PIA A320 Crash Karachi

[krismiler]

I'm sure any Air Traffic Controller would prefer not to have an accident occurring during their shift, with more modern ATC systems would it not be possible to have an alarm sound if an approaching aircraft is way out of acceptable parameters ? If I have a V/S of - 1500 fpm at 1000' I can probably still land but will be looking at a meeting with the Chief Pilot soon afterwards, whereas V/S - 2500 fpm and VREF + 40 at the same position is a whole different matter. Alerts are triggered for altitude deviations, terrain clearance and possible collisions with other aircraft, so why not for an excessive descent rate at low level or a groundspeed which makes an overrun likely ?

Human factors and CRM training have had a major effect in improving safety and have been around long enough to be a known and proven concept but appear to be not as effective in some cultures when compared to others. The strong authority Captains who the crew are afraid to speak out with, are very much a dying breed in the west, either eliminated in the selection process or forced to change their ways by management. First Officers are encouraged to speakout and report safety concerns. Unfortunately this isn't true in all countries, and a junior first officer challenging an ex military senior Captain would be unthinkable, sometimes with tragic results. I'm sure we can all think of the regions and airlines where this applies.

Back when I was getting my PPL, we had a very conscientious controller in the tower who would check retractable aircraft had their wheels out when issuing a landing clearance and she saved a few insurance claims. Noted that this involved light aircraft with less reliable undercarriage systems and lesser experienced pilots.

[Flying_Scotsman]

Back when I was getting my PPL, we had a very conscientious controller in the tower who would check retractable aircraft had their wheels out when issuing a landing clearance and she saved a few insurance claims. Noted that this involved light aircraft with less reliable undercarriage systems and lesser experienced pilots.[/QUOTE]

Maybe we need to resurrect the Jet Provost system? "Finals 3-Greens (Beep-Beep-Beep) for those who remember:)

[ObadiahDogberry]

If you ever fly at an airport that has a tower staffed by U.S. Air Force controllers, they always make the call "check gear down" as part of issuing their landing clearance.

[Pilot DAR]

we had a very conscientious controller in the tower who would check retractable aircraft had their wheels out when issuing a landing clearance

That's very nice, though does not solve the problem, and could introduce another one...

If you ever fly at an airport that has a tower staffed by U.S. Air Force controllers, they always make the call "check gear down" as part of issuing their landing clearance.

If a pilot gets used to being reminded over the radio to confirm the landing gear position, that pilot does not build the necessary self discipline to carry out that responsibility independently. If a controller forgets, the pilot is landing elsewhere, or any of a number of other variables, the artificial safety system is lost. And, there are GA aircraft models available as fixed gear or retractables, from PA-18, many Cessnas, right up to the Twin Otter the controller might not know if the plane is an RG or not, and thus not make the call the pilot was holing for. Finally, the controller has no way of knowing that the gear is down and SAFE. During a few landing gear problem flights, I have had controllers say to me that: "The gear appears to be down", which is fine, but that's about as much as they could say for certain.

In the mean time, flying RG planes, it is up to the pilot(s) to take full responsibility for confirming the gear position. Relying on warning systems and the such is lazy. I've trained many pilots on airplanes which have no gear position warning systems at all, and trained them to observe the gear position, and say that position out loud twice before every landing, as a matter of personal pilot discipline. If I'm on final in my retractable (which has no warning system), and I realize that I have not spoken the gear position out loud for that approach, I will go around, simply for the self discipline. I do realize that a disciplinary go around is not appropriate for the commercial world, but the discipline of saying the gear position out loud as you're checking it's position should not be a problem, and certainly can only be a good thing when there is a second pilot aboard!

[Lonewolf_50]

If you ever fly at an airport that has a tower staffed by U.S. Air Force controllers, they always make the call "check gear down" as part of issuing their landing clearance. Which is fine when landing at a USAF base but not very applicable to commercial flying. And if you want to give the USAF controllers a rise, you can do as my instructor did (I was flying Hueys at the time, he was a Marine) when we came in to land after an instrument approach into an Air Force Base. When told to "check gear down" he responded with "Two down and welded."

Pilot(DAR) makes a good point about discipline and habit forming; the crew training that most airlines do is intended to do that same thing - establish reliable patterns as well as to form, and reinforce good habits.
Likewise, the training for how to set one's self up for a stabilized approach long before you get to the five miles out point is intended to form good and reliable habits.
Those habits and those disipline building measures seem to have not helped in this case.
The exam question to be answered is: why?
What interfered with that?
Where's the CVR? That may provide some answers.
One of our controller contributors has pointed out that a full transcrip of R/T may paint a slightly different picture than the excerpts so far available.
Hoping to see that as well.
As an aside: a friend of mine flies A320's for an American carrier, and has had very few trips in the last two months. Is hoping to get some sim time to keep the rust off. When I asked about this accident, all I got was an eye roll and this - "Putting the gear down is a key to a successful landing, even you know that. :p "

[ATC Watcher]

Common , guys, forget this idea of having ATC checking if the gear is down or not. .we are not in a small local VFR local airport checking Bonanzas.. We are talking large civil multi runways airports with large capacity . operating 24/7 in all wx conditions . Also when visibility is less than 10 Km and at night.:rolleyes:.
We are also not in the military where less than ergonomic types are being flown single pilot, where indeed you have to confirm in the R/T , or initiate an electric confirmation like the" beep-beep" mentioned above which is as far as I know still standard in many types, ( like the Fouga Magister I was flying in the french air force when I was younger )
@Krismiller : with more modern ATC systems would it not be possible to have an alarm sound if an approaching aircraft is way out of acceptable parameters ?
You mean during the approach phase? ( TWRs normally do not have radar) I see the idea but for what purpose ? why creating a monster to solve a case in a few millions ? Is landing forgetting the gear a problem today in ANY airliner ? as to the speed/altitude/ROD it differs so much from type to type , and again, is this a real issue causing many accidents needing to be solved asap ?

[Sailvi767]

(pax). A bit disconcerted by the talk about using the gear to slow the thing down. Is that really an option in day to day ops and if you do it aren't there subsequent consequences since you shouldn't have been in that state anyway ( well so I assume). Thanks for your patience, I only sit in the back.

Its absolutely a option that is used often. There are many reasons you might need to use the big speed brakes ranging from weather avoidance, ATC requirements, ATC error, pilot error, runway changes, approach changes, aircraft slowing ahead of you to fast or to far out, VFR aircraft, Aircraft MEL restrictions ect....

[sonicbum]

Are we seriously spending several pages of thread to discuss the fact that ATC should cross check if the landing gear is down and locked ? Come on... let's discuss -as much as possibile given the data- the likely root cause of the event so we can learn something from it.

[Dan_Brown]

I am very interested to see the CVR transcript.

Also the autopsy report/results of the two pilots, may make very interesting reading

[excrab]

Are we seriously spending several pages of thread to discuss the fact that ATC should cross check if the landing gear is down and locked ? Come on... let's discuss -as much as possibile given the data- the likely root cause of the event so we can learn something from it.

As I said in an earlier post, it is a couple of years since I’ve been to Karachi, but every time I went there the tower controller always said something along the lines of “surface wind blah blah blah, cleared to land check gear down and locked” The problem is they generally cleared us to land well before intercepting the glide slope so we didn’t have the gear down and locked. But we never told them that, just acknowledged the clearance and followed our SOPs as to when configure for landing.
I think I read somewhere on about page 1000 of this thread that they didn’t talk to the tower, but even if they did, if they were told to “check gear down and locked”, and were regular visitors to Karachi they would possibly have been in the habit of ignoring the call anyway, even if they heard it.

[Pistonprop]

excrab, I believe they didn't talk to the Tower on the second attempt. After the go-around the Tower switches them to the Approach frequency. From that moment on they remained on that frequency until they crashed.

[Lonewolf_50]

As I said in an earlier post, it is a couple of years since I’ve been to Karachi, but every time I went there the tower controller always said something along the lines of “surface wind blah blah blah, cleared to land check gear down and locked” The problem is they generally cleared us to land well before intercepting the glide slope so we didn’t have the gear down and locked. But we never told them that, just acknowledged the clearance and followed our SOPs as to when configure for landing.
I think I read somewhere on about page 1000 of this thread that they didn’t talk to the tower, but even if they did, if they were told to “check gear down and locked”, and were regular visitors to Karachi they would possibly have been in the habit of ignoring the call anyway, even if they heard it. I think you raise an interesting points about habits that may be formed regardless of the intent of the procedures in place. (Such as the tower reminding inbound planes to check gear ...).
Years ago I got the usual bottle of scotch (for stopping a gear up pass) from my flight student - he had gotten into the habit of reporting the gear down without looking to see. They usually were, but, on this occasion, he gave me three different reports of the gear down (and the flaps were down on the last two). But the gear indicators all said "up" - we were getting this little warning horn going off in our head sets. As he rolled final and reported his gear down the third time to me I instructed him to wave off (go around).

When pilots report the gear down, what process have we gone through to ensure ourselves that it is in fact down before we say the words? (I think that is what Pilot(DAR) was alluding to a few posts up).
If we are making the report as a reflex, or as you suggest, because the tower wants to hear it, then it sort of defeats the purpose.

[Pistonprop]

As for the ATC part of the argument, who is flying the aeroplane? As it is, on the first approach ATC queried his altitude and hinted that he was high. The reply (on two occasions) was that it was in hand. Just what do you expect ATC to do? Furthermore, a Tower controller has much going on and is not following an aircraft all the way in. It is not unusual to look at an inbound when it still has the gear up and move onto other tasks until it is on the ground.

[dumbled0re]

As pointed out by DaveReidUK in #723, the Extended Mode S data from FR24 is garbage. I've seen "data integrity issues" before, but this takes the cake.

The question arises: Is there any way to salvage the data? I'm sure the cockpit data recorder and the tower tapes will be very informative, but I'm not holding my breath waiting for the authorities to release that data in .csv format.

FR24 claims "Overall trends in the data are correct as reported" but I beg to differ, as documented below. They also claim "Flightradar24 interprets this data using advanced scripts and historical comparative data" but evidently their Ouija board is missing a few letters.

In particular, consider the two records timestamped 2020-05-22 09:36:39Z.840 and 2020-05-22 09:36:45Z.880. Both are from FR24 receiver 1971. During this 6-second interval, the Mach number was unchanged, the IAS went up by 2%, and the TAS went down by 30%. Also the heading changed by 171 degrees, which is about ten times faster than a standard-rate turn. Also the OAT changed by 8 °C in six seconds. It's not a fluke in these two readings; multiple records from multiple receivers exhibit the same preposterous misbehavior.

Sorry, I do not consider these trends to be "correct as reported". Apparently the bit strings are being wildly misinterpreted. Many elementary cross-checks are not being performed.

They also claim that they need data from four receivers in order to calculate position. I'm pretty sure that's wrong too; three receivers plus pressure altitude should be sufficient.

So, bottom line: Is there any way of obtaining usable data?

[MPN11]

Not banging the ATC drum as such, but do you experts know how busy Karachi was on the day?

[Fursty Ferret]

(pax). A bit disconcerted by the talk about using the gear to slow the thing down. Is that really an option in day to day ops and if you do it aren't there subsequent consequences since you shouldn't have been in that state anyway ( well so I assume). Thanks for your patience, I only sit in the back.

Perfectly normal. Gear often dropped early when intercepting the final approach with a tailwind, for example. It's most useful at about 200kts - the gear doors provide significant short term drag and can be what you need to get flap 2 out. I wouldn't consider using it from 10,000 ft because the speed brakes are more effective at higher speeds. The noise in the cabin is astronomical if you drop them anywhere close to the limiting speed.

Neither of the videos shown above seem plausible to me.

[ex-EGLL]

Why is it every time a crash or serious incident occurs there are many calls to "automate" or "procedualise" out the suspected cause?

In this thread alone there have been calls for ATC to break off a suspected unsafe approach, for ATC to remind pilots to select gear down and I believe I even saw a suggestion to drop the gear automatically if it wasn't already down as the aircraft got below a certain height. Admittedly a lot of these ideas come from armchair critics and Flight Simulator specialists, but over time a lot of these types of ideas have found their way into the system in the name of safety.

Is it not the incorporation of all these so-called safeguards that point towards more of these types of accidents happening in the future?

The pilots get too reliant on the computer and gain very little appreciation of hand flying (and thereby aircraft charecteristics / limitations) as they are often required by SOP's to use the autopilot for the vast majority of the flight. If anything out of the usual comes up, rather than try to problem solve, in many cases I am sure the result is to "let the computer sort it out". Reliance on the computer then further results in loss of awareness, another incident may occur the computer is given an upgrade and the whole circle starts again.

Just me thinking aloud! back to my retirement now.

[Joejosh999]

Given their over speed at threshold, seemingly 215knots or so, what kind of flaps would the A320 even allow them to put out? Just slats maybe?....

[DaveJ75]

Why is it every time a crash or serious incident occurs there are many calls to "automate" or "procedualise" out the suspected cause. In this thread alone there have been calls for ATC to break off a suspected unsafe approach, for ATC to remind pilots to select gear down

If you thought that was mad, you should have been here earlier - you missed the fitting of analogue gauges and my personal favourite so far - additional wheels on the bottom of the engines 'just in case'. I kid you not.

[tubby linton]

Given their over speed at threshold, seemingly 215knots or so, what kind of flaps would the A320 even allow them to put out? Just slats maybe?....
Flap 1 which is slats only Vmo 230kt
Flap 2 is which is slat/flap Vmo 200 kt.
I thought that the telling item in the photo with the rat extended is that the wing is clean.As they turned downwind and declared Mayday where was the acceleration phase when they were rapidly running out of energy?

[Joejosh999]

I’d also wonder when the Gear Down decision came...presumably before they realized engines were compromised?
And how soon might RAT have deployed?

[ex-EGLL]

If you thought that was mad, you should have been here earlier - you missed the fitting of analogue gauges and my personal favourite so far - additional wheels on the bottom of the engines 'just in case'. I kid you not.
Oh I saw them, but couldn't bring myself to repeat them!!

[focault]

In my humble opinion, it was a fast approach, with an overspeed of the flaps in short final, as heard on the ATC recording. That triggered the go around. The PNF may have retracted one step on the flap and raised the gear too early, making the aircraft sink on the rwy and scratching the engines before climbing out. The rest is a consequence of the damaged engines.

[ex-EGLL]

To be fair, the reason we do accident and incident investigation is to identify weaknesses in the system and to introduce fixes to to prevent recurrence..

No argument there, but in the vast majority of cases the fixes often turn out to be modifications to the aircraft systems rather than (re)educating the flight crews, thereby leading to more system reliance rather than maintaining and acting on pilot awareness. I'm sure many of you are aware of CVR transcripts with wording similar to "why did the aircraft just do that". The more time the pilots have to spend minding the computer the less they have for maintaining situational awareness.

Next bit being said (partially) tongue in cheek. Many moons ago when I first started in ATC,, once a week (or maybe month) the computer systems would be shut down for a couple of hours and everything progressed manually. No one was hurt, no one died but everyone knew how to do their jobs should the electrons stop flowing. I am not suggesting the same for pilots, but it may be worth having some form of basic principles brought back to the flight deck, even if it is hand flying from take off to TOC and TOD to the ground. Admittedly this may not be a good idea in highly congested terminal areas but I am sure it could be fitted in somehow.

[tdracer]

With that speed over the threshold, I believe the crew would never have received a TOO LOW GEAR warning during the first approach; they would have received TOO LOW TERRAIN instead (or another mode if that would have priority). I can see how a crew would discard the latter GPWS warning as being erroneous/nuisance when approaching a runway in VMC, especially a crew that had already lost their situational awareness due to extreme (probably self-induced) tunnel-vision.

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/884x833/mode4a_e9ab563a8c070b5e4e7126e0601b44d406385cbb.jpg
Here's the mode 4a envelope.

So, if the data that they crossed the threshold at 210 knots (and where still over 190 when engine nacelles impacted) is correct, they never would have gotten the "TOO LOW GEAR" warning - just the EPCS "TOO LOW TERRAIN" which could easily dismissed as a nuisance during landing. :confused:
Looking at the photo of the CFM56-5 Gearbox in post #728, given the rather high rate of descent during the pod strike - the gearbox casing almost certainly would have fractured (it's cast so relatively brittle). Best case, they would have lost nearly all the engine oil almost instantaneously. It apparently didn't do catastrophic damage to the gearbox internals since they would have lost the fuel pump and the engine(s) would have quit in a few seconds.

[Joejosh999]

Interesting thanks tdracer. If engines did quit in only a few seconds, assume RAT deploys?
And presume loss of thrust becomes apparent soon?

I’m just wondering when/why the Gear Down decision was ultimately made.
Possibly just a knee-jerk reaction when they realized (finally) that gear was Up all along? Ugh. What an awful moment. :eek:

[grizzled]

Well spotted, xetroV. And excellent follow-up comments, tdracer.

Occasionally, just when one has had enough of the chaff, and is about to abandon pprune -- or a specific thread -- someone shines a light and brings renewed professionalism to the discussion.

[Milvus Milvus]

From an older FCOM

4B With Landing Flap, Full or 3, the "Too Low Terrain" will sound all the way down to 159Kt


https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1023x919/gpws_3f4b86755b53768f8010b8761f674ddbb9103f4d.jpg

[Capt Scribble]

Before everyone gets too excited, the post at 749 points out that the GPWS may not give an U/C warning but the ECAM will. They are different systems, and you can turn off the GPWS.

