EK-131: Airbus seconds from doom over Moscow (Report in The Times)

[Lyneham Lad]

Article in The times today. (https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/64eabdf8-83f8-11ea-a771-e3cbdc13ee70?shareToken=15bd7c202d3587d7d34cae500fa63da0)

A giant Airbus carrying 448 people came within seconds of crashing into a Moscow suburb when its pilots failed to realise how near the ground they were.

A controller had to intervene as a flight deck alarm barked: “Terrain ahead, pull up!”

Still eight miles from Domodedovo airport, the Emirates A380 was banking in a turn 395ft (120m) above the ground — only one and a half times its wingspan — when the captain realised the error and slammed on power to abort the approach and climb to safety.

Details of the near disaster have emerged after an inquiry. Flight EK-131 from Dubai was flying towards the airport in good weather in the dark in September 2017 with the 39-year-old co-pilot at the controls, monitored by the 54-year-old captain.

Under a heavy workload, the co-pilot descended and turned the “superjumbo” to intercept the instrument landing system, the radio beams that guide aircraft towards the runway.

However, the radio signal was unreliable as the aircraft was too far away, and the co-pilot continued to descend, believing he was on the normal path. He failed to check the altitude with his instruments, the investigators of the United Arab Emirates Civil Aviation Authority said.

“The commander . . . was concentrating on communications with air traffic control to such an extent that his situational awareness of what was occurring in the cockpit and of the actual aircraft state was significantly degraded,” the report said. With the jet at 195mph, dropping at 1,600ft per minute and about 25 seconds from hitting the ground in Gorkiy Leninskiye, the controller ordered the pilots to halt their descent. However, the Russian’s command of English meant he had to repeat the instruction three times.

The captain applied thrust to climb as the automated terrain warnings began blaring in the cockpit. The plane, weighing well over 300 tonnes, continued to descend for more than 100ft after power was applied.

In their second attempt to land the crew made errors setting up their automated system and aborted again, circling to land safely at their third try.

The investigators had no voice recording of the incident because it had been overwritten by sound from the return flight but investigators pieced together details from the black box and tapes from air traffic control. The report criticised the crew for failing to report the incident immediately, which would have preserved the recording.

The investigators depicted the near-accident as the latest in a series of serious incidents caused by pilots’ inability to keep pace with modern automated flight systems. However, it blamed the crew for poor judgment due to “insufficient communication and co-ordination between them”.

The co-pilot became “erroneously focused” on readings that “supported . . . his expectation that the aircraft was high”, the inquiry found, adding that the captain’s “stress level may have reached a point that led to anxiety and a reduction in his performance.

The passengers were unaware of how close they came to death.

[RoyHudd]

Dear Lord, EK's record is looking worse by the day. Is their Training Department accountable for their near-catastrophes in recent times? What with JFK, the 777 at DXB, and now this, there are 3 events that should never have happened had the flight crews been functioning correctly.

[gearlever]

More in Middle East forum:

Is it really that hard... (https://www.pprune.org/middle-east/631622-really-hard.html)

[Airbubba]

And, a few weeks later, seconds from doom at JFK :eek::

https://www.pprune.org/middle-east/602933-ek207-jfk.html

The JFK incident has possibly been swept under the rug by the FAA, the NTSB and the media. Or, has it?

[WHBM]

As I said at the time, over a lit suburb, after dark but CAVOK. What's not to see outside.

https://www.pprune.org/middle-east/599667-emirates-a388-moscow-uudd-ga-400-feet-agl-8nm-out-2.html#post9897206

Also surprised at comments about ATC command of English. Although Russian controllers may hesitate in general chatting, in ICAO standard phraseology they are normally spot on.

[Airbubba]

Dear Lord, EK's record is looking worse by the day. Is their Training Department accountable for their near-catastrophes in recent times?

In the JFK incident two captains were sacked, one in the left seat, one on the jumpseat. The other pilots in cockpit kept their jobs on double secret probation. The manager of training was fired.

As a (former?) EK 777 driver predicted at the time:

I really feel for this crew - not because of the error they made (Unlike some) - but because they knew in those moment after of “uh oh - we screwed up” - that while they were preparing to come around and fly the 22 approach - they were fubar’d, pending upgrade gone, final warning coming, safety Dept position in question, Augmentors interrogation on PM’ing, possible downgrade, possible termination - yada yada yada.

