type certification, using the steel containment box, or (b) try to veto the design component and try sending the airframer back to its drawing board?

I don't know how unusual Special Conditions really are in type certification, or if they are more or less routine depending on what era of aeronautics and aeronautical engineering is being examined, or if it's entirely idle spec to consider these. But then, after the 787, I think the next thing I read about was Asiana in San Francisco in mid-2013, in which article a thing called PPRuNe was mentioned, so....in a sense the Special Conditions were the start of much idle spec overall, SLF/ atty, you know....
WillowRun 6-3

[GlobalNav]

14 CFR Pt 21 specifies when Special Conditions may be needed. They are not that unusual especially these days of dynamic technical innovation, when existing standards do not cover requirements needed for safety. The NPRM will state the rationale and identify the characteristics of the design that existing rules don’t address sufficiently.

[tdracer]

What Global wrote...

Special Conditions are quite common on new aircraft programs - and the 787 had a bunch due to all the new technology it incorporated (many having to do with the carbon composite construction). New technology can move quite quickly, while new regulations move at a glacial pace (after all, the FAA and EASA are basically just huge bureaucracies). So the FAA uses Special Conditions to address areas where the technology isn't addressed by the existing regulations. Glass cockpits, FADEC, and FBW are just a few areas where Special Conditions have been common. The down side is SC's are a royal PITA to deal with during the cert process.
On the 747-8, I narrowly escaped getting at least two Special Conditions - either by pre-emptively going to the FAA and explaining that we were already going to do what the FAA wanted (uncontrollable high thrust) or by voluntarily stepping up to the newer regulation than what would have been required by the agreed cert basis (HIRF).

[WillowRun 6-3]

Okay, I get that SC's are routine or mostly so in context of rapidly advancing technologies and engineering techniques.

What still seems like a question worth addressing (and I'll say "why is it worth..." in a moment) is whether the SC for the batteries turned out so badly that - in hindsight yes, admittedly - some other solution should have been explored. There have been a good number of posters' volleys on various threads about the necessity of engineers to overrule, or try to overrule, the pinhead accountancy managerial cadres. Or is this component of a new type of aircraft just too big an item for that professional obligation of the engineering community to address at the level of certification?

The reason I am (and I hope not impolitely) pointing back to the question is that, Congress even before the new one is seated, and certainly in the next Congress opening in early Jan next year, is going to revisit FAA structure and process. Sensing that it's easy enough to wear out an SLF/atty welcome, all I'll say here is that many a legislative project ends up doing more actual harm than good, or gives the false appearance of progress when there isn't any progress in fact, and so problems grow worse. I don't work on the Hill but it's part of something...something.

[infrequentflyer789]

Okay, I get that SC's are routine or mostly so in context of rapidly advancing technologies and engineering techniques.

Debateable whether or not the LiON batteries were a new or advancing technology, certainly to an outside observer they look like an extant tech that was new to transport aircraft, and was thought at the time by many to be too risky to use in that context. Now, same can be said of FBW back in the 80s when it made the move from military to civilian transport, but A did a heck of a lot of work on FBW to mitigate risk, and (again, to an outside observer) it isn't clear that B did anything significant to the battery tech to de-risk it.

What still seems like a question worth addressing (and I'll say "why is it worth..." in a moment) is whether the SC for the batteries turned out so badly that
Entirely possible that the SC itself was fine and that the compliance was wanting (cf. MCAS). SC is at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2007/10/11/E7-19980/special-conditions-boeing-model-787-8-airplane-lithium-ion-battery-installation I believe. Notably it states that:
(2) Design of the lithium ion batteries must preclude the occurrence of self-sustaining, uncontrolled increases in temperature or pressure.
Which evidently wasn't precluded,and also:
(3) No explosive or toxic gases emitted by any lithium ion battery in normal operation, or as the result of any failure of the battery charging system, monitoring system, or battery installation not shown to be extremely remote, may accumulate in hazardous quantities within the airplane.
Which is clearly being addressed by the venting system. The venting system that was added after the in-service failures...

[SMT Member]

One obvious solution to culture change would be to end all financial or productivity based bonuses for each and every employee of Boeing, from the board down. If a bonus system must be in place, reward those who find flaws, makes improvements or creates solutions that enhances safety.

In other words, start living the words "safety first" instead of just speaking and writing them.

[GlobalNav]

Not realistic. But it could be realistic to separate those responsible for determining compliance to the safety requirements from the pressures of project schedule and corporate profit. There needs to be sufficient independence between the regulator and the regulated. This can be done even with delegation, as long as nothing the DER does is immune to regulator technical oversight and that a determination of incompetence or dishonesty disqualifies the DER. The DER’s most valuable asset, in addition to technical competence, is trust.

[Snyggapa]

I am pretty sure there is a Dilbert cartoon or similar where the people rewarded to find bugs ended up in league with the coders to find a "mutually beneficial outcome".

I think it has to be cruder and harder to manipulate - like a salary or bonus multiplier that contains elements like "deaths due to design or manufacture failure" which can immediately set the multiplier to zero , number of recalls / airworthiness directives / other violations which can massively reduce it, etc.