[siropalomar]

So, if the data that they crossed the threshold at 210 knots (and where still over 190 when engine nacelles impacted) is correct, they never would have gotten the "TOO LOW GEAR" warning - just the EPCS "TOO LOW TERRAIN" which could easily dismissed as a nuisance during landing. :confused:
Looking at the photo of the CFM56-5 Gearbox in post #728, given the rather high rate of descent during the pod strike - the gearbox casing almost certainly would have fractured (it's cast so relatively brittle). Best case, they would have lost nearly all the engine oil almost instantaneously. It apparently didn't do catastrophic damage to the gearbox internals since they would have lost the fuel pump and the engine(s) would have quit in a few seconds.
Speaking about acoustic warnings, and considering there were so many parameters out of limits, they may have gotten "SINK RATE , SINK RATE" , and "PULL UP, PULL UP" before the runway impact. Besides, there´s the ECAM , which surely was active with ¨"LANDING GEAR NOT DOWN" in red capitals and the MASTER WARNING caution flashing red and the chime sounding, But TUNNEL VISION is very powerful and blinding when the pilot flying is just trying to get the bird on the runway.
Anyway, my guess is that it won´t be long before CVR and FDR readings will be made available and it will be clear which warnings and in what order the pilot completely disregarded.

[Lookleft]

But TUNNEL VISION is very powerful and blinding when the pilot flying is just trying to get the bird on the runway.

It wasn't that long ago that an Air New Guinea 737 hit the water when trying to land in a storm at Chuuk. There was video taken by an engineer in the jump seat and showed the whole sequence of events with windshear warnings, too low terrain warnings and a big red weather return over the airfield. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Niugini_Flight_73 The idea that there were multiple warnings going off and that they were being ignored in this accident is highly likely. The least likely explanation is a bizarre sequence of technical failures and that a highly professional crew did their utmost but ultimately couldn't recover the situation.

[compressor stall]

TCAS design engineering meeting sometime in the 80's:

"Right, let's make the threshold 159kt. No-one will ever be trying to land faster than that without wheels. All in favour say Aye"
"Aye"
"Aye"
"OK that's it then."

Somewhere on a rocking chair in the sunroom of a house, with a throw rug on his lap is a retired engineer shaking his head today.

[tcasblue]

It would really surprise me if this really happened, because it is (or should) be well known to Airbus pilots that SRS and Go-Around mode do not activate if the thrust levers are not advanced in the TOGA detent. If for any reason the thrust levers are not properly set, the PF would notice immediately that something is wrong on the FMA, because he would still see the normal modes that guide the aircraft in the landing phase.

There was a near crash at one company on a go-around where the initiating issue was the selection of MCT instead of TOGA.

[ExSp33db1rd]

Common , guys, forget this idea of having ATC checking if the gear is down or not. .we are not in a small local VFR local airport checking Bonanzas.. We are talking large civil multi runways airports with large capacity .

I've already tried to explain - but my post was moderatored out - that San Francisco ATC , also not a small local VFR local airport checking Bonanzas, once advised me that my Boeing 747 was approaching finals with "No Gear". Not forgotten, deliberately held due to a flap problem under investigation that necessitated an eventual go around to a second successful landing approach.

I absolutely agree that it is not an ATC responsibility, but no ATC guy wants a disaster to close his runway if he is in a position to do something about it.

[TriStar_drvr]

This accident appears to have some similarities to the US Bangla crash in Kathmandu a couple years ago. A Captain seems to get tunnel vision, is determined to get on the runway, and ignores multiple aircraft warning systems including a gear unsafe warning, eventually driving the aircraft onto the runway in no position to make a normal landing. In the US Bangla crash the Captain also ignored the First Officers commands to go around. Perhaps the same in this one too, to be determined once the voice recorder is recovered.

[Toruk Macto]

Has the CVR been found ?

[ExSp33db1rd]

Has the CVR been found ?

I've read that it has, but incomplete, which rather defeats the crash proof design ? One has to wonder ........ ? Cynic ? Moi ?

[0ttoL]

Has the CVR been found ?

This seems like another reason to move towards having CVR & FDR data streamed via satellite to the cloud.
Yes, I know that it is a lot of data, but we have to start with something.
We can't have another MH370 and other cases where the FDR/CVR can't be found/retrieved for whatever reason.

[krismiler]

If the "RETARD" call had occurred at 20', and I can find no reference that having the gear up would prevent it, the PF automatically retards the thrust levers just like on every other landing. When the go-around decision is made the levers have to go from 0 through CL and MCT detents before TOGA i.e. 3 clicks. With a go-around in the air the levers go from CL through MCT into TOGA i.e. 2 clicks. That extra step can easily be omitted as most missed approaches occur before the levers have been retarded. As stated in an earlier post, this was a baulked landing and possibly extra training is needed to differentiate them.

CRM training has largely been successful in western countries, in the past there were problems particularly during the 1960/70s with former WW2 RAF pilots in BOAC/BEA/BA. Older PPruners might recall the "bomber buggers" who commanded their crews in the same manner as they would on a bombing mission in a Lancaster. Unfortunately some airlines still lag well behind in the CRM area.

[Global Aviator]

Kris I disagree. When I flew the bus a go around was pushem all the way forward, not counting clicks not looking at positions. Balls to the wall so to say. Even a GA from fairly high, at least this way you know you get TOGA (with FMA check of course). Then depending where when what you can bring them thingies back to CL or wherever you fancy.

Simple - GO AROUND = to the firewall son!

[Toruk Macto]

Makes me smile , crossing the threshold at 200+ knots in a 320 and your waiting for the thing to say retard so you can bring the thrust levers back .

[ExSp33db1rd]

Balls to the wall so to say.

I agree that that should be the procedure, tho' I know nothing about the Airbus ( and don't need / want to ! ) but I was early told "Everything forward for speed " i.e. Throttles, Mixture, Pitch, Flaps etc. " When in doubt, lash out "

Older PPruners might recall the "bomber buggers"

Undoubtedly ! " We do NOT use Christian names on the flight deck, MR. XXXX " I was once admonished.

[krismiler]

Agreed, last go-around I did I mashed the levers into the stops and got a nice pitch up and strong push in the back as the engine noise rose. This may not have happened with the PIA flight though, possibly he felt two clicks like he did in the SIM and confirmation bias took over.

[krismiler]

Undoubtedly ! " We do NOT use Christian names on the flight deck, MR. XXXX " I was once admonished.

You're not wrong there !

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9pN591cF1Y

A relative of mine worked for BEA in those days as ground staff and said "Good morning" to a Captain as he walked past him in the corridor. Response was "People like you don't talk to people like me."

Unbelievable these days, but 40-50 years ago things were different.

[Ollie Onion]

Who counts the clicks? If you need full power or are commencing a go-around you slam those levers forward like you want to push them though the nose, finesse not required or helpful.

[Terry Dactil]

So is the whole landing checklist now optional, or is it just the "Gear - Down, 3 Greens" bit ? /sarc

[Airbubba]

Update from ARY News in Pakistan:

PK-8303 crash: Investigators to begin forensic examination; search for missing voice recorderSalah Uddin (https://arynews.tv/en/author/salahuddin/)

On May 28, 2020KARACHI: The investigation team of Airbus comprising French experts will begin the forensic examination of evidences collected from the crash site of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) plane PK-8303 on Thursday (today), ARY News reported.

Sources told ARY News that the Airbus probe team will spend a busy day in Karachi as per schedule which includes the investigators will re-visit control tower, approach and radar control centres besides conducting a forensic examination of evidences using modern technical equipment.

The investigation process will be continued as the French experts and officials of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) will also resume search for the missing cockpit voice recorder of the Airbus 320 aircraft.

The investigators are still in search of cockpit voice recorder which is unrecovered so far. It has been decided to expand the area of search for early recovery of the voice recorder which is crucial to proceed with the probe.

The investigation team has been handed over the task of special inspection of the crash site to trace out the missing voice recorder.

Investigators will also get the assistance of staff associated with PIA engineering, technical ground support and CAA vigilance departments.

The aviation experts will expedite probe into the available evidences collected from the airport’s runway to the crash site of the ill-fated plane besides collecting more proves.

The visiting foreign experts reviewed the arrangements at the radar centre for the take-off and landing of aircraft. Moreover, the investigation team also inspected different equipment at the radar room besides witnessing the process of landing and take-off of the planes.

The Airbus team questioned on-duty air traffic controller during the visit, as well as visited control tower. Sources told ARY News that the foreign investigation team reviewed regulations regarding the emergency landing call.

Except for two survivors, all 97 passengers and crew members of the aircraft that crashed into a residential area near Karachi airport were confirmed dead. However, no resident of the Model Colony’s Jinnah Garden, where the plane crashed, was among the deceased.

https://arynews.tv/en/pia-plane-crash-investigation-pk-8303-cockpit-voice-recorder/

[DaveReidUK]

I've read that it has, but incomplete, which rather defeats the crash proof design ? One has to wonder ........ ? Cynic ? Moi ?

There was a photo published (can't remember where) of the FDR, showing all of the electronics (the cuboid bit) missing, but the memory unit (the cylindrical bit) intact, albeit battered. The latter is the only part that needs to survive, and I would fully expect that the data will be retrievable.

[ATC Watcher]

The investigators are still in search of cockpit voice recorder which is unrecovered so far.
So not found yet. Seen where the accident site is located , a money reward would probably speed up the recovery .:hmm:

Sorry for off topic : on the BEA old video posted ( thanks for that one krismiller ) the FE calls "V2 plus" . For those here old enough to remember , was that an early 707 procedure of another local BOAC addition ? never heard this before ..

[seafury45]

Krismiler post #785

Things may have been more formal 50 years ago but basic politeness was still in vogue. I am sure that the captain who replied in that way always had difficulty getting help with problems. Groundstaff have their own sense of justice.

[unworry]

There was a photo published (can't remember where) of the FDR, showing all of the electronics (the cuboid bit) missing, but the memory unit (the cylindrical bit) intact, albeit battered. The latter is the only part that needs to survive, and I would fully expect that the data will be retrievable.

Here you go ...

permalink to #714 : https://www.pprune.org/10794559-post714.html

[krismiler]

Anyone who watched the 1970s BBC comedy "Are You Being Served" would recall the staff addressed each other as Mr/Mrs/Miss rather than christian names.;)

I note than in the BOAC video, there is no "Positive Climb" call, the Captain simply replies to the "V2" call with "Gear Up". As many of today's SOPs are the result of mistakes made in the past, I wonder what happened to cause the "Positive Climb" call to be introduced, i.e which airline pulled the wheels up too early on take off ?

[Ridger]

You're not wrong there ! A relative of mine worked for BEA in those days as ground staff and said "Good morning" to a Captain as he walked past him in the corridor. Response was "People like you don't talk to people like me." Unbelievable these days, but 40-50 years ago things were different.

That video is a beautiful thing!

[parkfell]

What can we reasonably conclude so far:

1. The approach was grossly UNSTABLE.

2. The crew believed the Gear was DOWN, otherwise they would have notified ATC there was an issue. Recycling the gear may have resolved the issue. If finally they couldn’t select the Gear down, then the emergency services would have been deployed and fully ready for them.
“Aircraft Accident Imminent” declared by ATC prior to the wheels up landing.

3. The crew finally realised on ground contact that the Gear was not down,
and performed a “touch and go”.

4. The crew failed to appreciate that certain critical components are located on the underside of the engine, which unfortunately resulted in loss of thrust/engine failure.

5. This dreadful accident will be rich in CRM. As the CVR has now been found and if fully published, it will add greatly to the understanding of the sequence of events, and the unfortunate mind sets of the pilots.

As one Old Hand once said to me:
“learn from other peoples mistakes, as you will not live long enough to make them all yourself”

BOAC video: absolutely wonderful

[JeroenD]

So on this first name / formalities:

As you might be aware the Dutch King Willem Alexander is also a pilot. He keeps current flying commercial flights (always incognito) and of course the Dutch Governmental plane.

A while ago in an interview it became apparent that when flying and mixing with the rest of the crew, he insist on being called Alex. No “your majesty” for him on the flight deck!

Jeroen

[skadi]

CVR was recovered today!

https://arynews.tv/en/investigators-find-cockpit-voice-recorder-pia-pane/

skadi

[romiglups]

CVR was recovered today!


skadi

"The PIA officials handed over the cockpit voice recorder of the ill-fated Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) flight PK-8303 to Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, he said."

What a mess, in which other country is the airline leading the search for recorders ?

"The Airbus experts will take the aircraft’s black box, which contains the flight data recorder and the cockpit voice recorder, and any other evidence that would help with the investigation."

Everything is setup for conspirationnists for years ... First airline search for CVR then handle it to manufacturer. At the end, everybody will be unhappy for a reason, and happy for another one.

[nickp]

Perfectly normal. Gear often dropped early when intercepting the final approach with a tailwind, for example. It's most useful at about 200kts - the gear doors provide significant short term drag and can be what you need to get flap 2 out. I wouldn't consider using it from 10,000 ft because the speed brakes are more effective at higher speeds. The noise in the cabin is astronomical if you drop them anywhere close to the limiting speed.

Neither of the videos shown above seem plausible to me.
Does anyone remember the 'High level Jet Penetration' approach at Frankfurt in the '70s? Over the VOR at F/L100, outbound on a radial for a teardrop to R/W25. Flying 1-11s we slowed down approaching the VOR because the gear doors were the limiting factor and once the gear was down and the doors closed again we speeded up. I think the track distance was about 18 miles and it was no problem but I may be wrong about the distance.

[compressor stall]

Airbus have said that the BEA have the CVR / FDR

[wongsuzie]

Huh? Still looking for the CVR... hmmmmm

[inducedrag]

CVR has been recovered

[aterpster]

Does anyone remember the 'High level Jet Penetration' approach at Frankfurt in the '70s? Over the VOR at F/L100, outbound on a radial for a teardrop to R/W25. Flying 1-11s we slowed down approaching the VOR because the gear doors were the limiting factor and once the gear was down and the doors closed again we speeded up. I think the track distance was about 18 miles and it was no problem but I may be wrong about the distance.
The U.S. has those wherever jet fighters are based, civilian or military bases.

[Milvus Milvus]

CVR has been recovered

Earlier it was stated that they found only the Case. I think at the time they may have found the ATR rack mounting, and the CVR had been thrown free.
Here it is now after being retrieved.


https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1280x720/2aa61ae8_a4c8_4f4a_8f9b_401658ecf154_890a1ef33f655ae413e982e 4830453381043bd1e.jpeg

[reptile]

It is now confirmed that both accident recorders – FDR and CVR - have been recovered
from the accident site.

They are expected to be read-out sometime next week at BEA facilities in Paris Le Bourget,
France under the leadership of the Pakistan AAIB with participation from Airbus and PIA.

In line with ICAO annex 13 rules, Airbus is continuing to provide full technical assistance to
the BEA and to the Pakistan AAIB who leads the investigation.

[GAPU]

This accident appears to have some similarities to the US Bangla crash in Kathmandu a couple years ago. A Captain seems to get tunnel vision, is determined to get on the runway, and ignores multiple aircraft warning systems including a gear unsafe warning, eventually driving the aircraft onto the runway in no position to make a normal landing. In the US Bangla crash the Captain also ignored the First Officers commands to go around. Perhaps the same in this one too, to be determined once the voice recorder is recovered.
Also Garuda 200 in terms of an unstable approach and ignoring warnings. The gear was down for that one though

[Mullah Kintyre]

If you can not get a serviceable A320 in CAVOC conditions, on a 11000 feet runway at sea level down in one piece, you should be nowhere near row 0. There are lots of ways to land a A320 even in a nonstandard cowboy style way
They DID land. Twice.

ATC performance was good in this case. What can they do? The responsibility is with the pilots and they got all help from ATC.
You wouldn't happen to be ATC would you? Have you ever landed at OPKC or dealt with their ATC? If not maybe best not to comment.

Any 100h FO should and will make a better job than this one. If you can not get a serviceable A320 in CAVOC conditions
Any 100h FO also knows it's "CAVOK".

[Seat4A]

It is now confirmed that both accident recorders – FDR and CVR - have been recovered
from the accident site.

They are expected to be read-out sometime next week at BEA facilities in Paris Le Bourget,
France under the leadership of the Pakistan AAIB with participation from Airbus and PIA.

In line with ICAO annex 13 rules, Airbus is continuing to provide full technical assistance to
the BEA and to the Pakistan AAIB who leads the investigation.


And now posted on AvHerald:

"On May 28th 2020 the BEA tweeted the CVR data module was recovered today. Pakistan‘s CAA requested the BEA to read out the black boxes.

On May 28th 2020 local sources reported the data module of the CVR was found underneath parts of the wreckage while the wreckage was being removed from the crash site. Pakistan's Aviation Minister announced a preliminary report will be released on Jun 22nd 2020. 51 bodies have been identified so far. The French BEA is going to take FDR and CVR to France for repair, download and analysis."

Crash: PIA A320 at Karachi on May 22nd 2020, impacted residential area during final approach, both engines failed as result of a gear up touchdown (http://avherald.com/h?article=4d7a6e9a&opt=0)

[Airbubba]

BEA tweets about the recovery of the recorders. The gentleman holding the CVR appears to be wearing a BEA identification card and nomex flight gloves.

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/953x190/bea_2_0dc9c9d480db8874b6dd6c67f8186082e9b31ca9.jpg
https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/993x705/bea_6b5f69dbf5ad8e41af6a1f85194dbb629f82a3a8.jpg
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1104x621/ezgdzmexgaap5qz_9de18f3186fe3ff9b0e1e8ef82016dd6cac45688.jpg
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/801x1200/ezgdzmox0aahpre_e90ff3b5594ac0b07b3cf9f20cd211cbfa5666df.jpg

[slast]

Does anyone remember the 'High level Jet Penetration' approach at Frankfurt in the '70s?.
NIckP - Off topic but yes I do remember it, not least because on one occasion in the hold with at least two others above us and below, waiting for fog to lift we had an ATC voice which just said "F104 - over Charlie - abandoned...." Couple of minutes of silence with fingers firmly crossed..... never heard anything more, Luftwaffe had a lot of widowmakers. Back to topic

[CodyBlade]

Example of rolling out on your 2 engine nacelles.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=222&v=Ftr6EGIILZY&feature=emb_logo

[krismiler]

Luftwaffe had a lot of widowmakers.