The big one will come here not because of the error, but because of the cloud of punitive measures that are coming, as a crew tries to fix errors- because they know that with Fleet , unlike with a good trainer, resilience in getting it on the ground - will be met with swift, warped justice

Tragic

[Pugilistic Animus]

Unless I'm missing something, this is incident number four... instead of punishment for pilots perhaps a total revamp of the training department is in order. This is getting to be ridiculous now...EK is on my no fly list. And no, I don't think all pilots there are bad...

[Airbubba]

EK is on my no fly list.

I don't think you have to worry about flying EK at the moment. It will probably be weeks at least before they restart regular pax ops with one or possibly both of their fleets.

[safetypee]

I dust this link off occasionally, perhaps it should be more frequent; for everyone.

Black Hole, FMS - altitude / distance cross check, route planning, visual 'map-slip',

These are as much technology, procedure, or airspace complexity related incidents as human. The issue is how and when contributing factors combine; how can we identify those situations - its not training in isolation.

https://www.icao.int/safety/fsix/Library/TAWS%20Saves%20plus%20add.pdf

[rak64]

Last time, while ATIS and clearance talking about ILS and appropriate procedure, every direct was for the RNAV RWY 24L.
That created some extra workload.
As well on the ground, as the taxiway 15 is not to identify from Jeppesen plates because the 1 is part of a dashed line.

[n.dave]

Just ASR it and further training as required.
Job done.

[Herod]

Just ASR it and further training as required.
Job done.

Those were the good old days.

[Pugilistic Animus]

Would the ASR still be applicable to a company that's not in the US?

[misd-agin]

There are several ways to know your distance from the runway. Three miles = 1000' of elevation awareness should be SOP. You can be below, or above, the 3 to 1 rule so it's not a requirement to follow it blindly. Fast and below the 3:1? You're doing ok. Fast and one, or above, the 3:1? Things need to change (drag). It should be part of the overall S.A. picture.

[iggy]

There are several ways to know your distance from the runway. Three miles = 1000' of elevation awareness should be SOP. You can be below, or above, the 3 to 1 rule so it's not a requirement to follow it blindly. Fast and below the 3:1? You're doing ok. Fast and one, or above, the 3:1? Things need to change (drag). It should be part of the overall S.A. picture.

Maybe they were doing exactly that but possibly got confused with the QFE setting (if in Russia they are still using QFE, that is) and the 600' elevation? Just wondering.

[Black Pudding]

DME is the worst place I ever fly to that has dozens of different STARs and no idea which you’ll be given. Why so many ?

[White Knight]

Maybe they were doing exactly that but possibly got confused with the QFE setting

Easy answer: They didn't.... They were trying to intercept a GS from above; but in the wrong place!!

[Pugilistic Animus]

Last time, while ATIS and clearance talking about ILS and appropriate procedure, every direct was for the RNAV RWY 24L.
That created some extra workload.
As well on the ground, as the taxiway 15 is not to identify from Jeppesen plates because the 1 is part of a dashed line.

They have numerical taxiway designators? TWY 15?
​​​​​​

[Landflap]

misd-again : agreed and your advice already well articulated on the Middle East Forum regarding the same subject. The real problem here is one I fear will never be addressed and rectified..

All singing, dancing, high-tech , Fly By Wire, Fadec engines, etc etc etc were bought or leased by the Bean Counter Department. They insisted to the Flt Ops Dept that the aircraft should be operated, at all times, in accordance with the high tech facilities as this ensured incredible fuel savings based on optimal, computerised predictions. The Flt Ops dept had no option (Arse covering) but to bow to commercial pressure and, in turn, increasingly, were peopled by the new breed of computer loving nerds who relished consulting home computers before even getting out of bed !

We, ordinary, every day line jocks were forced to resolve everything, heads down, through the damned computer. Airmanship went out of the window as, in busy airspace, we were encouraged to look down at the FMC instead of look up out of the window.

Like many contributors on this subject, I too, am old school. Well trained in good old techniques of piloting and airmanship. As the automatics were introduced and built up, the notion was always the same ; if you don't like what is going on, knock it all out & fly it like an ordinary aeroplane . Airbus even fooled us into thinking that we were doing that with sidesticks linked to multiple FCC's and dummy throttles (called thrust selector levers clicked into idents ) . Boeing even fooled us because they. made the all singing, dancing 777 look and feel like other Boeings . No fool like an old fool but I too was blind sided ! So. knocking it all out and "flying" it like before was frowned on.