I agree with the general principle of rewarding the design, manufacturing maintaining of safe aircraft - it just needs to be careful to promote the desired outcome not just something else to be manipulated. Arguably my proposal should, in a a fair, world lead to management implementing yours :)

[unmanned_droid]

I find it very easy to believe that Boeing cut corners. What is unbelievable to me was the fact that Boeing used the supposed automated control of the shim process as justification for reducing the number of QA personnel. The drip drip drip of examples of corporate malfeasance is truly scary.

Now if there is a crash of any newer Boing due to a significant design or manufacturing flaw, I have to think Boeing in its present iteration is finished.

Apologies, only just catching up on this thread.

The reduction in QA personnel was almost certainly part of the business case for the introduction of that piece of equipment. It is almost inevitable that personnel are reduced with the introduction of major new equipment. Claims will be made about person hours saved by the introduction of the equipment and they will be banked in the business case payback timetable.

Different companies have different payback schedules. One company I worked at was 1 year almost non-negotiable. Introduction of any new equipment was incredibly difficult and it showed. Another company was 3 years, and far more realistic for larger capex.

[paulross]

Snyggapa that is the Cobra effect: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobra_effect

[Dave Therhino]

Sorry for the delay, tdracer.

I think you are right that all of the in-flight events since the fix have been contained single-cell events.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Seattle Times now reporting, Boeing has announced it will move all 787 production to South Carolina by mid-March of 2021, a number of months earlier than it previously had described. Article by ST aerospace reporter Dominic Gates.

[Big Pistons Forever]

No surprise there. This is a result of company chiefs that care more about union busting than making quality airplanes.....

[esscee]

If the 787 production is moving to South Carolina, then as there were some serious problems regarding quality control and adequate supervision over recent times at that facility, there may be more trouble in store for the next few years.

[JLWSanDiego]

Or it may solve the problems they have had

[fokker1000]

Haven't read this entire thread, so forgive my possibly naive comment.

Airbus are built in a part of the world which is very regulated, and many of it's governments are centre left... So if a person on the production line, or in the engineering dept etc. sees a possible fault, or a short cut too far to increase profits over safety, they would have no problem with raising this issue up the chain of command.

If a similarly minded person raised a concern elsewhere around the globe, they may not dare raise a reasonable concern for fear or being demoted, sacked etc.

The company I work for has a totally open culture to reporting absolutely anything that might compromise safety.

[Pugilistic Animus]

​​​​​​
Dave, why is EFATO included in the limit loads of that section. Just can't seem to get my mind around it...thanks in advance?

[kildress]

I had presumed it was because of the large compensatory rudder use creating unusually high lateral fuselage bending load between wing and tail.

[derbyshire]

Measure twice, cut once!

[Dave Therhino]

Pugilistic Animus

Again, I don't know exactly which load case is most critical for the joint in question, but lateral loads caused by the quick initial large movement of the rudder to compensate for assymetric thrust are one of the significant loads. I do know that in the past there was a fitting cracking issue on the 747 at the joint of the aft fuselage to the center wing section where the engine out case was the critical load case.

[Pugilistic Animus]

Ah yes, I now see how it may be possible during EFATO as a potential limiting case. Thank You Dave!

[BlankBox]

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4396993-boeing-787-problems-loom-large

[Capt_Tech]

What has happened to what used to be the best aircraft manufacturer?
Pre 2000 Job Interviews had a practical exercise to help employers select the right candidate for the job.
Now days employers are more interested in qualifications over technical hand skills.
I once witnessed a chap had passed his Part 66 licence and needed to fill out his practical experience in his experience logbook, he filled up his experience logbook in a matter of 3 days as per the requirements of the CAA.
His experience was fabricated.
This I find as a common problem in aviation today, engineers that are very clever with studying and exams but lack handskill and technical ability.
The Charlton whistle blowers were probably long term Boeing employees with a very rare skillset of seeing problems before they present themselves,through years of experience.
I have worked at many different companies UK based, where complacency is an every day norm, tasks are signed off without been done to meet costing and schedules.
With approved maintenance data not being used but signed off in accordance with that approved data.
When the issues are raised one finds themselves being set up to fail and end up being fired with excuses that it is not economically viable for the company to follow approved maintenance data due to cost and downtime.
The customer is non the wiser.

Boeing's biggest problem was their competition with Airbus. The B787 was the beginning of their downfall, due to getting the B787 certified before the Airbus A350. Boeing had a good relationship with the FAA and the FAA trusted Boeing ASB's and SB's were being approved in record time. Boeing took took advantage of this relationship with the FAA and that is when safety started to slide downhill.

The CAA are more interested in making money than safety, I have seen CAA conducting audits whereby they don't know what they are looking for and this comes from qualifications over technical ability ie hands on experience.

Recall the incident whereby the pilots windshield blew out due to the incorrect thread pitch bolts being used to secure the windshield, those bolts were taken from a bin on the hangar floor.
Following this incident the authority decided that quick access parts in bins whereby a requisition is not needed were to be eliminated. But over the years these have reappeared and the CAA walk passed them on audits. Toolboxes are rarely checked and toolbox check sheets are signed off by mates.
No control and we wonder why airplanes fall out the sky.