What to do if you wanted to get hold of an F 104 in Germany during the 1970s ?

Buy a field in the countryside and wait.

[vilas]

In Airbus there are a lot of warnings that tell you gear is not down. Did the crew activate approach? Did the landing memo appear? If it did did they look at it? Ldg Gear DN if it is green then the gear is down and locked. Did the SD display wheel page? If it did then at least one LGCIU did it show green? Now that the CVR is found it will reveal their activity from TOD to all the way down.

[Dan_Brown]

You're not wrong there !

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9pN591cF1Y

A relative of mine worked for BEA in those days as ground staff and said "Good morning" to a Captain as he walked past him in the corridor. Response was "People like you don't talk to people like me."

Unbelievable these days, but 40-50 years ago things were different.

Without being critical of crew or company, i did notice during that clip, the Captain wasn't using a five point harness. 4 points were used. In a deceleration that buckle will ride up above the pelvis without that 5th strap. If the deceleration is sufficent the occupant will probably never walk again.

That 5th point that comes up between the legs if adjusted correctly, will keep that harness buckle at the pelvis, helping to prevent a broken back. May do damage to the men but at least the chances of walking again are enhanced in the event of a survivable accident.

A bit of interesting but useless information for some, maybe useful to others.

[DaveJ75]

In Airbus there are a lot of warnings that tell you gear is not down. Did the crew activate approach? Did the landing memo appear? If it did did they look at it? Ldg Gear DN if it is green then the gear is down and locked. Did the SD display wheel page? If it did then at least one LGCIU did it show green? Now that the CVR is found it will reveal their activity from TOD to all the way down.

Welcome to the thread...

I fear your optimism in CVR data capture may be a little ambitious...

[Euclideanplane]

I fear your optimism in CVR data capture may be a little ambitious...
Not trying to sound optimistic. But the day will come when it has a CCTV track.

[asdf1234]

Not trying to sound optimistic. But the day will come when it has a CCTV track.
I think we know what happened but not why. The rushed descent was because they missed TOD. Why they missed TOD will likely be on the CVR. Hopefully it wasn't an FMS keying error but you never know. We could all speculate about cockpit arguments, visits to the cockpit by a VIP, or both crew sleeping. But once TOD was missed the descent, briefed or not, was rushed. This led to a highly unstabilized approach and whilst the PF was concentrating solely on scrubbing speed and height, the crew jointly forgot to lower the gear. Amazingly the PF got the aircraft down onto the tarmac but without gear extended they were doomed. They most probably would have overrun but I bet they would now trade a runaway excursion for what subsequently happened. So very sad.

[atakacs]

I'm still flabbergasted that two passengers walked from this one...

Just out of curiosity does anyone know what type of FDR were fitted on this airframe?

[beachbumflyer]

I think we know what happened but not why. The rushed descent was because they missed TOD. Why they missed TOD will likely be on the CVR. Hopefully it wasn't an FMS keying error but you never know. We could all speculate about cockpit arguments, visits to the cockpit by a VIP, or both crew sleeping. But once TOD was missed the descent, briefed or not, was rushed. This led to a highly unstabilized approach and whilst the PF was concentrating solely on scrubbing speed and height, the crew jointly forgot to lower the gear. Amazingly the PF got the aircraft down onto the tarmac but without gear extended they were doomed. They most probably would have overrun but I bet they would now trade a runaway excursion for what subsequently happened. So very sad.
But lowering the landing gear wouldn't be a good idea for scrubbing speed and height? I wonder what were they thinking.

[DaveReidUK]

I'm still flabbergasted that two passengers walked from this one...

Just out of curiosity does anyone know what type of FDR were fitted on this airframe?

The FDR and CVR are typically BFE (buyer-furnished equipment: the customer gets to choose which vendor's to fit).

That said, by far the most popular choice on narrow-body jets is the L3 FA2100 (https://www.l3commercialaviation.com/avionics/products/fa2100-series/) series (based on the original Fairchild A100, which many of us will recall).

Why do you ask?

Edit: Should have looked at the BEA tweet photos first. :\ Appears to be a Honeywell 980 series.

[Airbubba]

Just out of curiosity does anyone know what type of FDR were fitted on this airframe?

It looks to me similar to this Honeywell AR-120 unit. There are 120 minute and 30 minute variants to comply with the 'new' regulations that changed in some places years ago.

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1920x1055/ezgdzmox0aahpre_2_large__fb3c757a7fb77a44d591adb4845c3d8a068 007ef.jpg
https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x787/ar120_eb32f191e6e7a0f0d9af2198cf62062e3c7cbb3f.jpg

Here's the CVR from A321 EI-ETJ which crashed in Egypt in 2015:

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1920x1080/151107_gma_marquardt_16x9_992_large__995c51c93a4e4914d4f0398 246d15a1c60b86610.jpg

[DaveReidUK]

Incidentally, the photo in an earlier post which apparently showed the FDR from the aircraft

While everyone is scrambling to find the CVR module, here's a picture of the FDR on site.

Looks like it took quite a knock and may explain why only part of the CVR has been recovered so far


https://historyofpia.com/board/may_20/e-may26e.jpg


was an L3 unit, so it would appear that the aircraft was fitted with an FDR and CVR from different vendors.

[Joejosh999]

Given their speed over the runway, would they ever have gotten the “Retard” prompt?

[atakacs]

It looks to me similar to this Honeywell AR-120 unit. There are 120 minute and 30 minute variants to comply with the 'new' regulations that changed in some places years ago.
Thanks - was wondering how much (read how long) data the investigator would have.

[wub]

You're not wrong there !

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9pN591cF1Y

A relative of mine worked for BEA in those days as ground staff and said "Good morning" to a Captain as he walked past him in the corridor. Response was "People like you don't talk to people like me."

Unbelievable these days, but 40-50 years ago things were different.

The other side of the coin is that in those days it was usual for the captain to speak to premium passengers during the flight. On one occasion the captain approached a first class passenger who was reading a newspaper. The captain bid the passenger a good afternoon, at which the newspaper was lowered and looking over the top of his glasses the passenger said, “Did I call you?”.

[Grav]

Given their speed over the runway, would they ever have gotten the “Retard” prompt?

"The loudspeaker announces RETARD at:
‐ 20 ft, or
‐ at 10 ft if autothrust is active and one autopilot is in LAND mode."

Source: A320 FCOM.
Speed is not mentioned so radio altitude only appears to generate the automatic callout. By the way, their speed was due to the fact that they were on a very steep approach path, apparently, and not because they had too much power applied, so whether the callout was generated or not is not a factor i think.

[Joejosh999]

"The loudspeaker announces RETARD at:
‐ 20 ft, or
‐ at 10 ft if autothrust is active and one autopilot is in LAND mode."

Source: A320 FCOM.
Speed is not mentioned so radio altitude only appears to generate the automatic callout. By the way, their speed was due to the fact that they were on a very steep approach path, apparently, and not because they had too much power applied, so whether the callout was generated or not is not a factor i think.

thanks Grav. I’ve been wondering if PF ever retarded throttle at all. As you say their speed was more due to approach energy than power application though.

[Airbubba]

once more youtube nonsense and waste of time.... if there is one undeniable fact, then it's the exact crash location and even that, they managed to get it wrong....

It does have some of the actual audio from the LiveATC.net clips mixed with other sounds like the CRC for the dramatization.

The translation of the Urdu conversation about the runway lighting on departure out of LHE was helpful to me.

[Alas para Volar]

Thanks - was wondering how much (read how long) data the investigator would have.

long enough

[DaveJ75]

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/801x1200/ezgdzmox0aahpre_e90ff3b5594ac0b07b3cf9f20cd211cbfa5666df.jpg

Hang on... Isn't that just a pic of Graham Braithwaite on the telly?

[Airbubba]

More on the discovery of the CVR from Ary News.

Pakistan Rangers official found missing voice recorder from PK-8303 crash: sourcesSalah Uddin (https://arynews.tv/en/author/salahuddin/) On May 28, 2020 Last updated May 28, 2020
https://arynews.tv/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Untitled-5-1.jpgKARACHI: The person who discovered the missing cockpit voice recorder of the ill-fated PK-8303 is a Pakistan Rangers official, sources privy to the development revealed on Thursday.

Various search parties failed to find the important piece of equipment but in the end a Pakistan Rangers official managed to discover the critical component, sources claimed.

The Deputy Superintendent of the Rangers’ (DSR) name has been revealed to be Waseem.

The voice recorder is of great importance to the ongoing air crash inquiry being conducted by foreign investigators to pin down the reason for the national tragedy.

Prime Minister Imran Khan earlier in the day directed to ensure transparent and impartial investigations into Karachi plane crash that killed 97 passengers and crew members.

Presiding over a high-level meeting in Islamabad to review the latest developments in the investigation (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JMCMBOWC4hA) of the PIA plane crash, PM Imran ordered to make public all reports on fatal plane crashes occurring in the past.

The prime minister was also briefed about facilities provided to the injured and heirs of the victims.


https://arynews.tv/en/missing-cockpit-voice-recorder-found/

[krismiler]

For the benefit of non Airbus Pilots, the thrust levers are normally in the "CL" or climb detent throughout the approach. This allows the autothrust to command any power setting from idle to climb but the levers don't move whilst A/T is engaged. At the speed they were going on final, if the approach phase had been activated (automatically or manually) the engines would have been at idle, approach idle if flaps were deployed.

If the approach phase isn't activated, the A/T defaults to 250 kts below 10 000'. Many pilots have been caught out by going from selected speed into managed speed on approach without confirming that APP phase is active. A sudden power increase results as the system targets 250 kts regardless of flap/gear configuration. Doing it once is usually enough for most pilots and few repeat the mistake, as the master warning going off during the overspeed and subsequent visit to the Chief Pilot leave a lasting impression.

It's possible that they dived down from above the profile with A/T commanding idle thrust and if the APP phase wasn't activated, as the speed dropped below 250 kts there was a sudden increase in thrust.

[Lonewolf_50]

Very interesting post on how AB 320 works
kris, who is flying the plane?
The pilot or some kind of software?
It is very weird (to me) that thrust changes without the throttle levers moving.
I am sure that those who fly with that system get used to it.
well, I guess that most do.

[fatbus]

airbus has been that way for 30 years , it's not new.

[ExSp33db1rd]

I am sure that those who fly with that system get used to it. Well, I guess that most do.

and presumably the pilot who crashed through being low and slow approaching SFO on a manually flown approach ? It was reported that although hand flying he had engaged the auto throttle, but in fact he,or it, hadn't actually engaged, so being fresh off the Airbus and new to the B.777 he presumably wasn't concerned that the throttles weren't moving ? There were other factors of course, but I bet that was one of the "holes" in the cheese ?

Murphy is always with us.

[ozbiggles]

I don’t think even Murphy wanted to be on board with this crew

[krismiler]

who is flying the plane?
The pilot or some kind of software?

It should be the pilot, who is being assisted by the automatics. However some people are over reliant on the automation or do not fully understand it. Automation is a good servant but a bad master, getting behind with the aircraft and then having it behave in a manner which you do not expect or understand is a recipe for trouble.

With what occurred in this crash the range of possible errors is much wider than usual, and theories which would normally go on the back burner and only be looked at once the obvious ones have been ruled out, can't easily be discounted.

Gliding in from way too high with the engines back at idle, followed by a sudden application of climb power by the A/T once the speed drops below 250 kts could be an additional factor in further de-stabilising an approach which was already well out of limits. Given the known excess speed, the drop below 250 kts would have happened relatively close to the airport and at low altitude.

[TowerDog]

and presumably the pilot who crashed through being low and slow approaching SFO on a manually flown approach ? It was reported that although hand flying he had engaged the auto throttle, but in fact he,or it, hadn't actually engaged, so being fresh off the Airbus and new to the B.777 he presumably wasn't concerned that the throttles weren't moving ? There were other factors of course, but I bet that was one of the "holes" in the cheese ?

Murphy is always with us.

Those guys in SFO had no idea how to fly a perfectly good airplane in perfect VMC to a successful landing, just like these PIA A-320 guys. 😢

[tdracer]

and presumably the pilot who crashed through being low and slow approaching SFO on a manually flown approach ? It was reported that although hand flying he had engaged the auto throttle, but in fact he,or it, hadn't actually engaged, so being fresh off the Airbus and new to the B.777 he presumably wasn't concerned that the throttles weren't moving ? There were other factors of course, but I bet that was one of the "holes" in the cheese ?

Apologies for the thread drift, but I think the NTSB and FAA largely missed this contributing aspect of a recent transfer from an Airbus to a Boeing. SOP for doing an A/T landing in a Boeing is to keep one hand resting lightly on the throttles as a tactile indication of what the throttles (and hence the engines) are doing. It's painfully obvious that the Asiana pilot hadn't been taught that.
One of the recommendations should have been greatly enhanced training when switching between Airbus and Boeing (or visa-versa) to emphasize the basic differences in how they work.

[Toruk Macto]

Those guys in SFO had no idea how to fly a perfectly good airplane in perfect VMC to a successful landing, just like these PIA A-320 guys. 😢

If the captain was ex military with 17000 hours I’d respectfully suggest he knew how to fly and land . He would know all about how you need to put the gear down , gates , stabilisation criteria and check lists .

[Check Airman]

Apologies for the thread drift, but I think the NTSB and FAA largely missed this contributing aspect of a recent transfer from an Airbus to a Boeing. SOP for doing an A/T landing in a Boeing is to keep one hand resting lightly on the throttles as a tactile indication of what the throttles (and hence the engines) are doing. It's painfully obvious that the Asiana pilot hadn't been taught that.
One of the recommendations should have been greatly enhanced training when switching between Airbus and Boeing (or visa-versa) to emphasize the basic differences in how they work.

I’ve thought of this too. SOP on the A320 is to have a hand on the thrust levers on approach even if the AT is on. I’m not sure what benefit that provides. If anything, it decreases safety, as you’re more likely to forget it’s off with the AT off.

[Airbubba]

A Bloomberg article citing experts who say that you shouldn't land an A320 gear up at 203 miles an hour.

Crashed Pakistan Plane First Tried to Land Without Landing Gear at 203 Miles Per HourBy Alan Levin (https://www.insurancejournal.com/author/alan-levin/) | May 28, 2020
BloombergA deadly plane crash in Pakistan is prompting questions about how the crew could touch down without landing gear when their sophisticated jetliner was bristling with equipment to prevent pilots from doing just that.

After an abrupt descent that had unnerved air-traffic controllers, the pilots of the Pakistan International Airlines Corp. jet on Friday briefly put the aircraft on the runway without the landing gear, grinding along on its two engines at a speed of more than 327 kilometers (203 miles) per hour, according to preliminary data.

The pilots aborted the landing attempt, climbing back into the sky, but reported shortly afterward they’d lost power. The Airbus SE A320 apparently glided into a neighborhood as pilots were attempting to return to the same runway, killing 97 of 99 people aboard.

“It is unbelievable to me that an airline crew on a jet like an Airbus, with all the warning systems, would attempt to land the plane without the gear extended,” said John Cox, an aviation safety consultant who formerly flew the A320 as a U.S. airline pilot.

In addition to checklists designed to make sure pilots don’t attempt to touch down without the landing gear, the jetliner has multiple warning systems designed to alert crews if they somehow forget or the gear aren’t working.

“The airplane is not happy that you’re this close to the ground without the gear extended,” said Cox, who is president of consulting company Safety Operating Systems.

It’s not yet clear why the two jet engines quit after functioning well enough for about two minutes to lift them about 3,000 feet (915 meters) above the runway. Engines have become so reliable that losing two at the same time is almost always because of some common factor, such as damage from hitting a runway or a problem with the fuel supply.

Regardless, the bizarre landing attempt — which was carried out without any indication from the crew that they’d had an emergency during their initial descent — either triggered the accident or was a catalyst that worsened the situation, according to Cox and others who have studied crashes.

A Pakistan International spokesman declined to comment on “incomplete information.” An Airbus spokesman referred queries to Pakistani authorities. Civil aviation spokesman Abdul Sattar Khokhar didn’t respond to a call on his mobile phone.

As Flight 8303 from Lahore approached Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport last Friday afternoon, air-traffic controllers were concerned that it wasn’t descending on the proper path, according to a report cited by Sky News. A controller cautioned the pilots that they were “high” and urged them to adjust, according to the leaked preliminary report.

Turn Back

“We are comfortable. We can make it,” the pilot can be heard telling the controller, according to a recording of Karachi’s air-traffic radio posted on the LiveATC.net website.

Twice as the plane neared the runway, a controller told pilots to turn and break off their approach, according to the report. Again, the pilot declined, responding on the radio he was “comfortable” and was prepared to land on runway 25-Left.

At no point did the pilots say they had a problem with their landing gear or any other type of emergency, according to the radio calls.

Approaching a runway with such a rapid descent, which often leads to higher-than-recommended speeds, is a harbinger of danger, according to decades of warnings from investigative agencies such as the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board and the nonprofit Flight Safety Foundation.

After the controllers finally cleared the plane to land — despite their earlier warnings — the pilot replied, “Roger.” In the background, the sound of a cockpit warning chime can be heard.