Again, being trained on to a new all singing dancing type by a great believer in TOTAL faith in the computer systems , I was pushed into a tricky sim situation where I did the unthinkable. Overwhelmed with modern tech, I just "knocked it all out" and hand flew the daft scenario where I successfully pulled off an engine out, max X-wind , multiple failure scenario on limiting runway. I was told " Nice piece of flying but "..........yeah, all together now..........." that's not how we do it" ! Back to Ground school for "refresher Training". I think the Chinese call it "Re-education".

Until we get back to old school basic pilot training (yes, teach the newbees stalling, spinning, recovery from unusual attitudes, AIRMANSHIP, etc, etc, etc, ) and encourage fall back to high standards of hand flying , we will have more incidents like the ones currently being reported. Remember, many are not reported.

ASR's ? Don't make me laugh. I often thought that one paper basket in my last Fleet Office should have been labled......."ASR's". That is where most wound up.

[Max182]

Denis Okan posted some notes about flying to Moscow he prepared for Oman Air pilots before their first flight there (it includes a review of the EK incident): https :// yadi.sk/i/BzJJimZHbiM4dQ It's a good read.

[Gulfstreamaviator]

Qfe end of sorry

[White Knight]

Qfe end of sorry

Absolutely nothing to do with it. On several counts! Try reading the report:rolleyes:

[misd-agin]

Maybe they were doing exactly that but possibly got confused with the QFE setting (if in Russia they are still using QFE, that is) and the 600' elevation? Just wondering.
A 600' difference doesn't explain their altitude. They were at 8 miles at 400' AGL. Normal would be 2400' +/- AGL or 3000'. A 600' difference would be 2400' +/- (1800' AGL). That's nowhere near the risk of being at 400' 8 miles from the runway. The world, and horizon, looks really different at 400' AGL than it does at 2000' - 3000' AGL.

[Airbubba]

Absolutely nothing to do with it. On several counts! Try reading the report:rolleyes:

RTFM? Why, that would be cheating for some folks. ;)

The report is here, the link may take several minutes to load:

https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/admin/iradmin/Lists/Incidents%20Investigation%20Reports/Attachments/127/2017-AIFN0010_20_17%20Final%20Report.pdf (https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/admin/iradmin/Lists/Incidents%20Investigation%20Reports/Attachments/127/2017-AIFN0010_2017%20Final%20Report.pdf)

[CaptainProp]

Qfe end of sorry

Even if that would’ve been the case, if the RAD ALT indication of 400’ @ 8NM was not enough of a clue (way before it reached 400’) that something was wrong then I don’t know what would’ve been.

CP

[RudderTrimZero]

That sums it up basically, seeing and hearing 500, 400 at 8nm out.

[Capn Bloggs]

The report is here, the link may take several minutes to load:
Airbubba, I'm getting a "Page not found" on that link.

[Airbubba]

Airbubba, I'm getting a "Page not found" on that link.

The link is indeed wonky. :ugh:

See if you can download it as the report on the top of this list:

https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/Pages/InvestigationReport.aspx

[Capt Fathom]

A little digging around the GCAA website: A380 Moscow Final Report (https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/admin/iradmin/Lists/Incidents%20Investigation%20Reports/Attachments/127/2017-AIFN0010_20_17%20Final%20Report.pdf)

If that's what you are looking for?


PS. Well there you go, spoilt for choice!

[Airbubba]

A little digging around the GCAA website: A380 Moscow Final Report (https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/admin/iradmin/Lists/Incidents%20Investigation%20Reports/Attachments/127/2017-AIFN0010_20_17%20Final%20Report.pdf)

Thanks! :ok:

[Uplinker]

..........The real problem here is one I fear will never be addressed and rectified..

All singing, dancing, high-tech , Fly By Wire, Fadec engines, etc etc etc were bought or leased by the Bean Counter Department...............this ensured incredible fuel savings based on optimal, computerised predictions.

We, ordinary, every day line jocks were forced to resolve everything, heads down, through the damned computer. Airmanship went out of the window as, in busy airspace, we were encouraged to look down at the FMC instead of look up out of the window...................I too, am old school. Well trained in good old techniques of piloting and airmanship. As the automatics were introduced and built up, the notion was always the same ; if you don't like what is going on, knock it all out & fly it like an ordinary aeroplane . Airbus even fooled us into thinking that we were doing that with sidesticks linked to multiple FCC's and dummy throttles (called thrust selector levers clicked into idents).