[BlankBox]

...seems like none of their jets are safe from structural issues...

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/a-new-787-dreamliner-manufacturing-flaw-will-prolong-boeing-delivery-halt/

[568]

Capt_Tech

Unfortunately that is the norm today.
No practical experience but the qualifications look good.
just like the technical pilot that was in charge of the fleet we oversaw, but hadn’t flown the real thing!

[TURIN]

Recall the incident whereby the pilots windshield blew out due to the incorrect thread pitch bolts being used to secure the windshield, those bolts were taken from a bin on the hangar floor.
Not exactly accurate. The bolt p/n was incorrectly selected from a shadow board. It was then requested from stores.
No bins on hangar floors.

[Anti Skid On]

Capt_Tech

Fantasy logbooks are common place, but not always easy to spot; a few years ago there was the case of a pilot, Korean Airlines, who passes his initial IR in a twin that was under maintainence and had no engines fitted on the date his flight test was signed off.

[DaveReidUK]

TURIN

The bolts were obtained from an unmanned, uncontrolled, 408-drawer, self-service AGS carousel.

[Maninthebar]

TURIN

Also, if this refers to G-BJRT, I am not sure that an accident in 1990 can be used to indict 'recent' engineering recruitment standards. If anything it demonstrates that plus ca change,plus c'est la meme chose.

[Flingwing47]

And actually as I recall the engineer took a bolt from the frame and chose new bolts that matched it. Unfortunately it was an undersized bolt used in the last windscreen replacement :(

[Maninthebar]

"Engineering standards aren't what they once weren't"

Or, more accurately, Murphy is ever present.

[TURIN]

DaveReidUK

That is a very different scanario to the one represented in our human factors training. In fact the store man giving the bolts to the management grade engineer actually questioned him that these were really the bolts he wanted.

One of us has been given misinformation. I'll do some checking. 👍

[daved123]

Turin, your recollection coincides with mine from the orig report.

[DaveReidUK]

TURIN

Yes, but that's only part of the story.

The engineer attempted to obtain the bolts from the manned store in the hangar, and the stores supervisor did indeed query the part number requested (in my experience storemen usually know the correct part numbers for pretty well everything :O), but he didn't press the point.

In the event, the bin in the hangar stores contained hardly any of the requested bolts, so the engineer then went to the unmanned AGS carousel under the International Pier at BHX, where he picked up the required quantity after identifying them by comparing the bolts in the bin with those he had removed from the aircraft, resulting in the wrong diameter bolts being (re-)fitted.

[TURIN]

You could be right, I don't remember reading anything about those sort of AGS Carousels, we didn't have them where I worked.

[Yeehaw22]

Capt_Tech

Sorry but that's complete and Utter nonsense, for starters every line Station has a limited stock of parts that the engineer can access without a requisition as many do not employ a storeman(or woman). Always been the same. The simple fact remains that its the engineer's responsibility to order or use the correct part. If there is a stores person there to issue it they only issue what's been requested anyway.

Ref tool control its tighter now than its ever been in my experience, maybe its being company driven rather than caa driven though I don't know. And yes it's actively encouraged that your kit is checked by someone else to confirm its completion. Seeing as though I only work with a limited number of other employees it tends to be a mate aswell. Doesn't mean it doesn't get checked.

Just out of interest How many aircraft have 'fallen out of the sky' due to part or tooling control?

[TURIN]

I have to agree with Yeehaw.
In addition, my employer now provides tool boxes. Personal tools are no longer used (except for the odd GS and multitool).

Also, thankyou for supplying the AAIB report. Lots of holes in the Swiss cheese lining up there.

[Lyneham Lad]

On Flight Global.

Boeing video reviews fuselage ‘gap’ issue that prompted 787 delivery halt (https://www.flightglobal.com/airframers/boeing-video-reviews-fuselage-gap-issue-that-prompted-787-delivery-halt/144754.article)

Intro:-
Boeing has released a video about the fuselage-related quality issues that led the company to halt deliveries of 787s.

The Chicago-based airframer released the video (https://players.brightcove.net/5114477758001/default_default/index.html?videoId=6264506033001) on 23 July alongside an email from Boeing Commercial Airplanes chief executive Stan Deal to all Boeing’s commercial aircraft employees.

The letter addresses Boeing’s efforts to bring “production stability” to all its commercial aircraft programmes.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Wall Street Journal reporting today (Sept. 7 2021, article by Andrew Tangel) that FAA has not given its approval to the inspection process Boeing had proposed to FAA. Reportedly, in their meeting on August 2 with FAA certain Boeing staff presented the company's proposed inspection method or process, but another Boeing engineer disagreed that the proposed method or process would be sufficient. (There is enough detailed reporting in Mr. Tangel's article so that further summarizing of factual points or items wouldn't be helpful here.)

Article does refer in some places to the "team" or "teams" (plural) of Boeing engineers and employees, even referring to them as "teammates".