Too Much Energy

The jetliner was well above the normal speed as it neared the runway, said Jeffrey Guzzetti, the former chief accident investigator for the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration. It was traveling at roughly 250 miles an hour at about 1,000 feet above the ground, according to the tracking website, Flightradar24.

That’s more than 50 miles per hour faster than is typical for jets like the A320, Guzzetti said.

“They have too much energy for a normal landing,” he said.

It not only increases the chances of skidding off the runway, but puts additional pressure on the pilots to slow the big jet and can lead to other things going wrong.

Flightradar24’s data suggests that the jet was traveling at 375 kilometers (233 miles) per hour when it reached the runway and slowed to about 327 kilometers per hour as it lifted off. The data hasn’t been validated by investigators.

The airline said Thursday that the cockpit voice recorder, a key to piecing together the events, had been found in the debris from the wreckage. The flight data recorder was located earlier.

While it’s possible that in the chaos and confusion they might have have forgotten about the landing gear, it’s still puzzling, according to Guzzetti and Cox.

Computer System

The A320’s on-board computer system issues both a warning sound and illuminates a light to draw attention to a text message if the gear isn’t out as the plane nears the ground.

A separate safety system designed to prevent aircraft from inadvertently striking the ground also senses when the gear isn’t deployed before landing. Its recorded voice repeatedly says “Too low, gear” if the problem continues.

Before-landing check lists also require crews to verify that the plane’s instruments show the gear is locked into place.

“It’s very unusual in modern transport category aircraft to have a no-gear landing, just because the checklist and the warnings that go off,” Guzzetti said.

At about 2:34 p.m., the plane slammed onto the runway. Its engines left a series of black smudge marks, starting at 4,500 feet from the start of the landing strip, according to video of the runway broadcast by news outlets. It shows three separate patches, as if the plane skipped into the air between impacts.

“Going around,” a pilot on the jet told controllers, the term for aborting a landing and taking off again.

The plane climbed about 3,000 feet, but couldn’t hold its altitude, according to the radio transmissions and flight data.

“Sir, we have lost engines,” a pilot said. Then, 30 seconds later, he said, “Mayday. Mayday. Mayday.”

Seconds later, the plane hit the ground.

–With assistance from Khalid Qayum, Anurag Kotoky, Siddharth Philip and Ismail Dilawar.

[parkfell]

If the captain was ex military with 17000 hours I’d respectfully suggest he knew how to fly and land . He would know all about how you need to put the gear down , gates , stabilisation criteria and check lists .

And yet.....something clearly fell apart. Unless/until you get the CRM right on the flightdeck tragedies will continue to occur.
Ex military can, but not always, find it the most difficult to “adjust” to the new “style”. After all they are human, and not a machine you can reprogram with an updated software.

Is that not what the history of accidents often point to.......destroying a perfectly serviceable aircraft with tragic consequences?

[Superpilot]

Experience can lead to great things or a reckless mind. The culture towards experienced (and/or ex military) in eastern and southern cultures is one of respect without question. And it's deadly.

[kardavan]

As you said. And just to share. An instructor friend of mine tried in our FTD today to lower the gears above 260kt. No warning; Just the L/G CTL memo will appear amber on the Wheels page meaning the landing gear lever and the landing gear position do not agree. As soon as the speed drops below 260kt, the gears come down automatically ( No need to recycle the gears lever) and the overspeed warning kicks as the Max speed for gears extension is 250kt then it stops when the gears is locked. I assume because the max speed with gears down is 280kt.
Strange! According to Systems Description: One GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED and L/G selected down => CRC + MASTER WARNING + WHEEL PAGE + UNLK L/T ON
According to ECAM SYSTEM LOGIC DATA (ESLD), a manual that is used for troubleshooting there is a 30 seconds time delay until the warnings activate. That makes sense because without this time delay any time the flight crew extends the LG they would have all those attention getters for something that is normal operation. My explanation is that the test was carried out within this 30 seconds time frame. Could you ask your friend about the details? If this was not the case we may have one more surprise from Airbus.
Regarding the need to recycle the LG lever, according to the logic diagrams there is no need to recycle. A/C SPEED WITHIN LIMIT + LG LEVER EXT => LG EXTENSION. It's that simple. I believe the requirement for recycling the LG lever has to do with the standard operational practices. In maintenance we also have this kind of practice. We don't want to have discrepancy between the flight deck controls status and the respective system actual status. From a human factors point of view any discrepancy is a minefield and has to be avoided.
Overspeed warning due to landing gear extension? I bet that it won't sound above 260kts because the LG can't extend. On the contrary it would sound if the speed increased above 280kts with LG already extended because there is no automatic retraction. Anybody that has experience this?

[zero/zero]

Apologies for the thread drift, but I think the NTSB and FAA largely missed this contributing aspect of a recent transfer from an Airbus to a Boeing. SOP for doing an A/T landing in a Boeing is to keep one hand resting lightly on the throttles as a tactile indication of what the throttles (and hence the engines) are doing. It's painfully obvious that the Asiana pilot hadn't been taught that.
One of the recommendations should have been greatly enhanced training when switching between Airbus and Boeing (or visa-versa) to emphasize the basic differences in how they work.

No, although the moving TLs are helpful on a Boeing, the single most important indication of what a complex automated aircraft is doing (be it Airbus or Boeing) are the FMAs and having a solid understanding of automation modes. In this case they did not see or understand the FLCH/HOLD trap.

[ManaAdaSystem]

The A320 will happily fly right past TOD and it will not start a descent even if a lower altitude has been set. You need to start the descent yourself. The only trigger you get is a weird «deselerate» message to remind you.
The approach mode engages automatically, except when it doesn’t. You may have to select it yourself.
You will not even get the ILS indications unless you press LS, even if the correct approach has been loaded and frequencies checked.

Some aspects of this aircraft are not user friendly.

[double_barrel]

The A320 will happily fly right past TOD and it will not start a descent even if a lower altitude has been set. You need to start the descent yourself. The only trigger you get is a weird «deselerate» message to remind you.

Then the question would become, how did the relatively benign slip-up of flying past TOD rapidly degenerate into a total cluster****? All I read here about penalties for failure to follow SOPs would seem to create perverse incentives following a minor transgression. In other specialities, there is machinery for saying 'I screwed-up, I recognized the screw-up, I took appropriate action' without risking unemployment.

[fox niner]

Is there no “capture descent” mode in airbus? Reset mcp alt fmc message? change to Vnav Alt in the FMA?
(Sorry I have exactly 0 minutes flight experience on type A)

[Dan_Brown]

Apologies for the thread drift, but I think the NTSB and FAA largely missed this contributing aspect of a recent transfer from an Airbus to a Boeing. SOP for doing an A/T landing in a Boeing is to keep one hand resting lightly on the throttles as a tactile indication of what the throttles (and hence the engines) are doing. It's painfully obvious that the Asiana pilot hadn't been taught that.
One of the recommendations should have been greatly enhanced training when switching between Airbus and Boeing (or visa-versa) to emphasize the basic differences in how they work.

Auto throttles have have a lot to answer for, more so when the throttles dont move with power change.
They are just one more thing to take the "P/F" out of the loop.

[ManaAdaSystem]

Is there no “capture descent” mode in airbus? Reset mcp alt fmc message? change to Vnav Alt in the FMA?
(Sorry I have exactly 0 minutes flight experience on type A)

Not on the A320.

[Denti]

Is there no “capture descent” mode in airbus? Reset mcp alt fmc message? change to Vnav Alt in the FMA?
(Sorry I have exactly 0 minutes flight experience on type A)

No, there isn't. A slip up i have seen made by every former boeing pilot at least once was selecting the lower altitude, and then watching astonished that the aircraft did not start to descent. Been there, done it myself, more than once. However, usually that is really a non issue as the bus drops like a ton of bricks if you really want to, much less of a problem getting it down and slow than a 738 for example.

[DaveReidUK]

A Bloomberg article citing experts who say that you shouldn't land an A320 gear up at 203 miles an hour.
FlightRadar24’s data suggests that the jet was traveling at 375 kilometers (233 miles) per hour when it reached the runway and slowed to about 327 kilometers per hour as it lifted off.
I’m in the middle of a fascinating discussion with the FR24 people about that. Their data shows a constant 314 KTAS from FL100 all the way down to the go-around, only reducing (abruptly, to around 220 KTAS) when passing through 3000’ downwind after the GA.

So far, they are insisting that 200 KIAS during the GA isn’t incompatible with their 314 KTAS value. At sea level ?? Really ??

I suppose the moral is that you can have all the data in the world, and still not understand any of it. :ugh:

[parkfell]

I suppose the moral is that you can have all the data in the world, and still not understand any of it. :ugh:

Talking of data: Is Flight Data Monitoring a feature of PIA operations?

If so, what protocols existed to ensure that any “shortcoming trends”
are nipped in the bud.

[krismiler]

ICAO Annex 6 mandates that all airlines are required under regional legislation to implement Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) programs. These are supposed to identify trends, such as frequent unstabilised approaches at a particular airport or other exceedances, which are passed onto the relevant department for appropriate action, such a restriction, change of SOP or more emphasis on a particular area during simulator training.

The data is anonymous, unless something flags up as warranting tea and biscuits. In this case the guilty party receives an invitation to the office for a frank exchange of views on company procedures with a management pilot. This exchange is mostly one way and the management pilots view is normally the accepted one, unless the other pilot has an alternative means of paying his bills.

The data is only useful if it is interpreted properly and corrective action taken.

[spatston]

Way back when, wasnt it established = localiser established and fully established = localiser and glide slope

[Nightstop]

But perhaps they had established on a false glideslope due interception from well above. False glideslopes typically occur at 9 degrees and 12 degrees (normal being 3 degrees). A very high rate of descent would be apparent of course when established on a false glideslope, it’s up to the crew to recognise it as such.

[learner001]

Despite crew being visual all that time, I would'nt be surprised the least if the bus surprisingly just captured a false g/s signal...
learner . . . ;)

[Bluffontheriver123]

Despite crew being visual all that time, I would'nt be surprised the least if the bus surprisingly just captured a false g/s signal...
learner . . . ;)

Unlikely but could happen. Then again, I am sure a professional crew wouldn’t be caught out by something so simplistic. Next you’ll be telling me someone could turn the EGPWS off and land wheels up......

[Uplinker]

The A320 will happily fly right past TOD and it will not start a descent even if a lower altitude has been set. You need to start the descent yourself. The only trigger you get is a weird «deselerate» message to remind you.
The approach mode engages automatically, except when it doesn’t. You may have to select it yourself.
You will not even get the ILS indications unless you press LS, even if the correct approach has been loaded and frequencies checked.

Some aspects of this aircraft are not user friendly.

Not automatically descending just because you have reached the computer predicted descent point, is a good thing. ATC might have denied descent clearance - there might be something below you, which the aircraft would hit if it descended without a pilot's say so. The decelerate message is to try not to get too far above the profile.

The approach phase engages automatically when you are in managed nav and you fly over the decelerate icon, the "strawberry", some call it. If you are flying vectors using heading, approach phase will not automatically engage - again, another safety feature, requiring the pilots say so before starting an approach.

Both these functions make perfect sense to me because the aircraft does not know everything and cannot make such decisions on its own. And I think one has to rely on at least one pilot being professional, engaged and awake in commercial operations, otherwise we might as well all give up and let Mr Musk or someone build us pilotless passenger aircraft.

Proper training. Proper testing of pilots. Following proper SOPs and proper CRM does work. We know how to do this now. It is very sad that in 2020, aircraft are still continuing unstable approaches and crashing.

[Sailvi767]

Despite crew being visual all that time, I would'nt be surprised the least if the bus surprisingly just captured a false g/s signal...
learner . . . ;)

Happens now and then coming in to JFK. Not a big deal since in the Airbus you have a new device called a moving map and actually know where you are. I mean these were professional pilots correct? Do you have to be a old school pilot to still crosscheck altitude at the outer marker and be running 3 to 1 calculations?

[krismiler]

The A320 has thoughtful safety features built in to the automation, eg when going into HDG whilst climbing in NAV mode, the CLB goes into open. When descending if HDG is selected the descent goes into V/S at current rate rather than open descent. Also it will not capture the glidepath unless LOC is captured first.

These guys certainly wouldn't be the first to keep on going past TOD, some even keep going past the airport. I knew someone who woke up from a short nap and was puzzled as to why the DME was counting up instead of down, he soon worked it out.

[DaveJ75]

Despite crew being visual all that time, I would'nt be surprised the least if the bus surprisingly just captured a false g/s signal...

Agree 100%.

[Gary Brown]

45 pages of comments........ Are we any nearer to knowing whether: a) this was a horrible gear-up landing and go-round, that then got even worse; or b) was this a poorly executed gear-down go-around, with the gear then raised well before a positive rate of climb? The focus here seems more on how they crew got themselves into the mess, without anyone being sure what the mess was they got themselves into.....

[Denti]

Not automatically descending just because you have reached the computer predicted descent point, is a good thing. ATC might have denied descent clearance - there might be something below you, which the aircraft would hit if it descended without a pilot's say so. The decelerate message is to try not to get too far above the profile.

The approach mode engages automatically when you are in managed nav and you fly over the decelerate icon, the "strawberry", some call it. If you are flying vectors using heading, approach mode will not automatically engage - again, another safety feature, requiring the pilots say so before starting an approach.

Both these functions make perfect sense to me because the aircraft does not know everything and cannot make such decisions on its own. And I think one has to rely on at least one pilot being professional, engaged and awake in commercial operations, otherwise we might as well all give up and let Mr Musk or someone build us pilotless passenger aircraft.

Proper training. Proper testing of pilots. Following proper SOPs and proper CRM does work. We know how to do this now. It is very sad that in 2020, aircraft are still continuing unstable approaches and crashing.
Of course proper training and testing is relevant.

That said, it is interesting that a 737, even a classic, can automatically switch into the approach phase even on vectors, and does of course descend automatically if a "descend when ready" clearance has been given and the lower altitude has been selected on the MCP (or FCU in airbus speak). It simply makes life easier for the pilot. Of course it does not follow the managed descend profile blindly without a clearance entered into the aircraft system.

Probably quite irrelevant in this instance, but i have been caught out by it, so have many pilots that have switched from boeing to airbus. The airbus requires extra help to do simple stuff, it is in many ways quite old fashioned. Does it explain this case? Obviously not, but it could be a tiny part of the chain.

[double_barrel]

45 pages of comments........ Are we any nearer to knowing whether: a) this was a horrible gear-up landing and go-round, that then got even worse; or b) was this a poorly executed gear-down go-around, with the gear then raised well before a positive rate of climb? The focus here seems more on how they crew got themselves into the mess, without anyone being sure what the mess was they got themselves into.....

I think that although possibility b is easier to understand (excuse?), the physical evidence/data better supports a.

[Joejosh999]

45 pages of comments........ Are we any nearer to knowing whether: a) this was a horrible gear-up landing and go-round, that then got even worse; or b) was this a poorly executed gear-down go-around, with the gear then raised well before a positive rate of climb? The focus here seems more on how they crew got themselves into the mess, without anyone being sure what the mess was they got themselves into.....

do we not already have reports from ATC interviews that gear was UP on approach?

[PAXboy]

45 pages of comments........ Are we any nearer to knowing whether: a) this was a horrible gear-up landing and go-round, that then got even worse; or b) was this a poorly executed gear-down go-around, with the gear then raised well before a positive rate of climb? The focus here seems more on how they crew got themselves into the mess, without anyone being sure what the mess was they got themselves into.....
Early on in the thread, calculations were made about - if the gear were down to start with - how long the gear would take to retract so that no damage was made to the doors when the pods scraped, as seen in video. The conclusion was that the gear was never down.

When photographs and video emerged of the runway scrapes, it became clearer that there was not enough time for the full gear retraction cycle to have taken place. Therefore, the gear was never down.

[The Fat Controller]

The "false glideslope" theory holds no water.

ATC queried their position and offered alternatives, the crew's reply was indicative that they knew they were high and would press on with the approach.

It was VMC and being "local" pilots they would know that the view out of the window wasn't normal.

Absolutely NOTHING in the speed and height data looks normal.

As a former ATCO, what does bother me is that the TWR controller wasn't keeping a good eye on his piece of real estate and the customer and missed the runway contact.

[cbfkoh]

It looks like fast rushed approach. Attempted fast landing with speed above the inhibiting speed for undercarriage not down and first appreciation of that was when the engines touched the runway.

[ferry pilot]

There is a system that has worked since the beginning of powered flight to keep it as safe and efficient as possible. Parts of the system are badly disrupted by the current pandemic, and unusual events happen in unusual times.

[DaveJ75]

The "false glideslope" theory holds no water.

ATC queried their position and offered alternatives, the crew's reply was indicative that they knew they were high and would press on with the approach.

It was VMC and being "local" pilots they would know that the view out of the window wasn't normal.

Absolutely NOTHING in the speed and height data looks normal.

As a former ATCO, what does bother me is that the TWR controller wasn't keeping a good eye on his piece of real estate and the customer and missed the runway contact.

Your strength of opinion suggests you have access to more data. So what's your conclusion then?

[Milvus Milvus]

do we not already have reports from ATC interviews that gear was UP on approach?

Yes.
Also another video with clearer audio.

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/554x199/voi_188171c71a5665bcc09940ea48b0c2696910d042.jpg

He is saying, are you going to try again (carry on), with the Belly Landing procedure, that i have just seen you attempt prior to the Go Around.

[Airbubba]

Here's some audio I edited and posted here a few hours after the crash. There is presumably a much better recording available from ATC including the minutes before this clip starts. The earlier LiveATC.net OKPC recording was unusable due to an open squelch on one of the channels scanned.