.........Overwhelmed with modern tech...............

Until we get back to old school basic pilot training (yes, teach the newbees stalling, spinning, recovery from unusual attitudes, AIRMANSHIP, etc, etc, etc, ) and encourage fall back to high standards of hand flying , we will have more incidents like the ones currently being reported.

I agree with some of your points, such as airmanship and basic flying training, (that I did), but not your downer on automatics. Some are better than others, but without automatics, we would all be flying around in the airborne equivalent of Mark l Landrovers or Austin Minis and still have flight engineers, (no disrespect to flight engineers). We would also be flying along VOR corridors. RVSM, (capacity), and ETOPS would not exist.

Try flying through the London TMA without TCAS.........are you saying you can actually see all those other aircraft by looking out of the window rather than at your ND display? Even in IMC?

Automation was not demanded by the bean counters but indirectly by the flying public, who wanted safer flights that also cost less, and thus provided employment for most of us occupants of seats 0A and 0B.

The problem of losing SA, not doing basic flying cross checks and gross error checks, and being overwhelmed by high tech is what needs to be addressed, not the high tech itself. :ok:

[Imagegear]

There comes a time when even the sharpest tool in the box will get mentally maxed out while dealing with the complexities of the tasks required. Personally, I am not confident that the training and testing systems currently in use, do not test adequately through the point of highest workload and on into the area of overload. How well an individual prioritises tasks and makes conscious or unconscious decisions about what to "drop" in order to focus on the most critical elements, while in overload, needs to be more effective.

Of course, this could result in a decision as to that individuals suitability for the role. Pilots are not super-human. The complexity of automation should at least reasonably align with the capability of a candidate for testing. Pushing the limits is a recipe for disaster.

Just my opinion without prejudice, having been to the edge when it turned out to be a not very fun day.

IG

Oh I passed with Uplinker but in principle, I agree

[Landflap]

UPLINKER : You have selected bits of my post to comment upon, incorrectly. I never put a "downer" on automatics. I enjoyed the slow introduction of automatics as they reduced the pilot workload. I never suggested that we should, for example , hand-fly the N Atlantic . Neither was my suggestion to fly across busy TMA's looking, solely out of the window.

My experience is that from very excellent basic pilot training through to modern tech, I witnessed an overall high reliance on the automatics that were designed to reduce workload. It is not the fault of new joiners to our profession relying heavily on computerised solving. That is the way they are trained. But there is a woeful lack of airmanship and "SA" as you call it which really should be addressed.

Like the incident being discussed in the ME threads, the guys in Moscow could surely have "looked out of the window" and realised something was horribly wrong as they stared UP at Mrs Vlad hanging out her washing (1)....NO ?...... And the other guys, 8 miles out and at 400ft , SA...whaaaaat ? Nope, was it heads down , Extend the CL, give me an incpt leg to the final fix, enter an abm wp with height check....ooooops, what is all this "pull up. pull up" nonsense ?

Finally, oh yes ; the Beancounters surely forced it. I remarked my concerns to a CP who insisted on max use of autopilot and FMC interrogation with problem solving because the Commercial whizzos who authorised updated hardware in our already sophisticated aircraft demanded that he "re-educate" all pilots to use the equipment fully. On a beautiful, clear weather, no other traffic departure from a UK field, given the leg to the FO, I asked if he would like to hand-fly the departure. I suffered a bemused look with a terse" I would rather stick to company SOPs". Arrival into a non cluttered, clear weather destination, sticking to Company SOP's and painting lots of lovely magenta line options into both routes in the FMC (none of which to experienced airmen would ever be achieved ) we got, predictably very high and very fast from which I had to , regrettably, intervene.

In a previous more delightful and educated Company, the introduction of high tech was a gentle process where we were clear in the education that all the goodies were there to assist and make life more comfortable. OVER-reliance to the detriment of of basic piloting skills was a sure-fire killer. AS I said in my opener , I fear we will see more of this.