When were the tryouts for these teams, this SLF/attorney wonders? Aviators undergo real tryouts, what with detailed flight instruction, qualification tests for licenses to be granted, recurrent training, and so on. Isn't it the case that pilots first learn how to fly an airplane, and then how to fly a particular type of airplane? Word choices in contemporary vogue - such as calling groups of employees a "team" - obviously are not either the start or the solution of safety problems confronting Boeing . . . yet the sell-out by the "aerospace giant" widely and frequently derided on this forum very well could be reflected in company culture that encourages employees to yield to group-think mentality rather than thinking for themselves, individually. Or even requires it.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Article in Wall Street Journal (Andrew Tangel by-line, Oct. 14) stating that new problems have surfaced in 787s produced over the past three years: unspecified "titanium parts" that were found to be "weaker" than expected. As an non-engineer maybe this is an unwise side-comment, but shouldn't the concern be that parts were not as strong as specified?

Article is ambiguous about whether the (unidentified) titanium parts were found in aircraft in the production process only, or include planes already delivered. It does state that two undelivered aircraft were "repaired." And that "Boeing and regulators have determined that the new titanium issue doesn’t pose an urgent safety risk to planes currently flying, people familiar with the matter said."

The recent history with regard to Boeing's interactions and communications to/from FAA are noted, though without shedding any further light on what this newly reported titanium parts issue is about.

[Imagegear]

More detail:

787 more detail: (https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-deals-with-new-defect-787-dreamliner-wsj-2021-10-14/)

[DaveReidUK]

"The parts include fittings that help secure the floor beam in one fuselage section, as well as other fittings, spacers, brackets, and clips within other assemblies."

sounds like something that wouldn't be particularly newsworthy if any other manufacturer was involved.

[WillowRun 6-3]

More developments with regard to production and related problems with the 787. Wall Street Journal reporting today (weekend edition) that the production rate has been slowed again, due to problems in "areas surrounding passenger and cargo doors" on aircraft already in the production process - and that the manufacturer is (or may be) seeking assistance from other aerospace manufacturers for resolving these problems.

According to the article the earliest the company could deliver completed aircraft to customers now is February or March and, relatedly, at least one major airline is "proactively" taking the wide-body aircraft out of its planned winter schedules. As the article notes, something like 105 airplanes are in inventory awaiting delivery (certainly a major portion of which are due to the pandemic, obviously) with resulting highly negative financial impact on the company.

Not least, the article reports that the situation - more specifically the effectiveness of the FAA approach and actions in addressing the situation - has prompted increased scrutiny on Capitol Hill and because this involves the uncontroversial subject area of politics (. . .) I'm quoting the article directly on the point.
"On Thursday, Democratic and Republican leaders of the U.S. House Transportation Committee and its aviation subcommittee requested that the Department of Transportation’s inspector general review the FAA’s manufacturing oversight and 'the effectiveness of the FAA’s actions to resolve 787 production issues,' according to a letter reviewed by The Wall Street Journal." [article by Andrew Tangel, internal quotation in original] Reuters reporting the same thing also.

Anyone following Boeing's issues over the past few years will (or should) recognize that it was House T&I that conducted one of the most, if not the most, thorough and far-reaching investigation into the 737 MAX; which authored and got enacted legislation to try, at the very least, to bring effectiveness to the FAA-manufacturer relationship; and which announced its definite intention to stay, if you will, on the case. And the Inspector General reports and their value speak for themselves. While the Congress, like lawyers, get a lot of cheap shots, sometimes the efforts of both deserve some measure of respect. But we'll see.

[Less Hair]

Didn't the Capitol cut down the FAA financially before and paralysed it with the budget fight while moving US export company support into their agenda or similar? The House did a good job improving what had been wrong with the MAX before but maybe the FAA needs even more funding and political support to be able to work as in the old days? Reforming it growing the staff and spooling up seems to take long this time. It feels like this is already affecting the speed to get the 777X and 787 on track again.

[Big Pistons Forever]

This isn't Congress or the FAA's problem, it is Boeing's problem. I would have thought that by now Boeing executives would have figured out that if they don't commit enough time or money to do the job right, they will end up having to spend much more time and money to do it over :rolleyes:

[WillowRun 6-3]

Among people who have strongly criticized Boeing (especially on this forum, and not only here) it probably isn't controversial to say that the problems, plural, at the company run very deep, and that these problems didn't materialize just all of a sudden.... and so breaking the situation down and addressing problems is likely going to be a long process.

And that the problems presented in the situation at Boeing also require responses, if not solutions actually, at FAA and from Congress. It isn't either/or.

It could be very informative to hear what knowledgeable people think about identifying one of probably several root causes of the 787 Dreamliner difficulties at present. -- Specifically, in prior threads some posters have observed that Boeing shifted production to S. Carolina precisely for the reason of getting away from a unionized workforce. That union-organized workforce had turned out 787 airplanes without these production problems, had it not? At the same time, isn't the workforce in S. Carolina something like a distant second to the Seattle-area workers? If this much is valid, then.....

Maybe it would take more than the proverbial "act of Congress" but pack it in, move it back. Move all the 787 production back to the Seattle area. If any politicians from that southern state don't like that idea, tell each one they can move with it - but each will have to start by learning how to use a slide rule, then work their way up, just like "Wimpy" would have insisted, back when.