Edited KHI ATC audio from a LiveATC.net clip posted above. It's a .zip file which will open on most computers but not on most phones or tablets.

Sounds like the first transmission from PK8303 is something like 'We are comfortable and we can make it inshallah'.

[MPN11]

My red ... The "false glideslope" theory holds no water. Not a pilot, so I defer to them.

ATC queried their position and offered alternatives, the crew's reply was indicative that they knew they were high and would press on with the approach. Not a pilot, so I defer to them. BUT I see no reference to the pilot(s) saying they knew were high.

It was VMC and being "local" pilots they would know that the view out of the window wasn't normal. Not a pilot, so I defer again.

Absolutely NOTHING in the speed and height data looks normal. Generally agreed here, from TOD.

As a former ATCO, what does bother me is that the TWR controller wasn't keeping a good eye on his piece of real estate and the customer and missed the runway contact. AGREED. Regardless of disparaging remarks up-Thread, TWR should be looking out of the windows at a landing aircraft. Did he have 5-10 other aircraft on frequency that prevented him looking at the PIA on short final? I asked earlier if anyone knew what the traffic density was like ... no response from anyone. But ATC comments usually carry little weight in this environment - Captains rule 😎.

[vilas]

The approach mode engages automatically, except when it doesn’t. You may have to select it yourself. Approach mode never engages automatically it's the approach phase that gets activated when overflying the decele point in NAV. They are not same. You don't select Approach phase but you activate approach phase. Approach has to be armed for LOC/GS capture.

[flyingchanges]

Without rereading 45 pages, is there any plot of speed over the runway on the first approach?

[Airbubba]

Without rereading 45 pages, is there any plot of speed over the runway on the first approach?

From a couple of posts earlier in the thread:

Ian at FlightRadar24 has harvested some indicated airspeed data from the extended Mode-S data fields:



https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1408x959/pk8303_altitude_and_ias_f567e92fd3cf3d529d00580974f12f192e3a 7420.png

This altitude plot agrees nicely with the ones previously posted in this thread.

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1407x958/pk8303_calibrated_and_corrected_altitude_f5d119fd67743041773 5101a1fd4b9eb4fac1f95.png

https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/pakistan-international-airlines-flight-8303-crashes-near-karachi/

Thanks again Airbubba

took the liberty of highlighting a couple of key areas below, although it's comes as no surprise to most here.

Based on the FR24 CSV data
- (best approximation, due to periodicity and latency of recorded data)
-

251 IAS out of FL100
240 during descent, give or take
236 IAS at 2,000'
~215 IAS on tarmac, skipping down to 191 IAS
recording a minimum of 173 IAS, 200' AGL into the GA


https://i.imgur.com/TQPbjjk.png

[dingy737]

OK when the weather is bad airport cameras won’t help, but just as police now wear body cameras for after the fact analysis, shouldn’t airports have permanent cameras to film all ground , approach and landing activity to help provide facts. Imagine if we had high quality footage of this event from multiple angles.

[tdracer]

No, although the moving TLs are helpful on a Boeing, the single most important indication of what a complex automated aircraft is doing (be it Airbus or Boeing) are the FMAs and having a solid understanding of automation modes. In this case they did not see or understand the FLCH/HOLD trap.

A comprehensive differences training would include a solid understanding of the automatics (and other systems) and how they should be used, because the Airbus and Boeing automatics are quite different. A good example being the autothrottles - keeping a hand resting lightly on the throttles during final has the useful purpose is indicating what the engines are doing (or at least are being commanded to do) - while on Airbus it won't tell you squat. The SFO Asiana pilot apparently wasn't taught that - or about the infamous FLCH trap.
I'm not saying the Boeing moving throttles is inherently better (I think it is but I'm biased :E), I'm saying it's different than Airbus so when a pilot is transitioning, they should fully understand the differences and how best to use those differences to their advantage. Same thing with the force feedback through the yoke - it's there on Boeing, so the pilots should be taught what it means - and that if it starts getting excessive it's telling you something is wrong (reportedly the Asiana pilot was having to pull back with ~80 pounds of force before he hit the seawall - anyone experienced with flying Boeing aircraft would know that meant something was seriously wrong - but apparently he hadn't been so taught.
In short, the differences training that the Asiana pilot received was inadequate, and that contributed to the accident.

[homebuilt]

Guys, I cannot buy the question of fixed throttles (Airbus) or moving ones (Boeing). In my opinion it’s unlikely it has anything to deal with this accident. I guess many of us here started flying on poorly automated aircraft, let alone the Cessnas, Piper, Jodel, Robin, Stampe, Tiger Moth we learnt to fly on (and still fly, in my own case).

What do we do when at the controls of these, and of the Classic 747s, DC8, DC9s, Focker 27s and B727s we used to fly ? We set a preset power value, eg for example 1.15 EPR, 5000 in/lbs torque, 45% N1, or 1750 rpm on a fixed-pitch prop piston aircraft. And we set a pitch attitude, relevant with sequence of flight and airplane weight and configuration.

So while moving throttles, we look at power gauges and visually set proper value. Furthermore, on all aircraft but tail mounted jets, engine sound can be helpul. Then, as a former Boeing airman, I obviously learnt to do the same while feeling the autothrottle moving in my hands. And, then, some years ago I switched to the A330 and its fixed throttles. What am I doing when flying an Autothrust approach ? I’m still monitoring engine power gauges every 5 seconds or so... I cannot imagine any pilot doing otherwise.

So in the case of this terrible accident, I don’t think fixed throttles were an issue. If all what has been said before is true, ie ‘‘supersonic’’ speed, descent path, pitch attitude and vertical speed à-la space shuttle, these unhappy guys were not in condition to fly an aircraft. Poor training ? Poor CRM ? Poor physical condition due to ramadan ? Lack of recent experience ? Hopefully future will say..

[Fursty Ferret]

I wonder if they tried to use the emergency cancel button to silence the overspeed alarm (and I'm pretty sure that it can't be cancelled that way) and inadvertently removed the GEAR NOT DOWN warning.

[tdracer]

Sorry homebuilt - that was part of a thread drift that started several pages back where this was compared to the Asiana 777 crash at SFO (horribly botched approach under near ideal weather conditions resulting in a crash). No suggestion that it has any relevance to this crash other than the inability to land a perfectly good aircraft in good weather.

[homebuilt]

I wonder if they tried to use the emergency cancel button to silence the overspeed alarm (and I'm pretty sure that it can't be cancelled that way) and inadvertently removed the GEAR NOT DOWN warning.

By pressing the EMER CANC pushbutton you can switch any aural warning, but the discrepancy message remains on ECAM. But these guys were likely ‘‘tunnellized’’, as said earlier, and obviously didn’t hear any aural warning nor any other sound, as it uses to be when one get beyond his brain limit.

[homebuilt]

Sorry homebuilt - that was part of a thread drift that started several pages back where this was compared to the Asiana 777 crash at SFO (horribly botched approach under near ideal weather conditions resulting in a crash). No suggestion that it has any relevance to this crash other than the inability to land a perfectly good aircraft in good weather.

Ok, my apologizes, I’ve certainly read this very interresting topic too fast..

[PJ2]

Guys, I cannot buy the question of fixed throttles (Airbus) or moving ones (Boeing). In my opinion it’s unlikely it has anything to deal with this accident.
. . . .
So in the case of this terrible accident, I don’t think fixed throttles were an issue.
Precisely.

Why these observations/comments about "non-moving thrust levers" continue to arise in discussions regarding accidents involving Airbus after thirty years of worldwide A320 flying, is a puzzle. Moving/non-moving is not an issue. I flew Douglas, Boeing NB/WB, Lockheed, Airbus NB/WB, the latter for fifteen years, and the thrust levers and all types were never an issue because one just adjusts to the machine one is currently flying; QED.

And if one didn't like what the airplane, including the Airbus, was doing at any time, one just disconnected everything including thrust levers and flew the airplane just as one would fly a DC9/DC8 or 727 because that's all the A320 is, underneath the C* laws and protections.

On thrust levers/throttles, joysticks or control columns, one can comment on an airplane only if one has been trained on it and has flown it for some bit of time. Otherwise its just opinion and while perhaps interesting to argue, I believe that remaining curious and asking questions rather than pronouncing is still a good way to engage and learn in aviation. This isn't an "invitation" to stay in one's back yard...not at all...this is about acknowledging real expertise while engaging same. And that is still just good manners, isn't it?

PJ2

[grizzled]

PJ2

Excellent post and good advice -- as usual.

Stay safe and well.

[tdracer]

PJ, did you read my followup post #900 where I pointed out I was referring to the Asiana crash in SFO? Particularly this part?
No suggestion that it has any relevance to this crash other than the inability to land a perfectly good aircraft in good weather.

[gearlever]

Precisely.

Why these observations/comments about "non-moving thrust levers" continue to arise in discussions regarding accidents involving Airbus after thirty years of worldwide A320 flying, is a puzzle. Moving/non-moving is not an issue. I flew Douglas, Boeing NB/WB, Lockheed, Airbus NB/WB, the latter for fifteen years, and the thrust levers and all types were never an issue because one just adjusts to the machine one is currently flying; QED.

And if one didn't like what the airplane, including the Airbus, was doing at any time, one just disconnected everything including thrust levers and flew the airplane just as one would fly a DC9/DC8 or 727 because that's all the A320 is, underneath the C* laws and protections.

On thrust levers/throttles, joysticks or control columns, one can comment on an airplane only if one has been trained on it and has flown it for some bit of time. Otherwise its just opinion and while perhaps interesting to argue, I believe that remaining curious and asking questions rather than pronouncing is still a good way to engage and learn in aviation. This isn't an "invitation" to stay in one's back yard...not at all...this is about acknowledging real expertise while engaging same. And that is still just good manners, isn't it?

PJ2


Spot on:ok:

B727/A300/A310/A320/A340

[ExSp33db1rd]

ATC watching ?

Or the phone may have rung just at the wrong time. Who knows?
possible, but ...

do we not already have reports from ATC interviews that gear was UP on approach ?

suggests that they did know, if so why not advise the crew, did they really want their runway damaged ?

[PJ2]

Hi td - yes, I thought what you wrote was spot on because that is precisely what occurred. Perfectly serviceable & nobody home.

Knowing one's airplane including its energy-level & trend, the sounds of the air and the engines, what "low" and "high" look like outside, well enough to only glance inside at the airspeed to put it 350ft over the start of the approach lights. Others have said it here better - I'm just nodding in their direction. Sorry for the drift.

[Airbubba]

Investigation update from Ary News:

Investigation of PIA plane crash enters into final phaseSalah Uddin (https://arynews.tv/en/author/salahuddin/) On May 30, 2020

KARACHI: The investigation process of crashed Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) plane, PK-8303, has entered into its final phase as French experts would complete their probe till Sunday, citing sources, ARY News reported on Friday.

Sources told ARY News that the 11-member visiting team of Airbus company comprising French experts have collected important evidences of the crashed aircraft.

The French experts will depart for Paris on Monday with the plane’s black box, cockpit voice recorder to decode it. Following their scheduled departure after completing the six-day visit, the aviation authorities have permitted a special flight to land in Pakistan. The director of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) issued directives for the special flight likely to land at Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport on May 31.

https://arynews.tv/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/CAA-French-team-Airbus.jpg

A team of 11 French experts had landed in Karachi on a special Airbus 338 on Tuesday and visited the location of the plane crash in Karachi.

The investigation team of Airbus had also paid a visit to the radar centre of the Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport.

The visiting foreign experts had reviewed the arrangements at the radar centre for the take-off and landing of aircraft.

Moreover, the investigation team had inspected different equipment at the radar room besides witnessing the process of landing and take-off of the planes.

Except for two survivors, all 97 passengers and crew members of the aircraft that crashed into a residential area near Karachi airport were confirmed dead. However, no resident of the Model Colony’s Jinnah Garden, where the plane crashed, was among the deceased.

[Dan_Brown]

Sometimes I'm amused, sometimes I'm concerned, when someone suggests they LEARNT to fly on whatever A/C. The word learnt, is past tense. It gives the impression, after one learnt, there is no more learning to be had. Is this correct? We continue to learn until the day we die, do we not? Whatever we are doing.

Not trying to be clever and some may think this is irrelevant to this thread. I say it is relevent because clearly this crew learnt a very bitter leeson at the end, taking almost 100 poor soles with them. One crew member with 17,000 hours.

It was CAVOK with nothing to obstruct the flight, yet they flew the damned thing into the ground. The a/c had the most up to date automation etc., etc. This concerns me a great deal.

[Check Airman]

You will not even get the ILS indications unless you press LS, even if the correct approach has been loaded and frequencies checked.


It'll still capture the ILS though :)

I think

[pineteam]

Yes it will capture. The ILS push button is only for display. And it will keep flashing on your PFD in case you arm the approach but forgot to press the ILS push button. Quite difficult to miss it.

[krismiler]

If the aircraft was doing 236 kts at 2000' that suggests that the gear would have been down if it had been selected down, as the speed was now below the lockout speed. The tower controller has a very good view of the runway and would/should have been watching the aircraft to confirm its arrival and hand him over to ground frequency once vacated. He doesn't notice that the wheels aren't down, it isn't his job to check and everyone else manages to do it correctly. Possibly the view is distorted by the shimmering heat, dirty windows or fasting for the last nine hours.

He becomes concerned at the aircraft's excessive speed along the runway and at some stage realises that the landing gear is retracted. He assumes that there is a problem with the undercarriage and that the crew are aware of it but neglected to tell him, hence his query about carrying out a belly landing.

The primary cause of this accident was continuing the badly unstabilised approach instead of going around, and the final decision to continue appears to have been made when they informed the controller that they were established and could make it. The CVR should reveal if there was any mention of going around after this or if they tunnel fixated on landing the aircraft.

The events leading up to this, such as how they got into that position in the first place and the exact errors and sequence in which they happened should be revealed by the investigators.

[mosquito88]

Wouldn't the same security camera that recorded the final approach have recorded the first pass?
It would establish whether the landing gear was down on the first approach.

[A37575]

do we not already have reports from ATC interviews that gear was UP on approach ?
suggests that they did know, if so why not advise the crew, did they really want their runway damaged ? Several years ago I was reading an Indonesian incident report where the aircraft had caused a near miss by turning in the wrong direction during a SID. ATC were asked if they had seen this on radar and if so why didn't they warn the pilot when it was obvious the aircraft was not following the SID?

The reply by the ATC was the pilot of the 737 concerned was a former senior military officer well known to ATC and who had a propensity for ignoring SID requirements. In that society senior military people have contacts and unpleasant things can occur to anyone that has the temerity to question them or cross them. In the case of this particular pilot ATC said it was safer for all concerned to let him do what he likes and simply adjust the flight paths of other aircraft to avoid conflict

[Hot 'n' High]

ATC watching? ......suggests that they did know, if so why not advise the crew, did they really want their runway damaged ?

Maybe, but I'm not sure ATC knew any more than the a/c was H 'n' H certainly for most of the app.

Krismiler sums up a poss scenario in the VCP well at post #895 just above. It's not clear what ATC actually saw and, in many ways, while it might have saved the day had the lack of gear been noticed in time and had the crew actually responded to a final shout from ATC - even that is highly debatable if they were so fixated on getting the jet down onto the runway.

Ultimately this accident seems to have been set up at FL"x" at speed "y" where both "x" and "y" are quite a high! Maybe we will find out what really went on ...... that is up to the AAIB. Ultimately it's what went on in Row 0 which matters. Just my view based on unclear facts and educated guesses put forward by several people atm.... Thats all we still have.

Cheers, H 'n' H

[Bluffontheriver123]

Over 700 posts ago, this was written:

This video nails it pretty well.

3500’ at 5nm (over 2x the normal path), overspeed warning on recording, pod strike in the pictures and ATC mention “a belly up landing”.

Looks like high energy unstable approach, leading to a crash landing bounce, go-around into the circuit. Essentially crashed the jet then tried to fly it.

Since then the biases and prejudices have appeared:
1. Crew protection - no one could be dumb enough to do that so it didn’t happen. Followed by a plethora of systems posts blaming the jet.
2. Blame Ramadan - fair point on contributory factor. Not PC to discuss religion, gender identity etc.
3. Airbus vs. Boeing - it must have been those dodgy none moving throttles (conveniently forgetting Turkish at AMS, Korean at SFO and EK at DXB that all had moving thrust levers and managed to have the wrong power set. Why not blame the auto-trim system instead? Because it doesn’t matter.
4. Anti-military - ah, he flew military jets therefore had no CRM. If that was the case BA, UAL, DAL to name but a few would be spearing in left right and centre.
5. CRM protectors - if they had good CRM, they wouldn’t have crashed. No sh1t, if they had performed any other of about 100 competencies better they wouldn’t either.
6. Let’s blame a chain of events....everything that ever happens comes from a chain of events and if any were broken the day would have been saved. Sometimes though the links are as tenuous as a butterflies wing flap in the Amazon causing a Wall Street crash.
7. Bad Pilot/Good Pilot - we always like to judge as a defence mechanism blame the pilots solves the problem, particularly if they are conveniently dead.
8. ATC should have said something. Well they did but the crew ignored the advice.. but why?

Millions of approaches have been flown without incident and often the jet has saved the day by finally getting through to the pilots that they have screwed the pooch. The EGPWS works well, the Airbus FCS is well designed with world leading flight control protections. The jet was fine. All the rest above are at worse biases at best a small link in the chain.

So what was it? The crew performed inadequately on the day! It’s no different to the lorry driver that turns the wrong way up the freeway. All the signs are there but he didn’t notice. But he wasn’t trying to go the wrong way, why didn’t he notice. Was he worried about the length of the vehicle etc. etc. That must be it!