[RoyHudd]

Landflap, I fully agree with your views, clearly based upon experience. I would add one perspective, The blame for over-reliance upon automatics in my last company was driven by the Technical Department, led by an immature geek who was evidently fascinated by the newest technology offered by Airbus. This individual brought his influence to bear in writing incomprehensible tech notices and contributing to the creation of complex and unworkable SOP's. These were often based on over-use of the FMS on the large Airbus fleets. An increased number of unstable approaches and go-arounds ensued, creating additional problems due to the minimum fuel carriage recommendations. Management pilots led the way with dodgy approaches, missed approaches, and diversionsl. Many of the trainers disagreed with the SOP's, but chose to keep their heads down. ("Green" SOP's also enhanced the risks, with higher flap settings on approach and landing again creating problems). The company expired before the present crisis, thankfully without a major incident.

[Uplinker]

Hi Landflap, Fair enough, I must have read it wrong, but to me the general feel of your post #19; with phrases such as 'the dammed computer', 'overwhelmed with modern tech', 'dummy throttles' *, 'Airbus fooled us into thinking....' ; reads to me like that of the crusty high court judge on Not the Nine O'Clock News who doesn't know what a 'digital watch' is. :)

As I say, I agree with your points about basic airmanship and basic flying skills, e.g. basic cross checks of altitude versus distance to threshold etc., However, tech in itself is not the problem.



*which of course are fully functioning throttles, cleverly enhanced with modern technology, and are entirely instinctive to use manually or automatically :ok:

[Herod]

May some old bones be allowed to comment? Yes, modern technology is a wonderful tool; but it is just that; a TOOL. It is not the master. Way back in antediluvian times my airline had some good kit for the era. However, when it all went t.u. there was no argument about disconnecting the lot, turning it into a big Cessna single and FLYING THE AEROPLANE. Once sorted, work out what went wrong and reinstate the automatics as appropriate. Remember, the best computer on the aeroplane is THE PILOT'S BRAIN, and the best safety device is THE PILOT'S SENSE OF SELF-PRESERVATION.

Thanks for listening "Nurse, is it time for that nice medicine again?"

[White Knight]

Quite agree Herod...

From the Airbus 380 FCTM: Golden Rules

1. Fly, Navigate, Communicate.
2. Use the appropriate level of automation at all times.
3. Understand the FMA at all times.
4. Take action if things do not go as expected - and I will expand this part of the manual --> If the aircraft does not follow the desired vertical or lateral flight path, or the selected targets, and if the flight crew does not have sufficient time to analyze and solve the situation, the flight crew must immediately take appropriate or required actions, as follows: The PF should change the level of automation: From managed guidance to selected guidance, or from selected guidance to Manual Flying. The PM should perform the following actions in sequence: Communicate with the PF, Challenge the actions of the PF when necessary, Take over, when neceesary.

[Capn Bloggs]

which of course are fully functioning throttles, cleverly enhanced with modern technology, and are entirely instinctive to use manually or automatically
Would you buy a used car from this person? :) "Entirely instinctive..." I'm trialling website software at the moment and terms very similar to this are used to describe the programs (more than one). It's nonsense. If you hardly ever use the software (or throttles) then they are not "instinctive", nor are you likely to be confident enough to disengage the gimmicks and revert to basic, or indeed even think about doing so.

I haven't read the whole report yet but I suspect that the issue was more basic than violating the mighty Airbus Golden Rules. If the GPWS was going off, the crew never got to step 1.

[Uplinker]

Please don't get me wrong: Technology should certainly not get in the way of basic flying; but we simply would not be flying way we fly now without modern tech. Try driving a Mark I Landrover for a day to appreciate how technology has improved our modern car driving experience.

The problem with tech and flying arises when poor classroom training*, (and/or CBT), coupled with poor SIM training, coupled with poor testing allows some poor pilots - including some Captains - to slip through the system and "control" actual aircraft. 90% of the time they get away with it, especially in a modern ATC environment. But sadly, occasionally, these pilots' shortcomings show up, sometimes with terrible results. Pilots like me started our careers flying basic passenger aircraft with no AP, no FD, and no A/THR. As we progressed, we assimilated, (and most of us embraced), these systems as we encountered them, but we had our previous experience of manual flying in the background. Today you can go from a PA28 equivalent straight onto a modern FBW aircraft. Perhaps this process bypasses some basic airmanship stuff?

Aviate
Navigate
Communicate

:ok:


I will never understand people's problem with Airbus FBW thrust levers. Poor training perhaps? The more you push, the more thrust you get, same as a B737. On the way the Airbus FBW A/THR has various detents to limit and control the auto-thrust for various situations. The N1/EPR gauges show what is going on. Simple.