[SamYeager]

Do we know if this story that Seattle produced 787s had no problems is actually true? I believe the increased oversight by the FAA as well as increased self inspection by Boeing seems to have mostly, if not completely, taken place after the transfer of production to S. Carolina.

[kiwi grey]

WillowRun 6-3

Boeing have done their darnedest to make this impossible.
Firstly, the 787-10 fuselage sections are too long to be transported to Seattle: the -10 was only ever designed to have its final assembly in North Charleston, South Carolina.
Secondly, Boeing has sold off the DreamLifter arrival / unloading / materials storage facility in Seattle (to UPS or Fedex IIRC) to make sure there's no way to actually get the 787 major sub-assemblies to a FAL in Seattle
:(

[WillowRun 6-3]

SamYeager -
Good question. I haven't read anything that excludes 787s assembled not in S.C. from the pertinent manufacturing defects. The timing of the more intensive scrutiny does suggest the possibility that the other manufacturing site hasn't been accounted for sufficiently, with regard to these defects. (Several posts early in this thread suggested that the defects identified were in sections in S.C. - nos. 7 & 13 for example, but obviously that doesn't exclude the other site from problems.)

As for relocating back, okay that won't happen. Maybe posters who have advocated tearing the company down and selling off assets, letting someone else start from scratch, will prove prophetic.

[DaveReidUK]

My understanding is that most, if not all, of the 787 structural problems are rooted in manufacture, not final assembly, though it's during the latter process that they manifest themselves.

So transporting completed fuselage sections across the USA for final assembly elsewhere wouldn't be a solution.

[Chris2303]

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/faa-memo-reveals-more-boeing-787-manufacturing-defects-including-contamination-of-carbon-fiber-composites/

[Big Pistons Forever]

WillowRun 6-3

The shift of production to South Carolina was a result of Boeing executives that thought that the Seattle work force was too expensive. Well big surprise :rolleyes: the old adage you get what you pay for actually applied and so any work force savings are now obliterated by the costs to fix the problems the low wage work force created. The South Carolina production decision however is just a symptom of the root cause. The old Boeing ( ie pre MD merger ) was an engineering company and so the last major program at old Boeing, the 777, was designed mostly in house with aircraft component subcontracting carried out largely after the design was completed. When the 787 program was launched by the new Boeing, the Boeing engineers wanted to use the same process but were over ruled by the C suite execs. Instead the big bosses wanted both the design and build of most major components subcontracted to the lowest bidder who was usually many time zones away and often did not have proven production record. Boeing people would therefore only be doing the integration work which allowed for greatly reducing the size and influence of the engineering department.

Because Boeing execs were so focused on cost and largely had no real engineering or production background they did not appreciate what the ramifications of their decisions was. In particular outsourcing design and manufacturing QA meant that by the time it was apparent things were badly wrong it was too late to fix. Many of the issues were IMO totally foreseeable, if there had been any Boeing oversight. Ultimately all of Boeings problems with the 787 and indeed the MAX fiasco, can be attributed to a refusal on the part of senior Boeing management to acknowledge the value of spending money on quality engineering and production. Pay now or pay (more) later, there are no shortcuts in large aircraft design and manufacturing.

[ATC Watcher]

Thanks for the article Chris2303, I am not an engineer and I have not a degree in composite manufacturing so it is not easy to understand if this Teflon and wrong titanium alloys are indeed minor issues that happens regularly and are just blown up because it is Boeing, and/or because the FAA has taken a much firmer stand after the Max debacle, or if indeed as the article suggests , it is alarming and potentially safety related.

[WillowRun 6-3]

The letter from the leaders (both political parties) of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, requesting the Office of Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation conduct a review of FAA oversight of the "manufacture and production" of the 787: It's straight from the Committee webpage. The redactions are the same as on the webpage - the names of Committee staff members.

2021-11-18 LTR to DOT OIG 787 Production Issues FINAL.pdf (house.gov) (https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2021-11-18%20LTR%20to%20DOT%20OIG%20787%20Production%20Issues%20FINA L.pdf)

Big Pistons Forever (thanks for your post, btw)

I don't disagree with anything you've said - and that's even if previously I had a more credulous view of Boeing party-line dishonesty. (If I had to defend my earlier credulity, like in the film "Defending Your Life", I'd plead that I really wanted to become an aeronautical engineer when "I was a kid" - and the world would not have despaired over one fewer attorney.)

And something in your post might be interesting for more comment. Moving the production physically back to the location where the better workforce is located, as has been shown, isn't at all realistic. So, instead, what if someone were asked to advise the Boeing Board, along with the relevant USFG (U.S. Federal Government), authorities about what "should" be done to return the 787 program to a status the same as what "OldBoeing" would have had in place? I know this is a "what-if" speculative question -- but..... is there some viable proposal for fixing this mess that somehow Seattle Times, Air Current et cetera have missed?

I'll seize upon the very useful dichotomy your post drew, OldBoeing cf. NewBoeing -- Engineering Primacy cf. Engineering on-the-Cheap. What if the company - okay, so by magic - were forced to hire significant cadres of engineers, some destined to be seconded to subcontractors whose performance on subassemblies for the 787 obviously has left much to be desired; some sent to North Charleston to take charge; some with college minors in Industrial Relations sent to air thoroughly the grievances every single whistleblower in that plant; and some to oversee all the company-level engineering work?