Capt Gul, didn’t plan to crash and we can’t comment on how good his human machine normally was but it failed. The FO clearly should have intervened but his machine failed as well. Why? Tunnel vision, task saturation, lack of capacity. By the way this is the main reason most military pilots get washed out in training. Their human machine is unable to cope as the workload increases on complex missions. Okay problem solved.

How to fix it.
1. New rules...uh no, that is managements way of trying to show they have done something.
2. Better selection, Traning and examining. of course it could help..

But then there is the elephant in the room.

On this occasion this crew were unable to cope with the demands of a badly flown approach and actually managed to over-ride all the protections in place. But why didn’t they spot the clues? Why didn’t they listen to the machine, ATC etc, etc, telling them they were wrong?

Simple, culture! As an illustration, not to denigrate but a statement of fact, on the same day as this crash a video appeared of 2 women being ‘honor killed’ in Pakistan, in Iran a 14 year old girl met the same fate. That is the society from whence the Captain came. Those norms are still considered acceptable by many and at the same time a Captain is considered a god. ATC know they can only hint to the infallible Captain he may have erred. The bottom line is telling a Captain he is a little high on the approach is quite a long way down his ‘give a sh1t list’!

This will be little different to the Air Blue crash in Islamabad. That was put down to poor CRM whilst ignoring the elephant in the room.

The reality is the only way to try and reduce these types of events is to change the culture that is getting in the way. I know the middle eastern airlines and Korean have worked hard in divorcing airline culture from national culture.

Yep culture needs to change, but they won’t internally and anyone that suggests they need to externally gets run over by the PC / ‘ism’ / ‘phobic’ bus. Until that day you will have to accept a small but measurable additional risk attached to flying on an aircraft who’s crew’s basic cultural norms may be incompatible with safety.

[DaveReidUK]

ATC watching ?
do we not already have reports from ATC interviews that gear was UP on approach ?

I can't find the original post from which that appears to be quoted - but no, I'm not aware of any reports that ATC knowingly allowed the aircraft to land with the gear up.

Source ?

[parkfell]

The tower controller has a very good view of the runway and would/should have been watching the aircraft to confirm its arrival and hand him over to ground frequency once vacated. He doesn't notice that the wheels aren't down, it isn't his job to check and everyone else manages to do it correctly. Possibly the view is distorted by the shimmering heat, dirty windows or fasting for the last nine hours.


The internet Jepp plate from 4 years ago indicates that the VCR is some 3000m from the 25L threshold. Some 750m from 07R threshold.
Dirty windows...is this often an issue?

Quote: ”it isn’t his job to check” ~ it will be interesting to read the accident report as to whether your assertion is how ATCOs are taught during their training, and whether their equivalent of MATS part 2
(ATC local instructions/SOPs) makes any reference to looking at landing aircraft.

I do accept that given all the protections afforded to A320, a wheel up landing (in error) must be an exceptionally rare event.
10 to the minus 10 (and counting)

[ExSp33db1rd]

I can't find the original post from which that appears to be quoted - Source ?

Neither can I now but I'm sure I've read it somewhere, maybe not here. Not prepared to troll through 900 posts. Better things to do, like waiting for the "official " report - if I I live that long !

[tdracer]

3. Airbus vs. Boeing - it must have been those dodgy none moving throttles (conveniently forgetting Turkish at AMS, Korean at SFO and EK at DXB that all had moving thrust levers and managed to have the wrong power set. Why not blame the auto-trim system instead? Because it doesn’t matter.

Dude, did you actually read the posts in question?:ugh::ugh: :ugh: NO ONE ever blamed the non-moving throttles. The entire throttle discussion was a thread drift regarding the Asiana (NOT Korean) accident at SFO, where the issue discussed was the lack of proper differences training when transitioning between Airbus and Boeing.
I'm honestly sorry I ever brought it up. :rolleyes:

[Gary Brown]

I can't find the original post from which that appears to be quoted - but no, I'm not aware of any reports that ATC knowingly allowed the aircraft to land with the gear up.

Source ?

That's why I posed my "actual sequence of events" query a few pages back...... So far as I am aware, the only ATC mention of the state of the gear is *after* the first, failed landing, as they are turning back to try again.

Approach - to whom Tower have just transferred the a/c - asks the crew

Approach - to whom Tower have just transferred the a/c - ask

"Confirm you are ?carrying out? belly landing".

It's not easy to know exactly why Approach asks this question at that moment, and there's no clear answer from the struggling crew. Pure speculation - Approach have had a quick heads-up from Tower that the first landing was some form of no-gear.

I'm sure by now investigators know more, factually - but there don't seem to be any reliable reports (whether official or leaked) of what they actually do now know.

[Uplinker]

................The airbus requires extra help to do simple stuff........

It defers certain decisions to the pilots for good safety reasons, not because it is inferior.

Anyway, as others have said, the machine was almost certainly not at fault, but the pilots operating it probably were.

We just need to know why now.

[Hot 'n' High]

Quote: ”it isn’t his job to check” ~ it will be interesting to read the accident report as to whether your assertion is how ATCOs are taught during their training, and whether their equivalent of MATS part 2 (ATC local instructions/SOPs) makes any reference to looking at landing aircraft.

As several have suggested, what is taught and what is done need not be the same in some places. Years ago as a new PPL was flying a 172 in the Far East with "safety pilot" back into a small International airport. On left base with B737 quite close by on final. Was about to orbit for separation when Instructor said continue. Almost at the same time ATC "B737, one right hand orbit present position!" and I chugged onto final and landed with said 737 circling just behind me. I looked at the instructor in amazement as we rolled out and he said "Take your time - don't rush! Being the (national airline) 737 Fleet Captain has its perks!".

I learned a bit about Cultures from that one event I tell you! H 'n' H

[asdf1234]

That's why I posed my "actual sequence of events" query a few pages back...... So far as I am aware, the only ATC mention of the state of the gear is *after* the first, failed landing, as they are turning back to try again.

Approach - to whom Tower have just transferred the a/c - asks the crew (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bB4ORTy_BrQ)

Approach - to whom Tower have just transferred the a/c - ask

"Confirm you are ?carrying out? belly landing".

It's not easy to know exactly why Approach asks this question at that moment, and there's no clear answer from the struggling crew. Pure speculation - Approach have had a quick heads-up from Tower that the first landing was some form of no-gear.

I'm sure by now investigators know more, factually - but there don't seem to be any reliable reports (whether official or leaked) of what they actually do now know.

I think it is important to understand the use of the English language by people in India and Pakistan to fully understand the phrase "Confirm you are carrying out belly landing".

Whilst at first sight/hearing this may lead the listener to believe that the controller is asking about future intent, it is more likely that the controller is asking about a historic event.

A native english speaker would say "Confirm you carried out..." whereas in the subcontinent this is often phrased as "confirm you are carrying out" with both phrases referring to the past event.

[Gary Brown]

I think it is important to understand the use of the English language by people in India and Pakistan to fully understand the phrase "Confirm you are carrying out belly landing".

Whilst at first sight/hearing this may lead the listener to believe that the controller is asking about future intent, it is more likely that the controller is asking about a historic event.

A native english speaker would say "Confirm you carried out..." whereas in the subcontinent this is often phrased as "confirm you are carrying out" with both phrases referring to the past event.


Fair point - but it's not even clear to me, from the publicly available audio, that he's saying "carrying out" . And in any case, we don't know how the Approach controller knew whatever it was he knew.

[DaveReidUK]

I think it is important to understand the use of the English language by people in India and Pakistan to fully understand the phrase "Confirm you are carrying out belly landing".

It's also possible that a non-native-English-speaking controller, having just been informed by the crew that the aircraft had lost both engines, was simply struggling to find an appropriate adjective to describe a potential deadstick/engineless/glide landing (quite possibly the first they had encountered in their career) and used the first term that came into their head.

[Jump Complete]

Several comments have been along the lines of ATC could have seen and warned the crew they were about to land with the gear up. Leaving aside culture aspects or ATC responsibilities, surely I can’t have been the only one to have sat at the holding point, looking at the aircraft on final approach, and not being able to see the gear (or some of it) because of angles and aircraft configuration? Is it not possible that the tower controller couldn’t see the gear but dismissed it as an optical allusion (particularly if, as someone a few posts back mentioned, there is haze, shimmering from the heat etc).

[NOC40]

As several have suggested, what is taught and what is done need not be the same in some places. Years ago as a new PPL was flying a 172 in the Far East with "safety pilot" back into a small International airport. On left base with B737 quite close by on final. Was about to orbit for separation when Instructor said continue. Almost at the same time ATC "B737, one right hand orbit present position!" and I chugged onto final and landed with said 737 circling just behind me. I looked at the instructor in amazement as we rolled out and he said "Take your time - don't rush! Being the (national airline) 737 Fleet Captain has its perks!".

I learned a bit about Cultures from that one event I tell you! H 'n' H

I had a a similar experience in Amman airport in Jordan. I'd just landed my hang glider (didn't need all the 3300m of runway...) and had exited off the side. Tower didn't know where I was exactly and told me there was a C130 on finals, and "would I like them to send it round". Cursing myself to this day I didn't, just because I don't think I'll ever get that chance again! A little later we had Apaches aerotaxiing past. Not a comfortable feeling watching the guns swivel to point at you as the crew looked at you :-0

[Three Wire]

Many years ago, PIA received its first 747. The flight was scheduled into Lahore (the capital city) turned around, and with the same crew flew the final sector to Karachi of the delivery flight.
The crew landed gear up! The aircraft was laboriously recovered and refurbished in the maintenance base at Karachi.

What was the final outcome? ATC was required to change their proceidures. Approach, at Marvi (or abeam it) transmits "Check gears down." I never heard a crew transmit "gear down/3 green" or any of the other permutations.
(mainly because no crew would have the gear down at that point.)
On transfer to Tower after 1500 ft, the Tower reponds with "...., check gears down", I would respond with "three green fullstop" but I never heard anybody else respond with anything but the routine "Clear to land, XX123"

Can the Tower see you? probably not, even with high power binoculars, until the aircraft is in close. Even then, although the Tower guy can issue a " XX123 go-around", that is probably not what most operators would say.

Sadly at KHI, the last defence outside the cockpit is deficient in KHI for a number of reasons, mostly to do with the guys inside the cockpit.

I had 24 years of flying widebodies to Karachi, that is a lot of experience.

[N600JJ]

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/600x868/tkib_717ccd6d9103a3f6a16c221ceb0d8122a8b55140.jpg

[Axel-Flo]

Notwithstanding any of the ifs and whys, and while I know most airlines don’t practice this kind of profile or energy management strategy, perhaps for what they believe are good airmanship reasons in modern jets, but.....
.....with the data we are being shown and the number of unused sims/flight sims/computer reconstruction possibilities, has anyone tried to imitate something like a profile of this complexity? As only one example of many perhaps, 300 kts to 10000ft, alt capture, selected speed 250, full spoiler, gear down at 250 kts, thrust idle open descent, maintain selected speed at 250 kts to say🤔 2000ft.......(I haven’t looked at terrain issues but going down while/and slowing down aren’t good bed mates normally) then select 200kts perhaps, decelerate level, speed brakes in, configure, push managed speed and arm the approach? Is it at all in any way possible to achieve with the tracker miles from TOD to say a 6 mile final🤓

[Lonewolf_50]

Dude, did you actually read the posts in question?:ugh::ugh: :ugh: NO ONE ever blamed the non-moving throttles. The entire throttle discussion was a thread drift regarding the Asiana (NOT Korean) accident at SFO, where the issue discussed was the lack of proper differences training when transitioning between Airbus and Boeing.
I'm honestly sorry I ever brought it up. :rolleyes: Not your fault: mea culpa (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/632693-pia-a320-crash-karachi-42.html#post10796283). :eek: (I believe I brought up SFO before you offered you insights, and it was a diversion having to do with a grossly off-speed approach). Another interesting variation on "do you know what your power is?" and crew awareness is here (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/632863-here-s-something-keep-you-edge-your-seat.html); perhaps "gear awareness" and "power awareness" are related at the cognitive level.

A few posts up there was a discussion in culture and its effects on the performance of pilots and ATC. Then a shorter one regarding the tension between ATC and certain Captains in a different place. What will the report say about those factors?

It seems unfair to me to point a finger at a tower operator if the crew forgets to lower the gear. Besides that being a crew role fundamentally, and the points about 'can you see that they are up or down clearly?', what else has Tower's attention as a given flight arrives over the threshold? As this post (https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10797303) (the reasoning fits what is so far known) suggests, the tower seems to have been become aware of a gear-up pass after the first set of sparks as the cowlings scraped the runway.

A previous post mentions "was this flight on-time or not" and how does that influence the crew and crew day? As a contributor to crew mental fatigue, length of crew day will hopefully be covered in the report.

[learner001]

I think it is important to understand the use of the English language by people in India and Pakistan to fully understand the phrase "Confirm you are carrying out belly landing".

Whilst at first sight/hearing this may lead the listener to believe that the controller is asking about future intent, it is more likely that the controller is asking about a historic event.

A native english speaker would say "Confirm you carried out..." whereas in the subcontinent this is often phrased as "confirm you are carrying out" with both phrases referring to the past event.Also tried to figure out that phrase with respect to the use of English language in that region, as well as the reference to a passed or future event.

Despite, in this respect, asking the question at that very moment in time, seems very illogical, the probably puzzled controller may well have thought it was his last opportunity, as it had become clear that the crew was going to be extremely busy from now on…

To me it sounds as:

”Confirm WHY you-are carying-out belly-landing?”

Referring to the first landing in the past.
Using here the present tense ’are’,
instead of past tense ’were’,
as is very common in the region.

learner . . . ;)

[Nightstop]

Axel-Flo:

As only one example of many perhaps, 300 kts to 10000ft, alt capture, selected speed 250, full spoiler, gear down at 250 kts, thrust idle open descent, maintain selected speed at 250 kts to say🤔 2000ft.......(I haven’t looked at terrain issues but going down while/and slowing down aren’t good bed mates normally) then select 200kts perhaps, decelerate level, speed brakes in, configure, push managed speed and arm the approach? Is it at all in any way possible to achieve with the tracker miles from TOD to say a 6 mile final🤓

What a bizarre way of losing height with limited track miles. For a start, the A320 allows only approximately half speedbrake extension with autopilot engaged (even if the lever is selected to full). If you want full speedbrake extension you must first disconnect the autopilot. Secondly, the most effective method of losing altitude with reduced track miles is to keep the speed high, aircraft clean as long as possible to as low as possible, and then decelerate rapidly in level flight using Speedbrake, Gear and then flaps. So, if terrain, ATC and Company SOP permits the method would be selected MMO/VMO clean to 3000’ (say), activate Approach Phase, Managed speed then Speedbrake, Gear, Flaps. Use selected speed during deceleration according to taste.

[ReturningVector]

Axel-Flo:



What a bizarre way of losing height with limited track miles. For a start, the A320 allows only approximately half speedbrake extension with autopilot engaged (even if the lever is selected to full). If you want full speedbrake extension you must first disconnect the autopilot. Secondly, the most effective method of losing altitude with reduced track miles is to keep the speed high, aircraft clean as long as possible to as low as possible, and then decelerate rapidly in level flight using Speedbrake, Gear and then flaps. So, if terrain, ATC and Company SOP permits the method would be selected MMO/VMO clean to 3000’ (say), activate Approach Phase, Managed speed then Speedbrake, Gear, Flaps. Use selected speed during deceleration according to taste.


On almost every aircraft flying max gear extended speed with gear extended yields a way better descend angle then flying V/MMO clean.

[Axel-Flo]

The individual type of expeditious profile
flown could be anything at all for the purposes of the example. Throwing in an orbit in descent when ATC suggest they were too high for example. My point was only that by “bimbleing” on down, the speed trace shows no set and held speed nor rate of descent and as we know resulted in crossing the threshold too fast and more than likely without the gear; as to wether the Airbus approach check list or landing check list was completed? Who knows. I was as much as anything asking if a late descent, if TOD had been missed as suggested, could have resulted in being back in the groove at any point to stabilise an approach specifically with the track miles they had. To achieve that, for the purposes of speculation, any tools in the box to create drag, rod or control speed should be fair game.

[Nightstop]

On almost every aircraft flying max gear extended speed with gear extended yields a way better descend angle then flying V/MMO clean.

I’m not talking about an Emergency Descent, this is about normal flying with passenger comfort in mind. If your aim is to scare the sh!t out of your customers and cabin crew, then do as Axel-Flo suggests.

[Nightstop]

It’s not the maximum rate of descent per se, it’s more about the horrendous noise the gear extended makes from 10,000’ and below at 250kts and the likelihood of the aircraft altitude catching up with the cabin pressure altitude at (say) 5,000’, after which the cabin pressure changes at the same rate of descent as the aircraft..possibly 6000’ per minute! The eardrums don’t take kindly to descent pressure increases above about 500’ per minute.

[commsbloke]

That's why I posed my "actual sequence of events" query a few pages back...... So far as I am aware, the only ATC mention of the state of the gear is *after* the first, failed landing, as they are turning back to try again.

Approach - to whom Tower have just transferred the a/c - ask

"Confirm you are ?carrying out? belly landing".

It's not easy to know exactly why Approach asks this question at that moment, and there's no clear answer from the struggling crew. Pure speculation - Approach have had a quick heads-up from Tower that the first landing was some form of no-gear.

I'm sure by now investigators know more, factually - but there don't seem to be any reliable reports (whether official or leaked) of what they actually do now know.

I hear a "why" in there
"Confirm why you are ?carrying out? belly landing"
Which puts a bit of a different slant on it.

[CodyBlade]

I hear a "why" in there
"Confirm why you are ?carrying out? belly landing"
Which puts a bit of a different slant on it.

I hear "Confirm ah you are carrying out belly landing?"...

[lederhosen]

This is a very strange accident and there has been massive speculation as to how the operating crew could possibly have ended up in this situation. There has also been a lot of conjecture based on limited knowledge. I am currently typed on the aircraft and I admit to be being baffled how an experienced captain could do some of the things that are being alleged to have happened. I accept that we are probably in for some more surprises, but encouraged that the flight and voice recorders have been recovered, which should eventually throw some light on the situation. Although I suspect we will be left shaking our heads very much as we did with the Air France A330.

What I would caution against are absolute statements. For example we simply don't yet know whether the gear was selected down and did not extend because of the protections and was then selected up again before first contact with the runway. This requires a fairly convoluted series of actions not least the failure to properly select TOGA at the first attempt. But it is conceivable.

Just as it is conceivable that the crew ignored all the warnings and failed to lower the gear. We will eventually find out. We have also had some crusty old pros saying that the Airbus flies just like any other aircraft. At one level that is true. But in reality in normal operation it does a lot of the work for you. Which is where we get back to the insidious skill deterioration that automation encourages. Maybe a Corona enforced reduction in flying, plus low blood sugar, plus Airbus skill atrophy lined up the holes in the Swiss cheese. In which case we need to be very careful when we all go flying again.

We have also had some interesting inputs from the ATC perspective. I am surprised that the tower was not closely watching an approach that appeared so unusual, particularly at a time of lower than usual traffic. Perhaps they were caught off guard by the aircraft reaching the runway sooner than expected. If they were maintaining in excess of 200 knots inside the last three miles rather than the more usual 130 then the controller may have been looking the wrong way. But it is still odd and given the strong military influence in Pakistan the absence of a check of the gear position prior to landing is more notable than it might be at a big airport in Europe.

Anyway I think we should keep and open mind and treat each other with courtesy as well as hopefully learning something from these sad events.

[PJ2]

Great post, lederhosen.

I think the industry is on its way to addressing the decreasing/degrading skill problem - certainly simulator curricula are increasingly providing this. I agree it isn't the same as having flown steam though, and that my own experience on the Airbus was "informed" by such equipment. So confidence in, say, disconnecting the thrust levers is a skill that can go a very long way to manually flying automated types.

While in this accident there are lots of technical issues present and well-discussed which may/may not be contributing factors, I can't conceive of anything on the part of the aircraft directly contributing to the initial seriously unstable approach.

It would be a rare pilot at these stages of their career that this crew was, to know that 200kts across the fence is simply not going to work no matter what. Yet there is Air India Express @ Mangalore & Garuda @ Yogjakarta, and 15deg NU in an A330 at cruise altitude. All unbelievable, but not to the crew involved. Why?

How to break the "freeze"? Clearly, (but again, not to the crew...), this is a human factors accident in which recognition of & techniques for dealing with "tunnel vision" need independant investigation and then training.

[DIBO]

I hear "Confirm ah you are carrying out belly landing?"...
I hear 7 words, the middle one is still a bit of a mystery, "attempt" (or is it "intend"), but without the "...ing"
"Confirm are you attempt on belly landing"
But the meaning/intention of the question looks clear to me, certainly in the ongoing context: inquiring whether the next landing will be a belly landing.
For those with more experience on the accent, I've slowed down the audio fragment and repeated it a couple of times.

[Judd]

I think the industry is on its way to addressing the decreasing/degrading skill problem - certainly simulator curricula are increasingly providing this.
I don't share your optimism. While the more enlightened operators may slip in a couple of hand flown ILS just for the record and to keep their regulator happy, the usual suspects will continue with their full automation and the occasional hairy dirty dive at the runway once the autopilot is disengaged.

[krismiler]

#924 by lederhosen is an excellent post and just about sums it up. I think we’ve covered all the possibilities in the past 900+ postings and the investigators report isn’t going to be a total surprise. It will likely be very similar to one or a combination of scenarios that have already been put forward, we just don’t know which at the moment.

I put forward a couple of ideas and others came up with different ones, almost all of which were equally if not more plausible.

The report is unlikely to show that the crew found a brand new way to crash an aircraft which had never been tried before, but will leave us shaking our heads as to how they deviated so far from expected norms. Significant failings in major operational areas are likely to be exposed as well.

[iTechno8]

Hi,
Late to the thread, but just to give some insight, there are multiple CCTV cameras located as Karachi airport that are placed at the stands, it is possible that one of them has the runway in the background and may have captured the first approach. However, the footage is confidential and most probably won't be released.
I myself am a cadet based in Pakistan, and we see frequent violation of SOPs, both at GA level and at airline level. However it still baffles me that they decided to continue without gear down. I've always discussed that there still isn't any actual footage that confirms that they were gear up when approaching. Thus, is it possible they raised the gear prematurely after the go around 10-20 feet AGL, and the aircraft sinked due to TOGA activating a few seconds later? Karachi weather was hot and humid at the time, with very low air pressure. If someone has hypothesized this before, I'm sorry must've missed it.

[Smurfjet]

From the harvested data on this thread so far, I am very curious to know what kind of site-picture was in the minds of both pilots from short final, through the flare, and into touchdown during the first attempt. I want to understand what level of alleged task saturation, target fixation, cultural predisposition, or other cognitive deficit will allow 2 minds to accept the front view, given the energy parameters being suggested so far in this thread.

[Twitter]

In another life I did maintenance test flights which demanded, on lift off an engine to idle to check some flight guidance items, gear up and then a descent to check emergency thrust increase etc. Not only did this look awful from the cockpit and the tower (who had been informed in advance) but it set off a barrel load of aural warnings and red indicators.

Even with a meticulous preparation this scenario came as quite a shock - all the warnings from Hell, at the same time. It helps me, in a way to understand the reactions to blatant warnings in this case - and also the 737 Max departures - which were for sure not so planned for.

Warnings have their limitations. Only good procedures and discipline could have kept this crew from deteriorating into the chambers of Hell, where reason and experience no longer work. If there is a lesson here, it is not to get outside the envelope in the first place - and if you do, do everything possible to get back inside it before continuing.

[Uplinker]

........We have also had some crusty old pros saying that the Airbus flies just like any other aircraft. At one level that is true. But in reality in normal operation it does a lot of the work for you. Which is where we get back to the insidious skill deterioration that automation encourages. Maybe a Corona enforced reduction in flying, plus Airbus skill atrophy.


I agree with the general spirit of your post that I have quoted from. I have also avoided writing any speculation about why this happened.

But come on. The most basic function of every flight is to start descent at a reasonable range from the destination. To slow down and configure in good time. To be fully stable* by 1000' agl, (500' if visual), and to land, or go-around. One cannot blame Airbus or automation dependancy for the pilots' failure to perform this most basic series of operations.


*Which in most definitions means: Fully configured for landing. On speed. On track. On altitude/DME, and Landing checklist completed.

[sonicbum]

We have also had some crusty old pros saying that the Airbus flies just like any other aircraft. At one level that is true. But in reality in normal operation it does a lot of the work for you. Which is where we get back to the insidious skill deterioration that automation encourages. Maybe a Corona enforced reduction in flying, plus low blood sugar, plus Airbus skill atrophy lined up the holes in the Swiss cheese. In which case we need to be very careful when we all go flying again.


Crew factors, non compliance with SOPs and energy management are totally irrelevant on aircraft type, considering the specific event. We are not talking about a mismanaged 35 kt crosswind landing which could generate discussions on which is the most badass aircraft for pilots to deal with.

[CodyBlade]

*Which in most definitions means: Fully configured for landing. On speed. On track. On altitude/DME, and Landing checklist completed.

Exactly, from Tiger Moth to C5

And I might add as you look fwd you are satisfied with the site picture in-front for you...

[DaveJ75]

AFAIK, conjecture tending towards assumption.

5 words which describe the entire thread!

[what next]

5 words which describe the entire thread!

Sorry, but NO. There is a lot of good and well founded information in this thread. Lots of stuff to think about and more importantly lots of stuff to make one think about one's own mistakes of the past (e.g. regarding descent planning and stabilisation on final) and how we were saved from the same fate.

[DaveJ75]

If you were talking about the final report I would agree...

[parkfell]

I'm sure Peter Burkill would agree with you.

I don't see anyone saying a lesser standard is acceptable due to cultural differences, the problem is thinking that cultural differences by default result in lower safety standards. It's a simplistic way of looking at things.
BA 038 was on a stabilised approach with John Coward flying it. A double engined failure occurred on short final due to an icing issue. One stage of flap was raised and they ‘impacted’ in the vicinity of the threshold.
Both pilots did their initial training at British Aerospace flying college Prestwick.

The Tenerife accident in 1977 at TFN you have referred to was most certainly a CRM / cultural issue.
The Staines accident in 1971 at LHR was again most likely caused by awful CRM issues.
Kegworth was an eye opener where poor SCCM involvement was most definitely a factor. “Swiss Cheese”

The accidents in the 1970’s with ‘western operators’ were a very distinct wake up call where human factors played a significant part. It would be true to say that a great deal of energy has gone into mitigating these threats and minimising the risks.

Look at the BOAC video posted 0242 on 28 May on this thread. Certainty I had a good laugh at this British culture / CRM Style post World War II.
What is important is that flightdeck styles need to enhance flight safety, with evolvement and develop over time as incidents/accidents occur.

If in 50 years time, the new PPRuNers look back to 2020, they will be having a chuckle at our present CRM as well.
Cultures and CRMs issues play their parts invariably in all accidents.

And for the avoidance of doubt, I am been involved in training not only ‘Asian Muslims’ but others of this Faith from the Middle East, and other Faiths as well for the last 30 years.

[henra]

If you were talking about the final report I would agree...
Are we positive, we are going to see this paper still in this decade?

[scotbill]

Axel-Flo:

Secondly, the most effective method of losing altitude with reduced track miles is to keep the speed high, aircraft clean as long as possible to as low as possible, and then decelerate rapidly in level flight using Speedbrake, Gear and then flaps. So, if terrain, ATC and Company SOP permits the method would be selected MMO/VMO clean to 3000’ (say), activate Approach Phase, Managed speed then Speedbrake, Gear, Flaps. Use selected speed during deceleration according to taste.

That is completely wrong. You need gradient - not rate of descent.
Hold level to kill the speed using airbrake.
Drop droop, flaps and gear and resume the descent at the lowest approach speed.

A slippery aircraft like e.g the 757 will not decelerate nose down. I used to think it worthwhile to devote some time on the sim course to demonstrating that even being 400' too high at the outer marker with only 20 flap you could rescue the situation by holding level to drop everything and then resuming to be in the slot by 500'
Once in a Vanguard diverting from Heathrow over central London at FL100, Approach said the RVR on what was then 28L had gone to the magic (Cat 1) 600m and if we were interested we would be No 1.
By using the above technique we made it straight in as the first to land that morning.

[Mgggpilot]

That is completely wrong. You need gradient - not rate of descent.
Hold level to kill the speed using airbrake.
Drop droop, flaps and gear and resume the descent at the lowest approach speed.

A slippery aircraft like e.g the 757 will not decelerate nose down. I used to think it worthwhile to devote some time on the sim course to demonstrating that even being 400' too high at the outer marker with only 20 flap you could rescue the situation by holding level to drop everything and then resuming to be in the slot by 500'
Once in a Vanguard diverting from Heathrow over central London at FL100, Approach said the RVR on what was then 28L had gone to the magic (Cat 1) 600m and if we were interested we would be No 1.
By using the above technique we made it straight in as the first to land that morning.
Both you and Nightstop are right. Depends how far are you from the airport. You can't slow down flaps, gear down 100miles from field even if you are 4,000ft or above higher.

[misd-agin]

Both you and Nightstop are right. Depends how far are you from the airport. You can't slow down flaps, gear down 100miles from field even if you are 4,000ft or above higher.
Agreed. In the Caribbean we used to get handed off at FL280....60 miles from the airport, arriving from the NW and landing to the east. Full speed brakes and high speed until several thousand feet (7,000?) on the approach, then slow to configure as necessary. If you acted quickly, and aggressively, you could do it without too much trouble. The meek compounded the problem.

[Axel-Flo]

so please accept that what I suggested (and Nightstop was so quick to condemn) wasn’t a suggestion of normality at all. However, had one missed TOD, or at 10,000ft and reportedly 250 Krs +/-, Was there a profile that could have been flown to put a crew back in the “SAC” to fly either the ILS or a visual approach to the runway that didn’t result I. Threshold crossing speed of >200Kts, and not full flap and gear down?🤔

[scotbill]

Mgggpilot

You do not have a problem 100 miles from the airport!

I have been held at FL 280 by Italian ATC till 35 miles from the airport at Bari. But it was a Trident with reverse available in flight and we were able to join comfortably downwind.

[parkfell]

Mgggpilot

You do not have a problem 100 miles from the airport!

I have been held at FL 280 by Italian ATC till 35 miles from the airport at Bari. But it was a Trident with reverse available in flight and we were able to join comfortably downwind.

ROD ? In reverse centre engine...

[Paranoid]

Trident , a lovely, but uneconomical aircraft .Seem to remember 10000 hp rpm on center for a/conditioning reverse on 1/3 350/365kt descent circa 16000fpm.
Useful if pushed but far from normal Ops.
More useful , the ability to descend and decelerate at the same time.
With respect to the PIA issue under discussion the 1000' gate should have given any 'professional' pilot the information he/she/it needed to make a sensible decision.

[4runner]

In another life I did maintenance test flights which demanded, on lift off an engine to idle to check some flight guidance items, gear up and then a descent to check emergency thrust increase etc. Not only did this look awful from the cockpit and the tower (who had been informed in advance) but it set off a barrel load of aural warnings and red indicators.

Even with a meticulous preparation this scenario came as quite a shock - all the warnings from Hell, at the same time. It helps me, in a way to understand the reactions to blatant warnings in this case - and also the 737 Max departures - which were for sure not so planned for.

Warnings have their limitations. Only good procedures and discipline could have kept this crew from deteriorating into the chambers of Hell, where reason and experience no longer work. If there is a lesson here, it is not to get outside the envelope in the first place - and if you do, do everything possible to get back inside it before continuing.

I’m not sure you are being 100%. Ive never heard of any kind of FC that requires an engine to idle at liftoff. Some turbo props have auto feather and the crj 200 has auto increase in thrust, but these aren’t checked on a test flight, right after “liftoff”.

[fullforward]

Both you and Nightstop are right. Depends how far are you from the airport. You can't slow down flaps, gear down 100miles from field even if you are 4,000ft or above higher.

Spot on Mggg:D Botom line: demands the "youknowwhatyouaredoingfactor"....

[he1iaviator]

Potentially an undiagnosed Covid-19 infection in the cockpit could result in crew loss of capacity and be a contributory factor. No doubt this will be tested for by the investigators. Should all operating crews be antigen tested before every flight?

[jolihokistix]

So heavily dosed on medication? Now we’re getting into the realm of the absurd, or perhaps not, but this is Rumours & News, so let’s go one further and ask if, as with the case of the mysterious Malaysian pilot, they might not have spent lockdown playing games on a flight simulator. This could account for the matter-of-factness and lack of alarm in the quiet dreamy voice we hear on the recording.

[scotbill]

Parkfell

"ROD ? In reverse centre engine.."

The Trident could use reverse on the outer engines in flight. Although people speak nostalgically of RoDs of 12000+, clearly the risk of catching up the cabin had to be considered. However, it did make it easier to reduce speed and height simultaneously.
It has to be stressed that in a hot and high situation close to the airport, gradient is more important than losing height at high speeed.
As a corollary, in a visual circuit there is never any point in proceeding downwind at high speed past the airport.

[George Glass]

When I first started with an Airline on the B737 it was a matter of pride to be able to keep the speed on till late as possible , flap on schedule and thrust up and stable at 500’. Easiest way to get down was 320 knots and speed brake. Then hold your nerve. As long as your below profile everything is sweet. Today impossible. 250 knots below 10,000 and other even more restrictive company limits killed it. Obvious advantage is no more pesky QAR squawks but major, major downside nobody under the age of 40 has any idea of what the aircraft can do. Maybe not an issue if all you want to do is keep line flying nice and simple but a real problem when a crew finds themselves outside the envelope. I’ve seen perfectly competent crew hit the tilt switch when taken outside their comfort zone. Not their faulty , they’ve just never been allowed to experience it. But thats the brave new world.......

[Contact Approach]

When I first started with an Airline on the B737 it was a matter of pride to be able to keep the speed on till late as possible , flap on schedule and thrust up and stable at 500’. Easiest way to get down was 320 knots and speed brake. Then hold your nerve. As long as your below profile everything is sweet. Today impossible. 250 knots below 10,000 and other even more restrictive company limits killed it. Obvious advantage is no more pesky QAR squawks but major, major downside nobody under the age of 40 has any idea of what the aircraft can do. Maybe not an issue if all you want to do is keep line flying nice and simple but a real problem when a crew finds themselves outside the envelope. I’ve seen perfectly competent crew hit the tilt switch when taken outside their comfort zone. Not their faulty , they’ve just never been allowed to experience it. But thats the brave new world....... I think that pride you speak of may have been this crews end.

[George Glass]

I think that pride you speak of may have been this crews end.

Two crews can be in exactly the same position and the outcomes diametrically opposite.
I have noticed a big change over the last 30 years in how comfortable individuals are in the aircraft.
Personally, once the doors are closed I’m in my element. Love it. But I cant say the same of many of the younger generation.
Too much cookie-cutter training. Not enough flying the aircraft. Not enough passion for flying.

[Lookleft]

When I first started with an Airline on the B737 it was a matter of pride to be able to keep the speed on till late as possible , flap on schedule and thrust up and stable at 500’. Easiest way to get down was 320 knots and speed brake. Then hold your nerve.

On a line check you had to do the same thing but do it using the autopilot because it was assumed that you knew how to actually fly.

[fox niner]

Airbus flight from Karachi to Le Bourget is en route. Presently over the med, expected to land at 1130Z. They have the cvr and dfdr on board. flight number is AIB1889. Read out is going to start tomorrow..

[Contact Approach]

Airbus flight from Karachi to Le Bourget is en route. Presently over the med, expected to land at 1130Z. They have the cvr and dfdr on board. flight number is AIB1889. Read out is going to start tomorrow.. Let's hope they remember to put the gear down...

[parkfell]

..........Personally, once the doors are closed I’m in my element. Love it. But I cant say the same of many of the younger generation.
Too much cookie-cutter training. Not enough flying the aircraft. Not enough passion for flying.

The motivation behind the decision of young people to go flying continues to be questioned by those of a certain age. Passion often being one missing component.

The puppy farms as commercial outfits are really only interested in one thing ~ profit.

The ability to pay through the bank of Mum & Dad is often the case. They think of it as gaining ‘Status’ in society.

Depends upon the culture. Back in the 1990s, BAeFC trained Cathay students from Hong Kong ethnic Chinese only. There was difficulty getting recruits from time to time, as the ‘status’ was regarded similar to that of a taxi or bus driver.

My view is that pilots are best able to choose prospective pilots, not HR, or ‘recruitment experts’.
There are a number of what appears to be innocent questions which in reality are the ‘under arm test’.
Mental arithmetic for a start.
Q.1 what is the square root of 81?
Q.2 what is the cube of 9?

Old fashioned ~ Moi?

[PaulH1]

Slowing an aircraft down - it is a matter of energy levels. High speed and high altitude aircraft possess an abundance of both Kinetic and Potential energy. As profile drag increases as the square of IAS, then increasing drag (Speedbrakes, etc) at high speed will destroy more energy than it will at lower speeds. Slowing the aircraft down and then using speed brakes will not have as much effect as using the speed brakes at high speed before reducing.

[EDLB]

Mental arithmetic for a start.
Q.1 what is the square root of 81?
Q.2 what is the cube of 9?

Old fashioned ~ Moi?

That would result in a huge pilot shortage. Today you can be happy if those questions can be answered with the use of a pocket calculator.
Ballpark mental arithmetic was necessary in the slide rule time, because it did not give you the decimal magnitude.
SA and having the „big“ picture or at least some idea to analyse a situation or measurement is difficult to teach. And still you learn every day something new.

But I don‘t think that the median intelligence deteriorated a lot. It is more the problem of your memory that glorifies the past.

[he1iaviator]

So heavily dosed on medication? Now we’re getting into the realm of the absurd, or perhaps not, but this is Rumours & News, so let’s go one further and ask if, as with the case of the mysterious Malaysian pilot, they might not have spent lockdown playing games on a flight simulator. This could account for the matter-of-factness and lack of alarm in the quiet dreamy voice we hear on the recording.
I read that a significant number of Covid-19 patients have no visible symptoms of the disease, no fever, no cough, no breathlessness, but they are found to have an extremely low blood oxygen saturation level. Combine this with increased cabin altitude and the result could easily be hypoxia and reduced capacity to function. That could account for one hole in the cheese, but of course not why the other pilot didn't take corrective action.

[PaulH1]

That would result in a huge pilot shortage. Today you can be happy if those questions can be answered with the use of a pocket calculator.
Ballpark mental arithmetic was necessary in the slide rule time, because it did not give you the decimal magnitude.
SA and having the „big“ picture or at least some idea to analyse a situation or measurement is difficult to teach. And still you learn every day something new.

But I don‘t think that the median intelligence deteriorated a lot. It is more the problem of your memory that glorifies the past.

So you are told to descend to FL180 to be level 20 before **** . Are you saying that you would get a calculator out? Even programming the FMS takes time which could result in a late descent. A quick mental calculation while looking out of the cockpit; - do I need to go down now then start descent and programme FMS on the way down or; I do not need to descend now so programme FMS first.

My grandson is thinking of becoming a pilot and I am instilling in him the necessity to practice and practice and practice his mental arithmetic. If he makes any calculation using a calculator then he must do a mental gross error check. For instance when buying fuel in US Gallons and then converting to Litres/KG and Pounds it is all too easy to get the digit in the wrong place.

[Connie Wings]

Regarding fatigue risk assessment, does anybody knows about this crew duty on that day, as well as previous ones. I'm talking not only about days before that but also the monthly roster, because due to shortened flights, being out of the flight deck for a long period can be an issue sometimes.

[learner001]

Slowing an aircraft down - it is a matter of energy levels. High speed and high altitude aircraft possess an abundance of both Kinetic and Potential energy. As profile drag increases as the square of IAS, then increasing drag (Speedbrakes, etc) at high speed will destroy more energy than it will at lower speeds. Slowing the aircraft down and then using speed brakes will not have as much effect as using the speed brakes at high speed before reducing.The art of flying requires controlling all factors in the equation . . .
You need to chew gum and walk at the same time…
learner . . . ;)

[parkfell]

So you are told to descend to FL180 to be level 20 before **** . Are you saying that you would get a calculator out? Even programming the FMS takes time which could result in a late descent. A quick mental calculation while looking out of the cockpit; - do I need to go down now then start descent and programme FMS on the way down or; I do not need to descend now so programme FMS first.

My grandson is thinking of becoming a pilot and I am instilling in him the necessity to practice and practice and practice his mental arithmetic. If he makes any calculation using a calculator then he must do a mental gross error check. For instance when buying fuel in US Gallons and then converting to Litres/KG and Pounds it is all too easy to get the digit in the wrong place.

Hope you grandson is progressing well with his sums. The old saying ‘garbage in, garbage out’.
Paper One of the Scottish SQA maths exams, for NAT5 (‘O’ level / GCSE) is without calculators.
Paper Two allows calculators.

The final comment probably three years ago, somewhat tongue in cheek(?), by the Chief Training Captain of a well known National Airline to a group of us MPL simulator instructors was
“if nothing else, at least make sure they know how to multiply and divide by three before they leave you.....”.
A quiet chuckle went around the room.

[donotdespisethesnake]

I read that a significant number of Covid-19 patients have no visible symptoms of the disease, no fever, no cough, no breathlessness, but they are found to have an extremely low blood oxygen saturation level.

Where did you read that? And exactly what percentage is a "significant number"? I think the combination you are talking about (low blood oxygen, and NO other symptoms) is probably negligible.

[DaveJ75]

That would result in a huge pilot shortage

Sadly that's the smallest of problems right now... Unless you mean a shortage of huge pilots?

[andycba]

Where did you read that? And exactly what percentage is a "significant number"? I think the combination you are talking about (low blood oxygen, and NO other symptoms) is probably negligible.

Maybe not symptomless overall - but not struggling to breathe despite low O2 saturation

https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/science-and-technology/2020/05/they-dont-struggle-to-breathe-but-covid-19-is-starving-them-of

[he1iaviator]

Symptoms or not, the point being that a Covid infected pilot may be susceptible to hypoxia.

[donotdespisethesnake]

Symptoms or not, the point being that a Covid infected pilot may be susceptible to hypoxia.

I think by definition, if hypoxia affected decision making, his colleague would have noticed, taken control and declared a medical emergency. OTOH, if it was not enough to affect decision making then it was not a factor.

However, I am sure the investigators will give due consideration to the possibility it was a factor, and make appropriate recommendations.

[Airbubba]

When I first started with an Airline on the B737 it was a matter of pride to be able to keep the speed on till late as possible , flap on schedule and thrust up and stable at 500’.

I think that pride you speak of may have been this crews end.

That 'Warp 9 to the marker and configure on the way down' stuff went away a couple of decades ago at most places in the U.S. The subsequent drop in landing accident numbers shows the absolute idiocy of the 'watch this' fools who did it and in some cases taught it.

[Twitter]

I’m not sure you are being 100%. Ive never heard of any kind of FC that requires an engine to idle at liftoff. Some turbo props have auto feather and the crj 200 has auto increase in thrust, but these aren’t checked on a test flight, right after “liftoff”.

Try to get hold of the MD-80 maintenance test flight protocol 4R.

[GKOC41]

Regarding fatigue risk assessment, does anybody knows about this crew duty on that day, as well as previous ones. I'm talking not only about days before that but also the monthly roster, because due to shortened flights, being out of the flight deck for a long period can be an issue sometimes.
Connie
PIA only started up again a few days before so f,atigue won't come into it. There is a view that fasting may of but that's for another time

[PAXboy]

I think by definition, if hypoxia affected decision making, his colleague would have noticed, taken control and declared a medical emergency. OTOH, if it was not enough to affect decision making then it was not a factor.

However, I am sure the investigators will give due consideration to the possibility it was a factor, and make appropriate recommendations.
That would rely on blood samples having been taken at the post mortem of the two crew. We may never find out if PMs were done, other than routine blood tests for banned substances, The cause of death being done to 'blunt trauma'.

It is widely reported that Doctors and Paramedics have found Covid-19 patients who were lucid and talking and using their mobile phones - whlist having a blood saturation below 70. Usually, at that level, a person is either in heart/brain failure or about to be so within seconds. Covid-19 makes the blood 'sticky' it is report and this typically shows up first in the lungs but also damages other organs.

We come back to the concern about what the FO would do, if he thought the Cpt was not performing to the best of his ability?

[hans brinker]

Respectfully, can we get away from the covid/blood saturation discussion? The chance that bot of the pilots were incapacitated at the same time due to a virus seems unlikely.

[George Glass]

That 'Warp 9 to the marker and configure on the way down' stuff went away a couple of decades ago at most places in the U.S. The subsequent drop in landing accident numbers show the absolute idiocy of the 'watch this' fools who did it and in some cases taught it.

Maybe , but you should still be able to demonstrate it , at least in the sim.
Now I see guys getting into trouble by slowing to Flap Up manoeuvre speed ,which is pretty close to best L/D , then using speed brake. Speed brake does nothing on a B737 at 220 knots. Drift higher and higher on profile , don’t want to take gear early..... Clueless as what to do next.
Just cos you’re slow doesn’t mean you safe or know what you’re doing. Fully configured 10 miles out at approach speed isn’t smart. Its a pain in the butt.

[compressor stall]

That 'Warp 9 to the marker and configure on the way down' stuff went away a couple of decades ago at most places in the U.S. The subsequent drop in landing accident numbers show the absolute idiocy of the 'watch this' fools who did it and in some cases taught it.

Yes, high speed all the way in to show off should be a thing of the past.

But high speed until a safe distance out is a tool and should be able to be used as and when it's appropriate. The 'bus makes it even safer by even giving you the decel point on the screen.

[ExSp33db1rd]

For instance when buying fuel in US Gallons and then converting to Litres/KG and Pounds it is all too easy to get the digit in the wrong place.

Hence the Gimli Glider. Air Canada 767 en route to the West ran out of fuel and landed dead stick on the disused Gimli runway. ( near Winnipeg )

If he makes any calculation using a calculator..........

Have mentioned before - carry a key ring sized navigation computer in my wallet, using it at the supermarket one day, the "work experience" teenager asked me what it was? A circular slide rule, I replied. "What's a Slide Rule" ? was his reply. One could weep.

[tdracer]

Hence the Gimli Glider. Air Canada 767 en route to the West ran out of fuel and landed dead stick on the disused Gimli runway. ( near Winnipeg )

Have mentioned before - carry a key ring sized navigation computer in my wallet, using it at the supermarket one day, the "work experience" teenager asked me what it was? A circular slide rule, I replied. "What's a Slide Rule" ? was his reply. One could weep.
Not quite apples to apples - on the Gimli Glider they told the crew they had xxxxx kilos of fuel, when in fact they had that many pounds of fuel.

My first semester of college, pocket calculators were just coming online (1973) and outlandishly expensive. Slide rules were the norm - I remember glancing over during a mid-term at another student who was merrily punching numbers into a TI calculator while I was struggling with my slide rule. After hearing my tails of woe, my parents gave my an HP45 calculator for Christmas ($395 - ~$2,000 in today's money - to put that into perspective the previous summer I'd worked in a car dealer making $1.50/hr, and a semester's tuition was a bit over $300!). Most expensive Christmas gift I ever got by far.
Went back to college in January with my fancy new calculator only to have the professors ban using calculators in exams because not all the students could afford one and it was unfair and we all had to use slide rules :mad:.
I still have a couple slide rules around here somewhere - although I'm not sure I could still use one (I was never very proficient at it).

[George Glass]

Not quite apples to apples - on the Gimli Glider they told the crew they had xxxxx kilos of fuel, when in fact they had that many pounds of fuel.

My first semester of college, pocket calculators were just coming online (1973) and outlandishly expensive. Slide rules were the norm - I remember glancing over during a mid-term at another student who was merrily punching numbers into a TI calculator while I was struggling with my slide rule. After hearing my tails of woe, my parents gave my an HP45 calculator for Christmas ($395 - ~$2,000 in today's money - to put that into perspective the previous summer I'd worked in a car dealer making $1.50/hr, and a semester's tuition was a bit over $300!). Most expensive Christmas gift I ever got by far.
Went back to college in January with my fancy new calculator only to have the professors ban using calculators in exams because not all the students could afford one and it was unfair and we all had to use slide rules :mad:.
I still have a couple slide rules around here somewhere - although I'm not sure I could still use one (I was never very proficient at it).

One of the great advantages of a slide rule is that you’ve got to know the order of magnitude of the answer before you start.
Makes gross errors much less likely.

[hec7or]

Speed brake does nothing on a B737 at 220 knots.

if you are high on profile at 220kts the speed brake will help you control the increase in airspeed required as you increase vertical speed to regain the profile.

[Check Airman]

Yes, high speed all the way in to show off should be a thing of the past.

But high speed until a safe distance out is a tool and should be able to be used as and when it's appropriate. The 'bus makes it even safer by even giving you the decel point on the screen.

Agreed on the utility of 250kt to the marker as a teaching tool. We'd do it every now again in a regional jet, as a demonstration of what the plane could do, and to stay proficient through the entire envelope.

On the decel point on the A320, I usually find it way too conservative. If I slowed as early as the FMS wanted to slow, I'd be causing traffic jams.

[FullWings]

It’s thread drift but I suppose in some way pertinent to the subject as there isn’t any new information at the moment.

I’ve found, as a general observation, that to lose energy from the airframe you need to either fly it as fast as you can (highest parasitic drag plus brakes are most effective) or as slow as you can (highest lift-induced drag). Somewhere “in the middle” is where the aircraft is at its most efficient.

Depending on the distance to run, it’s possible to use an amalgam of both techniques: dive off the height at the top end of the speed range while you’re well away from the ground then slow down to fully configured, which gives the best gradient without excessive rates of descent and allows time for monitoring the progress of the approach. On the types I’ve flown, 700-1,000’ per mile is achievable without busting SOPs, once in the landing configuration and in normal conditions.

[sheppey]

Similar go-around accident. MD 82. Phuket Thailand September 2007. Copilot PF. Botched go-around 50 feet in heavy rain. The autothrottle was left engaged during manually flown approach. A/T closes the throttles in the middle of the GA. Aircraft hits an embankment and bursts into flames.
.https://reports.aviation-safety.net/2007/20070916-0_MD82_HS_OMG.pdf

[parkfell]

Agreed on the utility of 250kt to the marker as a teaching tool. We'd do it every now again in a regional jet, as a demonstration of what the plane could do, and to stay proficient through the entire .

Next time you have a spare 15 minutes in the simulator try this scenario.
Calm, CAVOK, 80nm NE STN FL370. SCCM just announced uncontained cabin fire.
Straight in STN runway 22......GO....

[George Glass]

Next time you have a spare 15 minutes in the simulator try this scenario.
Calm, CAVOK, 80nm NE STN FL370. SCCM just announced uncontained cabin fire.
Straight in STN runway 22......GO....

Exactly.

Not that hard if you know how.......

[ScepticalOptomist]

Exactly.

Not that hard if you know how.......

I would hope ANY pilot would handle that without breaking a sweat!

[Maninthebar]

I would hope ANY pilot would handle that without breaking a sweat!

Degree of sweat might depend on proximity and intensity of fire no?

[parkfell]

Degree of sweat might depend on proximity and intensity of fire no?

Very true, as the extremely unfortunate SR 111 (MD 11) found out in September 1998 at Peggy’s cove.
Priority, get your @rse on the ground ASAP?

Another useful exercise (calm CAVOK) to concentrate the mind is a double engine failure (flock of geese) 3500 ft, say 3.5nm from the runway at the start of the downwind leg at minimum clean speed. APU already started to concentrate on flying ‘the pattern ~ constant sight angle’. Dead stick it, flap & gear as required. Flare 100’. Cancel any side slip by 500’. CRM generated in abundance normally.

[Nightstop]

Night take off from LGW, CAVOK in a BAe146. I called for Gear Up, Master Warning “Avionics Smoke”. Call from Cabin Manager “Forward Galley Fire, ceiling melting”. MAYDAY to ATC. Turned downwind for a visual return at 1,500’ while F/O ran the checklists. Landed in just under 5 minutes. Fire extinguished by Cabin Crew so no EVAC. Source, forward oven fire due grease build up within. Avionics Smoke warning spurious, caused by galley air being drawn down into the avionics bay (as designed). Ovens no longer operated during critical stages of flight in any UK AOC as far as I know.