Your car almost certainly has a "fly-by-wire' throttle coupled to a FADEC, but I bet most of us don't mind it controlling our engine nicely and smoothly. Starting instantly on cold frosty mornings and adjusting for accessory loads, (and giving good economy) :)

*How many times has your classroom trainer said: "If we only have 20 mins for lunch, and crack-on; we should be able to get through all of this and beat the rush hour"?:=
.

[Landflap]

UPLINKER : What the h--l is a digital watch ? Creeping the thread a bit, i know, but can't allow your love of tech and analogies with tractors to go unresponded.

I recall being slapped over the head , several times, in conversion from huge Boeing background to Airbus. Attempts to throttle" the dummy sticks was shouted at. I have fat little fingers that led to great difficulty in placing all four dummy sticks, together, into the "click" for take-off. This would result in uneven thrust requerst which would send off an alarm with FGMC message. I would "stop" the T/O much to experienced howling from the F/O & Trainer. "Just slam all four into TOGA and GO " ........against an amber warning (?) . OK . "Resisting the training" was a write up in the notes. I stopped resisting, passed, hated it. Dreamed of my lovely ole DC3, coaxing those big P&W's into burping, farting, starts on cold mornings at Gatters.

Don't get me started on Tractors to Beamers mate. Done that. Brand new, all singing, dancing beamer that even talks to me is better than my first Ford Anglia but nowadays, on the M25, speed-lock in (you will probably call it " Cruise control", Uplinker, fearful of throttle jam & burst into flames, mindset, I am not happy. I really miss clutch, no synchro-mesh on first , wind up windows,...........yeah, yeah yeah.................sorry.

[Uplinker]

................I have fat little fingers that led to great difficulty in placing all four dummy sticks, together, into the "click" for take-off. This would result in uneven thrust request.........hated it.

They're not "dummy sticks" :) - they are thrust levers connected to electronic resolvers which electronically 'talk' to the FADECs. What you're used to is actual metal cables strung over all sorts of pulleys and expansion adjusters, running all the way to the carburettor or FADEC. I used to shudder, looking at all the 'Meccano' and pulley wheels and bits of string in the main wheel bay during my 737 walk-arounds. If you had trouble with four very easy to move Airbus thrust levers, how did you manage with the Boeing mechanical ones? :)

Dreamed of my lovely ole DC3, coaxing those big P&W's into burping, farting, starts on cold mornings at Gatters.


Ah, thought so....:) I nailed it. My first was the venerable Shed.


Don't get me started on Tractors to Beamers mate. Done that. Brand new, all singing, dancing beamer that even talks to me..............

I have never owned a Beamer, (or a new car), but interestingly, there could well be a case for stating that there is too much tech in some cars nowadays. TIPM for one. Lane assist for another. Needing a professional scan tool simply to change the rear brake pads is another.

Safe flying and clear skies to you sir :ok:

[misd-agin]

That's an over-simplistic comparison between the AB and Boeing autothrottles. You don't get more thrust if you simply push the AB thrust levers forward if they're already in a gate. Boeing's don't have a physical gate but they work the same without having to physically move them (they move themselves) for takeoff or climb. On the Boeing's it's also easier to override the thrust lever motors and place them manually without having to turn the autothrottles/thrust off like you do on the AB. There is no override function on an AB - it's either fully automatic of fully manual.
I've flown both, the Boeing design is better. BTW, I land almost every landing with the autothrust/throttles off in Boeing and AB products. So I'm not a slave to the automation. But I'm a fan of the automation because it allows us to focus on other stuff. Overall the automation increase has been a huge improvement but it has it's downsides.

[misd-agin]

BF's son just got qualified on the 737. He came off of the CRJ-200/700/900. He's very impressed with the ability of the automation and autothrottles, VNAV/LNAV, but didn't realize how much the workload was to adjust to it. As a jumpseater he'd watched guys who were fully up to speed on the automation who made it look easy. Now that he's in the seat, versus observing from the jumpseat, he's realized the learning curve is steeper than he realized despite having watched it numerous times.

[Uplinker]

I've flown both, the Boeing design is better.

I've flown both as well, the Airbus FBW design is better.

We will have to agree to disagree, because auto-thrust is a huge divisive subject, and I have drifted this thread too far already in my defence of Airbus design :ok:

Apologies to the OP.