I realize some people, some folks very, very knowledgeable about travel by air aboard airliners, find the 787 to leave a lot to be desired. But isn't the use of composite material a bona fide technological or engineering (or both) advance? and isn't it a worthwhile aircraft program to get back on track? and not only as a matter of financial survival for a major company?
Is it not the case that somebody somewhere, somehow or another, has to devise a game plan to rescue the 787 aircraft program from the awful mess it has become?

(I guess my limited, substandard undergraduate education is showing, so pardon me.... I was taught, repeatedly, that something to accomplish the given goal or objective or purpose must be added, before one can drop the corresponding something one wants to get rid of. You have to add before you can drop. (Ann Arbor, circa 1970-1972))

[Big Pistons Forever]

WillowRun 6-3

The production foot print is already set so I think moving production around isn't worth the cost and disruption. The solution is truly independent QA and SMS teams and processes. This means they have the authority to hunt out problems and shut down any part of the operation. No bean counter or marketing "professional" can over rule a team decisions.

The problem is things will invariably get worse before they get better because I think it is obvious that the more the teams look, the more they are going to find. The cost of doing it right is going be significant with an inevitable effect on profits and share price over the short and probably medium term. The chance of this happening in todays environment that prioritizes quarterly share prices, is IMO pretty much zero. The pay off is setting up the company for long term success, but it requires the vision to take the long view. I just don't see any of the current Boeing management that is interested/able to get there from here. Instead the company will lurch from crisis to crisis as it loses market share and relevance.

The decline and now breakup of GE is I think, sadly an example of the kind of trajectory that Boeing will follow...

As for the 787, well I think that program is effectively over in terms of meaningful large new sales going forward. It will limp along but the airlines have shifted decisively to the Airbus A350.

[Less Hair]

Boeing successfully rectified major program troubles with their early 787s, the early 747-8 flutter and the MAX. Ungrounded even in China.
What makes it so hard for them to finally get the 787 manufacturing right now?

[unmanned_droid]

Whilst we are seeing a shift in Boeing's approach to the development of a commercial aircraft, what we are also seeing is just how hard it is to design an airliner structure to hit tolerances in disparate factories across the globe.

Having read the articles that are chucking in all sorts of words and phrases that mean something to some of us who are designing, making and building these things, its clear that they are fairly normal problems. In some respects its been blown out of proportion. There are a few things that do worry me in terms of process failure, using technology not being properly monitored/operated , shimming knock down factors etc.
​
Composites at this scale require larger tolerances and gaps than similar metallic items, and chances are they are harder to close and keep closed. That's what happens when you take your metallic structure and mostly just swap materials. Really needs a totally different approach and thats scary/expensive in the extreme.

As an aside, Airbus isn't that different with the integrator thing and the shifting of immediate technical risk to tiered partners. Its always more fun to bang a desk and point at a missed deadline than wondering how the f you're gonna solve todays inbox full of technical problems. It was a very business oriented direction to take and has only caused problems. It solved nothing.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Are the causes of GE's break-up sufficiently comparable to the causes of Boeing's current dire straits? Saying "poor management and direction", or "bad management and direction", is so general that it doesn't prove they are comparable. ("poor" meaning, you scored 9 on a scale of 90; "bad" meaning you scored poorly plus you got ejected for the next several rounds of competition for misconduct - Boeing of course has both kinds of indictments at present)

Perhaps it will make a significant difference that some time back, Boeing brought in - or at least it said it was doing so - more Board-level experience with the Navy nuclear enterprise. I don't think people with successful careers in nuclear-powered ships in the USN have a bean-counter mentality. The "safety culture" problems couldn't possibly be solved overnight, regardless of what changes are made at the Board and in senior management. (I'm leaving for another day various wild and crazy thoughts about complicity amongst and between certain senior managerial types, and lawyers for the company of various stripes. It was all Forkner's fault, wasn't it?)

About the future prospects of the 787, as just an SLF/attorney, I wonder what the boards of directors of the airlines currently operating the 787 - let's just finesse the situation and say "operating it at levels commensurate with before the pandemic" - would have to say if they ever spoke publicly about seeing the demise of the company, and an inglorious and abrupt end to the aircraft program, as inevitable. Before responsible people call something quits, if the purpose the "something" was supposed to serve still exists and is valid, don't you need "something else" to take its place first? Or is it the case that Airbus can ramp up to a huge extent A350 production and assembly, without delay, difficulties or undue expense?

[Big Pistons Forever]

The GE analogy is far from perfect but I truly believe the decline of 2 industrial greats has a similar origins. That is when new management prioritized profits over everything else. The engineering and production brilliance that the companies history was built on was sacrificed on the alter of stock market dominance.

The trajectory of decline is much further advanced at GE but sadly I see the same path for Boeing. It is a tragedy of management hubris and short sightedness.

With respect to the 787, the programs best days are behind it. Boeing will still make and sell the 787, but it is damaged goods. Every AD, structural limitation, new service life limit etc etc, will cost Boeing as they have to compensate the airlines for an airplane that does not meet its promised in service performance metrics.

Boeing has completely lost the trust of the FAA so the regulator will ride them like a cheap donkey. In service issues that in the past were dealt with in house now get the full stifling government oversight treatment. Each belated admission of an “issue” like the latest one regarding door frame gaps feeds the narrative that Boeing has lost control of production QA.

Airbus is far from perfect, the A320XLR centre fuel tank scam being a good example, but they have seemed to have been able to keep a culture of engineering primacy that has mostly insulated them from the own goal gimme Fu*k ups .like we see at Boeing.

Airlines will now only buy Boeing’s at a steep discount, witness O’Learys smack down of Boeing’s attempt at price discipline on the MAX.

Sadly there is no commercial future for Boeing only fewer sales at smaller and smaller margins while the company is starved of R &D funding because of the costs of reparations for the MAX and 787 costs to airlines

[FlightDetent]

the MAX. Ungrounded even in China. CAAC rated friends have no knowledge of this, what's the good news?

Websearch https://airlinegeeks.com/2021/11/25/boeing-737-max-is-taking-steps-toward-flying-in-china-again/ suggest 'strong optimism it will be allowed to fly soon'.

[Less Hair]

Chinese airlines now can comment on this during a comment period before the grounding formally gets lifted.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Big Pistons Forever

Difficult if not impossible to argue that anything in your post is factually incorrect, or logically unrelated to the pessimistic view you hold . . . perhaps "realistic view" is a fairer, more complete reference.

As related to this SLF/attorney by a long-since retired airline heavy jet captain in the context of what will happen to Boeing after the 737 MAX debacle(s), "Boeing builds airplanes." Well at one point, so too did Willow Run build airplanes (the plant, not . . . .). As they say, past performance does not guarantee future results.

At the same time..... yesterday the Chairman of the House of Representatives Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, together with the Chairman of its Aviation Subcommittee and another Member of Congress, issued a letter to the FAA Administrator, focused on follow-up issues related to the 737 MAX. Specifically, the letter seeks direct answers to issues concerning the inoperability of the AoA Disagree alert, and to Boeing efforts to downplay the MCAS as a modification to the aircraft. (A link to the letter is posted on the current 737 MAX thread.)

The point I'm reaching for here is that in its conclusion, the letter very clearly points to the problems which have emerged with the 787, as well as the certification program for the 777X, as situations in which the Congressional authorities are expecting FAA to significantly improve its oversight effectiveness. On the one hand, the linkage of these situations by the letter's authors reinforce the point that Boeing is going to be under intense scrutiny for the foreseeable future (which as you indicated will tend to reveal more problems and could make those problems seem more significant than might be necessary).

Yet in searching back through assorted recollections of Congressional oversight follow-up with respect to deeply serious problems within the aviation safety ecosystem (including certification programs), I'm not yet recalling any follow-up with as much focus, directness, and even relentlessness, as witnessed in this current T&I (and Aviation Subcomm.) effort. Maybe the hopes some have had for Boeing to emerge a better and viable company, with Engineers at the key roles and stations, in a window of opportunity made possible by the Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act -- maybe those hopes will be positively rewarded.

In the meantime, Mr. Dickson's legal eagles will be, one would guess, pretty engaged for the next few days. Here's the link to the letter:
2021-11-29 - DeFazio-Larsen-Stanton LTR to FAA-Dickson RE Boeing Accountability - Enclosure Included.pdf (house.gov) (https://transportation.house.gov/imo/media/doc/2021-11-29%20-%20DeFazio-Larsen-Stanton%20LTR%20to%20FAA-Dickson%20RE%20Boeing%20Accountability%20-%20Enclosure%20Included.pdf)

[India Four Two]

WR,

Thanks for the link to that letter - a fascinating read. What immediately struck me about it was not the content, but the ludicrous gothic typeface in the letterhead. Do the Congressmen on the Committee think it gives them more credibility or gravitas?

I note that mere flunkies only rate a serif typeface. :*

[WillowRun 6-3]

India Four Two

Regrettably the legal profession, as well as its next of kin - politics - is full of dividing lines between the mere flunkies, and the Goths.

I'd have to admit that even law firm letterhead, though in far less glaring font and style, also is mostly all about strutting (though the first batch I had with my name and the word "Partner" next to it, was..... well, anyway). But there is an on-thread observation to offer about the over-wrought stationery.

Boeing's health and viability, assessed over a properly defined long term, has been critical for the strength of the U.S. economy; with regard to airline sectors in economies worldwide, its role as a major exporter is widely recognized. But the 737 MAX debacle(s) obviously have had significant negative impact. (For another time perhaps, did Boeing's corporate illness start with a too-smug, almost amatuerish strategy for anticipating the eventual strenuous competition with China? -- I wonder.)

How this relates is, what else, who else in Washington uses wildly pretentious fonts and engravings? Well, the Mint, on the currency, the Mighty Greenback.

Congress uses that letterhead because each Senator and Representative is supposed to be able to comprehend, at least, "for the good of the country." Boeing's present day travails are hurting the U.S. economy, ultimately posing some threat to the soundness of the dollar. But I doubt the lawyers who drafted the letter itself, with or without the addition of the elected officials they work for, can do much to solve that problem.

[megan]

Willow, do you see the letter taking the heat off Forkner and his attendant court case? The letter seems pretty damning in that covering up the role of MCAS was institutionalized within Boeing, that is, Forkner was acting upon instructions issued from above.

[WillowRun 6-3]

megan
Yes, to an extent.
The letter, plus the larger background fact of the Committee's relatively intense focus upon unearthing the facts, will be useful for Forkner's defense, and possibly very useful.
The centrality at the corporate level of the goals Forkner had, with regard to minimizing the MCAS and training needs etc., is difficult to over-state. He happened to draw attention to these goals with notable terminology, but indeed the goals were institutionalized and at the heart of the 737 MAX program from its outset. Not decisions that he made or participatrd in.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Reported by Flight Global, FAA has issued two ADs (Airworthiness Directives), available publicly as of 3 December, following on to inspections it had proposed in May. As reported, the ADs were “prompted by reports that shimming requirements were not met during the assembly of certain structural joints, which can result in reduced fatigue thresholds” as well as resulting in cracking of some structural joints.

“Fatigue cracking… could weaken primary structure so it cannot sustain limit load" (the article further attributes to the ADs). As reported, one AD requires airlines to inspect “for cracking of certain areas of the aft wheel well bulkhead body chord and… side-fitting and fail-safe straps, and repair of any cracking found”. The other “requires repetitive inspections for cracking of certain areas of the front spar pickle fork and front spar outer chord, and repair”.

Not least, the article notes, however dryly, that the "Chicago airframer" says it “'has determined that these are not immediate safety-of-flight issues'” (Boeing quote exactly as in original).

[GlobalNav]

Well, it appears that according to Boeing PR, any issue with the company’s airplanes are, by definition, not a safety issue. The FAA should completely dissolve the Boeing ODA. There are other ways, historically, to provide effective delegation of certification tasks with substantial, independent technical engineering oversight. It needs to be accomplished by trusted parties.

[WillowRun 6-3]

"American Airlines to Reduce International Flights Due to Boeing Dreamliner Delays" (The Wall Street Journal, A. Tangel, Dec. 9)

Relying on people reportedly familiar with the matter - as well as a draft internal memo made available to the WSJ - it is being reported that American has canceled plans for international flights next summer, because of ongoing delays with delivery of the 787s it has ordered and for which it is awaiting delivery. At least, it is not being reported that the carrier "was" expecting delivery but has given up - although the article does report that Boeing has approached unnamed airlines about possibly taking delivery of airplanes the orders for which could get canceled. (Kind of very much along the lines of what earlier posts (IIRC, Big Pistons) have projected....)

What is reported about American, though, is troubling enough:
"American won’t fly to Edinburgh; Shannon, Ireland; or Hong Kong next summer, and will reduce the frequency of flights to Shanghai, Beijing and Sydney, according to the memo viewed by The Wall Street Journal. The carrier isn’t bringing back seasonal flights to Prague or Dubrovnik, Croatia, and it is delaying the launch of certain routes, such as from Seattle to Bangalore, India, which it had announced before the pandemic hit.
“'Without these wide-bodies, we simply won’t be able to fly as much internationally as we had planned next summer, or as we did in summer 2019,' Vasu Raja, American’s chief revenue officer, wrote in the draft internal memo." (internal quotation as in original)

[Maninthebar]

The cynic in me thinks that AA are seeking to reduce loss-making flights AND claim compensation from Boeing.

[tdracer]

The cynic in me thinks that AA are seeking to reduce loss-making flights AND claim compensation from Boeing.
I tend to agree - with the additional aspect that they don't have flight crew for those flights as well. American has been cancelling domestic flights due to lack of flight crews.
Most of the US based carriers are running into flight crew issues - some may remember that Delta and others were predicting a pilot shortage a few years ago (before COVID cutbacks) as large numbers of pilots reached the 65 year old mandatory retirement. COVID made it even worse when some older (but well less than 65) pilots chose to retire to help the operators avoid pilot layoffs.
I was in LAX a few days ago. Busy, but international traffic was still lacking.

[Commander Taco]

There’s an excellent and very objective Aviation Week podcast available right now. The interviewees also discuss the problems that Airbus is having with composite structures. I was left with the impression that the 787 shimming issue has as much or more to do with the problems associated with building a large aircraft utilizing a new material, than it does with quality control.

[WillowRun 6-3]

The Chair of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Senator Maria Cantwell (D. - WA) has released today two important documents pertaining to whistleblower complaints about Boeing. One is a report on whistleblower complaints and concerns, and the second is a letter to FAA Administrator Dickson summarizing the report and providing context for it. The report, as made available on the Senate Committee website, is a set of links to various documents. According to today's news reports (on various platforms) some of these contents have been known publicly prior to today - and some are newly revealed.

For the report and Sen. Cantwell's letter:
3EA0337B-F3D0-493E-A1CE-E2F16D4EF971 (senate.gov) (https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/3EA0337B-F3D0-493E-A1CE-E2F16D4EF971)

26D989AC-E56E-41D4-B6EA-032DD14229B9 (senate.gov) (https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/26D989AC-E56E-41D4-B6EA-032DD14229B9)