[vilas]

There's a thread drift about Moscow incident. It has nothing to do with automation or manual flying or Airbus thrust levers. It's the result lack of information about the accuracy zone of GS signal, following an incorrect procedure on part of the PF and lack of situational awareness on part of both. The procedure of capturing the GS from above comes into contention when established on localizer. The PF distracted by false GS should have cross checked D×3 which he didn't then out of ignorance applied the procedure without getting on the localizer. It appears the PM had off day and was not with the aircraft and played no part in the proceedings CRM or otherwise. There's no need to comment on equipment or automation which is executing 1000s of approaches without any problems all over the world.

[Capn Bloggs]

It has nothing to do with automation or manual flying or Airbus thrust levers.
Vilas, I sincerely hope that Airbii are easier to fly than trying to comprehend that report; I really struggled there! Whether that was because of the complexity of the A380 or the report itself, I haven't yet worked out.

It appears the PM had off day and was not with the aircraft and played no part in the proceedings CRM or otherwise.
Apart from the FMS reset just because waypoints weren't sequenced "correctly"...

As for the "Capturing the GS from above procedure", one is asking for trouble setting the ALT SEL above you. I'm surprised Airbus would use that as it's policy. It should be set to 1500ft AAL and if you capture the altitude before the GS, tough, GA and do it again. This and many other recent incidents are showing crews becoming more and more detached from the aircraft and having procedures that are one step away from failure, so close in to the airport, is just asking for trouble.

What is it with pilots using Open Descent close in to the airport to facilitate a descent? The poor technique of using the secondary effect of controls to control the flight path again! :=

Quote of the report: "In this situation (GSIFA), taking into account the ground and the obstacles, and if ATC permits, it may be appropriate to perform a 360° turn before resuming the approach". In a 380?

[FlightDetent]

"In this situation (GSIFA), taking into account the ground and the obstacles, and if ATC permits, it may be appropriate to perform a 360° turn before resuming the approach".For those who do not remember though many do, this has killed before - in the "gulf". What a poor choice of words.

[safetypee]

vilas
You argue appropriately that automation alone was not the dominant issue; however stating poor human performance - 'a day off', 'should have checked', is hindsight and does not consider why … pilots have 'poor days', or why they do not check every cue on every approach.

Captn Bloggs
Developing your question re inappropriate use of autoflight modes … they are used because they are there.

Systems are designed to meet specific needs; open descent is an asset in many situations, but not so in others - joining the GS from above. Thus a piloting task is to understand when a specific mode should / should not be used. Many modern aircraft have inhibitors to exclude inappropriate use, but for each preventative design there is a risk of an unforeseen outcome.

Also, if avoiding capture of GS from above was a consideration (false GS) then is this risk any greater than encountering the situation in this incident.

A balancing argument is that as disturbing this situation appears to have been, the mitigating features resulted in a safe outcome. How often are these situations encountered, how often are the industry safety systems aware of them.

[Mendi Matt]

I've operated into this airport - at first guess in terms of cause, this could be easily done when tired, for two reasons:
1. The elevation of the airfield not being accounted for in distance-to-run vs. expected altitude raw data calculations (elev. 593 ft AMSL)...
2. An error in the time consuming and cognitively taxing conversion (metres on QFE to feet on QNH) from the controllers instructions to descend in metres, to an altitude in feet (to set on the MCP/FCU). "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone"

[Uplinker]

I have never flown metric altitudes, or the A380, but surely like other Airbusses, the A380 FCU ALT selector has a metres button, so no conversion from feet to metres is required - just press the button to change the ALT and PFD readouts to metres and then select the metric altitudes that ATC or the approach plate says?

Secondly, the elevation of the airfield is taken into account in the box on the approach plate of altitude versus DME, so you just read off the numbers to cross check - especially important when doing a non-standard approach, such as intercepting the GS from above.

[White Knight]

I've operated into this airport - at first guess in terms of cause, this could be easily done when tired, for two reasons:
1. The elevation of the airfield not being accounted for in distance-to-run vs. expected altitude raw data calculations (elev. 593 ft AMSL)...
2. An error in the time consuming and cognitively taxing conversion (metres on QFE to feet on QNH) from the controllers instructions to descend in metres, to an altitude in feet (to set on the MCP/FCU). "Let he who is without sin cast the first stone"

Try reading the report:rolleyes::ugh: